G.R. No. 6092 Tan Chiong Sian Vs Inchausti & Co.

ROWENA R.
CABAS
Obligations and Contracts
G.R. No. 6092. March 8, 1912

Tan Chiong San, plaintiff-appellee
Inchausti & Co., defendant-appellant
Nature of the Case:
Force Majeure; Fortuitous Event
Force Majeure with Negligence
Facts of the Case:
On November 25, 1908, Tan Chiong Sian delivered 205
packages of merchandise belonging to him to defendant Inchausti &
Co. with the agreement that the goods were to be delivered the
Chinaman, Ong Bieng Sip in the town of Cataman, Samar. The said
goods when delivered shall have the value of P20,000. The plaintiff
agreed to pay the defendant the amount of P250. once the delivery
is completed.
The shipment shall be transported via the steamer Sorsogon
which shall leave the port of Manila on November 25, 1908 towards
the port of Gubat in Sorsogon on November 28, 1908. Once at the
port of Gubat, the goods, together with other merchandise of the
defendant shall be transshipped via the lorcha Pilar, a nonmotorized boat, powered only by sails and poles and which shall
traverse shallows waters and estuaries towards its next port of call,
Catarman, Samar. On November 28, 1908, the lorcha Pilar was
nowhere in the port of Gubat and the defendant had no option but
to unload the merchandise for delivery to be kept in its warehouses
for safekeeping.
In the morning of December 4, 1908, the said vessel (Lorcha
Pilar) arrived. The merchandise were then taken from the
warehouse and brought to the same for transport to the port of
Catarman. At around the afternoon however, the wind started to

blow heavily and an impending storm was approaching. The lorcha
Pilar, which was set to sail that time, was forced to lower down four
of its anchors and had to be dragged/driven with the aid of the
launch Texas towards safety. As the storm dragged on, the vessel,
lorcha Pilar was brought ashore and wrecked, amongst it, the
merchandise supposed to be unloaded and delivered at the port of
Catarman. It was now the 5th of December 1908. After the storm,
defendant gathered the shipwrecked goods, including those that
were supposed to be delivered to Ong Bieng Sip. Considering that
the same can no longer be preserved despite diligence, the
defendant after making the offer to deliver the same, had no option
but to sell what was left from the wreck at a public auction before a
notary in the amount of P1,693.67.
Issues:
1. Whether the defendant is liable for the loss of the merchandise
and for failure to deliver the same at the place of destination.
2. Whether or not he is relieved from responsibility due to force
majeure.
Ruling:
No. The Higher Court ruled in favor of the defendantappellant by reversing the judgment rendered by the
Court a quo. In its decision it held that the defendantappellant is not liable for the loss of the merchandise and
that he is relieved of the responsibility due to force
majeure under Article 1602 of the Civil Code where it was
stated that carriers are also liable for the loss of and
damage to the things which they receive, unless they
prove that the loss or damage arose from a fortuitous
event or force majeure.
The defendant-appellant presented proof that the
loss arising from the effects of the storm was inevitable
although they have exerted all the efforts to preserve the

goods. The testimonies of the witnesses for the defendant
were unrebutted and incontroverted.
*Loss in a shipwreck (due to fortuitous event)

- losses are borne by the owner of the item
- loss of cargo, borne by the owner of the cargo
- with exception when it was proven that the captain
lacked skill or there was malice or negligence.
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-6092
March 8, 1912
TAN CHIONG SIAN, Plaintiff-Appellee,

CO., Defendant-Appellant.
vs. INCHAUSTI
AND
Haussermann, Cohn and Fisher for appellant.

O'Brien and DeWitt for appellee.
TORRES, J. :
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This is an appeal through bill of exceptions, by counsel for the

firm of Inchausti & Co., from a judgment rendered by the Honorable
A.S. Crossfield, judge.
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On January 11, 1909, the Chinaman, Tan Chiong Sian or Tan

Chinto, filed a written complaint, which was amended on the 28th of
the same month and again amended on October 27 of the same
year, against the said firm, wherein he alleged, among other things,
as a cause of action: That, on or about November 25, 1908, the
plaintiff delivered to the defendant 205 bundles or cases of general
merchandise belonging to him, which Inchausti & Co., upon
receiving, bound themselves to deliver in the pueblo of Catarman,
Province of Samar, to the Chinaman, Ong Bieng Sip, and in
consideration of the obligations contracted by the defendant party,
the plaintiff obligated himself to pay to the latter the sum of P250
Philippine currency, which payment should be made upon the
delivery of the said merchandise in the said pueblo Catarman; but
that the defendant company neither carried nor delivered the
aforementioned merchandise to the said Ong Bieng Sip, in
Catarman, but unjustly and negligently failed to do so, with the

result that the said merchandise was almost totally lost; that, had
the defendant party complied well and faithfully with its obligation,
according to the agreement made, the merchandise concerned
would have a value of P20,000 in the said pueblo of Catarman on
the date when it should have been delivered there, wherefore the
defendant party owed the plaintiff the said sum of P20,000, which it
had not paid him, or any part thereof, notwithstanding the many
demands of the plaintiff; therefore the latter prayed for judgment
against the defendant for the said sum, together with legal interest
thereon from November 25, 1908, and the costs of the suit.
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Counsel for the defendant company, in his answer, set forth,

that he admitted the allegations of paragraphs 1 and 2 of the
complaint, amended for the second time, and denied those
paragraphs 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7 of the same. As his first special defense,
he alleged that on or about November 28, 1908, his client, the said
firm, received in Manila from Ong Bieng Sip 205 bundles, bales, or
cases of merchandise to be placed on board the steamer Sorsogon,
belonging to the defendant, for shipment to the port of Gubat,
Province of Sorsogon, to be in the said port transshipped into
another of the defendant's vessels for transportation to the port of
Catarman, Samar, and delivered to the aforesaid Chinaman, Ong
Bieng Sip; that the defendant company, upon receiving the said
merchandise from the latter, Ong Bieng Sip, and on its entering into
a contract of maritime transportation with him did not know and
was not notified that the plaintiff, Tan Chiong Sian, had any interest
whatever in the said merchandise and had made with the plaintiff
no contract relative to the transportation of such goods, for, on
receiving the latter from the said Ong Bieng Sip, for transportation,
there were made out and delivered to him three bills of lading, Nos.
38, 39 and 76, which contained a list of the goods received and,
printed on the back thereof were the terms of the maritime
transportation contract entered into by and between the plaintiff
and the defendant company, copies of which bills of lading and
contract, marked as Exhibits A, B, and C, are of record, attached to
and made an integral part of the said answer; that Ong Bieng Sip
accepted the said bills of lading and the contract extended on the
backs thereof; that the merchandise mentioned was put on board
the steamerSorsogon and carried to the port of Gubat, Province of

Sorsogon, where this vessel arrived on November 28, 1908, on
which date the lorcha Pilar, into which the said merchandise was to
be transshipped for carriage to Catarman, was not at Gubat, and
therefore the goods had to be unloaded and stored in the defendant
company's warehouses at Gubat; that, on the 4th of December of
the same year, the lorcha Pilar arrived at Gubat and, after the
termination of certain necessary work, the goods received from
Chinaman, Ong Bieng Sip, were taken aboard the same, together
with other merchandise belonging to the defendant party, for the
purpose of transportation to the port of Catarman; that, before the
said lorcha could leave for its destination, a strong wind arose which
in the course of the day increased in force until, early in the
morning of the following day, the lorcha was dragged and driven, by
the force of the storm, upon the shore, despite the means employed
by the crew to avoid the accident, and notwithstanding the five
anchors that held the craft, which was thus wrecked and completely
destroyed and the merchandise with which it was laden, including
the 205 bundles or packages taken aboard for the said Chinaman,
was scattered on the shore; that, on the occasion, the lorcha
Pilar was in good condition, provided with all the proper and
necessary equipment and accessories and carried a crew of
sufficient number in command of a skillful patron or master,
wherefore the wreck of the said craft was solely due to the
irresistible force of the elements and of the storm which drove it
upon the shore; that the defendant company, with the greatest
possible diligence, gathered up the said shipwrecked goods that had
been shipped by the Chinaman, Ong Bieng Sip, but, owing to the
damage they had suffered, it was impossible to preserve them, so,
after having offered to deliver them to him, the defendant
proceeded, in the presence of a notary, to sell them at public
auction and realized from the sale thereof P1,693.67, the
reasonable value of the same in the condition in which they were
after they had been gathered up and salved from the wreck of
the lorcha Pilar; that the expenses occasioned by such salvage and
sale of the said goods amounted to P151.35, which were paid by the
defendant party; that the latter offered to the Chinese shipper, the
plaintiff, the amount realized from the sale of the said merchandise,
less P151.35, the amount of the expenses, and the sum of P250,
the amount of the freight stipulated, and is still willing to pay such
products of the said sale to the aforementioned Ong Bieng Sip or to
any other person who should establish his subrogation to the rights
of the Chinaman, Ong Bieng Sip, with respect to the said amount;
that, as his client's second special defense, the defendant company
alleged that one of the conditions of the shipping contract executed
between it and the Chinaman, Ong Bieng Sip, relative to the
transportation of the said merchandise, was that the said firm
should not be held liable for more than P25 for any bundle or
package, unless the value of its contents should be stated in the bill
of lading, and that the shipper, Chinaman, Ong Bieng Sip, did not
state in the bill of lading the value of any of the bundles or packages
in which the goods shipped by him were packed. Counsel for the
defendant company, therefore, prayed the court to absolve his client
from the complaint, with costs against the plaintiff.
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After the hearing of the case and the introduction of testimony

by the parties, judgment was rendered, on March 18, 1910, in favor
of the plaintiff, Tan Chiong Sian or Tan Chinto, against the defendant
Inchausti and Co., for the sum of P14,642.63, with interest at the
rate of 6 per cent per annum from January 11, 1909, and for the
costs of the trial. The defendant party appealed from this
judgment.
This suit was brought for the purpose of collecting a certain

sum which it is alleged the defendant firm owes the plaintiff for
losses and damages suffered by the latter as a result of the former's
noncompliance with the terms of an agreement or contract to
transport certain merchandise by sea from this city to the pueblo of
Catarman, Island of Samar, for the sum of P250.
The principal question to be determined is whether the

defendant is liable for the loss of the merchandise and for failure to
deliver the same at the place of destination, or whether he is
relieved from responsibility on the ground of force majeure.
Article 1601 of the Civil Code prescribes:

Carriers of goods by land or by water shall be subject with
regard to the keeping and preservation of the things entrusted to
them, to the same obligations as determined for innkeepers by

articles 1783 and 1784.
The provisions of this article shall be understood without

prejudice to what is prescribed by the Code of Commerce with
regard to transportation by sea and land.
Article 1602 reads:
Carriers are also liable for the loss of and damage to the things
which they receive, unless they prove that the loss or damage arose
from a fortuitous event or force majeure.
The articles aforecited are as follows:
ART. 1783. The depositum of goods made by travelers in inns or
hostelries shall also be considered a necessary one. The keepers of
inns and hostelries are liable for them as such bailees, provided that
notice thereof may have been given to them or to their employees,
and that the travelers on their part take the precautions which said
innkeepers or their substitutes may have advised them concerning
the care and vigilance of said goods.
ART. 1784. The liability referred to in the preceding article shall

include damages to the goods of the travelers caused the servants
or employees of the keepers for inns or hostelries as well as by
strangers, but not those arising from robbery or which may be
caused by any other case of force majeure.
Article 361 of the Code of Commerce provides:
Merchandise shall be transported at the risk and venture of the
shipper, unless the contrary was expressly stipulated.
Therefore, all damages and impairment suffered by the goods

in transportation, by reason of accident, force majeure, or by virtue
of the nature or defect of the articles, shall be for the account and
risk of the shipper.
The proof of these accidents in incumbent on the carrier.
ART. 362. The carrier, however, shall be liable for the losses and
damages arising from the causes mentioned in the foregoing article
if it is proved that they occurred on account of his negligence or
because he did not take the precautions usually adopted by careful
persons, unless the shipper committed fraud in the bill of lading,
stating that the goods were of a class or quality different from what
they really were.
If, notwithstanding the precaution referred to in this article,

the goods transported run the risk of being lost on account of the
nature or by reason of an unavoidable accident, without there being
time for the owners of the same to dispose thereof, the carrier shall
proceed to their sale, placing them for this purpose at the disposal
of the judicial authority or of the officials determined by special
provisions.
ART. 363. With the exception of the cases prescribed in the second
paragraph of article 361, the carrier shall be obliged to deliver the
goods transported in the same condition in which, according to the
bill of lading, they were at the time of their receipt, without any
detriment or impairment, and should he not do so, he shall be
obliged to pay the value of the goods not delivered at the point
where they should have been and at the time the delivery should
have taken place.
If part of the goods transported should be delivered the

consignee may refuse to receive them, when he proves that he can
not make use thereof without the others.
On November 25, 1908, Inchausti & Co. received in Manila
from the Chinaman, Ong Bieng Sip, 205 bundles, bales or cases of
goods to be conveyed by the steamer Sorsogon to the port of
Gubat, Province of Sorsogon, where they were to be transshipped to
another vessel belonging to the defendant company and by the
latter transported to the pueblo of Catarman, Island of Samar, there
to be delivered to the Chinese shipper with whom the defendant
party made the shipping contract. To this end three bills of lading
were executed, Nos. 38, 39, and 76, copies of which, marked as
Exhibits A, B, and C, are found on pages 13, 14, and 15 of the
record.
The steamer Sorsogon, which carried the goods, arrived at the

port of Gubat on the 28th of that month and as the lorcha Pilar, to
which the merchandise was to be transshipped for its transportation
to Catarman, was not yet there, the cargo was unloaded and stored
in the defendant company's warehouses at that port.
Several days later, the lorcha just mentioned arrived at Gubat

and, after the cargo it carried had been unloaded, the merchandise
belonging to the Chinaman, Ong Bieng Sip, together with other
goods owned by the defendant Inchausti & Co., was taken aboard to
be transported to Catarman; but on December 5, 1908, before
the Pilar could leave for its destination, towed by the launch Texas,
there arose and, as a result of the strong wind and heavy sea,
the lorcha was driven upon the shore and wrecked, and its cargo,
including the Chinese shipper's 205 packages of goods, scattered on
the beach. Laborers or workmen of the defendant company, by its
order, then proceeded to gather up the plaintiff's merchandise and,
as it was impossible to preserve it after it was salved from the
wreck of the lorcha, it was sold at public auction before a notary for
the sum of P1,693.67.
The contract entered into between the Chinese shipper, Ong

Bieng Sip, and the firm of Inchausti & Co., provided that
transportation should be furnished from Manila to Catarman,
although the merchandise taken aboard the steamer Sorsogon was
to be transshipped at Gubat to another vessel which was to convey
it from that port to Catarman; it was not stipulated in the said
contract that the Sorsogon should convey the goods to their final
destination, nor that the vessel into which they were to be
transshipped, should be a steamer. The shipper, Ong Bieng Sip,
therefore assented to these arrangements and made no protest
when his 205 packages of merchandise were unloaded from the ship
and, on account of the absence of the lorcha Pilar, stored in the
warehouses at Gubat nor did he offer any objection to the lading of
his merchandise on to this lorcha as soon as it arrived and was
prepared to receive cargo; moreover, he knew that to reach the port
of Catarman with promptness and dispatch, the lorcha had to be
towed by some vessel like the launch Texas, which the defendant
company had been steadily using for similar operations in those

waters.
Hence the shipper, Ong Bieng Sip, made no protest or

objection to the methods adopted by the agents of the defendant
for the transportation of his gods to the port of their destination,
and the record does not show that in Gubat the defendant
possessed any other means for the conveyance and transportation
of merchandise, at least for Catarman, than the lorcha Pilar, towed
by said launch and exposed during its passage to all sorts of
accidents and perils from the nature and seafaring qualities of
a lorcha, from the circumstances then present and the winds
prevailing on the Pacific Ocean during the months of November and
December.
It is to be noted that a lorcha is not easily managed or steered

when the traveling, for, out at sea, it can only be moved by wind
and sails; and along the coast near the shore and in the estuaries
where it customarily travels, it can only move by poling. For this
reason, in order to arrive at the pueblo of Catarman with
promptness and dispatch, the lorcha was usually towed by the
launch Texas.
The record does not show that, from the afternoon of the 4th
of December, 1908, until the morning of the following day, the 5th,
the patron or master of the lorcha which was anchored in the cove
of Gubat, received any notice from the captain of the steamer Ton
Yek, also anchored near by, of the near approach of a storm. The
said captain, Juan Domingo Alberdi, makes no reference in his
sworn testimony of having given any such notice to the patron of
the lorcha, nor did the latter, Mariano Gadvilao, testify that he
received such notice from the captain of the Ton Yek or from the
person in charge of the Government observatory. Gadvilao,
the patron, testified that only between 10 and 11 o'clock of
Saturday morning, the 5th of December, was he informed by
Inchausti & Co.'s agent in Gubat that a baguio was approaching;
that thereupon, on account of the condition of the sea, he dropped
the four anchors that the lorcha had on board and immediately went
ashore to get another anchor and a new cable in order more
securely to hold the boat in view of the predicted storm. This

testimony was corroborated by the said representative, Melchor
Muoz. So the lorcha, when the storm broke upon it, was held fast
by five anchors and was, as testified by the defendant without
contradiction or evidence to the contrary, well found and provided
with all proper and necessary equipment and had a sufficient crew
for its management and preservation.
The patron of the lorcha testified specifically that at Gubat or

in its immediate vicinity there is no port whatever adequate for the
shelter and refuge of vessels in cases of danger, and that, even
though there were, on being advised between 10 and 11 o'clock of
the morning of the 5th, of the approach of a storm from the eastern
Pacific, it would have been impossible to spread any sails or weigh
anchor on the lorcha without being dragged or driven against the
reefs by the force of the wind. As the craft was not provided with
steam or other motive power, it would not have been possible for it
to change its anchorage, nor move from the place where it lay, even
several hours before the notice was received by its patron.
A lorcha can not be compared with a steamer which does not need
the help or assistance of any other vessel in its movements.
Due importance must be given to the testimony of the weather

observer, Antonio Rocha, that the notice received from the Manila
Observatory on the afternoon of December 4, with regard to a
storm travelling from the east of the Pelew Islands toward the
northwest, was not made known to the people of Gubat and that he
merely left a memorandum notice on the desk of the station,
intending to give explanations thereof to any person who should
request them of him. So the notice of the storm sent by the Manila
Observatory was only known to the said observer, and he did not
apprise the public of the approach of the storm until he received
another notice from Manila at 20 minutes past 8 o'clock on Saturday
morning, December 5. Then he made a public announcement and
advised the authorities of the storm that was coming.
The patron of the lorcha Pilar is charged with gross negligence

for not having endeavored to remove his craft to a safe place in the
Sabang River, about half a mile from where it was anchored.
In order to find out whether there was or was not such

negligence on the part of thepatron, it becomes necessary to
determine, first, whether the lorcha, on the morning of December 5,
could be moved by its own power and without being towed by any
steamboat, since it had no steam engine of its own; second,
whether the lorcha, on account of its draft and the shallowness of
the mouth of the said river, could have entered the latter before the
storm broke.
The patron, Mariano Gadvilao, stated under oath that the

weather during the night of December 4 was not threatening and he
did not believe there would be a storm; that he knew the Sabang
River; and that the lorcha Pilar, when loaded, could not enter as
there was not sufficient water in its channel; that, according to an
official chart of the port of Gubat, the bar of the Sabang River was
covered by only a foot and a half of water at ordinary low tide and
the lorcha Pilar, when loaded, drew 6 feet and a half; that aside
from the fact that the condition of the sea would not have permitted
the lorcha to take shelter in the said river, even could it have relied
upon the assistance of a towboat, at half past 8 o'clock in the
morning the tide was still low; there was but little water in the river
and still less over the bar.
It was proven by the said official chart of the port of Gubat,

that the depth of water over the bar or entrance of the Sabang
River is only one foot and a half at ordinary low tide; that the rise
and fall of the tide is about 4__ feet, the highest tide being at 2
o'clock in the afternoon of every day; and at that hour, on the 5th of
December, the hurricane had already made its appearance and the
wind was blowing with all its fury and raising great waves.
The lorcha Pilar, loaded as it had been from the afternoon of

December 4, even though it could have been moved by means of
poles, without being towed, evidently could not have entered the
Sabang River on the morning of the 5th, when the wind began to
increase and the sea to become rough, on account of the low tide,
the shallowness of the channel, and the boat's draft.
The facts stated in the foregoing paragraph were proved by the

said chart which was exhibited in evidence and not rejected or
assailed by the plaintiff. They were also supported by the sworn

testimony of the patron of the lorcha, unrebutted by any oral
evidence on the part of the plaintiff such as might disprove the
certainty of the facts related, and, according to section 275 of the
Code of Civil Procedure, the natural phenomenon of the tides,
mentioned in the official hydrographic map, Exhibit 7, which isprima
facie evidence on the subject, of the hours of its occurrence and of
the conditions and circumstances of the port of Gubat, shall be
judicially recognized without the introduction of proof, unless the
facts to the contrary be proven, which was not done by the plaintiff,
nor was it proven that between the hours of 10 and 11 o'clock of
the morning of December 5, 1908, there did not prevail a state of
low tide in the port of Gubat.
The oral evidence adduced by the plaintiff with respect to the

depth of the Sabang River, was unable to overcome that introduced
by the defendant, especially the said chart. According to section 320
of the Code of Civil Procedure, such a chart is prima facieevidence
of particulars of general notoriety and interest, such as the
existence of shoals of varying depths in the bar and mouth of the
Sabang River and which obstruct the entrance into the same; the
distance, length, and number of the said shoals, with other details
apparently well known to the patron of the lorcha Pilar, to judge
from his testimony.
Vessels of considerable draft, larger than the said lorcha, might

have entered the Sabang River some seven or nine years before,
according to the testimony of the Chinaman, Antonio B. Yap Cunco,
though he did not state whether they did so at high tide; but, since
1901, or previous years, until 1908, changes may have taken place
in the bed of the river, its mouth and its bar. More shoals may have
formed or those in existence may have increased in extent by the
constant action of the sea. This is the reason why the patron,
Gadvilao, who was acquainted with the conditions of the port and
cove of Gubat, positively declared that the lorcha Pilar could not, on
account of her draft, enter the Sabang River, on account of low
water.
The patron of the lorcha, after stating (p.58) that at Gubat or

in its vicinity there is no port that affords shelter, affirmed that it
was impossible to hoist the sails or weigh the anchors on the
morning of the 5th of December, owing to the force of the wind and
because the boat would immediately have been dragged or driven
upon the shoals; that furthermore the lorcha was anchored in a
channel some 300 brazas wide, but, notwithstanding this width, the
Pilar was, for want of motive power, unable to move without being
exposed to be dashed against the coast by the strong wind and the
heavy sea then prevailing. The testimony of this witness was neither
impugned nor offset by any evidence whatever; he was a patron of
long years of service and of much practice in seafaring, especially in
the port of Gubat and its vicinity, who had commanded or been
intrusted with the command of other crafts similar to the lorcha Pilar
and his testimony was absolutely uncontradicted.
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The patron Gadvilao, being cognizant of the duties imposed

upon him by rules 14 and 15 of article 612, and others, of the Code
of Commerce, remained with sailors, during the time the hurricane
was raging, on board the lorcha from the morning of December 5
until early the following morning, the 6th, without abandoning the
boat, notwithstanding the imminent peril to which he was exposed,
and kept to his post until after the wreck and thelorcha had been
dashed against the rocks. Then he solicited help from the captain of
the steamer Ton Yek, and, thanks to the relief afforded by a small
boat sent by the latter officer, Gadvilao with his crew succeeded in
reaching land and immediately reported the occurrence to the
representative of Inchausti & Co. and to the public official from
whom he obtained the document of protest, Exhibit 1. By such
procedure, he showed that, as apatron skilled in the exercise of his
vocation, he performed the duties imposed by law in cases of
shipwreck brought about by force majeure.
Treating of shipwrecks, article 840 of the Code of Commerce

prescribes:
The losses and damages suffered by a vessel and her cargo by
reason of shipwreck or standing shall be individually for the account
of the owners, the part of the wreck which may be saved belonging
to them in the same proportion.
And Article 841 of the same code reads:
If the wreck or stranding should arise through the malice,
negligence, or lack of skill of the captain, or because the vessel put
to sea insufficiently repaired and supplied, the owner or the
freighters may demand indemnity of the captain for the damages
caused to the vessel or cargo by the accident, in accordance with
the provisions contained in articles 610, 612, 614, and 621.
The general rule established in the first of the foregoing
articles is that the loss of the vessel and of its cargo, as the result of
shipwreck, shall fall upon the respective owners thereof, save for
the exceptions specified in the second of the said articles.
These legal provisions are in harmony with those of articles

361 and 362 of the Code of Commerce, and are applicable
whenever it is proved that the loss of, or damage to, the goods was
the result of a fortuitous event or of force majeure; but the carrier
shall be liable for the loss or the damage arising from the causes
aforementioned, if it shall have been proven that they occurred
through his own fault or negligence or by his failure to take the
same precautions usually adopted by diligent and careful
persons.
In the contract made and entered into by and between the

owner of the goods and the defendant, no term was fixed within
which the said merchandise should be delivered to the former at
Catarman, nor was it proved that there was any delay in loading the
goods and transporting them to their destination. From the 28th of
November, when the steamerSorsogon arrived at Gubat and landed
the said goods belonging to Ong Bieng Sip to await
the lorcha Pilar which was to convey them to Catarman, as agreed
upon, no vessel carrying merchandise made the voyage from Gubat
to the said pueblo of the Island of Samar, and with Ong Bieng Sip's
merchandise there were also to be shipped goods belonging to the
defendant company, which goods were actually taken on board the
said lorcha and suffered the same damage as those belonging to the
Chinaman. So that there was no negligence, abandonment, or delay

in the shipment of Ong Bieng Sip's merchandise, and all that was
done by the carrier, Inchausti & Co., was what it regularly and
usually did in the transportation by sea from Manila to Catarman of
all classes of merchandise. No attempt has been made to prove that
any course other than the foregoing was pursued by that firm on
this occasion; therefore the defendant party is not liable for the
damage occasioned as a result of the wreck or stranding of
the lorcha Pilar because of the hurricane that overtook this craft
while it was anchored in the port of Gubat, on December 5, 1908,
ready to be conveyed to that of Catarman.
It is a fact not disputed, and admitted by the plaintiff, that

the lorcha Pilar was stranded and wrecked on the coast of Gubat
during the night of the 5th or early in the morning of the 6th of
December, 1908, as a result of a violent storm that came from the
Pacific Ocean, and, consequently, it is a proven fact that the loss or
damage of the goods shipped on the said lorcha was due to
the force majeure which caused the wreck of the said craft.
According to the aforecited article 361 of the Code of

Commerce, merchandise shall be transported at the risk and
venture of the shipper, unless the contrary be expressly stipulated.
No such stipulation appears of record, therefore, all damages and
impairment suffered by the goods in transportation, by reason of
accident, force majeure, or by virtue of the nature or defect of the
articles, are for the account and risk of the shipper.
A final clause of this same article adds that the burden of proof
of these accidents is upon the carrier; the trial record fully discloses
that the loss and damage of the goods shipped by the Chinaman,
Ong Bieng Sip, was due to the stranding and wreck of
the lorcha Pilar in the heavy storm or hurricane aforementioned;
this the plaintiff did not deny, and admitted that it took place
between the afternoon of the 5th and early in the morning of the
6th of December, 1908, so it is evident that the defendant is exempt
from the obligation imposed by the law to prove the occurrence of
the said storm, hurricane, or cyclone in the port of Gubat, and,
therefore, if said goods were lost or damaged and could not be
delivered in Catarman, it was due to a fortuitous event and a

superior, irresistible natural force, orforce majeure, which
completely disabled the lorcha intended for their transportation to
the said port of the Island of Samar.
The record bears no proof that the said loss or damage caused
by the stranding or wreck of the lorcha Pilar as a result of the storm
mentioned, occurred through carelessness or negligence on the part
of the defendant company, its agents or the patron of the said
lorcha, or because they did not take the precautions usually adopted
by careful and diligent persons, as required by article 362 of the
Code of Commerce; the defendant company, as well as its agents
and the patron of the lorcha, had a natural interest in preserving
the craft and its own goods laden therein - an interest equal to that
of the Chinese shipper in preserving his own which were on board
the ship lorcha - and, in fact, the defendant, his agents and
the patron did take the measures which they deemed necessary and
proper in order to save the lorcha and its cargo from the impending
danger; accordingly, the patron, as soon as he was informed that a
storm was approaching, proceeded to clear the boat of all gear
which might offer resistance to the wind, dropped the four anchors
he had, and even procured an extra anchor from the land, together
with a new cable, and cast it into the water, thereby adding, in so
far as possible, to the stability and security of the craft, in
anticipation of what might occur, as presaged by the violence of the
wind and the heavy sea; and Inchausti & Company's agent
furnished the articles requested by the patron of the lorcha for the
purpose of preventing the loss of the boat; thus did they all display
all the diligence and care such as might have been employed by
anyone in similar circumstances, especially the patron who was
responsible for the lorchaunder his charge; nor is it possible to
believe that the latter failed to adopt all the measures that were
necessary to save his own life and those of the crew and to free
himself from the imminent peril of shipwreck.
In view of the fact that the lorcha Pilar had no means of

changing its anchorage, even supposing that there was a better
one, and was unable to accept help from any steamer that might
have towed it to another point, as wherever it might have anchored,
it would continually have been exposed to the lashing of the waves

and to the fury of the hurricane, for the port of Gubat is a cove or
open roadstead with no shelter whatever from the winds that sweep
over it from the Pacific Ocean, and in view of the circumstances that
it was impossible for the said lorcha, loaded as it then was, to have
entered the Sabang River, even though there had been a steamer to
tow it, not only because of an insufficient depth of water in its
channel, but also on account of the very high bar at the entrance of
the said river, it is incontrovertible that the stranding and wreck of
the lorcha Pilar was due to a fortuitous event or to force
majeure and not to the fault and negligence of the defendant
company and its agents or of the patron, Mariano Gadvilao,
inasmuch as the record discloses it to have been duly proved that
the latter, in difficult situation in which unfortunately the boat under
his charge was placed, took all the precautions that any diligent
man should have taken whose duty it was to save the boat and its
cargo, and, by the instinct of self-preservation, his own life and
those of the crew of the lorcha; therefore, considering the conduct
of the patron of the lorcha and that of the defendant's agent in
Gubat, during the time of the occurrence of the disaster, the
defendant company has not incurred any liability whatever for the
loss of the goods, the value of which is demanded by the plaintiff; it
must, besides, be taken into account that the defendant itself also
lost goods of its own and the lorcha too.
From the moment that it is held that the loss of the

said lorcha was due to force majeure, a fortuitous event, with no
conclusive proof or negligence or of the failure to take the
precautions such as diligent and careful persons usually adopt to
avoid the loss of the boat and its cargo, it is neither just nor proper
to attribute the loss or damage of the goods in question to any
fault, carelessness, or negligence on the part of the defendant
company
and
its
agents
and,
especially,
the patron of
the lorcha Pilar.
Moreover, it is to be noted that, subsequent to the wreck, the

defendant company's agent took all the requisite measures for the
salvage of such of the goods as could be recovered after the
accident, which he did with the knowledge of the shipper, Ong Bieng
Sip, and, in effecting their sale, he endeavored to secure all possible

advantage to the Chinese shipper; in all these proceedings, as
shown by the record, he acted in obedience to the law.
From all the foregoing it is concluded that the defendant is not

liable for the loss and damage of the goods shipped on
the lorcha Pilar by the Chinaman, Ong Bieng Sip, inasmuch as such
loss and damage were the result of a fortuitous event or force
majeure, and there was no negligence or lack of care and diligence
on the part of the defendant company or its agents.
Therefore, we hold it proper to reverse the judgment appealed

from, and to absolve, as we hereby do, the defendant, Inchausti &
Co., without special findings as to costs.
Arellano, C.J., Mapa and Johnson, JJ., concur.
Carson and Trent, JJ., dissent.
Separate Opinions
MORELAND, J., dissenting:
In my opinion the decision of the court below, which this court

reverses, is clearly in accordance with law and in strict conformity
with equity and justice. The defendant, a shipowner, agreed with the
plaintiff to transport P14,000 worth of property from Manila to
Catarman, Province of Samar. The defendant never fulfilled its
contract. Instead of delivering the property at Catarman, Province of
Samar, it left it on board of a lorcha in the waters of Gubat, a port in
the southern part of the Island of Luzon, where, during a storm,
the lorcha foundered and the property was lost.
This court holds that the Chinaman must lose his property. This is
the manner in which the defendant lost the goods of the plaintiff:
The Sorsogon, on which the goods were loaded at Manila, arrived at

Gubat about the 28th of November, 1908. A few days later
the lorcha Pilar arrived at Gubat, towed by the tug Texas.
The lorcha was without means of locomotion of its own, except its
sails, which, from the record, appear never to have been used and
were substantially useless, and could move about and protect itself
from the weather only by being towed or "poled." The only boat on
the coast owned by the defendant which could tow the lorcha was
the tugTexas. Sometime before the 5th of December, at least one
day before the storm broke, the goods belonging to the plaintiff
were loaded on this lorcha. The tug Texas, under the orders of the
defendant, left the locality where the lorcha was loaded and did not
return until after it was wrecked.
Let us see what were the conditions at the time the defendant
voluntarily and unnecessarily placed the property of the plaintiff on
the lorcha Pilar:
(1) It must be remembered that Gubat is located on the Pacific

coast. The waters of Gubat are not protected waters; they are not
inclosed; they are in the form of a bay; they are directly open to the
winds from the Pacific Ocean, without protection or shelter of any
kind, except possibly the mouth of the river, a matter here in
dispute and which will be referred to later. They are likewise open to
the full sweep of the waves of the Pacific coming from its widest
reaches.
(2) At the time the plaintiff's goods were loaded upon

the lorcha Pilar it was the height of the typhoon season in that
locality.
The
prevailing
winds
were
from
the
Pacific.
Destructivebaguios might reasonably be expected at any time. It
was only with the exercise of diligence and prudence that shipping
could be protected therefrom.
(3) As I have before indicated, the lorcha Pilar had substantially no

means of locomotion of its own and depended for its protection in
stormy weather entirely upon the steam tugTexas or being "poled"
into the mouth of the river by its crew. At the time of the storm
which destroyed the lorcha, and for some time prior thereto and for
some days thereafter, the Texas was at the port of Barcelona, on
the coast several miles south of Gubat, having been sent by order of
the defendant, its owner.
Summarizing, then, we have the defendant voluntarily placing the

property of the plaintiff upon the kind of craft above described,
dispatching to a distant port substantially the only means of
locomotion and protection which that craft had, except, as we have
said, by being poled, placing that lorcha in waters directly exposed
to the winds and waves of the Pacific and at the mercy of
every baguio that blew; and this during a season of the year when
winds were generally high and destructive baguios might be
expected at any time, and with full knowledge that if a typhoon
came while the agents of the defendant were unprepared the
property of the plaintiff would in all probability be lost.
Having these facts in mind, let us see what the agents of the
defendant did to protect the property of the plaintiff which they had
voluntarily placed in a situation of such peril.
(4) At the time of the destruction of the lorcha there was a

Government weather observatory at Gubat which received advices
many hours in advance of the approach of a typhoon toward the
locality. It had been there for some years. The purpose of that
observatory was to furnish information to the public concerning the
formation and approach of typhoons from the Pacific and of warning
the people with exposed shipping to take such precautions as were
necessary for its protection. This was known to the defendant's
agents at Gubat. They knew that the observatory had a public
office, open to anybody who cared to visit it, in which would be
found all of the latest information relating to storms
and baguios coming from the Pacific Ocean. They knew that the
officials of said observatory were there for the express purpose of
giving such information. The defendant's agents had at Gubat a
barometer and all the other instruments usually kept by seamen
and navigators for forecasting the weather.
(5) As we have said, the storm occurred on the 5th of December. It

wrought its greatest havoc late in the afternoon and the early part
of the night. At about 2 o'clock on the day before the storm, that is,
on the 4th of December, the observatory at Gubat received notice
from the Manila observatory that a baguio was forming in the Pacific
Ocean. At about the same time at Barcelona, only 10 miles south of
Gubat, the barometer on board the Texas dropped so rapidly as to

indicate such dangerous weather probabilities that the captain of
the Texas deemed it unsafe to venture out of the harbor. On the
same afternoon the barometer on board the only steam vessel near
Gubat, the Ton Yek, also went down. Although it does not expressly
appear in the evidence, yet it is an inference entirely fair from the
record, and against which nothing whatever can be urged, that the
barometer in the possession of agents of the defendant also
dropped with the same rapidity. In all human probability this could
not be otherwise in view of the rapid and decisive fall of the
barometer on board the Texas, only 10 miles away, and the fact
that the typhoon broke over both places equally. At the same time,
and more pronounced a little later, every symptom which men who
have to deal with the sea could and would readily observe, and
which the captain of the Ton Yek did observe as a matter of fact,
indicated the approach of a heavy storm. These evidences were
heeded by the captain of the Ton Yek, who, early on the morning of
the 5th, without waiting for the appearance of a storm signal at the
observatory, sent a messenger to the observatory for the purpose of
ascertaining with more accuracy what was going to happen. In spite
of all these things, most of which occurred on the afternoon or
evening of the day preceding the storm, the agents of the defendant
did absolutely nothing to inform themselves as to the prospective
whether conditions or as to whether or not a baguio was
approaching, and did absolutely nothing to preserve or protect the
property which they had placed in so exposed and dangerous a
place.
(6) The morning of the 5th arrived. As we have already stated, all of
the signs which men who have to do with the sea so readily read
indicated unquestionably and decisively the approach of the storm
which the advices received by the observatory at 2 o'clock on the
afternoon before told the inhabitants of that locality was probably
coming. Still the agents of the defendant did nothing. The captain of
the Ton Yek, although his vessel was a steam vessel and was able to
take care of itself by reason of its machinery, judging these signs
and portents, found it advisable to consult with the
observatory early on the morning of the 5th. The approach of a
storm was apparent to him and he took precautions accordingly. Yet
the agents of the defendant did nothing. Although the lorcha on

which they had put the property of the plaintiff was, according to
their own admissions, utterly unprotected, and although P14,000
worth of goods intrusted to their care was in great danger of being
lost, still they did absolutely nothing, either by anticipation or
otherwise, to protect that property therefrom.
(7) On the morning of the 5th at about 8.20 or 8.30 o'clock the
observatory run up the first danger signal. Still the agents of the
defendant noted nothing, did nothing. They paid absolutely no
attention to it, as they had paid no attention whatever to the other
indications. They left the lorcha to its fate without lifting a finger to
save it. At 9 o'clock the wind had risen and the waves had
commenced to roll. Still nothing was done. At 9.30 the winds were
still stronger and the waves higher. Still nothing was done. At 10.30
the increase in the strength of the wind and of the height of the
waves continued. And yet the agents of the defendant did nothing.
It was well toward 11 o'clock before they began to move. And that
time it was too late. The wind and waves were so high that, with the
means at hand, the lorcha could not be moved from the exposed
position in which it was, even if it be conceded that there was any
safer place within those waters. The lorcha was prevented from
dashing itself immediately upon the rocks only by virtue of its
anchor. At between 10.30 and 11 o'clock the captain of
the lorcha came to ashore to secure additional anchors. And that
time, however, as we have observed, it was too late to unload the
goods and too late to remove the lorcha to a safe place within the
mouth of the river, even if that were possible. The agents of the
defendant, having done absolutely nothing up to this time, now
found, after they had awakened from their lethargy, that it was too
late to do more than stand by and see the property, which had been
intrusted to their care and for carrying of which they had been paid,
dashed to pieces on the rock and swallowed up by the sea.
(8) For nearly eighteen hours prior to the disaster the information
that the disaster was coming lay under the very noses of the agents
of the defendant. For nearly eighteen hours the barometer had been
dropping steadily, so much so that their own vessel dared not leave
a port only 10 miles distant on the afternoon before. For eighteen
hours every warning which nature could give, indicating the disaster
which subsequently came, had been repeatedly thrust upon them.
Yet they did nothing. Having placed the goods of the plaintiff in an
exposed and dangerous position, in waters open to the winds and
waves of the Pacific Ocean, at the height of the typhoon season, in a
vessel which had no motive power of its own, and having sent away
that which they themselves substantially admit was its only
protection, the agents of the defendant exercised no care or
precaution whatever to the end that they might protect the goods
which they themselves had so recklessly exposed.
Yet this court, under such circumstances, holds that the defendant
may go in peace and that the plaintiff is the one who must bear the
burden of such negligence.
With that decision I can not agree.
An act of God can not be urged for the protection of a person who
has been guilty of gross negligence in not trying to avert its results.
One who has accepted responsibility for pay can not weakly fold his
hands and say that he was prevented from meeting that
responsibility by an act of God, when the exercise of the ordinary
care and prudence would have averted the results flowing from that
act. One who has placed the property of another, intrusted to his
care, in an unseaworthy craft, upon dangerous waters, cannot
absolve himself by crying, "an act of God," when every effect which
a typhoon produced upon that property could have been avoided by
the exercise of common care and prudence. When the negligence of
the carrier concurs with an act of God producing a loss, the carrier
is not exempted from liability by showing that the immediate cause
of the damage was the act of God; or, as it has been expressed,
"when the loss is caused by the act of God, if the negligence of the
carrier mingles with it as an active and cooperative cause, he is still
liable." The loss and damage to perishable articles in consequence
of the weather will not excuse the carrier if it could have been
prevented by due care and diligence. The carrier must not only
show that it did all that was usual, but all that was necessary to be
done under the circumstances. (Wing vs. New York, etc., Ry. Co., 1
Hilt. (N.Y.), 235; Philleo vs. Sanford, 17 Tex., 228.) To be exempt
from liability for loss because of an act of God, the common carrier
must be free from any previous negligence or misconduct by which
that loss or damage may have been occasioned. For, although the
immediate or proximate cause of a loss in any given instance may
have been what is termed an act of God, yet if the carrier
unnecessarily exposed the property to such accident by any
culpable act or omission of his own, he is not excused. (Mc-Graw vs.
Baltimore and Ohio Ry. Co., 41 Am. Rep., 696.) In the case of Wolf
vs. American Express Co,., 43 Mo., 421, Wagner, J., said:
The act of God which excuses the carrier must not only be the
proximate cause of the loss, but the better opinion is that it must be
the sole cause. And where the loss is caused by the "act of God," if
the negligence of the carrier mingles with it as an active and
cooperative cause, he is still responsible. (Amies vs. Stevens, 1
Stra., 128.)
Where perishable property, such as potatoes, is received by a
common carrier at a season when a very low temperature may
reasonably apprehended, great diligence should be used in
forwarding such property with dispatch and haste; and where, by a
delay of two or three days, the property is damaged by freezing, the
carrier may be held liable for the damage. (Hewett vs. The Chicago,
B & Q. Ry. Co., 63 Ia., 611.) A carrier is bound to provide a vessel in
all respects adequate to the purpose, with a captain and crew of
requisite skill or ability; and, failing in these particulars, though the
loss be occasioned by an act of God, the carrier may not set up a
providential calamity to protect himself against what may have
arisen from his own folly. (Hart vs. Allen and Grant, 2 Watts (Pa.),
114.)
This doctrine is fully supported by the Spanish authorities on the

subject.
Manresa in his commentaries to section 1105 of the Civil Code of

Spain, volume 8, page 91, says:
Elucidation of article 1105 and the idea of the accident is interesting
under the following aspects; Relation between it and the blame;
enumeration of the requisites that must be present; proof of the
event and characterization thereof;

produces. Let us examine them.
and
the
consequence
it
Even when the distinction is simple and reasonable between blame

for some exempting circumstance (because it may not be serious
enough to involve such blame, under the law or the obligation) and
accident, since the former admits an imputation which the latter
excludes, even when the former may not be the basis for legal
responsibility, and therefore it can not be said that where no
responsible blame exists there the accident commences, yet the
latter is undeniably characterized by unexpectedness and
inevitability, circumstances susceptible of relative interpretation,
and so whatever relates to the blame must be taken into account,
because, as we shall see, it is in certain sense, especially in practical
application, connected with the matter under consideration.
Aside from this statement of ideas, there may be another of

consequences, for in the complexity of facts, in the same obligation,
there may be present blame enough to involve such and also
accident. When both causes are present, with separation of time
and affects, for partial breach due to one of them may be possible
and then the other may operate to aggravate or complete these
consequences, the distinction is easy and to each cause may be
assigned its own effect for the corresponding result, as neither
exemption, on account of accident, can be extended to what may be
imputed nor to what in any way depends upon it by basing
responsibility arising from blame on the fact that the damage is the
result thereof.
The problem becomes more difficult when both causes concur to

produce the same effect or when, even though the effect may be
due to accident, the obligor has not exercised necessary diligence,
however, blameless he was for the results arising from the breach.
In the first of the last two suppositions, the solution is plain,
because when the obligor incurs the blame of actually producing the
result, or even when it is not the only cause, or even the principal
one, there is still sufficient connection between it and the
consequences to cause them to be imputed to him and, as a
voluntary elements exists in the causes, there is lacking the
circumstance indispensable to exemption on account of accident.

The second supposition presents a very difficult problem of proof,
which rests upon the obligor, and calls for a careful analysis of the
origin of the breach. The difficulty in this case consists in that the
blame, in addition to its subjective aspect for imputing the
consequences to the obligor, has an objective aspect, to wit, that
these consequences may rise, that the damage which must be
repaired is caused, in such manner that due diligence may be
lacking and yet not extend to the point of involving responsibility,
because it produces no results. Now then, if an accident occurs
under these conditions, absolutely independent of the negligence
that may have existed, it may have occurred with or without
negligence and therefore any derivation of consequences was
lacking, then it can not be said that responsibility arises therefrom;
but to reach this conclusion there first rests with the obligor proof
so difficult that, in addition to overcoming the presumption of
existence of blame, it involves the very fine distinction of the origin
of the breach and perfectly reveals the occurrence of the accident,
joined by their coexistence, and demonstrating absolute lack of
consequences and influence of blame.
In connection with this question, a judgment of November 22, 1904,

declares that there are some events which, independent of the will
of the obligor, hinder the fulfillment of the obligation, and yet do not
constitute cases of force majeurefor the purposes of such
fulfillment, because the possibility that they would occur could have
been foreseen, articles 1101 and 1104 being applicable and not
article 1105, since negligence or blame is also present from not
informing the obligee, either at first or later on, of the state of
affairs and the situation, so as to avoid the consequent damage.
This was the case of a bull fight that could not be held because the
ring was not completed in time for reasons beyond the control of
the contractor, but the fact that the contract did not state that the
ring was unconstructed and the possibility that it would not be at
the time specified, reveals, in the opinion of the court, the lack of
foresight or the negligence which makes article 1105
inapplicable.
In an essentially analogous way, judgments were pronounced on

June 12, 1899 (Tribunal contencioso administrativo), and on
October 27, 1905 ( Sala tercera), against the company leasing the
tobacco monopoly, for losses caused by theft and fire. It was further
decided in these cases that the company and not the State must
bear the losses, for while accidental fire in a tobacco factory and
theft of stamped goods stored in a branch house may constitute
accidents, yet they do not deserve this characterization when they
occur through omission, neglect or lack of care which imply breach
of the contract.
According to the text of article 1105, which agrees with the rational
idea of accident, it is sufficient for the event to constitute such that
it have any of the two characteristics enumerated; if it is foreseen,
it is of little import that it be unavoidable; and if it is unavoidable it
does not matter that it may have been foreseen. The first
supposition requires some explanation: an event may be wholly
unforeseen, but, after it has occurred, be very slow in producing
effects, and in such case, although it could not have been foreseen,
as there is time before it produces its effects, the latter must be
considered.
Besides this special supposition, in which, if carefully considered,

the two characteristics do not concur, since the idea of
unexpectedness, as is seen, is relative, it will be sufficient that one
or the other be present. The possibility of foresight must be weighed
rationally with consideration of all the circumstances, but this
general rule has, strictly speaking, an exception when the event,
although in a general way very difficult, almost impossible to be
foreseen, should for some reason be known to the obligor in due
time.
The condition of inevitability can not be understood in so absolute a

sense that it should take away the character of accident from many
that are strictly such, because they are undoubtedly causes,
however powerful they may be, whose injurious effects may have
been avoided by exercising a number of precautions, so
exaggerated and so out of proportion to the importance of the
trouble anticipated, that they would be unreasonable and not
required in law. In such cases, if the means which can and must
rationally be employed are not effective, it will be held to have been
unavoidable. So we see demonstrated how the idea of diligence is
related, somewhat in the nature of limitation, to the accident.
Such was the doctrine established in our ancient law regarding the
obligor; the reasons whereof are theoretically set forth further on;
and as a written provision, law 20, title 13, partida 5, which
expressly laid down this principle in connection with pawn-broking
contracts, and which was, by analogy, made the basis for extending
a similar provision to the remaining cases.
That the Civil Code is inspired by the same idea is clearly expressed
in article 1183 thereof, the commentary on which should be
consulted. Still such solution depends upon the nature of proof and
of the accident, since its existence as an abnormal event hindering
the fulfillment of the obligation must be proved and not presumed,
and the burden of this proof rests upon the obligor, and not upon
the obligee, whose proof would have to be negative. Moreover since
an accident is the basis for exemption from responsibility, it must be
proved by him who will benefit thereby and who objects to the
requirement that he fulfill his obligations. To these reasons are
joined those above set forth in connection with the proof of
contractual blame, since they are, according to the same article,
1183, above cited, closely related questions, so much so that they
become two phases of one question - presumption against the
existence of accident of what tends to establish presumption of
blame, in the absence of proof to overcome it.
Proof of accident must include these points; the occurrence of the

event, the bearing it has upon breach of the obligation, and the
concurrence of unexpectedness and inevitably. In connection with
the first two points, the proof resting upon the obligor must be
specific and exact; but as for the last, although it may be admitted
as a general proposition that, in addition to proving the event, he
must also demonstrate that it involves the condition required to
make it an accident, there are some of such magnitude and, by
their nature, of almost impossible prevision, that proof of their
occurrence demonstrates their condition. Undoubtedly, and
differently from proof of the accident, the exceptional circumstance

that the event (which should as a general proposition be regarded
as unforeseen) was known to the obligor for some special reason,
must be of proven by the obligee who asserts it, since the obligation
of proof resting upon the former is fulfilled in this regard by
demonstrating that the event ought rationally to be held to have
been unforeseen.
Since proof of the accident is related to proof of the blame, it is

evident that the obligor must also prove, so far as he is concerned,
that he is not to blame for breach of the obligation.
Exemption from responsibility in accidents established by article

1105 has, according to its text, two exceptions, whereby an event
may be plainly proven, and be unforeseen and unavoidable and still
not produce such exemption, viz, when the execution is either
stipulated in the obligation or is expressly mentioned by the law.
The basis for these exceptions rests, according to this cases, either
upon the freedom of contracts, which is opposed to prohibition of a
compact, wherein, without immorality, there is merely an
emphasized stipulation, which is meant to guarantee in every case
an interest and indirectly to secure careful and special diligence in
the fulfillment of the obligation; or upon the nature of the
obligations when risk is an essential element therein; or finally upon
cases whose circumstances, as happens with that provided for by
the last paragraph of article 1096, justify the special strictness of
the law.
In conclusion, we shall point out that in order to relieve the obligor

from his obligation, it must be remembered that the occurrence of
the event does not suffice, but that the impossibility of fulfilling the
obligation must be the direct consequences of the accident, so that
when it can be fulfilled it will subsists, even if only in part, and
therefore, in order to see whether or not the accident produces this
result the nature of the obligation must be considered, and
according to whether it be specific or general, etc., it will or will not
be extinguished.
To hold the carrier responsible in the case at bar, it is not necessary
to go so far as the authorities just cited. The negligence is so clear
that it is not necessary to strain doctrines or even press them to

their limits.
I do not agree here argue the assertion of the plaintiff denied by the
defendant, that, at any time before nine o'clock of the day of the
destruction of the lorcha, the defendant's agents could have placed
the lorcha in the mouth of the river out of harm's way. I believe that
a fair preponderance of the evidence shows that this could have
been done. The defendant denies this, asserting that the water was
too shallow. Nevertheless, fourteen days after the storm, the
foundered lorcha, water-logged and undoubtedly containing water,
was " poled" by its crew from the place where it went on the rocks
to a place of safety inside the mouth of the river. It is more than
probable that this could have been done at any time before the
storm became too high. At last common prudence would have
required the unloading of the lorcha, which could easily have been
accomplished before the storm if the agents of the defendant had
awakened themselves to their duty.

G.R. No. 6092 Tan Chiong Sian Vs Inchausti & Co.

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G.R. No. 6092 Tan Chiong Sian Vs Inchausti & Co.

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ROWENA R.

G.R. No. 6092. March 8, 1912

Catarman. At around the afternoon however, the wind started to

although they have exerted all the efforts to preserve the

*Loss in a shipwreck (due to fortuitous event)

TAN CHIONG SIAN, Plaintiff-Appellee,

Haussermann, Cohn and Fisher for appellant.

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This is an appeal through bill of exceptions, by counsel for the

On January 11, 1909, the Chinaman, Tan Chiong Sian or Tan

Catarman, but unjustly and negligently failed to do so, with the

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Counsel for the defendant company, in his answer, set forth,

the steamerSorsogon and carried to the port of Gubat, Province of

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After the hearing of the case and the introduction of testimony

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This suit was brought for the purpose of collecting a certain

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The principal question to be determined is whether the

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Article 1601 of the Civil Code prescribes:

them, to the same obligations as determined for innkeepers by

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The provisions of this article shall be understood without

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ART. 1784. The liability referred to in the preceding article shall

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Therefore, all damages and impairment suffered by the goods

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The proof of these accidents in incumbent on the carrier.

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If, notwithstanding the precaution referred to in this article,

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If part of the goods transported should be delivered the

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The steamer Sorsogon, which carried the goods, arrived at the

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Several days later, the lorcha just mentioned arrived at Gubat

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The contract entered into between the Chinese shipper, Ong

company had been steadily using for similar operations in those

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Hence the shipper, Ong Bieng Sip, made no protest or

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It is to be noted that a lorcha is not easily managed or steered

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securely to hold the boat in view of the predicted storm. This

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The patron of the lorcha testified specifically that at Gubat or

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Due importance must be given to the testimony of the weather

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The patron of the lorcha Pilar is charged with gross negligence

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