Tca Final Report Nov Ah FH Final

International private law aspects and dispute
settlement related to transnational company

agreements
Aukje van Hoek & Frank Hendrickx
With the cooperation of

Nathalie Betsch
Anne Davies
Rdiger Krause
Jonas Malmberg
Francesco Monticelli
Sophie Robin-Olivier
Dora Sari
Nuna Zekic
Study undertaken on behalf of the European Commission

Contract number VC/2009/0157
Final report 20 October 2009
INTRODUCTION AND SCOPE

I.
About the study
This is the final report of a study undertaken for the European Commission
concerning International private law aspects of dispute settlement related to
transnational company agreements (VC/2009/0157).
For the purposes of this study, a transnational company agreement (or TCA) is
defined as:
an agreement comprising reciprocal commitments the scope of which
extends to the territory of several States and which has been concluded by
one or more representatives of a company or a group of companies on the
one hand, and one or more workers organisations on the other hand, and
which covers working and employment conditions and/or relations between
employers and workers or their representatives.
The objective of the study is to 1) provide a comprehensive overview of the rules to
be applied as to the applicable law and the competent jurisdiction when a dispute
arises on the interpretation or application of a transnational company agreement; 2)
identify the practical and legal obstacles to the way disputes relating to transnational
company agreements can be settled in court; 3) identify and suggest any actions
that might be taken to overcome these obstacles and allow for disputes relating to
transnational collective bargaining transnational company agreements to be settled
in a satisfactory way for the parties.
The central issue in this study concerns the problem of enforcement of transnational
company agreements and the private international law rules relating to this issue. In
this study, enforcement is narrowed down to private enforcement. It means that
excluded from the scope of study are public enforcement mechanisms involving e.g.
labour inspection services or other labour administration monitoring devices.
Within the scope of study, the focus will be on judicial dispute settlement, but the
report will take account of extra-judicial enforcement and compliance mechanisms
where relevant for the study. In this context extra-judicial mechanisms refers to
concepts such as arbitration, mediation and conciliation, as well as industrial action.
II.
Methodology and structure
The study gives a detailed analysis of the private international law rules applicable
to the enforcement of TCAs as well as an overview of problems with regard to the
enforcement of the TCAs at the national level. Its conclusions are based on an
analysis of the relevant legal instruments as well as on a comparative study of some
aspects of national law. The information on national law is mainly gathered through
national experts, who have reported on the basis of a questionnaire. In addition,
existing materials on TCAs and on national systems have been used.
For the specific information on member states systems, the countries that were
selected are: France and Germany who host a majority of TCAs concluded at
present. More importantly, they represent two distinct, prototypal models of labour
law and industrial relations. With regard to the operational structure of EWCs, a
distinction has to be made between two basic models. According to research of the
European Trade Union Institute and the reporting of the European Foundation for
Living and Working Conditions (see: www.eurofound.eu), the German model stands
for EWCs composed exclusively of workers representatives, while the French
model is jointly composed of management and workers representatives and is
chaired, in most cases, by management. In 2005, 63% of all EWCs applied the
French model and 37% applied the German model.
Belgium and the Netherlands were seen as systems building further on labour law
and industrial relations concepts of France (The Franco-Belgian tradition) and
Germany (the Germanic-Dutch tradition). Moreover, the law of Belgium is
considered to be very relevant as major European social partners have there basis
there. As regards the Netherlands, it is important to note that the national works
councils laws provide for particular enforcement rules, such as an appeal to the
Enterprise Chamber. This way, workplace democracy can be considered to hold the
middle between labour law and corporate law.
Furthermore, two systems without statutory systems works councils have been
selected, such as Sweden and the United Kingdom. The latter country can also be
considered as representing a distinct system in the area of collective bargaining and
industrial relations. With further consideration to geographical representation,
Hungary and Italy were also included in the scope of the study.
Before the final report was made, some discussion meetings with the European
Commission were held in order to further narrow the scope of the study. In this
context, it has been decided to confine the scope of the study mainly to private
international law issues concerning TCAs and to discuss the enforcement issues in
this context. The interaction between TCAs and European as well as national labour
law provision is being addressed, but only in so far as this enables the identification
of the specific problems and obstacles that may occur in light of the enforcement of
TCAs.
In light of this, the study is structured in three parts.
1.
Transnational company agreements (TCAs) represent a variety of
instruments. They differ according to the parties involved, the type of obligations
assumed by the parties and the topics covered. Before one can enter into the
discussion of choice of law and international jurisdiction, the TCA based legal
relationships and their characterisation should be briefly addressed and
contextualised. Any discussion of the character of the commitment undertaken by
the signatories to a TCA will be strictly limited to the aspects relevant for choice of
law purposes. When necessary for this purpose, the analysis will also take into
account the Community acquis in the field of labour law. A short outlook of a
possible (pre-existing) harmonised approach is, in private international law issues,
rather unavoidable. After a more comparative analysis, the problem of

characterisation will be discussed from the point of view of private international
law.
2.
Subsequently, the study will continue with its main focus, the rules and
instruments on applicable law as well as on international jurisdiction will be studied.
The relevant provisions are described as to their content and the application to the
subject matter is illustrated.
3.
Furthermore, an overview will be provided of problems of enforcement of
TCAs. The study is confined with these enforcement questions, mainly at national
level. It is also relevant, in identifying the competent court and applicable law, to
address the question which party will try to enforce the agreement in court, or seeks
judicial help in its interpretation. This involves the issue of ius standi meaning
they have the capacity to be a party to a lawsuit. But also other practical and legal
problems that may occur at the national level with regard to the enforcement of
TCAs, are addressed. In particular, not only access to courts but also alternative
disputes resolution mechanisms, including industrial action is being looked at. This
Member State level information has been collected and produced through the use of
a questionnaire that was sent to a number of national academic experts. A limited
number of countries were selected, not only in terms of available know how, but
also taking into account as much as possible concerns of both geographical as well
as systematic representativity. The involved experts are: Nathalie Betsch (Belgium),
Anne Davies (United Kingdom), Rdiger Krause (Germany), Jonas Malmberg
(Sweden), Francesco Monticelli (Italy), Sophie Robin-Olivier (France), Dora Sari
(Hungary), and Nuna Zekic (The Netherlands).
The study ends with conclusions and recommendations.
PART 1. BRIEF ANALYSIS AND QUALIFICATION OF TCAS

I. Existing research
It must be noted that scholarly legal literature on the subject of transnational
company agreements remains rather limited. The most relevant legal analyses are
made by, or with cooperation of, the European Commission or the International
Labour Organisation. A study of Ales and others (2006),1 which gives an overview
of the current developments in transnational collective bargaining in Europe,
includes a discussion on TCAs. Another interesting study is that of Papadakis and
others (2008) on cross-border social dialogue and agreements, which includes a
discussion on transnational company agreements within and beyond the European
Union context.2
Furthermore, the European Union itself has produced a set of documents and texts
on the issue of TCAs. From the European Commission, there is a Commission Staff
Working Document (SEC(2008/)2155) on The role of transnational company
agreements in the context of an increasing international integration,3 as well as the
document on Mapping of transnational texts negotiated at corporate level (2008).4
The European Commission also organised two seminars on TCAs, one on 17 May
2006 and one on 27 November 2006. Documents and presentations used in these
seminars can also be relied upon. Under the French presidency of the European
Union (2008), some research has been undertaken as well. A document representing
this research has been produced by Sobczak and Lonard (2009) 5 as well as by
Carley.6
E. Ales, S. Engblom, T. Jaspers, S. Laulom, S. Sciarra, A. Sobczak, F. Valds Dal-R, Transnational

collective bargaining. Past, present and future. Final Report, 2006, 43 p.
K. Papadakis (ed.) Cross-border social dialogue and agreements, Geneva, International Labour
Office, 2008, 288 p.
Commission Staff Working Document (SEC(2008) 2155), The role of transnational company
agreements in the context of increasing international integration, Brussels, 2 July 2008, COM(2008)
419 final, 11 p.
Mapping of transnational texts negotiated at corporate level, European Commission, Employment,

Social Affairs and Equal Opportunities DG Social Dialogue, Social Rights, Working Conditions,
Adaptation to Change, Brussels, 2 July 2008 EMPL F2 EP/bp 2008 (D) 14511, 37 p.
A. Sobczak & E. Lonard, Transnational social dialogue at the sector and the company level, Paper
to be presented at the Conference of the Regulating for Decent Work network, Regulating for decent
work: innovative regulation as a response to globalization, Geneva, International Labour Office, 8-10
July 2009, 17 p.
M. Carley, Report of the French EU Presidency conference Transnational company agreements.

Dialogue, rights, anticipating corporate restructuring, actors: A new perspective, Lyon, 13-14
November 2008, 39 p.
Two relevant research projects of the European Foundation for Living and Working
Conditions, also concern TCAs: the first is called Bargaining at European level?
Joint texts negotiated by European Works Councils (2001)7 and the second is called
European and international framework agreements: Practical experiences and
strategic approaches (2009).8
II. Legal qualification of TCA commitments

The characterisation of TCA commitments is an important issue in order to
determine the applicable rules on private international law applying to these
commitments. Closely related to this, is the question of characterization or reception
of TCAs in national legal systems. It should be noted that these two issues need to
be distinguished. The issue of the characterization of a TCA under national law is
only arrived at after the applicable national law has been found on the basis of the
applicable private international law rules. The relevant rules on the applicable law
can only be applied properly after the question of characterization of TCA
commitments under private international law has been answered. It should be kept in
mind that characterization in private international law does not necessarily coincide
with the characterization in national law. The issue of qualification of TCA
commitments under national law is, therefore, a secondary qualification problem,
but it nevertheless remains relevant in order to assess the possible legal and practical
problems with regard to the enforcement of TCAs.
The legal qualification of TCAs and the commitments that are arising thereof, is far
from evident. It must be pointed out that there is no single notion of a
transnational company agreement. There are many kinds of transnational texts
negotiated at company level, with various names, formulas and looks. Some of these
texts use the word agreement; some use the word declaration, or protocol, or
global agreement. It may be that not all TCAs may comprise strictly legal or
binding obligations.
TCAs show a lot of similarity with, and often qualify as, international framework
agreements (IFAs). In its Mapping document,9 the European Commission has
explained that a clear distinction of transnational texts, according to their scope and
character, between European and global texts is not always possible as there is a
continuum between both types and also both categories have had a quite comparable
M. Carley, Bargaining at European level? Joint texts negotiated by European Works Councils,
European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions, 2001, 94 p.
V. Telljohann, I. da Costa, T. Mller, U. Rehfeldt, R. Zimmer, European and international framework

agreements: Practical experiences and strategic approaches, European Foundation for Living and
Working Conditions, 2009, 95 p.

Adaptation to Change, Brussels, 2 July 2008 EMPL F2 EP/bp 2008 (D) 14511, p. 3-4.
evolution over time.10 There are thus strong parallels between IFAs and TCAs.
This would allow taking into account research findings on the (legal) enforcement of
IFAs. However, in these studies, the exact legal enforcement of the commitments
that have been undertaken by IFA signatories, remains equally an unresolved issue.
There remains thus a difficulty in drawing clear and precise conclusions as regards
the exact legal qualification of TCAs as legally enforceable commitments, taking
existing research into account. Statements on the legal nature of TCA commitments
can, therefore, only be made on the basis of legal construction or argumentation. In
this context, it is quite likely that much will depend on the actual commitments that
parties themselves are willing to undertake when concluding a TCA. In other words,
the role or the will of the parties would stand quite central. In practice, various
responses with regard to the parties perceived legal commitments are found.11 In
many cases, parties consider their commitments as legally binding commitments.
A.
Characterisation under national law
With regard to the labour law of various member states that have been studied, there
are two main possible ways to qualify TCAs or TCA commitments. One possibility
is that TCAs would qualify as collective agreements. However, the examined
member states systems show that recognition of TCAs as collective bargaining
agreements under national labour law can be problematic. The systems or the
examined member states are not adapted to collective agreements with a
transnational element, such as a transnational scope of application or transnational
parties such as international unions or multinational (groups of) employers.
On the other hand, a TCA could be qualified as a national collective agreement if all
the national conditions are met (e.g. if national representative workers organisations
have signed and other formal requirements have been met). France is one of the
examples where existing TCAs have been recognized as collective agreements under
French law.
A specific case is the United Kingdom. There, a TCA will count as a collective
agreement under English law if it meets the definition in Section 178 TULRCA. The
key elements of that definition are (i) the agreement must be made by or on behalf of
one or more trade unions and one or more employers or employers associations and
(ii) it must relate to the listed matters. Thus, it would be necessary to examine each
TCA to determine who the parties were and the subject matter covered. However,
the effect of being a collective agreement under English law would be to render the
10

Adaptation to Change, Brussels, 2 July 2008 EMPL F2 EP/bp 2008 (D) 14511, p. 4.
11
European Commission, General Directorate Employment, Social Affairs and Equal Opportunities,
Second study seminar Transnational Agreements, 27 November 2006, Working document n3,
Transnational agreements Complementary Study, First findings, p. 6-10.
agreement unenforceable under Section 179 unless it contained a clear statement that
it was intended to be a legally enforceable contract.
Another possibility would be to qualify a TCA as an agreement concluded with the
works council. This is particularly a possibility in Germany and the Netherlands,
two systems that know single party works council (composed only of worker
representatives) with which employers can conclude agreements recognized under
national law. But it would require that the works councils are involved as signatories
of the agreement.
Other forms or legal reception of TCA commitments can also be mentioned. In
civil law systems, the notions of contract or unilateral obligation would be relevant.
The applicable general principles of contract law would then need to be followed for
TCAs. The French report, for example, refers to the possibility to qualify TCAs as
unilateral commitments. This notion has been used in France to give legal effect to
other agreements than collective agreements, such as agreements concluded between
an employer and worker representatives. Depending on their content, such
commitments can be considered as unilateral acts granting rights or benefits to
workers which can be relied upon before the courts.
B.
Characterisation under private international law
The instruments with regard to applicable law and jurisdiction which may be
relevant for the present study are the Brussels I Regulation on jurisdiction in civil
and commercial matters, the Rome I Regulation on the law applicable to contractual
obligations and Rome II on the law applicable to non-contractual obligations. All
these instruments make use of autonomous interpretation which means that the
concepts used have to be interpreted in an autonomous fashion. This interpretation is
relatively independent of the interpretation of similar concepts in the legal orders of
the Member States. Private international law categories have to cater for a variety of
national systems. Hence, specific national requirements for the existence of a
contract (e.g. consideration under English law) can not be decisive for the
characterisation of a relationship as contractual under private international law.
Moreover, also a dispute on the existence and validity of a contract under the law
applicable to it, is contractual in nature for the purpose of private international law.
Two issues of characterization have a general impact on the application of the said
Regulations: firstly all three instruments restrict their scope of application to civil
and commercial matters. Secondly, a distinction must be made between contractual
obligations and non-contractual obligation. These qualification issues are dealt with
in detail in the Annex to this report. The main findings are presented here.
The concept of civil and commercial matters poses restrictions on claims by and
against public law entities. Theoretically the concept of civil and commercial
matters could also be used to exclude claims between private parties that are made
in the public interest and/or represent public policy. The ECJ however, does not
leave much room for such interpretation.12 Social law is not as such excluded from
the scope of application of the private international law instruments. Only when a
private party acts upon special state prerogatives, can such action be considered to
escape the framework established by the regulations discussed here.13 Accordingly,
when private entities try to enforce private law rules against other private entities,
their actions come within the scope of application of these regulations.14 The fact
that one of the parties has incomplete legal standing in some (or all) Member States,
does not seem to affect this qualification.
The distinction between contractual and non-contractual liability determines the
application of Article 5(1) as opposed to Article 5(3) of the Brussels I Regulation as
well as the respective scopes of application of the Rome I and Rome II Regulations.
According to the ECJ, the concept of contractual matters refers to obligations
taken on voluntarily by one party towards another. The obligations do not have to
qualify as contractual under national law. The concept is a relatively wide one. We
conclude from this that the commitments of an employer as laid down in a TCA may
come within the concept of contract when the commitments are claimed to be
legally binding15 and specific enough as to their scope and content.
The reach of the contractual commitments can go beyond the direct signatories to
the TCA. Others may be bound under contract through representation/agency.
They may also derive rights from the TCA as third party beneficiaries. In the latter
case, the commitment of the employer may not be met with reciprocal commitments
from the side of the beneficiaries. Such unilateral commitments may be covered by
the concept of contractual obligation as well. However, for such unilateral
commitments to result in contractual relationships, it would seem that the offer must
be precise enough as to both its contents and its beneficiary. Less clear is whether
the offer must have been accepted.
Accordingly, many claims by unions, works councils and individual workers will be
contractual in the meaning of the Brussels I and Rome I Regulations as long as the
TCA contains legally binding obligations with regard to them. A caveat must be
given for automatic extension of collective agreements and/or situations of legal
12
Compare U. Magnus & P. Mankowski, European Commentaries on Private international law: the
Brussels I Regulation, Mnchen, Sellier Europa Law Publishers, 2007, Rdnr 13, p. 51.
13
Compare Case C-265/02 Frahuil SA v Assitalia SpA, 2004 ECR I-01543 and BAG vom 2.7.2008
10 AZR 355/07 AP Verordnung Nr. 44/2001/EG Nr. 1: Sie (Die EuGVVO) erfasse auch
arbeitsrechtliche Streitigkeiten.
14
The (private or public law) nature of the court is irrelevant in this respect. Compare Article 1(1):
This Regulation shall apply in civil and commercial matters whatever the nature of the court or
tribunal [emphasis added]. U. Magnus & P. Mankowski, European Commentaries on Private
international law: the Brussels I Regulation, Mnchen, Sellier Europa Law Publishers, 2007, Article
1, Rdnr 21, p. 55.
15
The fact that one party to the TCA may deny the legally binding effect of the TCA does not take the
TCA outside the concept of contract for private international law purpose. Compare the fact that a
defense of non-existence or voidability of a contract does not change the contractual nature of the
original claim.
representation: the ECJ limits the concept of contractual obligations to those

obligations which have been voluntarily assumed by the parties. Hence it is
advisable to ensure either signatory status or proper representation for all parties
who are meant to benefit from the TCA. Enforcement by unions or works councils
of obligations which are not voluntarily taken on by the employer will not be
covered by the concept of contract but will rather be covered by the concept of noncontractual liability.
Outsiders (competitors, end consumers) will rarely be able to rely on the provision
on contract of the Brussels I Regulation. If they want to enforce the TCA obligations
through claims of unfair competition or misleading advertising, they will have to
base the jurisdiction of the courts on Article 5(3) rather than Article 5(1). Article
5(3) covers all claims which aim to establish the liability of the defendant and which
do not sound in contract. Likewise the law applying to such claims will be
determined on the basis of the Rome II Regulation.
III. Relationship with European labour law

An examination of private international law aspects of TCAs, including
enforcement issues, needs to take into account the European framework in which the
TCAs operate. Applicable law rules would not be needed if there would be a
comprehensive substantive law framework for TCAs at the European level. But
even if such substantive rules are absent or incomplete, European law could contain
specialized rules on applicable law and jurisdiction which would take precedence
over the general framework of the Brussels I, the Rome I and Rome II Regulations.
Absent this, the framework may still contain useful rules which may help to identify
the applicable law and/or the competent court. As will be explained in the next
chapter, such rules could pertain in particular to the place of performance of certain
obligations.
As may be expected, given the subject matter of this study, European labour law is a
particularly relevant area. However, the relationship between TCAs and European
labour law is far from evident. Given the close connection with the Treaty
framework on European social dialogue and the European Directive on European
Works Councils, both instruments will be addressed although rather briefly seen
the scope of this study.
A.
TCAs and the European social dialogue
One could defend the view that TCAs can only be considered as national
agreements. They would then have no Community relevance.16 Another view is that
European labour provisions would be relevant. In this case Articles 138 and 139 of
the EC Treaty are evident references, although this leaves complicated questions
with regard to resulting legal consequences. Nevertheless, an in depth discussion of
the possible reception of European company-level agreements under the provisions
16
J.H. Even, Transnational collective bargaining in Europe, The Hague, Boom, 2008, 231.
10
of, especially, Article 139 of the EC Treaty, would go beyond the ambit of the
present study. In practice, the issue would seem to depend on the TCA instrument
that is actually under examination. According to the findings in the European
Commissions Mapping document,17 most of the texts that are agreements do not
have the legal character of a collective agreement under any national rules, although
some do have this status under national law.
If TCAs are not recognized as legal instruments under EU labour law, and if
national labour laws do not qualify them as collective agreements, the possibility to
look at these agreements as an autonomous (European) category sui generis
should be left open.
B.
TCAs and the EWC Directive(s)
In many cases, TCAs are concluded in the context of the activities of a European
Works Council (EWC). There is thus a strong relationship between EWCs and the
conclusion of TCAs.
It is well known that the EWC legislation has had a significant impact on European
industrial relations.18 It is thus not surprising that very often European Works
Councils are the main parties in European TCAs.19 Existing research shows that
some EWC agreements contain explicit reference to the possibility of concluding
joint texts.20 However, it must be noted that TCAs, as examined in the present
study, have not been envisaged by the original 1994 EWC Directive. Also the 2009
Recast Directive has left the issue outside its explicit scope.
The EWC Directive(s) may, nevertheless, be instructive, with regard to the TCA
enforcement and claims qualification issues, which are relevant for the private
international law discussion.
In private international law, it is important to find an appropriate connecting factor
in order to determine the applicable law. The EWC legislative setting may be helpful
for interpretative purposes. The question which national law may be applicable to
EWC agreements can be dependent on a few factors.
17

18
The European Works Council came into existence with the adoption of the European Directive
94/45/EC of 22 September 1994 on the establishment of an EWC or a procedure in Community-scale
undertakings and Community-scale groups of undertakings for the purposes of informing and
consulting employees. (OJ L 254, 30.9.1994) A Recast Directive has been adopted as Directive
2009/38/EC of 6 May 2009 recasting Council Directive 94/45/EC of 22 September 1994 (OJ L 122,
16.5.2009).
19

20
M. Carley, Bargaining at European level? Joint texts negotiated by European Works Councils, 2001,
European Foundation for Living and Working Conditions, EF/01/52/EN, p. 11.
11
A European study on Article 13 agreements has indicated that about 60% of these
agreements specified which national law was applicable in instances where
problems would arise in the interpretation or application of the agreements.21 This
confirms that the role of the parties is important, a finding which may also be upheld
for the TCA discussion.
The EWC Directive (1994 and Recast) itself does not seem to contain an applicable
law rule with regard to EWC Agreements. It would only solve this issue in an
indirect way.
A useful connecting factor for an applicable national law could be the place
(country) where the EWC meetings are organised. Relevant in this respect is article
6, Paragraph 2, (d) of the Directive (1994 and Recast) which provides that the EWC
Agreement will determine the venue of the European Works Council.
Another useful connecting factor is the central management. It is central
management that bears the responsibility for the setting up of a European Works
Council. Furthermore, when no EWC is being set up, the subsidiary requirements
will apply as laid down in the law of the Member State where central management is
situated.22 Also Article 8 of the EWC Directive (1994 and Recast) refers to central
management. However, with regard to EWC Agreement obligations, the EWC
Directive gives a large degree of autonomy to the parties to determine the
undertakings or establishments that are covered by the EWC Agreement, taking into
account Article 1, 4 of the 1994 Directive (Article 1, 6 of the Recast Directive).23
These connecting factors could also play a role in the private international law
disputes arsing from TCAs that have been concluded within the context of
European Works Councils.
21
P. Marginson, M. Gilman, O. Jacobi and H. Krieger, Negotiating European Works Councils. An

analysis of agreements under Article 13, European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and
Working Conditions, European Commission, Office for Official Publications of the European
Communities, 1998, p. 17. A reading of a number of EWC Agreements shows that in many cases the
law of the country in which central management (or its representative) is situated, is chosen.
22
Article 7, Paragraph 1 EWC Directive (1994 and Recast).
23
This provides: Unless a wider scope is provided for in the agreements referred to in Article 6, the
powers and competence of European Works Councils and the scope of information and consultation
procedures established to achieve the purpose specified in paragraph 1 shall, in the case of a
Community-scale undertaking, cover all the establishments located within the Member States and, in
the case of a Community-scale group of undertakings, all group undertakings located within the
Member States.
12
PART 2. APPLICABLE LAW AND INTERNATIONAL JURISDICTION OF THE COURTS
PART 2. APPLICABLE LAW AND INTERNATIONAL

JURISDICTION OF THE COURTS
I.
Applicable Law
A. The legal framework and lay out of the chapter

A legal framework which is geared to the specifics of TCAs is currently lacking,
both at the international, the European and at the national level.
At the international level the right of association is recognized, laying the basis for
the formation of trade unions. These trade unions have the right to negotiate and if
necessary, use collective action to influence those negotiations. All these rights have
received recognition in both international and European law.24 However, there is no
unified law on collective agreements which has the capacity to govern all relevant
aspects of such agreements, such as formation and admissible content, obligations
under and execution of the agreement.25
European law does contain provisions regarding the social dialogue, both in the
treaty (Articles 138 and 139) and in secondary legislation (e.g. the EWC Directive).
But even if these provisions are applicable to TCAs (which is debated), the
European system as it stands to day is partial and fragmented at best.26 An important
omission would be that there is no European rule which would grant direct
normative effect to European collective agreements.27 Article 139 refers to the
implementation methods in the Member States and hence seems to leave this aspect
to national law (or rather to the national laws - plural).
24
For EU law, see ECJ 11 December 2007, C-348/05, ITF v. Viking, and ECJ 18 December 2007, C341/05, Laval.
25
Compare for the international sale of goods, the Vienna Convention (CISG) 1980, UN Doc A/Conf
97/18;
Misc
24
(1980);
1489
UNTS
3;
19
ILM
671,
http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/sales/cisg/CISG.pdf. For the specifics of a European
regulation of transnational collective bargaining, see E. Ales, S. Engblom, T. Jaspers, S. Laulom, S.
Sciarra, A. Sobczak, F. Valds Dal-R, Transnational collective bargaining. Past, present and future.
Final Report, 2006. Topics which are relevant in this respect are 1) the negotiating agents, 2) issues
to be covered 3) procedure and formal requirements 4) normative effects and 5) relationship between
levels of negotiation.
26
Compare E. Ales, S. Engblom, T. Jaspers, S. Laulom, S. Sciarra, A. Sobczak, F. Valds Dal-R,

Transnational collective bargaining. Past, present and future. Final Report, 2006.
27
B. Bercusson, European Labour Law, second edition, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2009,
p. 541 professes the opinion that a European collective agreement concluded under Article 139 binds
the members of the signatories. Still, implementation according to national standards would be
needed to produce normative effect on the labour relations covered by the agreement. Otherwise: O.
Deinert, Self-executing Collective Agreements in EC Law in: M. De Vos (ed), A Decade Beyond
Maastricht The Hague, Kluwer Law International, 2003.
13
In the absence of a (comprehensive) international or European framework, the

formation of and legal effects of a transnational company agreement will be dealt
with under national law. This conclusion redirects us towards the conflict of laws:
which national law will govern the TCA; which criteria are used to determine this
law? Currently, EU contains two Regulations which deal with applicable law in
patrimonial matters one (Rome I28 applicable as of December 2009) on
contractual obligations and another (Rome II29 applicable since 11 January 2009)
on non-contractual obligations. As we argued in the previous chapter and Annex I to
this report , obligations that are voluntarily taken on by the (signatory) parties to a
TCA are contractual in nature, even if these obligations are taken on towards third
parties covered by the TCA. Accordingly, the law applying to a TCA as such30 will
be decided upon by the rules of the Rome I Regulation.31
However, TCAs may also be relied upon by outsiders as a standard for
competitive behaviour or as marketing information addressed at potential clients.
When a TCA is relied upon by competitors or consumer organisations in the context
of unfair competition or misleading advertising, the relationship between the
claimant and the company will be non-contractual. In that case, the applicable law
will be decided upon by the Rome II Regulation. Both will be discussed here,
though predominantly Rome I will be analysed, as this regulation covers the
relationship between the parties primarily interested in and targeted by the TCA.
National law is by definition inadequate to regulate an intrinsically transnational
issue. But even under this proviso, national law as described in the national reports
rarely has special arrangements for collective agreements within groups of
companies (let alone for the transnational aspects thereof). However, national
systems may be to some degree receptive to TCAs: willing to lend its force to
certain elements thereof. This reception is mainly relevant with regard to the
normative effects of a TCA.32
Traditionally, collective agreements have an obligatory part which regulates the
mutual obligations of the contractual parties/signatories and a normative part which
28
Regulation (EC) No 593/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 June 2008 on the
law applicable to contractual obligations (Rome I) OJ L 177, 4.7.2008, p. 616.
29
Regulation (EC) No 864/2007 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 July 2007 on the
law applicable to non-contractual obligations (Rome II) OJ L 199, 31.7.2007, p. 4049.
30
Interestingly enough the Regulation applies to contractual obligations. The conflicts rules contained
therein however, designate the law applying to the contract. For the distinction between contract and
obligations arising out of a contract, see inter alia the Draft Common Frame of Reference (DCFR)
(Principles, Definitions and Model Rules of European Private Law, Draft Common Frame Reference
(DCFR), Outline edition, Prepared by the Study Group on a European Civil Code and the research
group on EC Private Law (Acquis Group), Mnchen, Sellier European Law Publishers 2009).
31
Malmberg points out that in some countries collective labour law may be closely related to the public
interest, and might be enforced through public law means. This may be a reason to apply the theory
of internationally mandatory rules, or even the public policy exception. In our opinion, this does not
remove the voluntary reciprocal commitment between the signatories from the ambit of Rome I.
32
Compare at the European level Deinert, Self-executing collective agreements in EC law in M. De

Vos, A Decade beyond Maastricht, The European social dialogue revisited, p. 38.
14
contains provisions with regard to the labour relations covered by the collective
agreement.33 It is the normative part which most distinguishes collective labour
agreements from ordinary civil law contracts.34 National statutes on collective
agreements (if available) will primarily deal with the normative aspects: Do the
normative provisions automatically become part of the individual labour contract?
Can only organised employees rely on the provisions of a collective agreement or
does such agreement have erga omnes effect? Is there any (after) effect of the
provisions on the individual contract after termination of the collective agreement
etc. etc.
Not only does national law provide which special effects are contributed to
collective labour agreements (if any), national law also contains the legal
requirements for attaining that special status. If such reception is lacking, a
collective agreement cannot by itself bind the parties to the individual labour
contracts covered by it. To still attain some legal effect in the horizontal
relationship, several civil law mechanisms may be used. In the legal literature (as
well as the national reports prepared for this study) the following mechanisms are
described.35
1. Agency. Parent companies may act as agents for their affiliates. At the side of the
workers, there may even be a chain of mandates: Confederations of unions may act
as representatives for the national unions, national unions as representatives for the
individual workers.
2. Membership. Membership of an association may create mandate: the authorities
to claim rights on behalf of the members and/or accept obligations in the name of
the members.
3. Third party stipulations. This covers the situation in which the contractual parties
include rights (and sometimes even duties) for third parties in their contract.
4. Unilateral commitments. In this case the reciprocal character of the TCA is denied
or ignored, and a binding effect is created with regard to the employers stipulations
only.
All these models have in common, that the third party will have to rely on the
original contract to enforce his or her claim. In some instances they will become a
party to the original contract. Agency is most specific in this: the concept of agency
33
Compare Malmberg, The Collective Agreement as an Instrument for Regulation of Wages and
Employment Conditions, Scandinavian Studies in Law, 2002.
34
The situation in the UK is different in that the status of collective labour agreement will lead to the
assumption that the agreement as such does not have legally binding force see Davies national
report. The normative effects may hence only be reached through the default mechanisms described
here.
35
A.T.J.M. Jacobs, Het recht op collectief onderhandelen : in rechtsvergelijkend en Europees

perspectief Alphen aan den Rijn, Samsom H.D. Tjeenk Willink, 1986; Van Hoek, International
Mobiliteit van Werknemers, Den Haag, SDU 2000, Malmberg l.c., p. 203 ff. for 3 and 4.
15
leads to the introduction of new parties to the contract as such: the represented party
replaces the agent as contractual partner or as the case may be, joins the signatory
party when the agent is also an independent party to the contract. Third party
stipulations, on the other hand, may allow the third party to rely on the contractual
stipulations in court without necessarily joining the contract as a party. In both
cases, the claim will be based on the original collective contract the TCA.
5. Incorporation in the individual labour contracts. Statutes on collective agreements
differ in the way they create normative effect. Some legal systems treat normative
provisions as objective rules binding the parties to the individual labour contract.
Others rather construe individual rights through incorporation of the normative
provisions in the individual labour contract. When the law does not provide for such
incorporation, parties usually can. The UK, the Netherlands and Germany are
examples of countries in which normative effect can be reached by way of
contractual stipulation. Typically, the employer will refer to the collective agreement
when entering into individual labour contracts. The collective agreement may in
such conditions take on the meaning of a set of standard terms.
6. Finally, TCAs and unilateral promises can impact on the individual labour
relation as indicators of good faith, fair employership, usage of the enterprise etc.
The latter two mechanisms both operate through the individual labour contract. One
should keep in mind, however, that these general principles mentioned under 5) may
also operate in other statutory arrangements: e.g. define the standard of care under
tort law by referring to TCA as standard of good practice.
In this chapter, the implications of the layered structure of transnational collective
bargaining shall be analyzed. First attention is given to the conflict rules with regard
to the TCA as such. Next attention is given to the scope of application of the lex
causae:
-
Is the TCA treated as a collective agreement under national law: this will be
referred to as the problem of national reception.
Does the lex causae of the TCA also govern questions with regards to the
representation of the national unions by the European or international
unions (or as the case may be, the national works councils by the European
works council?
Does it also extent to the normative effect of the TCA?
These questions will be answered in the framework of the (coming) Rome I

Regulation. The claim of outsiders, which would be covered by Rome II is discussed
separately.
16
B. The Rome I Regulation

1.
Introduction
The Rome I Regulation was adopted on the basis of Article 65 EC as the

Community successor to the Rome Convention. The exercise of transposing the
Convention was at first instance seen as a technical matter.36 On several issues
however, the relevant provisions were changed during the course of the negotiations
sometimes after heated debate.37 However, the structure of the regulation and the
main provisions therein, are largely identical to those of the Convention. The
regulation will apply to contracts concluded after 17 December 2009.38 Any TCA
concluded before this date will hence continue to be governed by the conflict of law
rules of the Convention. Though in this report the Regulation will serve as the point
of reference, if relevant, reference will be made to the Convention as well.
2.
Scope of application
According to Article 1 sub 1 the Regulation applies, in situations involving a

conflict of laws, to contractual obligations in civil and commercial matters. It shall
not apply, in particular, to revenue, customs or administrative matters. The
formulation of this provision is edited as to align the Rome I Regulation with the
Brussels I Regulation. This means that the interpretation of the provision of Rome I
will be influenced by the interpretation given to the parallel provision of Brussels I.
Both Regulations also contain a set of explicitly excluded matters, the one in the
Rome I Regulation being considerably longer than the one in the Brussels I
Regulation. Relevant to the topic at hand is that the question whether an agent is
able to bind a principal, or an organ to bind a company or other body corporate or
unincorporated, in relation to a third party is amongst the excluded matters. The
contractual relationship between agent and principal as such does fall within the
scope of application as does any contract between principal and third party
concluded through an agent.39 The agency exception was already included in the
Rome Convention. It may be contributed to the complexity of this issue and the
wide variety of rules which exist on this topic in the member states.40 These same
circumstances may also explain the lack of ratifications of the multilateral
36
In its proposal the European Commission states that it will not be necessary to make a formal impact
assessment as the proposal does not set out to establish a new set of legal rules Com(2005)650, p. 3
37
Compare on the individual labour contract: the original proposal in Com(2005)650, EP legislative
resolution EP P6_TA-Porv(2007)0560 and the Opinion of the Committee on Employment and Social
Affairs, in the Report of the Committee on Legal Affairs, A6-0450/2007.
38
Reg 593/2008, Article 28.
39
A. Briggs, Concept of Law, second edition, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2008, p. 164; Report
Giuliano & Lagarde OJ 1980 C282/13. Agency is again one of the debated issues the original
proposal included a conflicts rule for agency.
40
A. Briggs, Concept of Law, second edition, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2008, p. 164 refers to
the irreconcilable differences between the common law and civilian analysis of agency.
17
convention on agency which was concluded in the ambit of the Hague Conference
on private international law in 1978.41 The EU currently has no intention to ratify
this convention either.
Not only does the Rome I Regulation rely on the Brussels I Regulation for the
definition of civil and commercial matters, it will do so with regard to the concept
of contractual obligations as well.42 As is described in detail in Annex I, the Brussels
I Regulation contains a rule on special jurisdiction over contractual obligations in
article 5 sub 1. From the case law on this provision it becomes progressively clear
that contractual obligations is a rather wide concept, to be construed in an
autonomous way. It basically covers any obligation which is freely undertaken by
one party in relation to identified others.43 Based on this case law, we concluded that
claims by an employee and/or trade union covered by the TCA against one of the
parties to the TCA (on the employers side) will be classified 1) as a civil and
commercial matter and 2) as contractual.44 Claims by consumer organisations and/or
competitors are more likely to be based on tort/non-contractual liability (and hence
be covered by the Rome II Regulation).
Does the diversity in classification of collective agreements under national law
change this? Both from the legal literature45 and the national reports, it becomes
evident that the Member States have widely divergent systems of collective labour
law. Whereas in the UK a collective agreement is presumed to be non-binding, other
member states may supply some of their collective agreements with public law
41
Convention of 14 March 1978 on the Law Applicable to Agency, Entered into force 1 May 1992),
contracting states on August 2009: Argentina, France, Netherlands, Portugal. The Convention
contains rules on the internal relationship between principle and agent as well as the rules on the
relationship between those two and third parties.
42
Compare Rome I, preamble 7 on consistency, both as to scope of application and as to provisions

contained therein, between Rome I and both Brussels I and Rome II.
43
See for the parallel interpretation of Rome I and Brussel I Article 5(1) : A. Briggs, Concept of Law,
second edition, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2008, p. 158. For: freely undertaken + in relation to
identified others.p. 161 ff. Compare for a similarly wide interpretation of contractual obligations:
Lando & Beale, PECL Parts I and II, Kluwer Law International, 2000, p. 137.
44
This is supported by the Explanatory report to the Rome Convention: According to this report, the
concept of contractual obligation is wide enough to include unilateral commitments e.g. certain gifts.
Giuliano & Lagarde OJ 1980 C282/1, 10. See also A. Briggs, Concept of Law, second edition,
Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2008, p. 161.
45
On systems of collective labour law, see: A.T.J.M Jacobs, o.c. 1986. On the application of the Rome
Convention to collective agreements see: Malmberg & Jonsson, National Industrial Relations v.
Private International Law A Swedish Perspective; J.P. Laborde, The Contemporary Trends of
Labour Law in Western Europe at the Mirror of the EC Convention on the Law Applicable to
Contractual Obligations, in Changing Industrial Relations and Modernisation of Labour Law: Liber
Amicorum in Honour of Professor Marco Biagi, R. Blanpain & M. Weiss (eds.), New York, Kluwer
Law International, 2003, p. 264 ff. European Commission, First phase consultation of social partners
under Art. 138(2) of the EC Treaty concerning crossborder transfers of undertakings, businesses or
parts of undertakings or businesses, 2007, 8. L. Paulsson, Romkonventionen tillmplig lag fr
avtalsfrpliktelser, Stockholm, Norstedts, 1998, p. 83, R. Plender & M. Wilderspin, The European
Contracts Convention, second edition, London, Sweet & Maxwell, 2001), p. 160, and U. Liukkunen,
The Role of Mandatory Rules in International Labour Law, Helsinki, Talentum, 2004, p. 121.
18
enforcement mechanisms (e.g. France, Belgium). However, we argue that this does
not change the classification under private international law.46 If a party to a TCA
tries to obtain injunctions, specific performance or damages from its counterpart, the
primary (private international law) classification will be under contract. Once the
applicable law is established, this law may decide how to classify the relationship
under national law (secondary classification). In England, the result may be that the
contract is subsumed under the heading of collective agreement and deemed to be
non-binding. In other countries, the internal classification may be different e.g. a
contract sui generis, when the agreement does not fulfil to national requirements of a
collective labour agreement. This does not, however, affect the primary
classification under European private international law.47
France and Belgium attribute public law status to a specific category of collective
agreements, in particular to those collective agreements made generally applicable
by government decision. The scope of application of this public law system is
determined by unilateral scope rules. If a public law rule is not designated by the
conflicts rule (as part of the lex causae) but claims application anyway, this is dealt
with under Article 9 of the Rome I Regulation. The public law rule will be treated as
an overriding mandatory provision.48 TCAs in general do not fulfil the
requirements set by the domestic law systems for recognition as collective
agreements under public law. So this question is to a large extent moot. But even if
TCAs would receive public law backing, this would not change the classification of
the relationship between a civil law claimant and a civil law defendant for civil law
remedies as being civil and commercial in nature.49
3.
The system of the Regulation and the relevant provisions
The Regulation is based as was the Convention before it on the principle of party
autonomy. Under Article 3 a contract shall be governed by the law chosen by the
parties. In absence of a choice by the parties, the law to be applied has to be
established in accordance to the rules of Articles 4 to 8. Article 4 contains the
general rule, whereas Articles 5-8 contain special rules for specific contracts. The
only one of interest in the current context is Article 8 that deals with individual
employment contracts.50 This article can not be applied to collective agreements as
46
Especially not since the relevant rules are harmonised at the European level.
47
This position is not universally supported. See for example C.M.J. Clarkson & J. Hill, The conflict of
laws, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2006, p. 205, who would refer the question whether a specific
contract classifies as an individual labour contract to the lex causae.
48
Public law rules may also extert influence under the domestic and private international law concepts
of public policy.
49
Compare for collective actions: Malmberg & Jonsson, p. 221.
50
The others relate to consumer contracts
19
such,51 but will be relevant with regard to the impact of TCAs on individual labour
relations.
The normative effect of a TCA will affect the relationship between individual
worker and individual employer and hence impact on the lex causae of the
individual labour relationship. When individual employees demand enforcement of
individual rights granted in a TCA, this claim will be based on the individual labour
relationship. The position is more complicated when they act in their capacity of
member of the works council.52 The lex causae of the individual labour contract is
primarily determined by the place where the employee habitually performs his work.
In most cases the place of work will coincide with the place of establishment of the
production unit. In the case of the transnational corporation or enterprise, the work
force of the several production units will each be covered by their own local law.
The law designated by the multilateral conflict rules (the lex causae), determines in
particular the interpretation and performance of the contract, the consequences of a
breach of obligations, the various ways of extinguishing obligations, prescription
and limitation of actions as well as the consequences of nullity of the contract
(Article 12).53 The Regulation contains special provisions with regard to consent and
material validity (Article 10) and formal validity (Article 11) as well as the issue of
incapacity of natural persons (Article 13).
The Regulation (like the Convention) has universal application. This means that the
law designated by the multilateral conflicts rules of the Regulation will be applied,
regardless of their provenance: be they lex fori, the law of another member state or
the law of a third country. However, the court has two possibilities to ignore the
applicable law. One of these consists of the public policy exception. This exception
allows the court to disregard the foreign lex causae if the application of a provision
from that law to the case at hand is manifestly incompatible with the public policy
(ordre public) of the forum. (Article 21). This provision creates a safety valve for
the result blind multilateral conflicts rules.
The other obstacle to unhampered application of the lex causae is created by the
phenomenon of overriding mandatory provisions. Article 9 of the Regulation
contains a definition of overriding mandatory provisions, describing them as
provisions the respect for which is regarded as crucial by a country for safeguarding
its public interests, such as its political, social or economic organisation, to such an
extent that they are applicable to any situation falling within their scope, irrespective
of the law otherwise applicable to the contract under this Regulation. Under section
2 of the same article, courts are allowed to apply their own overriding mandatory
provisions to all contracts over which these rules claim application. The application
of foreign mandatory provisions is heavily circumscribed (compared to the Rome
51
Compare Giuliano & Lagarde, explanatory report to the Rome Convention; Malmberg & Jonsson,
p. 230.
52
See the discussion in the chapter on jurisdiction.
53
The Article does not mention any third party effects.
20
Convention): effect may be given to the overriding mandatory provisions of the

country of performance of a contractual obligation which render this performance
unlawful.
The provision on overriding mandatory provisions is extremely relevant for the topic
at hand. Whenever an individual labour contract governed by the law of Y is
submitted to rules derived from law Z, the application of the rules of Z can be
subsumed under Article 9. An example is this is the protection of a core of
protective rights which is granted to posted workers under the posting of workers
directive (dir 96/71/EC). As these core rights have to be granted regardless of the
law applying to the individual labour contracts, the relevant provisions can be
classified as overriding mandatory provisions.54
In the context of collective labour law it is often stipulated that collective
agreements have their own scope of (international) application. If collective
agreements from law X restrict their application to employment within the territory,
these agreements will not apply to individual contracts governed by law X which are
performed outside the territory. It that sense the collective agreements are self
denying: restricting their scope of application even when they are considered to be
part of the lex causae. However, if the same collective agreements apply to all
employment within the territory, these agreements have an overriding character
they overrule the law applying to the individual labour contract as such. This latter
aspect is regulated through Article 9.55 Article 9 will be discussed inter alia in the
context of the question whether the law applying to the TCA as such can also
regulate the normative effect of the TCA in a uniform manner, regardless of the
location of the labour units covered by the TCA (and regardless of the law applying
to the individual contracts performed there).
Lack of authoritative interpretation
The Rome I Regulation has not entered into force yet, so there can not be any case
law interpreting its provisions. But as the Brussels I Regulation is interpreted to
maintain continuity with the Brussels Convention (where appropriate), information
on the probable interpretation of the Rome I Regulation can be derived from the
interpretation of the parallel provisions of the Rome Convention. In this case,
however, that does not help us much. Whereas the ECJ was given jurisdiction to rule
on the interpretation of the Brussels Convention from the very beginning, the
Member States were much more reluctant to grant competence to the ECJ over the
Rome Convention. Only quite recently has the ECJ required a limited competence in
this field, which has not led to any case law relevant for the topic under discussion.
This means the next paragraphs are based on textual analysis of the provisions
combined with relevant legal literature from the member states.
54
Technically, the provisions need not apply, but the protection offered by them must be guaranteed.
55
The former (presumably) through the normal multilateral rules. Neither the Convention nor the
Regulation contains explicit rules on internationally mandatory rules of the lex causae. Based on the
Giuliano/Lagarde report it can be argued that internationally mandatory labour law provision can be
part of the law applying on the basis of Article 8 (article 6 RC).
21
C. The law applying to the TCA

1.
Article 3 choice of law by the parties
Under Article 3 a contract shall be governed by the law chosen by the parties. If the
contract has an international character, such choice of law will oust the law
otherwise applicable and replace it in its entirety by the law chosen by the parties.
This strong (conflicts of law) effect of a choice by the parties is limited in specific
circumstances: if the contract is domestic but for a choice of law or a choice of
forum, the choice of law by the parties cannot prejudice the application of
mandatory provisions of the otherwise applicable law. Likewise, if all objective
elements of the contract are situated within the EU, a choice of law for the law of a
non-member state cannot abrogate the application of community law.56 And finally,
a choice of law in an individual labour contract cannot have the result of depriving
the employee of the protection afforded to him by the mandatory provisions of the
law applying in absence of such choice.57 The first restriction, which will limit the
effect of a choice of law in purely domestic contracts, is not relevant in the case of
TCAs because transnational company agreements are by definition transnational in
character. Also the proviso with regard to mandatory EU law does not affect a
choice of law in a TCA as currently no binding rules on TCAs exist at EU level.
Finally, the special protection offered to individual employees may be relevant for
the effect of TCAs on the individual contract of employment. However, the
restriction does not apply to a choice of law in the TCA as such. This means that a
choice of law in a TCA seems to be honoured by the system of the Regulation.58
A choice of law can be made expressly or can be implied. In the latter case, the
Regulation specifies that the choice of law must be clearly demonstrated by the
terms of the contract or the circumstances of the case. With this stipulation, which
is stricter than the parallel provision in the Convention, the legislators wanted to
avoid implicit choices of law being assumed too readily. A choice of law can be
made at the time of conclusion, but can also be made (or changed, as the case may
be) at a later date.59 When making their choice, parties are free to choose any
existing system of law.60 There is no requirement of fair interest or any other
requirement of a link between the law chosen and the relationship submitted to it. It
is interesting to note that the preamble of the Rome I Regulation specifically
mentions the possibility to refer to a non-state body of law or a European nonbinding body of law such as a future Common Frame of Reference. The possibility
to choose for the application of the CFR is not opened under the provisions of the
Regulation itself. Though this option was debated (heatedly) during the negotiations
on the Rome I Regulation, the regulation itself refers to a law to be chosen by the
56
This restriction was introduced in the Regulation. It does not have an equivalent in the Convention.
57
Article 8(1). A similar provision applies to consumer contracts (article 6 sub 2).
58
As it was by the Rome Convention.
59
A change as to the chosen law can not adversely affect the rights of third parties: Article 3 para 2.
60
There is some discussion as to the possibility to opt for the application of an international convention
outside its scope of application see inter alia preamble 7.
22
parties. The preamble states in para 13 that This Regulation does not preclude
parties from incorporating by reference into their contract a non-State body of law or
an international convention. This opens up the possibility of referring to the CFR as
part of the contract, but does not result in a choice of law at the conflicts of laws
level. The preamble continues by stating: Should the Community adopt, in an
appropriate legal instrument, rules of substantive contract law, including standard
terms and conditions, such instrument may provide that the parties may choose to
apply those rules. This means that the Community may open up the possibility to
express a choice of law in the meaning of Article 3 in favour of the application of
the CFR once this common frame of reference is adopted in an EU instrument.
2.
Dpeage
By their choice the parties can select the law applicable to the whole or to part only
of the contract. The latter process is called dpeage. It is generally assumed that
this process can only be applied to obligations in the contractual relationship which
can be separated from the other obligations without disrupting the coherence of the
contract and/or the legal rules applicable to it.61 In international labour law the
following examples may be given: a clause on employees options and shares** may
be separated from the main obligations in the individual labour contract. Likewise, a
(long term) corporate pension plan is severable from the provisions on a specific
(short term) posting. For international trade contracts, the example can be given of
an interest clause or index-linking clause.62 Under the Rome Convention, both
subjective and objective dpeage had found recognition. Subjective dpeage refers
to a splitting up of the contract through partial choices of law by the parties.
Objective dpeage refers to the situation where a separable part of the contract is
manifestly closer connected to another law than the law applying to the contract as a
whole. The latter form of splitting up was controversial. The relevant provision in
Article 4 Rome Convention has no parallel in the Rome I Regulation. Whether or
not this should be interpreted as foreclosing objective dpeage altogether, remains
to be seen.63
The question of dpeage is pertinent in the case of TCAs. TCAs can be analysed
as multiparty contracts. Is such multi-party contract a single contract governed by a
single legal system, or rather a bundle of separable contracts64 or as a midway
61
The Giuliano & Lagarde report on the (similar) provision in the Rome Convention stipulates that the
parties choice must be logically consistent, OJ 1980 C 282/17. See also C.M.J. Clarkson & J. Hill,
The conflict of laws, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2006, p. 184.
62
M.V. Polak, Dpeage: een rechtsbegrip dat in het internationaal privaatrecht misstaat?, Leiden,
Rijksuniversiteit Leiden, 1994; C.M.J. Clarkson & J. Hill, The conflict of laws, Oxford, Oxford
University Press, 2006, p. 184.
63
B. Audit, Droit International Priv, fifth edition, Paris, Economica, 2008, p. 688 denies the possibility
of objective dpeage under the Rome I Regulation. On the possibility of objective dpeage under
the Rome convention, see C. Reithmann & D.Martiny, Internationales Vertragsrecht, fifth edition,
Kln, Dr. Otto Schmidt Verlag, 1996, Rdnr 108, p. 121-122.
64
Compare Germany, comparative report
23
position a single contract containing severable reciprocal rights and obligations.65

In our opinion a general answer can not be given as it would depend on the
obligations contained therein and the parties bound by it. Can certain parts of the
overall agreement be separated without disrupting the coherence of the contract as
such?66 Though not ideal, it might turn out that the obligatory provisions of the
contract have to be separated from the normative provisions. An overview of all
relationships involved and the law applying to them, may lead to this conclusion.
3.
Article 4: Law applying in absence of a choice by the parties
If no choice is made by the parties (either express or implicitly), the applicable law
is found by applying the rules of Article 4. This article has undergone considerable
changes, when compared to the parallel provision of the Rome Convention. The
Regulation start off with 8 specific rules for specific types of contract. A contract for
the sale of goods shall, for example, be governed by the law of the country where
the seller has his habitual residence. Likewise, a contract for the provision of
services shall be governed by the law of the country where the service provider has
his habitual residence. Each of these rules are a specification for the sake of legal
certainty - of the general principle of Article 4 para 2 under which the contract shall
be governed by the law of the country where the party required to effect the
characteristic performance of the contract has his habitual residence.67 The
presumptions enumerated in para 1 and 2 can be rebutted Where it is clear from all
the circumstances of the case that the contract is manifestly more closely connected
with a country other than that indicated in paragraphs 1 or 2 (para 3). Likewise,
when no characteristic performance can be established (and the contract is not
covered by one of the rules of para 1), the contract will be governed by the law of
the country with which it is most closely connected. (para 4).
It is generally assumed that TCAs dont allow for the identification of a
characteristic performance. This term refers to the obligation which characterises
the contract as a specific type of contract. Accordingly, the seller, who has to deliver
the goods, performs the obligation which characterizes the sale of goods as a sale of
65
Compare on the background of dpeage also Audit, o.c. p. 685.
66
See for this requirement inter alia M.V. Polak, Dpeage: een rechtsbegrip dat in het internationaal
privaatrecht misstaat?, Leiden, Rijksuniversiteit Leiden, 1994; and C. Reithmann & D.Martiny,
Internationales Vertragsrecht, fifth edition, Kln, Dr. Otto Schmidt Verlag, 1996, Rdnr 54, p. 66.
67
Note that the Rome I Regulation refers to habitual residence, where the Brussels I Regulation uses
the concept of domicile. The Concept of habitual residence is defined in Article 19:
1. For the purposes of this Regulation, the habitual residence of companies and other bodies,
corporate or unincorporated, shall be the place of central administration. The habitual residence of a
natural person acting in the course of his business activity shall be his principal place of business.
2. Where the contract is concluded in the course of the operations of a branch, agency or any other
establishment, or if, under the contract, performance is the responsibility of such a branch, agency or
establishment, the place where the branch, agency or any other establishment is located shall be
treated as the place of habitual residence.
3. For the purposes of determining the habitual residence, the relevant point in time shall be the time
of the conclusion of the contract.
24
goods. The payment of money as such does not distinguish the sale of goods from a
contract for the provision of services etc. Hence, the payment of money is rarely
distinctive or in the conflict of laws jargon characteristic. Collective labour
agreements are complex structures containing reciprocal commitments, none of
which are the simple payment of money. Both the employer and the workers
representatives take on obligations which are characteristic for the contractual
(sub)species of collective labour agreement. 68 A possible exception to this could
be a TCA which can be construed as a negotiated unilateral declaration, containing
only commitments of the parent company itself. In that case, the employer performs
the only (hence characteristic) obligation. This obligation is presumed to underlie
the law of his habitual residence. But even in the case of unilateral commitments,
where the employers side has taken on all the obligations, the obligations will often
be compound to be performed in part by the parent company and in part by the
subsidiaries. In these cases too, it might be hard to single out a characteristic
performance. The law applicable to the TCA will have to be determined on the basis
of the closest connection.
Determining the applicable law on the basis of the closest connection always leads
to some uncertainty as well as international variety as to the outcome. When the
Rome Convention was introduced, courts in the different Member States tended to
simply extend their previous approaches to conflict of laws in contract to the
interpretation of the provisions of the Rome Convention. Hence, when the
Convention was converted into a Regulation, the need was felt to circumscribe the
closer connection escape of paragraph 3. Under the Regulation, the presumptions
in paragraph 1 and 2 can only be disregarded when another law is manifestly more
closely connected.69 However, how a court should determine the closer connection
and which circumstances can be relevant in this respect, is not stipulated in the
Regulation itself, nor in its preamble.
In the general literature on private international law several circumstances are
distinguished which have to be taken into account when determining the closest
connection70
-
The parties to the contract and in particular their nationality and domicile.
The stipulations of contract, for example the language, currency of payment

and place of performance of the obligations therein.71
68
Malmberg & Jonsson, National Industrial Relations v. Private International Law A Swedish
Perspective.
69
Compare also preamble 16.
70
C. Reithmann & D.Martiny, Internationales Vertragsrecht, fifth edition, Kln, Dr. Otto Schmidt
Verlag, 1996, Rdnr 127 ff. p. 127 ff. Compare, albeit in connection to an implicit choice of law by
the parties: Coursier, Le conflit de lois en matire de contract de travail, Paris, LGDJ 1993, p. 70 ff.
25
Circumstances surrounding the formation of the contract, in particular the

place of conclusion of the contract.
Any relationship with other contracts such as previous relations between

the same parties or interrelated contracts between different parties.72
In literature on TCAs special weight is given to nationality and domicile of the

parties and to the place of establishment of the business units to which the TCA
applies.73
An example may clarify this approach. Suppose a French parent company enters
into a TCA for its European activities with the European works council, the relevant
European trade union and one or more French unions. The place of establishment of
the main signatory at the employer side will be in France, the contract covers several
business units amongst which the French enterprises, and both the EWC and the
French unions are signatories to the contract. In this case, the combination of
connecting factors will weigh towards the country of establishment of the parent
company, being France. This is helped by the involvement of local unions, a feat not
uncommon with regard to TCAs entered into by French and Nordic transnational
corporations.74 The situation is slightly different for TCAs entered into by
companies headquartered in the Netherlands, Germany and Belgium.75 These often
have only the EWC as a signatory party on the side of the employees. In that case,
the predominance of connecting factors pointing towards the country of
establishment of the parent company is less clear. Lacking a better alternative, courts
may still apply the law of the country of establishment of the parent company, but
the outcome is (even) less secure.
Even when we assume that the place of establishment of the parent company
constitutes a strong connecting factor, there may be good reason to hold that another
71
An interesting contractual stipulation in this respect is to be found in the ENI EWC agreement of
1995 which states that it seeks to confirm its Italian [emphasis added] tradition of labour union
relations at the European level: M. Carley, Bargaining at European level? Joint texts negotiated by
European Works Councils European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working
Conditions, 2001, p. 35-36.
72
Preamble 20/21: In order to determine that country, account should be taken, inter alia, of whether
the contract in question has a very close relationship with another contract or contracts.
73
Compare also Germany, comparative report. For the criteria used to determine the closer connection
in individual labour cases, see inter alia BAG 9 July 2003, 10 AZR 593/02
http://lexetius.com/2003,1833 which mentions the nationality of the parties, the seat of the employer
and the domicile (Wohnort) of the employee as primary factors. Additionally, the court will take into
account the language of the agreement and the currency. See also BAG 12. Dezember 2001 - 5 AZR
255/ 00 - BAGE 100, 130.
74
Eurofound, European and international framework agreements: Practical experiences and strategic
approaches, 2009 p. 24 ff. Nordic countries prefer unions as contractual parties to a TCA; Germany
EWC-involvement.
75
M. Carley (SPIRE Associates), Report of the French EU Presidency conference Transnational

company agreements. Dialogue, rights, anticipating corporate restructuring, actors: A new
perspective, Lyon, 13-14 November 2008/
26
law is more closely connected to the TCA at hand. The place of establishment of the
parent company may have no real connection to the underlying industrial relations.
An example of this would be a (mainly) European Framework Agreement entered
into by the EWC, European and/or international unions with an American
corporation (e.g. GM or Ford). When the EFA mainly concerns industrial relations
in Europe, the choice of law should refer to a European country as well, for example
the Member State which hosts the EWC. These extra-European cases have to be
taken into account as the Rome I Regulation has universal application: it will also
apply if its rules refer to a non-EU system of law.
4.
Main findings with regard to the lex causae of the TCA
When the parties to a TCA do not include a choice of law in their agreement, the law
applying to the TCA has to be found on the basis of Article 4 of the Rome I
Regulation. In the absence of a obligation which characterizes the contract, the law
applying to the TCA will have to be found on the basis of the closest connection.
The seat of the leading company in the enterprise which hosts the EWC, seems to
be an important factor in establishing the closest connection. But the outcome of the
conflict of laws decision will depend on the circumstances of the case, and the
interpretation of the closeness rule may differ according to the court seized. This
inevitably leads to legal uncertainty. Such uncertainty could be mitigated by creating
an assumption in favour of the country of the establishment which hosts the EWC in
the rule of Article 4 Rome I. Within the system of Article 4, such assumption could
only be rebutted when another law is manifestly closer connected.
Parties themselves can end any legal uncertainty as to the law which should apply to
the obligatory aspect of the TCA by expressing a choice of law in the TCA itself.
Whether or not such choice of law could also pertain to the normative effect of the
TCA will be discussed below.
D. Rights and obligations of non-signatories I: national unions and

individual workers
1.
The chain of mandates and third party stipulations.
There is lively discussion as to whether Article 139 EC creates a legal obligation on

the national social partners to implement agreements entered into at the European
level. However, even if a duty to implement is imminent in the Treaty provision, this
will not result in direct normative effect of the TCA with regard to the individual
labour relationships covered by it. If we assume for the sake of argument, that such
direct effect is absent in the case of TCA, the question arises how a binding effect on
national actors can be construed. For a proper analysis of this question, it is
important to describe the several relationships involved in creating normative effect
and the law applicable to those relationships. Central in this description is the
concept of representation or agency.
27
Agency can be defined as the fiduciary relation which results from the
manifestation of consent by one person to the other that the other shall act on his
behalf and subject to his control, and consent by the other so to act.76
Representation can be defined as the mechanism through which the legal act
performed by one person (the agent) is imputed to another (the principal).77 The first
definition focuses on the relationship between agent and principal, whereas the
second stresses the external effects of the agency relationship. Where the power to
bind the principal does not derive from contract, the literature refers to legal
representation as compared to consensual representation.78
The agency relationship itself is covered by the Rome I Regulation. Hence, in
normal circumstances the habitual residence of the agent will be decisive in
determining the applicable law. This may be different when the agency relationship
is an element of another relationship such as an individual employment contract. In
that case, the mandate aspect will (most likely) be covered by the lex causae of the
main relationship.79 The law thus designated determines the mutual rights and
obligations of the agent and principal. This does not answer the question whether the
principal (in this case the daughter company) has become bound by the contract (the
TCA) entered into by the agent (the parent company). Unfortunately, the Rome I
Regulation stipulates that its provisions do not cover the question whether an agent
is able to bind a principal, or an organ to bind a company or other body corporate or
unincorporated, in relation to a third party; As a result, there is no European rule on
this aspect.80 The Hague Convention on Agency refers this question to law of the
state where the agent has his business establishment or alternatively to law of the
state where he acted, if this connecting factor coincides with another relevant
connecting factor such as the place of establishment of the principal or the third
party. This can be only indicative of the relevant choice of law considerations,
however, as the Hague Convention drew a sparse number of four ratifications.81
Comparative literature82 on this matter reveal a wide variety of rules referring to the
locus actus (the place where the agent has acted), the place of business of the agent,
76
Restatement 2d Agency para 1(1), cited in H.L.E. Verhagen, Agency in private international law,
Dordrecht/Boston/Londen, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1993, p. 9.
77
Compare Verhagen, o.c., p. 9, translating definitions form the Dutch, German and French legal
systems.
78
Representation of legal entities by their organs is sometimes looked upon as an intermediary type of
representation. Its based in part on the articles of incorporation (which are drafted by the parties
themselves) but its to a large extent also determined by law.
79
Compare with
regard
to
the
Rome
Convention,
Polak,
meerpartijenverhoudingen, Praktijkreeks IPR, Deventer, Kluwer 1993.
80
There is no other European instrument covering this subject either. The original proposal of the EC
contained a special rule on agency, which also regulated the relationship between the principal and
the third party. See Com(2005)650.
81
The Convention entered into force in 1992, Argentina, France, Netherlands and Portugal are parties
to it.
82
H.L.E. Verhagen, Agency in private international law, Dordrecht/Boston/Londen, Martinus Nijhoff

Publishers, 1993, p. 66 ff.
28
Vermogensrechtelijke
the country of establishment of the principal83, the lex causae of the agency
contract84 and/or the lex causae of the contract concluded by the agent with the third
party.85 This strong divergence demonstrates the lack of consensus on what is
considered to be the most delicate problem in the law on agency: the third party
effect.
It should be kept in mind however, that the basic notion of representation should be
that the agent acts within the confines of his mandate. The issue of third party
protection only arises when the agent exceeds his mandate. In developing a system
for TCA one should not have to depend on this kind of third party protection.
Therefore, we will continue by discussing the law applying to the internal
relationship between agent and principal.
On the side of the employer, the parent company may be the only signatory. When
the affiliates have a separate legal identity from the parent, a signature by the parent
does not legally bind its daughters. Representation would require mandate
(representation or agency). French law seems to contain a special rule on legal
representation for the purpose of collective negotiations by the central undertaking
in a group of undertakings.86 Such legal representation is however, rare. Hence, the
power of attorney will have to be granted by specific mandate. Under the Rome I
Regulation the extent of this mandate will be governed by the law of the place of
establishment of the parent company (being the agent).
Similarly, the European trade union confederations can represent their affiliates,
given a sufficient mandate. In this case, the mandate is embedded in the legal
structure of the association. The bylaws of the association will play an important
role in establishing the mandate requirements. The law applying to the association
will be the law of its seat, though there is no uniform rule on which seat is relevant
in this respect. The Member States still have different conflicts rules on legal
entities, referring to either the statutory seat or the social seat. The ETUC is
established in Belgium under Belgian law and so are the mayor European sectoral
unions.87 This means that the relationship between the European confederations and
83
This referral is largely based on the concept (in civil law) that the granting of authority to the agent is
a unilateral act by the principal. The third party may be protected against apparent (but insufficient)
authority by allowing a third party acting in good faith to rely on the locus actus. H.L.E. Verhagen,
Agency in private international law, Dordrecht/Boston/Londen, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1993, p.
72. Compare Article 13 Rome I which contains a similar rule with regard to incapacity.
84
Sometimes with the protective proviso that the third party can invoke the lex loci actus with regard to
apparent authority, if this is more favourable to him: Koster, Flour and Jobard-Bachelier cited by
Publishers, 1993,p. 69.
85

Publishers, 1993, p. 77 ff. The main argument here is unity within the relationship between principal
and third party.
86
See comparative report.
87
E Franssen, Legal Aspects of the European Social Dialogue, Antwerp/Oxford-New York, Intersentia,
2002.
29
their national members will be governed by Belgian law.88 If no general rules of

mandate are in existence (or operative in the given case), specific mandate will be
required. The ensuing agency relationship will, again, be covered by the law of the
place of establishment of the agent. As the European trade union federation is the
agent, this again leads to application of Belgian law.
The problem of representation recurs at the national level. The European social
dialogue operates through a chain of mandates.89 The European workers
organisation may represent national federations, which in turn represent national
unions representing individual workers.90 Each of these national organisations
operate under a specific national mandate. Even if the national federations would be
considered to be bound to the TCA under the law applying to that specific question,
this does not necessarily entail that also the national unions and the individual
workers are bound to the TCA. The latter questions would depend on
1) the extent of the mandate of the national organisations as well as on
2) the third party effects of representation activities which exceed the mandate
under the relevant applicable law.
If the national chain contains both a national federation and a national union, the
powers of attorney of the national union is a purely national/domestic matter. All
parties in the triangle (the individual workers as principals, the union as the agent
and the national federation as the third party) are situated in a single state. Hence it
will be impossible to construe normative effect through a chain of mandates without
taking into account the law applying to the national union. This law will decide on
the representative powers of the union and the formal and/or procedural
requirements set for it. In case of a chain of mandates as described above, this law
will also decide on the third party effects of representation in violation of the
mandate.
The issue on the effect of a limitation on the mandate of the union is pertinent with
regard to the normative effect of TCAs. Unions may have to follow specific rules
and abide by specific rules in order for the actions to validly represent the workers.
Hungarian law, for instance, seems to require a ballot for a collective agreement to
become binding on the workers. 91 In German law there is a strict demarcation
between the powers of the unions and the powers of the works council. 92 If unions
do not respect these rules, they operate outside their mandate. Could they
88
This is different for the international trade unions which have their seat in Geneva.
89
Jacobs o.c.
90
Compare B. Bercusson, European Labour Law, second edition, Cambridge, Cambridge University
Press, 2009, p. 535.
91
Compare Hungary, in case the union which is a party to the agreement did not receive enough votes
as the last works council election, comparative report.
92
German law requires a strict separation between the two. So called mixed agreements are void, unless
the responsibility of the union is clearly separable from the responsibility of the works council.
30
nevertheless bind the individual workers? A first question would be whether they
could under Hungarian law or German law respectively. If they could not, the
second question would be whether this restriction under national law vitiates the
international agreement either because the restriction is part of the law applying to
that specific issue, or as an overriding mandatory provision. In either case it seems
good practice to respect the law of the place of establishment of the national unions
with regard to the extent of its mandate under national law. This argument is only
strengthened when we take into account the fact that unions may operate under a
legal rather than a consensual mandate. Countries which grant automatic extension
to collective agreements allow the unions to act on behalf of non-organized workers
as well as organized workers. Their mandate is only partially consensual. This legal
mandate will by necessity be covered by the national law that created it.93
Accordingly, unions operate under a national mandate, the limits of which they
should respect. Though there is no clear private international law rule on the binding
effect of representation outside the mandate, parties to a TCA should not rely on
private international law in order to avoid national rules on representation. Under the
current divergence as to the representational powers of national unions, the reference
to national law for the extent of union mandate does, however, make it extremely
difficult if not impossible to reach a uniform normative effect of TCAs in all the
member states concerned.
This would not be very different under the concept of third party stipulation. Third
party stipulations are part of the contract and are governed by the law applying to
the contract as such. There seems to be no problem for a national union to accept a
unilateral commitment on the side of the employer. In doing this, the union will
submit to the law applying to the contract with regard to the extent of the
commitments undertaken by the promissor (in this case, the employer).94 However,
as soon as the third party stipulation entails duties on the part of the third party, the
situation becomes more complex. A national union could probably create legal
obligations for itself by accepting a third party stipulation made on its behalf.
However, it may not be allowed to do so on behalf of its members. The latter
question would again primarily depend on the law applying to the unions mandate
as such. Which law would apply to the effect of acceptance in violation of the
national mandate is again unclear.
The parties to a TCA are to a large extent able to remedy the quagmire caused by the
complexity of the relationships in combination with an absence of clear European
rules. If they want the TCA to be binding on the daughter companies and national
unions, they should ensure they have a clear and sufficient mandate for the
93
See Comparative report, France. Compare H.L.E. Verhagen, Agency in private international law,
Dordrecht/Boston/Londen, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1993, p. 120 who seems to refer situations in
which the authority of the agent is predetermined by law, such as the German Prokurat, to the law
creating the legal mandate.
94
Compare for the use of the concept of unilateral commitments to create obligations from a TCA inter
alia France comparative report.
31
negotiations.95 Alternatively (or additionally), they could offer the result of the
negotiations to the national entities for ratification. In any case, it would seem that
the mandate given by the national unions to the European federation can not
circumvent the national requirements for normative effect of collective agreements.
Thus, the national unions can bind themselves directly or through representation96,
but they may not be able to directly bind the employees. This means that TCAs will
more often than not require national implementation. This conclusion conforms with
one frequently encountered in literature on TCAs.97 It also conforms with the
position chosen in Article 139 EC.
2.
Interim conclusion on representation
There is no European rule that determines in an unequivocal and uniform way which
law applies to the question whether an agent is able to bind a principal ... in relation
to a third party. That means that it is difficult to assess the law which will
determine the binding effect (or not) of TCA commitments with regards to the
national unions and/or the national affiliates of the employer. This situation could of
course be remedied by creating a European rule on this particular issue. However,
the fact that such rule could not be agreed upon during the negotiations on the Rome
I Regulation makes the prospect of success in the short term rather bleak.
In the meantime, the signatories to the TCA could circumvent this problem by
ensuring specific and adequate mandate. The national unions should not however,
exceed the mandate they hold with regard to the individual workers. This mandate is
determined by the national law under which they operate.
The national character of the mandate of national unions limits the possibility to
create direct normative effect for TCAs through a chain of mandates. Such direct
normative effect will simply not be accepted in all member states. A (less than
perfect) solution to this problem would be to insert a specific duty to implement in
the TCA.
E. Normative effect through the law applying to the TCA?

1.
National reception and extraterritorial effect
The several overviews of TCAs entered into in Europe contain examples of TCAs
which are registered under national (French) law as being a (French) collective
95
Inter alia Bercusson 2009 stresses the importance of clear rules on internal decision making as part of
legitimate representation at the European level.
96
In some occasion excession of the general mandate or the union may lead to individual liability of the
persons acting in its name. This would be determined by the law applying to the organisation as such.
97
Compare also European Commission, General Directorate Employment, Social Affairs and Equal
Opportunities. Second study seminar transnational agreements 27 November 2006, Working
Document no 3.
32
agreement.98 It that case, the TCA is recognized within the national system as a
collective agreement and is given the status and legal effects consequent with that.
One of the results under French law is that the collective agreement is legally
binding with regard to all employees of the employer who is a party to the
agreement (directly or indirectly). This binding effect does not depend on unionmembership of the employees. The relevant question here would be whether this
binding effect extents to all labour relationships covered by the TCA. Is
recognition of the TCA under French law universal or rather restricted to the
individual and collective labour relationships in France and/or governed by French
law?
There are several reasons why the normative effect of such reception by national law
might be limited geographically. Firstly, obstacles might arise under the law
applicable to the TCA as such. To be recognized as a collective agreement under the
national system, the TCA would have to fulfil the requirements of the national law.
These may differ from state to state: the national reports show the divergence in
criteria used. Criteria with regard to representativeness of the union and/or the legal
capacity thereof might make it difficult to recognize contracts entered into by
European federations.99 Sometimes even the recognition of foreign unions might
prove difficult. In this respect it is interesting to note that the French TCAs were
signed by French unions alongside the several European/international actors.
The French trade unions will most likely qualify as legitimate parties to a collective
agreement under French law at least in general. And under French law, once a
collective agreement is concluded, it binds the employer with regard to all his
employees, regardless of the place of work. But here another dilemma arises. To
what extent can national unions represent foreign workers? The criteria for
representativeness described in the French report include activity in the enterprise
and a minimum of votes in the works council election. Such criteria will make it
impossible for a French union to represent workers in the foreign undertakings of
the multinational enterprise. Accordingly, the French union will have national
mandate only: though the collective agreement may have universal application in
theory, it only applies to workers who are considered to be employed by the mother
company in France. This creates a catch 22 as the French unions may not have a
mandate to represent the workforce in other member states, whereas the foreign
unions may not have the legal capacity to be parties to a French collective
agreement. In those cases the French recognition of the TCA as a collective
agreement would be partial only: it is limited to the local (= French) undertakings of
the group of companies.
The problem of extraterritorial effect of collective agreements can also be put in
terms of conflict of laws. Can national collective agreements legitimately regulate
foreign labour relationships? The German report refers to a case decided by the
Bundesarbeitsgericht in 2003 in which the application of a German collective
98
E.g. the Suez and Air France agreements.
99
Compare Belgium and Germany.
33
agreement is made dependent on German law applying to the individual labour

contract.100 The case dealt with the application of a German collective agreement on
social funds in the construction sector to foreign workers posted to Germany. The
BAG concluded that the individual contracts were governed by Italian law. Hence
the collective agreement could only apply by way of overriding mandatory provision
in the meaning of Article 7 of the Rome Convention (Article 9 of the Rome I
Regulation). This mandatory character was lacking, according to the BAG.101
It is not evident that this case is also relevant for collective agreements which are
entered into voluntarily by the employer. In the situation discussed in the previous
paragraph the German collective agreement was declared universally applicable. It
claimed application to the specific case on the basis of its autonomous scope of
application. It was in all respects an overriding provision: it applied independent of
the will of either employer and employee, and it claimed application regardless of
the law applying to the individual labour contract. The latter is only acceptable
under the Rome I Regulation if the overriding provision can be considered to be
crucial for safeguarding the states public interests, such as its political, social or
economic organisation.102 Private agreements will as a rule not fulfil this
requirement.103
But maybe they dont have to. TCAs can be distinguished by their voluntary
character from collective agreements which are made generally binding by
government decree. The extraterritorial effect, too, is voluntary e.g. agreed upon by
the parties to the TCA. There is a certain practice of extraterritorial collective
agreements outside the more recent use of TCAs. An often cited example is the
collective agreement for the German Goethe Institutes world wide subsidiaries.104
Demarne defends the thesis that an employer can grant rights to his employees,
wherever they are actually performing their duties under the contract, as long as the
collective agreement respects the local law.105 She refers for this to the German
Gnstigkeitsprinzip, which is very similar to the French ordre public social of
100
BAG judgement of 9 July 2003 10 AZR 593/02, AP TVG para 1 Tarifvertrge Bau Nr. 261. By
contrast, Demarne, p. 100, in a work predating this case, claims that German collective agreements
can cover labour contracts entered into and executed abroad, given a sufficient mandate. She gives
examples of existing company agreements which have such extraterritorial scope. Under the concept
of ordre public social such agreement could better the position of the workers covered, regardless of
the applicable law. The link between application of a Dutch collective agreement and application of
Dutch law to the labour contract is also made by the Dutch court of appeal of Den Bosch. The
decision dealt with the sector agreement for the international transport sector. Compare also for
French law, Demarne p. 74.
101
The facts of the case predate the entry into force of the posting directive (Dir 96/71/EC).
102
And even then, other states need not recognize the overriding effect of the mandatory provision. See
Article 9 Rome I.
103
Compare on the use of the public policy by trade unions: ECJ 18 December 2007, C-341/05, Laval.
104
See e.g. Demarne, Anwendung nationaler Tarifvertge bei grenzberschreitenden

Arbeitsverhltnissen, Frankfurt am Main, Peter Lang Verlag, 1999 and A. Van Hoek, Internationale
mobiliteit van werknemers, Den Haag, SDU, 2000.
105
Demarne, Anwendung nationaler Tarifvertge bei grenzberschreitenden Arbeitsverhltnissen,

Frankfurt am Main, Peter Lang Verlag, 1999, p. 74-75.
34
principe de faveur as these terms are understood in private international law.106

This favour-principle would allow private parties to deviate from mandatory
provisions in the relevant labour laws if this offers better protection to the
employees. Likewise, under the German Prinzip, a collective agreement can add to
the protection which the individual worker enjoys by virtue of his individual
contract but it cant subtract from it. This would mean however, that the binding
effect which German law would provide to the Goethe Institutes collective
agreement is conditional in two ways:
-
the collective agreement does bind the employer, but may not be able to
bind the worker;
the collective agreement is to be applied subsidiary to (or at least in respect

of) the laws and local collective agreements applying at the place of
execution of the contract.
The Gnstigkeits-principle could mitigate the problems of applying a German or

French collective agreement to contracts governed by another legal system.
However, it does not cure all ills. What it does demonstrate is that unilateral
recognition in the country of origin of the TCA does not suffice to give it legal
effect: the TCA also needs to be recognized by the jurisdictions in which it wants
to have legal effect.
The English report suggests that English courts may be willing to accept the binding
character which is attributed to a TCA by the applicable foreign law. However,
whether this system would recognize any direct normative effect (i.e. a mandatory
character with regard to the individual employees) is unclear. The position of
Germany leaves room for doubt, given the necessary link between the collective
agreement and the law applying to the individual labour contract. But a more serious
problem with regard the recognition of TCAs in Germany would be the strict
division of powers between unions and works councils which is prevalent in
Germany. A TCA which does not respect that division would be void under German
law. It is unlikely that a foreign TCA which likewise violates the division of
powers, would nevertheless be accepted for application in the German subsidiaries.
This means that the reception of a TCA is a double sided sword: there are risks and
requirements at both ends which could prove to be insurmountable obstacles for
creating a direct normative effect. Moreover, even when a TCA is recognized in the
country of origin, uniform application of the TCA in the several member states
affected by it can not be guaranteed. Reception may work in individual cases, but
can not be relied upon as a general method of implementation in the EU.
106
See for example Demarne, o.c., p. 296, 313 ff.
35
2.
Main findings with regard to the reception of TCAs
In some cases, the national system which hosts the TCA might be willing to treat
the TCA as a collective agreement under national law. Such reception may create
binding obligations both at the collective level and the individual level if national
law so provides.
However, any normative effect thus granted may be limited to the (individual and/or
collective) labour relationships that have a relevant connection to the national
territory. This territorial limitation may be caused by requirement of the system
hosting the TCA, e.g. with regard to the representativeness of the unions
concerned. But also the other countries in which the TCA is to be applied may create
obstacles. These may again relate to representativity requirements, but also the
division of powers between the unions and the works council may create obstacles
for recognition.
This means that under the current diversity of legal systems, the obstacles for mutual
recognition are manifold. For that reason we do not believe that national reception
can be a general method of implementation.
F. Applicable law in case of enforcement as part of the individual labour

contract and/or company usage
We discuss these routes for enforcement in order to paint a full picture of all
possible ways in which the TCA can assert influence on the labour relationships at
the individual level. However, when the individual labour contract or the unilateral
prerogatives of the employer to install shop rules or usages are needed, the collective
consensual element of the TCA is lost. In that respect the individual enforcement
options are second best solutions. In some cases they may be effective, though. The
2006 Commission working document mentions the example of a clause in a TCA
foreclosing the introduction of a probation period in the contract of an employee
who has been subject to a mobility programme. This clause is deemed by the
employer to be opposable. This suggests that an employee could call upon the
TCA to have the clause removed from the contract. Likewise, Dutch law offers
opportunities to give binding effect to TCA and corporate conduct codes through the
use of open norms (such as good employership).107
If the individual contract of employment is chosen as point of entrance for
enforcement of the TCA, the law applicable to the individual labour contract will be
relevant for deciding on the requirements for and limits to such enforcement. The
law applying to an individual labour contract is determined primarily by the law of
the country where or from which the employee habitually performs his work under
the contract. In most cases this will be the country of establishment of the
subsidiary. Depending on the subject (individual or collective) the binding character
of shop rules will also be determined on the basis of the lex causae of the labour
107
See Dutch report.
36
contracts covered or rather the law of the place of establishment of the shop. In
most cases, these two laws coincide and refer to the place of establishment of the
labour unit in which the work is performed. This, again, leads to divergent
implementation in the several states covered by the TCA.
In short, also the individual enforcement methods lead to a fragmentation of the
TCA into a transnational commitment combined with dispersed national
commitments in the several states covered by the TCA.
G. Rights and obligations of non-signatories II: the special problem of the

(European or national) works councils
1.
Legal capacity and the classification of claims
As has been documented extensively, TCA are often negotiated by European Works
Councils. The same EWCs are also in a considerable number of cases one of the
signatories (or even the only one) on the side of the employees. It would be tempting
to treat any claim by a EWC member as contractual, and treat the position of
national works councils as a matter of mandate. However, here we come across the
problem of the non-existence of the EWC as a legal entity.108 Any right to enter into
agreements and to claim rights thereunder must be derived from statute. In some
countries, the works councils have such rights.109 If the works councils have the
capacity to enter into agreements with the employer, the ensuing enforcement of the
agreements by that same works council may in our opinion be classified as
contractual.110 As been stated above, the law applying to such contracts will be
determined on the basis of the closest connection. This connecting factor will most
likely refer to the country of establishment of company hosting the works council,
especially if when the EWC also meets there. Alternatively, the claim could be
classified as been statutory. In that case it is based on the national law regulating the
European works council. This law would normally be the place of establishment of
the central management of the European group of companies. In both classifications,
the place of establishment of the central management of the group comes up as a
important connecting factor with regard to TCAs.
More problematic are those systems in which only the individual members of the
works council may claim judicial enforcement of the works councils rights and
prerogatives. In those countries, works council may not have legal capacity either to
108
Though the EWC may have limited legal capacity. The latter is quite usual, see e.g. France,
Germany, the Netherlands.
109
E.g. Germany: see comparative report and C. Sachs-Durand, Consultation, Negotiation and
Codetermination in Europe, in: A. Veldman, F. Pennings, & Y. Konijn (Eds.), Social responsibility
in labour relations: European and comparative perspectives, Austin / Boston / Chicago / New York /
The Netherlands, Kluwer Law International (Studies in employment and social policy, 38), p. 461. In
Sweden, the EWC has legal capacity, national works councils do not exist: Swedish report.
110
Hence we disagree with the position described in the German report, which puts the relationship
between works council and management outside the scope of application of the Rome I Regulation.
37
enter into an agreement or to enforce it.111 Examples can be found in the reports on
Belgium, Hungary and the UK. This may create various difficulties of which the
classification of the claim is but one. Countries that use the individual enforcement
route, will have statutory provisions which form the legal basis of the claims by
individual representatives. These statutory provisions may be available to enforce
TCA provisions relating to information and consultation rights of the local (or
European) works councils. The legal provisions will most likely not suffice as a
basis for provisions in TCAs which address other issues. Hence another legal base
for the claim is necessary.
It may be impossible to base the claim of the individual members on their contracts
of employment, as the members may be employed by an affiliate whereas the TCA
was entered into by the parent company. The individual members themselves may
not be a direct party to the TCA either, for example because it was entered into
before they became a member of the works council. If the individual employee can
be deemed to be a party to the TCA, the relationship will be contractual. When the
relationship is constructed to exist with the individual members of the EWC, the
TCA is by necessity a multi-party contract.
As a subsidiary route, the French and Belgian reports describe the classification of
TCAs as unilateral commitments of the employer.112 Such unilateral commitments
would result in contractual claims under the Brussels I Regulation. Given the
parallelism between the Brussels I Regulation and the Rome I Regulation, this leads
to the assumption that the unilateral commitment itself would be covered by the
Rome I Regulation. Application of the conflict of laws rules of Article 4 would lead
to application of the law of the place of establishment of the employer: in the case of
unilateral commitments the promissor fulfils the characteristic performance.
There are good arguments to claim that the TCA relationship even when construed
as contractual commitments towards individual employees should be treated
separately from the underlying individual labour contracts (see also the chapter on
jurisdiction). That would mean that the applicable law should be determined on the
basis of the closest connection as prescribed by Article 4 Rome I. When determining
the closest connection it would not seem advisable to lay much weight on the factors
relating to the individual employee, since he or she is but one of the parties on the
side of the employees. Accordingly, the closest connection should be based on the
place of establishment and the centre of gravity of the commitments towards the
community of workers and/or their representatives.
The issue of mandate of the EWC is even trickier than the mandate of the national
and European confederations of unions. The EWC has a clear mandate under the
111
E.g. Hungary: WC are not legal entities, they can not enter into agreements and have limited ius
standi (with regard to statutory prerogatives only). UK: no legal personality for works councils.
Enforcement (if any) by individual workers. B: interestingly enough works council and other
representative bodies may enter into agreements with the employer. However, they can not enforce
them, because they lack ius standi. Individual workers will have to ensure enforcement.
112
See also C. Sachs-Durand, l.c., p. 462.
38
Directive, but TCAs as currently discussed are not (or at least not in their entirety)
covered by the Directive. Hence there is no legal base for the mandate of the EWC
in respect of the national works councils and/or the individual workers in European
law. National law may provide such legal base as for example German law seems to
do. However, it is doubtful that this national mandate can have extraterritorial
effect. The problems which arise here are similar to the ones discussed above with
regard to national recognition of collective agreements. If the EWC want to bind the
national works council, it would need a specific mandate. Whether the national
works councils could actually provide the EWC with such a mandate, would again
depend on the various national laws governing the national works councils.113
2.
Main findings with regard to the position of the works councils
The legal capacity of works council (even EWC) differ considerably from member
state to member state. They may or may not be able to enter into agreements, they
may or may not be able to defend their rights and prerogatives in court. This creates
problems not only with regard to effective enforcement of TCAs but also with
regard to conflict of laws. The absence of legal capacity for the EWC forces the
national systems to use legal constructions in order to create enforceable effects for
agreements entered into by the EWC. These constructions add to the already
existing uncertainty as to the law applicable to the TCA. The problem of legal
capacity could be solved by giving the EWC itself (limited) legal capacity. This
could be done in the ECW directive. The uncertainty regarding the applicable law
may be solved by creating a special presumption in Article 4 of the Rome I
Regulation.
H. Conclusion as choice of law under Rome I

The law applicable to the TCA will most likely have to be found by applying the
Rome I Regulation. This Regulation is based on party autonomy. This means that
the parties to a TCA can determine the law to be applied to their agreements
themselves. Choice of law has only limited effect in individual labour contracts, but
this does not affect the validity of a choice of law in a collective agreement. Such
choice of law will remove any unclarity with regard to the law determining the
obligatory aspects of the TCA.
When no choice is expressed in the TCA (or can be implied from it), the applicable
law has to be determined first by enquiring whether there is a party which perform
113
The tension between negotiation by works councils and negotiations by trade unions is a recurring
theme in the literature on TCAs and similar negotiated instruments of corporate conduct. See inter
alia B. Bercusson, European Labour Law, second edition, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press,
2009; F. Dorssemont, Corporate Social Responsibility and (European) Labour Law, Friends of Foes?
in: Pennings, Konijn & Veldman (eds.), Social Responsibility in Labour Relations, Kluwer Law
International, 2008, p. 68; and A. Jacobs, The Revision of the EU Directive on European Works
Councils, ibidem, p. 472-473. See on the privileged position of the trade union: De Laat/ Van
Slooten, ILO Conventions 135 and 154 and Works Councils Power, ibidem, p. 443 ff.
39
the obligation characteristic of the contract type. This party may be impossible to
discern in the case of TCAs. In that case, the Rome I Regulation refers to the law
with the closest connection. That means that the law has to be found by weighing the
circumstances of the case. In this process central management of the leading
company plays an important role, as does the location of the workforce.
The closest connection rule is an open one. This creates flexibility, but causes
uncertainty. It might be an option to supplement the rules of Article 4 Rome I with a
special sub-rule on TCAs. This sub-rule would establish the presumption that a
TCA is governed by the law of the place of establishment of central management of
the leading company. This presumption can be rebutted if another law is manifestly
closer connected. 114
The law applicable to the TCA itself can not determine the normative effect thereof.
At least not in a uniform fashion. The report deals with several aspects of normative
effect, inter alia representation and reception/recognition as a collective agreement
by the lex causae to the TCA. This overview clearly demonstrates that under the
current diversity, any binding effect of the TCA on national industrial relations will
have to respect the national rules which define those industrial relations. The
relevant differences between the Member States pertain to inter alia the requirements
for horizontal effect of collective agreements and the division of powers between
unions and works councils. The consequence of this is, that TCAs will have to be
ratified by national social partners and implemented in conformity with national
standards. Only a superimposed European system may be able to change that, but
this option seems unfeasible.
Accordingly, the TCA (and consequently the enforcement thereof) is split up in a
European, obligatory part and a set of national implementation measures.
I. Rights of non-signatories III: consumers, competitors and (potential)

sub-contractors
1.
Introduction
As regards third parties, the first question to be answered concerns the legal base on
which they might base a claim for enforcement, may be bound by it or rather may
object to the content of a TCA. The national experts express considerable doubt as
to the legal possibilities of third parties to rely on a TCA or oppose it. They refer to
several mechanisms which might be used, but all express doubts as to the chances of
success. The legal concepts which are mentioned most often are unfair competition
and unfair commercial practices. The latter refers to a set of rules which protect
consumers against inter alia misleading advertising. Unfair competition sounds in
tort. Misleading advertising and unfair commercial practices might lead to recission
114
One point of negotiations would be whether the presumption should be displaced as soon as another
law has a closer connection (compare Article 8 sub 4 on individual labour contracts) or only when the
contract is manifestly more closely connected to another country (Article 4 sub 3).
40
of a consumer contract. However, if enforcement is done by special interest groups,

their claim will be non-contractual (compare the chapter on jurisdiction). These two
tortuous mechanisms will be discussed briefly for the choice of law implications.
Other mechanisms are also referred to, albeit less consistently. Acquiring companies
may be bound by a TCA if the TCA is considered to be a collective agreement (see
the directive on the transfer of undertakings). For the choice of law complications of
a transfer of undertaking, the reader is referred to the special studies on this topic
commissioned by the European Commission. Other constructions mentioned in the
reports are a contractual commitment by a subcontractor to respect the TCA and
wrongful interference with a contract.115 The former will lead to contractual
obligations, whereas the latter is clearly tortuous. The mechanisms will not be
discussed separately.
2.
Rome II
The Rome II Regulation was the first choice of law regulation to be adopted under
the new powers conferred upon the EC by the Treaty of Amsterdam.116 It is meant to
complement the regimes of the Brussels I Regulation and the Rome I Regulation
(then still a Convention). As such, both the substantive scope and the provisions of
the Rome II Regulation should be interpreted in a manner consistent with the two
said Regulations.117 This requirement of consistency impacts inter alia on the
concept of civil and commercial matters and the concept of non-contractual
obligations. For specific information on these topics, the reader is referred to the
previous chapter of this study.118
For tort and delict, the Regulation contains several multilateral conflict rules The
ones of interest to us are Article 4, Article 6 and Article 14. Article 4 contains the
general choice of law rule for torts and delicts. Article 6 contains a special rule for
unfair competition. Article 14 contains a rule on choice of law by the parties. Under
Article 14, the parties may agree to submit non-contractual obligations to the law of
their choice either by an agreement entered into after the event giving rise to the
damage occurred or where all the parties are pursuing a commercial activity, by an
agreement freely negotiated before the event giving rise to the damage occurred. So
115
This construction is mentioned for instance in the Belgian report.
116
A. Dickinson, The Rome II Regulation (the law applicable to non-contractual obligations), Oxford,
Oxford University Press, 2008, p. 4 and 29.
117
Recital 7. A. Dickinson, The Rome II Regulation (the law applicable to non-contractual obligations),
Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2008, p. 134 and 148 ff.
118
It should be noted however, that the Brussels I Regulation uses a slightly different terminology from
the Rome I and Rome II regulations. A. Dickinson, The Rome II Regulation (the law applicable to
non-contractual obligations), Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2008, p. 177. Advocate General
Jacobs has described the difference between contract and tort by distinguishing the source of the
obligation which was breached by the defendant, leading to liability for damages. In the case of
contract, this obligation is based on agreement. In the case of tort, the obligation is based on the law.
Opinion to C-26/91, ECR 1990 I-3967, Jacob Handte. A. Dickinson, The Rome II Regulation (the
law applicable to non-contractual obligations), Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2008, p. 179.
41
the Regulation is based on party-autonomy. However, choice of law by the parties is

not open to all non-contractual obligations. For instance, and of direct relevance to
us, it can not be applied in cases of unfair competition.
The general rule of Article 4 refers the non-contractual obligation to the law of the
country in which the damage occurs (para 1). So, the locus actus is irrelevant, the
locus damni is decisive. Hence, under the Regulation it will be crucial to determine
where the damage has occurred.119 The locus damni connection is replaced by the
common habitual residence however, where the person claimed to be liable and the
person sustaining damage both have their habitual residence in the same country at
the time when the damage occurs (para 2). Finally, the rule of Article 4 is open
ended, leaving room for derogation from the presumptions in paragraph 1 and 2
where it is clear from all the circumstances of the case that the tort/delict is
manifestly more closely connected with a country other than that indicated in
paragraphs 1 or 2. This derogation is similar to the one found in Article 4 of the
Rome I Regulation.
Paragraph 3 contains a specification of the closer connection where it states that A
manifestly closer connection with another country might be based in particular on a
pre-existing relationship between the parties, such as a contract, that is closely
connected with the tort/delict in question. This rule may be relevant for example for
industrial accidents. The liability for damages in those cases may be framed both in
contract and in tort at least in some jurisdictions. The Rome II Regulation tries to
cater for this problem, not so much be deciding to treat the claim as non-contractual
or rather contractual, but by ensuring that courts may (where appropriate) apply a
single law to the issue of liability, regardless of characterisations.120
The Article which seems to have the most relevance for the enforcement of TCAs
by third parties is Article 6. This Article applies both to unfair competition and acts
restricting free competition. The concept of unfair competition covers inter alia
misleading advertising and forced sales, passing off, boycott and industrial
espionage.121 The concept is broad enough to include both rules that protect
consumers and rules that specifically protect competitors. This means that actions
taken by consumer organisations based on misrepresentation will be covered by the
concept. But also competitors may rely on it to fight misleading advertising. In
practice, companies have already been held liable for misrepresentation under
domestic law when their corporate social responsibility code did not conform to
119
Compare A. Van Hoek, in: A. Veldman, F. Pennings, & Y. Konijn (Eds.), Social responsibility in
labour relations: European and comparative perspectives, Austin / Boston / Chicago / New York /
The Netherlands, Kluwer Law International; Dickinson, The Rome II Regulation and the chapter on
jurisdiction.
120
Compare A. Dickinson, The Rome II Regulation (the law applicable to non-contractual obligations),
Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2008, p. 344/345.
121
A. Dickinson, The Rome II Regulation (the law applicable to non-contractual obligations), Oxford,
Oxford University Press, 2008, p. 400 ff. See for a definition of unfair commercial practices in B2C
relations: Directive 2005/87/EC OJ L 149/22.
42
company practice. Such a claim would come within the scope of application of
Article 6 (1) and (2) for choice of law purposes.
The remainder or Article 6 deals with restrictions of competition. This mainly refers
to Article 81 and 82 of the EC-Treaty and similar obligations under national
competition law. The provision seems less relevant for the enforcement of TCAs.122
Article 6 (1) states that The law applicable to a non-contractual obligation arising
out of an act of unfair competition shall be the law of the country where competitive
relations or the collective interests of consumers are, or are likely to be, affected. If
the consumers are spread out over several countries, the provision will refer each
group to its own law: This is referred to as the Mosaic principle. This rule does not
apply where an act of unfair competition affects exclusively the interests of a
specific competitor. In that case, the normal rules of Article 4 apply. The law
applicable under Article 6 is not open to party autonomy, as the provision is deemed
to relate to public interests, rather than private interest.
The special rule in Article 6 is not an exception to the general rule in Article 4(1) but
rather a clarification of it. This means that the affected market will be considered to
be the locus damni. The interpretation of this connecting factor is likely to be
affected by the interpretation of the parallel provision of the Brussels I Regulation
(see in the relevant chapter).
3.
Conclusion as to extra-contractual liability
The issue of extra-contractual liability is regulated by the Rome II Regulation. This

regulation contains a special provision on unfair competition which could be used
both by competitors and consumers in conflicts over the enforcement of TCAs. The
rule refers to the market on which the competition is unduly influenced.
122
Unless of course the use of the TCA in the relationship with sub-contractors may be thought to
restrict competition.
43
II.
Jurisdiction
A. Introduction
1.
Dispute settlement and the courts
The Brussels I Regulation applies to civil and commercial matters. Social security
and tax matters are excluded from its scope of application. The exact meaning of
these restrictions is discussed in Chapter I and Annex I. However, Article 1 of the
Regulation contains one more exception which is of relevance to the study at hand.
In paragraph 2 subsection d) arbitration is excluded from the scope of application of
the Regulation. This means that issues concerning the validity of an arbitration
agreements and the effect of such agreements on the competence of the courts are
left to the national systems and/or any applicable conventions. The main convention
in this field is the New York arbitration convention of 1958 which is signed by all
member states of the EU.123 However, this convention contains the possibility to
restrict its application to arbitration in commercial conflicts.124 Several member
states have made this reservation,125 reducing the relevance of the convention as a
harmonisation measure for ADR mechanisms in the social field in Europe.
The overview in Chapter V demonstrates that there is a large variety in voluntary
and/or compulsory ADR mechanisms in the social field. We do not purport to
express any preference as to the best way to solve disputes with regard to the
interpretation and/or implementation and enforcement of TCAs. The current
chapter is limited to questions regarding jurisdiction of the courts in transnational
conflicts: if one of the parties would choose to go to court, what are the rules
pertaining to international jurisdiction? And how can these rules be evaluated in
their distributive function how do they allot jurisdiction between the several
interested national systems.
123
http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/arbitration/NYConvention.html.
124
Article 1Section 3 read as follows: When signing, ratifying or acceding to this Convention, or
notifying extension under article X hereof, any State may on the basis of reciprocity. declare that it
will apply the Convention to the recognition and enforcement of awards made only in the territory of
another Contracting State. It may also declare that it will apply the Convention only to differences
arising out of legal relationships, whether contractual or not, which are considered as commercial
under the national law of the State making such declaration.
125
The reservation was made by Cyprus, Denmark, Greece, Hungary and Romania. Several other
member states however, have made the reservation that they will only apply the convention on the
basis of reciprocity.
44
2.
Structure of the Regulation
The main European instrument for jurisdiction in civil and commercial matters is the
Brussels I Regulation126. This regulation deals with both jurisdiction and recognition
of judgements. In this study only the first set of rules are relevant.
The chapter on jurisdiction contains a system of jurisdiction based on general
jurisdiction for the courts of the country of domicile of the defendant (forum rei).
This means that a defendant who is domiciled in a Member State, may - with some
exceptions to be discussed below always be sued in that Member State, regardless
of the exact basis of the claim or claims against him.127 The court of the domicile of
the defendant is considered to be the natural court for this defendant. The
Regulation contains special provisions on the question of domicile of natural
persons (Article 59) and legal entities (Article 60). Article 60 provides a set of
alternatives on which domicile of legal entities can be based, referring to the
statutory seat, central administration and principal place of business respectively. In
this way Article 60 seeks to accommodate the different private international law
systems which prevail in the EU with regard to legal entities. However broad the
definition may be, it does not cover an American company which has its main
establishment in the USA (e.g. GM128 or Ford129). This means that when such
American legal entity is a party to a TCA (rather than or in conjunction with its
European headquarter-company), jurisdiction against this American legal entity has
to be determined on the basis of national rules of jurisdiction.130 These rules vary
considerably between the Member States and are described in detail in the Study on
Residual Jurisdiction commissioned by the European Commission in 2005.131 But in
most Member States there will be jurisdiction over the American company when this
company has an establishment or branch in that state and the conflict relates to the
operations of that branch or establishment.132
126
Regulation 44/2001/EC of the Council of 22 December 2000 on Jurisdiction and the Recognition and
Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, 2001 OJ (L 012).
127
Preambule (11) and Article 2 of Regulation 44/2001/EC and European Commission, a Strategy to
Improve the Operation of the VAT System Within the Context of the Internal Market Com (1999)
348 final (7 Juni 2000), p. 13.
128
See www.gm.com for information on the new and old GM companies.
129
See www.ford.com.
130
Article 4 of Regulation 44/2001/EC. See also Com (1999) 348 final (7 Juni 2000), p. 13. Jurisdiction
over companies domiciled in Iceland, Norway or Switzerland is determined on the basis of the
Lugano Convention a convention which is based on the Brussels Convention and almost identical
in its content.
131
Arnaud Nuyts, e.a. Study on Residual Jurisdiction, General Report 3 September 2007, Service
contract JLS/C4/2005/07-30-CE)0040309/00-37.
132
This rule pertains to separate establishments within a single legal entity. Separate legal entities within
the multinational enterprise which are incorporated in one the Member States of the EU will have
their domicile in the EU and jurisdiction over them will be covered by the Regulation.
45
When the defendant is domiciled in a Member State the courts of other Member
States may only assume jurisdiction if the Regulation so provides.133 It does in the
form of either alternative grounds of jurisdiction which form an alternative to the
co-existing jurisdiction of the forum rei, or exclusive grounds of jurisdiction which
oust the jurisdiction at the domicile of defendant. It is important to realize that
jurisdiction is claim-dependant. Whereas choice-of-law rules try to determine the
law applying to a specific legal relationship134, rules of jurisdiction decide which
court is competent to hear a specific claim against a specific defendant. Even if the
question which lies at the heart of the procedure concerns the validity and legal
effect of a TCA, the relevant question here is whether the claim put before the court
sounds in contract, tort or otherwise. It is the legal qualification (also referred to as
classification or characterization) of the specific claim which determines special
jurisdiction under the Regulation.
Alternative grounds of jurisdiction can be found in Article 5 and 6 of the Regulation.
These articles provide for jurisdiction of a specific court over a specific dispute in
which defendant is a party. In those cases, jurisdiction is granted because of a close
link between the court and the action pursued and/or the need to facilitate the sound
administration of justice.
A in the context of this study topical example of alternative jurisdiction is to be
found in Article 5 sub 3 which grants jurisdiction to the courts of the place where the
harmful event occurred or may occur in matters relating to tort, delict or quasidelict. Jurisdiction at the locus delicti is justified inter alia by the availability of
evidence at this location. Hence, the close link between an action in tort and the
court at the place of the tort warrants a specific, alternative ground of jurisdiction.
This extra jurisdiction is only available when the place of the tort is situated in a
Member State other than the State of domicile of the defendant.135
Article 5 deals, inter alia and as far as relevant for the current studies, with
jurisdiction in matters relating to contract (sub 1), matters relating to tort, delict or
quasi-delict (sub 3) and disputes arising out of the operation of a branch, agency or
other establishment (sub 5). Article 6 provides for alternatives based on proficiency
and the sound administration of justice. It deals with multiparty proceedings (para 1
and 2), counterclaims (para 3) and the joinder of contractual claims to rights in rem
(para 4). As TCAs involve multiple parties Article 6 para 1 and 2 are of clear
133
See Article 3 of Regulation 44/2001/EC.
134
C.M.V. Clarkson & J. Hill, The Conflict of Laws 3d edition, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2006,
p. 456 distinguishes between characterization of the facts, the cause of action and the legal issue.
Strikwerda para 44 ff would rather characterize legal relationships and legal fact patterns. This seems
to represent a divide between the common law and the civil law tradition. But also as a practical
matter: a narrow conflict of laws category may embrace only a single legal issue (capacity to marry),
whereas the wider category encompass an entire range of issues relating to a specific legal
relationship (e.g. contract or marriage or liability in tort).
135
When domicile and place of tort are within one and the same Member State, it will depend on the
rules on the distribution of jurisdiction in that specific Member State which court or courts in the
Member State has or have jurisdiction.
46
relevance to the issue at hand: is it possible to sue all interested parties on the side of
the employer in a single forum? Can a national union join in the proceedings
between the European works council and the employer? Hence, these paragraphs
will be discussed below.
In some cases, the Regulation does not offer an alternative, but rather an exception
to the forum rei-principle. Most notably, Article 22 provides for exclusive
jurisdiction of the courts of a specific Member State over the proceedings included
in the Articles paragraphs. For example, the courts of the Member State in which a
public register is kept, have exclusive jurisdiction over the validity of any entries in
those registers. This jurisdiction is not dependent on the domicile of either claimant
or defendant and cannot be contracted away by the parties. Of interest here is the
exclusive jurisdiction granted to the courts of the seat of a company, legal person or
association of natural and/or legal persons on matters relating to the validity of
(amongst others) the decisions of their organs (Article 22, para 2).
Article 23 and 24 deal with prorogation of jurisdiction cases in which the
defendant voluntary submit to the jurisdiction of the court. Article 23 more
specifically regards the possibility of the parties to designate the competent court
themselves, either as an alternative jurisdiction or on an exclusive basis. Within its
scope of application, this provision could be used by the parties to a TCA to
designate a competent court or courts. Hence it is relevant to take a closer look at the
requirements posed by this Article. Article 24 regulates the phenomenon of (tacit)
submission by appearance. It contains the rule that a court may assume jurisdiction
when the defendant has appeared and has entered a defence on the merits without
contesting the jurisdiction of the court.136 It operates in the context of a given court
procedure and cannot be relied upon to determine in advance which court has
jurisdiction to hear a claim arising out of a TCA. It will not be discussed in the
remainder of this report.
With regard to consumer contracts, insurance contracts and individual contracts of
employment, the Regulation contains a separate set of rules for each, based on the
need to protect the contractually weaker party. These rules incorporate a similar
system of general competence in the domicile of defendant combined with
alternative jurisdiction in a court linked to the course of action but they deviate from
the general system in several respects. For the purpose of this study only Section 5
on individual labour contract is relevant.
A last provision of relevance to the subject at hand is Article 31 which pertains to
provisional measures. This competence may be used in (collective) labour cases to
grant interim relief.
136
Com (1999 )348 final p. 19.
47
3.
Structure of this chapter
As the exclusive jurisdiction based on Article 22 ousts all other rules of jurisdiction,
we will start the in-depth discussion of the several provisions on jurisdiction in
Brussels I with Article 22. After this, the special Chapter on individual labour
contracts will be discussed, both as to its contents and to its scope of application and
its relationship to the other Regulation provisions. This chapter will continue with a
discussion of the relevant provisions of Article 5 and Article 6. This concludes the
overview of objective grounds of jurisdiction. In a next paragraph an overview of
the requirements of Article 23 will be given. The chapter continues with a
description of the competence of courts to order interim measures and rounds off
with a conclusion.
4.
Standard of evaluation
In this chapter of the report, conclusions will be drawn as to the necessity to adapt
the system of the Brussels I Regulation in order to better accommodate claims for
the enforcement of TCAs. Any such recommendation should be based on certain
standards. In this case the relevant criteria for evaluation are:
1) Legal certainty and predictability. Is the rule sufficiently clear in order to allow
parties to predict in advance whether or not a court will have jurisdiction?
2) Accessibility. Does the Regulation provide the parties with real access to justice?
In this respect two elements which are specific to TCAs must be taken into account
a) the involvement of weaker contract parties (most notably the workers);
b) the involvement of entities with incomplete standing.
Both aspects lead to a preference for (alternative) jurisdiction at the home base of
the workers and their representatives. Workers should be able to sue at home, in
order to avoid the extra costs of foreign proceedings.137 Parties which are not full
legal entities, but are given specific standing by the law of their home country, may
encounter difficulties when they want to sue abroad. This argument is valid for both
unions and works council see also the relevant chapter of this report. These
problems can be avoided by giving the home state jurisdiction in cases involving
works councils and/or unions.
Of course, in the case of TCAs, workers representatives from more than one
Member State may be involved. Hence, it will not be possible for all of them to sue
at home. This does not mean, however, that access to a court in ones home state
137
Compare the arguments used by the ECJ in the cases on the interpretation of the Brussels Convention
in individual labour disputes, discussed below.
48
is not a relevant interest to take into account when evaluating the current rules. It
merely means that sometimes other interests may prevail, when the choice for a
given court must be made.
3) Gleichlauf. This term refers to the situation in which a court will be able to apply
its own law to an international conflict, because the relevant factors for granting
jurisdiction and determining the applicable law coincide. Gleichlauf can be
preferable when, for example, the issue at hand has public policy aspects. It is also
advocated when the conflict concerns legal institutions which are highly dissimilar
between the several states. Collective labour law, both in the aspect of industrial
relations and in the aspect of workshop democracy, is characterized by both strong
public policy overtones and a considerable divergence, as the national reports to this
study demonstrate. Conflict of law rules are based on the presumption of
interchangeability between legal systems. If this interchangeability is absent (e.g. in
the case of works councils between Germany and the UK), the multilateral conflicts
rules cant be used and unilateral rules will be needed instead. Unilateral rules only
determine the applicability of the lex fori, and hence are to a large extent forumsensitive.138 For effective enforcement of such rules, jurisdiction should be given to
the home court the forum from which the applicable rules originate. A strong
preference for Gleichlauf may lead to exclusive jurisdiction for the relevant court.
Such exclusive jurisdiction is granted in Article 22 of the Convention. However, the
interest of Gleichlauf should be balanced against the other interests involved. An
important counterargument against exclusive jurisdiction can be found in the last
interest to be discussed.
4) Efficient proceedings and the avoidance of conflicting judgements. In the case of
TCAs, there are multiple parties involved on both sides of the agreement. Hence, it
is important to check whether it is possible to join forces: i.e. to have a dispute
which involves multiple parties decided by a single judge. The main provision in the
Brussels I Regulation dealing with this aspect is Article 6.
B. Exclusive jurisdiction over the validity of company decisions Article

22 sub 2
1.
Relevance of Article 22 sub 2
TCAs contain commitments (be it legally binding or otherwise) of transnational

companies with regard to their social policies. Enforcement of such agreements is
only relevant when the company in question does not honour its commitments under
the agreement. Most often this takes the shape of senior management and/or the
board of directors of the company making a decision which contravenes the
agreement or rather failing to make the decision or to take the action which is
needed to implement its commitments. Relevant examples of duties arising from
138
The Rome I Regulation leaves only limited room to apply foreign overriding mandatory provisions
i.e. foreign rules with a unilateral scope of application. See Article 9(3).
49
existing TCAs might be a duty to provide timely information to the works councils
active within the group or a duty to set up a special consultation body in case of
restructuring. Can the works councils - both at national and European level - stop
management from going ahead with the restructuring without proper consultation?
A possible route to enforcement would be to start an action in which the decision of
the management and/or board of directors (or lack thereof) is put before the court.
The Brussels I Regulation contains a special provision according to which the courts
of the Member State in which a company, legal person or association has its seat
have exclusive jurisdiction in proceedings which have as their object the validity of
the constitution, the nullity or the dissolution of companies or other legal persons or
associations of natural or legal persons, or the validity of the decisions of their
organs (Article 22 sub 2, italics by the authors). The provision is taking from the
similar provision in the Brussels Convention.139 For the application of this provision,
the domicile of the parties to the lawsuit is irrelevant. The only relevant factor is
whether the company, legal person or association has its seat in a Member State of
the EU.140
Article 22 confers exclusive jurisdiction to the courts nominated in the several
provisions. This means that other grounds for jurisdiction are excluded, amongst
which the courts for the domicile of defendant (Article 2) and the court or courts
chosen by the parties (Article 23). For the ECJ this exclusive character is an extra
reason to interpret the provision strictly, with special attention being paid to the
purpose of the special exclusive jurisdiction.141 In the Hassett and Doherty case the
ECJ stressed that Article 22 sub 2 should not apply to all disputes in which a
decision by the organs of a company plays a role, however indirect. The provision
should not cover the disputes which would not give rise to conflicting judgments as
regards the validity of the decisions of the organs of a company, in that their
outcome would have no bearing on that validity nor to disputes which do not
require any examination of the publication formalities applicable to a company.
The Hassett/Doherty judgement seems to be in sync with the (earlier) national case
law described in the Hess/Pfeiffer/Schlosser report. According to Prof. Pfeiffer,
Article 22 receives very limited application in the Member States and is mainly used
to deal with matters coming within the purview of company law strictu sensu. By
giving exclusive jurisdiction to the courts of the Member State in which the seat of
139
Article 16 sub 2.
140
The seat is to be determined by using the private international law rules of the court seized of the
action. These rules still diverge between the Member States where some states use the statutory seat
as the determining factor, while others prefer the administrative seat. Compare U. Magnus & P.
Mankowski, European Commentaries on Private international law: the Brussels I Regulation,
Mnchen, Sellier Europa Law Publishers 2007, Article 22, Rdnr. 36 ff. p. 356 and
Hess/Pfeiffer/Schlosser, Report on the application of Regulation Brussels I in the Member States,
Study JLS/C4/2005/03, final version 2007, p. 157. So in theory different courts may place the seat of
a company in different States. Ibidem, p. 359.
141
The alternative grounds of jurisdiction are also interpreted in a strict manner, as they deviate from the
main rule of actor sequitur rei (the claimant should come to the defendant).
50
company is located, the provision seeks to attain what is called Gleichlauf:

concurrence between jurisdiction and applicable (company) law.142 This is
illustrated by the facts that
1) the provision uses the term seat rather than domicile and
2) the seat of the company is determined by using the private international
law rules of the court seized, rather than the general rule on the domicile of
companies in Article 60 of the Regulation.
Accordingly, the fact that a decision made (e.g.) by the board of directors or the
CEO of a company violates its commitments based on a TCA does not in itself raise
questions with regard to the validity of the decision as such and/or the publication
formalities of the company. Only if TCAs affect those issues, application of Article
22 may be called into question.
TCA may contain specific obligations with regard to works council involvement in
company decisions. Several national reports show that the prerogatives of works
councils can be extended through agreements.143 In some jurisdictions the legal
obligations of the management bodies of the company to inform and consult the
works council may affect the validity of management decisions which are taken
without the prescribed prior consultation.144 A more common sanction is the
suspension of a company decision which is taken in violation of the workers
consultation and information rights. Such suspension will take place in summary
proceedings. It is extremely rare that the sanction of nullity attaches to contractual
obligations with regard to information and consultation rights. Accordingly, under
the current formulation of the exclusive jurisdiction it is unlikely that conflicts
between management and works council would be covered by it.
142
Magnus/Mankowski (l.c., p. 356-357) mention as underlying reasons for the provision: legal
certainty, the need to avoid conflicting judgements, the relevance of publicity rules for the matter at
hand and concurrence between jurisdiction and applicable law. The latter is relevant given the often
mandatory nature of the underlying rules.
143
See e.g. Dutch national report, French report, additional information.
144
Commission staff working document accompanying the Communication from the Commission to the
Council, the European Parliament, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee
of the Regions on the review of the application of Directive 2002/14/EC in the EU {COM (2008) 146
final} /* SEC/2008/0334 final */ contains an overview of enforcement matters with regard to
consultation and information rights under this directive. According to the document Hungary, France
and The Netherlands adopt the sanction of nullity to certain types of infringement of information and
consultation rights. In Germany, France and the Netherlands the courts may order the suspension
and/or reversal of decisions made in violation of those rights. Nullity as a sanction for contractual
obligations is rare, though.
51
2.
The coming revision of Brussels I
At first glance a dispute over information and consultation rights seems to fit into
the category of conflicts which is described in German law as Organstreitigkeiten:
disputes between the several organs of the company as to their respective
prerogatives. One of the discussions with regard to possible amendments to the
Brussels I Regulation145 concerns the extension of Article 22 to such
Organstreitigkeiten (in as far as they are not covered currently).146 Should such
extension also cover disputes between works councils and management boards over
information and consultation rights? We would not welcome such an extension. A
first reason for this would be, that works councils are not organs of the legal
entity.147 They are collective labour law instruments created in the context of work
place democracy. As such they are linked to the undertaking, the economic entity,
rather than the corporation or other legal entity which runs it. This difference in
conceptual background has direct legal consequences, making the current rule of
Article 22 is unfit to deal with conflicts between works council and management.
Article 22 sub 2 refers to the seat of the company rather than the place of business of
the undertaking. The forum best suited for disputes between works councils and
managements would in our opinion be a forum which is geographically close to
the works council and which would be able to apply its own law. Works councils are
constructs of national law which do not exist in every legal system. Both their
prerogatives and the possibility to enforce their rights through the courts (ius standi),
will vary between the legal systems. Though it is not impossible for courts to apply
foreign law on information and consultation rights, and recognize the ius standi of a
foreign body (not being a legal entity),148 this situation is far from ideal. If any court
should have exclusive jurisdiction in these matters, it should be the court of the
country the law of which applies to the dispute. All exclusive jurisdictions follow
this logic.149 It should not be otherwise for information and consultation rights.
145
Green paper question 8.
146
Compare B. Sujecki, Anwendungsbereich der ausschliesslichen Zustndigkeitsregelung zum

Gerichtsstand fr Gesellschaftsrechtliche Klagen, EuZW 21/2008, p. 667-668 referring to
Geimer/Schtze EUZVR 2004 (2d ed) Art. 22 EuGVVO Rdnrn 141, 186 ff, Leibe/Freitag,
Forderungsneitreibung in der EU 2008, para 2 Rdnr 215-216; Gottwald Mnchener Kommentar
Zivilprocessordnung Band 3, 3d ed 2008, Art. 22 EuGVVO, Rdnr 22 ff/ 28 ff; Magnus/Mankowski
o.c. Art. 22 Rdnr 46 p. 358 insists that not all internal affairs are included in the current scope of
application of Article 22.
147
See comparative report Germany (additional information).
148
Compare the recognition of special consumer protection organisations and bodies under Dir
98/27/EC OJ L 166/15.
149
Compare for rights in immovable property ECJ case 115/88, Mario P. A. Reichert and others v
Dresdner Bank 1990 ECR, 27. In general, see U. Magnus & P. Mankowski, European Commentaries
on Private international law: the Brussels I Regulation, Mnchen, Sellier Europa Law Publishers,
2007, Article 22, Rdnr 7, p. 348.
52
The application of national rules on information and consultation rights is usually

made dependent on the place of business of the undertaking.150 The seat of the
legal entity acting as employer is not in itself relevant for this. Works councils tend
to meet at the place of factual economic establishment rather than at the place of the
seat of the legal entity.151 Because this is where they (and the workers they
represent) habitually work. Therefore the place of business rather than the seat
seems to be the most convenient forum.
Should then the court for the place of establishment of the undertaking have
exclusive jurisdiction in conflicts between works council and management? The
German report states that Germany already assumes exclusive jurisdiction over
conflicts involving German works councils. They do so by considering the issue to
fall outside the scope of application; a point of view we do not share. Likewise we
do not share the preference for exclusive jurisdiction. In purely internal matters the
Regulation does not apply. German courts will have jurisdiction in procedures
started by German works councils against the management of the German
undertaking. In international cases, the national works councils will generally be
able to sue at home on the basis of the other provisions of the Regulation. This will
be demonstrated below. So there is no need to create exclusive jurisdiction in the
court for the place of establishment in order to grant access to justice to works
councils. And there is a flip side to the medal of exclusivity: in the case of TCAs
the exclusive character may prove detrimental to the interests of the works councils
because it makes it impossible to consolidate procedures against different companies
within the group about the implementation and enforcement of a single TCA
obligation.
3.
Main findings as to Article 22 sub 2
Exclusive jurisdiction has only a very limited role to play in the enforcement of
TCAs. Only if the TCA would directly affect the way decisions in a company can
validly be made, their enforcement may to come under the heading of Article 22 sub
2. This may change if the scope of application of the provision of matters relating to
company decisions would be broadened.
The effect of an exclusive jurisdiction is that is ousts all other grounds for
jurisdiction. It is exactly this effect which led the ECJ to interpret provisions which
grant exclusive jurisdiction narrowly. Any extension of the scope of application of
Article 22 should therefore be extremely well argued. There is no convincing
argument to extent the scope of Article 22 to include disputes between works
150
Dir 2002/14/EG uses the terms undertaking and establishment in a MS. It does not refer to legal
entities and/or contractual parties to the labour contract. This distinction seems to blur somewhat
upon implementation: Commission staff working document accompanying the Communication from
the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, the European Economic and Social
Committee and the Committee of the Regions on the review of the application of Directive
2002/14/EC in the EU {COM (2008) 146 final} /* SEC/2008/0334 final */
151
Compare Article 7 of the recast EWC Directive (2009/38/EC) for European works councils.
53
councils and management. On the contrary, the provision seems ill suited for these
disputes as it refers to the seat of the legal entity rather than the place of business of
the undertaking (which is a more appropriate forum for this type of disputes). Hence
we would advice against widening the scope of application to include TCA
commitments. We dont favour the inclusion of a exclusive jurisdiction rule for
information and consultation rights either: it is not necessary to ensure access to
justice and it has a negative effect on the possibility to consolidate actions arising
out of a TCA.
C.
Jurisdiction over individual contracts of employment: Section 5

(Articles 18-21)
1.
Contents of Section 5
Since the replacement of the Brussels Convention by the Regulation, jurisdiction

over individual labour contracts is regulated in a separate Section. This is a deviation
from the Convention, as in the Convention special jurisdiction in labour contracts
was dealt with in the same paragraph as the special jurisdiction for contracts in
general whereas choices of forum in labour conflicts were dealt with in the general
provision on choice of forum. With the creation of a special Section the provisions
on labour contracts were brought in line with the provisions on consumer contracts
and insurance contracts, both contract types in which one of the parties is deemed to
be contractually weaker and less able to bargain. The re-codification of the rules on
jurisdiction led to substantive changes as well, again leading to an increased
parallelism with rules regarding the other two weak party contracts.
The Section, like the general rules of the Regulation, is based on the forum rei
principle, giving jurisdiction to the courts for the country of establishment of the
defendant. However, the Section works with a slightly extended concept of the
forum rei: Where an employee enters into an individual contract of employment
with an employer who is not domiciled in a Member State but has a branch, agency
or other establishment in one of the Member States, the employer shall, in disputes
arising out of the operations of the branch, agency or establishment, be deemed to be
domiciled in that Member State.152 This provision is relevant for US companies
which have a (dependent) branch or establishment in the EU in which they employ
workers. When the EU subsidiary is an independent legal entity, the provision does
not apply jurisdiction over the EU legal entity will have to be determined
separately.
According to Article 19 An employer domiciled in a Member State may be sued:
1. in the courts of the Member State where he is domiciled; or
152
Article 18 sub 2.
54
2. in another Member State:

(a) in the courts for the place where the employee habitually carries out his work or
in the courts for the last place where he did so, or
(b) if the employee does not or did not habitually carry out his work in any one
country, in the courts for the place where the business which engaged the employee
is or was situated.
Accordingly, the employee is granted an alternative to the forum rei, referring
primarily to the habitual place of work and alternatively to the place of business
through which he was engaged.
This rule deviates from the rule on contracts in general which is laid down in Article
5 sub 1 under a) of the Regulation. According to that provision a person domiciled
in a Member State may, in another Member State, be sued in matters relating to a
contract, in the courts for the place of performance of the obligation in question.
Under this provision, jurisdiction will depend on the specific obligation of the
defendant which the plaintiff seeks to enforce. Accordingly, a claim for specific
performance by party A may be sued in a different court than the claim for payment
of the contractual fee by the contractual counterpart B.153 This case specificity is
lacking under Article 19: jurisdiction under that provision depends on the place of
performance of the obligation which characterises a contract of employment being
the provision of dependent labour. Who is suing who and for what exactly, is
irrelevant under Article 19.
The special rule for labour contracts was developed through case law on and
subsequent amendments to the Brussels Convention. Hence, there is ample case law
explaining in particular the concept of habitual place of work.154 Where the
employee performs his work in more than one Contracting State, that place refers to
the place where the employee has established the effective centre of his working
153
Under the Regulation and in contrast with the situation under the Convention - contracts for the
sales of goods and the provision of services also have a single place of performance based on the
performance of the characteristic obligation.
154
It is likely that this case law will continue to be relevant for the interpretation of Article 19 sub 2
(compare i.a. Regulation preamble 19, ECJ Case C-180/06, Renate Ilsinger v Martin Dreschers, 2009
ECR, para 41and ECJ Case C-111/08, SCT Industri AB i likvidation v Alpenblume AB, 2009 ECR
para 22-24) . After all, Article 19 uses a similar terminology as Article 5 sub 1 of the Convention
when it refers first to the place of work and second to the place of business of the employer.
However, it should be kept in mind that the role of the alternative fora is different under the
Regulation. When an employer wishes to sue the employee, he may only do so in the court of the
state of domicile of the employee. Neither the alternative forum for the place of work nor the forum
for the place of business can be used by the employer. This was different at the time the ECJ gave its
judgements on the interpretation of the Convention provision. The unilateral character which the
additional connecting factors acquired in the Regulation may influence their interpretation (compare
on the differences between the Convention and the Regulation with regard to labour contracts: Case
C-462/06, ECJ 22 May 2008, ECR I-3965 GlaxoSmithkline).
55
activities and where, or from which, he in fact performs the essential part of his
duties vis--vis his employer.155 If a worker is sent to different member states to
perform similar activities, no such centre may be identifiable. In that case, the place
of work refers to the country in which the employee has worked the longest.156 So
the habitual place of work is given a very extensive meaning, leaving almost no
room for the application of the second sub-rule of Article 19 which refers to the
place of business of the employer.157
Section 5 continues with a rule on counterclaims (Article 20 sub 2) and rounds up
with a provision on choice of forum by the parties. According to Article 21 a choice
of forum which deviates from the rules of Section 5 is only valid in as much as it is
either entered into after the dispute has arisen or allows the employee to bring
proceedings in courts other than the ones designated by Section 5.
2.
Relationship between Section 5 and the other rules on jurisdiction
According to Article 18 sub 1. In matters relating to individual contracts of

employment, jurisdiction shall be determined by this Section, without prejudice to
Article 4 and point 5 of Article 5. The provisions of Section 5 must be understood
as forming a lex specialis with respect to the other provisions on jurisdiction. This
means that the general rules of the regulation are replaced by the special rules of
Section 5. The general provisions cannot by relied upon unless Section 5 explicitly
refers to them. Such reference is made to Article 4 (dealing with jurisdiction to
defendants domiciled outside the Member States) and Article 5 sub 5 (dealing with
special jurisdiction over disputes arising out of the operations of a branch, agency
or other establishment). However, no reference is made to Article 6 sub 1 on joint
defendants, neither is Article 5 sub 3 (on torts) referred to. Finally, Articles 23 and
24 (on choice of forum and tacit submission) are not mentioned either, though
choice of forum is. This raises the question whether the parties to a dispute
involving an individual labour relationship can still rely on those provisions.158
In the case of GlaxoSmithkline the ECJ had to decide on the applicability of Article
6 sub 1 in a conflict in which an employee was suing two (alleged) former
employers, both being part of the same international group of companies, for
155
Case C-125/92, ECJ 13 July 1993 ECR I-4075 (Mulox v. Geels) paras 20 and 26. Case C-383/95,
ECJ 9 January 1997 ECR I-57 (Rutten v. Cross) para. 23.
156
Case C-37/00, Herbert Weber v Universal Ogden Services Ltd., 2002 ECR I-02013.
157
Especially the judgment in the case of Weber v. Ogden Services, in which the court gave jurisdiction
to the court of the country in which the employee had worked the longest, has met with considerable
criticism in legal literature. In this judgement the Court seems to abandon one of the major principles
of the law of jurisdiction being that jurisdiction has to be predictable and easily identifiable.
158
Compare on the relation between Section 3 (jurisdiction in matters of insurance) and Article 24: ECJ
Case C-111/09, esk podnikatelsk pojit'ovna v. Michal Blas.
56
damages related to unfair dismissal.159 This procedural tactic, in which several

companies are sued for a single incident, is not uncommon in cases involving
transnational corporations. The transfer of international employees to different
legal entities within a single multinational conglomerate regularly leads to confusion
as to the legal counterpart to the employment contract. In those cases it is common
to sue all relevant parties at the employer side (e.g. the company who is responsible
for transfers and dismissals as well as the company where the employee is actually
posted). Evidently it is in the interest of the employee to be able to sue all parties in
a single forum since the claims against the several employers are closely related.160
Article 6 sub 1 normally would offer such opportunity. However, according to the
ECJ this provision is not applicable to individual labour contracts as it is not
mentioned in Article 18 sub 1.
The strict interpretation of the regulation given by the ECJ in the GlaxoSmithkline
case161 blocks recourse to Article 6 whenever one of the cases to be joined involves
obligations arising out of an individual labour contract. If several employees want to
start a court procedure to enforce obligations arising out of a TCA, the court seized
will have to have jurisdiction in each individual case (based on either Article 2 or
Article 19). The same argument is valid when the unions want to involve individual
employees in their claim for enforcement: jurisdiction in the case in which the
employee is the claimant can not be established on the basis of Article 6.
It is not entirely clear whether it is also no longer allowed to rely on Article 23
(choice of forum) and Article 24 (tacit submission) in those cases. The Commission
seems to be of the opinion that the special provisions of Section 5 only derogate
from the provisions of Section 1 and 2.162 In that view, recourse to Article 23 and 24
159
Para 9: Mr Rouard requests that those companies be ordered jointly and severally to pay him various
amounts of compensation and damages for non-compliance with the dismissal procedure, dismissal
without genuine and serious cause and wrongful breach of his employment contract.
160
Imagine splitting up the cases and having court A decide on the claim against the alleged employer A
and court B on the case against employer B. what if court A decides that employer A is not the
relevant contractual counterpart, whereas court B would decide the same with regard to employer B.
Such judgement would have to be deemed irreconcilable as they would leave the employee without
any form of legal recourse. Compare also the comment on Article 6(1) below.
161
Case C-462/06, ECJ 22 May 2008, ECR I-3965. This interpretation is not very favourable for the
weaker contract party. Compare B. Sujecki Anwendbarkeit der EUGVVO auf Arbeitsvertrge,
EuZW 12/2008, p. 371-372.
162
The Commission proposal refers only to Section 2 of the Regulation. For the controversy in a single
book: see Magnus/Mankowski, Brussels I, Article 24 Rdnr 24 p. 445 argues in favour of tacit
submission for weaker contract parties. However the same book denies recourse to Article 24 for
labour contracts in the comment on Article 21 (Rdnr 2, p. 343).
57
would still be allowed. A question to that effect is currently pending before the
ECJ.163
3.
Scope of application of Section 5
The different language versions of the Regulation use slightly different descriptions
for the type of claims covered by Section 5. Some refer to matters regarding
individual contracts of employment,164 others refer to individual obligations arising
out of a labour contract,165 still others refer both to the contract and to the
obligations arising therefrom.166 These is no specific case law on the scope of
application of Section 5, so any problems arising in this context can only be
discussed on a provisional basis, using case law on other topics to draw an analogy.
The issues which determine the scope of application of the Section are:
-
What contracts constitute an individual labour contract?
Which claims arising in the context of an individual labour relationship are

covered by Section 5?
As was mentioned before, the special jurisdictional rule for individual labour
contracts was first developed by the ECJ. In this context the court observed that
contracts of employment, like other contracts for work other than on a selfemployed basis, differ from other contracts - even those for the provision of services
- by virtue of certain particularities: they create a lasting bond which brings the
worker to some extent within the organizational framework of the business of the
undertaking or employer, and they are linked to the place where the activities are
pursued, which determines the application of mandatory rules and collective
agreements .167 Accordingly, the element of dependent labour and the inclusion in
the organisational framework of the employer would constitute important
characteristics of a individual labour contract.168
163
ECJ, Case C-111/09, esk podnikatelsk pojit'ovna v. Michal Blas. The relevance for this study is
minor, however. The tacit submission only works during a given procedure, and can not be planned
in advance. The choice of forum provision of Article 23 is mainly used, as far as individual labour
contracts are concerned, to establish the formal requirements and to establish consent. The validity of
the choice of forum is limited by Article 21.
164
E.g. the French and Italian versions: Comptence en matire de contrats individuels de travail,
Competenza in materia di contratti individuali di lavoro.
165
E.g the Dutch text: Bevoegdheid voor individuele verbintenissen uit arbeidsovereenkomst.
166
See e.g. the German version: ein individueller Arbeitsvertrag oder Ansprche aus einem
individuellen Arbeitsvertrag.
167
Case 266/85, Hassan Shenavai v Klaus Kreischer. 1987 ECR 00239, para 16. compare also
Magnus/Mankowski Article 18 Rdnr 4, p. 328
168
Compare P.H.L.M. Kuypers, Forumkeuze in het Nederlands internationaal privaatrecht, Deventer,

Kluwer 2008, p. 468.
58
Noteworthy is the reference made by the ECJ to mandatory rules and collective
agreements applicable at the place of work. In the early case law, the territorial
character of (some?) mandatory rules of labour law constituted an important
argument for granting jurisdiction to the court for the place of work. In later case
law the emphasis of the court shifted towards the position of the worker as the
weaker party to the contract thus increasing the parallel with consumer contracts
and contracts of insurance. This parallel may be important with regard to the
question whether unions may also make use of Section 5 when they want to enforce
labour laws and/or collective labour contracts for the benefit of the workers. If the
case law on insurance and consumers contracts is taken as an indication, the answer
may be negative.169 According to the ECJ the protective rules of the special sections
for weaker contract parties are meant to create a jurisdictional benefit for those
weaker parties. The weaker party should not be kept from enforcing their rights by
the costs and complications of having to sue abroad. As soon as a professional party
tries to enforce claims arising out of a consumer contract or an insurance contract,
this protection is no longer needed. Hence, according to the ECJ those professional
parties cannot rely on the special provisions and the court seized will have to base its
jurisdiction on Section 1 and 2 of the Regulation instead.170
In the case law on consumer contracts and insurance contracts, the professional
party generally acted on its own behalf, either as reinsurer of certain risks or as an
assignee of the claims based on the individual contract. It is uncertain whether the
ECJ will use the same reasoning in cases in which labour unions act in the name of
and/or on behalf of individual employees. It is relatively certain, however, that an
independent enforcement claim by labour organisations will not be covered by
Section 5.171 It would therefore depend on the construction of the course of action of
the unions under national law as agents of named or unnamed employees or rather
public interest enforcement bodies whether the claims put forward by the unions
are classified as contractual under Section 5, contractual under Article 5 (1) or even
non-contractual under Article 5(3).172 To illustrate this point, reference can be made
to the French report, in which prof. Robin Olivier describes the action de
substitution, the action in defence of special groups (amongst which foreign
workers, temporary workers) and the collective enforcement action as three types of
169
Compare P.H.L.M. Kuypers, Forumkeuze in het Nederlands internationaal privaatrecht, Deventer,

Kluwer 2008, p. 468, 469-470.
170
Case C-167/00, Verein fr Konsumenteninformation v Karl Heinz Henkel, 2002 ECR I-08111; ECJ
Case C-89/91, Shearson Lehmann Hutton Inc. v TVB Treuhandgesellschaft fr
Vermgensverwaltung und Beteiligungen mbH, ECR 1993 I-00139 (on consumer contracts); ECJ
Case C-412/98, Group Josi Reinsurance Company SA v Universal General Insurance Company
(UGIC), ECR 2000 p. I-05925 and ECJ Case C-77/04, Groupement d'intrt conomique (GIE)
Runion europenne and Others v Zurich Espaa and Socit pyrnenne de transit d'automobiles
(Soptrans), ECR p. I-4509 para 17, 20, 24, disp. 1.
171
They might have to use Article 5(3) instead, compare VKI v. Henkel.
172
Compare VKI v. Henkel. At this point of the report, it still remains to be seen whether the claim of
the unions would sound in contract (Article 5 sub 1) or tort (Article 5 sub 3). See below. In the Green
Paper on consumer collective redress, interestingly enough, the private international law part only
refers to Article 5.1 as a legal base for jurisdiction of the consumer organisations. Com(2008) 794
final p. 16 para 58.
59
action in which unions may seek the enforcement of (rights under) a collective
agreement. The first two are classified as individual actions aimed at the
enforcement of workers individual rights, the third is deemed to be a collective
action. The distinction determines alia the subject matter jurisdiction of the
Conseils de Prudhommes and the Tribunal dInstance or Grande Instance
respectively. In contrast, German law does not seem to allow the enforcement of
normative provisions of collective agreements by unions on behalf of individual
workers at all. Enforcement is only open to the unions in case of a violation of the
collective order as a whole.173 This dependency on national law does not sit well
with the proclaimed need for autonomous interpretation of the concepts used in the
Regulation.174
A final point of relevance with regard to the scope of application of Section 5 is the
restriction to obligations arising out of a contract. This point was raised in several
cases dealing with the relationship between Article 5 sub 1 (on contracts) and
Article 5 sub 3 (on non-contractual liability) as well as several cases on unilateral
commitments in the context of consumer contracts. These cases will be discussed
more extensively below. As regards the enforcement of TCAs under Section 5 of
the Regulation the questions raised do not concern the existence of the labour
contract as such.. Rather, it is important to determine whether commitments made
by the employer on a unilateral basis or in a contract with other parties, are
obligations arising out of the individual labour contract in those scenarios where
individual workers want to keep their employer to his promise.
As far as collective agreements are concerned, national systems use different
theories to explain the binding effect of normative provisions vis--vis the individual
labour contracts of both organized and non-organized workers. Under the
incorporation theory normative provisions of collective agreements are incorporated
into the individual labour contracts coming within their scope of application. This
concept is used in the Netherlands, with regard to organized workers.175 In France
however, the binding effect of the collective agreements is based on a statutory
concept in which the collective agreement is considered to be an external binding
rule limiting the freedom of the parties to the individual contract.176 Several
countries use the concept of incorporation through referral to allow reliance on
173
R. Krause, German report Part A, Question 1 f) aa)
174
Compare for the different remedies for consumers the Green Paper On Consumer Collective Redress
Com (2008) 794 final, para 24. The Green Paper distinguishes several types of action for redress: the
individual action (by a single consumer or by several consumers who join their individual actions),
the group action (being a special procedure to consolidate actions, with either an opt-in or an opt-out
possibility), the action pursued by a collective interest organisation (representative action) and test
case mechanism. Compare also the evaluation study on consumer collective redress, p. 25 para 3.1.
http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/redress_cons/finalreportevaluationstudypart1-final2008-11-26.pdf
175
Compare Dutch Statute on Collective agreements WCAO Articles 12 and 13.
176
French report Question 1 h).
60
normative provisions of collective agreements by non-organized workers.177 In all

instances, however, the claim of the worker against the employer is intimately
related to the contractual relationship between the two. It should not matter for
private international law purposes, whether the claim is constructed as being
contractual or statutory under national law, as long as the rights which the worker
claims are granted to them by virtue of their status as a worker.178
Claims against third parties (e.g. the mother company of the employer) fit into this
pattern less easily. We have to examine the concept of contract more closely to
determine the applicable provision. But even if some kind of contract can be
construed between the mother company (signatory to the TCA) and the individual
employee of a subsidiary company, this contract will most likely not be an
individual labour contract. It will lack the above mentioned characteristics of a
labour contract. The same is true when individual workers act in their capacity as
workers representatives in the EWC. Their claim is either statutory (based on the
Directive) or based on an agreement (TCA or the agreement with the special
negotiating body). The basis of the claim is related to their position as workers, but
can not be identified as arising from the individual contract of employment.
4.
Main findings as to Section 5
In the context of the enforcement of TCAs it should be clear that collective labour
agreements as such are not covered by Section 5 the Section is limited to
individual labour contracts. Enforcement of TCAs would only come within the
scope of application of Section 5 if the obligation for which enforcement is sought
can be considered to be an obligation arising out of an individual labour contract.
This would first and foremost be the case with provisions which grant rights to
individual workers vis--vis their employer. However, Section 5 only applies when
the enforcement is claimed by the workers themselves (and maybe by the unions as
their representatives). General enforcement actions by trade unions will not come
within the scope of application of Section 5. The distinction between individual
enforcement and collective enforcement is not very clear and may vary from state to
state. A further clarification on this issue may be useful.
177
Incorporation through referral. See for the position of outside employees: the national reports and
in particular The Netherlands, Germany Question 1d). For all employees, see UK report Question
1e). Compare also Malmberg The Collective Agreement as an Instrument for Regulation of Wages
and Employment Conditions in Wahlgren/ Malmberg Scandinavian Studies in Law (Sc.St.L.) 2002
para 5.3 p. 205.
178
Compare the question whether statutory protection offered to workers leads to obligations arising
out of a individual labour contract. The answer seems to be affirmative, as far as the rights conferred
upon the workers accrue to him/her based on their status as worker. This construction does not imply
that the normative provisions of the TCA would become part of the individual contract (incorporation
model). Compare France report. Kuypers o.c. p. 468 would include all claim which are closely
related to the labour relationship as falling within the scope of application of Section 5 (include lease
constructions, and tort claims for industrial accidents)
61
A special problem is created by systems which do not grant ius standi to the works
council as such, but only to the individual members thereof. These members (as far
as they represent the work force) will be employees of one of the companies within
the group covered by the TCA. Claims of these delegates against their own
employer may be covered by Section 5, especially when they claim individual
benefits. Claims against the parent company under which the EWC resides, will not
be covered by Section 5. However, no case law on this is available yet. Another
point of uncertainty is the position of individual workers acting on behalf of the
workforce, in their capacity as representatives. These claims will most likely not be
covered by Section 5, but again, case law is lacking.
Section 5 has an exclusive character. Jurisdiction can not be based on the other
provisions of the Regulation, unless Section 5 specifically refers to them.
Problematic in this respect is the exclusion of Article 6 sub 1 which facilitates the
joinder of interrelated claims against different defendants in a single procedure. The
current revision process on the Brussels I Regulation offers an excellent opportunity
to remedy this situation.
D.
Alternative Fora under Article 5: contract, tort and disputes related to

branches and establishments
1.
Introduction
Article 5 offers alternative fora for different types of claims or disputes. These
alternatives are offered when a defendant is domiciled in a Member State but a
specific close link can be established between the claim or dispute and another
Member State. The special jurisdictional grounds which are relevant for our
purposes are the jurisdiction in matters relating to contract (sub 1) and tort (sub 3)
and jurisdiction over disputes arising out of the operation of a branch, agency or
other establishment (sub 5). In the previous chapter we have discussed the
distinction between obligations in contract and obligations in tort. We will not repeat
that discussion here, but focus on the rules applicable to contracts and torts. The
scope of application of the special jurisdiction over branches, agencies and other
establishments, however, will be discussed in the context of that provision.
2.
Jurisdiction under Article 5(1): contractual obligations
Upon the replacement of the Brussels Convention by the Brussels I Regulation,

Article 5(1) has undergone a transformation. Not only was the individual labour
contract removed from its scope of application, the singular rule of the Convention
was replaced by a composite rule which gives different connecting factors for
different types of contract. For TCAs only the general rule seems relevant the
62
sub-rules pertaining to contracts for the sales of goods and contracts for the
provision of services respectively.179
Article 5 sub 1 under a) gives jurisdiction to the court for the place of performance
of the obligation in question. The obligation in question would be the obligation
which was allegedly breached by the defendant and on the breach of which the claim
is based. If for example, someone claims damages for non-performance of the
contract, the obligation to perform is the obligation in question, not the obligation to
make good the damages caused by the non-performance.180
The jurisdiction under Article 5(1) is restricted to the specific claim and any
ancillary matters. The ECJ accepts the rule accessorium sequitur principale.181
And as is explained above, obligations which replace the original contractual
obligation (e.g. damages in case of non-performance) share the place of performance
of the original obligation. However, if one contract contains several independent
obligations and TCAs will most likely do so the place of performance of each of
these must be separately assessed. If jurisdiction can be established with regard to
only one of these obligations, the court must decline jurisdiction with regard to the
other claims. If the claimant wants to seek redress on all counts in a single court,
they should address a court with a wider jurisdictional base e.g. the courts of the
country of domicile of the defendant.182
To assess the place of performance, the courts will defer primarily to the contract
itself.183 If this determines a place of performance, the national court for that place
has jurisdiction if the place of performance is situated in another Member State
than the State of domicile of the defendant. However, there should be a genuine link
to the designated place of performance and the actual performance of the contract. If
not, the designated place of performance is treated as an indirect choice of forum,
which must be tested against the requirements of Article 23.184 If the contract does
not contain any indication as to the place of performance, this place has to be
decided by first establishing the law applying to the contract and then determining
179
There is no case law on the criterion for distinguishing between the main rule of para 1 sub a) and the
special rules of para 1 sub 2.
180
Pocar Report to the revised Lugano Convention

http://www.bj.admin.ch/etc/medialib/data/wirtschaft/ipr.Par.0029.File.tmp/ber-pocar-e.pdf para 44;
Case 14/76, A. De Bloos, SPRL v. Socit en commandite par actions Bouyer, 1976 ECR 1497.
181
Case 14/76, A. De Bloos, SPRL v. Socit en commandite par actions Bouyer, 1976 ECR 1497.
182
Clarkson/Hill p. 74.
183
A.Briggs, The Conflict of Laws, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2008. For a contrary opinion see
Pocar Report to the revised Lugano Convention para 45 referring to Case 56/79, Siegfried Zelger v
Sebastiano Salinitri, 1980 ECR 00089.
184
Case T-106/95, Fdration franaise des socits d'assurances (FFSA), Union des socits trangres
d'assurances (USEA), Groupe des assurances mutuelles agricoles (Groupama), Fdration nationale
des syndicats d'agents gnraux d'assurances (FNSAGA), Fdration franaise des courtiers
d'assurances et de rassurances (FCA) and Bureau international des producteurs d'assurances et de
rassurances (BIPAR) v Commission of the European Communities, 1997 ECR II-00229.
63
the place of performance of the obligation under the applicable law. Accordingly,
and contrary to most provisions in the Regulation, the place of performance of the
contract under Article 5 (1) (a) does not receive an autonomous interpretation.185
If an obligation has to be performed in several locations, spread out over more than
one Member State, the literature offers divergent views as to the application of the
provision. One opinion would give jurisdiction to the courts for each place of
performance, albeit over only the part of the claim which is related to that specific
place of performance.186 Others would deny jurisdiction to any of those courts,
based on the assumption that Article 5(1) can not be applied when a singular place
of performance cannot be identified.187 The ECJ meanwhile has decided that where
there are several places of delivery within a single Member State, the court having
jurisdiction to hear all the actions based on the contract for the sale of goods is that
in the area of the principal place of delivery, which must be determined on the basis
of economic criteria. In the absence of determining factors for establishing the
principal place of delivery, the plaintiff may sue the defendant in the court for the
place of delivery of his choice.188 This leaves open the situation in which a single
obligation has to be performed in several Member States.
The application of Article 5(1) to obligations arising out of a TCA can be illustrated
by some examples taken from existing TCAs.
a)
Information and consultation rights
Several TCAs contain obligations to consult the interested works councils at

national or European level before undertaking major reorganisations. One
stipulation, cited in the questionnaire reads:
where a reduction in the staff of a subsidiary or a business unit within the Group
becomes inevitable, the Group undertakes to inform the Groups European Works
Council thereof.... Here an obligation lies with the Group. This obligation will
probably have either the place of establishment of the Group or the place of
establishment of the works council as place of performance under the applicable
law.189 Most likely, the two will coincide. The Air France TCA contains an
185
The contract of employment was the first contract to receive an autonomous interpretation of the
place of performance. Under the Regulation, the same is valid for the sales of goods and the
provision of services, leaving only a limited scope of application of the default rule.
186
A.Briggs, The Conflict of Laws 2nd edition, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2008, p. 79, referring
to Case C420/97, Leathertex Divisione Sintetici SpA v Bodetex BVBA, 1999 ECR I-06747.
187
C.M.V. Clarkson & J. Hill, The Conflict of Laws 3d edition, Oxford University Press, 2006, p. 75
referring to Case C-256/00, Besix SA v Wasserreinigungsbau Alfred Kretzschmar GmbH & Co. KG
(WABAG) and Planungs- und Forschungsgesellschaft Dipl. Ing. W. Kretzschmar GmbH & KG
(Plafog), 2002 ECR I-01699.
188
Case C-386/05 Color Drack, 2007 ECR I-3699.
189
Thought it would serve the protection of workers rights better if the obligation is to be performed at
the place of establishment of the Works Council.
64
obligation for Air France to supply information to staff members or their

representation in sufficient time for treatment of the matter at hand. The exact place
of performance of this obligation will depend on who holds the information that is
needed (parent or subsidiary) and which staff representative (European, national and
if the latter: in which country?) needs to be consulted in the circumstances. But
again, the options would in most cases refer to either the place of establishment of
the parent, or the place of establishment of the relevant business unit. Finally, if
several representative bodies located in different member states have to be informed
by the parent company, the question arises if this obligation constitutes a single
obligation with more than one place of performance, or rather separate obligations
towards the several representative bodies, each to be performed in its own separate
place. We tend to assume the latter, as each of the commitments can be separately
violated.
b)
Data protection
TCAs may contain clauses pertaining to data protection. One such clause reads:
Registration, filing and use of employee data is treated with strict confidentiality
and in accordance with local legislation. This clause would primarily have to be
respected by the party that collects, stores and uses the data. As the clause itself
already suggests, this puts an obligation on the management of each business unit
with regard to local data. Central management may have independent obligations
but the extent of these will depend on the corporate structure. A duty to exert
influence on local units to respect confidentiality seems however implicit in the
TCA itself. This latter duty may be located both in the seat of central management
(where the decision to influence is or is not taken) or in the seat of the local unit
(where the influence is exerted).190 Again, the choice will depend on the
interpretation of the primary obligation and its place of performance under the
applicable law.
c)
Subcontracting
The Club Mediterrane TCA contains a clause on subcontracting stating inter alia
that The terms under which subcontractors are hired fully comply with social
legislation and collective agreements concluded in the country in question. The
main duty under this provision lies with the local companies, which have to ensure
compliance with certain standards by the subcontractors hired by them. The place of
performance would be the country in which the local companies are established (or
rather the country for which the subcontractor is hired). The duty imposed on the
190
Compare A.A.H van Hoek, Transnational Corporate Social Responsibility: Some Issues with Regard
to the Liability of European Corporations for Labour Law Infringements in the Countries of
Establishment of Their Suppliers, in: A. Veldman, F. Pennings, & Y. Konijn (Eds.), Social
responsibility in labour relations: European and comparative perspectives Austin / Boston / Chicago
/ New York / The Netherlands, Kluwer Law International. (Studies in employment and social policy,
38), pp. 147 ff
65
central management of the group (again) mainly consists of exerting influence

through the corporate structures.
d)
Working time/equal opportunities and other workers rights
One TCA specifies that Working hours are set according to the current laws and the
industry norm. ... Overtime is voluntary and as a rule restricted to no more than 12
hours per week. Another contains the commitment that the company will refrain
from any discrimination if national law does not expressly provide for the selection
based on certain criteria. Both type of provision will have to be performed by the
actual employer in the actual workplace. Hence the possibility to comply rests with
the local companies, the parent company (or central management as the case may
be) can only exert influence. Hence, there are several places of performance for the
several obligations on the local level. The obligation resting on central management
could be located either at headquarters or locally at the non-performing company or
branch.
e)
Profit sharing
Profit sharing is special in that is aimed at creating individual rights for individual
employees. Assuming the TCA is specific enough to lead to directly enforceable
obligations (which the Air France/KLM TCA is not), individual employee could
claim these benefits against their employers under Section 5 (only). If the duty to
pay rests with the central entity, it would depend (again) on the law applicable to the
relationship whether payment should be made at the domicile of the debtor or at the
domicile of the creditor.
f)
Restructuring: closure of facilities, outsourcing, mergers etc.
When it comes to obligations regarding restructuring, a careful examination is

needed as to the specific obligation taken on by the employer. The obligation not to
close a specific plant could be located in the place of establishment of that plant.
However, if the obligation consists of the duty not to close any facilities without
prior consultation of the relevant workers representative bodies, the actual
obligation relates to information and consultation rights, rather than the restructuring
itself.
3.
Main findings with regard to contractual obligations (Article 5 sub

1)
Jurisdiction under Article 5 sub 1 is claim dependent. Hence it will depend on an

exact reading of the TCA involved which obligation undertaken by which party
underlies the claim. The law applicable the obligation in question will decide on its
place of performance unless the parties to the TCA already stipulated this locus in
the TCA itself. This creates uncertainty with respect to complex transactions as the
66
ones under study here. However, the practical relevance may be limited: in most
cases the obligations concerned have to be performed either at the domicile of the
parent company (or central management) or at the place of establishment of the
daughter company, the subsidiary or the business unit. Often there is already another
ground for jurisdiction in these locations.191
As already mentioned in passing, parties to a contract may include the place of
performance in the TCA itself, this way avoiding the detour of having to establish it
under the applicable law. However, if the designated place of performance has no
relationship to the actual place of (possible) performance and is made for the
purpose of establishing jurisdiction only, it is treated as a choice of forum clause and
has to comply with the requirements of Article 23 (see below).
When the place of performance is not agreed upon by the parties, it will be
determined by the applicable law. This need not be national law, but could also be
the relevant EU legislation. It might be worth considering the inclusion of a
provision on the place of performance of the duty to consult the workers in the
various directives granting consultation and information rights. Alternative, a place
of performance could be included in Article 5 sub 1 of the Brussels I Regulation as
it has been done for sales of goods and provision of services.
4.
Jurisdiction in tort, delict and quasi-delict (Article 5 sub 3)
Article 5(3) grants jurisdiction to the court for the place where the harmful event
took place. In case the harmful act is performed in one Member State and the direct
damage is sustained in another, the claimant may choose either jurisdiction.192 So
the defining criteria are act and damage. If damage is sustained in more than one
country, the courts for each of these countries have jurisdiction but only over the
damage sustained locally.193 All damage can be claimed at either the locus actus or
the courts for the domicile of the defendant.
In the relationship between workers and workers representatives as plaintiffs and
parts of the company structure as defendants, we considered it unlikely that Article
5(3) can play a major role in establishing jurisdiction. As demonstrated above, if a
promise agreed upon in a TCA and made towards workers representatives and/or
workers communities is legally binding and specific enough with regard to the
beneficiaries thereof, a claim based on that promise would probably qualify as being
191
Leaving aside the complication that the legal entity may not have its seat at the place of establishment
of the business unit. However, even this may not cause undue problems as the Brussels I regulation
contains an autonomous notion of domicile of legal entities.
192
Case 21/76, Handelskwekerij G. J. Bier BV v Mines de potasse d'Alsace SA, 1976 ECR 01735.
C.M.V. Clarkson & J. Hill, The Conflict of Laws 3d edition, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2006,
p. 78; A.Briggs, The Conflict of Laws 2nd edition, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2008, p. 79.
193
Case C-68/93, Fiona Shevill, Ixora Trading Inc., Chequepoint SARL and Chequepoint International
Ltd v Presse Alliance SA, 1995 ECR I-00415.
67
contractual. The situation is different when outsiders rely on the TCA as

representative of company policy. If false statements are uttered (because the
company does not live by its promise), this might be construed as unfair competition
or misrepresentation/misleading advertising.
The locus of a tort is relatively easy to establish when the tort consists of an act
causing physical damage to persons or goods. The localisation of a tort is more
difficult in case of a failure to act (omission) and in case of more abstract and
compound obligations. Suppose a daughter company violates the wording or spirit
of a corporate social responsibility obligation taken on by a multinational enterprise,
and collective interest groups want to hold the parent company responsible in court.
It is not immediately apparent how the locus delicti should be identified in such
cases: Which behaviour constitutes the tort and where should it be localised? How
should the damage be identified and localised? If one looks at literature on
transnational liability within multinational enterprises194 it becomes obvious that
localising the tort in those cases isnt easy. VandeKerckhove discusses several
theories on the localisation of torts committed by parent companies vis--vis the
creditors of a daughter company. In those cases, the Handlungsort (or locus actus) is
often located at the seat or headquarters of the parent company, where the decision is
taken.195 However, sometimes the seat or headquarters of the daughter company
whose behaviour is affected thereby, is considered as such.196 The Erfolgsort (or
locus damni) may again be situated at the seat of the daughter company - the
Erfolg or damage being the influence on the decision-making process within the
daughter company, but also at the place where the act impacts on the interest of third
parties - in her case mainly creditors. Transposed to cases involving TCAs, the
liability of the parent corporation for behaviour of its daughter companies can be
construed to be based on corporate behaviour of the parent (1), affecting the decision
making process of the primary perpetrator the daughter (2) which in its turn
194
E.g. K VandeKerkhove, Piercing the Corporate Veil: A Transnational Approach, Alphen aan de Rijn,
Kluwer Law International, 2007 and R.C. van Dongen, Identificatie in het Rechtspersonenrecht:
Rechtsvergelijkende Beschouwingen over Piercing the Corporate Veil in het Interne en
Internationaal privaatrecht van Nederland, Duitsland, Zwitserland, New York en Texas, Deventer,
Kluwer, 1995.
195
Or formulated differently: where the parent company failed to observe its duty of care, resulting in
the tort of negligence.
196
Depending on the specific duty violated other places may also qualify as locus actus e.g. the place in
which false appearances of creditworthiness were created. See K VandeKerkhove, Piercing the
Corporate Veil: A Transnational Approach, Alphen aan de Rijn, Kluwer Law International, 2007, p.
658.
68
leads to the infringement of rights of third parties (3). Depending on the facts of the
case, this may lead to three different loci delicti. 197
As stated before, jurisdiction under the Brussels I Regulation should not depend on
the way national law would construe liability in a specific instance its rules are
based on autonomous concepts. The complex issues of liability within corporate
structures may in time result in specific concepts of torts with regard to company
behaviour. Currently however, there is not enough case law of the ECJ to ascertain
the exact application of the provision to the conflicts at hand.198 However, it seems
safe to assume that the damage caused by misrepresentation and unfair competition
would be located on the market which is influenced by the tortuous behaviour.199
This would hold true for all actors who can be held liable for misrepresentation,
which may be in some cases both the parent (communicating the social
responsibility standard and hence causing the (mis)representation) and the daughter
(turning the representation into a misrepresentation by violating the code of conduct
or TCA). If the locus actus with regard to the parent company is construed to be
located at the place where the decision (not to influence or interfere) of the parent is
taken, this connecting factor will often coincide with the place of domicile of the
company.200 In that case, Article 5(3) does not create an alternative, as the provision
can only be applied when the ground for special jurisdiction refers to another
member state than Article 2. When either the actions of the parent company or the
damage caused by it can be located at the place of establishment of the daughter who
violates the TCA, this would create an extra ground for jurisdiction in case the
197
See A.A.H. Van Hoek. Transnational corporate social responsibility: Some Issues with regard to the
liability of European corporations for labour law infringements in the countries of establishment of
their suppliers, in: A. Veldman, F. Pennings, & Y. Konijn (Eds.), Social responsibility in labour
relations: European and comparative perspectives, Alphen aan de Rijn, Kluwer Law International,
2008 (pp. 147-170). The classification of parent/daughter liability differs between jurisdictions and
between type of liability. Piercing the corporate veil is most often construed as a part of company
law, but other classifications do occur as well. The parent company may be held liable for its
daughter company through agency constructions or identification, but may also attract an
independent tortious liability for lack of supervision. Moreover, special rules on liability and
identification may be present in bankruptcy law, labour law and environmental law. See extensively
on this issue K VandeKerkhove, Piercing the Corporate Veil: A Transnational Approach, Alphen aan
de Rijn, Kluwer Law International, 2007 and R.C. van Dongen, Identificatie in het
Rechtspersonenrecht: Rechtsvergelijkende Beschouwingen over Piercing the Corporate Veil in het
Interne en Internationaal privaatrecht van Nederland, Duitsland, Zwitserland, New York en Texas,
Deventer, Kluwer, 1995.
198
A.A.H. Van Hoek, Private international law aspects of collective action - comparative report, in:
F. Dorssemont, T. Jaspers, & A.A.H. van Hoek (Eds.), Cross-Border Collective Action in Europe: A
Legal Challenge, Antwerpen/Oxford, Intersentia, 2007, p. (425-468) 425 and Van Hoek/Dorssemont,
Collective action in labour conflicts under the Rome II Regulation in E. Ales (ed), forthcoming on
the localisation of the tort of instigation a collective action. In the SEKO/DFDS case the ECJ seems
to define the tort committed by the union in restricted terms: the tort allegedly committed by the
plaintiff consisted of illegally instigating and supporting a boycott action. This support may, but need
not be, localised in the same place as the actual boycott itself.
199
Compare Article 6 of the Rome II Regulation and A. Dickinson, The Rome II Regulation Oxford,
Oxford University Press 2008 p. 412 ff
200
Though the two criteria are not necessarily identical. Compare above on domicile under the
Regulation.
69
parent company and the daughter company are established in different member
states.201
Accordingly, for consumers and competitors relying on the statements made, the
market on which the company operates seems to be the most relevant criterion to
assess the locus of the harmful event (damage). If this market encompasses more
than one Member State, each state will have jurisdiction over the damage done
within the territory. At least, this seems to be the combined result of the Shevill case
(on defamation) and the Henkel case (on unfair contract terms). According to the
ECJ The concept of harmful event within the meaning of Article 5(3) of the
Brussels Convention is broad in scope so that, with regard to consumer protection, it
covers not only situations where an individual has personally sustained damage but
also, in particular, the undermining of legal stability by the use of unfair terms which
it is the task of associations such as the VKI to prevent.202 In this case a German
provider was operating on the Austrian market and the Austrian consumer
organisation applied for an injunction on the use of unfair contract terms before an
Austrian court. The locus delicti could be considered to be Austria, since this was
where legal stability was undermined by the violation of consumer rights.203
5.
Disputes arising out of the operations of a branch, subsidiary or

other establishment (Article 5 sub 5)
Under the main rule of Article 2 a legal entity like a natural person may be sued
in the courts of the member state where the entity has established its domicile.
According to Article 60 of the same Regulation a company or other legal person or
association of natural or legal persons is domiciled at the place where it has either its
statutory seat, its central administration, or its principal place of business. Thus the
Regulation creates jurisdiction in the place of primary establishment of a legal
entity. But under the freedom of establishment, companies may very well have
secondary establishments in other member states as well. Article 5(5) deals with this
type of situation: a person domiciled in a Member State may, in another Member
State, be sued: as regards a dispute arising out of the operations of a branch, agency
or other establishment in the courts for the place in which the branch, agency or
other establishment is situated. The relevance of this provision for TCAs would
be: can interested parties sue the parent company at the place of establishment of its
daughter companies or subsidiaries and vice versa.
There are several cases in which the ECJ had to interpret the predecessor of this
provision in the Brussels Convention. From that case law it can be deducted that
Article 5(5) requires a three step test:
201
And no jurisdiction can be established through Article 5(5). See below.
202
Para 42. The interpretation of the ECJ is based in part on the rationale of Dir 93/13 Article 7. This
European basis is - for the most part - lacking in labour law.
203
Compare Pocar, Report to the revised Lugano Convention, para 60 and Dickinson, p. 412 ff.
70
1) Is there an establishment (branch, agency or other) in another Member

State?
2) Which can be considered to be a branch, agency or other establishment of
the company which is actually sued?204
3) And finally, does the dispute arise out of the operations of this branch,
agency or other establishment?
The first criterion refers to a continuous and stable presence within a Member State,
the availability of an infrastructure and the possibility to enter into binding
commitments. The test applied is largely similar to the one used to determine
establishment (rather than services) in the context of the internal market
provisions.205 In the context of this study we mainly deal with multinational
corporations. There will be several places of business in several Member States,
each of which has its own business premises and its own work force, maybe even its
own works council and collective agreement. So the criterion of establishment will
be easily met.
The problem with application of Article 5(5) lies with the second criterion. This is
tested along two slightly different lines. In the case of De Bloos v. Boyer the ECJ
stressed the relevance of a hierarchical relationship between the parent entity and its
subsidiaries. In the cases of Blanckaert and Somafer more weight was given to the
fact that a subsidiary manifested itself as such towards third parties. If these could
assume, based on the appearances created by the company, that any business with
the parent could be negotiated through the subsidiary, Article 5(5) would apply. The
ECJ took the latter to its maximum when it allowed a creditor to sue a daughter
company in the place of establishment of the parent company the latter being
treated for the specific conflict as a branch of the daughter company.206 This
judgement seems to be atypical and was heavily criticized from disrespecting the
separate legal entities of the parties involved. Its line of reasoning has not been
relied upon since.207 It seems safe to assume that as a rule Article 5(5) is meant to
cover situations in which a single legal entity has several places of establishment
located in different Member States. Only in exceptional circumstances can it be
204
Case 33/78, Somafer SA v Saar-Ferngas AG, 1978 ECR 02183.
205
Case C-55/94, Reinhard Gebhard v Consiglio dell'Ordine degli Avvocati e Procuratori di Milano,
1995 ECR I-4165.
206
Case 218/86, SAR Schotte GmbH v Parfums Rothschild SARL, 1987 ECR 4905.
207
Though admittedly it has not been reversed either.
71
applied when the several establishments of a multinational enterprise have separate

legal entities.208
The dispute concerned should relate to the operation of the branch which is referred
to in order to establish jurisdiction over the company. Accordingly, if one would
want to sue a company established in France in the court for the place of
establishment of a German subsidiary, the case at hand should specifically concern
the German subsidiary. That being said, Article 5(5) covers claim in both contract
and tort. It is well established that the employment relationships of workers
employed at the German subsidiary concern the operation of the branch.209 Hence
if the German subsidiary would break a commitment made in a TCA vis--vis its
own workers, any claim against the company based on this breach would be covered
by Article 5(5). Likewise, if the breach of commitments by the German subsidiary
would constitute an unfair commercial practice by the said subsidiary, again, the
claim against the legal entity as such (being the parent undertaking) could be
pursued in Germany.
6.
Main findings as to the special jurisdictions under Article 5
From the above, it becomes evident (again) that jurisdiction rules are case specific.
General jurisdiction will depend on who is the claimant and who is the defendant.
Special jurisdiction will depend on the cause of action. In contractual matters, the
specific claim against the defendant will determine which obligation is at issue. The
place of performance of this specific obligation will in turn determine jurisdiction
under Article 5(1).210 The concept of contract seems wide enough to encompass the
majority of enforcement claims made by workers and/or their representatives against
the companies that are signatory to or otherwise bound by the TCA. Article 5(3)
seems mainly relevant for claims of third parties (consumers, competitors). As most
of the claims under this heading will be related to misrepresentation and/or unfair
competition, Article 5(3) seems to refer to the court or courts for the market or
markets on which these torts take place. But the application of Article 5 to liability
within the corporate structure is wrought with complications, as the exact
formulation of the tort committed may determine the locus thereof. Finally, Article
5(5) can be used if a dependent subsidiary breaks its commitment under the TCA. In
that case the claim entered against the legal entity can be entered at the place of
establishment of the branch office, even if the entity itself is domiciled elsewhere.211
It is very doubtful whether the provision can be used to sue daughter companies who
208
We would not advocate an interpretation under which the parent company who enters into a TCA on
behalf of the entire conglomerate, acts as a representative of its daughters in such a way as to
establish jurisdiction against the daughters in the place of establishment of the parent company at
least as far as the interpretation and implementation of the TCA is concerned.
209
So inter alia the reference made to Article 5(5) in Article 18.
210
Pocar, Report to the revised Lugano Convention para. 44; C.M.V. Clarkson & J. Hill, The Conflict of
Laws 3d edition, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2006, p. 73
211
To be precise, the domicile of the legal entity and the place of establishment of the branch office have
to be in different Member States.
72
have separate legal entities, in the place of establishment of the parent company and
vice versa. This restriction strongly reduces the use that can be made of the
provision for the enforcement of TCAs.
In all cases, Article 5 can only be used against defendants domiciled in a Member
State in order to sue them in another Member State. If the jurisdiction based on the
special provision would refer to the state of domicile of defendant, the special
jurisdiction rule doesnt apply. If the rules in Article 5 refer to a non-Member State,
the provisions cant be applied either and jurisdiction has to be based on Article 2
(and in multiple party cases Article 6). Jurisdiction under the special provisions of
Article 5 is claim specific. It does not provide a basis for jurisdiction against other
defendants and/or on other grounds. If parties want to consolidate proceedings, they
should do so in a court with a more general base of jurisdiction (either the courts for
the domicile or the court chosen by all relevant parties). See also below on Article 6.
The main problems caused by Article 5 directly concern the interpretation of the
provisions as applied to TCA commitments, not the rules as such. If the parties to
the TCA want to avoid the existing uncertainty as to the application of Article 5(1)
they could include specific provisions on the place of performance of the specific
obligations in the TCA itself. Likewise the European legislator may consider
introducing provisions on the place of performance of certain obligations as well.
E.
Multiparty dispute ( Article 6 sub 1)
Article 6 contains several alternative grounds for jurisdiction and in this respect
resembles Article 5. Most of the provisions of Article 6 relate to multiparty disputes
(or rather, disputes with more than one claimant and/or defendant). The most
relevant one for our purposes is Article 6(1) which relates to multiple defendants.
The second and third subsections refer to third party proceedings and counter-claims
respectively. There is no separate provision for multi-claimant proceedings (e.g.
group actions).
Article 6(1) states that a defendant may be sued, where there are a number of
defendants, in the courts for the place where any one of them is domiciled, provided
the claims are so closely connected that it is expedient to hear and determine them
together to avoid the risk of irreconcilable judgments resulting from separate
proceedings. The requirement of the close connection was introduced in the text
upon converting the Convention into a Regulation and derives directly from earlier
case law on Article 6 of the Convention.212
212
Case C-98/06, Freeport plc v Olle Arnoldsson, 2007 ECR I-08319, para 37; Case 539/03, ECJ 13
July 2006 ECR I-6535 (Roche Nederland e.a.) para 21; see also Case 189/87, Kalfelis, 1988 ECR
05565,
para 13; Case C-51/97, Runion europenne SA and Others v Spliethoff's
Bevrachtingskantoor BV and the Master of the vessel Alblasgracht V002. 1998 ECR I-6511, para 48.
73
In the context studied here the provision could be relevant when unions and/or
works councils want the summons both the contracting party / parent company and
the daughter who is in default in order to demand proper performance of the TCA.
Two relatively recent cases are especially relevant for the interpretation of this
provision: Freeport C-98/06 and Roche Nederland BV C-539/03. In these cases the
ECJ declined to give a general interpretation of the concept of irreconcilable
judgments in the context of Article 6(1).213 It simply stated the limits of application
of Article 6(1) to the cases at hand. The Freeport case concerned a situation in which
a contract was concluded between Mr Arnoldsson and a company within a
multinational group (Freeport plc). This contract contained specific commitments
(payment of a sum of money) towards Mr. Arnoldsson which were to be honoured
by another, yet unnamed company within the same group. This second company was
later identified as Freeport AB.214 As Mr Arnoldsson was not paid by either
company, he sued both the original contract party and the beneficiary of the contract
in the domicile of the latter. Freeport plc objected to the jurisdiction of the court of
ABs domicile. One argument put forward by Freeport plc concerned the difference
in legal base between the two claims: as Freeport AB denied being bound under
contract, the claim against Freeport AB might sound in tort.215 According to the ECJ
this difference in legal base does not by and of itself block the application of Article
6.216 Hence, and action in tort could be closely related to an action in contract as
long as the (other) requirements for application of the provision are met. These
requirements were elaborated upon in the Roche case.
The Roche case also concerned corporate behaviour. In this case several companies
belonging to a multinational enterprise are accused of concerted infringement of a
European patent held by the claimant. The actual infringements are attributable to
several companies established in different EU Member States, and take place on the
local markets. The case is brought before the Dutch Hoge Raad (Supreme Court)
which refers several questions to the ECJ all pertaining to the scope of application
213
To be specific: to ECJ refused to choose between the interpretation of the similar condition for
application of Article 28 on related actions or the concept of irreconcilable judgments in Article 34
on recognition of judgments (or yet another interpretation): see Roche Nederland para 22.
214
The contract concerned the development of commercial real estate. The company which was to
become owner of the real estate, Freeport AB, was yet to be established.
215
The ECJ did not answer the question whether the claim would be covered by Article 5(1) or rather
Article 5(3) as this was not relevant to the present case. Para 32
216
In this judgment the ECJ basically overrides part of its earlier judgment in Reunion/Spliethoff
although it claims to be distinguishing the two cases. Compare Hess/Pfeiffer/Schlosser, p. 104.
74
of Article 6.217 The ECJ observed that, even if the concept irreconcilable
judgments in Article 6(1) must be understood in the broad sense of contradictory
decisions, there is no risk of such decisions being given in the case at hand. In order
for decisions to be regarded as contradictory it is not sufficient that there be a
divergence in the outcome of the dispute, but that divergence must also arise in the
context of the same situation of law and fact.218 In this case the infringements that
the companies were accused of might differ slightly from case to case. Moreover:
Each infringement would be a separate act by a separate legal entity taking place in
different Member State. Hence, there is no unity of facts. At the same time, the
ECJ found no unity of law. Even though the European patent has a EU-base, the
exact scope and content is dependent on the country in which protection is sought. If
act A, committed in A under the legal system of A is found to be in breach of the
European patent as protected under law A by a court in A, any finding that a similar
act by B committed in B under the legal system of B does not infringe the patent is
not in itself irreconcilable with the earlier finding in A.
The judgment in the Roche case has attracted extensive criticism.219 Some authors
state that the Roche case should be interpreted restrictively and be read in the light
of European patent law and the complications caused by the exclusive competence
granted under Article 22 for procedures in which the validity of the patent is
contested. This may limit its general interpretative value. However, from the
wording of the judgment it would seem that the requirement with regard to the unity
of law and fact has indeed a more general validity.220
In the context of the enforcement of TCAs this would mean that unions and
workers representatives are not free to summons all companies which are covered
217
(1) Is there a connection, as required for the application of Article 6(1) of the Brussels Convention,
between a patent infringement action brought by a holder of a European patent against a defendant
having its registered office in the State of the court in which the proceedings are brought, on the one
hand, and against various defendants having their registered offices in Contracting States other than
that of the State of the court in which the proceedings are brought, on the other hand, who, according
to the patent holder, are infringing that patent in one or more other Contracting States?
(2) If the answer to Question 1 is not or not unreservedly in the affirmative, in what circumstances is
such a connection deemed to exist, and is it relevant in this context whether, for example,
the defendants form part of one and the same group of companies?
the defendants are acting together on the basis of a common policy, and if so is the place from
which that policy originates relevant?
the alleged infringing acts of the various defendants are the same or virtually the same?
218
Roche Nederland Para 26.
219
See inter alia B. Hess, T. Pfeiffer & P. Schlosser, report on the Application of Regulation Brussel I in
the Member States, Heidelberg, Institut fr Auslndisches und Internationales Privat- und
Wirtschaftsrecht, 2007, para 827-828.
220
Compare on the application of Article 6(1) to cross border collective action Case C-438/05,
International Transport Workers' Federation, Finnish Seamen's Union v Viking Line ABP, O
Viking Line Eesti, 2007 ECR I-10779 and A.A.H. Van Hoek, Private international law aspects of
collective action - comparative report, in: F. Dorssemont, T. Jaspers, & A.A.H. van Hoek (Eds.),
Cross-Border Collective Action in Europe: A Legal Challenge, 2007 Antwerpen/Oxford, Intersentia,
(425-468), p. 442.
75
by the TCA in the domicile of any one of them. There has to be a close connection
between the claims made against those companies. Based on the Freeport case, it is
not necessary to prove at the stage of establishing jurisdiction under Article 6, that
all companies covered by the TCA are bound under contract. So discussions as to
the power of attorney of the parent company need not arise.221 But the necessity to
show a close connection reduces the choice of competent courts considerably. In
case of breach of an obligation in a TCA, one might want to sue both the company
who is actually in breach of its obligations and the parent company/signatory party
who failed to implement the TCA properly and/or instruct and supervise its
offspring. Such a combination of actions seems to have a single breach of
obligations as its common factual base. Irreconcilable judgements could ensue if
more than one court would have to judge the same fact pattern for conformity with
the TCA. Hence we would advocate the use (and defend the availability of) Article
6(1) to this case.
The situation is different when several daughter companies are sued in the domicile
of one of them for individual breaches of the TCA. That case would lack a common
factual base and hence would not be covered by Article 6(1).
As is already discussed above, Article 6(1) can not be applied to establish
jurisdiction when a claim is covered by Section 5 on individual labour contracts. The
jurisdiction in those cases has to be established according to the provisions included
in or specifically referred to in that Section. This does not, however, preclude that
other related claims which themselves fall outside the scope of application of
Section 5 are joined to the claim based on the individual labour contract. If the claim
of the individual employee is instituted in the place of domicile of the individual
employer (in conformity with Section 5), other claims may be entered against other
defendants, as long as these are closely connected to the first claim in the meaning
of Article 6(1). In practice, this would mean that the individual workers may sue
both their employer and the parent company for breach of related commitments
under a TCA in the domicile of their employer. The other way around is not allowed
under the current text.
F.
Choice of forum (Article 23)
1.
Introduction
Both the Brussels I Regulation and the Brussels and Lugano Conventions allow the
parties to a conflict and/or legal relationship to choose the court which is to settle
their legal dispute. This choice not only creates jurisdiction for the court designated
by the parties, but it also (if parties so wish) ousts the jurisdiction of the otherwise
competent court or courts. This principled choice in favour of party autonomy with
regard to jurisdiction is elaborated in Articles 23 and 24 of the Regulation. Article
221
As they would if jurisdiction were to be based on Article 5(1) see above.
76
23 deals with choice of forum, Article 24 with tacit submission. Tacit submission
refers to the situation in which a defendant enters an appearance in a lawsuit without
(first) objecting to the jurisdiction of the court. In that case, the court may assume
jurisdiction even when it would not have jurisdiction otherwise. Choice of forum
refers to explicit submission by way of agreement. Article 23 deals both with the
basic acceptability of such agreement and with the formal requirements thereof.
With this, the Regulation covers important aspects of choice of forum, albeit not all.
From the point of view of TCAs, Article 23 is more relevant than Article 24: is it
possible to agree on the competent court for disputes arising out of a TCA in
advance? How could such choice of forum be effected and who would be bound by
it? We will discuss all these elements in turn.
2.
Scope of application of Article 23
Article 23 only applies when the parties to a particular legal relationship, one of
whom is domiciled in a Member State, agree to confer jurisdiction to a court of a
Member State. So there has to be a double link to the EU. Forum choices which do
not fulfil these requirements may be valid under national law and/or international
agreements.222 They are however not, or only to a very limited extent, covered by
the Regulation.223
A choice of forum by the parties may not contravene the provisions of Article 22
and Articles 13, 17 and 21 respectively. The first proviso means that a choice of
forum is not allowed when a EU court has exclusive jurisdiction under Article 22.
This restriction could become relevant if the provision on corporate matters in
Article 22 would be extended to include lawsuits between management and
workers representatives. Currently, it does not seem they have any practical
relevance for TCAs.
The second proviso refers to the special protective measures with regard to
consumer contracts, contracts of insurance and individual employment contracts.
The weaker contractual party is protected against unfavourable forum choices by
restricting the validity of a forum choice to
- choices made after the dispute has arisen or
- choices which allow the weaker party to bring proceedings in courts other than
those indicated by the objective rules of the regulation.
222
E.g. The Hague choice of forum convention.
223
Article 23 contains a provision with regard to the effects on other EU courts of a choice of forum in
favour of an EU-court by non-domiciled parties.
77
This means that a choice of forum in a labour contract can only have limited effects
with regard to the individual worker: he may hold the employer to the agreement,
but not the other way around.
Article 23 pertains to a choice of forum: an agreement between parties to a specific
legal relationship to grant jurisdiction to a EU-court. It does not apply to indirect
choices of forum. With this term we refer to provisions in contracts that designate
the place of performance of the obligation or obligations arising out of the contract.
Such stipulations on the place of performance may create jurisdiction under Article
5 sub 1. However, they are not choices of forum in the meaning of Article 23.
Hence, they do not have to fulfil the formal requirements which Article 23 sets for
choices of forum proper. In this way, the special requirements of Article 23 could be
circumvented by rephrasing a choice of forum into a stipulation regarding the place
of performance. The ECJ has prevented this by subjecting provisions that designate
fictitious places of performance for the purpose of establishing jurisdiction to the
requirements of Article 23 anyway.224
3.
Choice of forum: specificity and consent
A choice of forum must pertain to disputes which have arisen or which may arise in
connection with a particular legal relationship. The requirement is understood to
(inter alia) safeguard the consensual character of a choice of forum: a choice of
forum provision is only valid if the parties could predict to a reasonable extent
which disputes would be covered by it. A general clause to refer any and all present
and future disputes between the parties to a specific court, would not be valid under
Article 23.225 Likewise the ECJ is rather strict on the matter of consent. The main
aim of (the formal requirements of) Article 23 is to ensure that the consensus
between the parties is in fact established.226 Authors seem to agree on the fact that
the matter of (primary) consent is by and large covered by the Regulation and hence
has an autonomous meaning.227 This does not hold true for issues of secondary
consent with which we refer to the question to what extent third parties can be
224
C-106/95, Mainschiffahrts-Genossenschaft eG (MSG) v Les Gravires Rhnanes SARL, 1997 ECR,

I-00911, para 31-35; Case C-440/97, GIE Groupe Concorde and Others v The Master of the vessel
"Suhadiwarno Panjan" and Others, 1999 ECR, I-6307, para 28; U. Magnus & P. Mankowski,
European Commentaries on Private international law: the Brussels I Regulation, Mnchen, Sellier
Europa Law Publishers 2007, Article 23 Rdnr 41, p. 387 and Article 5 Rdnr 147, p. 163.
225
Case C-214/89, Powell Duffryn plc v Wolfgang Petereit, 1992 ECR I-1745, para 31.
226
Case 24/76, Estasis Salotti di Colzani Aimo e Gianmario Colzani s.n.c. tegen Rwa
Polstereimaschinen GmbH, 1976 ECR 01831 and Case 25/76, Galeries Segoura SPRL v Rahim
Bonakdarian, 1976 ECR 01851, para 6. U. Magnus & P. Mankowski, European Commentaries on
Private international law: the Brussels I Regulation, Mnchen, Sellier Europa Law Publishers 2007,
Article 23 Rdnr 75 p. 399.
227
B. Hess, T. Pfeiffer & P. Schlosser, report on the Application of Regulation Brussel I in the Member
States, Heidelberg, Institut fr Auslndisches und Internationales Privat- und Wirtschaftsrecht, 2007,
para 376 and 377, p. 159 states that the remaining issues are sometimes submitted to the lex causae,
sometimes to the lex fori. The Hague Convention opts for the law of the chosen forum. A major issue
here is the admissibility of choices of forum in standard terms.
78
bound (or can rely on) a choice of forum agreed upon by others.228 In several cases
the ECJ subjected this question to the law applying to the law applying to the
underlying relationship.229
The question has mainly been discussed in the context of bills of lading. These
instruments are used in maritime transport. They contain the transportation contract
but also function as a identification of the person who is entitled to demand delivery
of the goods. The party who claims the goods may not be a direct party to the bill of
lading.230 Also on the side of the transport operator the signatory party may not be
the party held responsible in case of damage or loss.231 Hence, bills of lading operate
in an extremely complex multiparty situation. These parties may be linked in
different ways to the bill of lading, e.g. through representation, assignment and/or
third party stipulation.
Bills of lading often contain a choice of forum clause. The interesting question (also
in the context of this study) will be who can benefit from and/or be held bound by
the choice of law in the instrument which is central to the multiparty relationship.
The ECJ seems to refer this question to the relevant national law. In the Tilly Russ
case the ECJ decided:232
As regards the relationship between the carrier and a third party holding the
bill of lading, the conditions laid down by article 17 of the Convention are
satisfied if
the jurisdiction clause has been adjudged valid as between the carrier
[the party performing the actual transport AH/FH] and the shipper
[the party who handed over the goods for shipment and signed the
transportation contract AH/FH] and if,
by virtue of the relevant national law, the third party, upon acquiring
the bill of lading, succeeded to the shipper ' s rights and obligations.
228
Compare on this issue P.H.L.M. Kuypers, Forumkeuze in het Nederlandse internationaal

privaatrecht, Deventer, Kluwer 2008, p. 193 e.v.
229
Magnus/Mankowski, Brussels I, Article 23 Rdnr 82 p. 402. B. Hess, T. Pfeiffer & P. Schlosser,

Report on the Application of Regulation Brussel I in the Member States, Heidelberg, Institut fr
Auslndisches und Internationales Privat- und Wirtschaftsrecht, 2007.
230
A forwarding agent may be the party, whereas the owner of the goods holds the bill of lading. Or the
bill of lading may be held by the purchaser, but be signed by either a forwarding agent or the seller.
231
Compare the facts in the Tilly Russ case 71/83.
232
Case 71/83, Partenreederei ms. Tilly Russ and Ernest Russ v NV Haven- & Vervoerbedrijf Nova and
NV Goeminne Hout, 1984 ECR, 2417.
79
If the third party is not bound indirectly, his consent must be established under the
rules of the Regulation which inter alia insists on certain formal requirements.233
Hence, just like in the context of Article 5, the questions relating to agency and other
aspects of third party accession to a contract are not dealt with autonomously, but
referred to the relevant national law. Which law would be relevant in this respect,
is beyond the scope of the jurisdiction convention/regulation.234 Moreover, it is as
yet unclear whether the third party should succeed to all rights and obligations under
the contract for the choice of forum to be transferred too.235
In the report on the application of the Regulation Brussels I in the Member States by
Hess, Pfeiffer and Schlosser the current situation is heavily criticized and a
suggestion is made to the effect that a (regular) third party holder of a bill of lading
claiming rights thereunder can rely on, but is also bound by a jurisdiction clause
validly agreed upon by the original parties.236
The case law on third party beneficiaries in a contract seems to deviate somewhat
from the above. This case law concerns insurance contracts, in which the insurer is
thought to be the stronger party and the policy holder, insured person and
beneficiary (which could be three different parties) are deemed to need protection.
The policy holder would be the signatory to the contract. The other two are not privy
to it. According to the ECJ third party beneficiaries may rely on a choice of forum
validly agreed upon between the insurer and the policy holder.237 In this respect, no
reference is made to national law.238 However, it would seem that normally only
national law can decide whether or not a particular party is actually a third party
beneficiary under the contract and which are the consequences of that status: can
third party beneficiaries only derive rights from the contract or are they bound by it
as well when they claim rights under it? 239
233
Case C-387/98, Coreck Maritime GmbH v Handelsveem BV and Others, 2000 ECR, I-9327, para 17.
234
Case C-387/98, Coreck Maritime GmbH v Handelsveem BV and Others, 2000 ECR, I-9327, para 28.
235
B. Hess, T. Pfeiffer & P. Schlosser, Report on the Application of Regulation Brussel I in the Member
States, Heidelberg, Institut fr Auslndisches und Internationales Privat- und Wirtschaftsrecht, 2007
para 290, p. 130.
236
See para 279, p. 128 ff; for the proposal para 292/293, p. 132.
237
Compare for bills of lading in which a third party is already named as beneficiary: B. Hess, T.
Pfeiffer & P. Schlosser, Report on the Application of Regulation Brussel I in the Member States,
Heidelberg, Institut fr Auslndisches und Internationales Privat- und Wirtschaftsrecht, 2007, p. 128
para 279 noot 406 in which it is stated that a third party who is named in the bill of lading as a
beneficiary would of course be bound by its provisions. Idem para 293 p. 132.
238
Compare P.H.L.M. Kuypers, Forumkeuze in het Nederlandse internationaal privaatrecht, Deventer,

Kluwer 2008, p. 196, when the formal requirements of the Regulation are met, national law can not
impose extra requirements.
239
The position of national parties as regards the TCA seems to be a lot less obvious than the position
of the insured person and the beneficiary in insurance which third parties are specifically mentioned
in the relevant provisions of the Regulation.
80
In the case of insurance, the latter question is moot as the system of the Regulation
does not allow a choice of forum clause in an insurance contract to bind the weaker
parties. Hence, neither policy holder, nor beneficiary can be held bound by it.240 A
similar reasoning would apply with regards to employees covered by the TCA
they may be able to rely on a choice of forum in a TCA (if they are assumed to be
third party beneficiaries under the TCA), but can not be bound by it. With regard to
national unions however, it would seem that they can be bound by the choice of
forum when they claim rights as third party beneficiaries. It remains to be seen, how
the ECJ would interpret the formal requirements of the Regulation in that specific
case.241
4.
Choice of forum: formal requirements
The regulation is exhaustive with regard to formal requirements: when a choice of

forum fulfils the conditions of the regulation, it cannot be invalidated for reasons of
form under national law. In its current state, the regulation contains several forms in
which a choice of forum can be concluded. The choice of forum should be
a)
in writing or evidenced in writing;
b) in a form which accords with practices which the parties have established
between themselves or
c)
in international trade or commerce, in a form which accords with a usage of

which the parties are or ought to have been aware and which in such trade
or commerce is widely known to, and regularly observed by, parties to
contracts of the type involved in the particular trade and commerce.
Of these three, the third one is obviously irrelevant for TCAs as TCAs can not be
deemed to be agreed upon in international trade and commerce. Though it is
possible for social partners to develop a practice amongst themselves, the option
under b) should not be relied upon either: this option only works when business
partners have regular dealings with one another leading to contractual relationships.
Moreover, the practice must be such to allow consensus on the choice of forum to be
derived from it with sufficient certainty.242
240
With some exceptions, which are not relevant here. See Reg. Article 13. On the position of the
beneficiary, see inter alia Case C-112/03, Socit financire et industrielle du Peloux v Axa Belgium
and Others, 2005 ECR I-3707.
241
Kuypers assumes that in case of accession to the agreement, the accessor accepts the choice of
forum contained therein and no additional formal requirements need be fulfilled. o.c., p. 215.
242
U. Magnus & P. Mankowski, European Commentaries on Private international law: the Brussels I
Regulation, Mnchen, Sellier Europa Law Publishers 2007, Article 23 Marginals 109 ff. p. 413 ff.
81
The formal requirements of Article 23 are aimed to provide sufficient certainty that
the choice of forum is based on true consensus especially if it is not agreed upon in
the course of trade or commerce. In line with this emphasis on consent by the
parties, the ECJ is only willing to accept a choice of forum clause in standard
contract terms under specific conditions:
-
the contract itself should refer to the standard term with sufficient clarity and
precision and
the general conditions have to be communicated to the other party together with
the offer in which the reference is made so that
the general conditions can be checked by a party exercising reasonable care.243
5.
Choice of forum in collective agreements
In a recent case before the Bundesarbeitsgericht (BAG) the question was raised
whether an employer had become bound by a choice of forum in a collective
agreement which was applicable to him by extension.244 The BAG referred to the
Regulation for this and decided, in our opinion rightfully so, that the choice of forum
was not concluded in conformity with Article 23 of the Regulation and hence could
not bind the employer. What seems to be lacking here is consent on the side of the
employer. The question whether a choice of forum in a collective agreement could
bind the employee (through extension or otherwise) will not arise, as such choice of
forum clauses can not be opposed to the employee by virtue of Article 21. Whether a
clause in a collective agreement between a parent company and a European
federation of unions would bind the daughter companies and/or the national unions,
will depend on whether their position can be subsumed under agency of third party
stipulations.
Currently the binding effect of jurisdiction clauses against non-signatories is unclear
as this question is largely remitted to the applicable national law. Accordingly,
there is no uniform answer in all European cases, but the answer may differ
depending on the lex causae. As will be demonstrated in the next chapter, there
might also be a lack of uniformity as to the conflicts rule which will decide on the
applicable law as not all situations leading to third party involvement are covered by
the Rome I Regulation. Hence it might be wise to develop a uniform rule on third
party effect of jurisdiction clauses in TCAs. This could be construed in a similar
243
Regulation, Mnchen, Sellier Europa Law Publishers 2007, Article 23 para 97, p. 408 with references
to; Case 24/76, Estasis Salotti di Colzani Aimo e Gianmario Colzani s.n.c. v Rwa
Polstereimaschinen GmbH, 1976 ECR I-01831, 1842.
244
BAG 2 July 2008, 10 AZR 355/07

http://www.bundesarbeitsgericht.de/ .
82
available
through
the website of
the
BAG:
fashion to the one proposed for bills of lading: if a party claims direct (contractual)
benefits from a TCA, it will be bound by a jurisdiction clause in that TCA.
Of course, this binding effect does not pertain to claims by individual workers due
to the protection offered by section 5 of the regulation. Also, the parties to the TCA
may choose the alter the effect of a choice of forum e.g. by stipulating that the
choice of forum is not exclusive, or optional for the benefit of one party (or side),
or only pertains to specific claims.
To be effective, any choice of forum should be in writing, or at least confirmed in
writing. Is seems unwise to rely on standing practice between the parties.
G.
Interim relief (Article 31)
Based on Article 31 Application may be made to the courts of a Member State for
such provisional, including protective, measures as may be available under the law
of the State, even if, under this Regulation, the courts of another Member State have
jurisdiction as to the substance of the matter. This provision, which was taken
virtually verbatim from the Convention, gives additional jurisdiction for a specific
type of remedy. The provision applies when the conflict has arisen, but has not been
decided on the merits yet.245 Which measures (injunctions or otherwise) are
available, depends on the law of the court seized. However, not all measures taking
in summary proceedings (e.g. the Dutch Kort Geding or the French rfer) under
national law are deemed provisional under the Regulation. According to the ECJ
Article 31 only covers measures which are intended to preserve a factual or legal
situation so as to safeguard rights the recognition of which is or can be sought
elsewhere.246 Especially when payment of a sum of money is ordered by way of
provisional measure, precautions must be taken in order to assure the temporary
character of the measure.247
The country reports mention several types of interim measures which may be
ordered in the context of the social dialogue and/or information and consultation
rights.
Several countries acknowledge the right of the works council to demand a court
order that stops management from implementing a decision taken in violation of
245
Regulation, Mnchen, Sellier Europa Law Publishers, 2007, Article 31 para 5/6, p. 525.
246
Case C-261/90, Mario Reichert, Hans-Heinz Reichert and Ingeborg Kockler v Dresdner Bank AG
(Reichert II), 1992 ECR I-2149; Case-391/95, Van Uden Maritime BV, trading as Van Uden Africa
Line v Kommanditgesellschaft in Firma Deco-Line and Another, 1998 ECR I-7091; Case C-104/03,
St. Paul Dairy Industries NV v Unibel Exser BVBA, 2005 ECR I-3481.
247
Van Uden C-391/95 and Mietz C-22/96, ECJ 27 April 1999, ECR I-2277. In general on the
temporary character: Case C-125/79, Bernard Denilauler v SNC Couchet Frres, 1980 case 125/79,
1980 ECR 1980 I-01553.
83
their participation rights. In other cases courts may order consultation under threat of
a penalty. In our opinion these measures come under the heading of Article 31: they
are meant to preserve a situation (stop implementation or prevent a decision) in
order to safeguard a right (the right of information and consultation which might be
irrevocably damaged if management was allowed to go ahead despite the violation).
Any court may order the measures which are available in its national law. However,
in order to qualify for recognition under the Regulation the court that orders the
measure must either have jurisdiction on the merits or demonstrate a real connecting
link between the subject-matter of the measure sought and the territorial jurisdiction
of the forum. This latter requirement is deemed to be fulfilled if the measure has to
be (or can be) enforced within the territory. The Article also applies in individual
labour cases.248
H.
Conclusions and recommendations as to jurisdiction
1.
Summary of the findings
Introduction
In the EU the rules of jurisdiction in patrimonial matters such as contracts and torts
have been unified by the Brussels I Regulation. The Regulation applies to civil and
commercial matters, with some specific exceptions. As disputes relating to the
enforcement of a TCA must be deemed to be civil and commercial in nature, and as
this topic is not excluded in Article 1, the Regulation applies. In should be kept in
mind, however, that the Regulation does exclude arbitration from its scope of
application. This means that the validity of arbitration agreements, their effect on
jurisdiction of the courts and the recognition of any ensuing arbitral awards are not
covered by the Regulation.
The Regulation distributes jurisdiction among the courts in the Member States for
defendants who are domiciled in a Member State. The Regulation does not contain
rules which attribute jurisdiction to EU-courts over defendants who are domiciled
outside the EU, except in the case of choice of forum and exclusive jurisdiction
under Article 22. Those defendants will be covered by national law (and in the case
of defendants domiciled in one of the EFTA countries: by the Lugano Convention).
Exclusive jurisdiction over the validity of company decisions - Article 22 sub 2
Under the Brussels I Regulation, jurisdiction is based on the principle of the forum
rei, meaning that in general the courts for the place of domicile of the defendant has
248
Regulation, Mnchen, Sellier Europa Law Publishers 2007, Article 31 para 16 p. 528 with regard to
consumers in: Case C-99/96, Hans Hermann Mietz v Intership Yachting Sneek B.V., 1999 ECR 1999
I-2277.
84
general jurisdiction over the defendant (article 2). This rule is only deviated from in
cases in which there is a strong policy interest in granting exclusive jurisdiction to
another court (article 22). For the purpose of this study only the exclusive
jurisdiction in the seat of a corporation over issues regarding the existence and
validity of the legal entity itself and decision taken by it, seems to have some
relevance. Closer scrutiny reveals however, that this exclusive jurisdiction is
interpreted strictly and mainly pertains to the relationship between organs of the
legal entity. It does not relate to disputes between works council and management
over information and consultation rights. In our opinion, there is no reason to change
this: the jurisdiction rule provided under Article 22 is unfit for disputes between
works councils and management as it refers to the seat of the legal entity, rather than
the place of establishment of the business entity for which the works council is
established. Moreover, an exclusive jurisdiction in these matters might frustrate the
effective settlement of multiparty disputes.
Jurisdiction over individual contracts of employment - Section 5

The Regulation contains a special section on individual contracts of employment
which replaces the general rules of jurisdiction. Under that special regime, the
employer may only sue in the place of domicile of the employee. The employee
however, has a choice to sue either in the place of domicile of the employer or in the
habitual place of work (simplified rendition). The normal alternatives of the
regulation are not available to these parties, with the exception of Article 5 sub 5
(jurisdiction at the place of establishment of a branch, agency or other establishment,
see above). There is no absolute clarity as to the outer limits of the concept of
individual contracts of employment, but from case law on other weak party
contracts it can be deduced that the special provisions only apply to disputes in
which the employee itself is a party. Section 5 will cover any claim by an individual
employee against his employer, in which the employee invokes the TCA. It will
(most likely) not cover direct claims by the employee against a signatory, not being
his direct employer. Hence, the relevance of Section 5 for the enforcement of TCAs
is limited.
Forum rei Article 2

Claims which are covered by neither Article 22 nor Section 5, will be covered by the
general system of the Regulation. This system awards general jurisdiction to the
courts of the country of domicile of the defendant (forum rei). The forum rei rule
lays much weight on the role of the contestants in the legal procedure: who is suing
who. In the most likely event as far as enforcement of TCAs is concerned that
parties from the company structure (rather than parties from the side of the workers
representatives) are the defendants, the rule would refer to the place of establishment
(as defined in the Brussels I Regulation) of the company being sued. Hence, if the
parent company is sued, the courts for the country of domicile of the parent has
general jurisdiction. If a subsidiary with independent legal identity is being sued, the
courts for the country of domicile of the subsidiary have general jurisdiction.
Companies that are domiciled outside the EU are not covered by the rules on
85
jurisdiction of the Regulation. Parties are referred to national law on this issue. As a
rule the national rules of attribution are slightly more extensive than the European
rules, which mainly distribute jurisdiction among the EU Member States.
Alternative grounds for jurisdiction in Article 5

Besides the forum rei rule of general jurisdiction, the Regulation contains several
heads of specific jurisdiction grounds of jurisdiction which can be used as on
alternative for specific claims or procedural situations. These alternatives create a
(limited) possibility of forum shopping for the claimant, who can choose which head
of jurisdiction to use in a specific case. All alternative grounds of jurisdiction have
to be interpreted restrictively, as they contain exceptions from the main rule of
Article 2 (forum rei).
The main provision containing alternative grounds of jurisdiction is Article 5. This
article contains special rules of jurisdiction for (inter alia) contractual obligations,
for tort, delict and quasi-delict and for disputes arising out of the operations of a
branch, agency or other establishment.
For the establishment of jurisdiction under Article 5 sub 1 or sub 3, a distinction
must be made according to the legal base of the claim. Both contract and tort are
autonomous concepts. Contract covers all obligations taken on voluntarily by one
party towards another (identifiable) party. This concept is wide enough to cover
unilateral commitments. Accordingly any claim by a signatory to a TCA against
other signatories based on the binding character of the commitments there under will
sound in contract. Claims by outsiders (competitors, consumers) will most
probably sound in tort. Less clear is the position of local subsidiaries or local unions
and works councils. Their claim can be contractual if they are indirect parties to the
contract through third party stipulation or representation.
As far as representation is concerned, the ECJ accepts a contractual base between
principal and third party, even in the case of an undisclosed principal, as long as
1) the relationship between the agent and the principal provides a sufficient
basis for representation and
2) the third party was aware of the fact that the contract was made on behalf of
another party.
There is an autonomous element in this definition as not all national laws would
create a contractual relationship between third party and undisclosed principal.
However, the court would have to refer to the relevant applicable law to see
whether or not there is a sufficient contractual base for representation.
Likewise, claims between beneficiaries and signatories with regard to third party
stipulations are contractual in nature. It is up to the applicable national law however,
to decide on the effect of third party stipulations.
Accordingly there is some uncertainty as to the application of Article 5 to the
national entities which are covered by the TCA without being signatories to it. The
86
obvious classification seems to be a contractual one, but it is up to the national law

applicable to the third party stipulation and/or the relationship of representation, to
decide to what extent third parties can derive benefits from and/or become bound by
the TCA. This referral to national law is even more prominent with regard to forum
clauses see below.
The court having jurisdiction under Article 5 sub 1 is the court for the place of
performance of the obligation under dispute. Hence, Article 5 does not create
general jurisdiction over the defendant, and not even general jurisdiction over all
disputes arising out of the TCA. Every independent original obligation in the TCA
may have a different place of performance, leading to a different competent judge.
Jurisdiction over one obligation does not create jurisdiction over other obligations
but must be established independently over each one of them. Like all alternative
grounds of jurisdiction, the provision is only applicable if the place of performance
is located is a member state other than the country of domicile.
The place of performance of a contractual obligation may be stipulated in the
contract itself. If not, this place will be identified by the law applicable to the
contract (except in case of the sale of goods and the performance of services). Most
obligations taken on in a TCA have to be performed in the place of establishment of
either the parent company and/or the daughter company. In those cases, Article 5
sub 1 may not add much to the jurisdiction already established through Article 2,
Article 5 sub 5 and Article 6.
Claims by outsiders would most likely be based on unfair competition and/or
misleading of the public. Under Article 5 sub 3 the claimant may choose to sue
either in the place where the wrongful act is committed (locus actus) or the place
where the direct harm is sustained (locus damni). In the case of misleading publicity
the locus actus is likely to coincide with the place of establishment of the company
using the TCA for publicity purposes - in which case it does not apply. The locus
damni would be the market on which the public is misled and/or the unfair
competition takes place. Depending on the circumstances of the case this may create
an extra competence. If several markets are targeted by the TCA (which will most
likely be the case), there is jurisdiction in each of these markets, but for local harm
only.
In the relationship between parent and subsidiary, also Article 5 sub 5 is relevant.
This provision confers jurisdiction on the court of the place of establishment of a
branch, agency or other place of establishment of a company over disputes arising
out of the operations of that branch, agency or other place of establishment. This
provision only applies if the branch is located in another member state than the
parent entity itself. It is mainly useful in case of dependent branches, its application
to the relationship between legal entities within a group of enterprises being
contested. The restriction to disputes arising out of the operations of the branch etc.
limits the jurisdiction to matters which specifically concern the local branch or
subsidiary. This includes disputes regarding the employees of the local branch and
disputes regarding the relationship between the local works council and local
management.
87
Multiple defendants Article 6 sub 1

A relevant possibility in the case of TCAs would be the possibility to join suits
against several defendants in the domicile of one of them (article 6 sub 1). A
requirement for using this provision is that the claims against the several defendants
are so closely related that it is expedient to hear them together to avoid the risk of
irreconcilable judgments. We infer from the case law of the ECJ that there has to be
a sufficient equivalence in the legal and factual basis of the disputes, for a reliance
on Article 6 sub 1 to be honoured. This limits to possibility to join claims against
several subsidiaries in the domicile of one of them. But the provision will allow
parent and daughter to be sued simultaneously in a single court over nonperformance of their duties with regards to the daughter entity. Likewise, the
provision could be used to join the claims against the European or international trade
union with claims against a national union, provided they pertain to the same subject
matter.
Choice of forum Article 23

The regulation allows parties to the TCA to choose the forum which will have
jurisdiction to judge disputes arising between them over the interpretation and
enforcement of the TCA. The requirements for a valid choice of forum are largely
contained in the Regulation itself. Most of these provisions are aimed to ensure true
consent of the direct parties to the choice of forum. However, the Regulation does
not provide rules with regard to the effect of a choice of forum on third parties.
These may claim rights under the contract be it through transfer of rights, through
representation or through third party stipulation. Though the case law on this is
sparse and not entirely clear it would seem that third party beneficiaries may rely on
a choice of forum and can be bound by it (unless the latter conflicts with the
protective rules for weaker contract parties). Cases of transfer of rights and
representation, however, are referred to the relevant applicable law. Accordingly
national law will decide whether the consent of the original contract party/signatory
can be imputed to the party claiming benefits under the contract. The question which
national law would be relevant, goes beyond the scope of application of the Brussels
I Regulation and has, till now, not been dealt with by the ECJ.
Provisional and interim measures Article 31

Finally, the Regulation contains a special provision on provisional, including
protective, measures. This provision may be relevant inter alia to stop companies
from implementing a company decision which violates the information and
consultation rights of the works council under the TCA. But it can be used for other
interim measures as well, as long as these are intended to preserve a factual or legal
situation in order to safeguard rights which can be enforced elsewhere. If the court
which grants the interim measures does not have jurisdiction on the merits, its
interim measures can only be recognized elsewhere if there is a sufficiently close
relationship between the measures sought and the territorial jurisdiction of the court.
88
In practice this often will mean that the measure will have to be executed or
enforced within the territory.
2.
Evaluation of the current system and recommendations
Article 2 of the Regulation provides the parties on the side of the employees with a
clearly defined forum. Hence the Article fulfils the requirement of legal certainty
and predictability. However, it might not offer efficient protection to individual
workers and workers representatives established in other member states. Especially
because the ius standi of works councils and unions may differ considerably from
state to state, it seems advisable to open up the possibility to sue at home in order
to ensure effective access to justice. Article 2 alone does not fulfil that need.
Article 22 grants exclusive jurisdiction over certain matters to the court most closely
connected to the issue. Currently TCA are not caught by any of the provisions
contained therein. Though some experts advocate exclusive jurisdiction on matters
involving works councils, we would not support this in the case of TCAs because it
makes it impossible to consolidate proceedings against several employers within the
group.
Article 5(1) and 5(5) may be useful in creating alternative jurisdiction in the home
state of the workers involved. Article 5(5) however, mainly pertains to the groups of
undertakings that operate under a single legal entity. If the group consists of
different companies, it is doubtful that Article 5(5) can be used. In that case, only
Article 5(1) remains as an option for introducing claims against the parent company
in a court for the place of establishment of the daughter or vice versa. This provision
grants jurisdiction to the court for the place of performance of the obligation on
which the claim is based. Complex obligations such as the ones undertaken in TCA
may be difficult to locate. First the exact content of the obligation will have to be
determined. Once this obligation is identified, the place of performance thereof need
to be established. If the parties have not designated the place of performance
themselves, it has to be determined in accordance with the law applying to the
obligation in question. These two steps may lead to divergence in outcome between
courts and (at the very least) complicate the application of the provision. Hence it
seems advisable to specify the place of performance of the main obligations arising
from a TCA either in an EU instrument249 or in the TCA itself. The places which
seem to qualify are the establishment of the parent company and/or the EU
representative of a non-EU company under the EWC Directive on the one hand and
the place of establishment of the affected secondary establishments in other member
states, with regards to obligations pertaining to them. Only the latter would provide
the workers with an extra ground for jurisdiction against the parent company.
If both parent and daughter company have breached their obligations under a TCA,
both parties can be sued in the domicile of one of them under the condition that the
249
Both the directives on information and participation and the Brussels I Regulation may qualify in this
respect.
89
claims against the two are closely related. Unfortunately, this extra possibility is
currently lacking in claims based on individual employment contracts. The current
revision of the Brussels I Regulation offers an excellent opportunity to remedy this.
Another important provision for enforcement of TCA commitments is the possibility
to ask for interim measures. Also courts that have no jurisdiction to decide on the
merits, may order interim measures. However, there has to be a sufficient link
between the measure asked and the court seized. Normally, the court will assume
jurisdiction when the measure has to be executed within the territory. If works
councils or unions want to stop the implementation of a management decision at
plant level, the courts for the place of establishment of that plant would most likely
assume jurisdiction. The remedies to be provided will have to be based on the local
law (lex fori).
Finally, the parties to the TCA may include a choice of forum agreement in the TCA
(or enter into such agreement at a later date). It seems advisable to make such choice
of forum a supplementary one. In that case the parties may seize the court chosen,
but may also approach a court having jurisdiction by virtue of the other provisions of
the Regulation. A choice of forum does not affect the competence to order interim
measures.
90
PART 3. ENFORCEMENT ISSUES

The issue of enforcement is discussed in light of the responses to the questionnaire
that has been used in this study. Different aspects are involved, such as the problem
of ius standi, alternative dispute resolution (ADR) and industrial action, in
particular the right to strike.
When enforcement issues are concerned, reference should be made to autonomous
procedures of enforcement. TCAs can provide for enforcement mechanisms or
procedures that can or have to be used by the parties when a question of
interpretation or application or more generally a dispute, would arise in light of the
TCA commitments that are made. Furthermore, reference can also be made to
existing transnational practices. TCA signatories may wish to refer to established
practices of dispute settlement in the context of transnational industrial relations or
in the context of the multinational enterprise itself or the EWC in which the TCA
has been negotiated and concluded. In short, a variety of autonomous transnational
procedures may be available, which may be more effective compared to both court
settlement and settlement under national alternative dispute resolution mechanisms.
Another relevant reference concerns the difference between disputes over rights
versus disputes over interests. The traditional view is that interest disputes
(bargaining or economic disputes) must be opposed to legal disputes. Interest
disputes can arise out of the failure of the social partners to agree in collective
bargaining on the establishment of new, or the modification of, norms. Normally,
only rights disputes would be able to arise before courts.250
I.
Court settlement and ius standi
A.
The relevance of ius standi
With regard to court settlement, the issue of ius standi, or legal standing, is
relevant. The problem of ius standi concerns the question whether a relevant actor
has the capacity or is recognised to claim a certain right before the courts. This
discussion is particularly relevant for TCA commitments, seen the wide variety of
signatories and stakeholders that are involved.
Many European oriented TCAs are concluded in the context of the activities of
European works councils. It is, therefore, relevant to examine the legal standing of
European works councils and their members.
With regard to the legal standing of European works councils, it is important to take
the composition of these bodies into account. EWCs are in many cases of a bi-partite
composition (composed of both management and worker representatives). But also
250
Cf. A. Gladstone, Settlement of disputes over rights, in R. Blanpain (ed.), Comparative labour law
and industrial relations in industrialised market economies, 2007, Wolters Kluwer, 690-691.
91
single party EWCs exist (worker representatives only). This has an influence on the
question whether or not a (European) works council is to be seen as representing the
interest of the employees only. This may have an impact on the possibility for
European works councils to take legal action and represent worker interest.
According to existing findings on EWCs the choice of composition is clearly linked
to the industrial relations system of the country in which the company has its
HQ.251 Legal standing is strongly dependent on the national legislation of the
Member States and the particularities of the national industrial relations system. It
would appear, therefore, proper to provide some insight into the ius standi problem
of national works councils.
B.
Insights into national works council ius standi
With regard to the legal standing of national works councils, it is relevant to

distinguish different kind of systems.
1) Systems with single party works councils that give ius standi: At the national
level, only two of the studied countries have single party (national) works councils.
In Germany, national works councils are exclusively made up of employees.252
Also in the Netherlands, works councils are composed solely of workers
representatives.253 In these systems, works councils have legal standing before the
courts, although they do not have full legal personality. The same regime is applied
to European works councils.
2) Systems with a mixed composition of works councils with legal personality and
ius standi: In France, national works councils are bodies that are composed of
workers representatives and presided by management. These bodies have legal
personality. In that capacity, they have access to the courts. The same regime is
applied to European works councils.
3) Systems with a mixed composition works councils without legal personality or
ius standi: In Belgium and Italy, works councils do not possess legal personality.
But the workers representatives have access to the courts. In Belgium, the national
union of which the workers representatives are a member, may also take legal action
regarding works council related legal issues. The latter option is the main practice.
4) Systems with no works councils: In Sweden, workplace representation for
employees in Sweden is organised through the local union at the workplace. There is
251
A preparatory study for an impact assessment of the European Works Councils Directive
VT/2007/98, Main Report, Submitted by the European Policy Evaluation Consortium EPEC (led by
GHK Consulting with support from Technopolis France), p. 17.
252
M. Schmidt and M. Weiss, International Encyclopaedia of Labour Law, Germany, ELL Suppl. 340
(July 2008), 223.
253
A.T.J.M. Jacobs, International Encyclopaedia of Labour Law, Netherlands, ELL Suppl. 276 (2004),
178, paragraph 248.
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no other channel. Nevertheless, European Works Councils are legal persons in

Sweden and have standing in court. In the United Kingdom, there are not statutory
works councils. However, a EWC has capacity to take a case to court where
management is not complying with an agreement setting up the EWC but the
legislation does not address the question of whether they have capacity to form
contracts with the employer on other matters. It is possible that if the EWC was
created under the law of another Member State which did give it legal personality,
this would be recognized by the English courts. Furthermore, anyone with legal
personality can in principle have access to the courts if he or she has a legal claim.
It remains relevant, in these national contexts, to point out the importance of the
composition (joint or single party) of works councils with regard to ius standi. Either
the works council as a body itself has ius standi, or the works council
representatives jointly or individual have ius standi, or trade unions.
C.
The EWC Directive and ius standi
With regard to the issue of ius standi in the context of European works councils,
reference should be made to Article 10, Paragraph 1, of the 2009 Recast Directive,
which provides:
Without prejudice to the competence of other bodies or organisations in
this respect, the members of the European Works Council shall have the
means required to apply the rights arising from this Directive, to represent
collectively the interests of the employees of the Community-scale
undertaking or Community-scale group of undertakings.
This provision leaves some room for interpretation. It can be argued that the
provision is limited to establishing the competence of the members representing the
employees on the European Works Council to represent (all) the employees of the
undertaking or group of undertakings.254
However, in the Commissions second stage consultation document with regard to
the Recast directive, the view was expressed that it might therefore be useful to
explicitly recognise the European works council as the representative of the
undertakings or groups employees.255 This seems to suggest that the purpose of
the provision was to provide for a representative competence for the EWC as such.
The second stage consultation document makes this statement against the
background that European works councils are called upon with increasing
frequency to represent European employees interests in dealings with authorities or
254
This finds support in the Proposal for a European Parliament and Council Directive on the
establishment of a European Works Council or a procedure in Community-scale undertakings and
Community-scale groups of undertakings for the purposes of informing and consulting employees
(Recast) COM(2008) 419 final, p. 8.
255
Consultation of the European social partners on the revision of Council Directive 94/45/EC of
22 September 1994, Brussels, 20 February 2008, C/2008/660, p. 7.
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other parties outside the undertaking, also in disputes relating to competition law.256
For example, in the case of Schneider, the Comit Europen du Groupe Legrand
was accepted as a supporting party before the Court of First Instance in a
competition law procedure.257 Nevertheless, it is relevant to note that the provision
of the Recast Directive only refers to the members of the EWC, in other words the
worker representatives. It does not refer to the legal capacity to the EWC as a body.
This solution seems logical as in many cases, EWCs are bipartite, meaning
composed of both management and labour.
The provision leaves some additional questions. Unclear is how the words to
represent collectively the interests of the employees must be interpreted. Does this
merely refer to the fact that EWC worker representatives represent the collectivity of
the workers? Or does it imply that EWC workers representatives can only act
collectively and not individually on behalf of the workers? This may be relevant in a
situation in which there is disagreement among EWC worker representatives about
what is the better interest of the workers. It can be assumed that this is something to
be addressed by the internal rules of the relevant EWC with regard to the workers
representatives.
Regardless of the exact interpretation of Article 10 of the EWC Recast Directive, the
question remains what the relevance of this provision is for the enforcement of
TCAs. The provision does not seem to lead to an obligation for Member States to
provide for ius standi of EWC members for the purpose of enforcement of TCA
provisions even when these have been concluded in the framework of EWC
activities. Disputes over TCAs might be outside the scope of Article 10 as it only
refers to the competence of the EWC and/or its members to apply the rights arising
from this Directive. However, the provision might induce the Member States which
have not done so yet, to provide for a certain measure of ius standi also outside the
exact scope of application of the Directive. In addition, a broad interpretation of the
phrase the rights arising from this directive would allow to bring TCAs back into
the scope of the provision, in so far as they are integrated in or annexed to EWC
agreements.
D.
Unions and ius standi
It is important to address the legal standing of trade unions, as the question arises
whether unions are given ius standi before the courts, if they would wish to enforce
TCA commitments in this manner.
A distinction can made be according to whether or not a legal system provides for
the legal personality of unions. In systems in which trade unions have legal
personality, the legal standing is mainly based on this legal capacity. In France,
256
Consultation of the European social partners on the revision of Council Directive 94/45/EC of
22 September 1994, Brussels, 20 February 2008, C/2008/660, p. 7.
257
Case T-77/02, 22 October 2002.
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Hungary, the Netherlands and Sweden, national trade unions possess legal
personality and have legal standing before the courts.
In systems in which trade unions lack legal personality, the issue of legal standing is
usually addressed in and court access is granted by alternative provisions. In
Belgium, Germany and Italy trade unions are traditionally associations without
legal personality, but they receive a statutory based capacity to act before the courts.
In the United Kingdom, where a trade union is not a corporate body, it does have
capacity to make contracts and to sue and be sued in its own name.
One of the main problems seems to lie in the fact that national systems are not
adapted to accept ius standi for international trade unions or for foreign trade unions.
This seems to depend on whether these organizations have legal personality under
the law applying to them and, on that basis, are allowed to act before the national
courts of a given member state.
E.
Some conclusions on ius standi
When looking at the examined Member States, it appears that one of the main
problems concerns the wide variety of solutions. For example, in some Member
States, trade unions have legal personality, in others they have not. The same goes
for national works councils and European works councils. Furthermore, it is not
clear to what extent a stakeholder with ius standi in one Member State, also receives
ius standi in another Member State.
With regard to European and international employees or employers associations, a
first question to be answered is whether these associations are actually incorporated
under a national law. Once this is established, a similar problem of recognition of
the legal entity and its legal standing in other member states arises.
With regard to management, the situation seems to be that companies mostly have
legal personality, although this is not a general rule (e.g. for subsidiaries or
establishments of a company). Furthermore, legal personality attaches to the
company itself and not to management bodies. It means that not all relevant
stakeholders can easily and independently be taken before a court (or have ius
standi).
It seems that there are four ways to address the problems described above, or at least
to mitigate their effect.
One solution could lie in creating a European rule on the standing of workers
representative bodies. The EWC Directive already provides a rule on ius standi (cf.
Article 10 of the EWC Recast Directive), but it remains unclear whether this
provision also pertains to TCAs that have been concluded in the margin of EWC
activities. The issue might be taken into account when implementing the Recast
Directive.
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When harmonisation at the European level is impossible, another option would be

the creation of a system of mutual recognition. The system that exists with regard to
ius standi of consumer organisations could be a source of inspiration for this.258
Again, the question of finding a legal base and method requires further study. To
begin with, the Commission could make information on the respective enforcement
rights of national unions and works council more readily available.
The problems of ius standi and mutual recognition can, to a large extent, be avoided
by providing jurisdiction in the home base of the workers representatives
concerned. If a national works council could choose to file suit in the courts of its
home country, the question of mutual recognition would probably not arise.
It is perhaps more realistic to give as much as possible relevant national
stakeholders, such as national unions or national works council representatives, the
possibility or right to introduce legal proceedings (and thus standing) before the
national courts where they are situated or organised. This would require an initiative
at the level of the respective national jurisdictions (i.e. the Member States). A
European contribution would probably be helpful, for example in the sphere of
coordination. A European legal basis for this could be found in Article 140 EC
Treaty, under which the European Commission can encourage cooperation between
the Member States and facilitate the coordination of their action in all social policy
fields under this chapter, particularly in matters relating to the right of association
and collective bargaining between employers and workers.
II.
Alternative dispute resolution
Previous studies have already concluded that plurality is the dominant trend in the
optional or compulsory nature of non-jurisdictional formulas for the settlement of
disputes as defined in each national legal system.259 The responses to the
questionnaire in the present study, confirm this.
In Belgium, a distinction must be made with regard to arbitration. The employer
may settle disputes by arbitration. But it should be noted that arbitration is almost
never used as a dispute-resolution mechanism in Belgium. In the area of collective
labour law, the particular legal problem of the Belgian law is that employees and
employers organisations as well as works councils, for that matter, do not have
access to arbitration since they do not have legal personality.
258
Directive 98/27/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 May 1998 on Injunctions
for the Protection of Consumers' Interests OJ L 166/51.
259
F. Valds Dal-R, Synthesis report on conciliation, mediation and arbitration in the European Union
countries, March 2002, 17. This report was drafted on the basis of the national reports prepared by
the members of the group of experts given the task of preparing a study, sponsored by the European
Commission Directorate General of Employment and Social Affairs, on comparative analysis and
proposal of a possible voluntary European system of conciliation, mediation and arbitration.
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The Belgian system provides for conciliation services. These services are organised
by the government, under the authority of the Ministry of labour. Independent
conciliators can be called upon in case of a conflict over interests. In principle,
disputes over TCAs would not be excluded from this.
In France, no specific alternative dispute settlement mechanism can be really used
to enforce TCAs. Conciliation exists in the first stage of the procedure before
employment tribunals. Judicial mediation is possible before all courts. In other
words, these solutions would imply a court intervention in the first place.
Arbitration would be available to solve dispute between signatories of a TCA. It
would require that the parties agree on having their dispute arbitrated. Enforcement
would require exequatur by a court. But there is no specific arbitration for labour
law disputes: rather, arbitration is prohibited to solve disputes between a employer
and his employee before the contract is terminated.
In Germany, arbitration could be referred to by the parties, as far as disputes
relating to collective agreements are concerned. If a TCA could be qualified as a
collective agreement this system would thus be applicable. This, however, is not
possible if a TCA would be qualified as a works council level agreement. Mediation
is theoretically possible but has only little significance in German labour law.
In Hungary, the Labour Code provides three options for the settlement of
collective labour disputes: 1) negotiation between the parties, 2) negotiation with
the participation of a mediator (mediation), 3) and the use of arbitration. With the
notion of collective labour disputes, the law means disputes arising between either
the employer and the works council, or the employer (employers organisation) and
the trade union in connection with disputes do not qualify as legal disputes.
Although there are various specific conditions laid down in the law, the different
systems and the wording of the Labour Code seem to be sufficiently broad and
flexible to include the disputes related to TCAs.
In Italy, a compulsory out-of-court conciliation is a precondition for admissibility of
an application to the court, but the Italian law on procedure expressly provides that
this process applies only to individual disputes. Furthermore, local or central
government authorities may, in practice, conciliate and/or mediate in labour disputes
even when the law does not provide for them to do so, acting either on their own
initiative or at the request of the parties. This is now recognised government practice
for safeguarding major public or collective interests at local or national level. As far
as arbitration is concerned, this is designed only for individual disputes and does not
play a role in collective disputes.
In The Netherlands, collective agreements can set out specific bodies of
conciliation and mediation (for specific branches of industry or for certain
enterprises) before which violations of the collective agreement may be brought.
The Dutch Code on Civil Procedure provides for regulations on arbitration, but it is
not a very current practice in the Netherlands to use it in labour dispute cases.
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In the U.K., a public body called ACAS (Advisory, Conciliation and Arbitration
Service) offers conciliation, mediation and arbitration services for the parties to a
collective dispute. The use of ACAS is entirely voluntary so both sides to the
dispute would have to agree to involve ACAS. Normally conciliation is the first
stage, with mediation or arbitration reserved for disputes which cannot be resolved
by conciliation. Where there exist appropriate agreed procedures for negotiation or
the settlement of disputes ACAS may not provide arbitration unless those
procedures have failed or some special reason justifies the resort to arbitration. In
principle, all kinds of matters may be brought before ACAS, but ACAS only has
power to offer conciliation or arbitration where a trade dispute exists or is
apprehended.
In sum, when looking at member states alternative dispute resolution mechanisms,
a main point of attention is the wide variety of mechanisms. Perhaps more important
than the lack of uniformity in Europe, is the fact that it remains unclear to what
extent alternative dispute resolution systems are available for disputes arising from
TCAs and what the consequences would be of the intervention of such alternative
institutions. Such finding might lead the parties to a TCA to prefer autonomous
dispute resolution mechanisms that are tailor made for the type of transnational
disputes at hand.
III. Industrial action

On the use of industrial action with regard to TCA commitments, a relevant
distinction to be mentioned, is the one between disputes over rights versus disputes
over interests. While it is generally accepted that the latter issues can be the subject
of industrial action, it is not quite clear for all examined member states concerned
whether binding collective agreements can be enforced through industrial action.
Due to the lack of clarity in the area of strike law in some countries like Belgium,
France and Italy, the legal opinion in seems to be that industrial action could be
used with regard to the enforcement of TCA commitments. In France, however
collective action is recognised in so far as it consists in strike action.
Other countries, with more precise boundaries of strike law, laid down in case law or
in legislation, would give a more nuanced approach. They seem to pay attention to
the distinction between disputes over rights versus disputes over interests.
In Germany, a strike is only considered lawful as a (necessary) pressure on the
employer for the purpose to conclude a collective agreement. Once the agreement is
concluded it is unlawful to enforce this existing agreement with measures of
industrial actions.
In Hungary, under the Strike Act, workers are entitled to use the right strike to
assure their economic and social interests. Although is interpreted broadly, strikes in
contradiction (or for the enforcement) of a (binding) agreement are, in principle,
unlawful.
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A similar response is found in The Netherlands. In general, the subject matters of

industrial action can include TCA disputes, knowing that this would be subject to an
ultimum remedium test under the existing case law. If the aim of a strike is to force
the employer to bargain about a TCA or to implement a non-binding commitment
made at international level in a national level agreement, then this would probably
be legally possible. But if the aim is to sort out legal obligations arising from the
TCA, so that the strike would be going over rights, it is not quite evident yet whether
that would be legal.
As regards the U.K., it can be said that English law does not recognise a distinction
between disputes of right and disputes of interest. The lawfulness of collective
action in English law does not really depend on collective agreements. Instead those
involved in the collective action must be acting in contemplation or furtherance of a
trade dispute, as defined by the law. Seen the scope of this legal definition, if the
TCA promises workers some particular set of terms and conditions, and the
employer does not comply, it would be possible to engage in collective action
because there would be a trade dispute within the meaning of this section. Of course,
the union or strike organiser would have to comply with the other provisions of
English law governing industrial action too (ballots, notices etc.).
IV. Enforcement by third parties

The issue of enforcement of TCAs by third parties, including subcontractors and
competitors, seems to be one of the most unclear issues. The overall assessment in
the studied countries is that the rule of relativity of the contract applies. This means
that third parties can only have rights or obligations deriving from a transnational
company-level agreement if they become a party and thus expressly gave their
consent to the agreement.
Some minor openings with regard to third party enforcement may be found, but
rather at a theoretical level. A possibility which, theoretically, cannot be excluded, is
that TCA signatories may be held liable to third parties for violation of certain
statutory provisions pursuant to general principles of tort law. Somewhat less
theoretical may be a reference to consumer protection or competition law. French
law imposes both criminal as well as civil sanctions on misleading product
advertising, which may include misrepresentation concerning modalities of
production. An interesting reference is also Germany, although it remains also
questionable whether under German law a competitor can rely on TCA provisions.
According to (older) case law a competitor can file for an order compelling a
company to refrain from violating a collective agreement on the ground of the
Unfair Competition Act, if the company uses the violation to achieve an advantage
in competition and if the interests of the competitor are affected. But since a reform
of the Unfair Competition Act in 2004 it is uncertain whether this case law is still
valid.
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CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

This study was undertaken for the European Commission concerning International
private law aspects of dispute settlement related to transnational company
agreements (VT/2008/102). The objective of the study was to: 1 provide a
comprehensive overview of the rules to be applied as to the applicable law and the
competent jurisdiction when a dispute arises on the interpretation or application of a
transnational company agreement; 2 identify the practical and legal obstacles to the
way disputes relating to transnational company agreements can be settled in court,
but also extra-judicial as well as regarding industrial action; 3 identify and suggest
any actions that might be taken to overcome these obstacles.
The main findings, conclusions and recommendations are as follows.
I.
Characterisation of obligations under TCAs
TCAs come under a wide variety of documents and texts. There is no single
notion of a transnational company agreement. Furthermore, TCAs cover a wide
variety of topics and the commitments that are undertaken in TCAs, may vary from
loose unilateral commitments to hard reciprocal rights and obligations. Likewise, the
parties to the TCA are diverse. On the side of workers representatives may range
from European and international trade union confederations, to EWC and national
unions as well as combinations thereof. This may create difficulties with regard to
the characterisation of the commitments undertaking in a TCA, both in national law
and in private international law.
As far as the binding character of TCAs is concerned, there may be conceptual
problems with regard to the position of the national and European works councils as
parties to a legally binding instrument. But quite often, TCAs themselves are
unclear as to the binding character of the commitments contained therein.
) It may be useful for the parties to a transnational company agreement to make
specific reference to the binding or non-binding character of the commitments that

are undertaken.
Even when the TCA is meant to create legally binding obligation, the national report
commissioned under this study show a divergence as to the exact characterisation of
these obligations. TCAs may be recognized as collective agreements under the
national law or rather be looked upon as unilateral commitments on the side of the
employer. The characterisation in private international law does not necessarily
coincide with the characterisation under national law. The terms of the relevant
regulations (Brussels I, Rome I and Rome II) are interpreted autonomously in order
to insure the effectiveness of the instruments and the uniform application of the rules
contained therein. A first question to be answered in this context is whether claims
based on a TCA are civil and commercial in nature. We argue, based on the case
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law of the ECJ on the Brussels Convention and Brussels I Regulation, that there is
no reason to exclude TCAs from the scope of application of the PIL-Regulations.260
Secondly, the question arises to what extent claim based on a TCA can be deemed to
be contractual in nature (again, in the context of the application of Brussels I, Rome
I and Rome II). We argue that an analysis of the rules on applicable law and
jurisdiction should be based on the assumption that commitments which
management has undertaken in a TCA towards the workers and their representatives
can in most cases be classified as contractual under the relevant instruments.261 The
relevant criterion is whether the TCA contains obligations voluntarily taken on by
(at least one of the) parties. Hence, the concept of contract is wide enough to cover
commitments which are largely unilateral in character.262
Both the Brussels I Regulation and the Rome I Regulation contain special provisions
for individual labour contract. The TCA as such is not an individual labour contract.
When a TCA contains individualised rights, however, individual workers may try to
enforce those obligations. In that case, the claim entered by the worker will be
covered by the special provisions on labour contracts. This does not, however,
change the classification of the TCA as such.
Likewise, outsiders (competitors, consumers) may want to rely on the TCA e.g. as
a statement of corporate governance policy. These claims have to be classified
separately. When there is no contractual relationship between the signatory company
and the claimant, any liability claim, even when based on statements contained in a
TCA, will sound in tort.
II. Relationship with European labour law

The relationship between TCAs and European labour law is far from evident. One
could defend the view that TCAs can only be considered as national agreements.
Another view is that European labour provisions would be relevant. In this case
Articles 138 and 139 of the EC Treaty might play a role. Nevertheless, an in depth
discussion of the possible reception of European company-level agreements under
the provisions of, especially, Article 139 of the EC Treaty, goes beyond the ambit of
the present study.
In practice, there is a strong relationship between EWCs and the conclusion of
TCAs. However, it must be noted that TCAs, as examined in the present study,
260
TCAs are private law instruments entered into by private parties. Even though they may touch upon
taxation and social security matters, they do not contain any public law obligations which may cause
them to be excluded from the scope of application of the Brussels I and Rome I Regulations. See the
relevant part of the full report.
261
It should be kept in mind that when one of the interested parties goes to court and enters a claim
based on a TCA, this claim will be based on the presumption that the TCA creates legally relevant
obligations. It will be up to the law designated by the relevant choice of law instrument to decide
whether this claim hold true.
262
The legal standing of the parties on the employees side does not seem to be decisive in this matter.
101
have not been envisaged by the original 1994 EWC Directive. Also the 2009 Recast
Directive has left the issue outside its explicit scope.
) The existing EWC legislation may be relevant in light of finding solutions for
TCA issues. This has mainly relevance de lege ferenda.
III. Applicable law

The law applicable to the TCA itself (and the obligations undertaken therein) will
have to be found by applying the Rome I Regulation. This Regulation deals with the
law applying to contractual obligation. It is based on party autonomy. This means
that the parties to a TCA can designate the law to be applied to their agreements
themselves. A choice of law expressed in the TCA will (have to) be respected on the
basis of Article 3 of the Regulation. Choice of law has only limited effect in
individual labour contracts, but this does not affect the validity of a choice of law as
between the parties to a collective agreement. Such choice of law will remove any
uncertainty with regard to the law determining the obligatory aspects of the TCA.
) Parties to a TCA may express a choice of law in the TCA itself. This will remove
any uncertainties as to the law applicable to the obligatory aspects of the TCA.
) Under the Rome I Regulation a choice of law should refer to an existing system
of law. However, if a European optional framework on TCAs would be created, this
instrument may be chosen by the parties if the framework itself so provides.
When no choice is expressed in the TCA (or can be implied from it), the applicable
law has to be determined first by enquiring whether there is a party which perform
the obligation characteristic of the contract type. This party may be impossible to
discern in the case of TCAs. In that case, the Rome I Regulation refers to the law
with the closest connection. That means that the law has to be found by weighing the
circumstances of the case. In this process, central management of the leading
company plays an important role, as does the location of the workforce covered by
it. When the TCA is understood as a unilateral commitment of the employer, the
choice of law rule will primarily refer to the law of the country of establishment of
the employer.
The closest connection rule is an open one. This creates flexibility, but also causes
uncertainty. There are several ways to remedy this either by EU action or by the
parties to the TCA.
) The EU legislator may consider supplementing the rules of Article 4 Rome I with
a special sub-rule on TCAs. This sub-rule could establish the presumption that a
TCA is governed by the law of the place of establishment of central management of
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the leading company. This presumption could than be rebutted if another law shows
a manifestly closer connection.263
As was mentioned above, the parties to the TCA can end all uncertainty by
expressing a choice of law in the TCA itself.
The law applicable to the TCA itself can not determine the normative effect thereof.
At least not in a uniform fashion. The report deals with several aspects of normative
effect, inter alia representation and reception/recognition as a collective agreement
by the law governing the TCA. This overview clearly demonstrates that under the
current diversity, any binding effect of the TCA on national industrial relations will
have to respect the national rules which define those industrial relations. The
relevant differences between the Member States pertain to inter alia the requirements
for horizontal effect of collective agreements and the division of powers between
unions and works councils. The consequence of this is that TCAs will have to be
ratified by national social partners and implemented in conformity with national
standards. Only a superimposed European system may be able to change that, but
this option seems unfeasible. Accordingly, the TCA (and consequently the
enforcement thereof) is split up in a European, obligatory part and a set of national
implementation measures.
)Parties to a TCA must ensure proper mandate from all relevant national bodies.
To ensure normative effect on individual contracts of employment, the TCA is best
implemented at the national level.
The above deals with the position of management, workers and their representatives.
When outsiders (competitors, consumers) want to rely on the TCA e.g. as a
statement of corporate governance policy these claims have to be classified
separately. Most likely they will sound in tort. In that case the Rome II Regulation
applies to the claims. Claims based on unfair competition are covered by Article **
thereof, which refers to the country where the unfair competition takes place.
IV. Jurisdiction
Jurisdiction in international matters is covered by the Brussels I Regulation. This
Regulation covers jurisdiction of the courts. Arbitration is explicitly excluded from
its scope of application.
Article 2 of the Regulation gives jurisdiction to the country of domicile of the
defendant. This provides the parties on the side of the employees with a clearly
defined forum. Hence the Article fulfils the requirement of legal certainty and
predictability. However, it might not offer efficient protection to individual workers
and workers representatives established in other member states. Especially because
263
One point of negotiations would be whether the presumption should be displaced as soon as another
law has a closer connection (compare Article 8 sub 4 on individual labour contracts) or only when the
contract is manifestly more closely connected to another country (Article 4 sub 3).
103
the legal standing of works councils and unions may differ considerably from state
to state, it seems advisable to offer these parties the option to sue in their respective
home states. Though suing at home has the disadvantage of in order to ensure
effective access to justice. Article 2 alone does not fulfil that need.
Article 22 grants exclusive jurisdiction over certain matters to the court most closely
connected to the issue. Currently TCA are not caught by any of the provisions
contained therein. Though some Member States advocate exclusive jurisdiction on
matters involving works councils, we would not support this in the case of TCAs
because it makes it impossible to consolidate proceedings against several employers
within the group.
Article 5(1) and 5(5) may be useful in creating alternative jurisdiction in the home
state of the workers involved. Article 5(5) however, mainly pertains to the groups of
undertakings that operate under a single legal entity. If the group consists of
different companies, it is doubtful that Article 5(5) can be used. In that case, only
Article 5(1) remains as an option for introducing claims against the parent company
in a court for the place of establishment of the daughter or vice versa. This provision
grants jurisdiction to the court for the place of performance of the obligation on
which the claim is based. Complex obligations such as the ones undertaken in TCA
may be difficult to locate. First the exact content of the obligation will have to be
determined. Once this obligation is identified, the place of performance thereof need
to be established. If the parties have not designated this themselves, the place of
performance has to be determined in accordance to the law applying to the
obligation in question. These two steps may lead to divergence in outcome between
courts and (at the very least) complicate the application of the provision. Hence it
seems advisable to specify the place of performance of the main obligations arising
from a TCA either in an EU instrument264 or in the TCA itself. The places which
seem to qualify are the establishment of the parent company and/or representative of
a non-EU company under the EWC Directive on the one hand and the place of
establishment of the effected secondary establishments in other member states, with
regards to obligations pertaining to them. Only the latter would provide the workers
with an extra ground for jurisdiction against the parent company.
If both parent and daughter company have breached their obligations under a TCA,
both parties can be sued in the domicile of one of them under the condition that the
claims against the two are closely related. Unfortunately, this extra possibility is
currently lacking in claims based on individual employment contracts. The current
revision of the Brussels I Regulation offers an excellent opportunity to remedy this.
Another important provision for enforcement of TCA commitments is the possibility
to ask for interim measures. Also courts that have no jurisdiction to decide on the
merits, may order interim measures. However, there has to be a sufficient link
between the measure asked and the court seized. Normally, the court will assume
jurisdiction, when the measure has to be executed within the territory. If works
264
Both the directive on information and participation and the Brussels I Regulation may qualify in this
respect.
104
councils or unions want to stop the implementation of a management decision at

plant level, the courts for the place of establishment of that plant would most likely
assume jurisdiction. The remedies to be provided will have to be based on the local
law (lex fori).
Finally, the parties to the TCA may include a choice of forum agreement in the TCA
(or enter into such agreement at a later date). It seems advisable to make such choice
of forum a supplementary one. In that case the parties may seized the court chosen,
but may also approach a court having jurisdiction by virtue of the other provisions of
the Regulation. A choice of forum does not affect the competence to order interim
measures.
V.
Enforcement issues
The issue of enforcement of TCAs is very complicated. There exists a wide variety
of law and practice in the studied member states.
It remains unclear how TCAs can be enforced at the national level. If a TCA
qualifies as a national collective agreement, the appropriate national enforcement
rules and mechanisms can be used. However, it remains unclear what can be done
with regard to TCAs that do not qualify as collective agreements, like mostly seems
the case.
) A certain amount of leeway seems to be available for the parties to transnational
agreements in defining their own procedures and practices with regard to dispute
resolution.
VI. Ius standi

There is considerable difference between the Member States with regard to the legal
capacity of unions and works councils. This creates specific problems in the case of
transnational agreements and their enforcement. It seems that there are four ways to
address the problems described above, or at least to mitigate their effect.
) One solution could lie in creating a European rule on the standing of workers
representative bodies. The EWC Directive already provides a rule on ius standi (cf.
Article 10 of the EWC Recast Directive), but it remains unclear whether this
provision also pertains to TCAs that have been concluded in the margin of EWC
activities. The issue might be taken into account when implementing the Recast
Directive.
) When harmonisation at the European level is impossible, another option would
be the creation of a system of mutual recognition. The system that exists with regard
to ius standi of consumer organisations could be a source of inspiration for this.265
265
Directive 98/27/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 May 1998 on Injunctions
for the Protection of Consumers' Interests, OJ L 166/51.
105
Again, the question of finding a legal base and method requires further study. To
begin with, the Commission could make information on the respective enforcement
rights of national unions and works council more readily available.
) The problems of ius standi and mutual recognition can, to a large extent, be
avoided by providing jurisdiction in the home base of the workers representatives
concerned. If a national works council could choose to file suit in the courts of its
home country, the question of mutual recognition would probably not arise.
) It is perhaps more realistic to give as much as possible relevant national
stakeholders, such as national unions or national works council representatives, the
possibility or right to introduce legal proceedings (and thus standing) before the
national courts where they are situated or organised. This would require an initiative
at the level of the respective national jurisdictions (i.e. the Member States). A
European contribution would probably be helpful, for example in the sphere of
coordination. A European legal basis for this could be found in Article 140 EC
Treaty, under which the European Commission can encourage cooperation between
the Member States and facilitate the coordination of their action in all social policy
fields under this chapter, particularly in matters relating to the right of association
and collective bargaining between employers and workers.
VII. ADR and industrial action

Some of the studied member states would allow the use of alternative dispute
mechanisms for conflicts arising in the context of TCAs. But they are generally not
designed to deal with TCA issues.
When looking at member states alternative dispute resolution mechanisms, a main
point of attention is the wide variety of mechanisms. Perhaps more important than
the lack of uniformity in Europe, is the fact that it remains unclear to what extent
alternative dispute resolution systems are available for disputes arising from TCAs
and what the consequences would be of the intervention of such alternative
institutions.
On the use of industrial action with regard to TCA commitments, a distinction can
be made between disputes over rights versus disputes over interests. While it is
generally accepted that the latter issues can be the subject of industrial action, it is
not evident to assume that binding agreements between social partners can be
enforced through industrial action.
) Attention should be drawn to the possibility for TCA signatories to create or call
on autonomous mechanisms of alternative dispute settlement, which can be agreed
upon in TCAs.
However, it is important to realize that the validity of such agreements and their
effect upon the jurisdiction of the courts may not be uniform throughout Europe.
Arbitration falls outside the scope of application of the Brussels I Regulation.
106

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International private law aspects and dispute

settlement related to transnational company

Aukje van Hoek & Frank Hendrickx

With the cooperation of

Study undertaken on behalf of the European Commission

INTRODUCTION AND SCOPE

INTRODUCTION AND SCOPE

About the study

Methodology and structure

INTRODUCTION AND SCOPE

INTRODUCTION AND SCOPE

rather unavoidable. After a more comparative analysis, the problem of

PART 1. BRIEF ANALYSIS AND QUALIFICATION OF TCAS

PART 1. BRIEF ANALYSIS AND QUALIFICATION OF TCAS

E. Ales, S. Engblom, T. Jaspers, S. Laulom, S. Sciarra, A. Sobczak, F. Valds Dal-R, Transnational

Mapping of transnational texts negotiated at corporate level, European Commission, Employment,

M. Carley, Report of the French EU Presidency conference Transnational company agreements.

PART 1. BRIEF ANALYSIS AND QUALIFICATION OF TCAS

II. Legal qualification of TCA commitments

V. Telljohann, I. da Costa, T. Mller, U. Rehfeldt, R. Zimmer, European and international framework

Mapping of transnational texts negotiated at corporate level, European Commission, Employment,

PART 1. BRIEF ANALYSIS AND QUALIFICATION OF TCAS

Characterisation under national law

Mapping of transnational texts negotiated at corporate level, European Commission, Employment,

PART 1. BRIEF ANALYSIS AND QUALIFICATION OF TCAS

Characterisation under private international law

PART 1. BRIEF ANALYSIS AND QUALIFICATION OF TCAS

PART 1. BRIEF ANALYSIS AND QUALIFICATION OF TCAS

representation: the ECJ limits the concept of contractual obligations to those

III. Relationship with European labour law

TCAs and the European social dialogue

PART 1. BRIEF ANALYSIS AND QUALIFICATION OF TCAS

TCAs and the EWC Directive(s)

Mapping of transnational texts negotiated at corporate level, European Commission, Employment,

Mapping of transnational texts negotiated at corporate level, European Commission, Employment,

PART 1. BRIEF ANALYSIS AND QUALIFICATION OF TCAS

P. Marginson, M. Gilman, O. Jacobi and H. Krieger, Negotiating European Works Councils. An

Article 7, Paragraph 1 EWC Directive (1994 and Recast).

PART 2. APPLICABLE LAW AND INTERNATIONAL JURISDICTION OF THE COURTS

PART 2. APPLICABLE LAW AND INTERNATIONAL

A. The legal framework and lay out of the chapter

Compare E. Ales, S. Engblom, T. Jaspers, S. Laulom, S. Sciarra, A. Sobczak, F. Valds Dal-R,

PART 2. APPLICABLE LAW AND INTERNATIONAL JURISDICTION OF THE COURTS

In the absence of a (comprehensive) international or European framework, the

Compare at the European level Deinert, Self-executing collective agreements in EC law in M. De

PART 2. APPLICABLE LAW AND INTERNATIONAL JURISDICTION OF THE COURTS

A.T.J.M. Jacobs, Het recht op collectief onderhandelen : in rechtsvergelijkend en Europees

PART 2. APPLICABLE LAW AND INTERNATIONAL JURISDICTION OF THE COURTS

Does it also extent to the normative effect of the TCA?

These questions will be answered in the framework of the (coming) Rome I

PART 2. APPLICABLE LAW AND INTERNATIONAL JURISDICTION OF THE COURTS

B. The Rome I Regulation

The Rome I Regulation was adopted on the basis of Article 65 EC as the

According to Article 1 sub 1 the Regulation applies, in situations involving a

Reg 593/2008, Article 28.

PART 2. APPLICABLE LAW AND INTERNATIONAL JURISDICTION OF THE COURTS

Compare Rome I, preamble 7 on consistency, both as to scope of application and as to provisions