GU-612 - Guidelines - Incident Investigation and Reporting
GU-612 - Guidelines - Incident Investigation and Reporting
GU-612 - Guidelines - Incident Investigation and Reporting
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HSE PROCEDURE
Embedding HSE into our Business
HSE PROCEDURE
Embedding HSE into our Business
Document Authorisation
Document Custodian
Document Controller
(CFDH)
NAAMAN NAAMANY
NIVEDITA RAM
NIVEDITA RAM
MSEM
MSE5
MSE5
Date: 30/08/2008
Date: 30/08/2008
Date: 30/08/2008
HSE PROCEDURE
Embedding HSE into our Business
ii Revision History
Authorised for Issue by the HSE IC
Document Authorisation
Document Authority
Document Custodian
Document Author
Naaman Namany
Nivedita Ram
Nivedita Ram
Ref. Ind::MSEM
Ref. Ind::MSE/5
Date: 30/08/2008
Date: 30/08/2008
Date: 30/08/2008
The following is a brief summary of the seven most recent revisions to this document. Details of all revisions prior to
these are held on file by the Document Custodian.
Version No.
Date
Author
Scope / Remarks
Version2.0
August 08
Nivedita Ram
MSE5
Version 1.0
Dec-03
Ohimai Aikhoje
MSEM/4
Version 1.0
July-03
Andrew Ure
MSEM/4X
Version 1.0
July-02
Chidozie Nzeukwu
MSEM/13
HSE/97/01,
Rev.3
Apr-98
John
MSEM/5
HSE/97/01,
Rev.2
Feb-98
John
MSEM/5
HSE/97/01,
Rev.1
Jun-97
John
MSEM/5
HSE PROCEDURE
Embedding HSE into our Business
Contents
HSE PROCEDURE
Embedding HSE into our Business
Document Authorisation............................................................................................................................... 3
ii
Revision History........................................................................................................................................... 4
iii
iv
1.......................................................................................................................................................................... 7
1.
Introduction.......................................................................................................................................... 9
1.2
1.3
1.4
Incident Reports................................................................................................................................. 20
1.5
Implementation of Recommendations............................................................................................. 20
2:
Ownership of Incidents...................................................................................................................... 20
3:
3.2
4:
5:
Appendix 2:
Appendix 3:
Appendix 4:
Appendix 5:
Appendix 6:
Appendix 7:
Appendix 8:
Appendix 9:
Appendix 10:
Appendix 11:
1.
1.1
Introduction
The purpose of conducting an Incident investigation and producing a formal report on
the findings is:
The Incident investigation, reporting and follow-up process comprises a number of consecutive
stages once the initial PDO Notification procedure has been completed. These stages are:
Brief guidance is provided below on how to conduct an initial and full Incident investigation and
how to complete the follow-up requirements.
1.2
To ensure that the site is made safe and that action has been taken to identify the
most obvious cause(s) of the Incident and protect against recurrence.
To collect and preserve initial information prior to the site being disturbed. This will
normally include:
Identification of witnesses,
Documentation/procedures in operation at the time of the Incident,
Phase of operations, process condition, etc.,
Markings left by equipment involved,
Position of personnel and equipment,
Documentation of Emergency Response procedures immediately following the
Incident,
Time of day,
Prevalent weather conditions.
Every opportunity should be taken to obtain photographs, statements, etc. during the initial
investigation. Documentation such as 'Permits to Work' should also be collected and passed
to the Investigation Team Leader.
Prior Planning includes the inclusion of the following
a) First Aid Kit
b) Camera
c) Journey plan
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d) Fuel
e) Accommodation
f) Water
g) Charger
1.3
1.3.1
Low
Medium
High
These are suggested minimum team compositions. It is entirely up to the Incident owner to
assign his investigation team based on the expertise of his personnel. The Incident owner is
accountable to his Director and the Managing Director for the quality of his investigation and
report. Normally a joint investigation conducted with any involved contractor is preferred;
however, should a Contractor wish to conduct a separate investigation according to its own
procedures and processes, then it is free to do so. In this case, it is strongly recommended that
the Incident Review Committee reviews the Contractors' associated Incident report at the same
time of the review of PDO's Incident review.
1.3.2
Investigation Timing
Investigations should take place as soon as possible after the Incident has occurred. The
quality of evidence can deteriorate rapidly with time, and delayed investigations are never as
conclusive as those performed soon after the event. Important evidence can be gained from
observations made at the location, particularly if equipment remains as it was immediately after
the Incident. In the case of fatal Incidents and Road Traffic Accidents, the scene must not be
disturbed until permission is obtained from local ROP Senior Officers.
In this case the scene and all evidence should be preserved to prevent deterioration as much
as possible.
1.3.3
Background information
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A structured checklist, in the form of a guide has been developed from various sources to help maintain
the required breadth of inquiry. The scope of the investigation is divided into four areas:
Prevailing Environment
People
Organisation
Equipment
In each section a number of basic questions cover the general scope of the investigation, while the
follow-on questions should be addressed where faults or unsafe conditions are found. The follow-on
questions in some cases lead to one of the other general areas. The guide may also assist in
identification and classification of causal factors for recording and analysis purposes.
There are at least eleven core areas of investigation:
1. The Injured person (IP)
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1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
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2. The Equipment:
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The equipment is
often immediately
blamed for the
cause of the
incident.. The
equipment was
faulty. the brakes
failed.. the
steering jammed
It is therefore
essential to evaluate
the equipments part
in any causation of
the incident itself
1.
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11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
3. The Environment
Static Environment
1.
2.
Are dead
Are injured and in hospital
Have left the scene before our attendance
Are upset and do not want to talk about it
Are uncooperative as they do not want to incriminate
themselves
Can not communicate in English
Embellish the truth to their own ends and means
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1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
8. Historical information
Sometimes during
the investigation or
interview you may
find that this is not
the first incident of
this kind. Reviewing
the findings of the
previous
investigation can
add value to yours.
Do not though
assume the
causation is
precisely the same
by default.
It may also be that
discussions have
been ongoing
relating to a potential
problem. If you can,
review any minutes
etc from these
discussions.
1.
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1. Work back from the known point of injury and identify the
actual hazard which led to the injury or the damage being
caused.
2. Identify the primary conditions which led to the circumstances
where the person could be harmed etc
3. Identify the secondary conditions which led to the
circumstances creating the primary conditions
4. Continue repeating this until such time as you hit the core
conditions which enabled the chain of events to start
5. Note that several primary or secondary conditions can result
which all need investigating and resolving as separate paths
6. For each condition or circumstance which contributed to the
incident identify the combination of controls which could have
been in place to prevent it arising
7. Identify if there was custom and practice where the official
controls are ignored habitually
8. Now identify the different manner in which the controls which
could have been in place can potentially fail and thus be
nullified
9. Record the conditions, circumstances, possible controls and
potential failures of such controls
10. Use the 5 Whys to try and find the answers and to keep
digging down until you discover a root cause
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3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
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certainly before the next interview as you will not remember who
said what later. Provide a copy to the witness if requested.
Word each question carefully and be sure the witness
understands. Use a combination of open and questions.
Open to elicit information; what did you see?
Closed to clarify a point; did you see the truck?
Be sure to distinguish facts from opinions
Be sincere and do not argue with the witness.
Use the interview to attempt to clarify any points you are unsure
of.
Not all people will react the same to a particular stimulus, a
witness close to the event may have a completely different
version to someone who saw it from a distance.
Stories may change with time and contact with other witnesses.
A traumatized witness may not be able to recall all the events
Witnesses may omit entire sequences for various reasons such as
failure to realize their relevance, failure to observe, personal
reasons, bias etc.
Incident reporting
Do not be ruled by the form ask other questions continually throughout the investigation.
Keep the purpose of the investigation in mind at all times, (prevention of re-occurrence).
Do not fall into the trap of immediately blaming the IP/employee and suggesting remedial training.
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The objective of the low potential form is to carry out a simple investigation and provide meaningful
corrective actions asap, as mentioned the form may be re-submitted if root causes cannot be
immediately established.
Medium and high potential incidents require a more in-depth investigation.
Use the template provided for a full report, this will be going on the website in the next few weeks.
PDO require a Tripod beta analysis for all high potential and fatal reports. They will do it.
You will be being investigated by the ROP as well as investigating internally in most fatalities.
The construction of a diagram showing the connections between the various events and conditions
leading up to the Incident - an Incident tree - has proved to be an essential tool in determining the
underlying causes and conditions leading to an Incident.
For High Potential Incident & fatality investigations, a process known as Tripod Beta should be
used to develop an Incident causation tree. Unit or Corporate HSE Advisers should be approached
to assist in this. Tripod Beta uses a specific logic methodology which is extremely powerful in
determining root causes of Incidents.
Preserving Physical Evidence
In some Incidents components or equipment may be damaged or have failed. In these cases, the
equipment should be lodged in a secure place pending more detailed analysis.
Conducting Interviews with Witnesses and Supervisors
Conducting Special Studies
Incidents of an involved or complex nature can require the analysis by specialists to determine
causes of failure. Aircraft crashes, crane failures and explosions are examples of such Incidents.
This should rapidly be identified and the specialists be involved early in the site assessment.
Requests should be made to the appropriate Corporate Functional Discipline Head(s) to assist in the
provision of such specialist support as required. The investigation team should ask whether the
ROP or the relevant medical officer have conducted any tests to determine if alcohol or drugs may
have contributed to the Incident.
'Rules of Evidence'
The investigation team leader must avoid the presentation of supposition as though it were fact.
Whilst it may be appropriate, sometimes even necessary, to evaluate the most likely cause(s) of an
Incident on the balance of probability, it must be avoided where the implication is that somebody
specific was responsible for the Incident. In such situations, the investigation must limit itself to the
facts. This is especially important if there is any possibility that criminal proceedings may result.
Supposition or assumption should be clearly stated as such and not confused with fact. Remember
that the main purpose of Incident investigation is not to assign blame to individuals.
Underlying causes and human factors
The initial stages in an investigation normally focus on conditions and activities close to the Incident
and only Immediate Causes may be identified at this time. However, the conditions underlying
these causes will themselves need to be investigated. As the extent of above physical factors
surrounding an Incident become clear, the investigator(s) should shift the emphasis of their
investigation and questioning to the underlying causes and to the reasons for peoples' actions. This
will allow for ease of assessment when analysing the Incident. It may be necessary to take a closer
look in the following areas:
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Engineering design
Operating procedures and philosophies
Equipment selection
Planning methods
Job responsibilities and descriptions
Discharge of HSE responsibilities
Organisational relationships
HSE systems and Control systems
Incident Investigation, Analysis and Reporting Guideline
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It should be noted that an investigation confined to immediate surroundings of the Incident will only
be able to identify localised causes. Recommendations will therefore, only be able to deal with local
problems and will not be effective in preventing similar Incidents elsewhere or involving other
groups of workers carrying out different but related tasks. In all cases, systematic investigation
should ensure that possible causes are considered both in the
range and depth appropriate to the Incident.
Analysis of findings and drawing conclusions
The purpose of the analysis stage is to identify critical sequences of events and to draw conclusions
with respect to immediate and underlying causes.
Data may be in the form of:
Hard evidence: data which usually is not disputed such as written records, evidence of
physical conditions, photographs of the undisturbed site, tests for alcohol or drugs etc.
Witness statements from people present at the time of the Incident and immediately
afterwards.
Reports of tests carried out since the Incident.
Circumstantial evidence: the logical interpretation of facts that leads to a single, but
unproven conclusion.
Identification of recommendations
The final list of recommendations for action should include AT LEAST ONE action against each
identifiable cause. It should be noted that not all causes can necessarily be eliminated, and some
may only be removed at prohibitive cost. Some recommendations will therefore aim at reducing a
hazard to a minimum, practicable level, others at improving protective systems to limit the
consequences.
Recommendations should be SMART : Specific; Measurable to the extent that it is clear when they
have been implemented; Achievable, Relevant to an identified cause (immediate or underlying) and
have a Target completion date assigned. Statements such as the following are expressions that DO
NOT satisfy these requirements!
'Drivers should take more care......
'Supervisors should ensure that
'The rules for..... should be followed.'
'More attention should be given to......
Recommendations should be structured corresponding to the failed barriers. Description of actions
should be worded in such a way as to clearly indicate how the Incident follow-up coordinator will
know when the action is complete.
The wording and target due dates for each action shall be agreed with each assigned action party
before the report is submitted to the relevant review committee. If agreement can not be reached
then this difference in opinion must be highlighted to the appropriate review committee who shall
decide if the recommended action is valid or not.
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Recommendations should generally be restricted to the key issues which contributed to the Incident
being investigated. They should address actions which are necessary to ensure that failed or
missing controls or barriers, which would have prevented the Incident and/or reduced the
consequence, are in place in the future. The reason for this is to sharpen the focus on the specific
learning points from the Incident. If other areas for improvement, which did not have a significant
impact on the specific Incident, become apparent during the investigation process, then these
should be communicated to the relevant person for action outside of the Investigation report
as part of PDO's normal business process.
1.4
Incident Reports
The degree of reporting required in the event of an Incident is determined by the potential severity
of the Incident and the probability of a similar Incident re-occurring. Refer to the Incident HSE Risk
Matrix
Reporting of Low Potential Incidents, is limited to a completely and accurately filled out
Notification form - either a Health and Safety Incident form or an Environmental Incident form.
All other Incidents require a more formal Incident Report in addition to the Notification. Two
different types of Incident Report exist for Medium Potential Incidents - one for each of the
following types of Incident:
Guidance on completion and routing of general Incident Reports is also provided in Appendix 3
A more comprehensive and detailed report is required in the event of a High Potential Incident. A
template for such a report is also provided in Appendix 1.
A simplified report is required in the case of a non-accidental sudden death of a person employed
by or on contract to PDO. A template for this special report is also included in Appendix 2.PDO's
medical department can assist in the completion of this report.
1.5
Implementation of Recommendations
Implementation of action items must be formalized for effective follow-up. All actions must be
tracked through FIM. In addition, it is necessary to inspect/audit at periodic intervals to ensure that
improvements have been sustained.
2:
Ownership of Incidents
Incident ownership is a term used to designate PDO single point responsibility for ensuring that an
Incident is investigated, reported and followed-up according to the requirements set out in this
document. Ownership is first assigned to a PDO Responsible Supervisor and then delegated to the
appropriate level within that Line for action. The organisation Line in this respect refers to PDO's
reporting Line from MD to Director to Line Manager to Department Head to Section Head, etc.
Within any given organisation Line, certain individuals are designated as Asset Managers, Contract
Holders, Site Representatives, etc. in line with the Asset Management or Contract Holdership
responsibilities.
There are two types of Asset Managers Product Flow Asset Manager and Service Provider Asset
Manager. There are also Process Owners e.g. UEOD for Engineering and Operations Processes, Risk
Advisors/Managers e.g. MSEM for HSE Risk and Skills Pool Managers (CFDHs). Each Manager is
directly accountable to the MD for the performance and development of his/her asset including staff
resources, however various assets are organisationally grouped together under a Director who is
responsible for the group of Assets under his/her control.
From time to time, depending on the activity, an Asset Manager (AM), such as a product flow AM,
may grant authority over a defined portion of his assets to another AM, such as a Service Provider
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who then becomes an Asset Custodian. The Asset Custodian then assumes full responsibility, on
behalf of the Asset Manager, for all activities and assets within that defined area.
The Service Provider AMs provide common services to support primarily the product flow Asset
Managers. These services include drilling, logistics, seismic, finance, telecommunications, etc. Some
of these Service Provider departments are organised within the same Directorate, or Line, as the
Asset Managers and others are organised into separate Lines such as the Drilling Engineering and
Exploration departments.
All Incidents are required to be investigated and reported, according to this document, ultimately to
MD who in turn is required to report elements of PDO's corporate performance to PDO's shareholders
according to separately agreed requirements. The designation of Incident ownership within PDO is
therefore a structural means by which PDO may systematically investigate, report and follow-up any
HSE Incidents which occur in the course of running the business. The ultimate aim is to manage
PDO's activities in line with the corporate policies.
Line Incident ownership is determined according to the following criteria which are aligned with PDO's
structure of Asset Managers and Service Providers. Incident ownership should normally rest with
the reporting Line which has most influence over the site or activity.
The purpose of defining clear criteria for Incident ownership is to ensure that in every event,
clear rules will always lead to positive Incident ownership immediately after the Incident so
that no time is lost in carrying out the investigation. It is understood that the criteria below
may not always be the most fair in light of the prevailing circumstances. However if the rules
are applied consistently and immediately, the benefit will outweigh any harm.
a) If the Incident, excluding transport related Incidents, occurred within one of the
following Asset Manager areas of operation, then ownership rests with the reporting Line of that
designated Asset Manager: any interior operational facility, installation or Operations asset such as:
-
well sites,
PDO & Contractor interior offices, camps, workshops & recreational facilities,
any area of common use within the physically fenced coastal office and industrial
area
b) If the Incident, excluding transport related Incidents, occurred within an area where holdership
was temporarily transferred, in a written agreement, to an Asset Custodian, then ownership rests
with the reporting Line of that Asset Custodian. This would normally apply to any:
-
fenced off or access controlled areas of existing facilities where only construction
or
maintenance activities are underway
-
interior contractors' facilities where only one PDO Contract Holder or Service
Provider is designated as accountable for those facilities
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c) If none of the above criteria are definitive, still for non-transport related Incidents, then Incident
ownership rests with the reporting Line responsible for supervising the activity during which the
Incident occurred. This rule shall then apply unless the involved parties have a documented
agreement in place which clearly defines alternative roles and responsibilities. Such a documented
agreement may take any form (e.g. a corporate procedure or an agreement covering the supply of
labour from one party to another) provided that it clearly states respective roles and responsibilities
and, is accepted by both parties.
It is therefore important for all parties who make such agreements to keep copies of the agreements
in case there is a dispute.
For all transport related Incidents (except milk run journeys without a single contract holder as
described in item 5 below), PDO Line ownership rests with the reporting Line of:
the person in control of each vehicle at the time of the Incident if that person is directly
employed by or seconded to PDO, or
the Contract Holder of the relevant Contract in control of each vehicle at the time of the
Incident.
If more than one PDO reporting Line is involved then Line ownership rests with the PDO reporting
Line which suffers the most severe injury, or the most damage if no injury is sustained, as a result of
the Incident. In the remote instance that all injuries and damage are equal then MSEM shall assign
Incident ownership based on his perception of which Line had most influence over the activity or site
at the time of the Incident. In the absence of MSEM, the acting MSEM shall make this decision and
this decision shall be final. In such an instance, the Incident should be investigated and reported
jointly with participants from each of the involved Lines and with the Incident Owner leading.
d)
A special procedure exists if a transport related Incident occurs during a "milk run" journey
where one journey was being used to supply or service more than one site or contract, whether for
PDO, a PDO active Contractor or a third party and where there is no single Contract Holder or
manager accountable for that journey.
For the purpose of determining Incident ownership, the
journey shall be divided into discreet sections. Each section shall have a beginning or "dispatching"
location and an end or "receiving" location. Each journey section shall progress from departure from
the dispatching location until arrival at the next receiving location. Incident ownership for each
section of such a milk run journey rests with the reporting Line of the Asset Manager or Service
Provider (as described in items 1, 2 and 3 above) which has the most influence on that section of the
milk run journey. To avoid debate on the significance of the degree of influence, for the purpose of
determining Incident ownership, dispatchers are considered to have more influence than receivers.
Therefore, Line ownership rests with the reporting Line of the dispatching location of the relevant
section of the milk run journey.
Incident ownership for the first section of such a milk run journey, from the home base to the first
receiving location, also rests with the reporting Line of the first receiving location. This also applies if
the first location is a supply warehouse or yard such as at MAF. If the Incident occurs on a section of
the journey where the last dispatching location was a third party or non-active Contractor, then for the
purpose of determining Incident ownership any third party or non-active Contractor location shall be
ignored and ownership shall flow through to the last PDO or active Contractor dispatching location.
An example of the above procedure is shown in the diagram below with the arrows showing the
journey sections and direction of travel and with the Incident owners shown in bold italics beside their
assigned sections of the journey. Where an agreement is also in place as defined in items 1, 2 or 3
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above, then ownership for each section of a milk run journey would also pass to the asset custodian
or service provider who required the supplies or services to be brought to their respective locations.
Figure G1 - Milk Run Journey Incident Ownership
SERVICE RIG
MAF Supply
Yard
(SUPPLY YARD
ASSET HOLDER)
(SERVICE RIG
ASSET HOLDER)
(SUPPLY YARD
ASSET HOLDER)
HOME BASE
SEISMIC CAMP
(SEISMIC CAMP
ASSET HOLDER)
(OPERATIONS
ASSET HOLDER)
PRODUCTION STATION
3rd Party
It is important to note that this determination of Incident ownership shall not affect the well established
journey management system where the journey manager is fully responsible for planning the entire
journey wherever he is located.
e) Once Line Incident ownership is determined, the authority level within that Line at which Incident
ownership normally rests is determined on the basis of Incident potential according to the HSE Risk
Matrix reproduced in Figure G4 below. Three levels of authority exist to cover the three classes of
potential risk to the Company Director level, Department Head / Area Team Leader level and
Section Head Level.
Figure G1 - Incident Ownership Level of Authority
Potential Severity
Low
Responsible Supervisor
Medium
Manager
Director
MD
Although the entire generic matrix is shown for completeness, for practical purposes columns A and B
will rarely if ever be applicable for potential risk assessments. Also, a potential risk of 0 is irrelevant
and therefore row 0 shall never be used in this context. Most PDO Incidents then will fall in the range
between severities 1 to 4 and probabilities C to E.
The person identified as the normal Incident owner in Figure G1; however, has discretion to delegate
responsibility for investigation, reporting and follow-up according to his / her assessment of the merits
of the learning value for the case in question and according to the specific capabilities of his available
personnel. It must be emphasized that the Incident owner is still accountable for the quality of this
work. The limit to delegation is determined on the basis of Incident actual outcome, not potential
outcome, as follows:
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Incident Investigation, Analysis and Reporting Guideline
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Limit to Delegation
0, 1 & 2
Department Head
Manager
Director
Investigation and reporting of a non-accidental death may be delegated to the Section Head
level provided that there are no apparent unusual circumstances surrounding the death.
Example
A driver was rushing to return to his camp at the end of a long day. At a distance of 40 km from his
destination he rolled his vehicle over. He received a minor injury which subsequently received First
Aid treatment. He was lucky in this respect because he wasn't wearing his seat belt and had no other
passengers with him. He was found by another road user some 30 minutes after the Incident.
There is a reasonable chance that the driver could have been killed and, of a similar Incident
happening again if nothing is done to prevent it. This type of Incident happens more than five times
per year within PDO but less than five times per year in that area or with that rig. Using Figure 4, an
Incident Potential of 'D4(People)' is proposed by the Incident Owner. Upon early review of the initial
notification, the Director learns that the circumstances of the Incident closely resemble those of an
Incident six weeks earlier, for which a thorough investigation had taken place and, various
recommendations implemented. Little benefit would be gained by the Director leading the
investigation into this Incident, so he elects to delegate. Given that the actual outcome was a First
Aid Case (Severity 1), the lowest level to which the Director may delegate responsibility for leading
the investigation & follow-up, is to the Responsible Supervisor level.
3:
3.1
3.1.1
Description
The following describes the Terms of Reference and operation of the Managing Directors Incident
Review Panel, as reiterated in PDO Management Circucular: Rev 1, dd 11/03/2007
3.1.2
Objectives
The MDIR is principally concerned with preventing the recurrence of incidents via the cascade of action
items across PDO and Contractor operations, and to act as a forum that allows MDC to hear, at first
hand, HSE views from the workforce. It also enables MDC and Contractor CEOs to assure first line
Supervisors of their support for continuous HSE improvement and to raise the importance of effective
first line supervision.
3.1.3
Participants
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Contractor Attendees
by Invitation
Others by Invitation
The review will take place on Monday afternoon 2 weeks of the incident happening in the Board Room,
starting at 13.15hrs and lasting up to 30 minutes per item. Before coming to the MDIRC the LTI will
have been reviewed with the responsible PDO director.
3.1.5
Preparation
The preceding Wednesday, MSE/4212 will issue the agenda and timing for the review. Relevant
Director, Line Manager, Incident Owner and Contract Holder (when applicable) will be advised.
The preceding Saturday, the Incident Owner shall issue the pre-reading material to MSE/5, who will
review and forward to the MSE/4212 for submission to MDIRC members.
3.1.6
Agenda
The Incident Owner will be the secretary for the incident during the review. He will identify those action
points with clear lateral learning value for company-wide cascade. MSE/5 will facilitate this process
and ensure the learning are cascaded appropriately.
Lessons learned from the review will be published on the HSE website and email sent to all Directors
and HSE Team Leaders. Directors and line managers will be required to cascade these lessons within
their organisation, and OPAL Representative will cascade same lessons amongst its members via copy
of the weekly highlights.
3.1.7
Review
MDIRC will review all LTIs in addition to fatal and high potential incidents.
Besides MDIRC permanent members, the appropriate PDO Director, Incident Owner, Contract Holder
and line supervisor are required to be present in the review. The Contractor MD will be invited by the
Contract Holder, where contractor staff is involved. Line Director or Contractor MD can invite other
personnel where they feel this is appropriate.
3.1.8
Meeting Format
The format of the review remains a round table, with a short presentation by Line Manager or
Contractor CEO. The presentation package shall be as per the templates provided (Medium potential
LTIs and High potential/fatalities), with the presentation taking no more than 5-10 minutes, allowing 20
minutes for discussion. Incident reports are not required to be submitted at this time, but should be
completed within 3 weeks of the review and copied to MSE/421 who will ensure the actions and report
are input into FIM.
3.2 Directorate Incident Review Committees (IRCs)
Each directorate will continue to have its own Incident Review Committee (IRC), which will
function in line with foregoing MDIRC scheme, as follows:
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Each IRC will review LTIs and medium potential incidents that occur within its business area in the
preceding week. To ensure coherence, some IRCs may be set up on the basis of Work
Practitioner Groups, e.g. DOIRC, XIRC, etc.
The Director will appoint a focal-point for each IRC who will be responsible for co-ordination of the
IRC meetings and ensuring LTI Briefing Packs are prepared within 10 days of the review to
cascade lessons across the company.
LTI Briefing Packs will only be issued company-wide by MSE/43 after review to ensure quality and
consistency. MSE/43 will provide standards template for the packs.
Minutes of the IRC and action items shall be copied to MSEM and MSE/5/421.
The intention is to continue to hear views from the workforce, raise the importance of the first line
supervision and assure supervisors of MDCs and CEO's support for their HSE tasks. Victimisation
is neither allowed nor intended and the reviews will therefore be carried out in an atmosphere
devoid of fear.
1.2.1
Committee Establishment
The Directorate IRCs are established in PDO:
1.2.2
OSIRC (OSD)
ONIRC (OND)
DOIRC (TWM)
HIRC (HD)
XIRC (XD)
FIRC (FD)
GIRC (GD)
Composition
Each directorate shall define the permanent members of their IRC, but they will typically be:
1.2.3
The unit director (chairman), who may delegate no lower than a line manager
2-3 Senior department heads (one of which will be vice chairman)
Unit HSE Advisor or Focal Point (facilitator, should have attended Tripod-B Incident
Investigation Course)
Senior representative of the contractor community (optional)
MSEM representative
Other ad-hoc attendees could be invited for specific reviews (e.g.: TTO/13 for lifting operation
incidents, MSEM/15 representative for review of any RTAs)
In case of absence, permanent members shall ensure a suitable delegate attends the IRC to
replace them.
Responsibilities
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Actual severity 4/5 and high potential incidents which have first been reviewed by MD-IRC will
have a final review and close out by the relevant Directorate IRC.
To ensure consistently high quality incident investigation by the line
To review incidents to a level of detail commensurate with incident potential severity, as determined
from the Incident Potential Matrix.
To review and endorse the actual severity and potential risk rating provisionally assigned to each
incident.
To endorse corrective and remedial action items to prevent reoccurrence of similar incidents. To assign
appropriate action parties and deadline for close out.
Note: assigned action parties outside the Directorates direct control shall formally agree to accept the
action item.
To define the lateral learning items that are to be communicated to others and ensure their rapid and
effective promulgation.
1.2.4
Meetings
Meetings may be held weekly at a fixed day/time, and could take place in the interior where incidents
occur. However, if no incidents occurred, the unit Director can decide to cancel the meeting.
Directorates that, due to the nature of their operations, have relatively few incidents, a monthly or 2weekly period is acceptable.
A typical IRC agenda could include the following items (at the discretion of the unit Director):
An
Review status of LTI reports and action items for the directorate
Review of new HSE Incidents
Learning from MDIR and other IRCs
incident should be reviewed within 2-3 weeks of the incident occurring. For an incident to be
reviewed by the IRC, the investigation and draft final report shall be completed and issued to all
IRC members prior to the meeting.
Incidents that have first been reviewed by MDIR shall be reviewed by the Directorate IRC (from which
the incident originated) within 2-3 weeks of the MDIR session. The incident investigation and
report (taking the MDIR proceedings into account) shall be completed before that time.
1.2.5
Lessons Learned
Lateral lessons from each IRC session should be prepared and issued within one week of the
meeting. Records should as a minimum include the following for each incident that has been
reviewed:
These lessons shall be issued within each Directorate and copied to Focal Points of all IRCs,
assigned action parties and MSEM (MSEM, MSEM/13/42/43).
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IRC Focal-Points should ensure that the agreed lateral lessons of key incidents are issued to
MSEM/13 within one week of each review as per the standard format provided. MSEM/13 will
quality check and issue Lateral Learning sheets for wider dissemination.
LTI Briefing Packs shall be prepared for those incidents with particular high lateral learning
value. The draft for these packs shall be made the incident owner, with assistance of IRC
Focal-Point, prior to being issued to MSEM/13 for quality checks. Final Briefing Packs will be
issued by MSEM by MSEM/43, but may be issued internally (within directorate or asset team)
by the IRC Focal-Point
4:
Asset Damage
A direct loss of or damage to plant, equipment, tools or materials resulting from an incident. (Refer to
guidance and examples in Appendix 6 of the ICIR).
Business
One of the global Shell businesses, i.e. Exploration and Production, Downstream or Gas and Power.
Business Travel
For a PDO employee, Business Travel is any travel undertaken for the purposes of work activities in
which that person is engaged in the interests of his or her employer, to the following extent:
It includes the period from the time that person leaves their residence or their normal place of
work until they return or until the time they arrive at their destination and check into temporary
accommodation (home away from home).
It includes, on the return trip, the period from when the person checks out of their temporary
accommodation until they arrive at their residence or their normal place of work.
It includes the whole spectrum of travel, from international travel through to simple acts like
crossing a public road on foot between two company buildings.
It includes travel to the airport for a business trip from the time an employee leaves home even
if that travel follows the same route as their normal commute. If the employee stops in the
office first to work, then the period of employees business travel starts from the office and not
their home.
It excludes that persons commute from their home away from home to their temporary place of
work or a significant detour made for personal reasons.
Any injury or illness occurring during the business trip is considered to be work related for
recording, investigation and learning purposes; but not all injuries and illnesses will be
recordable for statistical purposes.
It includes day-to-day travel undertaken by a Shell contractor in the course of carrying out Shell
work-related activities.
It excludes day-to-day travel undertaken by the Shell contractor when that person is not
engaged in Shell work related activities (such as their normal commute, or any travel
undertaken in the interest of their own employer).
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It includes contractor mobilization and demobilization when performed under contract with PDO
Business Unit
Activities in one of the Group businesses that are operated as a single economic entity. A business unit
can coincide with a Group company or straddle part or all of several companies.
Consequential Business Loss
The indirect loss associated with incidents resulting in asset damage, environmental impact or impact
on company reputation. It comprises elements such as loss of production (expressed as profit margin),
process unit downtime, product quality costs, cost of environmental clean up, cost of recovery/disposal
of waste and cost of reprocessing off-grade material.
The intention is to estimate the order of magnitude of the loss so that the incident can be assessed on
the RAM and the appropriate resources put into investigation. It should not be necessary to conduct a
detailed accounting of the full range of indirect costs. Consequential business loss should be estimated
on a 100% equity basis.
When consequential business loss results from an incident with impact on the environment or company
reputation, the consequences should be assessed under both asset damage and the
environmental/reputation categories of the RAM and the highest rating used to determine the extent of
investigation and follow up.
Company
Company or Group company means a Shell company, a Joint Venture under operational control (JVuoc), or a Joint Venture not under operational control (JV-nuoc) that has agreed to report its HSE
performance and incident data to Group following the reporting methodology detailed in this guide.
Contractor
All parties working for the company either as direct contractors or as subcontractors.
Environmental Impact
The negative impact on the environment resulting from an incident. (Refer to guidance and examples
in Appendix 7 of the ICIR).
Exposure Hours
The total number of hours of employment including recorded overtime and training but excluding leave,
sickness and unrecorded overtime hours. Exposure hours should be calculated separately for company
and contractor personnel.
Time off duty, even if this time is spent on company premises, is not included in the calculation of
exposure hours, but incidents during this time should be recorded and investigated. When they meet
the work related definition, they should be included in the statistics as recordable incidents.
In many company sites the number of exposure hours can be calculated from computer controlled
access or time keeping records. In the absence of more accurate methods exposure hours can also be
calculated from a headcount and nominal working hours per person or time writing systems.
In order to meet reporting schedules, exposure hours can be estimated on the basis of the previous
data. Corrections can be made at the end of the reporting year when more time is available.
Fatality
A death resulting from a work related injury or occupational illness, regardless of the time intervening
between the incident causing the injury or exposure or causing illness and the death.
FAR
The number of fatalities per hundred million exposure hours.
FIM
Fountain Incident Management (FIM) is the Group system for recording incident details, the
investigation, classification and action items. It can also issue notifications and reports. Other systems
can be used in the interim; but all Businesses and Functions are expected to be using FIM by end
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2009. FIM should be used for all potentially work related incidents including those that occur while in
home away from home status.
Fires and Explosions
Normally taken to mean all fires that necessitated the use of a fire extinguisher or other extinguishing
means, e.g. snuffing steam, shut off fuel or switch off electricity supply. Fires with no visible flame, e.g.
oil soaked insulation, should also be included. All flammable explosions or overpressure explosions
should be included, irrespective of the extent of containment.
First Aid
An incident is classified as a First Aid if the treatment of the resultant injury or illness is limited to one
or more of the 14 specific treatments. These are:
1. Using a non-prescription medication at non-prescription strength
(2)
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Incident
An unplanned event or chain of events that has, or could have, resulted in injury or illness or damage
to assets, the environment or company reputation.
Incidents do not include operations, maintenance, quality or reliability incidents which had no HSE
consequence or potential. Incidents do not include degradation or failure of plant or equipment resulting
solely from normal wear and tear.
Injury
Any injury such as a cut, fracture, sprain, amputation etc. that results from a single instantaneous
exposure.
Lost Time Injuries (LTI)
The sum of injuries resulting in fatalities, permanent total disabilities and lost workday cases, but
excluding restricted work cases and medical treatment cases.
Lost Time Injury Frequency (LTIF)
The number of lost time injuries per million exposure hours.
Lost Workday Case (LWC)
Any work related injury that renders the injured person temporarily unable to perform their normal work
or restricted work on any day after the day on which the injury occurred. Any day includes rest day,
weekend day, scheduled holiday, public holiday or subsequent day after ceasing employment.
A single incident can give rise to several lost workday cases, depending on the number of people
injured as a result of that incident.
Lost Workdays (LWD)
The total number of calendar days on which the injured person was temporarily unable to work as a
result of a lost workday case.
In the case of a fatality or permanent total disability no lost workdays are recorded.
Medical Treatment (MT)
An incident is classified as Medical Treatment (MT) when the management and care of the patient to
address the injury or illness is above and beyond First Aid (i).
Medical Treatment does not include:
The conduct of diagnostic procedures, such as x-rays and blood tests, including the
administration of prescription medications used solely for diagnostic purposes (e.g., eye
drops to dilate pupils);
Visits to a physician or other licensed health care professional solely for observation or
counselling;
The following may not involve any treatment but for purposes of severity classification, will be recorded
as Medical Treatment.
Needle stick injuries and cuts from sharp objects that are contaminated with another
persons blood or other potentially infectious material.
Medical removal under a government standard (use the Shell Health Guidelines where no
government standard exists).
(i)
Note: First Aid carries a very specific meaning for this purpose.
definition of First Aid.
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Any abnormal condition or disorder of an employee, other than one resulting from an occupational
injury, caused by exposure to environmental factors associated with employment. An illness is workrelated if the balance of probability is 50% or more that the case was caused by exposures at work.
Occupational illnesses include acute and chronic illness or diseases that may be caused by inhalation,
absorption, ingestion or direct contact with the hazard, as well as exposure to physical and
psychological hazards. (Refer to guidance and examples in Appendix 4 ICIR).
OSHA occupational illness cases will be captured for benchmarking purposes in FIM (and other
systems where possible).
Operational Control
See Instructions on Determining Operational Control Appendix 5 of the PMR
Permanent Total Disability (PTD)
Any work related injury that permanently incapacitates an employee and results in termination of
employment.
Prescription Medication
1. All antibiotics, including those dispensed as prophylaxis where injury or illness has occurred to the
subject individual.
Exceptions: Dermal applications of Bacitracin, Neosporin, Polysporin, Polymyxin, Iodine or similar preparation.
Naproxen Sodium( such as AleveTM-) Greater than 220 mg. in a single dose.
Codeine analgesics (Cocodamol, Panadeine, etc.) Greater than 16 mg. in a single dose.
Exceptions: acetylsalicylic acid (Aspirin) and acetaminophen (paracetamol) are not considered medical treatment.
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Significant Incidents
Incidents with actual consequences that rate 4 or 5 on the RAM. (people, environment, damage or
reputation).
Third Parties
Persons or organisations that are not employed by or contracted to a company or contractor.
Total Sickness Absence
Absence from work on grounds of incapacity to work due to any sickness and injury, work related or
not, expressed as percentage of total workdays available. All other cases of absence such as
pregnancy, childbirth, leave, training and seminars, are not included in the definition of absence.
Total Recordable Cases (TRC)
The sum of injuries resulting in fatalities, permanent total disabilities, lost workday cases, restricted
work cases and medical treatment cases.
Total Recordable Case Frequency (TRCF)
The number of Total Recordable Cases per million exposure hours.
Total Recordable Occupational Illness (TROI)
The sum of all recordable occupational illnesses. Cases involving no lost or restricted workdays and no
medical treatment or first aid are included. A single exposure can give rise to several occupational
illness cases. Contractor occupational illness cases are to be reported when known, but are not to be
included in the TROIF.
Total Recordable Occupational Illness Frequency (TROIF)
The number of employee occupational illnesses per million exposure hours.
Vehicle Kilometres Driven
The number of vehicle kilometres travelled during work related activities whilst being driven by a
company or contractor employee
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Work Related
An injury or illness must be considered work related if an event or exposure in the work environment
caused or contributed to the resulting condition or significantly aggravated a pre-existing injury or
illness. Work relatedness is presumed for injuries and illnesses resulting from events or exposures
occurring in the work environment unless one of the following exceptions applies in its entirety:
Occurs when an employee or contractor is present in the work environment as a member of the
general public. In this case it will be included in the 3 rd party statistics.
Involves signs or symptoms that surface at work but result solely from a non-work related event
or exposure.
Is solely the result of eating, drinking, or preparing food or drink for personal consumption
(whether bought on the employers premises or brought in). For example, if the employee is
injured by choking on a sandwich while in the employers establishment, the case would not be
considered work-related. Note: If the employee is made ill by ingesting food contaminated by
workplace contaminants (such as lead), or gets food poisoning from food supplied by the
employer, the case would be considered work-related.
Is solely the result of doing personal tasks at the establishment outside of the employees
assigned working hours
Is solely the result of personal grooming, self medication for a non-work-related condition. Or is
intentionally self-inflicted
Is caused by a vehicle accident and it occurs on a company owned parking lot or road while the
employee is commuting
Is the common cold or flu (Note: contagious diseases such as tuberculosis, brucellosis,
hepatitis A, or plague are considered work-related if the employee is infected at work).
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Appendix 2
Appendix 3
Appendix 4
Appendix 5
Appendix 6
Appendix 7
Appendix 8
Appendix 9
Appendix 10
Appendix 11
Classification of Occupational Illnes
Incident Investigation, Analysis and Reporting Guideline
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The contents of High Potential Incident reports should be based on the following template or
alternatively the Tripod Beta report format can be printed if a complete Tripod Beta analysis has been
done:
(This is the information required by PDO and SIEP.)
1.
SUMMARY
2.
INCIDENT DETAILS
3.
2.1
2.2
2.3
2.4
2.5
The Incident
2.6
Description of damage
2.7
Nature of injuries
2.8
INCIDENT INVESTIGATION
3.1
Investigation Team
3.2
3.3
3.4
3.5
3.6i
3.6ii
e.g.
3.6iii
Explicitly describe what action has been taken to determine if alcohol or drug use
was involved
4.
5.
3.7
3.8
Incident Tree
4.2
HSE MANAGEMENT
5.1
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PDO
5.1.2
Contractor / Contract
5.2
5.3
PDO
5.3.2
Contractor
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5.4.2
5.4.3
5.5
6.
CONCLUSIONS
7.
6.1
6.2
6.3
RECOMMENDATIONS
7.1
Immediate actions
7.2
Follow-up actions
Where non-accidental death occurs to a person who is currently employed by, or on contract to, the
Company, records of medical pre-employment checks, periodic medical checks, information about
the work and work conditions preceding the death should, if available be subject to investigation.
This also applies to non-accidental deaths outside normal working hours. The objective of this
investigation is to ascertain whether the cause of the fatality relates to systems and conditions
which are managed by the Company and may provide the grounds for corrective action. If this is
the case, such a fatality should be reported immediately and be included in the Company statistics.
The contents of Non-accidental death reports should be based on the following template where
relevant. This is the information required by PDO and SIEP.
1.
SUMMARY
2.
EVENT DETAILS
2.1 Time, Date, Place of Death
2.2 Details of the Deceased
2.3 Nature of injuries/cause of death
2.4 Sequence of Events leading to the discovery of the deceased
2.5 Sequence of Events following the discovery of the deceased
2.6 Post Incident response
2.6.1
Where death occurred within the Company fence, were the Company
Medical
Emergency Response (including First Aid, Medical Treatment and Medevac )
procedures suitable and complied with?
3.
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INVESTIGATION DETAILS
Incident Investigation, Analysis and Reporting Guideline
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4.
4.1.2
What is known of the health management within the direct working
environment of the deceased (health risk assessments, exposure monitoring,
health controls and performance indicators.)
4.2 Health requirements for contract
4.3 HSE Plans (PDO & Contractor) (focus only on issues which are relevant to the
cause of death)
4.4 Monitoring and Implementation of HSE Plans
4.4.1
4.4.2
PDO monitoring if Contractor is fulfilling responsibilities and
obligations
4.4.3
etc.).
5.
CONCLUSIONS
5.1
5.2
6.
RECOMMENDATIONS
6.1
Immediate actions
6.2
Follow-up actions
LIST OF ATTACHMENTS
Appendix 3:
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REPORTING DEPARTMENT :
DATE OF INCIDENT :
TIME OF INCIDENT :
INCIDENT LOCATION :
CONTROLLED BY :
] PDO
] CONTRACTOR
] THIRD PARTY
] INJURIOUS
] OCC. ILLNESS
] EQUIP. DAMAGE/OTHER
] NEAR MISS
[ ] Loss of Containment
[ ] Falling Objects
[ ] Electrical
[ ] Cleaning
[ ] Pollution Environment
[ ] Assault
[ ] Air Transport
[ ] Unsafe
[ ] Digging
Act/Condition
[ ] Sea Transport
[ ] Lifting / Crane
[ ] Sampling
Operations
[ ] Dismantling / Assembling
[ ] Slips/Trips/Falls
[ ] Draining / Flushing
[ ] Other:
[ ] Scaffolding
[ ] Disconnecting
[ ] Climbing / Descending
[ ] Connections
[ ] Walking at Same Level
[ ] Diving
[ ] Piloting
[ ] Other:
[ ] Working at High Level
PARTIES INVOLVED
PDO DEPARTMENT / SECTION:
PDO CUSTODIAN :
CONTRACTOR / SUB-CONTRACTOR:
CONTRACT NUMBER:
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Is the Activity and its associated Hazards / Controls adequately addressed in the applicable Safety Case(s)
[Y/N}? :[ ]
If 'No', state measures proposed to rectify :
What actions were taken to determine if alcohol or drug use contributed to the Incident?
* Required for all High Potential Incidents
IMMEDIATE ACTION TAKEN TO PREVENT RECURRENCE
SIGNED :
/ /
Signed:
Medical Officer:
PRODUCT LOSSES :
DESCRIPTION :
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EQUIPMENT PART :
EQUIPMENT TAG NR :
PHASE OF OPERATION :
DETAILS OF LEAKING EQUIPMENT
LEAKING ITEM
]
HAZARDOUS (Y/N)
EXTINGUISHING MEDIUM
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UNDERLYING CAUSE
[ ] Inadequate physical / mental
capability
[ ] Excessive stress
specify :-
[ ] Improper motivation
[ ] Inadequate supervision
[ ] Work environment
standards
[ ] Access
[ ] Inadequate maintenance,
[ ] Other
inspection
[
Other:_________________________________
[ ] Other:
[ ] Failure to observe / use warning safety devices
[ ] Lack of due care and attention
[ ] Improper manual handling
[ ] Attack by animal
[ ] Inadequate PPE
[ ] Fatigue / Stress
[ ] Failure to wear PPE
[ ] Lack of safety awareness
[ ] None of the above, specify:____________________________
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CORRECTIVE ACTION
PDO
ACTION
PARTY
TARG
ET
DATE
STATUS
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REF IND.:
SIGNED:
REF. IND.:
SIGNED :
RECOMMENDATIONS
DATE OF INCIDENT :
INCIDENT :
Number
Description of Action
Action Party
Due by
DATE OF REVIEW :
REVIEW (Y/N) : [
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The General Incident Report Form is used to report all types of Medium potential Incidents except Road
Traffic Incidents.
Efforts must be made to provide all information requested. Draw a line through any section that is not
applicable.
The General Incident Report Form is to be signed by the PDO supervisor responsible for completing the
report, and the Incident Owner responsible for review and approval of the completed report.
The sections 'Details of Injured Parties' and 'Review Committee Comments' are not to be completed by
the PDO supervisor. These sections are to be completed by the PDO Medical Department and the
Secretary of the Incident Review Committee respectively. Routing is as prescribed on the Form's cover
sheet.
Heading
Details Required
Reporting Department
Incident Location
State the general area followed by the specific locations e.g. Yibal/GGP
etc.
Location Controlled by
predominantly
controlled
by Contractor
(e.g.
Tick the box against the action which had led directly to the occurrence
of the Incident. This is not necessarily the action of the injured parties (if
any). Refer to Appendix 4.4 for Definition of Activities.
Tick the box against the general type of Incident. Refer to Appendix 4.5
for Definitions of Broad Incident Types.
Parties Involved
Identify all parties involved that have or possibly have contributed to the
Incident or have suffered from its consequences (injury/damage).
Describe how the Incident occurred. This will be based on results from
your investigation and must include:
- the reasons for carrying out the work
- events leading up to the Incident
- the Incident description and injury and/or
damage incurred.
State whether the Activity underway at the time of the Incident and
its associated hazards / controls are adequately addressed in the
applicable Safety Case(s). Does the Safety Case need updating?
The Report form may not provide enough space for the full
description. In this case, state that you have provided additional
information (which may include photographs and drawings),and attach
the material securely to the report form.
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Heading
Details Required
Name
Date of Birth
PDO
Reference
indicator(employee)
State as applicable
Contractor
Injury class
FTL, PTD, PPD, LWC, RWC, MTC, FAC, OCC. Refer to Appendix 1 for
definitions. IF RWC, STATE ALTERNATIVE WORK DUTIES ASSIGNED.
Nature of Injury
State nature of injury. Only one entry is allowed. Refer to Appendix 4.9 for
listing of injuries, and the rules in case of multiple injuries.
Part of body
Property Damage
Details
of
damaged
equipment
Type of facility
Equipment part
Equipment Number
Details
of
equipment
leaking
Leaking item
State the item of equipment from which the leak occurred e.g. Flange, valve,
drain.
Duration of leak
Hazardous
State yes/no depending on the pressure and nature of the fluids released.
Leak area
State the cross-sectional area of leak (and not of the area affected)
Initial/final pressure
State yes/no
Leak stopped by
Fire/Explosion
Duration
Extinguished by
Extinguishing medium
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State yes/no
Reason
failure
for
detection
Immediate cause
Underlying Causes
Action
to
recurrence
prevent
Heading
Details Required
Date of review
State the date on which the Incident was reviewed by the Incident Review
Committee.
Details adequate
Comments
Appendix 4:
REPORTING DEPARTMENT :
DATE OF INCIDENT :
TIME OF INCIDENT :
WEEK:
INCIDENT LOCATION :
CONTROLLED BY :
] INJURIOUS
] OCC. ILLNESS
] EQUIP. DAMAGE/OTHER
] NEAR MISS
Page 45
DAY OF THE
[
] PDO
] CONTRACTOR
] THIRD PARTY
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PARTIES INVOLVED
PDO DEPARTMENT / SECTION
PDO CUSTODIAN :
CONTRACTOR / SUB-CONTRACTOR :
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UNDERLYING CAUSE
[ ] Improper motivation
[ ] Inadequate supervision
[ ] Work environment
[ ] Inadequate planning,
organisation
[ ] Inadequate procedures, work
[ ] Other
standards
[ ] Inadequate maintenance,
[ ] Other:
inspection
[
]
Other:_________________________________
[ ] Inadequate PPE
[ ] Fatigue / Stress
PPE
] Failure to wear
[ ] Animal
[ ] Other:
[ ] Overtaking
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GENERAL
CONDITIONS
Weather:
Light:
Road:
Quality:
Condition:
Shoulder:
[ ] Clear
[ ] Dawn
[ ] Straight
[ ] Smooth
[ ] Wet
[ ] Shoulder
[ ] Rain
[ ] Daylight
[ ] Bend
[ ] Stony
[ ] Dry
[ ] Windrow
[ ] Fog
[ ] Low Sun
[ ] Incline
[ ] Corrugated
[ ] Washouts
[ ] Profile Flat
[ ] Dust
[ ] Dusk
[ ] Loose
[ ] Dark
[ ] Heavy
Sands
[ ] Profile Up
[ ] Overcast
[ ] Incline
& Bend
SKETCH
[ ] Profile Down
To show;
A copy of the page below has to be completed for each involved vehicle.
Vehicle number:
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Mode of operation:
Vehicle condition:
Tyre pressure:
[ ] Motor cycle
[ ] 2 Wheel drive
[ ] Head lights
[ ] Front left
[ ] Saloon
[ ] 4 Wheel drive
[ ] Rear lights
[ ] Front right
[ ] Station Wagon
[ ] Rear left
[ ] Crewcab
[ ] Pick up
[ ] Break lights
Head lights
[ ] Light bus
[ ] City lights
[ ] 2 axle truck
[ ] Dipped
Was
the
obscured in
visibility
lights
[ ] Plant
[ ] Trailer tyres
Tick
if
incorrectly
functioning
[ ] Heavy bus
[ ] Articulated truck
[ ] Spare
[ ] Signal lights
[ ] Off
[ ] Rear right
[ ] Off
[ ] On
VEHICLE
SPECIFICATION
INSPECTION
AND
Last vehicle inspection date:
Owned by:
Fleet number:
Make:
Estimate vehicle repair cost: OR
Estimate other direct cost: OR
DRIVER
PASSENGERS
Name:
Date of birth:
Gender:
Occupation:
Company number:
Nationality:
Company/department:
ROP driving licence:
1.
Type(s):
Number:
Expire date:
Type(s):
2.
3.
4.
Expire date:
LOAD
Composition:
years
Quantities:
years
Secured by:
medication/
under
influence
of
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INJURIES
INJURIES
INJURIES
INJURIES
DRIVER
PASSENGER1
PASSENGER 2
PASSENGER 3
PASSENGER 4
[ ] Head
[ ] Head
[ ] Head
[ ] Head
[ ] Head
[ ] Back
[ ] Back
[ ] Back
[ ] Back
[ ] Back
[ ] Neck
[ ] Neck
[ ] Neck
[ ] Neck
[ ] Neck
[ ] Hip
[ ] Hip
[ ] Hip
[ ] Hip
[ ] Hip
[ ] Leg
[ ] Leg
[ ] Leg
[ ] Leg
[ ] Leg
[ ] Foot
[ ] Foot
[ ] Foot
[ ] Foot
[ ] Foot
[ ] Abdomen
[ ] Abdomen
[ ] Abdomen
[ ] Abdomen
[ ] Abdomen
[ ] Chest
[ ] Chest
[ ] Chest
[ ] Chest
[ ] Chest
[ ] Arm
[ ] Arm
[ ] Arm
[ ] Arm
[ ] Arm
[ ] Hand
[ ] Hand
[ ] Hand
[ ] Hand
[ ] Hand
[ ] Multiple
[ ] Multiple
[ ] Multiple
[ ] Multiple
[ ] Multiple
Hours worked:
Prior to Incident-
of which driving:
Slept at-
Hours worked:
[ ] Home
[ ] Hotel
[ ] In vehicle
[ ] Outside
of which driving:
[ ] Elsewhere
Time of arrival at rest place/home:
Number of hours slept:
From:
At:
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THE ABOVE INDICATED INJURIES OF DRIVER(S) AND PASSENGERS ARE CONFIRMED BY THE
UNDER SIGNED
MEDICAL OFFICER
NAME :
REF. IND.:
SIGNED: --------------------------------
REMARKS:
DATE :
CORRECTIVE ACTION
PDO
ACTION
TARGET
DATE
STATUS
PARTY
REF. IND.
SIGNED:
REF. IND.:
SIGNED :
RECOMMENDATIONS
DATE OF INCIDENT :
INCIDENT :
Number
Description of Action
Action Party
Due by
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DATE OF REVIEW :
REVIEW (Y/N) : [
The Road Traffic Accident Report Form is used to report all types of Incident involving one or more
moving vehicles.
Efforts must be made to provide all information requested. Draw a line through any section that is not
applicable.
The Road Traffic Accident Report Form is to be signed by the PDO supervisor responsible for completing
the report, and the Incident Owner responsible for review and approval of the completed report.
The section 'Review Committee Comments' is not to be completed by the PDO supervisor. This section is
to be completed by the Secretary of the Incident Review Committee. Routing is as prescribed on the
Form's cover sheet.
Heading
Details Required
Reporting Department
Incident Location
State the general area followed by the specific locations e.g. Yibal/GGP
etc.
Location Controlled by
predominantly
controlled
by
Contractor
(e.g.
Identify all parties involved that have or possibly have contributed to the
Incident or have suffered from its consequences (injury/damage).
Describe how the Incident occurred. This will be based on results from
your investigation and must include:
- events leading up to the Incident
- the Incident description and injury and/or
damage incurred.
The Report form may not provide enough space for the full
description. In this case, state that you have provided additional
information (which may include photographs and drawings),and attach
the material securely to the report form.
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Tick the applicable boxes. Refer to Appendix 4.6 'Immediate Causes' for
a description of the causes listed.
Underlying Cause
General Conditions
Sketch
To show:
1. Direction of
2. Point of impact
travel
of
all
involved
vehicles,
etc.
Vehicle type
Mode of operation
Vehicle condition
Tyre pressure
Tick the applicable boxes if tyre pressure is within 20 KPa (0.2 bar) of
the required pressure.
Vehicle
Owned by
Fleet number
Estimate
cost
vehicle
repair
State the amount in OR required to bring the vehicle back in its original
condition
Last
driver
inspection date
Drivers are required to regularly carry out simple checks like tyre
pressure. State the date of the last driver inspection.
Driver
Name
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Date of Birth
Gender
Male or Female
Nationality
Occupation
Company/department
Company number
Motor cycle, Light, Heavy Goods and/or Heavy Earth Moving Plant.
Tool box meetings are held to briefly discuss safety items before work
commences
Courses like the Interior driving skill course may have been attended by
the driver, please specify.
Also specify if any testing for the presence of alcohol has been done.
Passengers
Names
Company/department
Load
Composition
Quantity
Secured by
Indicate which methods and tools were applied to secure the load
Height load
surface
from
road
Give the height in meters of the top of the load with respect to road
surface
Give the height in meters of the load bed with respect to the road
surface
Quantity spilled/lost
Injuries Driver
Injuries Passengers
Slept at
Time of arrival
place/home
Page 54
at
rest
Specify the time at which the driver arrived at his sleeping place after
completing his work
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Hours worked
Specify the number of the days since the last full day off from any of the
drivers jobs (he/she may have more than one job)
Specify the number of the days to be worked until next full day off from
any of the drivers jobs (he/she may have more than one job).
Was
the
car
airconditioned at the time of
the Incident.
Specify if the car was equipped with an air conditioner and if it was
switched on at the time of the Incident.
time
of
Journey approved by
Specify name of the person who signed the journey management form
Action
to
recurrence
prevent
Heading
Details Required
Date of review
State the date on which the Incident was reviewed by the Incident
Review Committee.
Details adequate
Comments
Appendix 5:
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The PDO HSE Incident report form requires the actual activity at the time of the Incident to be noted. This appendix
provides definitions of various activities.
Heading
Description
An Incident as a direct result of the use of hand tools and equipment including but not limited to
the use of all powered or non-powered hand tools, e.g. screwdriver, wrench, shovel, grinder,
chisel, hammer, punch, welding tools, saw, drill, blow torch, hatchet, pliers, scissors, etc.
Manual lifting/handling
An Incident as a direct result of manually moving or rotating an object in any plane or direction.
Operating
machinery
plant
Handling
materials
hazardous
An Incident as a direct result of hazardous materials whether in solid, liquid or gas form, including
but not limited to acids, alcohol's, arsenic compounds, pesticides, halogen compounds, nitrous
fumes, petroleum products or gas, explosives, chemicals, drugs, medicines, radiation sources,
etc. Check the Toxic Materials Manual for degrees of hazard.
Dismantling
assembling
Scaffolding
An Incident as a direct result of the erection, dismantling or use of any type of scaffolding,
including the use of fixed and movable ladders.
Climbing / descending
An Incident as a direct result of climbing on, or descending from, any type of plant, building or
process equipment.
An Incident as a direct result of any sort of walking (stopping, starting running, jumping) on any
type of horizontal surface: floor, ramp, platform, walkway or street,
Driving / Piloting
An Incident as a direct result of operating mobile equipment such as a car, truck, forklift, crane
(whilst mobile) or piloting any sort of boat, plane or helicopter.
An Incident as a direct result of working at a high (higher than waist) level above the surrounding
grade level or water surface on platforms, columns, vessels, buildings, cranes, scaffolding, etc.
Welding / burning
Cleaning
An Incident as a direct result of any sort of internal or external cleaning operations of moving or
stationary equipment, vessels, tanks, buildings, trucks, barges, etc.
Digging
An Incident as a direct result of any kind of earth removal operations, be it onshore or offshore, in
shafts or tunnels, by hand or with machines or explosives.
Sampling
An Incident as a result of a sampling activity of any kind of solid, liquid or gas flow, e.g. feed stock
flows, product flows, utilities system flows, etc.
Draining / flushing
An Incident as a direct result of a draining / flushing operation of any kind of equipment, e.g.
process vessels, tanks / tankers, pipes, bund-wall areas, sewer systems, etc.
Disconnecting
connections
Diving
An Incident as a direct result of any operation where people are required to work fully submerged
in water, with or without aqualung, umbilical or submarine hoses, including all surface
operations, e.g. compression and decompression facilities.
Other activity
An Incident not resulting from any of the other mentioned activities, excluding a road traffic
Incidents which is reported on a separate form. In this case the supervisor should state the
Other activity.
Appendix 6:
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The broad Incident types fall into several main categories which are not mutually exclusive. Only one entry per
Incident can be entered, determined by which type of Incident caused the major injury, environmental or financial
impact.
Event
Description
Air Transport
An Incident which happens while transporting people or goods by air (plane, helicopter) and an
Incident of which the major impact is limited to loss of or damage to aircraft and injury and/or
loss of life of crew and passengers. (For example, an aircraft which crashes into a production
station causes loss of containment in a process vessel and subsequently a fire which destroys
the complete facility. This Incident will be classified as a fire and explosion not as air transport).
Assault
An Incident of which the major impact is caused by the direct consequences of an assault on any
person or installation.
Electrical
An Incident of which the major impact is caused by an electrical phenomenon, short circuit, static
electrical discharge, electrocution, etc., and where this impact is limited to the direct
consequences of the electrical phenomenon.
An Incident of which the major impact is caused by a fall, trip or slip and where this impact
remained limited to the direct consequences of the fall, trip or slip.
Falling objects
An Incident of which the major impact is caused by a falling object and this impact is limited to
the direct consequences of the falling object.
Fire
explosion
and An Incident of which major impact is a direct result of a fire and/or explosion.
Lifting / Crane An Incident of which the major impact is caused by the direct consequence of lifting or crane
operations
operations.
Loss
Containment
of An Incident of which the major impact is a direct result of loss of containment of a fluid, e.g. oil,
gas, chemical, water, etc. The loss of containment can be due to a leak, rupture, blowout, a
malfunctioning valve, etc.
Pollution
environment
/ An Incident of which the major impact is pollution or any other damage to the environment, e.g.
water, soil, air or plant/animal life.
Road Transport
Theft
Sabotage
and
- was deliberately initiated for the purpose of secretly taking or damaging property belonging to
someone else with the intention of permanently depriving the owner of its use or possession,
and
- where the most severe impact is the loss or damage of assets, including information assets.
Theft may involve visible intrusion (eg. burglaries) or simply disappearance of an asset.
Unsafe acts
conditions
/ An Incident without any injury, environmental or financial impact, which could, however, have
developed into an Incident with injury, environmental or financial impact because of unsafe acts
or conditions observed or violation of commonly accepted safe procedures.
Water transport
An Incident which happens while transporting goods or people by sea (e.g. boat, barge,) and an
Incident of which the major impact is limited to loss of or damage to the ships/barges and their
cargo and injury and/or loss of life crew and passengers. (For example, a super tanker loses its
cargo of 200,000 bbl oil in coastal waters causing damage to shore and wildlife will be classified
as pollution/environmental).
Other
Any other Incident which can not be categorised within the other broad Incidents type. Including
for example, an illness or adverse health effect caused by recurrent exposure to hazards. The
supervisor should state the "Other" Broad Incident type.
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Description
Information error Was an information error or omission occurring between parties directly or indirectly involved
or omission
with the activities leading to the Incident a contributing factor?
Failure to follow Was failure to follow established rules and procedures a contributing factor, e.g. permit-to-work
rules/procedures
system not followed, gas testing or vessel entry procedures not followed, etc.? There are
several reasons why there may be a failure to follow established procedures. These are listed
below :: Procedure not documented. Were there any documented rules or procedures which adequately
covered the task or activity being done when the Incident occurred?
: Procedure considered impractical. Were the rules and procedures covering the task or activity
in place but generally not enforced because they were recognised or considered to be
impractical / inappropriate for the circumstances ?
: Procedure not communicated. Were practical rules and procedures covering the task or
activity in place but they had not been successfully communicated to the people involved in
the Incident? A lack of communication may be due to the persons being unaware of the
procedure or being unable to understand it.
: Other - any other reason not covered above why known rules and procedure were not followed.
Inadequate
warning/safety
devices
Failure
observe
warning
devices
Improper
handling
to Were available warning safety devices ignored, or were necessary warning signals not
use installed, placed or used?
safety
manual Was improper handling e.g. incorrect lifting, carrying, gripping, applying of force a contributory
factor?
Inadequate PPE
Failure
PPE
Were inadequate warning signs, lights, horns, whistles, etc., or malfunctioning warning signals
a contributing factor. Or were safety devices, such a relief valves, blowdown system, level,
pressure, gas or fire detectors, guards, screens or safety nets, by-passed, disconnected,
maladjusted, incorrectly replaced or not installed a contributory factor?
to
wear Was the failure to wear required PPE equipment a contributory factor?
Influence
intoxicating
substances
of Were the effects, including side effects, of intoxicating liquids or illegal drugs a contributory
factor?
Inadequate
equipment/tools
Were the quality or quantity of the equipment or tools a contributory factor. e.g. non sparking
tools, uninsulated electrical tools, no flame or spark arresters, etc.? Did the equipment or tools
fail during operation?
Misuse
of Was improper use of tools or equipment a contributory factor? Work environment Was
equipment/tools
excessive noise, inadequate ventilation, inadequate illumination, inadequate traffic control,
inadequate building or workshop layout; inadequate furniture, etc. a contributory factor?
Work Environment Was excessive noise, inadequate ventilation, inadequate illumination, inadequate traffic
control, inadequate building or workshop layout, inadequate furniture, etc. a contributing
factor?
Untidy site
Access
Was inadequate or congested access, aisle space, exits or clearance a contributory factor?
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factors Were uncontrollable outside influences factors, such as third party drivers, environmental
party, conditions, sabotage, war, weather, floods, landslides, etc., a contributory factor?
Other
State any "Other" Immediate Cause as: Lack of due care and attention; Attack by animal;
Fatigue / Stress; or Lack of safety awareness. If none of these are applicable then specify
applicable immediate cause in words.
Appendix 8:
Note these Underlying Causes are defined in slightly different terms than the Tripod Beta General
Failure Types. If a Tripod Beta analysis is used then the Tripod Beta GFTs shall be stated.
Heading
Description
Excessive Stress
Improper Motivation
Inadequate Supervision
Inadequate
Policy,
Safety
communication thereof.
Plan
or
Those which can not be categorised within the abovementioned underlying causes.
Appendix 9:
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Phase of Operation
Material/Product
Construction or erection
Additive
Production facilities
Dismantling
Bitumen
Utilities
Maintenance or repair
Chemical (general)
Chlorine
Pipe s (off-plot)
Starting up
Crude oil
Transport facilities
Shutting down
Fuel gas
Construction sites
Upset conditions
Fuel oil
Berths/jetties
Normal operation
Gasoline
Others
Natural gas
Loading/unloading facilities
H2S
Buildings
Source of Ignition
Hydrocarbons
Others
Kerosene
LPG
Equipment Involved
Residue
Columns
Flares
Steam
Compressors
Open flames
Sulphur dioxide
Smoking
Water
Gas turbines
Lighting
Others
Generators
Static electricity
Heat exchangers
Pipework
Leaking Item
Pumps
Gasket
Reactors
Electrical equipment
Fitting
Tanks
Flange
Vessels
Sabotage or vandalism
Vent
Others
Chemical reaction
Valve
Plug
Part of Equipment
Hose
Bellows
Others
Seal
Burners
Pipe
Filter
Unit or Plant
Drain
Flange/gasket
Control building
Nipple
Hose
Offices
Pinhole
Instrument element
Laboratories
Weld
Loading arm
Living quarters/houses
Other
Pump body
Restaurant
Pump seal
Warehouse/yard
Workshop/garages
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Valve-
Firewater system
Others
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Gas Compression
Gas Treatment
Gathering Station
LPG Facilities
Oil Separation
Oil storage
Offshore mooring
Pipeline Gas \ Oil \ other
Pumping \Booster Station
Station \ metering
Tanker- sea
Tanker Loading
Well Head/Drilling facilities
Wireline/workover unit
Others
Heading
Description
Nature of injury
The nature of injury classification identifies the injury in terms of its principal physical
characteristics.
General rule
Rules for selection in When one injury is obviously more severe than any of others, select that injury. For
cases of multiples injures example select an injury involving permanent in preference to temporary injury.
When there are several injuries of different natures, such as cuts and sprains, no one is
indicated as being more serious than the others, classify as multiple injuries.
Damage of eyeglasses, hearing aids, dentures or artificial body parts is not considered
an injury.
Open wounds
Crushing/contusions/brui
ses
All bites and stings (insect, dog, human, reptile, etc.) except venomous reptile and insect
bites, see poisoning.
Superficial injuries
Burns (heat/cold)
The effect of contact with hot or cold substances. Include electric burns, but not electric
shock. Does not include chemical burns, effects of radiation, sunburn, systematic
disability such as heat stroke, friction burns, etc.
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Tissue damage resulting from the corrosive action of chemicals, chemical compounds,
fumes etc. (e.g. acids, alkalis).
Heat
stroke/sun All effects of exposure to environmental heat. Does not include sunburn or other effects
stroke/heat exhaustion
of radiation.
Radiation effects
Sunburn and all forms of damage to tissue, bones or body fluids produced by exposure to
radiation (e.g. sun light, X-ray, gamma ray, etc.).
Asphyxia, strangulation
Fractures
Cerebral Concussion
Transient loss of consciousness for a few seconds followed by a retrograde and posttraumatic amnesia
Cerebral Contusion
Dislocation
Drowning
A sprain is an injury with stretched or torn ligaments, soft tissue damage around the joint.
A strain is a muscle injury from over stretching.
Hernia/rupture
Includes both inguinal and non-inguinal hernia, and all internal injuries.
Drowning
Loss of sight
Hearing
impairment
or Hearing loss / impairment as a separate, single injury not the sequel of another injury.
Poisoning
A systematic morbid condition resulting from the inhalation, ingestion, or skin absorption
of toxic substance affecting the functioning of the metabolic system, the nervous system,
the circulatory system, the digestive system, the respiratory system, the excretory
system, the musculo-skeletal system, etc. Includes chemical or drug poisoning, metal
poisoning, organic diseases, and venomous reptile and insect bites. Does not include
effects of radiation, pneumoconiosis (dust disease), corrosive effects of chemicals; skin
surface irritations; septicemia or infected wounds.
Other injury
Multiple injuries
Several injuries of different natures, such as cuts and sprains, no one of which is
indicated as being more serious than the others.
Electrical shock
Heading
Description
Lung problems/diseases
Skin disease
e.g. contact dermatitis from repeated skin contact with solvents or allergic eczema
from repeated contact with epoxy resins.
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Poisoning
Systemic affects due to toxic mass e.g. anemia from repeated benzene exposure.
Physical causes
e.g. radiation, excluding effects from a single event, diseases from long-term
exposure to vibration. (Excludes Noise Induced Hearing Loss and toxic materials).
Infections/contagious
Cancer
Stress
Repetitious Injury
Noise Induced Hearing Loss: definition and criteria for reporting are given in the SHC Noise Guide
1991.
10
Other Illness and Disorders: Benign tumours; eye conditions due to dust and toxic agents; other
(non-malignant) diseases of blood and blood forming organs.
Appendix 11:
11.1
The Environmental Incident Severity Rating Index (EISRI) has been developed to give a quantitative
assessment of the potential of a solid or liquid released to soil or water to damage the environment.
There are three main factors which determine the potential for a particular environmental Incident to
impact the environment:
Sensitivity Index (S) - the sensitivity of the receiving environment into which the material is released
which depends upon various factors:
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Proximity to native (i.e. wild) fauna and flora, and their types;
These factors have been summarised and a Sensitivity Index (S) allocated as shown in the table
below.
Table Appendix-11.1-Sensitivity Index
10
100
100
100
Wadi
100
100
Toxicity Index (T) - a measure of the toxicity of the material (solid or liquid) released into the
environment. The Toxicity Index for several materials commonly used in PDO's operations is given in
Table Append-11.2. or can be obtained from the corresponding SHOC card of the chemical concerned
Quantity (Q) - the amount of material released expressed in cubic metres.
Note that all spills or leaks are reportable (within the general rules found in Section 11.1) no matter how
small the quantity is.
The EISRI is calculated as follows:
EISRI =
(S x T x Q) = S x T x Q 1,000
1000
The calculated EISRI value is then entered into Table Append-11.3 to determine the actual
environmental impact and severity rating.
The potential environmental risk depends on the potential severity and the probability of the Incident
happening again. Potential severity is determined by recalculating the value of EISRI based on
potential scenarios and using Table Append-11.3. Once the potential severity has been determined,
the probability of the Incident happening again must be assessed. Both are then entered into the RAM
to determine the overall potential HSE risk.
Table Append-11.2 Toxicity Index of Common Hazards
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Toxicity
Index
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A001
1,000
API sludge
O003
1,000
Asbestos
A004
1,000
Battery acid
B004
1,000
Chemical waste
C005
10,000
Clinical waste
C006
1,000
Crude oil
Refer to L001
1,000
C007
1,000
C008
10
D001
1,000
Dehydration water
P007
10
O001
1,000
B005
10
L001
1,000
P008
10,000
N001
10,000
Lubricants (spent)
L001
1,000
Paint
P002
100
Paint thinner
T002
100
Pigging wastes
P004
100
Sewage (untreated)
S001
100
Calculated EISRI
0
Severity Rating
No Effect
< 50
Slight Effect
50 - 4,999
Minor Effect
Localised Effect
5,000 - 49,999
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Environmental
Impact
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11.2
Major Effect
Massive Effect
Some environmental Incidents can not easily be classified according to quantity, toxicity and sensitivity
of the receiving environment and hence the EISRI can not be determined quantitatively. Examples of
these Incidents types include animals (camels, desert fox, rabbits, etc) falling into waste pits, releases
of natural gas, Halons or CFCs, presence of objectionable smells or high noise levels, and third party
environmental complaints, etc. For these types of environmental Incidents, a qualitative approach for
determining the environmental impact must be used as defined in Table Appen-11.4. Table Append-2.4
contains a qualitative description of each environmental impact and corresponding severity rating.
11.3
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Alternatively, if the potential quantity spilled is 500 m3, the EISRI would increase to 50,000. Using
Table Appendix-2.3, the Potential Consequence of the Incident becomes Major environmental impact
with a severity rating of 4. If the probability of the Incident happening again is determined to be 'D' (i.e.
happens more than 5 times a year in PDO), the potential HSE risk in RAM is 4D and the Incident is
classified as High Potential. Using Fig. G4 the ownership level is Line Director.
11.3.2 Natural Gas Leak
Consider a 2 scm gas leak from a flow line. As the Incident does not involve a spill of liquid or solid
material, a qualitative approach for determining environmental impact must be used. Using the
qualitative description of Environmental Impact of an Incident in Table Appendix-11.4, the actual
consequence of the Incident is a Slight environmental impact with a severity of 1 since the quantity of
natural gas released is less than 1,000 scm. An actual severity of 1 indicates that investigation may be
delegated to the level of Company Site Representative.
In calculating the Potential Consequence of the Incident it is necessary to review what could potentially
have happened to increase the severity of the Incident. For example, consider whether the leak could
have gone undetected for longer resulting in a larger volume of gas, say 1,500 scm, being released. In
this case, using Table Appendix-11.4, the Potential Consequence of the Incident becomes Minor
environmental impact with a severity rating of 2. If the probability of the Incident happening again is
determined to be 'D' (i.e. happens more than 5 times a year in PDO), the potential HSE risk in RAM is
2D and the Incident is classified as Medium Potential.
11.3.3 Halon Release
Consider a release of 75 kg of Halon. As the Incident does not involve a spill of liquid or solid material,
a qualitative approach for determining environmental impact must be used. Using the qualitative
description of Environmental Impact of an Incident in Table Appendix-11.4, the actual consequence of
the Incident is a Minor environmental impact with a severity rating of 2 since the quantity of Halon
released lies between 50 and 100 kg. An actual severity of 2 indicates that investigation may be
delegated to the level of Company Representative.
In calculating the Potential Consequence of the Incident it is necessary to review what could potentially
have happened to increase the severity of the Incident. Usually if the fire fighting system is triggered,
all the Halon contained in the system is released at once and there is no potential for the amount
released to be increased. In the unlikely event, for example, of only half the total quantity of Halon
being released, the quantity could increase to 150 kg. In this case, using Table Appendix-11.4, the
Potential Consequence of the Incident becomes Localised environmental impact with a severity rating
of 3. If the probability of the Incident happening again is determined to be 'D' (i.e. Halon releases
occur more than 5 times a year in PDO), the potential HSE risk in RAM is 3D and the Incident is
classified as Medium Potential.
11.3.4
Consider a spill of 20 m3 of untreated sewage from a tanker on the road between a seismic camp and
a sewage treatment plant. As the Incident is a spill of liquid an EISRI can be calculated. The road is
running through flat, unpopulated terrain. Using Table Appendix-11.1, the Sensitivity Index (S) for flat
unpopulated terrain is 1. Using Table Appendix-11.2, the Toxicity Index (T) for untreated sewage is
100. The quantity (Q) of sewage released is 20 m3.
Therefore the EISRI = S x T x Q/1000 = 1 x 100 x20/1000 = 2. Using Table Appendix-11.3, the actual
consequence of the Incident is a Slight Environmental Impact with a severity rating of 1. An actual
severity of 1 indicates that investigation may be delegated to the level of Company Site
Representative.
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In calculating the Potential Consequence of the Incident it is necessary to review what could potentially
have happened to increase the severity of the Incident. For example, consider whether the road runs
through a populated area anywhere along its length. In this case the Sensitivity Index would increase
to 100 and the EISRI to 200. Using Table Appendix-11.3, the Potential Consequence of the Incident
becomes Minor environmental impact with a severity rating of 2. If the probability of the Incident
happening again is determined to be 'C' (i.e. Incident has occurred in PDO), the potential HSE risk in
RAM is 2C and the Incident is classified as Low Potential.
11.3.5 Dead Wildlife in Drilling Waste Pit
Consider a camel found dead in a drilling waste pit with complaints or claims received from the public.
As the Incident does not involve a spill of liquid or solid material, a qualitative approach for
determining environmental impact must be used. Using the qualitative description of environmental
impact of an Incident in Table Appendix-11.4, the actual consequence of the Incident is a Minor
environmental impact with a severity rating of 3. An actual severity of 3 indicates that investigation
may be delegated to the level of Section Head.
In this example, it is difficult to predict a situation where the Potential Consequence of the Incident is
higher than the Actual Consequence and therefore the Potential Consequence equals the Actual
Consequence. If the probability of the Incident happening again is determined to be 'C' (i.e. Incident
has occurred in PDO), the potential HSE risk in RAM is 3C and the Incident is classified as Medium
Potential.
11.3.6 Persistent Complaints from Third Parties
Consider a number of complaints being received from third parties owing to odours from a sewage
treatment plant. As the Incident does not involve a spill of liquid or solid material, a qualitative
approach for determining environmental impact must be used. Using the qualitative description of
Potential Consequence of an Incident in Table Appendix-11.4, the actual consequence of the Incident is
a Localised environmental impact with a severity rating of 3. An actual severity of 3 indicates that
investigation may be delegated to the level of Section Head.
In this example, it is difficult to predict a situation where the Potential Consequence of the Incident is
higher than the Actual Consequence and therefore the Potential Consequence equals the Actual
Consequence. If the probability of the Incident happening again is determined to be 'E' (i.e. complaints
are made more than 5 times a year for the particular location), the potential HSE risk in RAM is 3E and
the Incident is classified as High Potential.
11.7 Persistent Cases of ExceedingEnvironmental Permit Requirements
Consider a sewage treatment plant where more than three consecutive weekly analytical results
indicate that the total coliform count is > 1600 (MPN/100ml). Since the permit requirement is 1,000
(MPN/100ml), this is a regular case of exceeding the limits. As the Incident does not involve a spill of
liquid or solid material, a qualitative approach for determining environmental impact must be used.
Using the qualitative description of Potential Consequence of an Incident in Table Appendix-11.4, the
actual consequence of the Incident is a Localised Environmental Impact with a severity rating of 3. An
actual severity of 3 indicates that investigation may be delegated to the level of Section Head.
In this example, it is difficult to predict a situation where the Potential Consequence of the Incident is
higher than the Actual Consequence and therefore the Potential Consequence equals the Actual
Consequence. If the probability of the Incident happening again is determined to be 'E' (i.e. exceeding
permit requirements occurs more than 5 times a year at the particular location), the potential HSE risk
in RAM is 3E and the Incident is classified as High Potential. Incident ownership level is Line Director.
Table Appendix 11.4 Potential Environmental Impact
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Slight Effect
2.
Minor Effect
Small oil/water spill from flow line confined to soil surface and
disappears after evaporation.
Adverse effect is likely to be detected by third parties but does not exceed a
recognised standard of environmental quality. Effect does not impair the use
of the environment for other users. Single case of exceeding permit
requirement or internally prescribed standard. Halon and CFC release 50 100 kg. Gas leak of 1,000 scm and greater. Investigation, monitoring or
clean-up cost US$ 1,000 - 10,000. EISRI 50 - 4,999.
Examples:
Oil/water spill from flow line which seeps into the sand.
Visual quality; Chemical quality (air, soil, water, living resources); Biological quality (diversity); Noise level; Smell
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Localised
Effect
4.
Major Effect
Oil spill from flow line which seeps into sand or from pipeline requiring
significant excavation.
Excessive oil levels in permitted MAF tank farm discharge or oily sheen
observed.
Small oil spill at MAF tanker loading operation which has to be cleaned
up from sea.
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Oil spill at MAF tanker loading operation which arrives on local beaches
requiring onshore and or offshore clean up operations.
Any physical damage caused to nature reserve area for rare species.
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Massive Effect Extensive damage to attribute(s) of natural environment thereby affecting its
ability to support human population or wildlife. Prolonged recovery period
(several years) or site cannot be restored to satisfaction of interested parties.
Clean-up and site restoration costs > US$ 1,000,000. EISRI > 500,000.
Examples:
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Maximum credible release of PDO crude oil from MAF facilities such
that oil is dispersed along several kilometres of beaches affecting
recreational, fishing interests and water abstraction.
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