PAPERS READ BEFORE THE SOCIETY,

OQ

O 4.

ADDEESS: METHOD IN PHILOSOPHY.

By SHADWORTH H. HODGSON,

IN the unavoidable absence

an absence which we

Vice- President.

of our President, Professor Stout,

all regret,

the duty has devolved upon

me

of delivering the

customary address at the opening meeting of

the present session of the Society. As I have had but a short
time for preparing it, I must throw myself upon your kind
indulgence to

make allowance

elaboration which
shall,

may

for

any defects

argumentative
be only too apparent as I proceed. I

however, confine myself, so far as possible, to general

considerations as to the nature, scope, and

and

of

method

of philosophy,

present position and prospects in this country.

There are two very
first as to the field before it.
different senses in which the term common sense is intended and
its

And

applied.

In one of them

it

means a

certain degree of intel-

ligence, in the other a certain set of ideas

between
because

common
it is

and

beliefs.

In the

involved no opposition or antagonism

In the latter there is,
sense and philosophy.

former sense there

is

just the set of

common-sense ideas and

current at any period, which

beliefs,

the task of philosophy to

examine, verify, and, if necessary, correct a task which, I may
add, philosophy performs and can perform solely by the applicait

is

tion of

common

term,

Philosophy

sense itself taken in the former meaning of the

is

common

sense in

the former meaning

SHADWOKTH

2
the

II.

HODGSON.

examination, verification, and correction

applied

to

common
You

sense in the latter meaning.

field is

how

see

large

had almost

hereby opened to philosophy, a

it is bound, so far as in it lies, to

said

field

immeasurable

of

nevertheless which

measure and reclaim.

For

supposing that any idea or belief of common sense should be

examined by philosophy, and should be replaced by some new
idea or belief, which in its turn becomes current, and wins
to which of
general acceptance, at once the question arises,
the two, philosophy or common sense, does this new idea or

belief belong

is it

to philosophy, in virtue of its being

philosophical criticism, or

is it

to

common

due to

sense, in virtue of its

having taken its place among generally accepted truths ?

It is around ideas and beliefs belonging to this class that the
such ideas and
great philosophical controversies in reality rage
the
terms
are
as
for
"Substance,
instance,
beliefs,
expressed by
;

And

Power, Agent, Agency.

cannot but think that an end

will only then be found to such controversies,

line

of

distinction

have

shall

been

when some

drawn,

between

clear

the

essential characteristics of a philosophical idea or belief on

the one hand and those of a common-sense idea or belief

And more

on the other.

for line of distinction

than

must be

this.

itself

I think that this

of

hopedsuch a nature as to

assure a certain validity to ideas and beliefs of both classes,

within the class to which they are respectively recognised as
I

belonging.
analysis

mean

that, if

and when philosophical theory and

and when they lead to the establishment of the

some reality, the nature and mode of operation of

fail, if

existence of

which human consciousness has no means

ideas

of

that

reality,

of ascertaining, there

back upon some common -sense

ideas which for man have practical

and then we of necessity

fall

validity, as guides to his conception of his

own

relation to that

reality, but which afford no grounds for a speculative knowledge

or theory of it.
And, farther, I am of opinion that the line of
distinction spoken of above must be discovered by philosophy

METHOD
in reflecting on its

method

it is

IN

I'HILnsoi'llV.

own

scope and im-tlmd, tor that scn^r ;ui<l

which constitute it a separate pursuit, arid ni\<- it

the primacy over

all

other lines of speculative enquiry.

Three and twenty years ago, when I had the privih

delivering the first Presidential Address from the chair of

which
be,

this

opening of our

Second Session, the point on

most insisted was, that there was, and could not hut

Society, at the
I

such a separate pursuit, defined provisionally, and

most general terms, by

Rationale of the
centre.

Well,

in the

end or purpose of attaining a

as
Universe,
mentally visible from a human
think there is no need now to insist on this
its

Our continued existence in such a place as

elementary
London shows that we as a Society are well convinced of it.
truth.

The points we have now

true definition of the end
method
itself,

of attaining it

to

keep before us are, what is the

? and what is the true

of philosophy

points within the scope of philosophy

points of ardent controversy

of philosophy is assured to it

primacy
that

is,

by the

that

is,

subjectivity itself, as such,

its

among
by

votaries.

its sflbjective

The

character,

fact that consciousness, experience, or knowledge,

is its

object of investigation,

and not any object or set of objects assumed to exist, without

enquiry into the modes of consciousness by which that assumpBut within this philosophical enquiry there
tion is justified.
is

room

of

for the greatest differences of opinion.

opinion

it

is

opportunities of

it is

this

selves continue to exist, long

For

These differences

which the meetings

Society afford
while
the
and
differences
themdiscussing
of

may

these

meetings continue.

to philosophy that the decision of the great questions

which most deeply interest humanity b3longs, questions falling

under the heads of Ethical, Theological, ^Esthetical, Logical,
and Psychological, as well as

of those speculative

questions

concerning the nature of the Universe, including the question

whether any speculative solution of them is possible to human
thought.

we can

Some purview

of the

whole must be taken, before

reach any satisfactory foundation of doctrine concerning

A 2

SIIADWORTII

If.

HODGSON.

a part, since some conception of the relations of that part to

the whole and to other parts is a necessary ingredient in that
foundation.

In casting a glance of retrospect on the year which has

just elapsed, we have to lament the loss by death of two most
valued members.

One

of

them, removed at a comparatively

early age, Professor D. G. Ritchie, well known by his contributions to philosophical literature, as well as by his teaching
in the Chair of Logic and Metaphysic at St. Andrews, was the

valued President of this Society for the year 1898 to 1899.

The other, Alexander Bain, a veteran in age, a veteran in
philosophical

teaching, a veteran in

philosophical literature,

who

has had as great an influence- on the philosophical thought

of this country as any contemporary writer that can be named,

joined our Society in the year 1884, a time when support was
very welcome, and gave us the advantage of his membership,

sending us live years' subscription in advance as token of his

He many times attended our meetings and joined in
goodwill.
our discussions. At the time of his death he had for some years

been an honorary member.

And

here I hope it will not appear out of place if I say a

word of lament on the loss philosophy has recently suffered in
the death of Robert Adamson, Professor of Logic and Rhetoric

Glasgow (February, 1902). Assuredly a vigorous and independent mind was here at work on philosophical questions.
at

Most fortunate

it is

that those four courses of Lectures, two

modern philosophy and two on psychology,

on
extending over two sessions, 1897-1899, at Glasgow, have been
rescued from oblivion, and made generally accessible, in the
two handsome volumes edited by Professor Sorley.
There is another philosophical veteran, whose loss by death
the history of

at the age of 88 philosophy has this year to lament, M. Charles

Renouvier, whose energies as a philosophical writer continued
up to the close of a very long life with undiminished clearness

and

vigour.

He

is

perhaps best

known by

his

JEssais

de

METHOD
Critique Genemlc, the

IN

I'HILOSOl'HY.

edition of

first

which

."

in four

volumes

extended from 1854 to 1864, and the second, very considerably

also by his Science de la Mo, "/<

enlarged, from 1875 to 1896

1869

his historical

by

founder, in

volumes

new

La

editorship of

with

M.

F.

Pillon, of

succeeded by

and as the

a periodical,

La

in

and as a contributor to the

1868,

Critique
earlier

L'Annde Philosophiquc, which

Critique Philosophique in 1891, under the able
M. Pillon, and still continues to appear in the

of the

succeeded

romance, Uchronie, 1876

conjunction

L'Annee Philosophiquc
Philosophique in 187^

of

series

shape of an annual volume of the highest importance and

which M. Pillon himself is the chief contributor.

interest, to

Renouvier's last work, Le Personnalisme, published this very

year, is a singularly able and most instructive exposition of
that Neo-criticist theory, founded on Leibniz and Kant, which

he had devoted the whole

And

latter part of his life to

work

out.

the nine or ten preceding years had seen the publication

of as

many

several volumes on philosophical questions from

the same pen.

Chair,

am

humble

my

thankful to be able to

tribute of honour

offer,

Irom this

and admiration

to this

French philosopher, so recently taken from us.

But all the more in thinking of our losses it behoves us

illustrious

and

rally our forces,

And

as to the

first

being that which

steadily face the problems of philosophy.

method

is

my

of approaching them, its

distinctive of

And

philosophical thought.

graph from

to

method

any particular system

of

here I venture to quote a parato the Society, delivered in

sixth Address

October, 1885, entitled Philosophy and Experience,

p. 11,

on the
"

"

Method in philosophy," I said, holds

the same place that Hypothesis holds in science.
Both must be tested by their results. But while results in

function of method.

very much

science are tested by successful

there

is

no prediction

Existent being

its

and

verified prediction,

and

philosophy, a Rationale of the

aim, the question is, what are the results
in

which, in philosophy, test the value and soundness of the

BHADWOBTH

method
logical

They are the removal

the

puzzles,

consciousness,

of all gratuitous

harmonising

what

or,

HODGSOX.

H.

of

all

parts

and merely
or

facts

of

the same thing, of experience, with

is

each other, and thereby by degrees obtaining such a systematic

Rationale of the whole, as was contemplated in my first
Address, and there exhibited as the great purpose of philosophy.
Puzzles are introduced into philosophy by making tacit and
unsuspected assumptions in contrast thereby to the assump;

tions of science,

which are hypotheses adopted

purpose, and with

The soundness of
its

leading

to

the

for

some express

awareness of their hypothetical character.

full

method

in philosophy consists, therefore, in

successful

detection

and

avoidance of

unwitting assumptions."

We

must, then, I think, go to work in philosophy on a

in thought, from that

different basis, a different distinction

which governs common-sense thinking, by which latter I mean

the distinction between Subject and Object, or Self and
suppose some previous
or necessarily involved distinction to have been drawn between
one or other of those pairs which I mentioned at the outset,

Not-self, a distinction

which seems

to

mean, Substance and Power, Agent and Agency, or some

which distinctions are embodied and
equivalent distinction
I

expressed by the forms of noun and verb construed with each

other in ordinary language. Not that I would reject any of
these distinctions as misrepresentations of the truth
their nature

and validity as ultimate

but

if

distinctions, lying at the

basis of philosophy, are to be

examined, it is surely necessary

that some distinction in thought should be apparent, on which

ground and justify our examination. It is as the basis of

philosophy, and in that character only, that they are challenged.
to

In ordinary language and no other is at our disposal

speak, and to that extent also tend to think, in what I
call

the logic of Substance, that which

is

we

may

expressed by noun

or pronoun substantive represented in thought as

doing or

suffering, having or not having, giving or receiving something.

MKTHOD

IN

PHILOSOPHY.

Abstract indeed, or even imaginary, the agent or Ins <lnin<r may

be this makes no difference to what I have called the logic
;

the thinking

of

The agent and

the

distinction underlying

it

is

the same.

and its power, are

taken as complete empirical realities. The question
now raise is, whether they are entitled also to he taken as
his agency, the substance

nil alike

the ultimate basis of

we must

find

and which
I

philosophy.

distinction which

we

are to test them,

is still

more fundamental,

If

ground as an ultimate distinction.

such a distinction universally discoverable

will hold its

think there

in experience,

and

some

is

and universally

fully adopt

applicable, so soon as we frankly

the subjective aspect, or our knowledge, of

things as our object-matter, and apply

it to

that, in contra-

distinction from their objective aspect, or things as they exist.

The

distinction

to 7eVecrfc9,
TTCO?

is

that insisted on by Plato in opposing ovcrla

in opposing the ri e<m to the

and by Aristotle

7rapayiv6Tix.i.

Briefly

we may

call

it

that between the

nature and the history of any object thought of so far as it

is thought of, or can be
thought of, by us. Let these questions,
first

of its nature,

named conceptions

then of

its

history, be put

to the above-

Substance, Power, Agent, Agency, Subject,

What do we know of the nature and

Object, Self, Not-self.

the history of the objects, as we call them, of these conceptions?

Let the attempt be made to conceive those same objects from
a different point of view, that is, under the guidance of a
different distinction, or pair of conceptions.

The

distinction of nature

and history

is

applicable to any

content of thought, and divides it exhaustively, being nothing

but (1) a transverse section, as it were, of one particular timethread of consciousness, and (2) a longitudinal view of that
time-thread in connection with its collaterals. The distinction
itself

is

found by analysis of

every,

even the

least

and

simplest, empirical experience, and introduces nothing what-

ever by assumption into the content taken for examination,

If any other content is introduced under
whatever it may be.

SHADWOBTH

H.

HODGSOX.

the head of history, either from the antecedent parts of its

own

time-thread, or from the collaterals, the

same questions

and the same distinction applied.

the distinction does is thus to supply a means of

must be put

What

to that content,

Of course
accurately questioning the content of our thought.
this does not mean that it supplies the answers to our questions,,
that

it

gives us a positive knowledge, either of the content

which we had not before. Obtaining

on
conditions than merely applying
other
this must depend
quite
At the same time
a distinction as a method of questioning.
examined, or of

may

it

its history,

blanks in our knowledge which were before

reveal

reveal as assumptions or hypotheses what

taken
to be data.
When this is the case,
previously
and for so long as it is the case our only true course is to
acknowledge the fact, admitting in the case of the blanks that

unsuspected, or

may

we had

something in existence, the content of which is not

positively represented in our knowledge, and only retaining
there

is

the assumptions or the hypotheses as aids to our

own needs

in reasoning or in conduct, with full consciousness of this their

and

true character

mental error

It was, in

office.

opinion, the funda-

my

Kant's theory, that in examining experience

he reversed the order of these two questions; he attempted
of

answer the question

to

of its history, or

possible, before putting the question of

it

was known

its

as,

how

from which alone the idea

genesis, its history, could

be derived;

experience was

nature, or

its

what

of its possibility,

a reversal which

compelled the assumption from common-sense sources, though

without any philosophical warrant, of the existence of a
Subject, of
If

some

we apply

definite of the
its generality,

sort or other, capable of experiencing.

this questioning distinction to the six

above

list

of conceptions, omitting Object for

and Not-self

find, I think, concerning

most

for its negativity,

them

is,

that they

fall

what we

shall

into the rank of

the assumptions or the hypotheses just spoken

of.

They are
and

brief descriptions, characterisations, designations, of classes

METHOD

IN

PHILOSOPHY,

which enable us

to deal in thought and practice

but must not be taken as if they were names
or thoughts corresponding to immediately given facts themThat is, they must not be hypostasised
selves, each to each.
series of facts,

with those

as entities.

facts,

They do not supply an explanation

of the fart-

which they summarise.

It is a fallacy to regard them in that
light and then to say that they arc noumcna, or things-inthemselves, of which as such we have no knowledge, but

which we know in their phenomena or manifestations.

are short expressions of the

phenomena themselves.

They
Power,

any other analogous term, such as Force, or

not an unknowable something which makes things
is a brief expression for the actual
happening of

for instance (or

Energy),

happen

is
it

things.

Brought to the test of this questioning distinction, the six

conceptions spoken of not only reveal their anthropomorphic
character I mean as being summaries of classes or series of

human

experiences, not applicable so

the Absolute or the Universe at large

far

as

we know

to

but also exhibit the

phenomena which they summarise as requiring explanation

from regions of existence which lie beyond the reach of positive

human knowledge.

And

and inseparably belonging

it is

to,

thus a distinction lying within,

positive

human knowledge, which

forces us to this conclusion, forces us in thought to transcend

the sphere within which

Anthropomorphic

the six conceptions are applicable.

knowledge, in virtue of this its own

unavoidable distinction between nature and history, forces Us

to look beyond itself for an explanation of itself, an explanation
which, as anthropomorphic, it is incapable of supplying.
long as human nature seeks to know, and this is one of
ineradicable tendencies, so long
distinction, so long

must the

must we apply

As
its

this questioning

last tiling in the course of

human

speculative thought be a question and not an answer, so long

must a speculative insight into the Absolute, or a speculative

construction of the Universe, be precluded.

SHADWOKTH

10

H.

HODGSON.

think that this surrender on the part of philosophy of

the expectation of obtaining a speculative knowledge of the
I

Absolute, or constructive principle of the Universe, will be

But the grounds
the result of modern philosophical enquiry.
on which it rests will always form an essential chapter in the
record of philosophical thought.
far

enough

And

am

aware that we are

In

at present from acquiescing in the surrender.

fact the question

whether such a speculative construction

is

or

not within our reach, must for a long time be kept open. We
cannot foresee the time when it will be generally accepted as
is

decided in the sense which I have here maintained as the only

practicable one.

But supposing

accepted, would the function, the value,

it

the necessity of philosophy be injuriously affected thereby, or

would it furnish the smallest reason for regarding philosophy

and vain pursuit ? Most certainly not. True, the

end which philosophy must propose to itself as the

as a futile
ideal

can conceive, discovery of the constructive principle

of the Universe, would have been recognised as unattainable,
largest

it

but then the discovery of its unattainability and of the reasons

would have been made by philosophy, and would of
itself have become a great step forwards in our knowledge of
for it

the Universe.
right to
its

make

We

should have found that we never had any

the assumption, that a speculative knowledge of

construction was attainable.

human

Like

It does not

know

of its enquiries.

ascertain whether

other

branches of

is

the attainment of that end which

guide

all

necessarily tentative.
philosophy
beforehand whether it will succeed or fail in

effort arid thought,

it is

It

is

it

takes beforehand as the

only by their result that

it

can

attainable or not.

Notwithstanding the supposed surrender of this ideal, the

whole content of human thought and conduct still lies before
philosophy, as the field for the application of its subjective
method. Its special value in exploration of that field remains
entirely unaffected.

It is still our only valid

means

of dealing

METHOD

IN

rillLOSOrilY.

with the phenomena of human icclinu, emotion, d<-sir<-. ;i<-ti<>u,

practice, the nature and justification of lie conceptions of
moral right and wrong, and the grounds, if any, which man'-

and

and moral nature

practical

his

concerning

relations

affords for his entertaining

those

to

unseen

Universe, a speculative knowledge of which

as unattainable.

Nor

is

it

small benefit, that

the

portions of tinhas surrendered

lie

supposed surrender,

inehuling the discovery of the reasons which render

it

impera-

and place man's relations to the Universe in their true

light, the light in which his own nature compels him to regard
tive,

them, also precludes the setting up of further speculative

constructive principle of the

theories concerning the

whole,

from time to time, and in different

The whole
countries, have been devised and surrendered.
content of our consciousness, every one of our conceptions,
in place of those which,

ideas,

feelings,

and

affections

idea of Being or Existence,

consciousness,

is

man's idea

us,

as

anthropomorphic

we cannot help experiencing

the bare

the pcrcipi of a content of

that there

is

an Universe at

This content, however,

a thought of ours.

is

is

it.

And

it

is

all

forced upon

carries with

it

its

limitations, the idea of experiences and existences beyond

itself but in relation to it, of which, as beyond itself, it can

ow n
r

never have positive knowledge, and any idea of which, as in

relation to it, can only be an anthropomorphic and inadequate
idea.

who

The perception
perceives

it

prevent any one

frame a specula-

of this truth will at once

from directing his

efforts to

tive theory of the Universe, just as the perception that

the

name

Being

apart from any consciousness of it, was

for an unrealisable attempt at thinking, the suggestion

or Existence in

itself,

which we

frame and could not,

precluded the hypothesis of a noumenal as distinguished from a
phenomenal world. Now, to be finally relieved from following

of

a conception

tried

to

frame a speculative theory of the Universe,

attempts which from the nature of the case are foredoomed to

up attempts

to

12

SHADWORTH

failure, is surely to

be counted a gain, a benefit, an advantage to

human
On

HODGSON.

H.

thought.

the other hand

it is also,

now supposed

no doubt,

true, that

with the

such attempts, a surrender

surrender
founded on the perception of the anthropomorphic character of
the whole content of human consciousness, we lose that sense of
of

all

which would seem

intellectual security

to

have been one main

motive, at any rate, for framing such speculative theories. We

can no longer survey in thought the Universe from outside, so
contemplating it in its entirety, and ascertaining the fixed laws

which connect our human portion of it with the

compelled to survey it from within, our point

human

within the

portion

We

rest.

are

view being
and from that point of view no
of

can be imagined or conceived. The possibilities of

modes of consciousness, different in kind from any which we as

limits of

human

it

beings possess, are beyond number, numberless possiour human thought, but actual existences, it may be,
;

bilities to

Human speculative thought is like

an island of terra firma rising in the midst of an immeasurable
ocean, in which no land, no rock, no anchorage for speculative
Instead of the Universe being the
thought, is discernible.

in the Universe beyond.

island and

human thought the ocean, the Universe

human thought the island. The

the ocean, and

has become
intellectual

security to be derived from a speculative theory of the Universe

is

it

gone

and the

loss is

no doubt

great.

The change which will be wrought by the surrender when

comes and sooner or later it is inevitable is enormous, and

has both

its

bad and

its

good

side.

But, good or bad,

it

will be

a recognition of fact, it will be forced upon us by experience,

in which we shall have no choice but to acquiesce.
What will

be the position in which it leaves us? How are we to conceive

our relation to the Universe, when a speculative knowledge of
the nature of the Universe is seen to be impossible ? It will
be observed, that

human

110

experience.

made within the bounds of

altered is the idea, that human

alteration is

What

is

METHOD

IN

1'HILosoniY.

speculative knowledge extends to world* beyond that for which

human experience gives us data, without <>m having data not

belonging to human experience, which ex lu/imtkesi are impossible.

The surrender of this idea involves an alteration (1) in

we take up with regard to the Universe,

a practical instead of a speculative one;
(2) in the

the attitude which

making

it

relation of practical

As

to the

first

and speculative thought

point, our idea of

to each other.

the Universe

anthropomorphic, and we cannot frame a larger

idea,

is

itself

we cannot

think of anything beyond it, not included in it, while at the

same time we must think of portions of it as really existing,
for a speculative knowledge of which no data are within our

Towards these portions therefore our

reach.

attitude,

not

being one of knowledge, must be one of confidence, a confident

assurance that their laws are in harmony with those of our

known
I say

human thought and conduct.

because the tentativeness involved in all human

world, including those of

must

be,

thought and conduct, beyond the point

of

already acquired
knowledge, of itself involves a confidence that the tentative
action will not be fruitless of desirable results.

As

to

the

second

point,

the relation of practical

and

speculative thought to each other, the change wrought by the

surrender in question will consist not only in bringing out the
tentative character of all thought, but also in the surrender of
the idea of the priority of knowledge to consciousness, or of

what

is

called the a priori character of forms of thought or of

perception, forms which are a prior condition of all experience.

is a process in which all our knowledge of being
or of existence originates. The simplest sensations, our ultimate
have no a priori or logical test of
data, are revelations.

Experiencing

We

the truth of that knowledge, that

being or existence, of

which we

is,

of its

call it the

agreement with the

knowledge.

Logical

necessity, the necessity of the laws of thought, is itself but a

fact,

though an universal

existence.

The harmony

of

our experience of being or

thought with thought, of experience

fact, of

SHADWORTH

14

H.

HODGSON.

with experience, not of thought or experience with being or

existence as separate from thought or experience, is that in

which truth

Experience simply as fact

consists.

is

thus the

guarantee of logical necessity, not logical necessity the guarantee

Of being or existence we can only say it is, not it must
of fact.
be.

But

as a fact

being

of these the is is
;

the must
logical

be,

were

thought

actually forced upon us

practical,
it

possible,

about

fact.

would be speculative,
There is no higher

necessity than the practical universality of fact, the practical

uniformity of law.
And now a word, in conclusion, as to the bearing of the
foregoing remarks on the present position and prospects of
I have shown you that the
this country.
and
the
the
existence,
validity,
primacy of philosophy do not
depend upon its success in framing a speculative theory of the

philosophy in

Universe

have shown you how

that no valid speculative

it is,

have shown you that

all our knowledge is based upon data which are revelations,
and
in the sense that we have no further test of their truth
theory of the Universe can be framed

that consequently our so-called knowledge of that which we

think of as the source of those revelations is of necessity a
practical idea, not a speculative conception.

certain kind of practical attitude

same source

of the revelations

necessarily forms part of the

Now

religion is a

which we take towards that

spoken

of,

and

in that character

field of philosophical investigation.

Eeligion and a speculative theology are therefore two essentially

different things, as different as. on the other hand, are a speculative theology

and philosophy.

But what says the ordinary Englishman, imbued with the

current group of common-sense ideas and beliefs, which I spoke
of at the outset ? He identifies religion with some form or other
of speculative theology,

with philosophy.

and he

Some form

identifies speculative theology

or other of speculative theology is

what he means by philosophy.

In what

cannot but

call his

arbitrary limitation of vision, he refuses even to glance at

what

MKTUOD
philosophy really

form

him

And

of speculative

he finds

it

so perhaps

validity as

in

is

its

IN PHILOSOPHY.

true nature.

15

His own particular

theology, he will tell you, is enough for

practically sufficient for his religious needs.

it

may

a speculative

be, but,

theology

then,
?

what becomes

Now

of

its

think that the

growing divergence of these speculative theologies from one

another, and the growing dissatisfaction with the speculative
validity of any one of them, are signs that even Englishmen
are coming to see the necessity of philosophy, as that line of

thought which, from its independent investigation of human

nature as a whole, can alone afford a theoretical justification of
religion,

as a certain kind of practical attitude towards the

speculatively

unknown and unknowable

What we need

is,

regions of the Universe.

that a deeper and an increasing

interest

should be taken in the nature and purpose of philosophy, and

in the

means

at its disposal,

attaining that purpose.

and the method best adapted,

for

16

BACON'S

II

METHOD OF

SCIENCE.

By HERBERT W. BLUNT.
BACON'S method

of science is called indifferently inductio vera

and cxclusiva. Induction, because it is identical in purpose with

True
the Aristotelian and scholastic ascent from particulars.
induction, because the inductive process as described in the
Topics of Aristotle,

is

merely dialectical

and while

the burden of disproof upon the interlocutor,

it

it

is

throws
thereby

cogency upon his inability to produce a

counter-instance (v. Topics, 6 8, especially 156&, 1 sqq.), so that
for its

dependent

its
it

conclusion
is

is

precarious.

Exclusion or elimination, because

through the elimination of anything of the nature of

an alternative that the new organon claims

to guarantee the

scientific conclusion against disproof.

The elimination proceeds

as follows

The observed and recorded facts relevant to any enquiry

be digested and organised in three tables of appearance (talulce comparentice, the latter word signifying by a legal
A.

must

first

metaphor the appearance

in

answer

to citation before the court

of the intellect).
(a)

table of presence (tabula prcesentice)

which

registers

the occurrence of the nature or quality under investigation

as it appears in various combinations.
(b)

table

declinationis sive

of

absence of the said

are so like

some

in allied subject-matler (tabula

This registers the
in proximo).
nature or quality where the conditions

absence

absentice

of

those in the table of presence that

it

might with reason have been expected to occur. Privationes

inspiciendse tantum in illis subjectis quse sunt maxime cognata

BACON'S METHOD OF SCIENCE.

illis

alteris

Organum,

in quibus natura data inest et

II,

12)

vol.

(Works,

comparet (
Topica Inquisitionis de luce et lumine,
317). Videndum etiam quae sunt ea quae
cf.

p.

ii,

nullam lucem edant, quae tamen cum

habent similitudinem.
(c)

which

17

iis

quae edant

magnam

table of degree (tabula

graduum sive comparative)

the
in
variations
registers
quantity of the said nature

or quality according to quantitative variations of

some

of the

concomitants.

We may now

B.

and perfect form

proceed to our exclusiva.

In the complete

method we must put forward on the

possible suggestions as to what the general

of the

basis of Table 1 all

explanatory formula (i.e., usually the mechanical equivalent) of

the nature under investigation can be. We then reject on the

and 3 those suggestions which are qualitatively

and quantitatively inadequate. There should then be left one
basis of Tables 2

and but one suggestion as to forma or formula, which we may

then affirm positively.
If

we can be

sure

practically possible,

that

negativas tot quot sufficiunt,

remaining one

which we are
If

is

are

all

that are

Novum Organum,

I,

1 (post

105), then the

the formula, equivalent, or explanation of

in search.

we cannot be
then

possibilities,

n suggestions

and can succeed in rejecting n

it

sure that the

is

n suggestions include

possible that

we may

reject

all

all

and

have to begin afresh.

If absence in proximo and failure of concomitant variation
in quantity

do not, owing to defects in our 2nd and 3rd

tables,

or possibly to coincidences, enable us to complete our rejections,

it

may

well be that

m being
We
of

>

we can only exclude n

suggestions,

suggestions are still left in the field.

must then apparently have recourse to certain devices
1,

so that

method which come

instantiarum.

under the heading of prccrogoMvce

prerogative instance is one which in virtue
B

HERBEKT W. BLUNT.

18
of seine kind of

superiority

may

be presumed to carry the

form as

election of one candidate for the position of

rivals.

Rome

So in elections at

secured the right of voting

first

againstr all

the century or tribe which

normally determined the choice

of the electorate.

The appeal

insufficient material for the-

available where

when

to a prcerogativa only takes place

complete exclusiva.

we cannot begin

there

It is also often

to contemplate the possibility

of a complete exclusiva. It is because the elimination

perfect, and cannot be so sub initiis (II, 19), and because
of the notions

which we have

is

of simple natures

and

not

is

many

qualities are

neither good nor true, but vague and ill-defined, that exclusiva
needs progressive rectification (ib. and II, 21). Prerogative
instances include

many

a special prestige of
provisionally to

its

make

Novum Organum,

II,

ill-classified

own, that enable us hypothetically and

a first vintage (vindemiatio

20 with regard to the

of heat, that it is a definite

is

types of cases with each

mode

"

prima\

form

"

This conclusion

of motion.

reached by the use of the prerogative instance

glaring.

But that Bacon

is dissatisfied is

as in

or formula

proved by

known

as

his use of

other prc&rogativce in the case of heat, under several titles of

no
prerogative instances, and by his declaration (II, 3.1) that

form has yet been discovered. Formarum quarum nulla adhuc

inventa est
though adhuc might conceivably mean only down
;

to

my

time.

To return
It

may

to the exclusiva in its ideally complete form.

be described as a method of residues built up on a

joint use of agreement

tative.

And

it

is

and

strictly

difference, qualitative

deductive, though

is,

The premises

of the deduction are

(2)

alone, factd

in Bacon's view, the real induction

comparentid,

(1)

it

and quanti-

(II,

A disjunctive major, usually with many members.

A negative minor, normally conjunctive, excluding
members

of

the

disjunction save

Logic, Eng. Trans., vol.

15).

ii,

pp. 296-7).

one

(v.

all

Sigwart,

is

indubitably valid, provided

be-duly constituted.

It

instrument which no
to

no

is

less

scientific

that

pn- misses can

indubitable that it is an
its

enquirer has

ever employed

any purpose.

Bacon's paradox consists in the deliberate

preference of a
method of negative reasoning over the positive method of

hypothesis with verification.

The

unaii of

science sets

tentative or provisional formula, based not

upon

jecture but
to

upon

his

up a

blind con-

accumulated knowledge, which, according

Tyndall's pregnant metaphor, beyond the circle of perfect

half lights a surrounding penumbra in which at least

vision

the direction of advance can be perceived. Bacon

rejects such
mndemiatio prima as a mere ^/.s aHer. All his references to
hypothesis

(e.g.,

Nov. Ory.,

I,

25, 45, 46, 70, 106) are of the nature

of warnings, or grudging recognitions within the

very narrow
limits of instantiw constitution (II, 26).
His
is other,

way
"quod ad hue factum non est, nee tentatum certe, nisi tantuin"
modo a Platone (I, 105), i.e., the determination of each and
any subject by the successive negation of alternative determiIt is apparently
nations, till the whole field is exhausted.

what he takes

to be the

The explanation

of Bacon's Instauratio,

second part which

is

meaning

of the Platonic Sialpe&H;.

of the paradox lies in

and

the general idea

specifically in the relation of the

concerned with the method of science to

the third part dealing with the material.

Spedding (Jtacou's
an
370-390)
interesting argument that
the novelty on which Bacon laid stress in his scheme was the
Works,

I,

suggests in

formation of a dictionary of nature to serve the exponent of

as Tycho Brahe's observations served Kepler, as
He
meteorological registers serve the expert meteorologist.

exclusiva

quotes the Auditorls Monitum prefixed to the History of the

Winds to the effect that the completion of the organon apart

from the Natural History would do little, the latter apart from
the organon much for the advancement of science (Works,
II, 16).

To the same purpose

in the Distributio Opcris

Works,

B 2

HERBERT W. BLUNT.

20

140) Aut hoc prorsus habendum aut riegotiuni in perpetuum

deserendum. It were vain to polish the mirror if there were

I,

no imagines

Now

141).

(ib., p.

this

encyclopaedia

in Bacon's view the

is

The preliminary cautions

division of labour.

work

of

are all directed

and registration of material, the ministratio

ad sensum and ad memoriam. The collector must use auxilia

to the collection

and must eschew hypothesis.

to the senses,

He must

advance

His conjectures of the solitary

gradually and step by step.
worker must be discounted as due to a personal equation

human equation must be guarded against as idola.

the
other
On
hand, the expert of the method will not use
hypothesis, because not having himself collected the facts and
or to a

to them, so to speak, or brooded over

grown

them

till

his

scientific imagination has hatched an idea out of them, he is

indifferent to all suggestions alike.
Any one is as likely to

be wrong as any other, and error is multiple, truth one. The

expert will simply take from its pigeon-hole the appropriate
experientia literata (in one of the senses of that phrase,
recorded experience), draw up his tables, outline the
possible alternatives and reject all save one, and in the

viz.,

effect

process

axioma

(=

a $iaip(Tis

new

enquiry in

the

or rejections.

if

we

elSrj

general proposition) with

will involve

prima

KCLT'

suggestions

which, besides the one

its

for fresh

permanent usufruct,
and similarly fruitful

elements underlying the negations

more obvious is it that vindemiatio

positive
Still

method by way of hypothesis is unsuitable,

we seem to have here, intermediates between the

or a positive

have, as

collectors

and the interpreters of nature, subordinate agents

engaged in forming instantice constitutive,

and the

like.

conjecture,

for

organic whole.

drawing up
None can form an hypothesis which

tables
is

not

none has thought the facts together into an

Each, on the other hand, can perform his one

when the product of the organised labour is

process which,
complete, is seen to be far more fruitful than if he ploughed his

21

SCIKNVK.

Co-operation in knowledge, an abandonment of

lone furrow.

individualistic rivalry

and competition, a

And

Bacon's ideaL

is

METHOD OF

OX'S

i;\

the

success

that

Jioyal Society

Germans

the

of

in the

a partial exemplification of what can be

done in such directions by a quasi-nationalisation of scientific

chemical industries

is

effort.

This idea of division of labour in the

Novum Organum,

to be found in the

seems to account

A vindemiator
.the

for the

field of

notably in

knowledge
113, and

I,

is
it

form which Bacon's method has taken.

will be a specialist

who has taken

for his part

brooding over, or, to change the metaphor, the assimilating

certain

facts,

academy

and

part will not

be the highest in the

The highest will be his who with all

his

of science.

subordinates working to his hand exhaustively specificates some

genus, establishes some forms or constitutive formula? adequate

which they are elicited.

Bacon's idea is proved by

in a literal sense to the facts out of

That

this is not a fanciful reading of

the account of Salomon's

III, pp.

House

in the

New

1645) where he enumerates 18

Atlantis

Works,

collectors belonging

to three different classes, then three Pioners, "that try

new

"

three Compilers,
experiments, such as themselves think good
"
"
that draw the experiments of the former four
(sc. classes)
;

"

into titles

and

tables, to give the better light for the

drawing

"

of observations and axioms out of them

three Dowry-men,
" that bend
themselves, looking into the experiments of their
;

and cast about how

fellows,

and practice

for

man's

to

draw out

of

them things

of use

life."

"

Then, after divers meetings and consults of our whole

number, to consider of the former labours and collections, we

have three that take

ments,

care, out of

of a higher light,

former.

These we

call

them, to direct

more penetrating

Lamps.

We

new

have three others that do

execute the experiments so directed, and report them.

we

call

Inoculators.

Lastly,

experi-

into nature than the

we have

three

that

These

raise

the

former discoveries by experiments into greater observations,

22

HERBERT W. BLUNT.
These we

axioms, and aphorisms.

We

have

you must

also, as

call Interpreters

the succession of the former employed men do not

a great number of servants and attendants."

The Pioner and the Dowry-man

of to-day.
to

They

are allowed to

of Nature.

and apprentices, that

think, novices

fail

besides-

and patentee
their own and

are the scientist

make

their facts

form hypotheses, subject in the one case to experimental

verification, in the other to success in the amelioration of life.

But the troops and droves

less directly,

more

of effects follow

on the action of the higher degrees,

lower degrees work properly to their hands.

the Dowry-men, but they will do more.

If only
this that

of the

The

makes the

work sub

Bacon forgotten
It

is,

upon an adequate

It

is-

basis of collected

Has-

selective hypotheses.

perhaps, not necessary with

Paradoxes, pp. 50

hands.

even wrongness
which Bacon apologises (I, 118).

collection implies
this

only the

be perfected unless the tables can be

perfected, nor these except

And

to their

if

will inspire

difficulty, the uncertainty,

initiis, for

exclusixa cannot

material.

work properly

the lower degrees

They

certainly, if

sq.)

De Morgan

(Budget of

suppose that Bacon, like a lawyer,

to

thought that given the facts adequately sifted there was an antecedently existing rule which could be applied, whereas science
has to

elicit

the facts.
after

one

its

The
of

unknown, out

rule, hitherto

selective hypothesis

those

"

divers

is

supplied from above,

meetings and consults,"

out

anthropologist or psychologist sends

a meteorologist rules and registers and

warnings too against anticipation es

a Restoration.
to

reform

selective

and

it.

It

starts

Existing

hypotheses

to

stick to collection.

of the sifting of

lists

instruments.

And

as

an

of queries, or

With

Bacon's scheme

is

with existing knowledge in order

knowledge
those

who

will
will

supply plenty of
eschew explanation

Classification does not involve con-

current valuation, of necessity and in all ranges of knowledge.

At least, as in meteorology, the valuation and interpretation

BACON'S METHOD OF SCIKNVK.

is

in the

mind

of the lamp,

and not

L>:;

in that of the myst<

///-///////

Bacon's original collector), and not too

(the mystery-man
in
the
mind
even of the lamp. We might instance
explicitly
is

Galton's collection of finger-prints through subordinate a^

or the work of collection for the corpus inter iptionum.

The

task of research that a professor of physics or chemistry or

what not sets his pupil is often enough of a like nature.

Bacon then can

of collaboration,

such as

is

offered

at least claim that, granted his conception

he

is not exposed to a simple

from the point of view of Mill's

that the uselessness of his

it

method

is

fool's

muti-,

logic.

And

perhaps not proven

till

has been at least tried.

Mill's dissent

from Bacon

is in

the main on the two points

treatment of hypothesis and his neglect of plurality of

causes.
Bacon's reason for the former is perhaps clear, even if

of his

As

inadequate.

to the latter,

either of Mill's senses.

He

in the famous instance of

"

ex punctura
adds, et

gladii,

not talking of causes in

is

ex apoplexia, ex atrophia (II, 17,

ista in natura .... mortis

4),

but

tamen couveniunt

Certissimum enim est

in

Bacon

does recognise plurality of causes

mors ex summersione, ex crematione*

formam

sive

ista,

utcunque heterogeuea

et aliena, coire

legem earn qure ordinat .... mortem." He

"
"
form and rightly, meaning what he does

denies plurality of

by form.
Bacon's case against Mill would be that the methods of

agreement and
solitarice

guatenns

crepantiam

under
is

difference

(II,

22)

ad
;

are

fully

treated

under

and

quatenus

siniilitudinem

the

method

of

exclusive^

that

</

ilix-

concomitant variations

instantice migrantes (II, 23); that the

simply a mutilated

instantice

method

of residues

the joint method

of

agreement and difference so far as valid is a mutilated

but as
(under the terms of the permission, II, 18, ad. init.),
stated by Mill

is

invalid, because Mill has forgotten to qualify

the absence he would

in proximo

make

use of by the necessary limitation

that Mill starts without

tabl*--.

Le. t

at

too late

HERBERT W. BLUNT.

24

a stage, and owes his induction to Bacon filtered through

Herschel with some loss in the process that finally Mill owes
his most scientific conception of cause (as sum of conditions) to
;

Hobbes (Elementa Philosophies, II, 9), with whom it was either

an adaptation or a misunderstanding of Bacon's account of
"

form."

Why,

then,

we have

dead, and Mill's living

In the

first

to ask, is Bacon's

method

of science

the great collegiate and socialised or

place

common endeavour

of science is as much beyond our strength

and our hopes as the great result, the scientia activa of the
sixth and concluding part of the instauratio magnet,.

In the second place because Bacon was too Aristotelian

His

even in his passionate protest against Aristoteliariism.

forma was more

easily construed

superficial reader in

by the

terms of scholastic and bookish dialectic than in terms of the

new

physics which constituted the fruitful half-truth of the

times.

In the third place because Bacon was really from the point
of view of contemporary science an amateur merely.
Many a

man

of science has looked to

his pages for inspiration

decided with Leibniz, otherwise

much

stimulated,

that

and
his

ignorance of mathematics puts him outside the course of

The scientist finds him still
actual scientific development.

ante-Copernican in his physics,

still

so

much engaged

in a

organon that his discovery of forms

be assimilated to Aristotle's account of the definition of

recension of Aristotle's
is to

him to dissect
We find that Bacon would
as the "form" of water, and

attributes, while his materialism has not led

rather than to abstract nature.

probably

fail to

9
recognise
for a conjugium of the several formula; of its

would rather seek

colour,

weight, and the like.

Novum Orgamim,

II, 24, that,

slightly other than that of,

natures modified

by

their

It is not, for

using format

example, until

copulate?, (in

a sense

II, 17) as the forms of simple

combination, he first recognises

e.g.,

BACON'S METHOD OF

chemical composition other

enim omne corpus

et in concrete,

fit

S(

IKN<

25

K.

tli;m verbally (as in

I,

"Cum

75).

suscipiat nmltas iiaturanim i'mnms ropulataN

ut alia aliam retundat, deprimat, frangat, et

unda obscurantur

fornui- singula-."
But surely it follows
that his mechanical view of the simple nature as bound up
with a single definite schematitinua (><'/ it/ urn occurs among the

liget;

schematisms of matter, De Avy., Ill, 4 Work*, I, r>60) becomes

at once unworkable, and if an anticipation of the doctrines of
;

physical chemistry,
"

false

If

dawn

we add

"

to

is

only so accidentally, and by way of a

science or a sunset to ancient physics.

modern

that he undoubtedly coquetted with the doctrine of

the transmutability of the metals in the inadmissible sense of

the alchemists

(v.

Novum

Orgctnum, ed. Fowler, Introduction,

p. 27, and the passages there quoted), and that the thought of
possible development in the subject-matter of science and of

even necessary development in the ideas and hypotheses under

which such matter is colligated was completely foreign to
Bacon, we have said enough to account for his insuccess in
influencing the course of science.

Fourthly, because of his choice of Latin as the language

destined to preserve his teaching when English should have
perished, and his pretension to something of the nature of an

arcanum.

And,

finally,

great ideas.

because of his

The form

own

or formula

the form looked at from another point of view, and so

i'2Jsissima res
"
"

the

form

and

lex

adus puri and

we know

it

it is

And we

the substitution of the form for the nature of which

in nature

it is

both

limitatio natnra notioris as

of heat is a limitatio of motion.

form, because knowing the latter

own

imperfect grasp of his

the nature of which

is

now

in

gain by
the

it is

terms of a true genus

which enable us,

in wider relations,

through the latent molecular process in which it emerges, to

produce it with a less limited power of control. But the form in
concomitant of the given nature. It is that
given nature otherwise considered. It is not to-present with
this sense is not a

HERBERT W. BLUNT.

26'

that nature, though

it is

present

when

that nature

is

present,
Identity in difference of this type is
not to be detected by concomitance for observation save by a
happy accident, but rather by hypothesis followed by experi-

because

mental

it is

that nature.

Bacon

verification.

you cannot

tell

which

is not exposed to the objection that

form and which is that of which it is

is

the form, for form and nature are one and the same thing viewed
from two sides, and to know the nature in terms of limitation
of a true

same

is to

genus

know

in wider relations.

Nor, for the

reason, to such a difficulty as the impropriety of taking

impenetrability for
limitatio.

But,

concomitance

is

true genus

the

equally,

of

which

inertia

is

method apparently adapted

the
to

only applicable to identity in difference by

who has formed an

one

it

hypothesis.

If a selective hypothesis

is necessary for the collector, so is an explanatory hypothesis

for the

that

is

neglect of the former, or at any rate

its explicit recognition, is

Bacon's

History

If

compiler.

absence of

all

responsible for the fact

Syha Sylvarum or Natural or Experimental

but worthless, omnino falsum as he had feared

might happen sub initiis, neglect of the latter is responsible for

the cumbrous inutility of the tables for the purpose for which
they are drawn up and in the hands of the type of investigator
whose use they are intended. It is, after all, on the Pioner

for

and the Dowry-man, with their possibly free use of hypothesis,

The interpreter
that both collectors and compilers depend.
of nature working
of stuff

by negatives can only work upon a mass

which has been put together in the

after

hypothesis
contradiction

provisional

light of provisional

hypothesis, just

as

the law of

only applicable to a positive material which

Bacon's
organise but only criticises.
workers through the division of their labour are for the most

it

does

not

is

itself

part precluded from any opportunity of successful hypothesis.

Yet the application of the tables to the discovery of forms,
necessitates acuteness in hypothesis.
The criticism from the

point of view of Mill

is

not so unreasonable after

all,

though

BACON'S MKTIlnl)

27

sciKXCE.

<)F

"

"
at
the objection rests on the character of the
form
on
the
of
the method qua method.
as much as
invalidity

And

as adapted

to

the case

become exposed to those

Dr. Fowler under plurality
intermixture of

of

difficulties

of causes,

causes, the

classified

method does
by Mill and

which are really due to

effects.

I observe heat.

only perceive that there

is

always pr<-

ni

mode of motion when I have already begun to

that
heat is just this. Facts are to try new theories
suspect
new theories from by mechanical means.
extract
to
not
by,

definite

So roughly runs
p. 56), and it

De Morgan's
is

valid

objection (Budget of Paradox**,

the

against

There

exclusiva

as

method

an apparent alternativeness of causes due to the difficulty of analysis of intermixed

effects which will vitiate our method as applied to the discovery
for the discovery of forms.

of

"

and

invariable antecedents."
so rectified it is valid.

is

So runs Mill's objection rectified,

Bacon's own judgment of his first

Of these forms none

vintage as to the form of heat is true.
and
the investigation is
discovered
as
been
has
(II, #1),
yet
"
not applicable to causes (II, 20, 4) for we do not mean quod

motus generet calorem," although

fields,

It
is

this

may

be true in some

or in certain subjects.

not without significance that the cases in which Bacon

result are the two cases of heat as a mode of

is

most near a

molecular motion, and colour as a mode of the collocation of

"
"
matter (Valerius Terminus with regard to the direction as to

Novum Oryanum,

whiteness, and

It is in the light, that

general).

that he

is

II,
is,

22, as regards colour in

of his molecular hypothesis

The
nearest to determining mechanical equivalents.
mice may be the form in the case of man, and Bacon

spiraculum

from realising his own hypothesis that

he attempted an Inquisitio Legitima de Motu,as if even motion
were not ultimate, but his method is hypothetical so far as it
to lead to results, and his hypothesis is a molecular

may have been

begins
materialism.

so far

So

in

I,

127,

where the universality

of

his

28

HERBERT W. BLUNT.

method

proclaimed, it deals indeed with ethics and politics

and logic, i.e., with normative and practical studies, but with
these only as sciences concerned with mentales mot us (and
is

</. I, 80).

It is also not

without significance that both cases are of

E.g., feeling warm I sit and

simple secondary qualities.
look at my fire, and, abstracting from the relativity to sense,

form an obvious hypothesis as

to molecular motion.

And

it is

perhaps significant that in the one case, that of colour, Bacon

is wholly wrong, and in the other not wholly right.
crucial

case for Bacon's method as based on concomitance would be

psychophysical parallelism.
Precisely where we observe the
one order we are unable concurrently and in the same sense
to observe the other.

necessarily a case for

It therefore is

hypothesis, and even by the use

of

hypothesis we do not

resolve the one into terms of the other.

The interpreter of nature, then, must depend on the Pioner,

<md can only present the whole of the accumulated knowledge
of the collaborateurs in the form of an articulated system divided
/car'

ei&rj.

He

can only apply formal

consistency which depend

pioneers.

What

tests

and principles

upon the teeming brains

very roughly

of

of

the

the gist of Aristotle's com-

is

plaint against Plato's Siaipeo-ts, the absence of any movement

of thought, which defect unfitted it for the instrument of

discovery or of proof, and left

it

simply a convenient mode of

presentment for otherwise established truths, what, again, the

critics of Aristotle's own syllogism, from Bacon and Hobbes to
Mill and Lotze, have urged with perhaps less truth against that
account of the form of inference, is more obviously valid against
Bacon's induction. And Mill's induction rests on Bacon's.
Mill's induction, however, lives

still,

in part because of its

close touch with

actual contemporary progress in science, in

because
while
the experimental and so-called inductive
part
canons are simply, in terms of his own strictures upon syllogism,

formula? of registration, he yet has recognised generously and

BACON'S METHOD OF SdKNCK.

adequately that hypothesis

is

the

purely logical part

of

worker

Method

in science.

29

the actual starting-point of

mental

process

in the former

the

of

sense

is

tin-

solitary

only an

ex post facto formulation of the result of the scientist's

work

really done when he has

reached a formula which can be expressed in such terms as

communicates

as he

His work

it.

"one circumstance only

is

in

is

common

involved in processes

"

"

and the

like.

His actual

subsidiary to induction,"

asprocedure
have
which
The
Baconian machinery
Mill would say,
preceded.
is not made less Baconian by Mill's partial adoption of it and as
so adopted is obnoxious to a like criticism. But the generalisa-

tion of the significance of hypothesis with verification

valid, because so general as to cover the

remains

non-mechanical and

not in logical method expressible psychological process of the

man of science, as we have it described to us in non-technical

language by Tyndall in his lecture on the Scientific Use of the

Imagination.
Mill has dropped Bacon's principle of Division of Labour,
and he might with advantage have dropped the methods,

whether as mutilated

exclusiva or as application of prceroyativcc,

But he has formulated the work

save as regulative ideals.
of the Pioner and the Dovjry-man so far as capable of formulaand

tion,

so he can join

hands with Tyndall the modern as

against Bacon the scholastic.

Yet the success of the Germans in the chemical industries

may
The

well give us pause before we reject Bacon's scientific ideal.

formulation of the available material, with hypothesis

allowed,
scientific

if

allowed at

all,

hierarchy, reveals

only to the higher grades in the

gaps, suggests

new experiments,

enables fuller formulation, and the combined work grows. And

German method rests on negatives, with the aim of ending

the

in a positive,

i.e.,

with an exhaustive knowledge of a comIt is freer in experiment, commits

but with more stress on verification, and

pletely specificated genus.

more

to the Pioncrs,

more

to the

Dowry-men, provided they secure the patents, but

it

HERBERT

30
is

Baconian in

\V.

BLUNT,

Division of Labour and

its

determination by negation,

it is

in- its

Baconian in

progressive

tables

its

and in

on physics. It is even Baconian in its

way
search for forms, though no longer of simple qualities, but of
compound substances. But it is not Baconian in its cleavage
that

the

it

rests

between form and cause as sum

on observation

rest

conditions.

of

on

concomitance, but

of

equivalence experimentally verified.

It differs, therefore, from Bacon's

scheme

It does not

hypothetical

of

scientific

research unless we are prepared

such as those of the German physicists and chemists are what
to suggest that investigations

Bacon

really

meant

workers of the higher grades

we do suggest this, then the

to allot to his

as their specific functions.

If

Baconian conception of science and its method is saved in the

fields at least of physics and chemistry, by the office assigned
to his Pioners and

between the work

closer connection than he indicates

by a

of these

and that

of the

Lamps, Inoculators,
and Interpreters of Nature.
I have insisted on the Pioners rather than the Lamps,
because the former are the only exponents of hypothesis
prior to the compilation of tables, and the latter do not

proceed directly to the rectification of the tables but to inspire

But the frequent
the Inoculators on the higher plane.
"
"
of the whole body would perhaps justify the
consults
attribution

to

the

Lamps and even

to

the

Interpreters

of

important functions in the direction of hypothesis- making.

It is, however, only by the aid of free reading between
the lines that
vital

we can

significance

for

interpret Bacon's
science.

Even the Novum Organum

reason

The Instauratio

as having a
is

torso.

and the

incomplete
21),
seems to be that Bacon had never reached a true

denouement.
at all that

and

is

dream

If it is only

we can

others, it

by

(v.

failure to read

IT,

between the

lines

indulge in the superficial criticism of Mill

must be confessed that Bacon's claims

as proto-

pirus are not so substantiated that of himself he can lead us

31

into Salomon's House.

work

of science

Yet as a dream

which seems

of that co-operative

for a while to run in harness to

but must in the long run express itself as a social

democracy such as Zola describes in Travail, or Mr. H. G. Wells

capital,
"

anticipates," or as

an enlightened aristocracy such as Ruskin

Novum Organum

preaches, the
which are nowhere

Atlantis

come from

has

its

place

and yet everywhere.

its

isolation

into

the

among
It

the Utopias
is

the

New

common world

Platonic apologue, which, like its prototype, rests incomplete,

written by a knight-errant of the ideal, masquerading as a

Aristotle

new

32

PKOFESSOR SIDGWICK'S ETHICS.

III.

By Miss

WHAT

E. E. C. JONES.

I propose to do in this paper is to recapitulate very

what I understand to be the main points of

Professor Sidgwick's ethical view, and then to attempt to answer
some of the objections to it that have been brought forward
briefly indeed

in recent criticisms.

As

regards

The Good for man, that which

is

in itself

Mr. Sidgwick holds that "if we consider carefully

such permanent results as are commonly judged to be good,
other than qualities of human beings, we can find nothing that,

desirable,

on

appears to possess this quality of goodness out

existence or at least to some consciousness

reflection,

of relation to
"

human
"

beauty, knowledge, and other ideal goods,

as well as all external material things, are only reasonably to
be sought by men in as far as they conduce either (1) to
or feeling

that

Happiness or
existence

(2)

to the

Perfection

"

(Methods of Ethics,

Book

or Excellence of
I, ch. ix,

human

4).

With

regard to Virtue, and the other "talents, gifts, and

graces which make up the common notion of human Excellence
or Perfection .... reflection shows that they are only valuable

on account of the good or desirable conscious life in which

they are or will be actualised, or which will be somehow

promoted by their exercise

"

(Methods of Ethics, III, xiv,

2,

p. 395).

human life that is ultimately desirable

human life regarded on its psychical side,
"
And it is only Desirable
or briefly, Consciousness
(p. 396).
Consciousness that we can regard as ultimate Good for man

Any

11

quality of

must belong

(p.

397).

to

Consciousness that

is

painful

or

even

merely

PROFESSOR SIDGWICK'S ETHICS.

indifferent

is

not in

itself desirable.

The

33

cimviii

notion of

cannot without a logical circle be identified with

the notion of Ultimate Good, for " to say that general good consist s
solely in general Virtue, if we mean by Virtue conformity
Virtue

itself

'

'

such prescriptions and prohibitions as make up the main part

of the morality of Common Sense, would obviously involve us
to

in a logical circle

since

we have

seen that the exact determi-

nation of these prescriptions and prohibitions must depend on

"
the definition of this General Good (p. 392, cf. p. 391).
And

Virtuous activity,

neither does
torture,

appear to be in

by extreme
desirable to the agent, nor can

itself

mere subjective rightness

of

if

accompanied

Will be maintained

to be

Ultimate

Good.
It
'

life

be said, however,

may

"

that

we may take

'

conscious

a wide sense, so as to include the objective relations

in

of the conscious being implied in our notions of Virtue, Truth,

Beauty, Freedom

this point of view we may

Truth, contemplation of Beauty, Free or

and that from

regard cognition of

Virtuous action, as in some measure preferable alternatives to

Pleasure or Happiness even though we admit that Happiness

must be included

as a part of Ultimate Good.

In this case

the principle of Eational Benevolence, which was stated in the

last chapter as an indubitable intuition of the practical Keason,

would not

direct us to the pursuit of universal happiness alone,

but of these
for

'

'

ideal goods

as well, as ends ultimately desirable

mankind
"

generally.
tlunk, however, that this view ought not to

itself to

show

commend

In order to

the sober judgment of reflective persons.

must ask the reader to use the same twofold pro-

this, I

cedure that I before requested him to employ in considering

the

absolute

precepts.

and independent

I appeal, firstly,

due consideration

and

to

validity
his

of the question

of

intuitive

when

common moral
after

judgment

fairly placed before

it

secondly, to a comprehensive comparison of the ordinary

judgments of mankind.

As

regards the

first

argument, to
c

me

34
at

MISS

seems

least it

clear, after

the conscious

relations of

E.

E.

C.

JONES.

reflection, that these

subject,

when

objective

distinguished

from

the consciousness accompanying and resulting from them, are

not ultimately and intrinsically desirable, any more than
material or other objects are,

when considered apart from any

Admitting that we have actual

relation to conscious existence.

experience of such preferences as have just been described, of

is something that is not merely

which the ultimate object

consciousness,

it still

seems to

me

when (to use Butler's

we can only justify to

that

phrase) we sit down in a cool hour,'

ourselves the importance that we attach to any of these objects
'

by considering

its

conduciveness, in one

way

happiness of sentient beings.

"
The second argument, that refers to the

or another, to the

common

sense of

mankind, obviously cannot be made completely cogent since,

as above stated, several cultivated persons do habitually judge
not to speak of Virtue are ends
that knowledge, art, &c.
;

independently of the pleasure derived from them. But we

urge not only that all these elements of ideal good
*

productive of pleasure in various

to obtain the

commendation

of

ways

are

but also that they seem

Common

Sense, roughly speak-

ing, in proportion to the degree of this productiveness.

seems obviously true

respect of any kind of

may
'

This

and will hardly be denied in

of Beauty,

it is paradoxical to maintain
that any degree of Freedom, or any form of social order, would
still be commonly regarded as desirable even if we were certain

that

it

case

had no tendency to promote the general happiness. The

Knowledge is rather more complex; but certainly

of

Common
when

social ideal

its

Sense
'

is

most impressed with the value of knowledge

has been demonstrated. It is, however,
'

fruitfulness

aware that experience has frequently shown how knowledge,

long fruitless, may become unexpectedly fruitful, and how light
be shed on one part of the field of knowledge from another
and even if any particular branch of
apparently remote

may

scientific

pursuit could be

shown

to be devoid of

even this

PROFESSOR SIDGWICK'S ETHICS.

indirect utility,

it

would

still

35

deserve some respect on utilitarian

grounds; both as furnishing to the enquirer the refined and

innocent pleasures of curiosity, and because the intellectual
disposition

which

it

exhibits

and sustains

to produce fruitful knowledge.

this last,

Common

Sense

is

commonly paid

Science

likely

on the whole

approximating to

somewhat disposed

the misdirection of valuable effort

to

is

Still in cases

so that the

to complain of

meed

of

honour

seems to be graduated, though

perhaps unconsciously, by a tolerably exact utilitarian scale.

Certainly the moment the legitimacy of any branch of scientific
enquiry is seriously disputed, as in the recent case of vivisection,
the controversy on both sides is generally conducted on an
"
avowedly utilitarian basis
(Methods of Ethics, 6th edition,
pp. 400-402).

On

the same principle we may allow as possible some

infelicific effects of cultivation of Virtue, and are able to

Common

explain the aversion of

be the Ultimate Good.

Sense to admit Happiness to

are accepted, the hedonistic or

admitted, and Virtue is interpreted as
conduct conducive to that end. And an examination of the
If

considerations

these

eudseroonistic

end

is

Common

Morality of

Sense, the precepts of duty and virtuous

action which are

currently accepted, leads us first of all to

that these rules are difficult to define, mutually

recognise

wanting in independence and self-evidence.

conflicting,

moralist

is

forced to seek for some principle which

is

clear

The
and

and capable of explaining, justifying, and reconciling

these vague and unsystematised rules of Dogmatic Intuitionism.

evident,

step towards this

is

made by Philosophic

Intuitionism, which

reaches principles of Prudence, Justice, and Benevolence, under

which minor rules may be brought, Common Sense Morality

appearing on examination to be a system of rules tending to the

promotion of the general Happiness, and showing no clear and
self-evident

principles

except such as

are

consistent

Utilitarianism.

c 2

with

MISS

36

The maxim

and the Utilitarian rule

basis for Utilitarianism,

"

the General Happiness

On

JONES.

C.

Benevolence furnishes an intuitional

of Eational

moral intuition."

E.

E.

seen to

is

this

"

aiming at
on a fundamental

rest

view there

is,

"

it

of

"no

seems,

opposition between Intuitionism and Utilitarianism."

As regards Method, Intuition gives the End, or Good

must be

that end or good can be best realised

settled

by

real

how

careful

"
appeal to experience, by a Hedonistic Calculus." If Happiness
is the Good, the right end of action, we have of course Ethical

One

Hedonism.

of

Professor

Sidgwick's

ethical thought consists in the clear distinction

which

is

an ethical doctrine, a doctrine

services to

great

between

this,

what ought

of ends, of

to be, and. the psychological doctrine (Psychological

Hedonism)

every one does always act from desire for pleasure or

aversion to pain.
This latter view he has, I think, conclusively

that

He

disproved.

shown that

has also

Hedonism cannot admit

differences

quantity, in pleasure (or pain).

the case for Ethical

Hedonism

strengthened in expression

It

of

may

Ethical

quality, but only of

be remarked here that

(so-called)

by

consistent

would be very much

Pain

a systematic reference to

Happiness includes

as well as Pleasure in considering the end.

absence of painful consciousness as well as presence of pleasant

consciousness if Pain is in itself (apart from consideration of
;

causes and effects) bad and to be avoided, similarly Pleasure

uhat

who

makes
is

that

also

ethical intuition

that " interest,

He

moment

is

Besides

the

Principle

of

Eational

another fundamental

Sidgwick recognises
Prudence or Rational Self-Love

that of

my own

agrees with

Butler

Governing Faculty, or
no intuition to the

find

Happiness

it

sentient.

Benevolence, Mr.

is,

the happiness of any moment

worth having to a rational creature

in itself merely, desirable

happiness,

(i.e.,

a manifest

recognising
Practical Reason.
effect that

what

obligation."

Dualism

of

the

But since he can

is

for the greatest

be for the greatest Happiness of

that Virtue will be rewarded), and as,

of others will also

the individual agent

is

in

PROFESSOR SIDGWICK'S KTHK

37

3,

moreover, an examination of experience admits the view that

conduct which, hest promotes the one will not always best

promote the

other,

The

problem.

Dualism

this

Practical Reason

my own Happiness

is

presents

is

fundamental

not satisfied unless loth

promoted and the Happiness

of others.*

And yet it is interesting to notice that I cannot accept the

maxim of Rational Benevolence unless I have accepted the
maxim of Rational Self-Love for surely it is only if my own
consciousness tells me that my happiness is for me as an
;

individual intrinsically worth having, only on this condition

is there ground for
holding that the happiness of others is that

which, for their sakes,

Why

it

is

worth while

for

should I think that another's happiness

him, unless I feel that

me
is

to promote.

any good

to

me ? Can I
And perhaps it

a good to

my happiness
judge his consciousness except by my own ?
may also be noted here that each individual, when aiming at
the happiness of others, since he does not aim at the happiness
of one

man

is

aim

alone, has to

at both happiness

and virtue

(in

conduces to happiness) in each.

(And, of
on
the
utilitarian
conduciveness
to
view,
course,
happiness is
the very content of virtue.) f
as far as virtue

Professor Sidgwick himself holds that in order that ethical

science

should

be

constructed

and

morality
completely rationalised, Ethics must borrow a premiss from
"
Theology or Philosophy and he asks whether, if the reconsatisfactorily

duty and

be regarded as a
hypothesis logically necessary to avoid a fundamental contradiction in one chief department of our thought," this

ciliation

necessity

of

self-interest

would "constitute a

is

to

sufficient reason

for accepting

this hypothesis.
This, however, is a profoundly difficult and
controverted question, the discussion of which belongs rather

* It
may be noted that the same difficulty might occur if good were
not interpreted hedouistically.
"
"
in International Journal of
Rational Hedonism
t Cf. article on
Ethics, vol. v.

38

MISS

to a treatise

Methods of

E.

E.

C.

JONES.

on General Philosophy than

to

work on the

could not be satisfactorily answered

without a general examination of the criteria of true and false
beliefs.
Those who hold that the edifice of physical science
is

Ethics, as

it

really constructed of conclusions logically inferred from self-

evident premises

may

reasonably

demand

that any practical

judgments claiming philosophic certainty should be based on

an equally firm foundation. If, on the other hand, we find that
in our supposed knowledge of the world of nature propositions

which yet seem to

rest on no other grounds than that we have a strong disposition to accept them, and that they are indispensable to the

commonly taken

are

to be universally true

systematic coherence of our beliefs it will be more difficult to

reject a similarly supported assumption in Ethics without
The strength of
opening the door to universal scepticism."
this position has not, I think, been always appreciated.
It

appears to make the case for Ethical Science at least as good as

the case for Natural Science.

go on to consider a few of the objections to Utilitarianism

of this type which have recently come under my notice.
As
r

regards those that appeared before 1894, I collected all that

came in my way, and gave to them the best answer I could
in

1894 and 1895

the International Journal of Ethics for

(vol.

v).

journal

Also Mr. Hayward's criticisms

(1900-1901) have received, in the

in vol. xi

perhaps as

much

attention as they require.*

that

of

same volume,

I will, therefore,

pass on to examine some points in the criticisms of Professor

J.

Seth and Mr. Moore.

Ethical

System

of

1901) considers that

Professor Seth (in his article,

Henry Sidgwick,"
Professor

in

Sidgwick

Mind
has

for

"

The

April,

subordinated

Utilitarianism to Egoism, yet that at the same time he recog"

three Methods of Ethics
the Egoistic, the Intuitional,

nises

* Mr.
Hayward's book, published soon after the
extent an expansion of the latter.

article, is to

a great

PROFESSOR SUM! Wlt'K's KlUK's.

and the Utilitarian, as equally legitimate."

(Thi> recognition,

in Mr. Seth's view, is

assumption

"apart from Mr. Sid^wickV

or postulate
a position which may

thc.,ln-ic;d

called

he.

Eational or Intuitional Hedonism, not Rational or Intuitional

Utilitarianism."

What,

however,

is

Hedonism ?)
But Professor Sidgwick shows how,
and Utilitarianism coalesce
Professor
of

Seth on

p.

Utilitarianism

to

177).

(this

is,

hut

Utilitarianism

in his view, Intuition ism

indeed,

As regards

rern^m.-rd

the

by

subordination

Egoism, Professor Seth himself quotes

"
I
p. 177, the following statement of Professor Sidgwick
do not hold the reasonableness of aiming at happiness generally

on

with any stronger conviction than I do that of aiming at one's

I hold with Butler that Seasonable Self- Love and

own .....

'

Conscience are the two chief or superior principles in the nature

of man,' each of which we are under a 'manifest obligation'
to obey."

And

if

one wer* subordinate to the other,

how

could the three Methods be (as Professor Seth says they are)

regarded as "equally legitimate" ?

Again, Professor Seth says that (on Professor ISidgwick's
"
view) the conflict between Egoism and Utilitarianism is
.

ultimate and insoluble because each

Practical Reason

each

is

"

is the expression of the

but what Professor Sidgwick holds is that

an expression of Practical Reason

Practical Reason

an

"

insoluble

is

the two together.

conflict," as

subordinated to the other

Mr. Seth

the expression of

And
says,

again,

if

there

how can one

is

be

Professor Seth does not, I think, rightly represent Professor

Sidgwick's attitude towards the natural Methods of Ethics,

and his attitude to Common Sense (which Professor Sidgwick
does

not regard as sole and final appeal

"
clarified
Sense requires to be

Common

recognising that

'*

for

philosophical

purposes).

Again, Professor Seth asserts that Mr. Sidgwick's "own

statement of the principles suggests, if it does not imply,

40

MISS

E.

E.

JONES.

C.

that both Prudence and Benevolence are transcended in the

Principle of Justice of which they are only special applications.
"
All three," he goes on, are principles of the distribution of the

Good

or

Happiness, and

impartiality which

is

the

common mark

of the essence of Justice."

of

all

It.

is

that

surely a

is

"

"
to say that Prudence and
distribution
very odd use of
Benevolence are principles of distribution and to say that
Prudence and Benevolence are transcended by Justice, because
;

"impartiality," which
Justice,

mark

the

is

(it

also characterises them, is

should be a mark) of

also

odd, since Justice in

mere form of law any law must be

and Prudence and Benevolence imply a
definite ultimate good (Happiness) without reference to which
Justice remains a bare form of impartiality, without any
this sense is simply the

equal and impartial

content of good to be impartial about. Justice is not (unless

we have accepted the Hedonistic principle of Eational Benevo"

lence) a principle of

with impartial concern for all

The form of Law
(p. 181).

action

elements of general Happiness"

is

common

peculiar to

to all

systems of Ethics, but the hedonistic end

The acceptance of Happiness as end

Hedonism.

is
is

a very important addition to the mere form of Law, and on the

Utilitarian view, the maxim of Justice seems plainly subordinate

And

to that of Benevolence.

unless

the individual's point of view there

difference between self

Professor Seth does

and

others, it

(p. 184), as

if

it

is

can be shown that from

no valid or important

seems

futile to

argue as

this difference did not exist.

Could we, indeed, have any knowledge of, or care for, the
happiness of another., unless we have first recognised happiness
as good for ourselves, worth having for ourselves ? (Cf. above,
p. 36).

Does not even the very conception of Duty (not to say

imply a valid and important difference

of Life or Consciousness)

between Self and Other

good

is

always a

individuals

And when

common, never

by a common good

many

What

it

is

said that

a private good,"

common good

what

"

is

moral

meant

but the good of

Is not our duty to our neighbour
brother
is

PI.'OKKSSOK HUMiWICK's ETHICS.

or sister or wife or child

"

merely

individual

"

41

and the good hence accruing,

child, &c.

to tin-

"The only possibility," says Professor Seth, "of reducing

morality to a rationul system is by subordinating Prudence to
Benevolence through the subordination of both Prudence and
Benevolence

to the

formal or logical principle of Justice, of

which they together constitute the special application and

"
"
content (p. 182).
We have only to ask what is the
.

relation of a Logical [whole or genus] to a mathematical [or

quantitative] whole to reach the conclusion that the one

is

the

form, the other the content, and that the larger application of
the principle of Justice which we find in Benevolence must

include and transcend the narrower application of the same

principle in Prudence."

But the question

of the relation

use of the

is not to be solved by a mere consideration

between two such wholes, and in any ordinary

maxim

maxim

not applicable in
the case of Prudence, because there is only one person conAnd the maxim of Prudence can be subordinated to
cerned.
of Justice this

is

if we
ignore the difference between
not from the point of view of the sentient
is merely one of those similar units that

that of Benevolence only

self

and other

it is

individual that

make up

lie

Logical Whole, and that his fraction of the

whole
constituted by the various quanta of good
quantitative
of all sentient individuals taken together, is on a par with
this is only true from the universal
every other equal quantum
the

point of view.
It

Seth

may seem superfluous to dwell on this point, but Professor

"
"
the point of
If," he says,
lays much stress upon it.

view of the individual and his happiness

is

once exchanged for

if the

the point of view of society and the general happiness

former

subordinated as only a part, to the latter as the true

ethical whole
if, in Sidgwick's own terminology, the principle
is

of prudence

is

subordinated to that of benevolence, or both to

the principle of justice, the dualism and contradiction of ethical

MISS

42

E.

E.

C.

JONES.

thought immediately disappears, and Utilitarianism, or the

identification of the individual with the social whole of which
a part, is seen to be the only rational principle of
conduct, the only principle worthy to be called intuitive."
But is it intuitive ? And is it either a principle or rational ?

he

is

To me

it

none of these good things indeed " the

the individual with the social whole of which

to be

seems

identification of

"

he forms a part
individual

is

seems

me

to

a contradiction in terms

part of a whole, he surely, e%

identified witli the

it, is

tive self being the other part,

the existence for

him

an

if

termini, cannot be

indeed, from his point of view, the

whole

he knows

whole, as far as

only a part of him, his cogni-

and that

upon which
But even the

part, too,

of all the rest depends.

identification of the individual with the whole does not quite

satisfy Professor Seth

the further question would remain, he

"

whether the point of view of a quantitative or even of a

says,
(This seems to me
logical whole is the ethical point of view."
"

so unfair as to be quite beside the mark.)

Good

is itself

determined by
(Is

If

....

the

interpreted rationally, the value of pleasure

its

quality,

and not merely by

its

is

quantity.''

rational to hold that pleasure in itself can vary quali-

it

"

Sidgwick's main interest," Professor Seth goes

seems to have been in the question of the true method

tatively
"

on,

?)

of the distribution
of

the

the problem of

and

in

of the

Good, rather than in the question

His investigation of
Good
the Good does not compare, in seriousness

nature of the

persistence, with

his investigation

of the

problem of

its distribution."

If Professor Seth considers

Prudence and Benevolence

to be

perhaps explicable that he should

distribution receives a disproportionate share of

principles of distribution, it is

think

that

attention, but

how he

conies to regard

distribution

hard to understand, and the view that

is

little

them

as principles of

Professor Sidgwick treated the question of the nature of the

Good with comparative

neglect

is

still

more surprising

in

J'KOFKSSOl! SlIXiWlCK's

view

of.

Book

the discussions,

in Hi. ix of

<?.//.,

To the complaint

III.

43

KTIII'

Book

I,

and

Hi. xiv of

(p. 180) that Professor Sidgwick

does not apply to his own intuitions (of Rational Self-Love

and Rational Benevolence) the criterion of consistency on
which he justly lays stress, it may be replied that the two
in question cannot be shown to be incompatible
with each other, that a possible mode of complete reconcilia-

intuitions

tion

is

indicated, and serious reasons offered for its acceptance,

and that Benevolence certainly presupposes Self- Love.

Finally, I would just observe that the conjectural tracing
of the sources of Professor Sidgwick's Ethics needs correcting

own account of the development of his

and that in many of the quotations from The Methods
of Ethics which Professor Seth gives there is a curious disregard

in

the light of his

view

owing to which a garbled impression

doubt unintentionally) produced in several cases

of context,

is
;

(without

the quota-

some cases strangely beside the point

&c.
pp. 180, 184, foot, and 185, top, &c.

tions, too, are in

p. 178, line 87,

e.y.,

go on to make a lew remarks on some of Mr. G. E.

Moore's criticisms, in his recent book, Principia Eth )<<(.
I

In attempting

to disprove

the doctrine that Pleasure

is

Hedonism, by which he means

the sole good, Mr.

Moore

lays

upon what he calls (1) the principle of organic unity;

The principle of unity is that
the method of isolation.

stress

(2)

whole bears no regular proportion

the sum of the values of its parts. This he uses chiefly,

the value of an organic

to

the purpose of showing that though wholes of

pleasure (or pleasant feeling) is a factor are highly

I think, for

which

valuable,

alone

the

and

seem

value

none

of

parts (except pleasure) taken

that
not therefore follow
does

the

of

valuable,

it

the complex

whole

is

due

to

pleasure.

By

we

separate a thing or quality from

its causes, accompaniments, and effects, and as so separated

the method of isolation,

"

endeavour to determine by reflective inspection (by looking

to see ") whether it has value or demerit in itself, and, if so,

44

MISS

how much.

E.

E.

JONES.

C.

Pleasure, he decides, though

it

has some intrinsic

goodness, has not much, in isolation, and

is

by no means the

He

sole good.

settles this

by a hypothetical consideration

of

cases in which every element of the concrete instances, except

pleasant feeling itself, has been abstracted from, and of cases

in which the other elements of a whole which is good in itself

which

are considered apart from the pleasure or happiness

their

is

normal concomitant.

In dealing with Professor Sidgwick's doctrine (which he

recognises to be free from some of the defects and faults
of

previous

attempts to

Human

English Hedonistic Moralists) Mr. Moore first

answer the contention that nothing outside of

He

existence can be good or the good for man.

takes

the passage of The Methods of M/iics, already quoted above

(pp. 33-35),

and objects

characters of

Human

he asks

"
(p. 83).

to the limitation of

Existence.

cannot think

would consider

"

to certain
"

good

Is this conclusion justified

'

it is.

No

one,' says Professor

aim at the production

of beauty in external nature, apart from any possible contem'

Sidgwick,

plation of
I,

for one,

it

by human

it

rational to

Well, I

beings.'

do consider this rational

get anyone to agree with me.

and

say at once that

us see if I cannot

may
let

Consider what this admission

It entitles us to put the following case

Let
us imagine one world exceedingly beautiful.
Imagine it as
beautiful as you can put into it whatever on this earth you

really means.

most admire

mountains,

rivers,

the

sea,,

trees

and

sunsets,

and moon.

Imagine these all combined in the most

exquisite proportions, so that no one thing jars against another,
but each contributes to increase the beauty of the whole. And
stars

imagine the ugliest world you can possibly conceive.

Imagine it simply one heap of filth, containing everything that

then

is

most disgusting

as far as

may

pair of worlds

Professor

be,

whatever reason, and the whole,

without one redeeming feature.
Such a

we

are entitled to

to us, for

compare

Sidgwick's meaning, and the

they

fall

within

is

highly

comparison

PROFESSOR SIDGWICK'S
relevant to

45

KIHI<

The only thing we are not

it.

entitled to imagine
ever
has, or ever, by any possibility,
being
can, live in either, can ever see and enjoy tin- Ix-autv of tinone or hate the foulness of the other. Well, even so, suppis

that any

human

them quite apart from any

still, is

beings;

beautiful world

possible contemplation by

rational to hold that

it

should exist, than

it

is

human

better that

the one which

tin-

is

ugly ?
not be well, in any case, to do what we cou/</ f<>
produce it* rather than the other?
Certainly I cannot help
that
it
and
I
that
some may agree with
would,
thinking
hope

Would

me

it

in this

To

extreme instance."
cannot myself see that

this I reply that I

consequence what happens

smallest

so

long as

of the

it is

there

no

is

consciousness anywhere in any creature of this happening

not that I think anything can or does happen or exist apart

from

consciousness, but just supposing

all

we put

that

the

case.
I submit,
case,

beautiful.
it

"

however, that Mr. Moore does not really put this

imagine one world exceedingly

he says, "Let us

for

Imagine

not be well

The

that

ugliest world
is

mere
speaks

it

to
"

as beautiful as

ugliness.)
of

the

"

love

Would
"

most disgusting

And

you can

do what we could to produce it

?
"
is described as
containing everything
to

us!'

(This

includes

more than

in the last paragraph of his book he

of

imaginary things

"

and

persons as
purpose," he

It is enough for my
undoubtedly good."
remarks (p. 84), " if it be admitted that, x/7//W/*// no greater
good were at all attainable, then beauty must in itself be
if it be admitted
regarded as a greater good than ugliness
that, in that case, we should not be left without any reason
;

for preferring

one course of action

to another,

we should

not be

without any duty whatever, but that it would then be

positive duty to make the world more beautiful, so far a*
left

Italics mine.

o in\u>

46

MISS

E.

E.

C.

JONES.

able, since nothing better than beauty could then result

our
efforts!'
from
This refutation, then, of the limitation of human good to

were

goods of consciousness by reference to imaginary cases of

beauty and ugliness seems to me to break down. The appeal
to our imaginative appreciation or disgust,

and

to our

duty
of
rather
than
Can
we,
ugliness.
by
help
beauty
produce
such considerations, make any decision about things that are
Is not even the attempt to
not matter of any consciousness ?
is

to

put the case, and to estimate the hypothetical beauty and

ugliness on the supposition of their not being objects of consciousness, quite futile

Mr. Moore goes on

alone

.is

good

for its

to consider the doctrine that Pleasure

own

sake

He

(p. 87).

first

spends some

pages in combating the view that "pleasure alone and not the
consciousness of pleasure is the sole good," quoting in support of
it a passage from the Philebiis, in which Socrates sophistically
presents to the victimised Protarchus an arbitrary mixture of
"You would not think you needed
possible and impossible.

anything else

if

you possessed

for

your whole

life

the enjoy"

Socrates
in completeness ?
Then
Socrates
answers.
Protarchus
Certainly not,"
enquires.
supposes his interlocutor to be divested of sight, wisdom,

ment

of

the

greatest

pleasures

"

memory and knowledge, and asks, "Would

in this state of destitution if he still
content
be
Protarchus

intelligence, reason,

had the greatest enjoyment, but without knowing that he had

?
To this Protarchus feebly, but very naturally, responds,
it ?
"Socrates, your reasoning has left me utterly dumb." He is
'

too surprised

and shocked

to retort,

"

Yes, certainly, if I

still

possessed this blessing in completeness."

Mr. Moore should have troubled to give so much

I do
space to this refutation of pleasure without consciousness
not know, as he admits that he thinks it is consciousness of

Why

* Italics mine.

J-UOKKSSOR SIDGWICK'S ETHICS.

47

which Hedonists have meant, and after the quotation

he gives from The Methods of Ethics there could be no doubt
about Professor Sidgwick's view.*
"

But even the formula,

Consciousness of Pleasure

is

the

sole end," does not correctly give

for

Professor Sidgwick's view,

have to include absence of pain as

he expressly says that we

The most
Good and Bad is that

well as presence of pleasure in the Hedonistic end.

striking point in Mr. Moore's account of

while

rather reluctantly that he admits mere happy feeling

it is

to be intrinsically valuable,

he fully allows that Pain (unhappy

in itself a great

feeling) is

and unmixed

"Great

Evil.

evils

may be said to consist either (a) in the love of what is evil or

ugly, or (b) in the hatred of what is good or beautiful, or (c)
in the consciousness of pain/'
Probably the love of evil is
and the love of good persons may be sometimes
good, but what is the evil of which the love is an unmixed
Evil, what is that good in persons the love of which is an
itself evil,

unmixed good
indeed
person

"

love

Is

good to the persons who

it

(conscious, of course)

from

and while

justification

anything

Is it so certain that ugliness

without consciousness of pain)

the admission

worthless

Is

and that beauty and the love of it

And if Pain (there can be no Pain

can we escape

indifference

of it are evil,

are very great goods

abstracting

feel it

good in itself except beauty, anything as evil in

except ugliness and pain

and the love

itself

very vague
a third

of good persons

Is it the love as felt, or as contemplated by

definite left as
itself

"

Is not

its
it

is

causes,

if

evil,

it

itself a great evil, how

Pleasure or Happiness
?

If Pain intrinsically,

concomitants, and

state in

worthless while
is

in

that

a great good

lasts

makes any

is

feeling-tone

which

it

of

in

absolute

occurs intrinsically

lasts, considered

there for not treating

effects, is

in

itself,

what

Pleasure or Happiness

* Pleasure without consciousness seems to me a contradiction in

as impossible and absurd a notion as colour without extension,
warmth without temperature, or music without sound.

terms

48

MISS

(the feeling- tone which

?

correspondingly

If

E.

E.

is

Pain

C.

JONES.

the contrary-opposite of

Pleasure)

be estimated in

abstract-

to

is

itself,

ing from any particular causes, concomitants, &c. (and, of

course, causes, concomitants, and effects of Pain may be
excellent), ought

also estimated

in

not

the

be

to

Feeling, Pleasure,

opposite

abstraction from all

particular causes, &c.

(which may, of course, be bad) ? Mr. Moore himself is very

emphatic about the need of the "method of isolation," but
in

order

to

convince us

that

is

pleasure

not intrinsically

good he appeals to concrete cases where causes and concomitants are supposed such as to arouse strong condemnation
of

Would

the whole state.

more

effective

if

more

not his supposititious cases be

human
mean mere

in conformity with ordinary

the

does

And, by
way,
cruelty
experience
If it had no effect
pleasure in contemplating suffering ?
direct or indirect in producing suffering, would our condem?

nation of
I

it

be so severe

think, too, that there

both that

it is

a constant tendency to forget

is the utilitarian end,

is

General Happiness which

and that (the world and human life being what they are)
among the most important means to this are the currentlyaccepted rules of morality.
In as far as appeal is made to intuition,

each individual's intuition

if

the appeal

me

and common usage,

sought and as highly estimated
it

disapproved

seems to

is

it is,

to

of course, to

common

that Happiness
as

and that appearances

to

Pain

is

is

as

avoided

the contrary

sense

much
and

may

be

(cf. Methods of Ethics, Book III, ch. xiv,

do we habitually wish each other long life and

satisfactorily explained
5).

Why

else

many happy returns of the day, a happy new year,

a merry Christinas, why do we have Christmas trees for
children, why try to secure happiness for others, why reward
labour and merit with the means of securing, from among
many sources of happiness, those which the labourer most
happiness,

desires, or

can best turn to account

49

PROFESSOR SIDG WICK'S ETHICS.

No

doubt Mr. Moore's method

of

isolation

may

be

towards finding out the character and value

valuable help

any whole or part in itself, apart from causes, &c. If we

want to know, e.g., the value at the moment of its occurrence
of a state of consciousness, or any element of it, this method

of

applied with exact care

what

is

it

is

necessary to use.

We

must abstract rigorously from all particular causes, concomiThis is what Professor Sidgwick has, I
tants, .and effects.
think, succeeded in doing in estimating Pleasure or Happiness.

But anyone can use

and

for himself

it

I cannot understand

how anyone who

has carefully and systematically used it can

whole
state of consciousness or any part of
that
say
any
such whole is intuited by him as intrinsically worthy, as good

in itself,

that

is

if

abstraction has been

to say, if it is

some degree
year,

much

painful.
less

made

of all pleasant feeling

taken as absolutely indifferent, or in

Who would care to live through a

life,

in which,

whatever

else there was,

Who

would think
happiness
difficult
to allow
It
seems
in itself, worth having ?
it,
this without allowing the great intrinsic value of Happiness
there was

not a moment's

or Pleasure.

a good of consciousness, it must be the good

and if a good of Feeling
of some consciousness in particular
consciousness of the
a
of
the
is
it
good
Happiness)
(i.e.,
If the

good

is

who

and can only be a good to other

All Happiness, I think, is in itself
absolutely good from the point of view of an universe consisting
of creatures capable of Happiness and misery ; but it could not

particular person

feels

it,

consciousnesses indirectly.

be good from the universal point of view unless

it

were

first

good from some individual's point of view, since it can only

exist, or be contemplated or imagined as existing, as the good
primarily of the particular creature that experiences it; the
good of each being, although good in itself, only apart of the

good of the whole

of each and all.

the sole good being the

sum

of the

good

50

MISS

And

it

seems to

another, and since

me

(if

since there

is

consciousness,

C.

JONES.

that since each

the good

directly as part

good

E.

E.

of

is

therefore

himself and not

know

feeling-consciousness,

no such good except what

that

is

Happiness) he can only

own

his

man

Egoistic

and

part of a feeling-

is

Hedonism

is

rational

from the individual's point of view supposing there were

"
no one but himself, as we are " supposing so much. It is
(cf. p. 99) that the difference to any individual
"
between his own happiness and another's happiness is "for

surely true
*"

him

"

own

"

not merely
the ultimate rational end for himself, but a part of Universal
Good."
all-important

"

his

greatest happiness

Ultimate rational end for himself

what

is

means, I suppose,

him personally

his good in a
good
cannot be another's, in a sense without which

to

intrinsically

;sense in

which

no good

of feeling could exist at

it

"

is

all.

In

this

way Egoism must

the presupposition of Universalism in Hedonistic Ethics.

Everyone who is part of the universe has, it would seem,

T?e

reason to try and realise all parts of the good of the universe
but unless each one's own Happiness concerned him specially
there would on hedonistic principles be no good of the whole
I think that some at least analogous conto be aimed at.
siderations

would apply

to

any non-hedonistic good

of conscious

creatures.

Without denying the Principle of Organic Unity,* it may

be observed that since pleasure is necessarily felt pleasure, the
only whole that we are here interested in considering in
The
relation to the Principle is a whole of consciousness.
a
of
such
whole
contains
are
elements
that
elements
(1)
only
cognition or perception, (2) feeling or emotion, and (3) volition
and the only abstraction that seems valid and applicable in the

It

may

be said, however, that this principle and its application

fuller exposition and discussion than Mr. Moore has

seem to need much

given

us.

PROFESSOR SIDG WICK'S ETHICS.

II

is an abstraction not of all

cognition
or all volition (attention) or all feeling, but of any particular
case or kind of cognition, feeling, &c.
have,- e.g., no

case of any of these three

We

from cognition, or destitute of

Thus there exists no concrete Whole of con-

experience of volition cut

feeling-tone.

that

sciousness

is

oft'

without feeling-tone, and no feeling-tone

not the feeling-tone of some whole of consciousness.

Though feeling can be distinguished in thought from cognition and volition, the separation is not so much comparable
that

is

to that of,

e.g.,

an arm from a human body

illustration) as to

that of

Life

or

(as in

Mr. Moore's

Consciousness

Intelligent

from such an organised body.

And

if

Pleasure or Happiness

is

allowed to have some value,

while no one can hold that any combination of volitions and

cognitions,
lute

if

accompanied by unremitting torture, or even absowould be good in itself, and, on the other

indifference,

hand, the only ground that anyone can find for refusing to allow
that happy feeling is good in itself seems to be by reference
to causes, concomitants, or effects that are disapproved
so,
it

how can we
alone which

escape the affirmation that

is

in itself

(i.e.,

it is

if this is

Happiness and

in abstraction from all particular

and accompaniments) worth having ?

At the same
time, the notion of organic unity, which may be extended to
cover the whole of conscious life, helps us to see how it is and

causes

happy feeling under the name of pleasure is so

for all actual happiness as well as
readily condemned
suffering
has causes, concomitants, and effects, and these may, in any

why it

is

that

given case, be such as

of disapproval

we

disapprove.

I believe that the

grounds
may, in any instance, be explained, systeniatised,

and

justified by appeal to effects upon General Happiness

but I will not pursue the point here. And another contributing
factor to the condemnation of Happiness, when called by the

name
most
in

of Pleasure,
of us,

is

the influence of the word itself

what Bent ham

which a word,

"

calls a dyslogistic

term

like the Tartar's bow, shoots

it is,

to

an instance

back upon him

D2

52

MISS

that uses

it,

E.

E.

C.

JONES.

and mightily disturbs and confuses

his under-

standing."

My attention

in the above discussion of

Mr. Moore's attack

on Hedonism has perhaps been too entirely taken up by

Chapter III (Hedonism) and the destructive side of the
argument, with which indeed that chapter is almost excluThe chief point in Mr. Moore's positive case
sively occupied.
against Hedonism is that though nothing is good which is
not pleasant, the only things which are good in themselves
in
of

any high degree are very complex wholes, the goodness

which cannot be arrived at by any computation of the

separate values of

the constituents into which they can be

Of the complex things which are intrinsically good,

analysed.
the chief are the love of beautiful things and the love of good
persons.

In any complete consideration of Mr. Moore's whole view,

the constructive side of his doctrine must, of course, be
I hope that I may have an opportunity at some
other time of attempting some discussion of it.

included.

BEAUTY.

IV.

By

Sir AD woimi

I.

H. HODGSON.

OBJECT.

AT

the very basis of philosophy lies the distinction between

consciousness as a knowing, or knowledge, and that same

In philosophy we are making

consciousness, our whole knowledge of things, our whole mental
content, awareness, or furniture, the object-matter of our
consciousness as an existent.

In other words, we are exercising the psychological

enquiry.
function of Apperception, as distinguished from perception or
consciousness

which

simply,

nevertheless

therein, and pre-supposed as an inseparable

is

pre-supposed

part, constituent,

or element, of the apperceptive process.

All consciousness is
a reflective or retrospective process, and apperception is therefore nothing

more than attention

to

some particular content

that process, or perception plus attention to its

as

own

of

content

recedes into the past, or becomes objective to the attention.

Apperception itself, with its content as apperceived, is there-

it

fore a necessary part, but by no means the whole, of the objectmatter of philosophy.
It is with consciousness as a knowing that we are specially

concerned in philosophy, not with

sciousness as an existent, which
of perceiving, attending,

two
is

is

inseparable aspect, conthe fact or actual process

its

and apperceiving.

To confuse these

aspects,. though in fact inseparable, to attribute to

true only of the other,

is

the ruin of philosophy.

one what

Of course

we must

not lose sight of the existent aspect of consciousness,

while occupied with the other aspect. It is the distinction

between them which

it

is

The
necessary to keep in view.
is discoverable by

ground or reason for drawing the distinction

SHADWORTH

54

H.

HODGSON.

apperception in the process of simple perception

prior to apperception, is

itself,

which,

always a perception having content,

is, being of some particular kind, though this

not a whatnexs as distinguished from an existence, until
apperception has distinguished the fact of the content being

or whatness, that
is

perceived from the content as a whole, and thereby also from

the remainder of the content which is its whatness in the

The order

knowledge as distinguished from

the order of existence thus begins with a perception of a

narrower

sense.

of

content, or of whatness in the larger sense.

know
it is

of

that anything exists, you must know something of what.

existence alone, its bare existence, without a whatness

its

any kind, cannot

in thought
of nothing,

alike

Before you can

any way be conveyed to us, or realised

without a content, existence would be the existence
in

consciousness the consciousness of nothing; both

would be non-entities.

Consciousness thus, in virtue of

process,

always makes us aware

its

of

being an objectifying
the existence of some

content of consciousness; the ideas of existence and

ideas rooted in the nature of consciousness
ideas, or rather the experiences

itself.

object

are

But these

which they represent, are not

enough to give us the knowledge, or account for

the idea, of a Conscious Being, the Subject of objects, such as
we take ourselves to be in common-sense thinking, and such as

of themselves

assumed by Psychology as its special object-matter a

knowledge or an idea, into the nature and validity of which,
as of all other apparently fundamental ideas, it is the business

is

of Philosophy to enquire.

seem

long course of experience would

have been requisite before any such knowledge or idea

could have been attained, a course of experience compelling
to

us to recognise consciousness as such, and to make it as such

our object, that is to say, as distinguished from other objects
which are recognised as not-consciousness, and the existence

which is recognised as independent of our own. Only as

the result of some such long course of experience does it seem

of

00

REALITY.

we should

possible that

attain the knowledge or the idea, that

consciousness not only has

an existent or objective aspect,

inseparable from its philosophically subjective aspect, or aspect

as a knowing, but also that as a particular existent, the
differentia

of a

conscious

it

being,

as

it

an order

to

belongs

which we must conceive

existence, in

of

some way

in

generated by something not itself, and its existence as the

prior condition of its having contents or objects as a knowing
process.

The order
latter is in

knowledge and the order of existence (which

knowledge derived, as we have seen, from the
of

former) are thus the reverse of one another, or run in opposite

But it is with the order of
directions, both being processes.

knowledge that we are specially concerned

it is

in knowledge, that

is,

in philosophy

and

in consciousness as a knowing, that

Till events or changes

ultimate data of experience lie.
in the order of existence have produced into existence, or
determined to exist, a state or process-content of consciousness,

the

there

is

no knowledge from which the knowledge of an order

can be derived.

of existence, or of the existence of anything,

But

this derivation is based, not

of the series

upon perception

changes by which the state or process-content of

consciousness has been produced, but upon features, or changes
in features, of the process-content itself, which features or
of events or

changes are immediately perceived in retrospection from what

we

the present moment, and the perception of which is the

In
prolongation of the same process-content into the future.
elucidation and support of the foregoing paragraphs I may refer
to

call

my

MetapUysic of Experience, Book

I,

Perception, and more particularly to the

Vol. I, pp. 72 to 91.

The place and function

reason (so to speak) for
evidence of everything

knowledge

of its

own

Oh. II,

first

of consciousness as a

its existence,

else,

and of

existence

is

thus

lie

Refl,ectice

knowing, the

in its being the

itself in all its

immediate

half of the section,

modes.

Its

or rather let us

SHADWORTH

Ob

II.

HODGSON.

avoid misconception, onr idea of existence

say, to

itself,

the

meaning which we attach to the term, is derived from the

immediate perception which the process-content of consciousness has of

itself,

in

continuing as a process-content.

The

meaning of all terms belongs to consciousness as a knowing.

Knowledge

consists

of

consciousness.

To use

expression, nothing matters but consciousness.

exist besides consciousness as a knowing, or

ness

may

be causa

sui, that

is,

self-existent, are questions, the

at

all,

must be sought

whether

it

a paradoxical

What

else

may

whether consciousis

sole existent, or

answers to which,

if

attainable

in the analysis of the process-content of

consciousness as a knowing, which is the only source, as it is

In all enquiries we begin with a
the only issue, of evidence.

knowing and we end with a knowing, and we are modifying

our knowing throughout the process. But this does not imply
or necessitate the thought, that in that process

we can have

true perceptions, or ideas, or thoughts, of such objects only as

are or

owe

may

their

knowledge

be themselves part of the process of knowing, and

to that process.
For it is only the

existence
of

the independent existence of objects, not that

independent existence

knowing.

itself,

which

included in the process of

is

In other words, Existence does not of necessity

consist of consciousness, as

knowledge does.
In philosophy we have to see what the analysis of consciousAnd this must be
ness as a knowing tells us on this point.

The process-content of
analysis without assumptions.
consciousness as a knowing, not as an existent process, is the
object-matter to be analysed. To suppose that, because it is
an

itself

an existent process, therefore

all

that falls within

it,

in

the sense of being its object as a knowing process, also falls

within it, or is part of it, as an existent process, and cannot
exist otherwise than as part of

an existent process of conscious-

an illegitimate assumption, founded on confusing the

ness,
distinction between consciousness as a knowing and consciousis

ness as an existent.

Consciousness as a knowing

may

be a

UKAL1TY.

57

knowing of many other existents besides

the fact of their, and of

its

the knowledge which

has of them.

But

all

must be put

it

itself,

as well as of

own, existence being independent of

assumptions, and not only the one now signalised,

aside in the philosophical analysis of consciousness

us a knowing.
The true meaning of all the general terms we
in
employ
analysis must first be ascertained and justified by
that analysis, before their use can be anything but provisional

and

as provisional,

and thankful,
Reality

is

employ them.

to

we must

that has been done,

till

The meaning

be content,

we have

to

elements

of

ascertain

it

concerning

consciousness, and

is

what

this,

the

of

term

And what

the special object of the present paper.

what

ultimate

facto unavoidable,
or
of
constant
inevitable,
them, are the conconjunctions
stituents of the idea, or in the first instance give rise to the
idea,

tie

which we designate provisionally by that term.

We

have, of course, at the outset of our philosophical analysis, a

from our pre-philosophic

and our purpose

provisional idea of icality, derived

experience, which
is

to ascertain,

provisional

is

our guide in the enquiry

by means

idea

of analysis,

also the sole

is

what form,

valid

lor in

if

of

any, of that
it,

de facto

unavoidable, and in harmony with other de facto unavoidable

ideas, which are also derived from experience and ascertained

by similar processes
It is a i'atal

to treat

their

when

of analysis.

though very prevalent tendency in philosophy

some familiar

ideas, that of leality for instance, as if

meaning was already ascertained by philosophical analysis,

in fact they are only provisional, and to use them as

standards of truth, or tests of philosophic validity, forgetting

that it is the ultimate constitution, or origin in the first instance,
of these ideas,

which in philosophy

is

the point in question.

is to ignore the differentia of philosophy, and to place it on

the same footing as the positive sciences, practically denying
its special characteristic, that of examining consciousness as a

This

knowing, whereby

it

stands in correlation with, but also in

SHAD WORTH

58

H.

HODGSON.

We

contradistinction from, all the other sciences.

then find

ourselves asking, in the case of reality, Is this real ?

Is that
real ? and so on, instead of asking, What we mean by the term

what is the analysis, what the validity, of the

are then doing actually, though perhaps unintentionally, what Kant for ever, by his failure, showed to be
Reality, or

We

idea.

when he worked out a theory of it taking Categories

how we arrive at a consistent experience, instead of
how
showing
categories, or any general terms, are derived
futile,

to explain

from de facto inevitable experience.

a priori, that

is,

We

are glorifying the

the constitution of some assumed Subject of

consciousness.

There is no greater error, no greater delusion, than to take

the distinction between Subject arid Object as the ultimate
basis of philosophy.

It

may

be true that there

this is

is

no conscious-

none without an Object. But

not an immediate datum of consciousness, not an imme-

ness without a Subject, as there

The

diate piece of knowledge.

is

validity of both ideas, Subject

Object of consciousness, has to be ascertained

by

and

analysis of the

content of consciousness, without calling in either an assumed

Subject or an assumed Object to account for it. These are objects
of provisional ideas derived

from pre-philosophic experience, the

first instance, of which

ultimate constitution, or origin in the

has

to be ascertained

by

much as that of
You cannot in fact assume

analysis, just as

any other pre-philosophic ideas.

a Subject as the basis, or as part of the basis, of philosophy,

without thereby changing philosophy into psychology. When

we

say

/,

and We, and so

on, in philosophy,

and speak of them

must be the case, since language is

formed on a pre-philosophic basis, we must remember that we
are using terms provisionally only, without prejudice to the
as agents, as everywhere

results of philosophic analysis,

We

must remember

whatever these results

may

be.

that the very purpose of analysis is to

back
the
us
analysandum in a different shape from itself,
give
that is, in the shape of constituent elements and their mode
also,

59

IIEALITY.

of

which

conjunction,

account

analysandiim as a whole,
as one of its

own

for, or
correspond to, the
but do not contain it over again,

The

constituents.

of the idea, in the true shape which

is
it

validity or non-validity

assumes under analysis,

it

the result at which the analysis aims.

This may show that
has a true and valid meaning, though it may divest it of

that explanatory character which

supposed

to stand for

it

seemed

to possess,

when

an immediately known and unanalysable

entity.

It is in the light of considerations like the foregoing that

we must

interpret such phrases as Esse is Percipi, which taken

by themselves are susceptible

is

cases of existere, under

esse,

it) is

its particulars,

i.e.,

all

the object of percipere, or of con-

its

which

(what

say,

utmost generality) in its character of a knowing,

character of an existent and percipere the evidence of

sciousness (iu
its

when we

is Percipi,

generality or abstraction, including all

not in

and conflicting

our meaning can only be that the term

the meaning of the term esse, or that esse (in its utmost

or think, Esse

percipi

of very different

If these considerations are true,

constructions.

is its object

Our meaning cannot be

as a knowing.

often supposed to be) that the secret, or essence,

it is

which Esse

or inner nature, in virtue of

Being, consists in Percipi, or

is

is

Esse, or

Being

is

identical with the percipere of

a percipient.

The

logical fallacy of this latter interpretation

supposes us to have some knowledge both of

is,

esse

that

it

and

of

we have any perception, consciousness, or

knowledge at all, that we know them as different from each
other, and that (so knowing them a priori) we proceed to ask

perdpere, before

of

one of them,

viz.,

esse,

depends, or in virtue of

Percipi

is

illogically

not what

what

then interpreted as

it
if

is

it
esse.

it

is,

but upon what

it

The phrase Esse

is

was the answer

to

this

put question, and was an assertion that the inner

nature or essence of Being was Knowing, instead of asserting

that Being could only be thought of as the object of a Knowing.

SHAD WORTH

60

Briefly stated the truth

H.

HODGSON.
Esse

this.

is

neither (1) that perception gives us a

is

Percipi expresses

knowledge

of the

whole

nature of being, or of any being, nor (2) that being, or any

being, depends upon perception, either for its nature or for
its existence, but (3)

we must think

that

of being,

and of every

being, as at least the object of perception, independently of the

question as to the existence of such a perception. For, in saying

esse is percipi, nothing depends upon the mere existence of the
perception, but all depends

upon

self-objectifying process,

upon the

i.e.,

nature as a reflective or

its

fact that, as

it

proceeds,

perceiving part after part as past,

different in point of time from the then present

it differentiates its content,,

that

is,

as object,

moment

of perceiving,

which

will in its turn be perceived as

having been a present moment

of

perceiving, or content of

perception not yet objectified as past.

The

fact that a per-

when it exists, is perception and objectification of a

content, not the fact that the perception itself exists, is that

ception,

which determines the meaning of Esse.

Here perhaps I may be allowed

to say, that this

whole

paper (barring minor corrections and additions, none of which

affect the three preceding paragraphs) was written before seeing

Mr. G. E. Moore's
for October, 190o,

article

"

The Eefutation

of Idealism," in

Mind

No. 48 KS., containing his skilful dialectical

attack on the logic of the phrase Esse is Percipi. Though I still

see no reason to alter anything in what I have written, I am

glad to recognise that Mr. Moore

have rightly understood

him) rejects Idealism, however different from mine the route
may be, by which he reaches his conclusion.

II.

(if I

MATTER.

We are far away at present, I mean so far as this paper has

as yet gone, from anything that can be called Eeality. Or
rather, if we use the term at all, there is no reason for
prohibiting its application

to

anything which

is

or can be

61

REALITY.

Now

thought of as an object of consciousness.

we

idea of reality, witli which

we have

to

examine and, if

the provisional

start in philosophy,

requisite, to correct

and which

by philosophical

analysis, I take to consist of three points, namely, the object

(including event) called real must,

independently of the

must not be

illusory, but, in

thirdly,

it

exist or take place

secondly, it

unchanged circumstances, must

continue to be or to appear as

moment

first,

existence of a percipient;

it is

or appears at

must have some

any given

operation in

efficient

changing or maintaining the state of things around

Stated

it.

briefly, by the real is meant, in pre-philosophic thought, the

opposite of that which is appearance only. Now whence arises

this distinction in the first instance, or

what are the

actual experience which compel us to perceive

they justify us, or in

taining
idea,

it

what form

as a true distinction,

when examined by

The answer

it

facts in

And

will they justify us, in

and the idea

of reality as a true

philosophical analysis

will be found, as I shall

will

main-

now

briefly

endeavour

to show, in those phenomena of actual experience which compel

us to form the idea of Matter, and of an external material

world, in the

our

first

first

instance

or which, in other words, give us

perception of Matter and an external material world,

including our

own organisms

spatially inclusive of,

material objects which are

as well as different from, our consciousas

The first formation of

is the perception of them.
cardinal ideas, or original perception of three objects

ness which
three

involving those ideas, will then be found to be included in that

perception which we call briefly the perception of Matter,

namely (1) the

from some of

differentiation, in point of kind, of consciousness

its objects,

which are then thought

of as not-

consciousness, (2) the local separation of consciousness from

the greater part of these latter objects, by its localisation in

one of them, the

physical

organism, and (3) the idea of

efficiency or real conditioning, derived from the perceived fact,

that certain states of consciousness arise only, but then arise

SHADWORTH

(j'2

inevitably, on the

coming

of

HODGSON.

II.

two or more material objects into

contact with one another.

The perception

of Matter, it will thereby

us our
is

first perception of Eeality

that is, the idea of Eeality
derived from the idea of Matter, which in its turn is derived

from
is

be shown, gives

facts of

commonly

immediate experience.

And

the question which

stated as that of the Reality of Matter, as if the

idea of Eeality was an a priori or standard idea, under which

Matter must be brought

an

idea, is thus

and the truth

if

we would conceive

it

as other than

changed into a question concerning the nature

and the answer shown to

of our idea of Eeality,

depend, not on any a priori concept or provisional idea, but

upon

namely, those which together

In what I have here
Matter.

facts of actual experience,

constitute our

of

perception
about to allege concerning the reality of
Matter, I do not think there is anything which is not to be

found in

VIII

am

and

alleged

my

Metapliysic of Experience,

inclusive,

though

Book

I,

Chapters

IV

to

here attempt to bring the essential

Indeed I think there

points together in a single conspectus.

anything, in this whole paper, which will be

readers of that work.

is little, if

The perception
evident that

of

Matter

is

a complex perception,

no attempt can be made

new

and

to

it is

to ascertain the historical

order or genetic sequence of those experiences which are its

constituents, or the succession of steps in its formation which

repeated combinations and

changes in the combinations of those constituent experiences
spoken of in the last paragraph but one, and of the still more

depend upon attention

to

the

simple elements of those experiences. We have no data upon

which any such historical enquiry could proceed, the reason
being that they are facts belonging, for the most part at any
rate, to the period of infancy, which it is beyond the power of

memory

to

recall.

We

have complex experiences which we

and when we take either

can analyse into their constituents,

these

complex

experiences

or

their

constituents,

or

the

63

KKALITY.

elements of those constituents, one by one, as being such

and such in the first instance, what is intended is, not to
indicate their position in the historical order of the genesis

knowledge, but to insist on what they are per se, apart

from association with other facts or ideas which, in pre-

of

experience,

philosophic

may have become

so

closely

bound

up with them, as to appear to furnish a reason or explanation

It is of course true, that whatever empirical state
of them.
consciousness appears anywhere, in order of knowledge
to
simply, must also have had a first appearance, relatively

of

its

own

but

it

later appearances, in order of the genesis of

by no means follows that

knowledge

this first appearance is prior

in time to that of other empirical states of consciousness, in

It is simply as an aid to abstracthat same order of genesis.
tion in analysing, that the phrase in the first instance must be

understood.

But now

for the facts.

consciousness as a knowing, which

thing, itself included,

that

with the content of

It is solely

we have

the evidence of every-

is

do

to

not with conscious-

ness as an existent, or with consciousness as a psychological

function, both of which, as

or are

known

knowing.

to

When,

shown above, derive

be what they

are,

their meaning,
from consciousness as a

proceed to state, that our

formed out of perceptions belonging
I

therefore,

perception of Matter is
to the psychological functions of sight and touch, I am using
these functions solely as means, and the only means at my

disposal, of designating the experiences belonging to conscious-

ness as a knowing, upon which I

mean

Matter

to constitute the perception of

to rely as contributing
I

must not be held

to

be assuming the existence of those functions, or founding any

I do
conclusions upon their supposed nature or capacities.
not assume the existence of a Psyche, any more than I assume
the existence of Matter. To do so would for a metaphysician
be illogical. The sense of sight gives us no immediate perception of its

own

organ, the eye

neither does touch give us any

SHADWORTH

64

H.

HODGSOX.

immediate perception of its organ, the sensitive skin surface.

It is solely the immediate objects, that is, the contents of
these sensations objectified in consciousness (which as

shown

a reflective or objectifying process) which can furnish

legitimate grounds for relying on the validity of the complex

above

is

perception of Matter, which they compel us to construct by

their varying combinations and dissociations.
construct

We

it,

no doubt, by the active exercise

reasoning

of attention, thought,

but here again nothing in

my

argument

is

and
built

upon, no conclusion is drawn from, the nature or capacities of

these psychological functions it is the facts belonging to the
immediate content of consciousness which compel us to attend,
;

and reason

as

we

do, in constructing the

complex percepsuch processes as those employed

in this construction, though not these processes alone, which
originally give us the data from which our knowledge of the

think,

tion of Matter.

And

existence, nature,

and capacities

is

it is

of these psychological functions

derived.

Now

and tactual sensations normally occur in coneach

with
other, we experience sensations of both
junction
kinds simultaneously.
And, as contents of consciousness as
visual

a knowing, the sensations of both kinds are spatially extended.

Both are what we may call surface sensations, and these
sensations themselves are extended, the sensations themselves

occupy two of the dimensions of space, meaning here by the

term dimensions that they have length and breadth inseparably
united with their sense-quality. And this I take to be an
The
indisputable and cardinal fact of immediate experience.
two
in
the
extension
have
sensations themselves
spatial

dimensions (so to call them) of length and breadth.

The next point I would notice is, that attention to these two

when we see and touch what

a small object which we can grasp with the

sensations in

combination, as

we afterwards

call

hand, gives us our first notion of such objects, and adds the
perception of the third dimension (so to call it) of space, depth,

65

REALITY.

or distance

other

than

the perception of the

superficial, to

two first dimensions, which belong to sensations of both kinds

These combinations are our first perceptions of
.severally.
So far as we have
solid objects, as we afterwards call them.
gone at present, they consist of surface sensations enclosing a

And it may be noted, that our

space of three dimensions.
of
never
-conception
gets beyond or away from this
solidity
original perception.
Space in three dimensions, tangible on
the surface,
so

any

is

essential to

called solid

solidity, divisible

infinitum, as

ths

it,

intra,

space

tangible surfaces enclose.

is

far

not be matter, or a material

we

in alternating

is

in dividing
a continuum of

though not necessarily divisible in

which it occupies, or which its
That is to say, minima of volume,

atoms of mass, are conceivable, anything

Thirdly,

we may go

Solid matter

object.

ad

however

less

than which would

solid.

obtain from attention to these two sensations,

and varying combination and dissociation with

what we afterwards call our

*iach other, our first perception of

own

body, as the constant central object of a spatial panorama

in three dimensions of space, a panorama containing various
solid objects, moving and stationary, in ever varying relations
of distance relatively to each other

and

to the constant central

All these contents composing or

of the

panorama.
contained in the panorama are contents of consciousness. Some
are visual contents only, others tactual as well, while those

object

which in certain cases are tactual only, as when we touch or

feel in the dark, or with eyes shut, become also visual as well
as tactual in changed circumstances, and the visual and tactual
contents of sensation then combine and harmonise with each
other into one complex content, or single object of consciousness, single because occupying one and the same portion of
And this is the case with that central object of the
space.

panorama which
short,

we afterwards

we then have

experience of

an external and material

world,

own body.
what we afterwards

call

our

world which, as

In
call

then

66

SHADW01ITH

H.

HODGSON.

experienced, consists of nothing but contents of consciousness

as a knowing.

Now up

so

far as our analytical

description of the experience of visual

and tactual sensations

this

to

point, that

is,

gone at present, notwithstanding that this experience is

experience of an external and material world, there has been
lias

nothing but consciousness in knowledge, that is, in consciousness

as a knowing; nothing but

But the idea

of

occurred therein

distinguished
its

it is

several

call consciousness.

consciousness has never presented itself or

for there has been nothing presented, no

state of consciousness has

;

what we now

not

occurred, from which

known

it

could be

or recognised as consciousness

contents have been

known and

only
recognised,
because different and distinguishable from one another; but
the whole which they compose has not been named or classed

simply because nothing which

is

not-corisciousness has occurred.

Perception and object perceived have not as yet, in any case or

been distinguished as different in kind from one

class of cases,

another.

be objected, that we may or even must have

perceptions, though not of what I have called not-

If it should

had

consciousness, yet of unconsciousness, that

is,

intervals or inter-

which are not the contrary but the

consciousness, and that these suffice to give us

ruptions of consciousness,

contradictory of
a distinct idea of consciousness,
of unconsciousness

must

my reply

is this.

Such

intervals

either be perceived as void portions of

the chain or time-stream of consciousness as a knowing, in

which case they are still parts belonging to consciousness as a
knowing, and do not lead to the distinct recognition of consciousness, or else they pre-suppose the distinct recognition of con-

sciousness, that

is,

suppose

it to

have already taken place, in

That

to it as its contradictory, unconsciousness.

being opposed
the occurrence of perceived intervals of unconsciousness
does not in any way involve or lead up to what I have called the

is to say,

recognition of consciousness, or suffice to give us a distinct idea

of it.

REALITY.

What,

67

then, are the facts or the circumstances, or are there

any, which

in the first instance, that

now

sources than the experiences

is,

without aid from other

described, compel us to break

undivided phenomenon into consciousness and imtconsciousness, while retaining in consciousness the positive

up

this

we

sense-quality of that part of the whole which

as not-consciousness

or in other words,

to

undivided phenomenon into perception, which

and object perceived, which

think,

is

is

the

consciousness,

not-consciousness

is

distinguish

distinguish

This,

the crucial question.

I proceed to

show that there are such

facts,

and that they

are to be found in our tactual experience, in conjunction always

with facts of visual experience. The compelling facts are two

first, the fact that one and the same sensation cannot be in two

or

more places

at one

what we afterwards

and the same time

call the

secondly, the fact that

primary properties

of

matter are an

exact replica of the tactual sensations which, in combination

with visual sensations, go to constitute our original knowledge
of solid objects, and which we afterwards call our perception of
those primary properties, that

is,

of matter.

The

and the same sensation cannot be in two places

fact that one

at once

compels
us to duplicate in thought the content of that sensation, to
locate one of its two members in the central object of our

panorama

of consciousness, as a state of consciousness

the other member, and

refer

which

is

that other

a perception of
member to a non-central object of our panorama, to which it
belongs as a constitutive property, perceived but not perceiving,
that

is,

as

something which

is

to

not-consciousness.

A solid
Let us now see more particularly how this is.
us
into
let
described
above
as
comes,
suppose,
visually
object
apparent contact with the constant central object of our
panorama

of consciousness, that

is,

with our body.

or set of sensations of touch and pressure occurs.

which

of the

two

sensation

Now

to

objects, the central or the non-central, does

this sensation belong

(I

speak of the whole set of sensations

E 2

SHAD WORTH

68

II.

HODGSON.

in the singular for the sake of simplicity.)

located

seems to belong

It

to

both

In which

both, as a constituent contributing to constitute both of

as

The

solid

is

it

indeed to enter into

of

them

the

distinguishable
inseparability
objects.
elements, the extension-element and the sense-element, in the

least

and simplest phenomena

of sight

and touch,

inseparability of the distinguishable elements, the

as also the

time-element

and the sense-element, in all phenomena whatever, was shown

my Time and Space (1865), Part I, Ch. II, 11, "Elements

in

and Aspects

Phenomena."

of

And

this fact,

which

is

a fact

one have never ceased to insist upon, as

of experience, I for

fundamental in philosophy. The appearance just spoken of

One and the
therefore, should it occur, would be illusory.

same sensation cannot be

As

a matter of

trying

to

do

fact,

so,

we

in

two separate objects at once.

we cannot imagine
ipso facto break

or conceive

it

in

up the one sensation

Observe what happens when contact, the visually

.apparent contact, between the two solid objects is broken.
The tactual sensation ceases to exist as a sensation, but in
into two.

its

stead there arises, or rather there

sciousness,

representation

of

remains alone in con-

that

tactual

sensation

as

belonging both to the central and to the moving or noncentral object;

sensations and

all

three alike, I

mean

the representation of them,

hitherto undifferentiated

panorama

the two represented

making part

of consciousness.

of the

This

is

the fact of experience, this representing process is the process

of experiencing, which breaks up the panorama of conscious-

ness as a knowing into consciousness and not-consciousness,

the part which is not-consciousness being perceived but not
in turn perceiving, though still belonging, as a perceived part,
to the panorama.

this

We

must now

see

more particularly how

is.

Eepresentation or redintegration is an essential part of that

process-content of consciousness as a knowing, which gives us
our original panorama of consciousness. Without it, there is

REALITY.

no continuous consciousness at

term containing two meanings

sented, at

content.

all.

But representation

is

means at one time a reprea

another,
representing, representation of the same
Of these, the represented representation, or memory
;

it

image, of a sensation, as in the case of the tactual sensation

now in question, is necessarily represented as belonging to the
solid object or objects

which the sensation originally contributed

to constitute in our

panorama, a panorama which, as continuous

in time, has throughout one and the same central object but
;

the representing representation of the sensation, as will presently

appear, can be conceived as belonging to that central object

But first (to keep strictly to our present instance) of

the tactual sensation represented as belonging to the moving
non-central object.

alone.

we imagine

If

sensation as

or try to imagine this represented tactual

making part

as a knowing, that

is,

of the process-content of consciousness

as belonging to a perceiving as well as

perceived object, we can then no longer regard it as makingpart of the same panorama as before, which, so far as our
present knowledge goes,

is

identified as

one and the same by

the constancy, or continuity in time, of its central object. The

moving non-central solid object, to which the represented

and which we are now endeavouring

must

tactual sensation belongs,

to imagine as a perceiving as well as a perceived object,

in that case (on the analogy of our

panorama

when

of its own, of

perceiving as

this is

we

no doubt the

which

are

case,

own

it is

panorama) have

the constant central object,

now imagining it to perceive. And

when we think of such solid moving

objects as seats of consciousness, that

continuing to belong to

original

is,

as persons.

But

as

one and the same panorama of con-

sciousness, the tactual sensation, represented as belonging to

the moving non-central object, cannot be represented as consciousness, but must, along with that non-central object which
it

is

contributes to constitute, be represented as an object which

not-consciousness, perceived but not perceiving.

It must,

70

SHADWOHTH

II.

HODGSON.

therefore, as consciousness, be represented as located

in

some way

or other as belonging to, the

body,
central object of the panorama.
Briefly to

sum up

have been speaking

the argument.

of

can only be

The
in

and

in,

which

the

is

tactual sensation

we

one of the two objects,

the central or the non-central, of the panorama, this

panorama
remaining the same as hitherto, that is, continuing to have the

same central

object.

It must, therefore, as a sensation, be in

the central, and not in the non-central, object of the

panorama,
were in the non-central, it would be in a different

since, if it

panorama, a panorama in which that non-central object would

be central. That is to say, there would be a breach in the
continuity of consciousness as a knowing, a breach which,
besides involving a change of the object-matter spoken of,

namely, the panorama to which the central and the non-central

objects alike belong, would leave the dilemma which has been

occupying us in precisely the same unsolved condition as before.

And

the

same reasoning

holds good of the representation

the
sensation.
On the other hand the represented
representing
sensation and the represented representation of it must by the

same reasoning be located in the non-central object

panorama, and conceived as properties contributing

the

of

to con-

an object which is not-consciousness.

If we suppose, as I think we must, that the experience

stitute it as

now

described as containing acts or processes of sensation,

perception, representation, and reasoning, takes place in the
period of early infancy, we must of course suppose also, that it
takes place without any recognition by the infant of the nature
of the process, or of its several steps or component elements.
He has the sensations, perceptions, and representations, and he

performs the reasoning, which

we can now

and describe as what they severally

later knowledge, that

is,

later actual experiences.

recognise, distinguish,

are, in

terms derived from

own

ultimately, from analysis of our

Still

the infant's experience

the less real because he cannot recognise or analyse

it

is

not

as

it

REAL IT V.

we cannot now reproduce, in

or in imagination, the thoughts and feelings composing

actually occurs to him, or because

memory

that experience of his as

what an

it

Who

actually occurred.

act of reasoning feels like to the infant

shall say

But now observe the great and unique significance of the

We have obtained, indeed
step which we have now taken.
have had forced upon us by experience, our first idea of
existence as distinguished from consciousness, for the question
as to location, the question ivherc as distinguished from what,
a question concerning the existence of that concerning which
is

put.

we have obtained our

Besides this

existent

of

aspect

aspect as a

consciousness,

knowing

and we have

as

lirst

and

modes

also of certain different

is to say,

we have obtained our

ness and

its

first

from

its

also obtained our first idea

own

its

it

idea of the

distinguished

of concrete consciousness itself as an existent, of

such a concrete existent in

is

its

location as

central object, the body,

of it

when

so located

that

idea of existent conscious-

modes, which afterwards, "in their character of

The
object-matter of psychology.
perception of the difference between the two subjectivities, the
philosophical and the psychological, has here its origin for we

existents,

become

the

have obtained our

first

idea of an object possessing, but not

being, consciousness.

Observe, moreover, that the sensation and

its representing
as a
not
of
consciousness
do
to
cease
make part
representation

knowing, when, owing to their location being ascertained, they

Both our original tactual

are thought of as existents also.

sensation and the representing representation which represents

it are alike, of necessity, located by thought in that central
object of our

panorama which we

our body, the representing

continues to be a knowing)

call

representation (though it still

losing, as an existent state of consciousness, that definite spatial

extension which
sensation,

and

knowing.

And

still

remains an essential

in the representing
in the

moving

element in the

representation of

solid object, in

it

as

which we locate

SHADWORTH

72

H.

HODGSON.

the represented representation, or object as we afterwards cali

it, of the original tactual sensation, there is nothing represented
but what is a repetition or duplicate of that original sensation.

The surface

feelings of touch

and located in the

and pressure, when represented

become

in thought, or are thought of

object,
the
of
as,
matter, namely, space occupation r
primary properties
hardness, and resistance to pressure, properties which are

actually perceived in tactual sensation.

Of what these properties are in

themselves,

that

if

is,

we

attempt to imagine them as separate entities or agencies, acting

in, through, or upon matter, as we do when we give them
separate single names, such as Force, Energy, or Agency, we
have no notion whatever, save what we gather from the
sensations

by which we know them, which belong

to

our

consciousness as a knowing, and which they are said to cause

or produce in us.
They consist of the represented motion or

tendency to motion, which is represented as belonging to

matter in all its parts, down to its minutest particles, another

mode

of representing space occupation, hardness, and resistance

to pressure.

These properties must in the

first

instance be

of as objects of consciousness as a

knowing, not as an
unknowable entity or agency, or Ding-an-sich, as would be the
case if we started with an a priori idea of Eeality,
manifesting

thought

itself in or as

the

phenomena

or Agency, taken as an

of consciousness.

Force, Energy,

entity acting in, through, or

upon

matter, but having an existence separable from it, is a fiction,

the fruit of a wrong analysis of the experiences which constitute the perception of matter,
wrong because it mixes up

with their analysis an attempt at accounting for their genesis.

These considerations bring us to another most essential
point in the conception which experience compels us to form
of matter; and this is the third of the three constituent
experiences, mentioned above as necessarily contributing to our

perception of

it.

Observe what happens when the visually

renewed between the

apparent contact, after being broken, is

REALITY.

central

and the non-central

?:.>

solid objects of our

panorama, in

combination with the ideas of them which we are

posing to

The renewal

have been formed.

now sup-

of the contact

is

immediately attended by a new tactual sensation, which would

not occur without it. The contact causes (to use the ordinary
term) the occurrence of the new sensation, but it cannot be
said to cause its nature as a tactual sensation, or as a repre-

These belong to consciousness as a knowing, and

cannot be thought of as caused by anything, consisting as they
do in ultimates, or combinations of ulfcimates, in knowledge.

sentation.

The nature

of the thing causing and the thing caused are both

assumed as known, provisionally at least, before the question of

a causal connection between them can arise.
At the same
time, the occurrence of the contact
of the

new

particulars of change, so that

bodies, or in the

mode

is

essential to the occurrence

and that down

tactual sensation,

of their

any

to the

minutest

difference in either of the

coming into contact, would be

attended by a corresponding change in the sensation. In this

respect the two solid objects and their contact are more
properly characterised as real conditions, in contradistinction
from causes, of the sensation, which latter term implies, that
the whole nature of the consequent as well as

its

occurrence, is

determined by the contact. The Law of Uniformity does not

account for the qualities of the things which it connects,

though knowledge

From
solid

of it enables prediction.

this experience of Matter, that

external

objects with

is,

of the contact of

the body, which

object and the constant central object

of

is

also

a solid

our panorama,

we

form, I think, our original conception of Reality, that original

conception upon which

whatever

else

we

we mould our ideas of the reality

though we may apply the term

call real,

of
to

very different and even to immaterial agencies and objects.

The real in matter lies in its primary properties, which from
the subjective point of view are known as represented tactual
sensations, and from the objective or existential point of view

SHADWORTH

74

H.

HODGSON.

arc thought of as determining by contact with our bodies, but

independently of our ideas or volitions, the occurrence of new

tactual sensations in us, the

same

have already received from them.

the object and the cause, or rather
of

That we know

touch.

sentation,

modes

it

in kind as those

tangible object is at once

real condition, of a sensation

only by sensation and repre-

of consciousness, is

existence as represented,

which we

no argument against

its

independently of the existence of

producing a new tactual sensation,

by its action on coming into contact with our body, is the
evidence of its independent existence and activity, that is, of
conciousness.

what we
of

real

which

it

Its efficacy in

call its reality.

We

think of

it

as existing, in order

to the sensations and representations

causes or determines to exist in us, while, in order

genesis, prior

and representathe knowledge which we have of its nature

of the genesis of knowledge, these sensations

tions are prior to

and

existence.

And

it

is

difficult,

not impossible, to see

call real, not being immeif

how anything whatever which we

diately known to us, even if it should be something

non-material,

can escape from this law of mediate representation, that is to

say, of being thought to exist in the shape and with the

which compose our representing representation

of

it,

Touch holds an unique position among the avenues

of

qualities

objectified as its properties.

knowledge.
only sense, the only kind of feeling,
an
which has
objectified representation or replica of its own
It

is

the

In handling
its real condition as well as its object.
a solid object we have presented in sensations the very thing
which gives rise to those sensations at the time. Moreover,

content for

other sensations, feelings, and states or process-contents of

consciousness, not only have not such replicas of themselves as

all

their real conditions, but, whatever their

own kind

or quality

may
they have real conditions of one kind only, and that
the same as in the case of touch, namely, motions and interactions of material particles, in which term all modes of matter
be,

REALITY.
in motion, as,

cerebral

<.//.,

activities,

instance,

is

ethereal vibrations, electrical charges,

must be held

to

be included.

and

Sight, for

evidence of the existence of ethereal vibrations

proceeding or reflected from the object said to be visible,

impinging upon our organ of vision, and evoking the visual
sensation, quite different in point of kind from tactual sensation.

Thought

again,

and emotion,

in all their

modes, seem

depend for their occurrence upon cerebral activities, in

whatever way we may conceive these activities to be related

to

to the action of external objects

upon the organism.

Matter, then, seems to be not only that object which gives
us our first conception of Reality, but also that which includes
every kind of real condition of which we have positive knowledge.

All

human knowledge

is

conditioned upon the real

existence and operation of matter, in endlessly varied modes

of motion and their combinations.
At the same time, while

giving us our conception of Reality, and our conception of

Real Condition, it gives us no knowledge whatever of its own
It does not explain its own existence, while
real conditioning.
the conceptions to which it gives rise compel us to regard that
existence as requiring and capable of explanation,

if

only modes

of consciousness were accessible to us, other than those

we

derive from matter

itself.

The

possible modes or

which

qualities

consciousness must be conceived

by us as unlimited in
number, since we have the experience of an indefinite number
of them, and know of nothing by which that number can be
The nature and operations of matter limit the number
limited.
of

of

modes

of consciousness

but within this number

which material beings can experience,

is

inevitably included the thought of

a world of reality and real conditioning, evidenced (though not

to us) by modes of consciousness which are not within our
experience, and containing the real conditions of our material

world.

SIIADWORTH

76

III.

We may

HODGSON.

SUBJECT.

from what

see

H.

that

precedes,

approaching experience from the subjective

the

result

of

side (philosophically

not psychologically subjective), that is, of enquiring what we

know of things rather than what we tacitly assume them to be,
as if we knew a priori what Toeing meant, is to substitute the
distinction

philosophical

conditionates,

between

distinction

process-content of

real

arrived

conditions

at

and

by analysis

of

their

the

consciousness, for the pre-philosophie dis-

tinctions of Substances

and their Attributes, Agents and their

Actions, Causes and their Effects, in which the

of Substance, Agent,

and Cause are taken

conceptions

as ultimate

and

explanatory, and to bring the phenomena, which were previously

referred to one or other of the three latter distinctions, under

the former single distinction, as particular cases of it.

But
it is also evident, that this does not enable the conception
of Matter, to

which

all positively

known

real conditions

have

been shown to belong, to

take the place or perform the

function previously supposed to be held or performed by
one or other of the three pre-philosophic conceptions of SubTo think in this way would be to
stance, Agent, or Cause.
ignore

the

result

arrived

to bring the conception of

would be attempting
Real Condition under one or other
at,

since

it

of those pre-philosophic conceptions.

The

substitution of the conception of Real Condition for

is no mere change in nomenclature, but has

important consequences in psychology. It enables an alterna-

that of Cause

hypothesis concerning the genesis and development of

It makes it
consciousness to be offered to psychologists.

tive

any one to maintain, that the function of being

the proximate real condition of consciousness, as distinguished
from its cause, can (to say the least) be equally well performed

possible for

by a material

as

by an immaterial agent or agency, without

his thereby incurring the imputation of being a Materialist in

And the practical advantage of adopting this

philosophy.
alternative can hardly be overrated.
Briefly stated it is this,
that a scientific physiological psychology can be thereby incorporated with, and assigned a definite position in, a philosophy

But now

in the strictest sense of the term.

The conception
taken as

tion,

if

of Subject in current philosophy, in

and not merely

three

pre-philosophic

phenomena

the conception of

agency,

which

as another side or aspect of a concrete

nothing but one or other of

conceptions mentioned above

is

(substance, agent, cause), taken

of the

our

were an independent philosophical concep-

it

conscious being or organism,

those

to

the term Subject.

present question

it is

to turn

ultimate and explanatory

as

of consciousness

and conscious

action.

It is

an immaterial conscious being, or conscious

and actuating the concrete conscious

inhabiting

organism, and so accounting for the phenomena of consciousness and conscious action which it displays
a conception
which merely repeats as an explanation the very thing to be
explained.

But these phenomena,

into objects

known

as

shown above, are

divisible

as real conditions of consciousness,

which

are not-consciousness, and states or processes of consciousness

which are conditionates

is,

nor professes

phenomena,
introduce

it.

into

of

them.

And

this division neither

to be, any explanation or theory of the

which we are compelled by analysis to

Philosophy

is

of necessity the ultimate

we put

formula-

which
questioning
not
does
that
but
it
ourselves,
change
questioning
into unquestionable knowledge, nor does it assume that it is
tion of

the

we

find

of

necessity

explanatory

to

the Universe in

capable of attaining a speculative conception

the nature of that Universe, which is the

of

It may be found to issue in

its enquiry.
the attainment of a conception which can be shown to be
the highest which we are capable of attaining, though not

object-matter of

sufficient as an explanation of the Universe.

Now the real
conditions of consciousness must, we have seen, be conceived

SHAD WORTH

78

something which is
conception we may form

as

as non-material.

HODGSON.

H.

not-consciousness,
of it or

whatever further

them, whether as material or

But the current conception-

of

Subject in

an attempt to override this division, by identiphilosophy

fying consciousness with something, not otherwise specified,
is

which, besides being consciousness, is also its Substance, Agent,

or Cause.
It is virtually an assertion, that the conception of
a Conscious Being is incapable of analysis, and ultimate alike
in

thought and in

conception would,

existence.

Generalising this fallacious

evident, supply a ready though fallacious

it is

explanation or theory of the Universe, by supposing

imagined as a single vast Person.
If,

then,

we adopt

term Subject as
designating the

make our

is

consciousness, or something which is

conditions.

And

choice between these alternatives.

Now

consciousness, not agency,

in philosophy,

we want

is

is

among

known.

object

At

its real

the essential characteristic of what,

the term

Subject to express.

jectivity implies consciousness, implies

from

be

we must, the
a philosophical term, and not as another mode of
conscious organism, we must restrict it to mean

not-consciousness but which

to

to

in philosophy, as I think

either something which

we have

it

the same time

knowing
it is

Sub-

as distinguished

not consciousness as

a general conception, but a particular, individual, and existent

consciousness, that we want to express, and this the term Subject
Accordingly we must say, that the connecessarily implies.
sciousness in any sequence or grouping of contents of conscious-

ness connected in memory, which at any present moment is being

continued into the future, is that which is most properly called

the Subject, being a condition of knowing, conditio cognoscendi,

in relation both to its past already objectified states or contents,

and

to its

which

makes

own

continuation as consciousness into the future, of

The memory bond is that which

the pre-requisite.
The Subject is thus
a single unified consciousness.

it is
it

consciousness of

itself,

that

is,

of

supposed substance, agent, or cause of

consciousness,
itself.

And

not of

this is the

79

REALITY.
true meaning of the pre-philosophic terms

when

"

"

and "

Self,"

these are taken as philosophical terms with a definite

and ascertained moaning. " Subject" " I" and "Self,'" are terms
which in philosophical use are applicable solely to consciousness,
as distinguished

from any Being or Agency which, as such,

is

nolr consciousness.
I should here observe that the opposite alternative as to

the meaning of the term Subject was the one adopted in my

4 (Vol. Ill,
Metaphysic of Experience, Book II F, Ch. I,
pp. 59 to 78),

where

it

was taken

mean

to

real conditions of consciousness.

proximate

the

sum

That

is

of the
its

true

meaning in Psychology, which I was then considering. But we

And there is noalso want the term in Philosophy proper.
reason

why we

meaning

should not adopt

in each, so long as

sophical from

its

we

psychological

in both, with a different*

it

clearly discriminate its philouse.

In philosophy

it

is

conditio cognoscendi, in psychology a conditio existendi.

Light

is

philosophic

embodied in

thrown upon the formation of the pre"

"
I
and " Self," which being
conceptions of
thus

all

language exercise so powerful an influence

upon philosophical thought, in preventing

own adoption in philosophy, as

For we have seen (1)
conceptions.
their

analysis,

and securing

they were philosophical

that there is no immediate
if

experience of an Ego or Self, as a Substance, Agent, or Cause,

that is, of a Feeler, Perceiver, Thinker, or Doer, as distinguished

from a Feeling, Perceiving, Thinking, or Doing, and (2) that

there is a positive experience from which the existence of
proximate real conditions of consciousness may be inferred,
the existence, namely, of neural and neuro-cerebral activities
organisms, which activities are never
immediately presented as contents of the consciousness which
in

living

conscious

they proximately condition. Now since pre-philosophic thought

invariably assumes that, in order of existence, there must exist a
doer, before a doing of

any kind can take

place, that

is,

since it

always in thought places a doer before a doing, referring the

S HAD WORTH H.

80

HODGSON.

existence of the doer (not of his doing) to some immediately

preceding real condition, and so on in infinitum ; and since, in

the case of consciousness,

we

are conscious of

conscious

modes

of being
without being

feeling, perceiving, thinking, doing

conscious of any proximate real condition of them;

we

resort

an expedient, in pre-philosophic thought, to supply this

absence of an immediately perceived proximate real condition
by the idea of an agent sui generis, an agent whose agency
to

consists in

modes

modes

of

being conscious, and upon

can re-act so as to

thus, I think,

what

conceptions of

"

"

modify
have ventured

and

whom

those

his subsequent action.

"

Self

It is

to call the pre-philosophic

"

arise,

conceptions which are

unobjectionable so long as they are frankly accepted as what

are, namely, pre-philosophic designations of individual

they
conscious beings, also called Persons, designations always calling
but which are fatal in philosophy, that is, when
for analysis
;

treated

when

as ultimate, true,

and unanalysable conceptions;

for

so treated they not only put a stop to further analysis,

of themselves to secure a basis for a theory of the

but appear

Universe, by identifying all agency with consciousness. The

"
I,"
conceptions of a concrete conscious organism, and of an
"
"
and
or
consciousness
which
is
agent
Self," or
Subject,"

agency in one, are alike pre-philosophic, and cannot be adopted

as ultimate conceptions, incapable of analysis, in philosophy.
The fact that in conscious process and conscious action, both

and non-volitional, we are never immediately aware

of the neural or cerebral activities upon which that conscious
the fact which not
process or action proximately depends, is
volitional

for the
only enables, but almost irresistibly compels us to look
agency of the process or action within the consciousness that
;

so long as

we have not acquired

having acquired, disregard

the knowledge of the existence of these neural and cerebral
activities, or in other words confine our view to what is

is,

or,

sometimes called introspection alone, which

assume that nothing but consciousness exists.

is

virtually

The whole

to
real

BEAUTY.
mechanism, so to speak, of consciousness goes on without our
being immediately aware of it, aware as we immediately are
only of the consciousness which proximately depends upon it.

But

it is

mechanism

a fatal error in philosophy to treat this real

and

its function, as

the proximate

real condition of consciousness, being established

by analysis of

as non-existent, its existence

the contents of consciousness itself without assumptions.

Now

it is

on introspection alone, disregarding

all

of the mechanism, that all our ordinary thought

knowledge
and ordinary

language concerning conscious process and conscious action are

founded. Everything that we call a motive or a determinant
of conscious process or action is a state or process-content of

consciousness

some sensation or perception, some pleasure

or pain, desire or aversion, representation or idea, wish, interest,

emotion, thought, anticipation, purpose, volition. The laws of
association are ordinarily held to be laws expressing connections
directly obtaining

we

between

states of consciousness.

All conduct,

determined by motives, and no motive is ever anything but some state or mode of consciousness. The agency in
consciousness is thus found, or seems to be found, within the
say, is

consciousness

By

itself.

disregarding the real

mechanism we

erect consciousness itself into a system of what we call purely

mental or psychical processes and actions, a system having its
agency within itself. In the ordinary or pre-philosophic use
of the

terms

/,

Self, or Subject,

We,

we do not

enter on the

consideration of the seat of the agency implied in those terms

we

take them to

designate

concrete

self-conscious

agents,

without further analysis of them. It is only to concrete selfconscious agents, not to their constituents taken severally, that
The
Moral responsibility can be conceived as attaching.

Freedom
or

real

of action attaches,

conditioning

responsibility.
stituents,

the

alone,

But moral
is

and

it exists,

is

of

the

dependent upon

to the

pre-supposed

responsibility

action

real

consciousness which

when

includes

mechanism,

mechanism
in

moral

both con-

and

it.

the

SHAD WORTH

82

But the disregard

the

of

H.

HODGSON.

mechanism

is

arbitrary,

and

consequently the independence of the psychical or mental

Once admit
system, having its agency within it, is imaginary.
the existence of the mechanism, and its relation to consciousness as determining the occurrence of

and the mode

its

states

whole course of conscious process and action

to say, no

new

difficulty arises in

for the supposition of a real

I

and contents,

of applying this conception in explanation of the

do not say that there

physical movements,

is

clear; that

such as to

is

call

agency within consciousness itself.

no difficulty in seeing how merely

actions

which

or brain matter

is

applying

is

it,

and

re-actions,

in living nerve

not-consciousness, movements not

by feeling or thought, can bring about

consciousness which are called rational because they

initiated or directed

trains of

are

apparently so initiated and directed, that

is,

in

which

conscious purpose seems to be the guiding motive.

great
deal has still to be done both in facing and overcoming this
difficulty.

But the mode

clear.

of applying the conception in question is

Say, for instance, to take the case of volition,

where the

spoken of is most apparent, that in a case of

conscious choice between alternatives, the idea of the one is
difficulty just

more pleasureable than that of the other, or that it is the idea

of an action which is right while the other action is wrong or
what
dubious, and that I select and resolve accordingly
not that the more pleasureable idea, or the
compared to wrong or dubious, determines the

really takes place

idea of right as

is,

occurrence of the state of

mind

called selection or resolve, but

that the cerebral activity conditioning that idea, in interaction

with the cerebral activity conditioning the alternative idea,

determines the occurrence of the cerebral activity conditioning

the state of consciousness called selection or resolve, which
again conditions the efferent neurocerebral activity requisite to produce the presentations, if any,
which are involved in what we call the realisation of the
latter cerebral

activity

REALITY.

The course

selected idea, or the carrying out of the resolve.

the action runs

entirely', so to

of

speak, through the activities of

the mechanism and their interaction

it

does not run at all

through the states or processes of consciousness which they

condition. And the same account obviously holds good of other
cases of conscious processor action, of the most varied kinds,

from those in which the motive seems to be a simple sensepresentation, as where we withdraw the hand from a hot coal

which we have inadvertently touched, to those in which the

motive seems to be some complex moral idea, or some intense
emotion, or vividly felt desire, whatever may be its kind, or
the rank it may hold in the scale of moral and spiritual

There

significance.

which determines

always some activity in the mechanism

occurrence and its intensity, and in which

is

its

resides that efficiency in contributing to direct the course of

action,

which we wrongly attribute to the feeling or idea

it

so

do,

often

When

a motive.

in calling

itself

psychologists talk glibly, as they

the undoubted influence which mental

of

or

psychical states, ideas, thoughts, affections, desires, volitions,

and so on. exert on the body and bodily actions, they forget, as
it seems to me, the high probability (to say the least) that
psychical states

may

be themselves conditioned, not upon a

"

mind," or psychical agency within consciousness, but upon

neuro-cerebral processes, and that their supposed effects may be

conditioned

upon

the

continued

operation

of

those

same

processes.
It is solely to express this relation of

mechanism which proximately conditions

is

rightly called an epiphenomenon.

As

consciousness to the
it,

that consciousness

consciousness simply,

it

does not act as a motive in conscious process and action. But

this is not to give the mechanism alone the place or function
of the whole conscious being, nor is to deprive consciousness

simply of its own place and function in the scheme of things.

We cannot but analyse conscious process or action into its two
constituents, the

mechanism and the consciousness.

And
F 2

it

SHADWORTH

84

must never be

HODGSON.

II.

forgotten, especially in calling consciousness

an

epiphenomenon, that its ultimate nature or qualities as such

stand altogether outside any possibility of being accounted for

by any cause or

real condition whatever.

are ultimate

They

data of knowledge, from which our very idea of cause or of real

condition is originally derived.
indeed receive them as-

We

data,

through channels the nature and existence of which

we

infer

as

data.

from them, after having received them previously

to which inference we do not recognise them or think of them
;

Our whole knowledge immediate and

inferential

thus consists of consciousness, which only in point of its

occurrence and genesis can be accounted for; the real conditions accounting for these latter being inferred objects, not

consisting of consciousness, which objects, however, give us

no

And such
insight into their own causes or real conditions.
causes or real conditions we must of necessity think they have.
The very same evidence which forces us to infer their real
existence,

part and parcel of

as

physical world

real

of

Matter, forces us also to infer, that they along with the rest of
that world depend for their nature and existence upon some
real world

or

than themselves, the nature of

worlds, other

which cannot possibly be inferred from anything we know,

or can ever get to know, of their own nature and activities as
The evidence for the real
physical or material existents.
existence and efficiency of Matter

is

also evidence for the real

existence and efficiency of the Supra-material or Unseen.

To return

to the place

and function

of consciousness as a

constituent of conscious process and action,

it is

or efficiency therein

belongs to the other

living nerve or brain mechanism.

function of the consciousness

and direction

obeys as living

and

What,

is

then,

mechanism

the place or

nature

not of course

activities, or of the

and organised matter, but

that

All the agency

constituent, the

It is the evidence of the

of the activities of the

of its physiological structure

it

we have seen

not an efficient link or motive therein.

laws which

of its character,

REALITY.

tendency, and value, as

which

is

its

known from

conditionate.

It

the consciousness

concrete conscious being has of

the

as a conscious being, and therefore of the

constituent of that being,

itself,

knowledge which the

his own nature and activities

is

mechanism

or active

when once the two constituents are

we have now distinguished

distinguished from each other as

And

them.

evidence

Briefly

significance.

conscious

the

stated

and

process

the

thus afforded
it

is

action,

to

the

volitional

is

of

effect,

the

highest
that in all

and non-volitional

activities of the
tendency
mechanism is from the bad to the good, from the good to
the better, and not vice versd.
We shrink from pain and

alike,

or

direction

seek pleasure, involuntarily as

voluntary action

ment

of

some

is

of

the

well as voluntarily, and all

indisputably directed towards the attainend or good. There is, I think,

as yet unattained

no serious controversy on the question of direction or tendency.

The only difference made by an analysis of conscious process or
action like the present is, that it attributes that direction and
tendency solely to the mechanism, excluding the attendant
consciousness, which it considers solely as conditionate and
evidence of the direction and tendency of the mechanism, not
But it is the mechanism,
as also contributing to determine it.

and not the consciousness, which

real conditioning,

is

the real link, or link of

connecting us as real and material beings

with the real supra-material and unseen world, of which

it is

the real conditionate.

It is a

with which

Power (using
it

term in the most general sense)

thus connects us, but a Power of whose nature
this

we can know nothing but what

is

involved in that

Hope which

inseparable from, because it is the emotional element in,

the tendency of our living mechanism to the good, combined
with the thought of the infinite possibilities (so to call them)
is

of the nature and qualities of consciousness, which as qualities

are wholly independent of causation or conditioning. It is an
infinite

and eternal Eeality, known

to exist, but also

known

to

8 HAD WORTH

86

II.

HODGSON.

transcend any positive or definite conception which we can form

of it, though at the same time a Reality which we can only
represent to ourselves by ideas derived from our positive

knowledge, ideas which are thus of necessity anthropomorphic.

It is this Hope, inseparable from connected consciousness,

combined with the thought of the infinite possibilities of

and not any speculative conception of the
nature of the Divine Being, which is the living root and wellconsciousness,

For it leads us individually to put Faith in

spring of religion.
a Divine Being, infinitely higher and greater than humanity, of

whose nature we can form no speculative conception, but whom

of necessity name and think of in terms derived from human

we

Religion means

knowledge.
responding
Reality.

to,

And

for

us

St.

the highest form of goodness, unalloyed,

Paul's well-known triad,

which Christianity has

conception

of

relying upon, and

the Goodness of an omnipotent and omniscient

in -the Christian sense of the term.

roots

the

his

what

are they

in the nature of
to the

relation

is

Love

Faith, Hope, and Charity,

?

They

man.

are

the

practical

Universe, founded in

his.

own nature, and concerning his own conduct

his own hopes and fears for the future, and of

experience of his

and

its issues,

infinite interest to himself, is thus the nearest

man

can

make towards

Universe, of

which he

conception of that
an infinitesimal particle.

speculative

finds himself

approach which

87

FAITH AND THE WILL TO BELIEVE.

V.

L. T.

By

WHEN

a religious creed

HOBHOUSE.

lias lost its vital

hold and nothing has

come to take its place there are two makeshifts possible by

which men seek to fill the void. One is to re-state the old
belief in metaphysical terms, alleging truth of idea where it
plead truth of fact and using the
ambiguities of abstract terms as a cover, behind which by
moving rapidly from one meaning to another the direct conflict
is

no longer possible

with brutal fact

may

to

The other

be indefinitely evaded.

is

to

very temper of mind which accompanies the

decay of religion and make of it a means of evading sheer
denial.
For if an active and aggressive scepticism with its
seize hold of the

claim to judge all things by the test of reason in the name of

truth is the cause of destruction to supernaturalism, the effect
of that destruction' is a scepticism of a different temper
disappointed and disillusioned with a world emptied of its gods,
which the key to all the final problems is still to seek,

in

disheartened with a victory which has possessed it of a bare

and devastated land. In this mood scepticism is ready to be
turned against itself, and there soon arise those who question

much

reason

made

as reason questioned authority.

science a ruler

methods, to which she

superior to

product of

human
scope

any others

human

instincts.
is

and judge over us

is

welcome, but

why

Who, they ask,

Science has her

should they be held

human, the

Science, like theology, is

thought, and, if we push it to the bottom, of

Her conclusions are not infallible, and her

not exhaustive.

As to her first
men have never

fundamental assumptions,
agreement about their nature,
uniformity of nature

which

is

origin,

assumed

principles

and

yet come to an

and
in all

validity.

The

generalisation

88

L.

T.

HOBHOUSE.

is difficult to formulate in terms upon which all would

and has been admitted by distinguished men of science

itself a matter of faith.

why

not at others

agree,
to be

And

if faith is admitted at one

point
"
It is surely not for " reason
to make

arbitrary distinctions.

And the appeal may be pushed further, and urged perhaps

more subtly and persuasively upon the rationalist. The world,
it

may be

said, is doubtless

and in that sense

only to a

is

capable of being rendered intelligible,

in the end rational.

perfected intelligence,

and

to

But

it

the

human mind

is intelligible

at

its present stage it is all fragments and gaps, full of hard

stumbling blocks and appearances of sheer contradiction. On
what ground of reason, the rationalist may be asked, do you

rest

your

belief that these

gaps

may

be

filled,

these fragments

pieced together, and these painful stumbling blocks of contradiction smoothed over? Whence your confidence in a rational
-explanation

of

all

things,

wherein relying

explanations that you hold irrational.

you reject all

Be frank and admit that

along you are building upon faith faith in reason no doubt,

but none the less faith. And having once admitted i'aith as
the necessary basis of the speculative reason, be wise as well as

.all

frank and allow yourself to indulge in faith also in the region

of the practical reason. Eecognise that the demand of reason
upon the world is not only that it should be intelligible but
that it should be just, or say rather that if the terms be taken
in their full significance the world cannot be intelligible unless
it is just.

Extend your

faith, therefore,

and take comfort when

wicked and hear the deep

of
the
allow
the
faith which is in you to
poor.
sighing
Only
have full play. Do not fear your own instincts, but let them
carry you onwards to a realm of inward peace and confident

you look upon the prosperity

of the

outer activity, to which, as a mere reasoner, you will never

attain.

The appeal thus seductively made

general grounds

is

to

the rationalist on

backed up by special considerations drawn

both of psychology and of the theory

place we are told that far from being

i'rom the present condition

of knowledge.

89

AND THE WILL TO BELIEVE.

FAITH

In the

irrational in allowing

first

emotion and desire to influence

belief,

we

are merely facing facts in admitting frankly to ourselves that

what emotion and

this is just

desire inevitably do.

Our

beliefs,

upon our passional nature, and when

the scientific man, with his dogma of the supremacy of truth,

we

are told, are grounded

comes

in to crush us with his superiority he

is

all

the time

merely following another passion of his own. He has a desire

for truth
others have a desire to find particular things true

and

he, it is suggested, is as

anyone

else.

like a rcductio

much

biassed by his desire as

am

This statement, I

ad absurdum, but

aware, looks something

appears to me the fairest

it

statement that can be made consistently with accuracy of

much of the argumentation upon these lines. But the matter
is

pushed further. What, it is asked,

to which the rationalist would

is

truth

man any

scientific

satisfactory account to give of the ultimate

knowledge, and

criteria of

the general test of

us ?
Has the

refer

if

all

if

not,

our existing knowledge

which here and

consists of isolated fragments of ideal systems

there

we

are able to test

by finding that they conform

to fact,

not possible that the beliefs dismissed by science as

superstitions may erect for themselves as good a test and

is

it

stand

it

equally well

are certain

beliefs.

No

For how does the case stand

Here

one doubts that they are the expression

But how are we to tell whether

of genuine states of mind.

or not they correspond to reality

as

questions

conceptions.
practical

living

we

We

need not here ask

and validity are separate

All we need ask is, whether applied to our

work
we are

experience, they

verify themselves.

need, and

origin, for origin

to

We

believe,

satisfactorily
told, in

are right in believing in them.

and so

the gods we
That is true

which works well.

The genuine inner experience, which is
established and confirmed by subsequent experience, equally
genuine,

is

as good an intimation of reality as anything else

90

L.

T.

IIOBHOUSE.

which our limited human intelligence could provide.

In a
somewhat similar spirit other lines of thought have led to
the suggestion

that religious

belief,

not true,

if

at

is

least

biologically valuable, and that just as natural selection has

favoured a protective organ in one creature, an organ for sight

or for hearing in another, so in the

a set of supernatural

rate needs

any

race there

conceptions that have

morality, and, on the theory that

at

human

what works

no further enquiry, here

sufficient justification of the

Finally, the whole conception

is

evolved

guarded social

well, if not true,

is

a simple and

acceptance of the supernatural.

made more systematic by the

is

theory that the basis of intellectual constructions is not the

self-evident axiom but rather the deliberate postulate.

We

have no longer need of the understanding to make our system

of nature, the will is a more efficient and a more adaptable

For instance,

organ.

we must

if

we do not find
we do not

postulate the identity

identity in experience
If the postulate

find.

works well in the practical operations of

has justified
and no more questions need be asked about it. It is

itself

life,

it

only necessary, it would seem, to give a long pull and a strong

pull, and, above all, a pull all together, and we can make our
reality,

within wide and somewhat indeterminate limits, very

much what we please. For all that appears to the

we can settle the question of immortality by simply
by a

overwhelming majority to be immortal, and if

thrown on these assertions, analogies are again not

sufficiently

doubt

is

wanting in the world of psychology.

it

is

One

writer tells us that

simply irrational to decry faith in a fact,

becomes

fact

contrary
resolving

fact.

by

our having faith in

it,

wherever the

and we have the

authority of Mrs. Eddy and her countless followers to prove

that at least in the important department of the relation
between mind and body, faith removes, if not mountains, at

any

rate,
I

the aches and pains that nervous flesh is heir to.

perhaps be told that I have failed to state the view

shall

which

am

criticising

without caricaturing

it.

I can only

RUTH AM) THE WILL TO

plead that I find

it

91

BELIEVE.

impossible to state the case in

my own

words and yet keep from all suggestion of the ridiculous. We

seem in the main to be dealing with one or other or both of

The

two propositions.

make

it

true

first

the second

that by believing a thing

is.

that

is,

we can

believe in a thino-

without asking ourselves seriously whether

As

to the first of

that

it

is

not so ridiculous as

instances in which
fact.

these propositions,

What we

we

it

we

true or false.

it is

are sometimes told

sounds, because there are

are forced to admit

believe about

we

to be the plain

it

the future, for instance, often

it depends on our actions.

In particular, the sanguine man, and that is the man who has
80
faith, is more likely to succeed than the despondent man.
far it is true that faith is an actual force, and, in the main, a

influences the actual event so far as

But, in the

healthy force.
these cases

is

first

place,

what has operated

not the insufficiently grounded belief but

in

the

attitude of will, the resolute, high-spirited, unswerving deter-

mination which carries a

man

And from

on.

this distinction

we may

It
learn a lesson that may be applied in other cases.
not the ungrounded and perhaps incorrect belief which is
intrinsically valuable, but the state of feeling, emotion, and
is

will

from which that belief issues and

In practical

affairs, in

essential, there is too often the

misdirection of

effort,

to

which

so far as the

and

if

it

ministers.

belief itself is

premature
Nemesis of rashness or other

philosophical analysis

is

to be

must surely be allowed to go below

the surface, and separate what is of genuine value from what
is superabundant and possibly hurtful.
Thus in the cases taken
there is a higher state of mind than that of the spurious courage
applied to these matters,

due

it

to ignorance or over-confidence,

based on determination
Nevertheless,

it

will

be

to

do

the

said, the

namely, genuine courage,

best whatever happens.

belief

is

certain

in

cases

the operative force, for there are natures not strong enough to
act at their best, except under the influence of an over-belief
of

one kind or another, and wherj their action

is

a factor the

92

L.

T.

HOBHOUSE.

event will in a measure depend upon what they believe

certain to be.

Clearly this

a dangerous line of argument

is

It has a wider application,

for the advocates of faith.

it

and

only the old familiar recommendation of irrational belief as a moral prop for the weaker brother
suggests that after all

that

is

it is

being urged upon us.

Whatever the

of this recommendation, to urge

clearly be to

abandon the case

it

practical

wisdom

in this connection

for

would

emotion as a vehicle of

truth.

us carry the matter a step further by taking another

class of cases where the fact is affected by the belief in it.

But

let

In the case of faith-healing, belief often affects not only the

The child or the
future but the present state of mind or body.
adult whose pain vanishes when he is clearly and
emphatically assured that he has none, illustrates vividly the
childish

dependence

a certain order of fact upon the recognition

of

accorded or refused to

it.

class of cases, the limits of

We

have here, no doubt, another

which are

at present ill-defined, in

state of mind affects the reality to which the state

mind has reference. In the first case that we took, the
reality is some event external to ourselves, affected by our

which our

of

action

in the second set of cases it

feelings or our

own

these cases

that in

is

body.

was the

The common

them our

state of our

own

characteristic of both

state

of

mind

is

itself

an

operative cause working under certain conditions which are in

part determinate, in part, in the present state of our knowledge,

not determined.

In so far as any event depends upon a state

and

in so far as that state of

of

our minds,

mind depends upon the

belief

which we entertain,

it needs no argument to prove that a fact

affected
our
belief about it.
be
Experience, however,
by
may
restricted to a very
kind
of
causation
is
shows us that this

narrow sphere.

In the special relation

of

mind and body some

physiologists are perhaps disposed to think that the sphere is

somewhat wider than was formerly supposed, and that some

small percentage of what was formerly classed as quackery may

But all this, besides being
be based on a true causal relation.

concerned with a region in which the facts are still hopelessly

intertwined with self-deception and fraud, is in reality quite
irrelevant to the present argument.

That our mental state

operates on our bodily tissues, and through them may affect

other things, is a popular way of stating a very familiar fact.

But, upon this ground, to draw a kind of blank cheque upon the
intellect to construct in any department it pleases any image of
reality it pleases, and to take that for reality, would be a most

inconsequent proceeding. The neurotic imagination

basis for a world philosophy.

is

a poor

I pass to the second question of the belief which we are

asked to hold without questioning as to whether it is true.
There are two possible interpretations of what is meant. It

be suggested that we should hold the two positions

simultaneously, that we should believe and, at the same time,

may

not believe the truth of what

we

believe.

I cannot state this-

any form which is not to my mind a contradiction

in terms, for I cannot make anything of belief which does not
constitute an assertion of truth.
But, it may be said, the conposition in

ception of the will to believe involves no such contradiction.

Will necessarily influences belief. When we resist an orator's

appeal to our emotions on the ground that, logically regarded,

he is all the time talking clap-trap, we can only do so by a
determined effort to keep our minds fixed on the real facts of
the case.
believe
justifies

What, it may be asked, is this if not the will to

The reply is that it is precisely this analogy which
us in treating the will to believe as an expression

tacitly inviting us to divorce belief

attention with which

resist

an emotional appeal

point of the
that there
truth,

we

argument

is

and the

from truth.

The

effort of

follow a difficult demonstration or

is

an

effort after

Truth, and the

in favour of entrusting belief to will

no radical distinction between this

effort to attain belief

is

effort after

without regard to truth.

94V

L.

The two

T.

HOBHOUSE.

are held fundamentally identical, because effort and

passion enter into both as though effort and passion were not
necessarily present as moving forces in all that we do, good and
l)ad

The

alike.

rational

without evidence
as

"

We

snarling logicality," to the plane of

are

recommended

deepest service

there are gods.

works

is to

"

accepting conclusions

to

relegated, perhaps with a dash of

is

an argument or to
"

objection

temper
an antiquated prejudice.

to exert our wills not in order to follow

sift

evidence, but to do the universe the

in our

power by obstinately believing that

The plural number one gathers from recent

be taken

literally,

and the world awaits with

interest

Jupiter and Minerva, Isis and Osiris,

Mumbqjumbo, or Unkulunkulu in whom it is to make up its
mind to believe. It wants but an effort, and once again we
to learn

whether

it

is

"

have sight of Proteus rising from the sea and hear

However this may be,
old Triton wind his wreathed horn."
shall all

the point of the whole argument is that we do our duty in the

world by suppressing logical criticism and accepting the belief
And when we are asked
to which emotional impulse prompts.
to do this deliberately

we

are in effect being invited to believe

without regard to the truth

of

what we

believe.

Now to

take up this position open-eyed would be voluntarily

to embrace a self-contradiction, and would therefore be difficult.

But there

is

another

way

of advocating the will to believe, in

from self-contradiction,
a recommendation of insincerity.
And
which, to escape

difficult.

All that

is

needed

is

it

merely amounts to
by no means

this is

that the different sides of the

contradiction should be held apart.

Belief

is,

I suppose,

an

acceptance of an idea as an element in the general system of

conceptions whereby we harmonise our experience and regulate

our thought were always consistent and

coherent, there would be only the one system for each of us,
harmonious throughout alike in methods and results, but in

our conduct.

point of fact

If

we know that

actual

human

experience in fragments, and thinking

it

beings, obtaining their

out very inadequately,

FAITH

AND THE WILL TO

95

BELIEVE.

have many different and frequently incompatible groups of

ideas lying side by side in their minds without touching or

The view we have now before

recommend that we should encourage this frag-

interfering with one another.

us seems to

mentariness, that with regard to some of the most important of

our notions we should, while conscious that they have not stood
the tests which

we

ordinarily find necessary as a check to hasty

judgment, nevertheless set them firmly

in

one or other of our

fragmentary systems.
Fragmentariness of this kind passes by delicate shades into
insincerity, but in its most typical form there is no need to
apply to it any harsh epithets. What we find common at a

time when fixed principles are melting away

in

which the

a type of

mind

different orders of experience are separated off

into, as it were, water-tight compartments.

scientific

is

view

of all

mundane

affairs

With

a very rigidly

combined

for example,

perhaps with a complete scepticism as to orthodox religion, there

any new thing in the domain of

the supernatural, and the more determined a materialist a man
is in his judgments of human history and contemporary events,
will go a readiness to believe

of politics,

and

also perhaps of private affairs, the

more we are

likely to find him, or possibly her, ready for the cult of the

These two mental

extremely irrational in another sphere.
do
not
come into contact.
attitudes exist side by side.
They

But though
noticing

it,

it

is

easy to imagine people

growing, without
it is not

into this condition of double-mindedness,

easy to understand anyone's recommending it as a healthy

It might indeed be advised by a cynic, as a
condition of mind.

means

of

making the

best of both worlds, but

we

are here not

discussing cynicism, but a serious attitude of mind in connection with the deepest problems of existence, and, dealing
spirit, we are bound to point out,
not only that the attitude recommended is indefensible, but,
that even the practical advantages claimed for it are more than

with the matter in the same

doubtful.

For the faith in things

spiritual,

which

is

thus kept

96

L.

T.

HOBIIOUSE.

compartment from things temporal, ceases to

and inspire our judgment of the practical things with
which we have to deal. Indeed the separation does positive

in a separate
vitalise

harm. It is only because he keeps a private storeroom of

nourishment for his spiritual nature that a man is capable of
being a sheer materialist in his judgment of the things of this
it is only by
forcing him to recognise
a spiritual at all it is to be found in this
temporal experience that he can be made to bring his religion
into contact with actuality.
Against the doctrine that for the

world, and, conversely,

that

if

there

is

sake of practical religion we must have a faith that is divorced

from scientific method, it may on good grounds be retorted that
the only religion of practical value

is

that which

we can

seriously

from and applying to that very same experience

with which science has to deal. To make life a coherent whole
treat as flowing

is

the aim not merely of

theoretic

reason but of practical

morals.

As

there

naturalism

are

those

necessary

for

who

find

their

an

extravagant superbalance as a

own mental

corrective of their equally exaggerated materialism, so there are

others

who on

similar grounds

recommend supernaturalism

as

morally and educationally necessary to the world at large.

They find the heart of man so depraved, and the rules of right
and wrong so far divorced from reason that except through fear
of a supernatural judgment they cannot believe that we poor

human

can scrape up enough of moral decency to

keep society together. The most conflicting forms of supernatural doctrine may be taught, provided only that some form
beings

of the supernatural be retained.

Such a

position, of course,

could never have been taken up in days when supernaturalism

living hold, and it well illustrates the condition of mental

had a

twilight that

we

are describing, in

which

intellectual incoherence

passes through various shades of self-deception into definite

insincerity, the background being all along a narrow and

perversely materialistic interpretation of actual experience.

FAITH AND THE WILL TO BELIEVE.

We

97

have seen then that the will to believe, in so far as

it

means determination to retain belief in that which in our hearts

we do not consider true, is a contradiction in terms. In so far
as

it is

an invitation

to us so to

shape our minds as to divorce

the fundamental questions from the problems of practical

it is

life,

an invitation, theoretically speaking, to inconsistency and,

practically speaking, to irreligion, while lastly, in so far as

it

upon the suggestion that what we believe can affect

reality, it is a crude generalisation from a very narrow order of

rests

facts, in

which the conditions are peculiar and cannot,

be applied to a wider sphere.

But, it may be said, what
after all irrational if
is

is

we adopt

therefore,

the criterion of truth

that

the distinctive boast of science

are

we

method of verification which

The answer is clearly in

the negative, provided the method of verification is the same

in both cases.
But is it so ? If I understand correctly the

method

propounded to us by the exponents of practical

desirability, it amounts to this, that certain beliefs, arising no
matter how, but felt with intensity, are decided by application
to our practical experience.

We

find ourselves contented with

They meet our needs, they suffice to direct our actions,

and they come across no practical obstacle that being so, the
them.

.suggestion that they are in the same position as a scientific

hypothesis, which is verified by consistency with the facts, is

put forth. On this we must remark first, that bare consistency

with the facts is not, by careful thinkers, held sufficient as a
final

may

demonstration of a hypothesis. More than one hypothesis

be consistent with the facts, and it is clear that more

than one hypothesis cannot be true. And this is suggestive

for our purposes.
A hypothesis may well accord with the
facts

without being

itself

true,

descriptions and generalisations

when

it

contains within

which are

true.

it

Thus, I

suppose the Ptolemaic system of the universe summed up a

mass of recorded observations and generalisations as to the

movements

of the planets,

which were in the main perfectly

G

98

L.

T.

HOBHOUSE.

sound, and eking these out with certain further suggestions

which were not based upon experience, or were based on a
faulty interpretation of experience, it formed a certain concrete
of

picture

the

material

On

universe.

the

basis

of

this

hypothesis, the motions of the planets and the occurrence of

astronomical

events

in

great measure, capable of

being predicted, and so for a long while the hypothesis accorded

with known

became,

and not only accorded with them, but

facts,

I imagine in the practical requirements,

of reducing these facts to order

if

we may

assisted

so call them,

and anticipating the future.

The hypothesis served this purpose in virtue of the element in

which was sound, as being derived by legitimate generalisa-

it

from well-attested experience.

But so far there is no
discriminate what is sound from what is unsound,
and so long as we only look to bare consistency with fact as
tion
test

to

with

contrasted

ment

necessitation

of a certain ethical

of the

by

we cannot make

fact,

Similarly, a religious creed

distinction.

experience which

and
it

is

this

a concrete embodi-

spiritual experience.

embodies a creed

may

In virtue
serve our

practical needs well and, within certain limits, perfectly, but,

the kernel of experience and not the husk

imagery which is the solid truth. Mere conformity

nevertheless,
of spiritual

it is

with experience, then, is not enough either in science or religion.

But there is a more fundamental point. The verification which
science requires

is

further inference
scientific

the verification by further observations or

from observed facts, that is to say, the

hypothesis

is

an assertion

of fact,

and

it is

decided

by comparison with other assertions of facts. The hypothesis

of faith, on the other hand, is an assertion of fact which is to
be decided at best by
are fairly faced,

its utility,

and

its satisfaction of

this

means, when the facts

As long as our

our desires.

impulses, our cravings, our thirst for some sign of justice, or

mercy, or love in the order of things is satisfied, so long all is
well, and we may believe in the scientific truth of the belief

by which we obtain

this satisfaction.

It is clear that the

two

FAITH AND THE WILL TO BELIEVE.

99

The verification which commonthings are not on all fours.

sense and science desiderate is la verification of assertions of
fact

by

requires
wishes.

The

facts.

verification

which we are told that

faith

the verification of assertions of fact by our

Now, it is said that neither scientific men

is

own
nor

Be
philosophers are agreed as to the final criterion of truth.
it may, they are, I should
as
to
certain
imagine, agreed
negative points, and there is one negative which common-sense
that as

us long before we philosophise, and that is that

is a very bad
guide to truth. When we desire to
form a cool and accurate judgment we dismiss desire and
teaches

emotion

The doctor

feeling.

come

to

the

best

another practitioner to diagnose

ones, or, as Aristotle reminds us, we

calls in

own loved

the case of his

decision

as

to

whether Helen shall

we hold our

We

deliberations.

are told that all this rationalism has in

Pharisaical, that
for all our

tions

be

room while

retained or dismissed by sending her out of the

we cannot be

rational through

common-sense and our science

rest

it

something

and through,

upon assump-

that some of these assumptions at least are not self-

evident, but that they are, in fact, instruments of which

we

make

use deliberately with the distinctively practical end of

harmonising our experience by their means. To criticise this

view

of things

would involve a complete statement of the

which this is not the time. But I

theory of knowledge, for

may

point out,

us not so
tion of

much

first,

that

if

the theory were true

it

would lead

to the justification of faith as to the destruc-

knowledge and the encouragement of scepticism as the

only rational attitude, while, secondly, I

may

be allowed to say,

my mind, a different opinion of the structure of knowOur thought builds upon experience by
ledge is a truer one.
methods of which it is not conscious, till it comes to look back
that to

upon them, and philosophise about them.

in point of fact, by no means unerring

These methods
if

are,

they were so we

should never hear of a hasty generalisation or a confusion of

G 2

T.

HOBHOUSt

reflective thought sifts them and selects out as

sound the elements which consist and cohere with one another.
These methods are, in the first place, not foreign to reason,

but, on the contrary, are merely the expression in general

terms of what in concrete cases reason actually does. They are

not assumptions which it is open to the rationalising mind to

take np or lay down at pleasure, but they express those acts or
functions in which the work of the rationalising mind consists.

And

if

they are capable of being set as

first

principles at the

top of the chain of deductions from which the judgments of

common-sense are derived, they are equally capable of being

deduced in turn from the work which thought achieves. The
ideal of knowledge in this view is a complete circle, or, if the

expression is preferred, a system in which the different parts

and what are called the fundamental

necessitate one another,

assumptions of thought are merely the most wide-reaching

strands which form the inter-connection of the parts. It is,
of course, true that, on such a conception of verification there
could be no absolute certainty in any knowledge short of complete knowledge of all things that are, and so in fact we find
that, in the advance of science, we are not merely extending

but continually modifying, in one way or another,

those results which have been regarded as best established.

territory,

But though

rational thought is never final, it is at any

the
nearest thought to truth that we can have.
given stage
For the reason is simply the effort of the mind to grasp its

experience as an articulate and coherent whole. Unreason lies

in the formation of beliefs in isolation from, and ultimately in

body of thought. The rational view is

must be a consistent whole, we cannot admit

defiance of, the general

that, since truth

inconsistent judgments, nor can

we admit methods

of forming

judgments in one pan which are known to lead to false results

in another. It is one thing to admit that, our experience being
incomplete, the body of thought resting on it is not final, and
that accordingly judgments shown to conflict with it may still

FAITH

AND THE WILL TO

101

Such an ajlmuaiim

contain a measure of truth.

is

merel v an

judgment pending an appeal to a still wider experience.

It is quite another thing to admit for purposes of utility, and
not of truth, methods which are definitely known to give fake

arrest of

In the

results.

first

case

we

are merer/ recognising that a

must he a gradual growth. In the second, we

g the principle on which any

rational system

most

_rr

But,

which

is

we may be

told, it is

intended as the

practical utility.

test,

not the satisfaction of

but the

much

harder fact of

A hypothesis is sound not because it

our wishes, hut because it works weH that is to say, i

well by holding it in our minds as a truth. It tfMMgK

about the world, and do the work the world requires of

This position may be most fruitfully considered in its
setting, to
If,

which a

then,

it

brief reference

us.

has already bee

were true that certain

beliefs are useful, or, to

to the furthest point, necessary to the life and growth

of the species, could that be taken as evidence of their truth ?

push

it

Let us

first

considering,

hold fast the point that

and not

The

utility.

it is

truth which

evolutionist

we are

must not ask i

to believe as true certain beliefs which he can see to have

useful, purely

upon the ground that they were useful He

say that it would be a sad day for the race when we come tocriticise these principles if our criticism is to weaken them, and

he

may

suggest to us, as

practical proposal, that in the

question about them.

This

we

should agree to bury aU

is to suggest a rpttam practical

interest of race preservation

But he cannot at one and the sune time ask us to

and also refuse to face it. Evolution having
brought him, and presumably us, to die point at which we are
able to look back over the ascending process, and discern that
certain thoughts served as the ladder by which we have climbed
attitude.

face the question

to our present vantage-ground, we cannot put ourselves back

upon the position of those who are upon the ladder. At feast,

102

T.

L.

HOBHOUSE.

can only do so by descending on to it again, and so losing

our vantage-ground. In other words, we are in the same
dilemma as before, that we are asked to be either inconsistent
\ve

or insincere.

Clearly,

of the truth of
it

must be through the

manently valuable
to

the evolutionist

is

to tell us anything

strict sense of truth,

explicit assumption that

to the species does in

Now, within

reality.

what

is

per-

some sense correspond

certain limits, this

a very fair

is

For, taking the term reality in a popular sense

that if the sense organs, for example,

assumption.
I

if

our religious beliefs in the

suppose we may admit

do not accurately inform us as to the nature of things about

for
us, they would hinder and not assist us in the struggle
oO
existence, and that, on the evolutionist hypothesis, the eye and
/

the ear come to be formed as they are because in their present

structure they do, in point of fact, inform us accurately as
to

what

is

passing around us, and so enable us to meet the

The same argument is fairly applicable

In the main it may very fairly be argued

necessities of existence.

to ethical truth.

we have come

form about conduct, the

mass of instincts and traditions which have grown up to
that the judgments

this

regulate

to

judgment, have grown up in accordance with

and

they radically failed to meet those

needs, if they were on the balance injurious, the societies
holding them would go under in the struggle for existence and

certain social needs,

if

Whence, conversely, the moral attitude of a society

which has survived and come to the top is the attitude which

disappear.

corresponds best to the real requirements of human existence.

at once expand and correct this view if we look

We may
a

little

who

further into the actual moral order.

faces the facts, will not, I think, find

The

rationalist,

harmony

actually

attained in the existing moral judgments of men, and

if

he

does not find harmony, he will not admit that there is final
truth, and if he looks at the working of natural selection he
will not expect to find final truth, but only very

rough truth,
For

the preponderance, on the whole, of truth over falsity.

103
not secure that any instinct, or any
faculty, or any structure should be perfect or life-giving
through and through. It secures only that it should give life
The rationalist, therefore,
more often than it gives death.
natural selection

does

calling in conceptions of evolution to his aid,

is justified

in

treating our moral judgments as data which it is his problem

to harmonise as best he may, and it is only in the ideal

harmony that he will find complete ethical truth.

If we assume provisionally that such an order
so that in

principle

the

rationality of

is

established

our moral nature

vindicated, further lines of thought are opened up.

now reached

We

is

have

the conception of a spiritual reality, for the moral

a spiritual order having

its very imperfect manifesThis reality we may use as

a starting-point of a philosophic system.
This was in essence
the aim of the Critique of the Practical Reason. Kant's position
is spiritual,

tation in the life of humanity.

was that the analysis

mind

problems.

mathematics, physical science, and

together as the work of the speculayielded no positive conclusions upon fundamental

Exactly the same analysis might be applied, he

metaphysics
tive

of

all classed

moral judgment, and with more positive

results.
Now, if the system of moral judgments is valid, I can
see no flaw in principle in Kant's method. It must be legitimate
conceived, to the

to trace the

axioms which these judgments imply, and to

tri

at

those axioms as conveying truth.

Unfortunately

if

the method

is

right in principle

it

can:iot

be said that the application has met with general assent. The
three ideas of the speculative reason, God, freedom, and
immortality, which Kant found justified by the criticism of
practical reason are, in reality, of very doubtful application
to ethics.
On the contrary, it may be contended that the only
rational system of ethics

is

one which finds the value of moral

action within the sphere of

world, and

human

life

and conduct in

this

assumption which the moral

which
consciousness makes and
the practical reason has to
the only general

104

L.

T.

HOBHOUSE.

that the purposes of social human life are worth

and
realising
capable of being realised by human effort.
But be that as it may, in the notion of axioms applied by

justify

is,

we pass out of the sphere of faith, and'

the
limits
of
our present question, which is precisely
beyond
this, whether if reason fails any belief resting on other grounds
the practical reason,

is

to

have any claim upon our acceptance.

rationalists will not readily allow that it has

As

to morality,

any need of any

special backing; but the rationalist unless very readily con-

tented

or blindly

optimistic,

must admit

that

the

human

imagination craves other sustenance than that of mere morality.

The more he
as

he sees

is

it

permeated with the irrationality of the world

deeper is his underlying thirst for some

the

assurance of a higher order, in which the wrongs are righted.

Of intimations of such a higher order he, in common with the
irrational] st, has his share, but he will not admit them blindly,
as long as he

is

determined to govern his beliefs and

to rule

himself only according to the best evidence attainable of the

actual truth.
Does this mean that he must dismiss from
consideration everything that he cannot prove, that he must
attach no weight to much that in him, as in all humanity,

seems to speak of a wider, a higher and a nobler reality than

anything which we actually see or touch ? This is, to my mind
the kernel of the problem. Having made up our minds to put

aside all juggling as to the belief

which

is

not true, as to the

imperfect axiom which may be voluntarily postulated, as to

the useful which may be confused with the true, and having
frankly admitted the distinction between the vague suggestion
that feeling prompts and the articulate proposition which
reason proves, are we to take the world precisely as reason
shows it us or are we to give weight to the element of feeling
as well

For the

latter alternative I see

two reasons.

One

is

that the instinctive revolt against the limitations of experiences

as we know them, against the unspeakable injustice of things,

the universal waste of faculty, and the brokenness of

life,

has

FAITH

AND THE WILL TO BELIEVE.

105

one of the qualities which belongs to proof, that is to say,

It
to many of us at least, compelling and recurrent.

in

it

it

is,

is

the character of proof

attraction but

by

It

force.

master

to

us,

not, as it were,

the flowery paths of imagination merely entice us on.

my own

speaking from

any particular scheme

one's

happy

belief,

experience at
is

that

"

by

compels us to give assent, while

And
that

rate, it is

so,

when

any
propounded with a view to restoring
God's in His Heaven, and all's right

with the world/' the scheme is alluring but not compelling.

But if we turn from every successive concrete scheme of things

back to the blank world that we find and say that that is all
we know or can know, always there seems to arise in revolt

same inner consciousness, with its insistence, that though

every actually propounded scheme may be demonstrably false,
this

still

there
of

powers

something more, it may be entirely beyond our

conception, but something in which the spiritual

is

problems wherewith experience groans and travails would find

a solution and leave us at peace. This insistent counter-belief

same quality of coming back, though we expel

with a pitchfork, which the reluctant irrationalist is bound
What precise value
in the end to concede to demonstration.

has, I think, the

it

can we attach

if we
try to stand outside ourselves and our
own impulses to believe or to question what precise value can
we attach to this impulse ? I think we may arrive at a fair
valuation if we bring in a second consideration. Through the
whole course of the upward evolution of the mind we find that

the function of reason

which

is

is

to analyse

before held confusedly.

and render

At

through a glass darkly what in the next stage

face

to

meaning

face.

of

Instinct

which

it

is

prompts

to action, of

unconscious.

explicit that

we
above we

the lower stage

the

Instinct

see
see

end and

fused with

is
still
half-conscious, or at best imperfectly
conscious of the meaning and tendency of its own behaviour.
At all the stages in the procreation and rearing of the young,

intelligence

for

example, the

succession

of

instinctive

acts

leads

the

106

L.

T.

HOBHOUSE.

animal blindly on from stage

to

to

While the whole process

it

delightful.

intrinsically

each step seeming

stage,

is,

as we say metaphorically, Nature's object it is never as a

This blindness
whole the object of the animal which acts.
of instinct dominates the animal world.

same limitation applies

to

But

human conduct

in principle the

Our own

as well.

motives are but imperfectly present to us in the act. Nor are

they reasoned out. They are shaped by the scheme of things
in which we grow up, and which arranges for us plans of action
of which we agents never have
a perfect idea beforehand. Only in proportion as we reflect
and analyse does the full bearing of what we do become clear

and chains of consequences

to

we

We

us.

also sift

rational

for our impulses, while

find a rational

meaning
out from them what is
scheme

and unworthy.
be perfected, would

irrational

of conduct, could

it

represent a kind of purified deposit from the ore, the very crude

and traditional behaviour, in which what was

wholly intelligent and of value should be separated from the
impurities arising from selfish desire and limitation of view.
ore, of instinctive

Instinct as such,

world

we

it

is,

after

should be remarked here,

it

At

guide to truth.

all,

manner

we

find

no

infallible

the animal

highest development
a quite fallible basis of reaction.

analyse the beliefs which

instinctive,

is

in

its

their

in

basis

human
in

experience we

some

sensibility,

If

call

some

probably emotional perception, so subtle

as to defy our rationalising intelligence, as the finer feminine
intuition outruns the slow conclusions of the clumsy and prosaic
male.

of perception,

When we

judge by instinct we form judgments on data

too fine or too complex to be analysed out. But such judgments

are far from infallible, though those who most trust to them
are

wont

to

note only the

affirmative instances

Thus the immediate unproven judgments

of success.

our sensibility
carry us much further than our analysing reason could do, but
they are also much more heavily charged with error. Eeason
of

lumbers along in their wake with slower but surer tread.

FAITH AND THE WILL TO BELIEVE.

It

follows on this account that the element of reason in

human conduct

is dependent on the element of feeling as that

which originally prompts to action. The world of feeling is
a tangle in which it is the business of reason to sort out the

threads.

But the work

complete.
as

of reason is never in our experience

On

we come

the contrary it often seems that in proportion

to a higher stage of conscious intelligence, so do

further depths

and heights of imagination and -feeling open

us, and the work of reason is to follow in

above us and beneath

the directions to which

thus pointed rather than decline to

move beyond the ground that it has already won.
It has,
indeed, the right to reject the utterance of imaginative feeling

when
but

it

down

it is

dogmas, professing to be settled truth,

has not the right to decline investigation of the kind

laid

and measure

as

which imagination may point. And

seems justified to the ethical rationalist

of truth to

this double attitude

by the history of religion and ethics, for here we rind that what
for us an established rational order of conduct, has been

is

propounded in the past under religious forms which we as

now reject. We do not believe in the gods of

but
we believe in the wisdom of Athene, and perhaps
Olympus,
in the vengeance of the Erinnyes.
We do not believe in the

rationalists

God

of the Israelites,

Similarly
surrender,

we

and we seem

precisely that

to recognise in the evolution of religion

movement from an imaginative

apprehension of truth

but we believe in the law of righteousness.

believe in the law of love, of forgiveness, of self-

just conception of mental evolution then

means allow us

to a

rational

which has been described.

would by no

of feeling in our

to despise the

promptings
Neither would it allow us to accept as
sufficiently accredited the formal creeds into which these
promptings crystallise themselves. Experience comes to us
search for truth.

half-formed and ill-understood feelings, emotions, and

The practices and the theories which we base on
imaginings.
first in

these are irrational, and the

first

work

of

rational criticism

108
is

to destroy

the

T.

L.

ruins

them

Its second

as such.

what was

for

HOBHOUSE.

in

reality

work

to dig

is

or

beautiful

among

true,

to

get back to the elements of experience which were faultily

used, and to piece them together again on better principles.
Investigators have shown that even in the crassest primitive

magic there

distorted.

often

is

taboo

genuine experience embodied and

be partly based on the facts of the

may

transmission of disease by infection, though it may be applied

to qualities which cannot be so transmitted, and may be made
the basis of rules which sanitary science would hold foolish.
Similarly the worship of household gods may be an irrational

form in which the rational love

the love of

of

home and family

expresses

God an

expression for the recognition of duty,

the possibly undue exaltation of a virtue for its own sake the

itself,

unconscious admission of

its

necessity to society.

In these and

countless other cases with very varying degrees of error the

rational ordering of life
partially

apprehended

Now

practice.
is

is

it is

as

truth.

were anticipated, and being

enshrined in some concrete belief or

the discrimination which

also required in the present.

beliefs,

it

We

we apply

must firmly

to the past

reject irrational

and yet allow that they may embody a measure

find that measure is always our problem, and

To

of
in

we must frankly admit that the stimulus to onward

movement is always the formless element of feeling that reaches
doing so

We

out beyond the rational order of established truth.

shall
then not undervalue that insistent feeling which in our dissatisfaction
solutions,

with the world drives us forward

and yet we

rational tests,

to seek for

new

shall decline to accept, until confirmed

any solution which

it

proposes,

by
and therewith

also the bare promise that of a surety there will be a solution.

We

have no such absolute assurance.

Yet though there

is

no

one word of a message of certain truth that they can give us we

have no reason to doubt that there is a real significance in the
confused utterances within us which respond to the deeper
voices of nature or human life, as we listen to the singing of

FAITH AND THK WILL TO BELIEVE.

109

the birds on wet spring evenings, or sound the depths of a

human tragedy without solution on this world's stage, or let
ourselves be swept along in the tide of
it

that

is

All

would say

life

we know

significance

is

some noble verse. What

to us in these

moods we cannot

tell.

experience is charged with a deeper

cannot adequately apprehend, but we can

that

which we

and try to piece the broken message together. Just as

have come to understand the instinct which prompts the

listen
\\c

and act without understanding, just as we can

often trace the genesis of a creed which an earlier race formed
animal to

feel

without knowing

how

or why, so

if

we do not

by premature certainty our successors

stifle enquiry
value justly the

may

thoughts and hopes, the fancies and yearnings, which we find

it hard even to express, and may find for them a place in a
rational order

which

it

was beyond our power

to construct.

As a forerunner of thought, then, feeling has its place, and

we should do ill to close our minds absolutely to its suggestions.
But we do still worse if we deliver over our reason to its
guidance. We do worse again when we feign to ourselves
a reasoned assent to conclusions to which in reality we are
prompted by desire alone. And we do worst of all when we
seek to escape the whole difficulty by discrediting reason and
Those who
clouding the issue between truth and falsity.

concern themselves so

much with

practical

referred to history to determine whether

has caused the more tears to flow.

when

successful with ourselves,

The

dogma
\yill to

grow into the

should believe as well, for belief so attained

on

its

much

apex, needing

and trembling

discussion.
lives,

of

is

all

Shorn

believe must,

will that others

a pyramid based

the cruelty born of panic.

drives

it

of all external support,

spirit

ransacking the ages for a

be

support of sympathy from outside,

internal weakness

and the dogmatic

may

or rationalism

to its fall at every blast of incredulity.

has persecuted with

sciousness

results

God

is

Dogma
Tha con-

to suppress

overt

dogmas have short

tossed from creed to creed,

that will outlast the seasons'

110
changes of

L.

fashion.

T.

HOBHOUSE.

Meanwhile rationalism

moves slowly

onward, incorporating such suggestions of feeling as it finds

sound, well aware of the smallness of its achievement and the
vastness of the problems that loom beyond, but strong in the
sense of inward harmony and in the knowledge that what it

has done, whether

work.

much

or

little, is

always thorough and honest

VI.

REMARKS ON THE SUBJECTS OF MORAL

JUDGMENTS.
By EDWARD WESTERMARCK.

IN every study of the moral consciousness as a whole the

subjects of moral judgments call for a very comprehensive

Such a study must comprise a discussion both

and of the particular branches

examination.

of the general characteristics

of

those

phenomena which have a tendency

condemnation or moral

praise,

and

evoke moral

to

in each case the investigation

should be both historical and explanatory.

The present paper,
however, will be neither the one nor the other. Its object is

simply to examine the general nature of the subjects of moral

valuation from the standpoint of the enlightened moral
consciousness.

Moral judgments are commonly said to be passed upon

conduct and character.
This is a convenient mode of
expression, but the terms need an explanation.

Conduct has been denned sometimes as

"

acts adjusted to

ends,"* sometimes as acts that are not only adjusted to ends,

but definitely willed.f The latter definition is too narrow for

our present purpose, because, as will be seen, it excludes from
the province of conduct

many phenomena with reference

The same may be said

which moral judgments are passed.

the former definition also which, moreover,

wide, including as

it

does an immense

is

number

to

of

unnecessarily
of

phenomena

with which moral judgments are never concerned. Though no

definition of conduct could be restricted to such phenomena as

Spencer, Principles of Ethics,

t J.g.

i,

5.

Mackenzie, Manual of Ethics, 1900,

p. 85.

EDWARD WESTEKMAKCK.

112

actually evoke moral

"

emotions, the term

conduct

"

seems,

suggest at least the possibility of moral

valuation, and is therefore hardly applicable to such "acts
"
adjusted to ends as are performed by obviously irresponsible
It may be well first to fix the meaning of the word
beings.
nevertheless,

to

"act"
According to Bentham, acts may be distinguished into
external, or acts of the body, and internal, or acts of the mind.
"

Thus, to strike

is

an external or exterior act

*
strike, an internal or interior one."

the word

But

to intend to

this application of

neither popular nor convenient.

is

The term "act"

suggests something besides intention, whilst, at the

it

same time,
To intend

suggests something besides muscular contractions.

is no act, nor are the movements involved

epileptic

An

fit

acts.

act comprises an event

The event

an

in

to strike

and

its

immediate mental cause.

outward act, but this

generally spoken
term seems to be too narrow, since the intentional production
of as the

is

of a mental fact

for instance, a sensation, or

'emotion like joy or sorrow or anger

an

act.

The objection

idea, or

will perhaps be raised that I

acts with their consequences,

is,

may

an

and that what

as Austin maintains, nothing but bodily

an

be properly styled
I call the

confound
"

event

"

movements.

But

"

"

acts
Austin himself admits that he must often speak of
when he means " acts and their consequences," since " most of

the names which seem to be names of acts, are names of acts,

coupled with certain of their consequences, and it is not in our

power to discard these forms of speech."! I regard the so-called
consequences of

acts, in so far as

they are intended, as being

by themselves, or forming parts of acts.

"
The very expression " outward act implies that acts also

acts

have an inner aspect.

*

"

Intention," says Butler,

"

is

part of the

Bentham, Principles of Morals and Legislation, 1879, p. 73.

t Austin, Lectures on Jurisprudence, 1873, i, 427, 432 sq.

action itself."*

By

intention I understand a volition or deter-

mination to realise the idea of a certain event

be only one intention in one

hence there can

Certain writers distinguish

between the immediate and the remote intentions of an act.
act.

Suppose that a tyrant, when his enemy jumped into the

him, saved his victim from drowning with a
view to inflicting upon him more exquisite tortures.
The
sea to escape

immediate intention, it is maintained, was to save the enemy

from drowning, the remote intention was to inflict upon

him
to

tortures, f

But

means
that,

of

when

we have

I should say that, in this case,

distinguish between two

acts, of

which the

was a

first

producing the event belonging to the second, and

the former was accomplished, the latter was still

only in preparation.

distinction has, moreover, been

drawn
"

between the direct and the indirect intention

of

a Nihilist seeks to blow

an Emperor and

up a

train containing

an act

If

may be simply the destruction of

the Emperor, but indirectly also he intends the destruction of
the others who are in the train, since he is aware that their

others, his direct intention

destruction will be necessarily included along with that of the

Emperor." t In this case we have two intentions, and, so far
as I can see, two acts, provided that the nihilist succeeded in

carrying out his intentions, namely (1) the blowing up of the

train, and (2) the killing of the emperor; the former of these
acts does not even necessarily involve the latter.
see that

there

is

But

I fail to

any intention at all to kill other persons.

Professor Sidgwick maintains that it would be thought absurd

"
"
did not intend to kill
to say that, in such a case, the nihilist

Butler, "Dissertation II.

Religion, etc., 1893, p. 336.
t Mackenzie, op. cit. p. 60.

Of the Nature

The example

of Virtue," in
is

Analogy of

borrowed from Stuart

Mill, Utilitarianism, 1895, p. 27, note.

J

Mackenzie,

p. 202,

note

op.

cit.

p. 61.

Cf.

Sidgwick, 1901, Methods of Ethics,

1.

EDWARD WESTERMARCK.

114

them;* but the reason for this is simply the vagueness of

language, and a confusion between a psychical fact and the
moral estimate of that
forward

the

nihilist's

might be absurd to bring

non-intention as an extenuation of
It

fact.

it would hardly be correct to say that he

intended the death of other passengers besides that of the
emperor, when he only intended the destruction of the train,

his crime

though

but

involved an extreme disregard of the

this intention

various consequences which were likely to follow. He knowingly

exposed the passengers to great danger but if we speak of an
;

intention on his part to expose

them

regard this exposure as an act by

itself.

A
dently

moral judgment
of

its

being

may

mere

refer to a

or

realised

to

such a danger, we

intention, indepen-

Moreover, the moral

not.

judgments which we pass on acts do not really relate

In this point moralists
event, but to the intention.
schools seem to agree.f

Even Stuart

Mill,

who drew

a distinction between the morality of the act

worth

admits that

of the agent,

"

to the
of

all

so sharp

and the moral

the morality of the action

depends entirely upon the intention."

The event

is

of

moral

importance only in so far as it indicates a decision which is

From the moral point of view there may be a considerable
final.
difference

between a resolution

to

do a certain thing in a

distant future arid a resolution to do it immediately.

determined a person

may

However

be to commit a crime, or to perform

a good deed, the idea of the immediacy of the event may, in the
"
last moment, induce him to change his mind.
The road to
hell is

paved with good

intentions."

External events are

generally the direct causes of our moral emotions; indeed,

without the doing of harm and the doing of good, the moral

Sidgwick, op.

cit.

p.

Stuart Mill, op.

Mackintosh, 1835,

cit.

p. 376.

note

202,

intention," cf. also Benthain, op.

t Sidgwick, op. cit. p. 201.

cit.

p. 27,

1.

On

the subject of "indirect

pp. 84, 86.

note.

Cf.

James

Mill,

Fragment on

REMARKS ON THE SUBJECTS OF MORAL JUDGMENTS.

consciousness would never have

come

into

115

Hence

existence.

the ineradicable tendency to pass moral judgments upon acts,

even though they really relate to the final intentions involved
in acts.

would be both inconvenient and useless

It

in this respect

to deviate

And

from the established application of terms.

arise from such application if

no misunderstanding can

be

it

borne in mind that by an " act," as the subject of a moral

judgment, is invariably understood the event plus the intention

which produced it, and that the very same moral judgment as
passed on acts would also, on due reflection, be recognised as

is

valid with reference to final decisions in cases where accidental

circumstances prevented the accomplishment of the act.

It is in their capacity of volitions that intentions are

What is perfectly independent

no proper object of moral blame or moral praise.
the other hand, any volition may have a moral value. But,

subjects of moral judgments.

of the will is

On

so far as I can see, there are volitions

which are not intentions.

person
morally accountable also for his deliberate wishes,
and the reason for this is that a deliberate wish is a volition.
I

is

am

aware

that,

by calling deliberate wishes "volitions,"

offend against the terminology generally adopted

by psycholoHowever, a deliberate wish is not only from a moral

point of view as being a proper subject of moral valuation
gists.

but psychologically as well> so closely akin to a decision, that

In the realm
there must be a common term comprising both.
of conations, deliberate wishes and decisions form together a
province by themselves.

In contradistinction

to

mere conative

impulses, they are expressions of a person's character, of his

will.
deliberate wish may just as well as a decision

"
represent his true

may

will

observes

It has

been argued that a person

one thing and^ yet wish the opposite thing. Locke

"
man whom I cannot deny, may oblige me to

use persuasions
speaking, I
it is

self."

may

to

another, which,

wish

may

at

the same time I

not prevail upon him.

plain the will and desire run counter.

am

In this case

I will the action

EDWARD WESTERMARCK.

116

that tends one way, whilst my desire tends another, and that
the direct contrary way." * Yet in this case I either do not
intend to persuade the man, but only to discharge my office by

speaking to him words which are apt to have a persuasive

on him or, if I do intend to persuade him, I do not in

effect

moment

the same

although I

may

any deliberate wish

feel

to the contrary,

such a wish before or afterwards.

feel

cannot simultaneously have an intention

a deliberate wish not to do it.

We

to do a thing and

admitted that moral judgments are passed on acts

simply in virtue of their volitional character, it seems impossible
to deny that such judgments may be passed on the motives of
If it is

as well.

acts

"

By

motive

"moves"

the will, in

volition.!

The motive

"

understand a conation which

other words,
itself

may

the conative

be, or

may

cause of a

not be, a volition.

within the sphere of moral valuation.

The motive of an act may even be an intention, but an intention
If it

is, it

obviously

falls

belonging to another act. When Brutus helped to kill Caesar

in order to save his country, his intention to save his country

was the
Csesar.

cause,

The

and therefore the motive, of his intention to kill

an intention frequently acts as a motive

fact that

has led some writers to the conclusion that the motive of an

act
is

a part of the intention.

is

a part of the act

itself,

But

if

the intention of an act

and a motive

is

the cause of an

intention, the motive of an intention cannot be a part of that

*

Locke,

Essay

concerning

Human

Understanding

',

ii,

21,

30

(Philosophical Works, p. 219).

"
*
t "The term motive,' says Professor Stout (Groundwork of Psychology,
" is
ambiguous. It may refer to the various conations which
p. 233 sq.\

come

into play in the process of deliberation,

Or it may refer to the conations which

and tend

to influence its

we mentally

assign as the
has been fully formed." Motive,
in the former sense of the term, is not implied in what I here understand
by motive. On the other hand, it should be observed that there are
motives not only for decisions, but for deliberate wishes another

result.

ground or reason

of our decision

when

it

circumstance which shows the affinity between these two classes of

mental

facts.

REMARKS ON THE SUBJECTS OF MORAL JUDGMENTS.

intention, since a part cannot be the cause of the

which

it

forms a

hunger with food which

act

a non-volitional

is

not his own.

is

conation,

Yet

sequently no moral value.

by him who judges upon the

it

The motive

of his

an appetite, and has conmust be taken into account

Other things equal, the

act.

person in question is less guilty in proportion as his

more

and,

conations,

moral valuation, may

much influence on moral
of

indirectly exercise
Suppose that a person without permission gratifies

judgments.
his

no proper subjects

are

nevertheless

deliberate wishes

non-volitional

of

consist

intentions,

therefore,

whole of

part.

But even motives which, being neither

nor

117

The moral judgment

hunger

is

modified by the pressure

which the non-volitional motive exercises upon the agent's will.
intense.

The same

the case

is

when

is

the motive of an act

element involved in an emotion.

If a

is

the conative

person commits a certain

crime under the influence of anger, he is not so blameable

if he commits the same crime in cold blood.
Thus, also,

as

more meritorious

kind to an enemy from a feeling

of duty, than to be kind to a friend from a feeling of love.
No man deserves blame or praise for the pressure of a non-

it

is

volitional conation
is

upon

to be

his will, unless, indeed, such a pressure

it might have been avoided with due

But a person may deserve blame or praise for not

due to choice, or unless

foresight.

resisting that impulse, or for allowing

it

to influence his will

for evil or good.

moral judgments are commonly passed on

* but the
regard being paid to their motives

It is true that

acts without

much

reason for this

estimates.
first

only the

is

place, aroused

an act

James

Cf.

ordinary moral
are, in the

Moral indignation and moral approval

tion of

p. 364.'

superficiality

of

is

by conspicuous

facts, and,

whilst the inten-

expressed in the act itself, its motive

Mill,

Fragment on Mackintosh,

p.

376

is

not

Sidgwick, op.

cit.

EDWARD WESTERMARCK.

118

But a conscientious judge cannot, like the multitude, be content

with judging of the surface only.
Stuart Mill, in his famous
"
the motive has nothing to do with the
statement that
morality of the action, though much with the worth of the
* has drawn a distinction between acts and
agent,"
agents
which is foreign to the moral consciousness.
It cannot be
does what

hope

of

is

"

he who saves a fellow creature from drowning

morally right, whether his motive be duty, or the

admitted that

being paid for his trouble."

He

ought, of course

to save the other person from drowning, but at the

he ought

to save

money.

It

him

is

may

him from a
be that

guilty of a crime,

whom

"

he

who

even

same time

better motive than a wish for

if

betrays his friend that trusts

his object be to serve another
"

under greater obligations

f but surely
his guilt would be greater if he betrayed his friend, say, in
friend to

he

is

order to gain some personal advantage thereby. Intentions

and motives are subjects of moral valuation, not separately, but
as a unity and the reason for this is that moral judgments
are really passed upon men as acting or willing, not upon acts
It is true that our detestation
or volitions in the abstract.
;

not always proportionate to our moral condemnaBut

tion of the agent people do terrible things in ignorance.

of an act

is

our detestation

an act

of

is,

properly speaking, a moral emotion

him who committed the

directed against
act, in his capacity of a moral agent.

only in so far as

it is

We

when we hear of a wolf

condemn the wolf.

are struck with horror

eating a child, but

we do

not morally

A volition may

have reference not only to the doing of a

but
to
the
It may form
thing,
abstaining from doing a thing.
an
of
a
forbearance.
forbearance
of
but
act,
part not only

is

morally equivalent to an

is

equivalent to

act,

an intention.

and the volition involved

"

Sitting

still,

* Stuart Mill, Utilitarianism,

p. 26.
f Ibid., p. 26.

in it

or holding one's

REMARKS ON THK SUBJECTS OF MORAL JUDGMENTS.

"

peace," says Locke,

though
in

mere

nation of

when walking

forbearances,

the

will,

or speaking are propox-.l,

requiring

and being

119

as

much

as

the

deter-

often weighty in their

consequences as the contrary actions, may, on that consideration, well

correct to call
of

them

acts.

commission and acts

too." *

for actions

enough pass

Yet

Bentham's division

it

is

hardly

of acts into acts

of omission or forbearance t is not to

not-doing I do not call an act, and the

not
purpose
doing I do not call an intention.J But the
fact remains that a forbearance involves a distinct volition,

be recommended.
of

which, as such,

may

be the subject of moral judgment no

than the intention involved in an

less

act.

Willing not to do a thing must be distinguished from not

willing to do a thing forbearances must be distinguished from
;

An

omissions.

omission

is

by the absence

characterised

of

"

It is, as Austin puts it,

the not doing a given act,
without adverting (at the time) to the act which is not done."
Now moral judgments refer not only to willing, but to notvolition.

willing

as

omissions.

only to acts and forbearances, but to

important point has been

well, not

It is curious that this

by writers on

although it constitutes a
distinct and extremely frequent element in our moral judgments.
It has been argued that what is condemned in an
so little noticed

omission

is

really a

that an omission

is

volition,

ethics,

not the absence of a volition

something, but because he did something

such a condition that he could not will, and
the acts which brought
*
t

Locke, op.

Bentham,

cit. ii,

op.

21,

cit. p.

bad, not because the person did not do

him

"
else,
is

was in

condemned

into that condition."

28 (Philosophical Works,

or

||

for

In the

p. 218).

72.

Of. Clark, Analysis of Criminal Liability, p. 42.

Austin, op. cit. i, 438.
Alexander, Moral Order and Progress, p. 34 sq. So, also, Professor
"
Sidgwick maintains (op. cit. p. 60) that the proper immediate objects of
moral approval or disapproval would seem to be always the results of a

||

man's volitions so far as they were intended

i.e.,

represented in thought

EDWARD WESTERMARCK.

120

latter case, of course, the

omission,
"

man

cannot be condemned for his

blamed for not doing what he

but to say that an omission is condemned

since he cannot be
"

could not will

only on account of the performance of some act is undoubtedly

a psychological error. If a person forgets to discharge a certain
duty incumbent on him, say, to pay a debt, he is censured, not
for anything he did, but for

blamed

what he omitted

for not doing a thing

because he did not think of

it

Closely related to negligence

He

do.

is

In other words, his guilt

fulness.

to

which he ought to have done,

he is blamed for his forgetis

lies in his negligence.

heedlessness, the difference

between them being seemingly greater than it really is. Whilst

the negligent man omits an act which he ought to have done,
because he does not think of it, the heedless man does an act
which he ought
its

probable

there

But

is

in

have forborne, because he does not consider

In the latter case
possible consequences.*

to

or

acting, in the former case there

both

attention, in

negligent

cases

the

moral judgment

other words, to not-willing.

man

is

is

absence of acting.
refers

to

want

The

fault

of

of

the

that he does not think of the act which he

ought to perform, the fault of the heedless man is that he does

not think of the probable or possible consequences of the act
as certain or probable consequences of such volitions," and that, in cases
of carelessness, moral blame, strictly speaking, attaches to the agent only
" in so far as
his carelessness is the result of some wilful neglect of duty."

A similar view is

taken by the moral philosophy of

Eoman

Catholicism

Gopfert, Moraltheologie, i, 113).

Binding, again, assumes (Die Normen,
ii, 105 sqq.) that a person may have a volition without having an idea of

what he

wills, and that carelessness implies a volition of this kind.

Otherwise, he says, the will could not be held responsible for the result.
But, as we shall see immediately, the absence of a volition may very well
be attributed to a defect of the will, and the will thus be regarded as the
cause of an unintended event. To speak of a volition or will to do a

thing of which the wilier has no idea seems absurd.

"
* The
meaning of the word
negligence," in the common use of
is
indefinite.
It
stands for heedlessness as well, or
often
language,
very
for carelessness. I use it here in the sense in which it was applied by

Austin

(op.

cit. i,

439

.9*7. ).

REMARKS ON THE SUBJECTS OF MORAL JUDGMENTS.

121

which he performs. In rashness, again, the party adverts to

the mischief which his act may cause, but, from insufficient
advertence assumes that

man

is

partial

want

and rashness are

will not ensue

it

the fault of the rash

of attention.*

Negligence, heecllessness,
included under the common term " care-

all

lessness."

Our moral judgments of blame, however,

are concerned with

not-willing only in so far as this not-willing is attributed to a

defect of the will, not to the influence of intellectual or other

circumstances for which no

power

in a person

man can

which we

call his

be held responsible.
"

will

"
is

That

regarded by us as

a cause, not only of such events as are intended, but of such

"
events as we think that the person " could
have prevented

by

And

his will.

the party

is

just as, in the case of volitions, the guilt of

affected

by the pressure

of non-voluntary motives,
mental facts falling outside the

so in the case of carelessness

sphere of the will must be closely considered by the conBut nothing is harder than to apply this
scientious judge.
rule in practice.

Equally difficult
person's behaviour

it

is,

in

many

due

is

want

to

whether a

cases, to decide

of

advertence,

or

is

combined with a knowledge of what his behaviour implies,

to decide
or of the consequences which may result from it
due

than carelessness.

to carelessness or to something worse

For him who refrains from performing

an

though

whether

it

is

"

"

is
adverting to it,
negligent
certainly too mild an epithet, and he who knows that mischief
will probably result from his deed is certainly worse than

obligatory

heedless.

act,

Yet even

in

such

blame may be the absence

cases the immediate

of

a volition

not

object

of

want

of

attention, but a not-willing to do, or a not-willing to refrain

from doing, an act in

implies or to its consequences.

Austin, op.

advertence to what the act

spite of

cit. i,

440

sq.

may

abstain from performing

Clark, op.

cit. p.

101.

EDWARD WESTERMAKCK.

122

an obligatory act though I think of it, and

make no resolution not to perform it.

is

ruining his family by his drunkenness, he

same

yet, at the

time

So, too, if

may

man

be aware that

and yet he may do it without any volition

doing
that effect.
In these cases the moral blame refers neither
he

is

so,

heedlessness, nor to 'any definite volition, but

duty or of the interest of one's family.
time the transition from conscious omissions

or

negligence

to
to

to disregard of one's

At

the same

into

and

forbearances,

the

from

transition

not-willing

to

from doing into willing to do, are easy and natural

hence the distinction between willing and not-willing may
be of little or no significance from an ethical point of
refrain

For

such consequences of an act as are

foreseen as certain or probable have commonly been included
view.

this reason

"

under the term

"

intention
but,

appropriate.

"

oblique," or

was

as

intention,"

already
I shall

* often

as

indirect," or

noticed,

this

"

a special branch
virtual

"

intention

terminology

is

of
;

hardly

such consequences of an act as are

call

known by him
known concomitants " of the

foreseen by. the agent, and such incidents as are

to be involved in his act,

When

"

the

blows up the train containing an

emperor and others, with a view to killing the emperor, the
extreme danger to which he exposes the others is a known conact.

the

nihilist

most crimes, the breach of law

as distinct from the act intended, is a known concomitant of the

comitant of his

act,

So, also, in

act.

inasmuch as the criminal, though knowing that

does not perform

his act is

for the purpose of violating the law.

doth a wrong for the wrong's sak<j. but
thereby to purchase himself profit, or pleasure, or honour, or the
illegal,

As Bacon

"

said,

it

No man

like."}

*
Cf.

Sidgwick, op.

Bentham,

op.

cit. p.

cit.

202.

p. 84.

Austin, op.

cit.

i,

480.

Clark, op.

cit.

pp. 97, 100.

|

Bacon, "Essay IV. Of Revenge," in Essays, p. 45. Cf. Grotius

"
belli et pads, ii, 20, 29
Vix quisquam gratis malus est."
1,

Dejure

REMARKS ON THE SUBJECTS OF MORAL JUDGMENTS.

Absence

of volitions, like volitions themselves, give rise not

only to moral blame, but to moral praise. We may, for instance,

applaud a person for abstaining from doing a thing, beneficial
to

himself but harmful to others, which, in similar circum-

stances, would have proved too great a temptation to any

and it does not necessarily lessen his merit
ordinary man
if the opposite alternative did not even occur to his mind, and
;

his abstinence, therefore, could not possibly be ascribed to a

Very frequently moral praise refers to known concomitants of acts rather than to the acts themselves. The merit

volition.

of saving another person's life at the risk of losing one's own,

really lies in the fact that the

knowledge

of the

danger did not

prevent the saver from performing his act and the merit of
the charitable man really depends on the loss which he inflicts
;

upon himself by giving

and analogous cases of

self-sacrifice for a

concomitant of a beneficial

though much
on a person

which

is

which moral praise

itself

to

not-willing

Tims

beneficial.

avoid

But there are

act.

less frequent, in

for

good end, the merit,

not- willing to

in

speaking, consists

strictly

In these

his property to the needy.

avoid a
it

known

instances,
is

bestowed

known concomitant

may on

certain conditions

be magnanimous of a person not to refrain from doing a thing,

though he knows that his deed will benefit somebody who has
injured him, and towards whom the average man in similar

circumstances would display resentment.

All these various elements into which the subjects of moral
"
judgments may be resolved, are included in the term conduct."

By

a man's conduct in a certain case

the absence of a volition in

him

is

understood a volition, or

which

is

often,

but not always

or necessarily expressed in an act, forbearance, or omission

viewed

with

reference

to

idea of

these circumstances,

only the case

is
understood

itself,

such

all

circumstances as

it

is

necessary to consider not

but the man's character,

person's

may

In order to form an accurate

influence its moral character.

will

regarded

as

by character

if

continuous

EDWARD WESTERMARCK.

124

entity.* The subject of a moral judgment is, strictly speaking, a

person's will conceived as the cause either of volitions or of the

absence of volitions
continuity,

it is

and, since a man's will or character

necessary that any judgment passed upon

is

him

in a particular case, should take notice of his will as a whole, his

character.

we

We

impute a person's acts

him only

in so far as

regard them as a result or manifestation of his character,

as directly or indirectly
"

to

Actions

due to his

will.

Hume'

observes

are, by
temporary and perishing
and where they proceed not from some cause in the character
and disposition of the person who performed them, they can

their very nature,

neither redound to his

good nor infamy, if evil.

not answerable for them and as they
proceeded from nothing in him, that is durable and constant,
and leave nothing of that nature behind them, it is impossible

....

The person

honour,

if

is

he can, upon their account, become the object of punishment or

vengeance/' -f- There is thus an intimate connection between
character and conduct as subjects of moral Valuation.
When
a
of
man's
conduct
in
a
instance
we
judging
special
judge of
his character,

and when judging

of his character

we judge

of

his conduct in general.

perhaps be remarked that moral judgments are

passed not only on conduct and character, but on emotions and
for instance, that resentment in many cases is
opinions
It

will

deemed wrong, and love of an enemy is deemed praiseworthy,

and that no punishment has been thought too severe for
*

Cf.

Alexander, op.

cit.

p.

49

"Character

is

simply that of which

individual pieces of conduct are the manifestation."

To the word
" character " has also been
given a broader meaning. According to John
Grote (Treatise on the Moral Ideals, p. 442), a person's character "is his

way of thinking, feeling, and acting."

Hume, Enquiry concerning Human Understanding,

habitual
t

viii,

2 (Philo-

Idem, Treatise of Human Nature, iii, 2 (ibid.,

See also Schopenhauer, Die beiden Grundprobleme der Ethik
ii, 191).
(Sammtliche Werke, in "Cotta'sche Bibliothek der Weltlitteratur,"
vol. vii), pp. 123, 124,281.

sophical Works,

iv. 80).

Cf.

REMARKS ON THE SUBJECTS OF MORAL JUDGMENTS.

But even

and unbelievers.

heretics

in

125

such instances the

The person who

censured because his will has not given a
check to that emotion, or because the hostile attitude of mind
object of blame or praise is really the will.

feels

resentment

is

has led up to a definite volition. Very frequently the irascible

impulse in resentment or the friendly impulse in kindly emotion
develops into a volition to inflict an injury or to bestow a
benefit on its object; and the words resentment and love

themselves are often used to denote, not mere emotions, but

states of

mind characterised by genuine

absence of an emotion,

or the

may

volitions.

An

emotion,

when viewed

also,

as a

and be the apparent subject of, a moral

are apt to blame a person whose feelings are

give rise to,

symptom,

judgment. We
not affected by the news of a misfortune which has befallen his
friend, because we regard this as a sign of an uncharitable
character.

We may

The same person

be mistaken, of course.

might have been the first to try to prevent the misfortune

if it had been in his power
but we judge from average
;

cases.

As

for opinions

and

beliefs, it

be said that they involve

supposed to depend on the

may

responsibility in so far as they are

will.
Generally it is not so much the opinion itself but rather
the expression, or the outward consequence, of it that calls

forth moral indignation

speaking, refers

and in any case the blame,

either to such

strictly

to the cause of the

a certain belief, or " unbelief,"

or

acts,

opinion within the will. That

is never as such a proper object of censure

is

recognised both

by Catholic and Protestant theology.

Thomas Aquinas

out that the sin of unbelief consists in

"

points

contrary opposition to
the faith, whereby one stands out against the hearing of the
faith, or

even despises

itself is in

faith,"

and

that,

the intellect, the cause of

adds that in those

has not the

it is

though such unbelief

in the will.
And he

who have heard nothing

character

of

"
sin,

of the faith, unbelief

but rather of a penalty,

inasmuch as such ignorance of divine things

is

a consequence of

EDWARD WESTERMARCK.

126
the sin of our

first

parent."

Dr.

"The Bible condemns no man

heard

of,

or for not believing

Wardlaw

for not

likewise observes

knowing what he never

what he could not know ....

criminal only when it arises from wilful inattenIgnorance

from
aversion of heart to truth.
or
Unbelief involves
tion,
is

guilt,

when

aversion

To shut
nobody

is

it

of a

is

the effect and

want

manifestation

of will to that

which

is

of the

to truth may be a heinous wrong, but

blameable for seeing nothing with his eyes shut.

one's eyes

* Thomas
Aquinas, Summa Theologica, II, ii, 10, 1 sq.
t Wardlaw, Sermons on Man's Accountableness for his Belief,
p. 38.

same

right and good."f

&c., 1830,

KANT'S IDEALISM.

IL

Bi
"

IT has been

G. E.

to

attempts

"
that all our
Kant,*
but on this assumption

hitherto assumed," says

knowledge must conform

all

MOORK.

make

a priori by means of

to objects

out

about

anything
in

conceptions,

such

those

objects

as

way

to

enlarge our knowledge, came to nothing. Then let us try for

once, whether we do not succeed better in the problems of

Metaphysics, by assuming that objects must conform

knowledge

an hypothesis, which

is

to our

immediately more agree-

an a priori knowledge of
a knowledge which can establish something with regard

able to the desired possibility of

them

to objects, before they are given to

tion

as with the

first

ideas

of

ns."f

It is with this

Copernicus,

assumpwho, when he

found he could not advance in the explanation of the motions

of the heavenly bodies, on the assumption that the whole host

around the spectator, tried whether he could

not succeed better, if he supposed the spectator to revolve and
of stars revolved

the stars to stand

still.

Now

a similar experiment can be

made

in Metaphysics, so far as concerns the Intuition of objects.

If

our intuition were bound to conform to the nature of the objects,

I do not see how we can know anything a priori about that
nature

but

if

the object (as presented to the senses) conforms

to the nature of our intuitive faculty, I can very well imagine

such a possibility.

Since, however, I cannot stop short at these

if they are to be converted into knowledge, but must

them as presentations to something or other as object
and must determine this object by their means, I can again

intuitions,

relate

* Preface to Second Edition of

Critique of Pure Reason.
t

My italics.

128
either

G.

assume that the

MOOKE.

E.

by means

conceptions,

conform to the

this determination to pass, also

of

which

object,

I bring

and then

am

again in the same perplexity regarding the manner in

which I can know anything about it a priori : or else I assume
that the objects or (which is the same thing) our experience, in
I

which alone they are known as given objects, conforms to these

conceptions, and then I at once see an easier way out of my
difficulty, since

experience

itself

is

as to require the Understanding;

such a kind

and

of knowledge
must presuppose the

rule of the Understanding in myself,* before objects are given

me, that is, must presuppose it a priori a rule which is

expressed in a priori conceptions, to which accordingly all

objects of experience must necessarily conform, and with which

they must agree."

In this passage Karit gives a sufficiently clear account of
one of the points in which his Idealism differs from the
Idealism of Berkeley, with which he was so angry at having his
confused.
And this point is the one to which, as he
himself explains, he refers by calling his theory Transcendental

own

He means by

Idealism.

that

title

that he attributes merely

ideal existence, or existence in the mind, to certain entities

which are not indeed transcendent, since they are not objects, but
which are also not parts of experience or particular experiences,
since they are, as he says, conditions of

These entities are not

objects

all

possible experience.

substantial individuals or things

"

forms" in which the objects of experience are'

arranged they are the forms of Intuition, Space and Time,
and the forms of thought, conceptions of the Understanding or
but are merely
:

"categories," of which one

Idealism

is

instance

is

"causality."

Kant's

Transcendental, and differs from Berkeley's in that,

whereas Berkeley only maintained the "ideality," or merely

mental existence of particular objects, Kant maintains the
ideality of

the

Berkeley and

forms in which these objects are arranged.

before Kant had not perceived the

others

My

italics.

129

KANT'S IDEALISM.

necessity of distinguishing so clearly between sense-impressions,

"

the matter of knowledge," and the forms in which all such

impressions are always arranged.

Kant, then, here gives us one point in which his Idealism
he holds, what Berkeley did not
differs from Berkeley's
;

expressly hold, that space

and time and causality

exist only'

And

he also gives us one of the reasons

which lead him to think this particular view of his true. If,

in or for the mind.

we only saw /that particular objects had geometrical

properties, we could riot possibly be entitled to assert that all

he

says,

objects

would always have them.

It is only if the

constituted that, whenever anything

is

presented to

mind
it, it

is

so

invests

that thing with geometrical properties, that we can be entitled

to assert that everything we shall ever experience will have

In short, Kant offers his theory as an

how we can know that certain things are true

those properties.

explanation of
of all objects.

If,

he says, we know that the mind always

it. then we

attaches these predicates to everything presented to

can

know

that everything presented will have these predicates.

Therefore, he concludes, the only predicates which do attach to

all

formal predicates are given to them by the mind.

Kant's Transcendental Idealism is thus connected with what

things

was certainly a great discovery

of his.

He

discovered that

all

mathematical propositions are what he calls "synthetic" as

he here says, that they " enlarge our knowledge." They do
not merely

tell

us that a certain predicate is a part of that of

it
they tell us that A has the predicate B,

which we predicate

although B is neither identical with A, nor a part of A they

are not identical nor analytic. Hume had convinced Kant that
;

"

Every event has a cause," was not analytic

and, in thinking of this fact, Kant discovered, what no one
had clearly recognised before, that 2 + 2 = 4 was not analytic
the proposition,

either.

Hume

had inferred that we had no reason whatever

to believe that every event

was obviously absurd

to

had a cause

but Kant thought it

+ 2 = 4: it was

maintain this of 2

130

MOORE.

E.

G.

absurd to say that we had no title to assert "2 + 2 are

"
to admit that 2 + 2 might sometimes make 4 and
always 4
;

sometimes not.

But, on the other hand,

who had

sophers,

held that

we

know

did

had held that they were analytic

"

they asserted

with

"

A," that

is

we

part

could

of

know them

all

previous philo-

universal propositions,

that

was only because

it

"

B," or

A"

identical

is

to be always true.

Kant,

saw an entirely new difficulty. He saw, in conseof

what Hume said, that
was synthetic
quence
was
Hume
he
convinced
would
have
led him to
(what
yet
therefore,

2+2=4

2=4

was always true true of every case.

deny) that 2 +
In his own words, he recognised for the first time that there
"
a priori synthetic propositions." He asked himself the
are
question

And

are synthetic a priori propositions

only because

possible
"

How

Transcendental

ideal

"

ways

was

Idealism

answer.

his

Time, and the

Space,

possible

They

are

categories

are

which the mind arranges things.

in

I have thus represented Kant's Transcendental Idealism as

an attempt

to

answer the question

of the

meaning

And

besides.
sider.

can we

This

is

know universal

certainly a part

have quoted: Kant

whatever else he may maintain

which

of the passage

certainly does maintain this,

How

synthetic propositions to be true

only this theory which I propose to conmay, perhaps, explain (since I have used ambiguous
it

that

language)

is

proposition which

mean by
asserts,

universal

proposition,

either "All instances of

any
have

the predicate B," or "Anything which has the predicate

has the predicate B." I may also add that I have no doubt

whatever that the instances of such propositions which I have

quoted, namely, all mathematical propositions and the pro"

position,

Every event has a

cause," are, as

Kant thought,

do not propose to argue that point.

synthetic.
as an exceedingly important discovery of Kant's
I

which would, perhaps, by

usually assigned

itself

him among

alone, entitle

philosophers.

him

I regard

it

a discovery
to the

rank

KANT'S IDKALISM.

My

present

however,

business,

with

is

Transcendental

Idealism.

propose to consider both, whether Transcendental

Idealism gives a satisfactory answer to the question How are
I

synthetic propositions a priori possible ? and whether Transcendental Idealism is true. And for this purpose, I will first
to

try

re-state,

in

reference to Kant's
precisely

the

simplest

possible

own language than

what the question

is,

with

terms,

less

have hitherto used,

which
I doubt whether
to
I

a satisfactory answer.
Kant, as I
have said, may be trying to answer other questions as well
the meaning of his terms is much more complex than that of

Transcendental Idealism

is

those which I shall use:

but he certainly does pretend to

that was one of the

have solved the difficulty I shall state

difficulties in his

mind

and

I only propose to consider that

part of his doctrine.

Well, then,

we have

the following kind.

the fact that

We

we do make judgments

believe that

It'

there be

of

any two

groups of objects, of each of which it may be truly predicated

that there are two objects in the group, then it may be truly
predicated of the whole that

it

is

this

it

concerns

proposition

universal,

And we have

kind named.
believe that

is

Of any objects

certain geometrical relations,

a group of four objects

all groups of the
:

We

similar geometrical beliefs.

of

which we can truly predicate

also truly predicate some

we may

other different geometrical relation.

Finally, we can at least
think, whether we believe or not, that Every event in time
:

has been preceded at a certain interval by some other event,

such that, whenever an event of precisely this second kind
exists,

an event of the

first

the same distance in time

are all of

them universal

kind will exist after

i.e.,

it

at exactly

every event has a cause.

These

propositions, they all assert that a

what Kant

calls a formal kind, attaches to

which a certain other predicate attaches. And,

certain predicate, of
all objects to

132

G.

being universal, they are

MOORE.

E.

independent of experience in the

all

that certain predicates apply

they
to things which we never have seen and never shall see
to
which
has
even
of
that
nobody
thought
they say
things
following sense

all assert

certain predicates apply to all objects of a certain kind, whether

This was Kant's

actually experienced or not.

know

can we

How

we have never experienced ?

universal proposition

the

mind

is

How

difficulty.

that certain predicates do attach to things which

such that

whatever which

it

true

is
it

And

we know

can
his

answer

that

is

any
Because

attaches these predicates to every thing-

This

ever experiences.

is

the doctrine of

Transcendental Idealism.

Now
is

what

want

He

ambiguous.

Two

How can we

ask:

point out

asking, as

is

different questions.

we

first to

if

is

that Kant's question

they were one, two quite

whenever

questions are always asked,

or do

we know

a thing

reason that knowledge is a complex concept.

we know a thing, we mean both that we believe

for the simple

When we
it,

that

say

we have

a certain mental attitude towards the proposition in question,

and also we mean that the proposition is true. Hence, when

we

ask

How

do you know that

we

are asking both

(1)

How

do you come to believe it, what is the cause of your believing

and (2), How do you know that what you believe is true ?

it ?

"What

title

have you to say that your

not mere belief

belief

is

true

What

belief is

knowledge and

evidence proves that the object of your

Now it is evident that the second of these questions is far

the more important and it is evident also that Kant intended
He wished to explain the
to answer this second question.
not only how we could come
validity of universal propositions
;

to believe them, but

he be

contradicting

asserted

cause

how

We

have no

they could be valid.

Hume's
title

and Kant answers

sceptical

Only

conclusion.

so,

could

Hume

to believe that every event has

We

true that every event has a cause.

have a

title

I can prove it

KANT'S IDEALISM.

Kant, therefore,

is

133

trying to prove the validity of universal

a title to assert them.
And he

we have

that

propositions
regards his Transcendental Idealism as giving this title. His
argument is Every object will have certain formal predicates,
because mind always gives an object that form. I wish to point
:

out two absolutely conclusive objections to this argument

(1) Kant says: From the fact that mind is so constituted

as to give to every object a certain form, we can infer that
every presented object will have that form. And this reasoning
is

perfectly valid

Fmt the

argument

the conclusion does follow from the premiss.

objection which I have to

first
is

make

proposition of exactly the same kind which

The premiss

to prove.

is

Mind always

is

a universal

was proposed

it

acts in

in a certain manner, everything

way upon, arranges

That

the

whole

to the

this, namely, that the premiss itself

certain

which

only evidence which

presented to

it.

Kant

prove the validity of universal propositions

offers to

to

is

say,

is

is

It is, then, perfectly

merely another universal proposition.
certain that he has not done what he professed to do
given us

to

title

believe

all

There

universal propositions.

is

one

universal proposition, at least, which he has simply assumed,

for which he has given no reason.
How
If you ask him
can you know that mind will always act in that manner ? he
has no answer to give. He simply assumes that this proposi:

tion
it

is

true,

just as
2 -f 2

.acts

and that there

is

no need of evidence to prove

on the contrary, that it needs evidence

if we need a title to believe that
2 = 4

It is certain,

so.

much as 2 +
4, we certainly need one
;

in a certain

to believe that

way on every presented

object.

mind always
now

I do not

say that this universal proposition of Kant's is untrue I shall

My present point is only this
presently try to show that it is.
is one universal proposition,
certain
one
that
there
perfectly
;

at

least,

therefore,

which Kant has given us no

Kant has

not, in

his

own

possibility of all synthetic propositions

title

words,

to believe
"

a priori?

that,

explained the

134

G.

But

E.

MOOHE.

more

(2) there is a far

objection to Kant's

serious

I have just said that a certain conclusion will

argument.
follow from Kant's premiss, if once you assume that premiss
to be true; and it is, I think, this fact
the fact that that

conclusion does follow from the premiss, which gives to Kant's

Transcendental

But what

The premiss
"

it

possesses.
?

Mind always gives a certain form to everything

and the conclusion which follows from this is
:

Everything presented will always

which mind gives

is

plausibility

"

is

"

presented

whatever

Idealism

the conclusion which follows from the premiss

is

have the formal predicates

I have now to point out

And what

to it."

that this conclusion, which docs follow from Kant's assump-

tion, is not the conclusion

which Kant

set out

to prove.

Let

us remember what the universal propositions were, of which

Kant was going to prove the possibility. One of them was

The

number

total

is 4.

What

And

this

of objects in any two groups, of two each,

conclusion will not follow from Kant's premiss.

will follow

groups of
by mind.

only this

is

Whenever we

perceive two

then the whole group has the predicate 4 given it

is to say, it does not entitle us to assert that

2,

That

any 2 groups

of 2

groups make 4

make 4

time

at the

but only that any two presented

when they are presented. Kant's

premiss does not entitle him to any more than this

given us no reason whatever to think but that the

he has

moment

2 groups of 2 objects cease to be presented, precisely the very

same objects in those same two groups, which had the total
number 4 when presented, may have the total number 7 or 5
or a hundred billions.
not prove that 2

In other words, Kant's premiss does

4 in every case on the contrary, it

allows that more often than not

other number.

That

is

to say,

2+2

may make

5 or

any

Kant's Transcendental Idealism

gives no answer to that scepticism, greater than Hume's, which

he devised
But, so
0,

it

to answer.

far,

pretation which

is

have given to Kant's argument the interthe most favourable for him in one respect

KANT'S IDEALISM.

135

have assumed his principle to be that mind does really give

to objects the formal predicates in question, so that

when they

are presented they really and truly have those predicates

have allowed that, assuming his premiss, it would follow that

2 and 2 are sometimes 4; and this is certainty the most favourable

interpretation

possible

his

premiss certainly will not

and 2 are always or even generally 4.

conclusion
that 2 and 2 are sometimes 4 will

entitle us to assert that 2

But even

this

only follow

if

we assume him

really to

mean

that

mind

gives

these predicates to objects, so that, for the

moment, they really

belong to them and I believe that this hypothesis was part of
what was in Kant's mind. Yet I believe also that he would
:

moment have

never for a

had confused

more

it

plausible.

with another, which

No

is

mind

it

What

it is

much

actually gives properties to things

makes one thing the cause

e.g.,

4.

quite different and

one, I think, has ever definitely maintained

the proposition, that

that,

entertained such a belief, unless he

plausible to

of another, or

maintain

is

makes 2 and

that the nature of

our mind causes us to think that one thing is cause of another,

and to think that 2 and 2 are 4. This, I think, is certainly
part of what Kant meant by his Transcendental Idealism
though he confused it with the different theory that mind gave
:

objects

these

properties.

Indeed, I think

may

it

be worth

while to point out that this interpretation strictly follows

from one doctrine of Kant's, the precise meaning of which hasnot

received

all

the

holds that Are cannot

"

attention

know

it

at all

deserves.
Namely, Kant
what properties belong to

What I wish to point out is that if

of the statement, it merely
the
meaning
carefully
amounts to this That we never can know that a thing, as it is
Things in Themselves.'"

we examine

in

itself,

It

would

"

The

really has, even for a

moment, any property whatever.

follow, therefore, that in Kant's view,

fingers on this hand are

five,

those fingers, as they are in themselves, are five

know

that, the

only alternative

is that,

when I think
know that

do not really

and

it'

I don't

in Kant's view, I

merely

136

G.

them

think

to be

5.

MOORE.

E.

good deal of confusion has, I think,

arisen from the failure to see that the only alternative to the

we do know things as they are in

admission that we have no knowledge at

admission that
is

the

themselves,
all.

We

"
cannot escape this dilemma by contrasting with
Things-in"
"
"
the
themselves
for, if we know
objects of experience
anything about the objects of experience, then we know what
:

properties the objects of experience have, as they are in themselves.

Even to know what we think about them is to know a Thing-

Tor

in-itself.

we know

if

we do know

of that thing.
"

we think

that

that our thought, as

it is

in

itself,

a thing at
really

is

all,

then

a thought

Thus, in so far as Kant denies any possible

Things-in-themselves," there is reason to suppose

knowledge of
that he does not really think that mind gives predicates to
objects, so that even for a moment those objects really have
his theory is that we do not know what
their predicate
:

properties anything really has

itself.

Let us then suppose his Transcendental Idealism to mean

that the

mind

is

so constituted as always to

the objects presented

to

it

make ns think that

Can he

have certain predicates.

from this premiss the validity of universal propositions ?

the contrary, he cannot now infer that 2 and 2 are 4 even
in any one instance he can only infer that we shall always
infer

On

think them to be

so.

From

the

i'act

that

we always think a

certainly does not follow that what we think is true.

thing
I have, then, tried to show that on neither of two possible
it

interpretations of Kant's Transcendental Idealism will it follow

from that doctrine that universal propositions are valid on the
:

first, it

second

will only follow that 2

it

we always

think

so.

and 2 are sometimes

and 2 are ever

Kant's Transcendental Idealism was

tion

and

others (as
all.
of'all.

see

on the

itself

4,

an universal proposi-

if it

proved the validity of any

it doesn't), it

does not prove the validity

that, therefore, even

we now

4,

but only that

I
before
that,
And,
pointed out that

will not follow that 2

KANT'S IDEALISM.

137

I now propose to deal briefly with the question

Is this
universal proposition itself
the proposition that the mind
always attaches to things certain formal predicates, or makes
:

us think that things have these predicates itself true ? And

What reason has Kant to give for it ? Here we

first of all

find, curiously

enough, that his chief reason

fact that other universal propositions are true

must be true

this

the assumed

is

he infers that

from the assumed

of the mind,

fact that

mathematical propositions and the principle of causality are

true.
What he says is They could not be true, unless mind
:

contributed these predicates we could have no title to assert

that all things had causes, unless the mind gave them this
;

Since, therefore, all things have causes,

predicate.

are

always

4,

the

mind must

give these

and 2 and 2
This

predicates.

reasoning obviously will not prove Transcendental Idealism.

From the mere fact that the number of objects in two groups
of

two

is 4,

we cannot

that predicate

infer that

nor from that fact

mind caused them to have

can we even infer that mind

caused us to think that they were 4. There is, therefore, so

far, no reason whatever to think Transcendental Idealism true

and

am

not aware that

Kant

gives

any other reason

for

it.

He

does not profess, by an empirical observation of the mind,

to discover that it always does cause events to have effects or

cause us to think that 2 and 2 are

facts tending to

show that

4.

this is

Nor do

the case.

know

I
It

may

of

any

be true

and thus
that every mental event has some mental cause
that our belief in
if Transcendental Idealism only asserted
;

universal propositions has some mental cause, Transcendental

Idealism might possibly be true.

But even

this

is

quite

have only to say, as against one form of the theory,

that I can find no evidence that, when I apprehend that 2 and

doubtful

2 are

my

4,

that apprehension

mind than when

is

any more due

to the activity of

I see the colour of that tablecloth.

I can

apprehend that 2 and 2 are 4 as passively as I can apprehend

anything.

Transcendental Idealism

may

possibly be true

if

it

138

G.

MOORE.

E.

be understood as this comparatively unimportant psychological

proposition; what is certain is that it does not explain the
possibility of experience,
title

if

by that be meant that it gives us a

and not merely that it

to assert universal propositions,

them

asserts our belief in

have some mental cause.

to

So much then for Kant's Idealism, so far as regards the

point, in which, as I said, it differs obviously from that of
contention

namely, the

Berkeley,

universal propositions

This appears to

which Kant

me

is

to

due

that

knowledge

of

our minds.

to the constitution of

be the only Idealistic contention for

any arguments, and

offers

our

with regard to those arguments (1) that

I
it

have tried to show

will not explain the

not give us any

ground for thinking them true, and (2) that it will not follow
from their validity, and is at best merely a doubtful psychouniversal propositions,

validity of

logical

But

assumption.

idealistic opinions, for

have

i.e.,

will

now

to

mention certain

which Kant gives no arguments, but

differ in no respect from

which he certainly holds and which

those

of

Berkeley.

Kant

holds, namely, that

and

spatial

temporal properties, that sounds and colours, and that causality

He holds
exist only in the mind of him who is aware of them.
that space and time themselves are forms of consciousness, that
sounds and colours are sensations, that causality is a conception.

he agrees with Berkeley; Berkeley also held that

everything of which we are aware is an idea or a notion a
Kant himself has
constituent part, that is, of our own minds.
In

all this

denied furiously that he does agree with Berkeley he says he

holds that we do know that objects really exist in space and
if he had held that, he certainly would not have agreed with
;

Berkeley.

But

know what he

I shall try to

held

show that he himself did not

that, at least,

he certainly held that objects

do not exist in space. It has often been pointed out that at

one time Kant says his difference from Berkeley is that he
asserts the existence of Things-in-themselves, while Berkeley
denies

it

and

at another time says his difference is that he

KANT'S IDEALISM.

139

asserts the existence of things in space, while Berkeley denies

On

that.

the

point he certainly does

first

not differ

from

Berkeley, since Berkeley also holds that there do exist thingsin-themselves, though he says there are none except God and
other minds.
But that matter exists, Berkeley certainly does

deny: and what

have now to show

is

Kant denies

that

it too.

Let us consider what is Kant's theory of experience. He

holds that objects of experience, e.g., chairs and tables, consist
"
of the matter of sensation," colours, sounds, and other qualities,
arranged in the

"

the

or

the

categories

forms

"

and time, and connected by

of space

forms of understanding. With regard to

he never suggests for a

of these entities, sensations,

first

moment

means by them anything but mental facts

on the contrary, he repeatedly insists that what he is talking
about

is

that he

presentations (Vorstellungen),

i.e.,

when he

"

says

blue,"

he means the consciousness of blue; when he says "hard," he

means

It is, then, these mental,

of hardness.
out
of
which, according to him,
purely subjective, elements,
when they are arranged in space and time, matter and all
the sensation

When we

material objects are composed.

in space,

what we

sensations of

our

perceive an object

merely some

perceive, according to him, is

own arranged

in space arid time

and con-

nected with other things by the categories.

That is to say,
the subjects of what I have called his formal predicates are

own

exclusively our

4 chairs
of

there,

sensations

attaches.

sensations

he understands
it

is

to

my

me

merely in

my

I say that there are

to say that I

sensations

plain, then, that

It is

according to him,

when

that

have 4 groups

the

predicate

the matter of sensation

mind.

But

it

is

lie

is

often says, that the former are

affected,

and that the

latter are

is,

equally plain

that time and space and the categories are so too

discovery is,
the subject

ways

ways

his great

in
in

which
which

If, then, he did maintain that matter really existed,

other than as a part of mind, he would be maintaining that

it

acts.

140

G.

MOORE.

E.

out of three subjective things, things in my mind, there was

somehow composed one thing that was objective, not in my
what he does
But he never does maintain this
mind.
:

maintain

and

is

that to say that sensations have spatial predicates

are connected

by the

categories, is the

say that they exist objectively.

it is

plain

And,

same

If to
disagreed with Berkeley.
simply equivalent to saying that the

see quite plainly that

think

is

when

I think that chair exists,

not that certain sensations of

What

the categories.

do think

But

exists.

that the two statements are not equivalent

is

to

understood,

why he thought he

say that matter exists is

categories do apply to it, he does hold that matter
the fact

as

tiling

this be

if

can

what

mine are connected by

that certain

is

objects

of

sensation do really exist in a real space and really are causes

and effects of other things. Whether what I think is true is

another question

matter

we

exists,

whether

certain

what

is

certain

that

is

are asking this question

sensations

of

ours

are

if

we

we ask whether
are not asking

connected

by the

And

one other thing is certain too, namely, that

categories.
colours and sounds are not sensations that space and time are
;

not forms of sense

that causality

is

not a thought.

All these

which we are aware, things of which we

they are in no sense parts of consciousness.

things are things of

are conscious

Kant's Idealism, therefore, in so far as

it asserts

that matter

mental elements, is certainly false. In so far

composed
as it asserts this, it differs in no respect from Berkeley's, and
of

is

Whether

both are

false.

which he

also agrees

what we
of

really do

or not Kant's further contention, in

with Berkeley,

mean by

also false

namely, that

matter, something not composed

mental elements, does not exist

another question.

is

this, as

say, is quite

141

PEIMARY AND SECONDARY QUALITIES.

VIIL

By
"

EVERYONE,"

divisibility,

Thomas

says

figure,

G. F. STOUT.

motion,

"

Reid,

solidity,

knows

that

hardness,

extension,

softness,

and

were by Mr. Locke called primary qualities of body

and that sound, colour, taste, smell, and heat or cold were
fluidity

called secondary qualities.

distinction

Is there a just foundation for this

Is there anything

common

to the

primary which
"

belongs not to the secondary ? And what is it ?

The first of the questions thus formulated by Reid may
be regarded as settled. No competent person doubts that the

But on the second question

distinction has a real foundation.

it

seems to

me

answer which
is,

think,

philosophers

is

who
it

is

most familiar and

definitely

substitute for

which

that there

much room

wrong.

also

On

for discussion.

The

most precise and clear

the

other hand,

those

reject this false doctrine do not in general

any positive and detailed view

I find myself able to accept.

They

are

of their

own

more bent on

showing their opponents do not solve the problem than on

solving

The

it

themselves.

view commonly accepted by representatives of

Physics and Physiology and also by many Philosophers is that
the primary qualities really do belong to bodies, whereas the
definite

so-called secondary qualities are not qualities of external things

but qualities of sensations experienced by percipient

minds when external things stimulate the organs of sense in

at all

certain ways.

Postponing consideration of that part of this theory which

primary attributes, let us first examine the con-

relates to

secondary attributes are attributes not of

This contention is urged against
bodies but of sensations.

tention that the

142

what

G.

is

presumed

to be a natural fallacy of ordinary thinking.

It is directed against a

between qualities

When

the plain

mean
when he
to

STOUT.

F.

man

common

supposed confusion of

and properties

of sensation

says that burning coal

hot he

is

is

that the peculiar quality of the sensation felt

holds his hands near the

fire

sense

of external things.

taken

by him

actually part of the

is

nature of the burning coal.

Similarly, when he says that grass
he
is
taken
to
mean
that the specific quality of the
green

is

visual appearance of the grass

when he

daylight inheres in the grass

urged that heat in this sense

itself.

it

by ordinary

Against such a view it is

no more in the fire, and that

no more in the grass than pain is in

Grass and burning coal being insentient

greenness in this sense

the surgeon's knife.

is

looks at

is

cannot experience temperature-sensations or colour-sensations.

Hence,

all

man ought

that the plain

example, that the

fire in

the grate

is

to

mean

in asserting, for

hot, is that it has a

power

making him feel hot under certain conditions. If we enquire

on what this power depends we are referred to the primary

of

properties of the

Now,

fire,

such as the vibrations of

this criticism of

common

its

molecules.

me

sense seems to

to be

founded on a misconception of the actual procedure of ordinary

In principle the plain man is not really guilty of
thinking.
the confusion with which he

is

He

charged.

general confound intrinsic characters

with attributes of external things.

of

On

his

not in

does

own

sensations

the other

hand, I

admit and maintain that in ascribing secondary qualities

corporeal things he does not merely mean their power
produce certain sensations in us. His point of view
that of his critics
but neither is it that which his
;

ascribe

'to

When

it is

him.

What

it

really

is

fairly presented it will,

and indeed the only one which

is

to
to

not

critics

remains to be investigated.
I think, be found defensible,

is

defensible, for the case of

primary as well as of secondary qualities.

In investigating the view of the plain man, the very worst
we can pursue is to ask the plain man himself what he

course

PRIMARY AND SECONDARY QUALITIES.

His thought is through and through based on latent
assumptions and implicit inferences which he does not ordinarily
means.

attempt to define and formulate. So soon as he attempt

and formulate them he becomes a philosopher. But

define

his

untrained ventures in philosophical analyses are sure to

be extremely crude and unsatisfactory.
To depend on his raw

first

opinions about such topics as we are here concerned with is

like depending on a child for an account of the psychology of
If we wish really to understand
his own mental processes.
common sense we must follow and analyse its actual pro-

with the view of bringing out

cedure

which underlie
to give

this procedure.

an account

meant

is

the presuppositions

must not ask

it

directly

to

enquire

of these presuppositions.

we may now proceed

This being understood,

what

We

in ordinary, unreflective thought,

when

tilings

We may

are asserted to be hot, cold, sweet, red, blue, &c.

take as typical the case of temperature.

I touch a piece of
and feel a sensation of heat. I consequently assert that

iron

the iron

is

What

hot.

do I mean by this

assertion

Not

merely that the body is actually producing a certain sensation

For I presume that the iron was hot before I touched

in me.
it

or

came near

it,

and that

hand and go away.

it

will continue to be so

if

remove

Do

T, then, regard the hotness of the

a
sensation of heat under certain
power
produce
conditions
?
That
is
assignable
certainly a part of my meaning.

my

iron as a

to

But it is far from being the whole of it. On the contrary, the
hotness of the iron is thought of as being a quality in it as
specific and positive as the quality of my sensation when I
touch
other.

it.

The one

This

is

is

no more a mere possibility than the

shown by the

qualities to things

fact that in ascribing secondary

we normally think

of the things as

if

they

were actually producing the sensations in a hypothetical perWhen we think of iron as hot and gradually cooling
cipient.

down, we think of

were in fact generating gradually

diminishing sensations of heat in some one near enough to
it

as

if

it

G.

F.

STOUT.

them, even though we are quite well aware that no one

When we now think of the books in our
actually present.

feel
is

and yellow, we think of them as

they would appear to us were we there to look at them in
ordinary daylight. But we proceed quite otherwise in the case
library as

of

mere

red, blue, green,

When we

possibilities.

think of a hayrick as inflam-

mable we do not do so by representing

in flames.

as

it

if it

not represent

it

think of a window pane as brittle we do

as actually being broken.
In such case we

consciously distinguish between possibility and

We

were actually

When we

its actualisation.

do not lose sight of the possibility as such and mentally

substitute the actuality.

Are we then
experiences them

common sense
change when no one

conclude that

to

supposes sensations exist and

actually
actually

with so flagrant an
I
we
to
think,
absurdity
ought,
enquire first whether there
be
and
more
defensible
not
another
may
interpretation of its
It

procedure.

Before charging

seems to

me

it

that there

is

another which

merely defensible, but the only one which is defensible.

There are two main points to be emphasised. The
that the sensations which

mediate our knowledge

is

not

first is

of

the

secondary qualities do so only in so far as they represent,

and
express, or stand for something other than themselves
;

their representative function being independent of their actual

existence at this or that

moment

in this or that mind, they

be validly thought of as if they existed when in fact they

do not and cannot exist. The second point is that the distinc-

may

tion between

what

is

represented and

its

sense-representation

The
only a latent presupposition of ordinary thinking.
man
does
in
not
formulate
in
our
it, though
plain
general
of
his
procedure we must formulate it for him.
logical analysis
is

What

are

called

identified with

the

what

sense-representation,

in

distinction

secondary qualities of matter are not

is

represented

nor

from what

yet
it

with
stands

in distinction

the
for.

from

its

sense-representation
It

is

rather

the

145

PRIMARY AND SECONDARY QUALITIES.

complex unity formed by both together and commonly

left

unanalysed.

The representative function of sensation may be

exhibited by contrast with cases in which it is absent.

The gradual diminution and

sensations which ensue

when

final

best

discontinuance of heat

the sentient organism

is

with-

drawn from the perceived object is without representative

value.
It depends on movements of the organism which
neither produce nor imply any relevant change in the object.

Hence the concomitant change

of sensation is rightly regarded

as merely a change in the sensible appearance of the thing

which does not express or represent any corresponding

tion in the thing

may

itself.

altera-

All such variations in sense experience

therefore be ignored or cancelled as irrelevant in mentally

Now, if it is legitimate to
dealing with external objects.
cancel out variations of sensible appearance due merely to
variable

conditions

legitimate

of

perception,

it

is

to represent the object as it

for that

very reason

would appear under

uniform conditions of perception, whether or not it is actually

so perceived, or, indeed, whether or not it is perceived at all.
All sensible changes and differences under uniform conditions
of perception express or represent corresponding changes in
for by hypothesis they can be due to no
things perceived
other cause (and the principle of causality underlies the whole
;

procedure).
value,

Hence we

are interested in their representative

and not in their actual existence.

think of them as
actually exist.

if

We

they actually existed

may,

We may

and do

when they do not

for instance, legitimately represent

the sun as sensibly hot before any sentient beings appeared on

this planet.

Such procedure

is

logically justifiable provided

always that one grand rule is observed. In comparing one

thing with another, or different states of the same thing, it
is

always presupposed

.that the

conditions of perception are

sufficiently similar to prevent confusion between

mere

difference

of sensible appearance and difference in the nature of the things

146

G. F.

compared.

The uniformity

sufficient in

view

Coming now

is,

STOUT.
of course not absolute, but only

of the fineness of discrimination required.

to

our second point,

we must

insist

that,

between the independent nature of

though
material things and the mode in which their nature is sensibly
this distinction

is

represented
it

logically presupposed in ordinary thinking, yet

is not, as a rule, explicitly recognised.

On

the contrary,

both the sensible representation and what is represented are

equally included in what are called the secondary properties

Were it otherwise the secondary properties would

common sense mere powers, or occult qualities, or if they

of matter.

be for

had a positive and

in

for

terms of the primary properties.

common

their

own.

would be definable only

In fact, however, they have

specific content, this

sense a positive and specific qualitative content of

They possess

this content because the qualities

relations of temperature, colour, sound, smell,

and

and

taste sensa-

tions enter in virtue of their representative function into the

essential constitution of the corresponding secondary attributes

of matter.
If

this

attributes

analysis
of

corresponding

is

correct

it

follows that the secondary

matter are correlated but not identical with

qualities

language we speak not

of

sensation.

Hence,

in

ordinary

of a yellow sensation or a hot sensa-

but of a sensation of yellow or a sensation of heat. In

ordinary life our predominant interest is in the sensible
tion,

properties of bodies with which we are conversant through

the medium of sense, and therefore we name these directly.

The corresponding sensations are named indirectly by reference

But it would be a gross error to suppose on this
to these.
account that the sensations as such are without qualitative
content. On the contrary, whatever qualitative content belongs
to the secondary properties of

matter presupposes and

is

derived

from the qualitative content of sensations gud sensations. This

is to be borne in mind when we come to deal with primary
qualities.

PRIMARY AND SECONDARY QUALITIES.

We
as

have seen that in comparing objects with each other

perception
conditions

secondary qualities, standard conditions of

presupposed. The selection of the standard

their

regards

are
is,

reference.

But

there

is

is

Distinct sensible appearances are preferred

important principle.
to those

determined by convenience of
also another motive which involves an

of course, in part

which are relatively

indistinct.

The

principle involved

that difference in the sensible appearance under uniform

conditions

of

in

perception always expresses difference

the

things perceived, whereas absence of difference in the sensible

appearance does not necessarily express absence of difference in

the things perceived.

In the latter case

which do appear.

all

that

implied is
appear are slighter than those
For this reason a near view of an object

that the differences which

is

fail to

preferred to a more distant view, and in determining the

proper or constant colours of things we think of them as they
is

appear by ordinary daylight and not as they appear in the dusk

when only

different shades of grey are discernible

and other

colour distinctions are hidden from view.

This analysis of the secondary attributes of matter holds

The
good in all essential respects for the primary also.
primary, like the secondary, are correlated but not identical
with intrinsic characters of sensation, especially visual, tactual,

and motor

sensation.

same kind

for both.

of the

The

is

essentially of

the

Sensation enters into the constitution

primary attributes only in so far as certain features

of sense-experience represent

and

correlation

something other than themselves,

only because this representative function is logically

independent of the actual occurrence and fluctuation of senseit

is

affections that the

primary qualities can be validly thought of

as existing in the absence of percipients.

thinking of

the existence of sentient being.

same

justification

Finally,

We

are justified in

matter as extended and movable in space before

for

the positive

thinking

and

But we have exactly the

of

it

as

specific nature

hot

or

of

the

coloured.

primary

148

G.

qualities

no

less

STOUT.

F.

than that of the secondary

is

derived from

corresponding sensations.

We may

take as our chief example the most fundamental

of the primary qualities
In ordinary language
Extension.
it seems strange to speak of sensations as extended.
The
reason

is

same sense

that they are not extended in the

as

Bodies are extended in space. But touch

and sight sensations do not- in the ordinary sense of the words
occupy Space. They do not occupy any part of the single,
corporeal things.

infinite

homogeneous,
things and

which

space

embraces

all

material

They do not occupy any part

of the space in which Cardiff or Oxford is so many miles
from London, and in which bodies attract each other inversely
as the square

sight

have an

None

the

less,

touch and

intrinsic character correlated

with

and shape, just as the quality of sensations of

correlated with the yellowness of buttercups arid

size
is

oranges.
sion.

their distance.

of

sensations

spatial

yellow

distances.

their

We may

call this intrinsic character sensible

Since in

life

we

are interested in

exten-

sensible

ordinary
extension mainly as an expression or manifestation of spatial
extension, spatial extension may be called real arid sensible
extension apparent. Thus we contrast the apparent size of
a thing as seen at this or that distance from the eye with
its

real size as

measured in

feet or inches.

extension
of

Spatial or real

sensible extension

is throughout homogeneous;
two kinds, the visual and the tactual.

is

Their difference

perhaps comparable to that of the intensity of light sensations

and the intensity of sound sensations.
is

Consider

first

though we cease
own bodies, there

visual

extension.

On

closing

to see external objects or

is

still

field or

the

any part

eyes

of our

expanse of visual sensation

which may be entirely grey or variegated with

colour.

Each

expanse has local relations

of position and distance to other parts, and the whole is a single
continuous extensive quantum. Yet the visual expanse thus
distinguishable part of this field or

PRIMARY AND SECONDARY QUALITIES.

149

presented for our attentive scrutiny does not occupy any part
If it is in space it must be here or there.
of space.
But we

cannot from the nature of the case say where

no room

for

it

in the space occupied

by

it is.

bodies.

It

There

is

may

be

suggested that the extent of the visual field coincides with that
To this it seems a sufficient reply that the
of the retina.

extent of the visual

on the

size of the retina or its parts,

structure

not merely dependent

but also on its anatomical

field or its parts is

on the packing of rods and cones.

Thus, the same-

stimulation of the lateral portions of the retina gives a less

than stimulation of the fovea centralis.

the
Again,
expanse of visual sensation occupies any portion
of space it must be conterminous with other outlying portions
of space.
But in this sense it is boundless though not of

extensive sensation
if

Parts within

course infinite in magnitude.

it

are

bounded by

other contiguous parts, but in its totality it does not form part
of a

more extensive whole, and

it

has therefore no limits which

any sense spatial. It has no shape. If you doubt thisIn the next place, if it
try to discover what its shape is.
occupied space, it would be commensurable with other spatial

are in

It ought to be possible to express its magnitude in

quanta.
feet or inches.
But this is an intrinsic impossibility.

We

cannot, for instance, say that

it

equal in extent to the total

is

which comes within the range of

For what we can thus embrace
vision when the eyes are open.
in one view may vary indefinitely in extent.
It may include
tract of the external world

the expanse of the starry heavens or

may be confined to the

space may be conceivably
it

Again, a part of
but
the
empty
conception of a vacuum has no application to
visual extension.
There is no visual extension where there are
walls of a room.
;

no colour and brightness sensations.

Finally,

space

is

accessible to all of us.

only with his

own

common

object,

But each

of us

visual

field.

in principle equally
is

directly acquainted

The extension

of colour

and

brightness sensations disappears with the sensations themselves,

150

G.

when

man

dies or

STOUT.

F.

afflicted

is

with cortical blindness.

But

'no part of space is thereby annihilated.

What

has been said of the visual

holds also in

To avoid tedious
application for

field

of the closed

eye

for the visual field of the

all essentials

repetition,

open eye.
you to make the
now pass on to consider the

I shall leave
I

yourselves.

relation of real or spatial extension to the visual extension,

which

is

its

sensible

Everyone knows that the

familiar to everyone.
of the visible

size.

may

it,

of a thing

appearance

approach or recede from

relation to

The relevant

appearance.

it,

size

facts

are

and shape

vary indefinitely as we

or otherwise change our position in

while the thing remains constant in shape and

appearance of a match-box in my hand

be co-extensive with the visual appearance of a distant

The

visual

when we go far
a
case
of
such
variations.
!N"ow, we
enough away
limiting
cannot identify the real size of a thing with the whole series
of possible changes in the extent of its visible appearance, nor
mountain.

The

entire disappearance of things

is

yet with the fixed order of their possible occurrence. For the
real extension may remain constant, while its appearance
alters,

and

it

does not in

the concept of change.

its

Still

own

less

nature include or imply

can we select this or that

apparent extension and identify it with the real. For each

of them has in principle just as much and just as little logical
to be so regarded as any of the others.
They pass into
one another by continuous gradations, so that it is impossible
to fix on one only, to the exclusion of all others differing ever
title

so slightly

from

extension

in

conditions.

it.

We

terms of

do, indeed, usually

its

visual

But these conditions

think of the real

appearance under certain

are loosely determined,

and

they are variable according to our convenience or the degree

of accuracy required. We may choose any conditions we please,
provided we abide by them with sufficient strictness in coinparing one object with another, and provided they yield visual
appearances sufficiently distinct in view of the required fineness

PRIMARY

be revealed

magnifying glass

151

If \ve are interested in differences too slight

of discrimination.
to

SECONDARY QUALITIES.

AM.)

to
;

naked

the

and the

eye,

we have

recourse

visible extent of the thing

to

under

the magnifying glass has just as much claim to be identified

with its real magnitude as its extent when it is seen by the

naked

is

eye.

In general, extension as a characteristic of visual sensation

And
quite distinct from the extension of things in space.
if

yet

we

leave

tactual experience

out of count, extension

and the space in which bodies are

as a property of bodies

extended derive their positive and distinctive content from the

extensiveness of visual sensation.
Real extension is, indeed,

but its extensive

something other than visual extension
character belongs to it only inasmuch as this something is
represented in terms of the extensiveness of sight sensations
;

or of touch sensations.

has been customary to assume that

touch affords an immediate revelation of the real size and shape
Since Berkeley's time

which

is

denied to sight.

it

Visual extension

admitted to have

is

a merely representative value, but the reality represented is

identified with tactual extension.
It is easy to show that
this distinction is indefensible.
Apply the blunt end of a
pencil to the forehead, to the

lips, to

the back of the hand, to

the tip of a finger, to the drum of the ear.

The resulting
tactual sensations vary conspicuously in extent, though the
areas of the skin affected are throughout equal and the surface

with which they are brought

None

in.

contact remains constant in

the tactual extensions has any better logical

claim than the others to be identified with the real extent
size.

of

either of the skin stimulated or of the surface applied to

and
is
it

their rival claims are

mutually destructive.

also variable in this respect

is

different in the child

diseases
narcotics.

of

the

brain,

and

from one individual

and the adult

by the use

it

of

it

Skin sensibility

is

to another

affected

by

drugs such as

152

G.

The case

not altered

is

kinaesthetic sensations

F.

STOUT.

if

we turn

muscle, joint,

to

what are

called

and tendon sensations,

Berkeley identified the real distance between one body and

another with the series of joint, muscle, and tendon sensations-

which would be experienced in moving from one to the other;

We ask what series is meant ? Is it that which would be
experienced in walking, or in running, or in hopping on one
Is it that which would be experienced by a child of
leg ?
three or by an

adult with a long stride

and

series consists of feet

Which

There

of

these

only one tenable

answer to such questions, whatever sense-experience we may be
Given uniform conditions of perception, whatever
considering.
these
of

may

of yards

is

be, differences of sensible extension

more and

and

differences-

in the series of motor sensations represent

less

differences in the external world arid the differences as thus-

the differences together with the mode of repreare what we call differences of real, physical, or
extension.
The more differences are discernible in the
spatial
represented

senting them

sensible appearance under sufficiently uniform conditions, the

fuller

and more exact

distance.

is

our knowledge of real size, shape, and

fix on any set of conditions and

But we cannot

identify the corresponding sensible extension with extension

Neither tactual nor visual extension occupy any

part of the space in which bodies attract each other inversely

in space.

as the square of the distance.

that the single infinite all embracing Space of

It is
not, as he assumes, a form of sensibility at all.

It follows

Kant

is

essentially a

form

of

what he

calls external objects,

and as such

work which he ascribes to the categories.

presented by him at the outset as a pre-condition of the
the categories, and is from the outset confounded with

already presupposes the

Yet

it is

work

of

sensible extension.

No wonder

that he found in

it

a most

convenient middle term between the pure concepts of the

understanding and the disparate matter of sense. This confusion,

and a similar one relating

to time,

seem

to

me

to vitiate

r
l. >3

PRIMARY AND SECONDARY QUALITIES.

the

argument

of

Critique

of Pure

Reason from beginning

to end.

It is needless for

me

to

deal separately with

the other

primary qualities, resistance and mobility. These are correlated

with sensations of muscular tension and with sensible displace-

ment within the

is

field of sight

correlated with tactual

Our general

result

essential difference

and touch just

as real extension

and visual extension.

up

to

this

point

is

that there

no

is

between the primary and secondary attributes

of matter so far as regards their connexion with sense-experience.

one way independent of sense and in another

dependent on it. Both are dependent on it for the positive
content which makes them more than mere powers or occult

Both are

in

qualities.

Both are in the sense explained independent of

it

as

regards their existence.

What, then, is the true foundation of the undoubted

between them which is marked by calling them
So far as I can
respectively primary and secondary qualities ?

distinction

see the difference lies in their respective relation to the inter-

action of material things.

The executive order

of the material

world can be expressed only in terms of the primary and not in

terms of the secondary properties of matter. The unity and
continuity of material processes

is intelligible

only through the

unity and continuity of Space.

co-existence and sequence, and

The system

of uniformities of

of qualitative equivalences

and

correspondences which constitutes the order of physical nature

in its causal aspect can be formulated only in terms of
On the other hand, we find
extension, motion, and tension.

no such constancy, continuity, and quantitative equivalence in

There is, e.g.,
the occurrence of sounds, colours, or smells.
laws according to which sounds succeed each
other or vary concomitantly in loudness. But you can always
obtain a certain note by striking the right key of a piano, and

no system

of

by striking more or
softer.

less

hard you can make

it

louder or

154

G.

F.

STOUT.

This is mere common-place and needs no further exposition.

But something must be said concerning the implications of
For an attempt may be made to use it so
this common -place.
as to upset the results of our previous analysis.
It may be
if
to
in
that
matter
virtue
of
its
urged
agency belongs
primary
properties, these properties must have an existence indepen-

dent

of

sense-experience

such

as

does

not belong to

The steam hammer beats out the bar

secondary.

and the sun

attracts the

planets independently of

of

the
steel

anyone's

The primary properties are presupposed in the

processes by which the organs of sense are stimulated how,

sensations.

then,

can

they

be

dependent on the resulting sensations

Again, science finds itself

bound

to postulate operative condi-

and therefore primary qualities where the secondary can

have no place. Thus the particles of luminiferous ether cannot
tions

Does not

themselves be coloured.

this

point

to

a radical

between the primary and the secondary qualities

difference

their relation to sense-experience

in

In reply to such contentions, I need only refer again to the

distinction between sensible representation and that which is

What

represented exists and operates indecoming and going of the sensuous presentations
through which we express its existence and operation. It is
independent of these as the topography of England is inde-

represented.

is

pendently of the

pendent

of the

map

of

England, or as the

rise

and

fall of

temperature is independent of the rise and fall of the mercury

in a thermometer.
There is a systematic agency which we
express in terms of sensible extension, motion, and muscular
so expressed it is what we call material causation
the interaction of bodies in space.
But the features of senseexperience through which we represent it contribute nothing

tension

to its agency.

value of

On

the

other hand, since

sense-experience

we may

is

independent

the representative
of the existence of

represent in terms of sensible

extension, motion, and resistance, the processes through which
sensations,

validly

PKLMARY AND SECONDARY QUALITIKS.

those and other sense-experiences

come

to be

and cease

."."

to be.

From

the same point of view, it is easy to account for the

existence of primary qualities in the absence of the secondary.

There

no reason

is

resistance

should

why

not

sensible

have

extension,

representative

motion,
value,

and

where

and taste have none, just as

relative positions and distance on a map have representative
value where the flatness of the map, its absolute size, and the
sensible

colour,

sound,

heat,

colouring of the counties have none.

Similarly, in thinking

empty space, representative value attaches only to sensible

extension and the series of muscle, joint, and tendon sensations.
of

And now I might regard my immediate problem as

disposed of, so far as I am able to deal with it, were it not
the theory which
that a rival theory still demands attention
resolves the material world into a system of possibilities of
sensation.

This view

is

advocated in

its

purity by Mill, and

with a well known reservation by Berkeley, and Kant at times

seems to lean to the same side. According to it sensations
have indeed a representative value, but what they represent is

always only the possibility of getting other sensations in a fixed

and systematic order. The material world is supposed by it to
be constituted of actual sense-experiences, together with the
systematic order of possible sense-experience.
Against this
doctrine I urge in the first place that the order of possible
sensations is widely divergent from the order of the physical
world and its processes. Consider the fluctuation of the visible

appearance of a body as we approach or recede from it, and the

variations of tactual extent as a body is applied to different
parts of the skin.
of the

body

when we

itself,

Such differences are not differences in the

size

and they are not included in what we mean

say, for instance, that the

body

is

three inches long.

Again, as Kant has insisted, there is

succession of our sensations and co-existence in the external
a contrast between the

The back and

house co-exist, but the

corresponding sensations are successive. Finally, how can the
world.

front

of

156

G.

internal content of a solid

STOUT.

F.

body be resolved into any possible

Slice it as you will you only

not solid content, but only the boundaries of
The supporters of the theory usually meet such

series of sensory presentations.

disclose surfaces
solid content.

arguments by the help

They

of extravagant illustrative hypotheses.

urge, for instance, that sentient beings, otherwise con-

ditioned than ourselves, would experience simultaneously the

sensations which we can experience only successively. But the

appeal to such an imaginary percipient implies that at least the

successive order of our own sensations, in spite of its fixed and
systematic character, forms no part of the order of the physical
world. Nor can the theory so long as it remains self-consistent
supply us with any reason why the imaginary experience should

be preferred to ours. The relevant difference cannot lie in

the diverse conditions of perception. For these conditions,
according to the theory, can themselves consist only in an order
of

actual and

possible

assignable ground

There seems to be no

sensations.

for preferring the fictitious experience unless

we

already presuppose a knowledge that, e.g., the order of the

external world is co-existent as contrasted with the successive
its sensible appearance to us.
There is a still more
fundamental objection to the doctrine.
It dislocates and
the
relation
It commits
of
and
actual.
the
transposes
possible

order of

the old blunder of dogmatic metaphysics, making essence prior

to existence, investing it with a pseudo-existence, and deriving
actual existence from

it.

Possibility essentially presupposes

To say that something is possible is to say that

something actual v/hich would behave in a certain way

actuality.

there

is

under certain conditions.

deals freely in

mere

But the doctrine we are discussing

possibilities

without any such relation to

anything actual; these naked possibilities it regards as the

source of actual sensations, and to intensify the absurdity it
supposes

that

possibilities,

actual

and

changes

also that

determines changes in others.

take

change

Take

place
in

in

these

naked

one naked possibility

Mill's

example

of the table

IMMMAKY AND SECONDARY QUALITIES.

which
it.

is

believed to exist

This belief

construed as

is

into the room, or were

organs

now

is

present to perceive

meaning that

in

it,

if

any one went

and suitably directing

his

he would be aware of certain sensations,

sense

of

when no one

157

group of visual sensations. Now, the going into the

room and the being in the room and the adjustment of the
sense organs must, of course, in accordance with the theory be
e.g.,

of a

simply identified with having certain possible sensations in a

It does

Suppose these sensations actualised.

certain order.

not therefore follow that a table becomes

visible.

should

have just the same sensations without seeing any table if no

The table itself is that which so reacts, or
table were there.

under the assigned conditions, as to give rise to

those actual sensations which are called the visible appearance

would

so react

But according

of the table.
table

naked
to

is

to the theory

under discussion the

nothing actual but only a naked possibility.

possibility

it

supposed to operate as an agent giving

actual

something

absurdity,

is

is

Thus a

actual

to

supposed to

naked and unactualised

effect

sensations.

To

rise

crown the

by determining other
of sensation which again

this

possibilities

changes taking place in yet other naked and

unactualised possibilities. For such is the only interpretation
which the theory can put on the proposition that the table

consist in

organism by reflecting light to the eye and

so setting up molecular processes in the nervous system.
For these, among other reasons, I feel bound to reject the
affects the sentient

doctrine of Mill and Berkeley, though I imagine it is held in

substance by some at the present day who belong to a very
different school of thought.

thinkers with

my own

whom

I am. quite prepared to be told

I have at

by
bottom much in common that

is at least as untenable.
I expect to be
reviving the exploded doctrine of things in
themselves, disparate and discontinuous with our immediate

position

charged with

experience.

With

a clear conscience I plead not guilty to

counts of this indictment.

all

158

G.

There

is,

themselves.

F.

STOUT.

indeed, a sense in which I postulate things in

But in this sense I do not see how anyone can

deny them. I postulate things in themselves

which another man's toothache is relatively

in the sense in

me

to

a thing

own which I do not

I
know
of it.
I postulate
immediately experience though
may
them in the sense in which my own past toothache is a thing
in itself as

having an inner being of

its

my present existence inasmuch as I do

not immediately experience it when I remember it.
But so
understood things in themselves are surely admitted facts and
in itself relatively to

not exploded figments of an obsolete metaphysics.

In distinguishing between sensible representation and what
it

represents I do not

commit myself

to

any irreducible dualism.

and discontinuous

I do not divide the universe into disparate

On

parts.

the contrary, the existences and processes which

have an inner being of their own are the very same existences
and processes which as sensibly represented constitute the
It is with the things in

world of material phenomena.

them-

name them thus, that we are incessantly

selves,
medium of sense. They constitute the
the
conversant through
if

we choose

to

presupposition and necessary complement of our

Their inner being cannot therefore be
On
disparate and discontinuous with our own conscious life.
the contrary, we and they must form part of one continuous

constant

conscious experience.

They must be bone of our bone and flesh of our flesh.

This means for me that their inner being is ultimately psychical.
"
"
Indeed, like Lotze, I fail to understand what inner being can

whole.

possibly

mean

But how,

it

unless

it

means

"

psychical being."

will be asked, can

we know

all this

Am

not

begging the question in assuming that in any relevant sense we

are or can be conversant with the things in themselves so as to
be able to represent them in terms of sensation ? Granted that

they determine modifications of our sense-experience how can

we be aware of anything except the resulting sensation. The
scratch, as H. Stirling says, knows nothing of the thorn.

AND SECONDARY QUALITIES;

I'IM.MAKV

Confined at the outset to our own states

our

own immediate

by what possibility can we ever transcend these ?

we
can only do so by way of inference. But how
Evidently
can we infer from A to B, when B is supposed to be something
with which we are totally unacquainted ?
As regards this last question I would point out that unless
what is inferred is other than the datum there is no inference.
All that is necessary for inference is (1) that the datum shall
experience

be by

its

shall

therefore

intrinsic nature a

point

fragment of a wider whole, and

itself

beyond

to

its

own

necessary

complement; (2) that there shall be a thinking and willing

being capable of discerning and actively eliciting the implication.
Turning to our special problem, I admit that on my view
the primary datum for the individual mind is its own immediate

But

experience.
distinct

seems

this proposition

from but in direct contradiction

me

to

to the

to be not only
statement that

we know only our own states. If our own

could be known in pure isolation from aught else, they

in the first instance

states

would not be

data.

datum

An

datum

isolated

is

a contradiction in

a datum only because being essentially a

and what it thus implies
fragment it points beyond itself
cannot be merely being in general or merely the absolute, but

terms.

is

always something as

specific

as

itself.

state

of

feeling

incapable of revealing anything beyond itself that would be a

This applies to the primary datum immepetty absolute.
the immediate experience of each of us being
a fragment of the one continuous universe must manifest itself

diate experience

Immediate experience must from

the outset be inseparably blended with immediate inference,
and this in manifold ways. It is in this direction and not in
as such to a thinking being.

any a priori contribution of the understanding that I would

look for the source and the justification of the Kantian
categories.

I can here only say one

of these general

word

or

two

to indicate the bearing

remarks on the question, how we can know the

160

G.

existence

F.

STOUT.

and processes which, as represented in terms of

The only answer which

sensation, constitute the external world.

I

have to

can

offer is

discover,

an old one, but one which has

been

yet

intelligently criticised.

properly stated

understood or

I turn for a solution to the intrinsic

nature of conation and will and the

and

or

not, so far as I

mode

in

which conation

conditioned as regards success or

From the same
failure in the control of sense-experience.
will

find themselves

source I coincidently derive the concept of tendency which

seems to be the most distinctive and indispensable element in
concrete causality.

It lies

beyond the

limits of this paper

to,

It is sufficient for my
follow out this line of thought in detail.
if I have succeeded in showing how I conceive
present purpose

the problem without attempting to solve

it.

161

ABSTRACT OF MINUTES OF THE PROCEEDINGS

OF THE ARISTOTELIAN SOCIETY FOR THE
TWENTY-FIFTH SESSION.

Mr. Shadworth H.
November 2nd, 1903, at 8 p.m.
Hodgson, V.P., in the Chair. The following resolution was
"
That the Society has heard with the
passed unanimously
And that
deepest regret of the death of Dr. Alexander Bain.

Meeting,

a messsage of condolence be sent to Mrs. Bain." The Chairman then delivered the Inaugural Address on the subject
"Method in Philosophy." The Chairman invited discussion,

and Mr. Shand, Dr. Hicks, Dr. Westermarck, and others made
remarks on some of the points brought forward in the Address,
and Mr. Hodgson replied.
Mr. A. F. Shand, V.P.,
Meeting, December 7th, 1903, at 8 p.m.
in the Chair.
Mr. Herbert W. Blunt read a paper on "Bacon's

Method of Science." In the discussion, Mr. Benecke, Mr.

Boutwood, Mr. Carr, Mr. Finberg, Mr. Hodgson, Mr. Spiller,
and Mr. Walker took part, and Mr. Blunt replied.
Meeting,
V.P.,

January
in

the

unanimously

4th,

1904,

at

p.m.

Dr.

G. Dawes Hicks,

The following resolution

Chair.
" That the
Members of the

was carried
Aristotelian

Society, at this their first meeting after Mr. Herbert Spencer's

death, desire to express their sense of the great loss suffered by
English Philosophy, and to place on record their high appre-

work he was enabled to complete."

Constance Jones read a paper on " Professor
Sidgwick's Ethics." A discussion followed, in which Mr. Moore,
Mr. Daphne, Mr. Hodgson, Professor Brough, and Dr. Golds-

ciation of the laborious

Miss E.

E.

brough took part, and Miss Jones

replied.

Meeting, February 1st, 1904, at 8 p.m. Mr. A. F. Shand, V.P., in

the Chair.
Mr. F. B. Jevons was elected a member.
The
following

resolution

was carried unanimously

" That the

162

Members of the Aristotelian Society, London, desire to express

at this time their high appreciation of the great work of Kant
in philosophical enquiry, and to convey to Professor Vaihinger
and

colleagues their best wishes for

his

the success of the

and of the Kantgesellschaft

February
meeting
Mr. Shadworth H. Hodgson read a
then to be founded."
in Halle on

12th,

"
paper on Reality." In the discussion, Dr. Hicks, Mr. Benecke,
Mr. Shearman, Mr. Carr, and others took part, and Mr.

Hodgson

replied.

Mr. Shadworth H. Hodgson,

Meeting, March 7th, .1904, at 8 p.m.
Mr. L. T. Hobhouse read a paper on
V.P., in the Chair.
" Faith and the Will to Believe." The
Chairman, Mr. Benecke,
Mr. Boutwood, Mr. Carr, and others took part in the discussion,

and Mr. Hobhouse

replied.

Meeting, April llth, 1904, at 8 p.m. Dr. G. Dawes Hicks, V.P.,

in the Chair.
Dr. Edward Westermarck read a paper on
" Remarks on the
In the
Subjects of Moral Judgments."
discussion Mr. Hodgson, Mr. Benecke, Mr. Carr, Mr. Shearman,
and others took part, and Dr. Westermarck replied.

May 2nd, 1904, at 8 p.m. Mr. Shadworth H. Hodgson,

Mr. F. Tavani was elected a member.
V.P., in the Chair.
Mr. G. E. Moore read a paper on " Kant's Idealism." The

Meeting,

Chairman, Mr. Carr, Dr. Grece, and Mr. Shearman took part
and Mr. Moore replied.

in the discussion,

The President in the Chair.

Meeting, June 6th, 1904, at 8 p.m.
The Report of the Executive Committee for the Twenty-fifth
Session and the Financial Statement were read and adopted.
The Rev. Hastings Rashdall was elected President for the

ansuing session. Dr. G. Dawes Hicks, Mr. G. E. Moore, and

Professor W. R. Sorley were elected Vice-Presidents.
Mr. A.
Boutwood was elected Treasurer and Mr. H. W. Carr,

Honorary Secretary.

The

"
President, Mr. G. F. Stout, read a paper on
Primary

and Secondary Qualities." Mr. Hodgson, Mr. Boyce Gibson,

Mr. Shand, Mr. Carr, Mr. Benecke, Mr. Shearman, and others
took part in the discussion, and Mr. Stout replied.

163

REPORT OF THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE FOR THE

TWENTY-FIFTH SESSION.
(Read

THE

at the

Meeting

June

Qth, 1904.)

following papers have been read during the Session

"Method

in Philosophy."
Being the opening Address, by
Mr. Shadworth H. Hodgson.

"

Bacon's

Method

of Science,"

by Mr. Herbert

" Professor
Sidgwick's Ethical Theories,"
stance Jones.
"

Reality,"

W.

by Miss

Blunt.
E. E. Con-

by Mr. Shadworth H. Hodgson.

"Faith and the Will to Believe," by Mr. L. T. Hobhouse.

"

Remarks on the Subjects

of

Moral Judgments," by Dr. Edward

Westermarck.
" Kant's
Idealism," by Mr.
"

Primary and Secondary

Gr.

E. Moore.

Qualities,"

by Mr. G. F. Stout.

new number
The number of members
two members having resigned

All of these papers have been printed and form the

of the Proceedings in course of publication.

remains unaltered since

last report,

and two having joined during the

session.

L2

164
g

NOO

00 CO

t-

00 CO 00 <M

CD

oi

11

HO 00 i>

O
.

3
CT5

CO

Ci

o
HH
CG

H
IH

rt

rH

o>

tM

p
H
p

165

KULES OF THE AEISTOTELIAN SOCIETY.

NAME.
This Society shall :be called " THE ARISTOTELIAN SOCIETY
FOR THE SYSTEMATIC STUDY OF PHILOSOPHY," or, for a short title,
I.

"

THE ARISTOTELIAN

SOCIETY."

OBJECTS.
II.

The

Philosophy;

object of this Society shall be the systematic study of

1st, as to its historic development; 2nd, as to its

methods and problems.

CONSTITUTION.

This Society shall consist of a President, Vice-Presidents,

a Treasurer, a Secretary, and Members.
The Officers shall constitute an Executive Committee.
shall be a
Ex-President
Every
III.

Vice-President.
SUBSCRIPTION.

IV.
first

The annual subscription

shall be one guinea,

due at the

meeting in each session.

ADMISSION OF MEMBERS.

V.

person desirous of becoming a member of the

SOCIETY shall apply to the Secretary or other
of bhe Society, who shall lay the application before the

Any

ARISTOTELIAN
officer

Executive Committee, and the Executive Committee, if they

nominate the candidate for membership at an
fit, shall
ordinary meeting of the Society. At the next ordinary meeting

think

after such nomination a ballot shall be taken,

the votes cast shall be required for election.

when two- thirds

of

166

COKRESPONDING MEMBERS.
VI. Foreigners may be elected as corresponding members oi
the Society.
They shall be nominated by the Executive Committee, and notice having been given at one ordinary meeting,
their nomination shall be voted upon at the next meeting,

when

the votes cast shall be required for their

Corresponding members shall not be liable to the

two-thirds

election.

of

annual subscription, and shall not vote.

ELECTION OF OFFICERS.

The President, three Vice- Presidents, Treasurer, and

VII.

Secretary shall be elected by ballot at the last meeting in each

Should a vacancy occur at any other time, the Society
shall ballot at the earliest meeting to fill such vacancy, notice
session.

having been given to

all

the members.

SESSIONS AND MEETINGS.

The ordinary meetings of the Society shall be on the

Monday in every month from November to June, unless
otherwise ordered by the Committee. Such a course shall conVIII.

first

Special meetings may be ordered by resolution

the Society or shall be called by the President whenever
requested in writing by four or more members.
stitute a session.

of

BUSINESS OF SESSIONS.

IX.

At

Committee

the

last

meeting in each session the Executive

and the Treasurer shall make a financial
.

shall report

statement, and present his accounts audited by two

appointed by the Society at a previous meeting.

members

BUSINESS OF MEETINGS.

X.

Except at the

first

meeting

in

each session, when the

President or a Vice-President shall deliver an address, the study

of Philosophy in both departments shall be pursued by means of
discussion, so that every member may take an active part in the

work

of the Society.

167

PROCEEDINGS.

The Executive Committee

are entrusted with the care of

or
for
the
publication of a selection of the
publishing
providing
read
each
session
before
the
papers
Society.

XI.

BUSINESS RESOLUTIONS.
XII. No resolution affecting the general conduct of the
Society and not already provided for by Rule XIV shall be put
unless notice has been given and the resolution read at the
previous meeting, and unless a

quorum

of

five

members be

present.

VISITORS.

XIII.

Visitors

may

be

introduced

to

the

meetings

by

members.

AMENDMENTS.

XIV.

Notices to

amend

these rules shall be in writing and

Amendments must be announced

an ordinary meeting, and notice having been given to all the
members, they shall be voted upon at the next ordinary meeting,

must be signed by two members.

at

when they

shall not be carried unless two-thirds of the votes cast

are in their favour.

168

OF OFFICERS AND MEMBERS FOR THE

LIST

TWENTY-SIXTH SESSION,

1904-1905.

PRESIDENT.
KEV.

HASTINGS RASHDALL,

M.A., D.C.L.

VICE-PRESIDENTS.

SHADWORTH H. HODGSON, M.A., LL.D. (President, 1880 to 1894).

BERNARD BOSANQUET, M.A., LL.D. (President, 1894 to 1898).
F. STOUT, M.A., LL.D. (President, 1899 to 1904).
G. DAWES HICKS, M.A., PH.!).
G. E. MOOEE, M.A.

G-.

W.

R.

SORLEY, M.A.
TR,EASURER
A.

BODTWOOD.

HONORARY SECRETARY.
H.

WILDON CARR,

22,

Albemarle

Street,

W.

HONORARY AND CORRESPONDING MEMBERS.

Elected.

1885.
1899.
1889.
1880.

1891.
1881.
1883.

1899.
1880.
1899.

SAMUEL ALEXANDER, M.A., 13, Clifton Avenue, Fallowfield,

Manchester (elected hon. mernter 1902).

Prof.

MASK BALDWIN, Princetown, New Jersey.

M. CATTELL, M.A., Ph.D., Garrison, New York.
Prof. W. R. DCNSTAN, M.A., F.R.S., 30, Thurloe Square, S.W.
(elected hon. member 1900).
M. H. DZIEWICKI, 21, Szpitalna, Cracow, Austria.
Hon. WILLIAM T. HAEBIS, LL.D., Washington, United States.
Prof. WILLIAM JAMES, M.D., Cambridge, Mass., United States.
EDMUND MONTGOMEEY, LL.D., Liendo Plantation, Hempstead, Texas.
Prof. A. SENIEE, M.D., Ph.D., Gurthard, Galway (elected hon.
member 1902).
Prof. J.

J.

Prof. E. B. TITCHENEE, Cornell University, United States.

169

MEMBERS.
Elected.

1898.

Miss DOROTHEA BEALE, Ladies' College, Cheltenham.

1893.

E. C. BENECKK, 174, Denmark Hill, S.E.

W. BLUNT,

1888.

H.

1886.

Prof.

M.A., 183, Woodstock Road, Oxford.

BEBNABD BOSANQUET, M.A., LL.D.,

Vice- President,

The Heath

Cottage, Oxshott.

1890.

A.

1895.

BOUTWOOD, Treasurer, Bledlow, Bucks.

BBOUGH, LL.M., University College, Aberystwyth.
Mrs. SOPHIE BRYANT, D.Sc., 6, Eldon Road, Hampstead.

1883.

Prof. S.

1881.
1895.

H. W. CARE, Hon. Sec., 25, Cumberland Terrace, Regent's Park.

STANTON COIT, Ph.D., 30, Hyde Park Gate, S.W.

1884.

P.

1889.

Prof. J.

H. BTJTCHEK, M.A.,

6,

Tavistock Square, W.C.

1899.

DAPHNE, LL.B., 9, Roseleigh Avenue, Highbury.

E. T. DIXON, M.A., Racketts, Hythe, Hants.
J. A. J. DEEWETT, M.A., Magdalen College, Oxford.

1891.

Lady EVANS, Nash

1893.

W. H. FAIEBEOTHEE,

J896.

Mills,

Hemel Hempstead.

1901.

A. J.

M.A., Lincoln College, Oxford.

FINBEBG, 34, Bartholomew Road, N.W.

1897.

Prof.

W.

R.

BOTCE GIBSON, M.A.,

9,

Briardale

Gardens, Platt's

Lane, Hampstead.
1900.
1882.

1901.
1890.

1902.

1892.
1880.

G. F. GOLDSBKOUGH, M.D., Church Side, Herne Hill, S.E.

C. J. GBECE, LL.D., Redhill, Surrey.

Mrs. HEEZFELD, 53, Marlborough Mansions, Finchley Road, N.W.

G. DAWES HICKS, M.A., Ph.D., rice - President, 7, Highbury

Grange, N.
Mrs. HICKS, 7, Highbury Grange, N.
L. T. HOBHOTTSE, M.A., 32, Lancaster Road, Wimbledon, S.W.
SHADWOETH H. HODGSON, M.A., LL.D., Vice-President, 45, Conduit
Street,

W.

M. JACKSON,

Manchester

W.

1896.

Miss L.

1904.

F. B. JEYONS, M.A., Litt.D., Univ. of

1892.
1899.

Durham.
Miss E. E. CONSTANCE JONES, Girton College, Cambridge.
ROBERT JONES, M.A., M.D., Claybury, Woodford Bridge.

1896.

FEEDEEICK KAIBEL,

1881.

A. F. LAKE, 12, Park Hill, Clapham Park, S.W.

Prof. ROBEET LATTA, M.A., D.Phil., The College, Glasgow.
Rev. JAMES LINDSAY, M.A., D.D., Springhill Terrace, Kilmarnock, N.B.

29,

Street,

Durham, Bishop

Hatfield's

Hall,

1898.
1897.

LEWIS MclNTYEE,

1899.

J.

1896.

Miss E. A. MANNING,

1883.
1889.

1896.

27,

Kensington Mansions, Earl's Court, S.W.

D.Sc., Rosslynlee, Cults,

N.B.

Pembridge Crescent, W.
C. C. MASSEY, 124, Victoria Street, S.W.
R. E. MITCHESON, M.A., 11, Kensington Square,
5,

W.

G. E. MOORE, M.A., Vice- President, Trinity College, Cambridge.

170
Elected.

1900.

Eev. G. E. NEWSOM, M.A., King's College, London.

R. G. NISBET, M.A., 13, Nelson Terrace, Billhead, Glasgow.

1903.

Miss E. A. PEARSON, 129, Kennington Road, S.E.

1900.

1903.

GEORGE CLAUS RANKIN, M. A., The

1889.

Rey. HASTINGS RASHDALL, M.A., D.C.L., President,

Oxford.

1893.
1895.

GEORGE S. RHODES, Ashby, Otley Road, Harrogate.

ARTHUR ROBINSON, M.A., 4, Pimlico, Durham.

1896.

Hon. B. A.

1897.
1901.

Mrs. SCHWANN, 4, Princes Gardens, S.W.

ALEXANDER F. SHAND, M.A., 1, Edwardes Place, Kensington,
A. T. SHEARMAN, M.A., 67, Cranfield Road, Brockley, S.E.

1900.

Prof.

1892.

W.

W.

Settlement, Tavistock Place,

New

W.C.

College,

RUSSELL, M.A>, 44, Grosvenor Road, S.W.

R. SORLET, M.A., Vice-President,

W.

Chesterton Lane,

St. Giles,

1893.

Cambridge.
GUSTAV SPILLER, 54, Prince of Wales Road, Battersea Park.
G. JOHNSTONE STONEY, M.A., D.Sc., F.R.S., 30, Ledbury Road,
Bayswater, W.
Prof. G. F. STOUT, M.A., LL.D., rice-President, Craigard, St. Andrews,
N.B.
HENRY STURT, M.A., 5, Park Terrace, Oxford.

1904.

FE. TAYANI, Merchant Venturers' School,

1900.

Prof. C. B.

1886.

FRAMJEE R. VICAJEE, High Court

1902.
1896.

JOSEPH WALKER, Pellcroft, Thongshridge, Huddersfield.

CLEMENT C. J. WEBB, M.A., Magdalen College, Oxford.
Prof. R. M. WENLEY, M.A., D.Sc., East Madison Street, Ann Arbor,

1897.

EDWARD WESTERMARCK,

1901.
1888.

1887.

1890.

UPTON, M.A.,

Bristol.

St. George's, Littlemore,

of Judicature,

near Oxford.

Bombay.

Mich., U.S.A.

Bush,

Ph.D.,

8,

Rockley

Road,

Shepherd's

W.

Harrison and Sons, Printers in Ordinary

to

His Majesty,

St.

Martin's Lane.

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