Estrada vs Escritor (August

4, 2003)
Estrada vs. Escritor
AM P-02-1651, August 4, 2003
FACTS:
Soledad Escritor is a court interpreter since 1999 in the
RTC of Las Pinas City. Alejandro Estrada, the
complainant, wrote to Judge Jose F. Caoibes, presiding
judge of Branch 253, RTC of Las Pinas City, requesting
for an investigation of rumors that Escritor has been
living with Luciano Quilapio Jr., a man not her husband,
and had eventually begotten a son. Escritors husband,
who had lived with another woman, died a year before
she entered into the judiciary. On the other hand,
Quilapio is still legally married to another woman.
Estrada is not related to either Escritor or Quilapio and is
not a resident of Las Pinas but of Bacoor, Cavite.
According to the complainant, respondent should not be
allowed to remain employed in the judiciary for it will
appear as if the court allows such act.
Escritor is a member of the religious sect known as the
Jehovahs Witnesses and the Watch Tower and Bible
Tract Society where her conjugal arrangement with
Quilapio is in conformity with their religious beliefs.
After ten years of living together, she executed on July
28, 1991 a Declaration of Pledging Faithfulness which
was approved by the congregation. Such declaration is
effective when legal impediments render it impossible
for a couple to legalize their union. Gregorio, Salazar, a
member of the Jehovahs Witnesses since 1985 and has
been a presiding minister since 1991, testified and

explained the import of and procedures for executing

the declaration which was completely executed by
Escritor and Quilapios in Atimonan, Quezon and was
signed by three witnesses and recorded in Watch Tower
Central Office.
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent should be found guilty of the
administrative charge of gross and immoral conduct
and be penalized by the State for such conjugal
arrangement.
HELD:
A distinction between public and secular morality and
religious morality should be kept in mind. The
jurisdiction of the Court extends only to public and
secular morality.
The Court states that our Constitution adheres the
benevolent neutrality approach that gives room for
accommodation of religious exercises as required by the
Free Exercise Clause. This benevolent neutrality could
allow for accommodation of morality based on religion,
provided it does not offend compelling state interests.
The states interest is the preservation of the integrity of
the judiciary by maintaining among its ranks a high
standard of morality and decency. There is nothing in
the OCAs (Office of the Court Administrator)
memorandum to the Court that demonstrates how this
interest is so compelling that it should override
respondents plea of religious freedom. Indeed, it is
inappropriate for the complainant, a private person, to
present evidence on the compelling interest of the state.

The burden of evidence should be discharged by the

proper agency of the government which is the Office of
the Solicitor General.
In order to properly settle the case at bar, it is essential
that the government be given an opportunity to
demonstrate the compelling state interest it seeks to
uphold in opposing the respondents position that her
conjugal arrangement is not immoral and punishable as
it is within the scope of free exercise protection. The
Court could not prohibit and punish her conduct where
the Free Exercise Clause protects it, since this would be
an unconstitutional encroachment of her right to
religious freedom. Furthermore, the court cannot simply
take a passing look at respondents claim of religious
freedom but must also apply the compelling state
interest test.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the case is REMANDED to the Office
of the Court Administrator. The Solicitor General is
ordered to intervene in the case where it will be given
the opportunity (a) to examine the sincerity and
centrality of respondent's claimed religious belief and
practice; (b) to present evidence on the state's
"compelling interest" to override respondent's religious
belief and practice; and (c) to show that the means the
state adopts in pursuing its interest is the least
restrictive to respondent's religious freedom. The
rehearing should be concluded thirty (30) days from the
Office of the Court Administrator's receipt of this
Decision.

Estradav.EscritorDigest
Estrada v. Escritor

A.M.No. P-02-1651, August 4, 2003

Puno, J.:
Facts:
1. Respondent is the Court interpreter of RTC Branch 253 in Las
Pinas City. The complainant Estrada requested for an investigation
of respondent for living with a man not her husband while she was
still legally married and having borne a child within this live-in
arrangement. Estrada believed that Escritor is committing a grossly
immoral act which tarnishes the image of the judiciary, thus she
should not be allowed to remain employed therein as it might appear
that the court condones her act.
2. Respondent admitted she started living with Luciano Quilapio, Jr.
more than 20 years ago when her husband was still alive but living
with another woman. She likewise admitted having a son with
Quilapio but denies any liability for alleged grossly immoral conduct
because, 1) She is a member of the Jehovahs Witnesses and the
Watch Tower Society, 2) That the conjugal arrangement was in
conformity with their religious beliefs, and 3) That the conjugal
arrangement with Quilapio has the approval of her congregation.
3. Escritor likewise claimed that she had executed a Declaration of
Pledging Faithfulness' in accordance with her religion which allows
members of the Jehovahs witnesses who have been abandoned by
their spouses to enter into marital relations. The Declaration thus
makes the resulting union moral and binding within the congregation
all over the world except in countries where divorce is allowed.
Held:
Escritor was therefore held not administratively liable for grossly
immoral conduct. Escritors conjugal arrangement cannot be
penalized as she has made out a case for exemption from the law
based on her fundamental right to religion. The Court recognizes that
state interests must be upheld in order that freedomsincluding
religious freedommay be enjoyed.
In the area of religious exercise as preferred freedom, however, man
stands accountable to an authority higher than the state, and so the
state interest sought to be upheld must be so compelling that its
violation will erode the very fabric of the state that will also protect the
freedom. In the absence of a showing that the state interest exists,
man must be allowed to subscribe to the Infinite.

Sunday, July 09, 2006

The Estrada vs. Escritor case: Did the Supreme

Court legitimize live-in relationships?
Two weeks ago, various newspapers reported the Supreme
Courts 9-5 decision in the Estrada vs. Escritor case, a landmark
decision involving the Constitutional freedom of religion. The
Court (even in its in interim resolution last August 2003) ruled
that Escritor, a court interpreter at the Las Pias Regional Trial
Court Branch 253, could not be dismissed from the government
service for disgraceful and immoral conduct on the basis of a
valid exercise of her freedom of religion.Admittedly, Escritor was
living in with Luciano Quilapio Jr (also married to another
person) without the benefit of marriage. But her church (the
Jehovahs Witnesses) had recognized her relationship and
allowed them to have marital relations, since her legal husband
had abandoned her. In a JW church document known as
Declaration of Pledging Faithfulness entered into by Escritor
and Quilapio, they bound themselves to have their union legally
recognized should the opportunity arise.Moreover, as
investigation by the Office of the Court Administrator showed,
such a practice of the JW had extensive theological
underpinnings and was a long time, widely held practice. It was
not simply a device or scheme that Escritor resorted to in order
to evade administrative liability.Please take note that the JW, in the
defense of its doctrines and practices, has had a long history of
butting heads with the State. In 1956, for example, the Supreme
Court ruled against the JW in the Gerona case, where JW members
enrolled in public schools were not granted exemption from attending
flag ceremonies and singing the national anthem. Yet the JW
persisted in challenging this ruling. Finally, after 39 long years, in
1995, the Supreme Court in the case of Ebralinag vs. Division
Superintendent of Cebu, recognized the right of the JW members not
to participate in the flag ceremonies and in the singing of the national
anthem.Please also take note that being a Baptist, I do not
subscribe to the JW teachings and practices; I hope only to
clarify what the Supreme Court's ruling is in the Escritor case.

Flawed understanding of the Escritor ruling in

media reports

The problem is, some newspaper reporters and editors have

misunderstood the SC ruling. For example, one headline in a
business newspaper stated, SC ruling favors live-in setup if churchblessed. The lead went on to say, The Supreme Court virtually gave
its blessing to living-in couples when it issued a landmark decision
declaring that they cannot be punished for having such an
arrangement if it does not clash with their religious beliefs.

"Repercussions" of the Supreme Court ruling

Some people I have talked to (and who have read the skewed news
reports) are disgusted with the SC ruling, saying that its another
assault on the institution of marriage, encouraging people to simply
live in without the benefit of marriage, in the name of religious
freedom. (In a previous post, I mentioned a DSWD finding that 40%
of couples in the CALABARZON area are merely living in.) They say
that now, various religious groups will come up with doctrines,
documents and practices similar to the JWs Declaration of
Pledging Faithfulness in order to accommodate their own
members.One pastor (from the Visayas region) I talked to last year,
mentioned the difficulty of one couple in his church. They are new
converts, living in together as husband and wife, but could not have
their previous marriages annulled because of the prohibitive legal
expenses. The pastor mentioned that he has been thinking of just
conducting an ecclesiastical marriage so that this couple and the
church could say that in the eyes of God, they are husband and wife,
even though legally, they are married to other persons.
Justice Consuelo Ynares-Santiago, who voted against the
majority ruling, states in her dissenting opinion (see below) the
possible repercussion that each church or religion could
become a republic unto itself.

Setting the record straight on the Escritor ruling

The legal expert on GMA-7s early morning show Unang Hirit about
a week ago has explained quite clearly what this SC decision is all
about. (My congratulations to her for such a clear explanation despite
the very limited time allotted to her. I was riding on a G-Liner bus
equipped with a TV set, on my way from Pasig/Ortigas to the NLRC
in Quezon City when her portion came on. Atty. Roldan, I think her
name is, used to do the late night news for RPN-9, if I'm not

mistaken.) She clarified that:

[1] As a general rule, people in live-in relationships and whose
marriages to other parties have not been annulled or declared null
and void, can and will be held criminally liable for adultery,
concubinage, marital infidelity, etc. under the Revised Penal Code
and other special laws like RA 9262.
[2] If these people in live-in relationships are in the government
service, then they can be charged administratively under the
Administrative Code of 1987.
[3] The Escritor doctrine established not a general rule but an
exception to the general rule on the basis of a valid exercise of the
Constitutional freedom of religion. As the Supreme Court clarified, It
does not mean that the Court would grant exemptions everytime a
free exercise of religion comes before it.

Restricted application of the Supreme Court's

ruling
As the Supreme Court in the dispositive (concluding) portion of
its June 2006 decision stated,
Thus, we find that in this particular case and under these distinct
circumstances, respondent Escritors conjugal arrangement cannot
be penalized as she has made out a case for exemption from the law
based on her fundamental right to freedom of religion. The Court
recognizes that state interests must be upheld in order that freedoms
- including religious freedom - may be enjoyed. In the area of
religious exercise as a preferred freedom, however, man stands
accountable to an authority higher than the state, and so the state
interest sought to be upheld must be so compelling that its violation
will erode the very fabric of the state that will also protect the
freedom. In the absence of a showing that such state interest exists,
man must be allowed to subscribe to the Infinite. (emphasis by
boldfacing supplied)

A word of caution to other live-in couples and to

other religions

Thus, any pastor, church or members of a religious sect who

might draw some unfounded conclusions and consequently act
according to the way some media outlets have reported the
Escritor case, should be forewarned. Any pastor who obtains a
license from the State to solemnize marriages is bound by the
laws of the Philippines. If he solemnizes a marriage without
observing the legal requirements, he could be charged
criminally with violation of the Revised Penal Code in
performing an illegal marriage. If he claims freedom of religion
and the Escritor ruling as his defense, hed better make sure that
his case has similar antecedents (background) as that of the
Escritor case. As lawyers are fond of saying, his case must be
on all fours with the Escritor case.
I strongly recommend that pastors, Bible students and church
members read the complete text of the Supreme Courts interim
decision in August 2003 and its final decision released this June
2006. The decision is a difficult read even for law students but the
time and effort are well worth it.
But from my own perspective, and without going into the merits
or the intricacies of the Escritor ruling, I would always be in
favor of the least interference or no excessive entanglement
with religion by the State. This is the so-called Lemon Test in
American jurisprudence. In the Escritor case, the Supreme Court
used the compelling state interest test from a benevolent
neutrality stance. That is, the Court entertained the possibility
that Escritors claim to religious freedom could warrant carving
out an exception to the Civil Service law, unless the government
succeed in demonstrating a more compelling state interest.

The "compelling state interest test from a

benevolent neutrality stance"
In its 2003 interim decision, the Supreme Court explained how
the compelling state interest test from a benevolent neutrality
stance was to be applied:
In applying the test, the first inquiry is whether respondents
right to religious freedom has been burdened. There is no doubt
that choosing between keeping her employment and abandoning her

religious belief and practice and family on the one hand, and giving
up her employment and keeping her religious practice and family on
the other hand, puts a burden on her free exercise of religion. xxx
The second step is to ascertain respondents sincerity in her
religious belief. Respondent appears to be sincere in her religious
belief and practice and is not merely using the Declaration of
Pledging Faithfulness to avoid punishment for immorality. She did
not secure the Declaration only after entering the judiciary where the
moral standards are strict and defined, much less only after an
administrative case for immorality was filed against her. The
Declaration was issued to her by her congregation after ten years of
living together with her partner, Quilapio, and ten years before she
entered the judiciary. Ministers from her congregation testified on the
authenticity of the Jehovahs Witnesses practice of securing a
Declaration and their doctrinal or scriptural basis for such a practice.
As the ministers testified, the Declaration is not whimsically issued to
avoid legal punishment for illicit conduct but to make the union of
their members under respondents circumstances honorable before
God and men. xxx Respondents request for exemption from the flag
ceremony shows her sincerity in practicing the Jehovahs Witnesses
beliefs and not using them merely to escape punishment. She is a
practicing member of the Jehovahs Witnesses and the Jehovah
ministers testified that she is a member in good standing.
In its 2003 decision, the Supreme Court remanded the case to
the Office of the Court Administrator. The Solicitor General was
ordered to intervene in the case and be given the opportunity (a)
to examine the sincerity and centrality of Escritors claimed religious
belief and practice; (b) to present evidence on the states compelling
interest to override Escritors religious belief and practice; and (c) to
show that the means the state adopts in pursuing its interest is the
least restrictive to Escritors religious freedom.
Well, as things turned out from 2003, the OSG failed to prove, in
the minds of the nine justices who voted in favor of the Escritor
ruling, any compelling interest of the State that could have
overridden Escritors exercise of her religion.

Dissenting opinions in the Escritor case;

Muslims exemption from prosecution for bigamy

Supreme Court Justice Antonio Carpio, voting against the
majority in the Escritor case, explained in his dissenting opinion
that:
The majority opinion will make every religion a separate republic,
making religion a haven for criminal conduct that otherwise would be
punishable under the law of the land. Today concubinage, tomorrow
bigamy, will enjoy protection from criminal sanction under the new
doctrine foisted by the majority opinion.
Associate Justice Consuelo Ynares-Santiago, in her separate
dissenting opinion, stated that Escritor should have been
declared guilty of immorality and disgraceful conduct and
subsequently suspended for six months without pay. Justice
Santiago stated in her opinion,
"The Court cannot be the instrument by which one group of people is
exempted from the effects of these laws just because they belong to
a particular religion. Moreover, it is the sworn mandate of the Court to
supervise the conduct of an employee of the judiciary, and it must do
so with an even hand regardless of her religious affiliation."
I have read the 2003 interim decision of the Supreme Court in
the Escritor case and there it was mentioned that under Art. 180
of P.D. No. 1083, otherwise known as the Code of Muslim
Personal Laws of the Philippines, Muslims have been expressly
exempted from the operation of bigamy laws of the Philippines.
This provision of law has never been challenged in terms of
violation of the establishment of religion clause of the 1987
Constitution. In the light of the Escritor ruling however, if and
when such a case is brought before the Supreme Court, my
guess is that the said provision of law will be declared as
constitutional.
Unless, in view of the vigorous dissent by the five justices who voted
against the Escritor ruling (namely, Justices Carpio, Consuelo
Ynares- Santiago, Romeo Callejo, Conchita Carpio Morales and
Chief Justice Artemio Panganiban), the Ecritor ruling could later on be
overturned. Is this possible? Well, from the introductory portion of the
interim 2003 decision as quoted below, from Justice Punos ponencia,
the issue of freedom of religion has had a long and convoluted

history. Anything is possible.

Anyway, heres the introductory part of Justice Punos
compellingly written ponencia in the 2003 interim decision in the
Escritor case:
"The case at bar takes us to a most difficult area of constitutional law
where man stands accountable to an authority higher than the state.
To be held on balance are the states interest and the respondents
religious freedom. In this highly sensitive area of law, the task of
balancing between authority and liberty is most delicate because to
the person invoking religious freedom, the consequences of the case
are not only temporal. The task is not made easier by the American
origin of our religion clauses and the wealth of U.S. jurisprudence on
these clauses for in the United States, there is probably no more
intensely controverted area of constitutional interpretation than the
religion clauses. The U.S. Supreme Court itself has acknowledged
that in this constitutional area, there is considerable internal
inconsistency in the opinions of the Court. As stated by a professor
of law, (i)t is by now notorious that legal doctrines and judicial
decisions in the area of religious freedom are in serious disarray. In
perhaps no other area of constitutional law have confusion and
inconsistency achieved such undisputed sovereignty. Nevertheless,
this thicket is the only path to take to conquer the mountain of a legal
problem the case at bar presents. Both the penetrating and
panoramic view this climb would provide will largely chart the course
of religious freedom in Philippine jurisdiction. That the religious
freedom question arose in an administrative case involving only one
person does not alter the paramount importance of the question for
the constitution commands the positive protection by government of
religious freedom - not only for a minority, however small - not only
for a majority, however large - but for each of us.
Liberty and authority; freedom and responsibility; law and grace
this reminds me of that famous chapter (The Grand
Inquisitor) in Fyodor Dostoyevskis novel The Brothers
Karamazov. But thats for another post
Again, I strongly recommend that pastors, Bible students and
church members read the complete text of the Supreme Courts
interim decision in August 2003 and its final June 2006 decision.