FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 163217. April 18, 2006.]

CELESTINO MARTURILLAS, petitioner, vs.
PHILIPPINES, respondent.

PEOPLE

OF

THE

DECISION
PANGANIBAN, C.J :
p

Well-rooted is the principle that factual ndings of trial courts, especially when
armed by the appellate court, are generally binding on the Supreme Court. In
convicting the accused in the present case, the Court not merely relied on this
doctrine, but also meticulously reviewed the evidence on record. It has come to the
inevitable conclusion that petitioner is indeed guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime charged.
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Review 1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking to
set aside the November 28, 2003 Decision 2 and the March 10, 2004 Resolution 3 of
the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 25401. The CA armed, with
modications as to the award of damages, the Decision 4 of Branch 10 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Davao City. The RTC had found Celestino Marturillas
guilty of homicide in Criminal Case No. 42091-98. The assailed CA Decision disposed
as follows:
"WHEREFORE, subject to the modication thus indicated, the judgment
appealed from must be, as it hereby is, AFFIRMED. With the costs of this
instance to be assessed against the accused-appellant." 5

The challenged CA Resolution denied petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration. 6

Petitioner was charged with homicide in an Information
worded as follows:

dated November 5, 1998,

"[T]hat on or about November 4 1998, in the City of Davao, Philippines, and

within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-mentioned
accused, armed with a gun, and with intent to kill, wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously shot one Artemio Pantinople, thereby inicting fatal wound upon
the latter which caused his death." 8

The Facts

Version of the Prosecution

The Oce of the Solicitor General (OSG) summarized the People's version of the

facts:
"4.
The prosecution presented Lito Santos, Ernita Pantinople, PO2
Mariano Operario, Alicia Pantinople and Dr. Danilo Ledesma as its witnesses
from whose testimonies, the following facts were established.
"Lito Santos, a forty-three-year old farmer and resident of Barangay
Gatungan, Bunawan District, Davao City, testied that about 6:00 o'clock in
the afternoon of November 4, 1998, he saw his neighbor and 'kumpare'
Artemio Pantinople arrive on board a jeepney from Bunawan, Davao City.
Artemio was carrying a truck battery, some corn bran and rice. They talked
for a while concerning their livelihood afterwhich, Artemio proceeded to
connect the battery to the uorescent lamps in his store. Artemio's store
was located about five (5) meters away from Lito's house.
HSDaTC

"After installing the battery to the uorescent lamps, Artemio sat for a while
on a bench located in front of his store. Then, Cecilia Santos, Lito's wife,
called him and Artemio for supper. Artemio obliged. Lito, opting to eat later,
served Artemio and Cecilia the food. After eating, Artemio returned to the
bench and sat on it again together with his tree (3) children, namely: Janice,
Saysay and Pitpit.
"Lito was eating supper in their kitchen when he heard a gunshot. From a
distance of about ten (10) meters, he also noticed smoke and re coming
from the muzzle of a big gun. Moments later, he saw Artemio clasping his
chest and staggering backwards to the direction of his (Lito's) kitchen.
Artemio shouted to him, 'Tabangi ko Pre, gipusil ko ni kapitan ,' meaning 'Help
me, Pre, I was shot by the captain.' However, Lito did not approach Artemio
right after the shooting incident because Cecilia warned him that he might
also be shot.
"Lito did not see the person who shot Artemio because his attention was
then focused on Artemio.
"Shortly, Lito saw Ernita Pantinople, the wife of Artemio, coming from her
house towards the direction where Artemio was sprawled on the ground.
Ernita was hysterical, jumping and shouting, 'Kapitan, bakit mo binaril and
aking asawa.' She also repeatedly cried for help.
"Lito then went out of their house and approached Artemio who was lying
dead near a banana trunk more than ve (5) meters from his house. Some
of their neighbors, namely: Antenero, Loloy Libre and Lapis answered
Ernita's call for help and approached them.
"When the shooting incident happened about 7:30 in the evening of
November 4, 1998, Lito's house was illumined by a lamp. Their kitchen has
no walls. It is an open-type kitchen giving him an unobstructed view of
Artemio who was about ve (5) meters away from where he was positioned
at that time. Although there was a gemilina tree growing in the space in
between his house and the store of Artemio, the same did not block his view
of Artemio. Likewise, the coconut trees and young banana plants growing at

the scene of the crime did not affect his view.

"At the same instance, Ernita was also in their kitchen preparing milk for her
baby. Her baby was then lying on the oor of their kitchen. When she was
about to put the bottle into the baby's mouth, she suddenly heard the sound
of a gunburst followed by a shout, 'Help me Pre, I was shot by the captain.'
She immediately pushed open the window of their kitchen and saw appellant
wearing a black jacket and camouage pants running towards the direction
of the back portion of Lito's house. From there, appellant crossed the street
and disappeared.
"Ernita saw appellant carrying with him a long rearm which looked like an M14 rie. Ernita also sensed that appellant had some companions with him
because she heard the crackling sound of the dried leaves around the place.
Ernita had a clear view of appellant at that time because their place was wellillumined by the full moon that night and by the two (2) uorescent lamps in
their store which were switched on at the time of the incident.
"Ernita immediately went out of their house and ran towards Artemio.
Artemio tried to speak to her but he could not do so because his mouth was
full of blood. Upon seeing the pitiful sight of her husband, Ernita shouted
several times, 'Kapitan, ngano nimo gipatay and akong bana.' She also
repeatedly called her neighbors for help but only Lito Santos, Eufemio
Antenero, Norman Libre and some residents of Poblacion Gatungan
responded to her calls and approached them. She noted that no member of
the CFO and CAFGU came to help them. Also, no barangay tanod came to
offer them to help.
cDIHES

"While waiting for the police, Ernita did not allow Artemio's body to be
touched by anybody. After more than two (2) hours, the police arrived,
together with a photographer by the name of Fe Mendez of Bunawan
District, Davao City who took pictures of the crime scene.
"PO2 Mariano Operario, Investigation Ocer of the Investigation Section of
the Bunawan Police Station, Philippine National Police, Davao City, testied
that about 9:05 in the evening of November 4, 1998, he received a report of
an alleged shooting incident at Barangay Gatungan, Bunawan District in
Davao City. Together with SPO1 Rodel C. Estrellan and a member of the
mobile police patrol on board their mobile car, PO2 Operario proceeded
immediately to the crime scene. They reached the crime scene about 10:00
o'clock in the evening of the same date. They found the lifeless body of
Artemio sprawled on the ground. Ernita and Lito then approached PO2
Operario and informed him that appellant was the one responsible for the
shooting.
"PO2 Operario stayed at the crime scene for about one (1) hour and waited
for the funeral vehicle to pick up the body of Artemio. When the funeral
hearse arrived, PO2 Operario told the crew to load Artemio's body into the
vehicle. Thereafter, he then boarded again their mobile car together with Lito
Santos.

"Armed with the information that appellant was the one responsible for the
shooting of Artemio, PO2 Operario proceeded to the house of appellant and
informed him that he was a suspect in the killing of Artemio. He then invited
appellant to go with him to the police station and also to bring along with him
his M-14 rie. Appellant did not say anything. He just got his M-14 rie and
went with the police to the police station where he was detained the whole
night of November 4, 1998. Appellant did not also give any statement to
anybody about the incident. The following day, appellant was transferred by
the police to Tibungco Police Station where he was detained.
"Alicia Pantinople, the 44-year old sister of Artemio, testified that on the night
of November 4, 1998, she was at home watching television. She heard a
gunshot but did not mind it because she was already used to hearing the
sound of guns fired indiscriminately in their place.
"After a few minutes, Junjun, a child and resident of Sitio Centro, Barangay
Gatungan, Bunawan District, Davao City came knocking at their door. Junjun
informed them that: 'Yoyo, Uncle Titing was shot,' referring to Artemio.
"Upon hearing the report, Alicia looked for some money thinking that it might
be needed for Artemio's hospitalization because she expected Artemio to be
still alive. Artemio's two (2) children, namely: Jonel and Genesis who were
staying with her hurriedly left. She then ran to the place where her brother
was shot and found Artemio's dead body on the ground surrounded by his
four (4) children.
"At the Bunawan Police Station, Alicia was informed by the police that
appellant was at Tibungco Police Station. She sent her male cousin to
proceed to Tibungco Police Station to nd out if appellant was indeed in the
said place. However, her cousin immediately returned and informed her that
appellant was not in Tibungco Police Station. She then went around the
Bunawan Police Station and noticed a locked door. When she peeped
through the hole of the said door, she saw appellant reclining on a bench
about two and a half (2 1/2) meters away from the door. Appellant's left leg
was on top of the bench while his right leg was on the ground. Appellant
was wearing a brown shirt, black jacket and a pair of camouage pants. He
was also wearing brown shoes but he had no socks on his feet.

"At the police station, Alicia confronted appellant: 'Nong Listing I know that
you can recognize my voice. It is me. Why did you kill my brother? What has
he done wrong to you?'
cASEDC

"Appellant did not answer her. Nevertheless, she was sure that appellant
was awake because he was tapping the floor with his right foot.
"Dr. Danilo Ledesma, a medico-legal ocer of the Davao City Health
Department, conducted an autopsy on Artemio's cadaver about 9:30 in the
morning of November 5, 1998 at the Rivera Funeral Homes located at
Licanan, Lasang. His ndings are summarized in his Necropsy Report No.

76:
'POSTMORTEM FINDINGS
'Pallor, marked generalized.
'Body in rigor mortis.
'Wound, gunshot, ENTRANCE, 0.9 x 0.8 cm. Ovaloid located at the
anterior chestwall, rightside, 1.0 cm; from the anterior median line, at
the level of the third (3rd) intercoastal space and 131.0 cms. above
the right heel, directed backwards, upwards, medially crossing the
midline from the right to left, involving the soft tissues, perforating the
body of the sternum, into the pericardial cavity, perforating the heart
into the left thoracic cavity, perforating the heart into the left thoracic
cavity, perforating the upper lobe of the left lung, forming an irregular
EXIT, 1.5 x 1.1 cms. at the posterior chest wall left side, 13.0 cms.
from the posterior median line and 139.0 cms. above the left heel.
'Hemopericadium, 300 ml.
'Hemothorax, left, 1,000 ml.
'Stomach, filled with partially digested food particles.
'Other visceral organs, pale.
'CAUSE OF DEATH: Gunshot wound of the chest.
Signed by: DANILO P. LEDESMA
Medico-Legal Officer IV'
"During the trial, Dr. Ledesma explained that Artemio died of a gunshot
wound, 0.9 x 0.8 centimeters in size located about one (1) inch away from
the centerline of Artemio's Adam's apple down to his navel and about 1:00
o'clock from his right nipple.
"The trajectory of the bullet passing through Artemio's body indicates that
his assailant was in a lower position than Artemio when the gun was red.
Dr. Ledesma also found the wound of Artemio negative of powder burns
indicating that the assailant was at a distance of more than twenty-four (24)
inches when he red his gun at Artemio. He did not also nd any bullet slug
inside the body of Artemio indicating that the bullet went through Artemio's
body. Artemio's heart and lungs were lacerated and his stomach contained
partially digested food particles indicating that he had just eaten his meal
when he was shot.
"In the certicate of death of Artemio, Dr. Ledesma indicated that the cause
of his death was a gunshot wound on the chest.
"5.

After the defense presented its evidence, the case was submitted for

decision." 9

Version of the Defense

On the other hand, petitioner presented the following statement of facts:
"9.
This is a criminal case for Homicide originally lodged before the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 10 of Davao City against herein Petitioner
Celestino Marturillas, former Barangay Captain of Gatungan, Bunawan
District[,] Davao City and docketed as Criminal Case No. 42,091-98. The
criminal charge against Petitioner was the result of a shooting incident in
Barangay Gatungan, Bunawan District, Davao City which resulted in the
slaying of Artemio Pantinople while the latter was on his way home in the
evening of November 4, 1998.
cDTIAC

"10.
On that same evening at around 8:30 p.m. herein Petitioner former
Barangay Captain Celestino Marturillas was roused from his sleep at his
house in Barangay Gatungan, Bunawan District, Davao City by his wife since
Kagawads Jimmy Balugo and Norman Libre (Barangay Kagawads of
Gatungan, Bunawan District, Davao City) wanted to see him. Dazed after
just having risen from bed, Petitioner was rubbing his eyes when he met the
two Kagawads inside his house. He was informed that a resident of his
barangay, Artemio Pantinople, had just been shot. Petitioner at once ordered
his Kagawads to assemble the members of the SCAA (Special Civilian Armed
[Auxiliary]) so that they could be escorted to the crime scene some 250
meters away. As soon as the SCAA's were contacted, they (Petitioner,
Kagawads Libre and Balugo including Wiliam Gabas, Eddie Loyahan and
Junior Marturillas the last three being SCAA members) then proceeded to
the crime scene to determine what assistance they could render.
"11.
While approaching the store owned by the Pantinople's and not very
far from where the deceased lay sprawled, Petitioner was met by Ernita
Pantinople (wife of the deceased-Artemio Pantinople) who was very mad and
belligerent. She immediately accused Petitioner of having shot her husband
instead of Lito Santos who was his enemy. Petitioner was taken aback by
the instant accusation against him. He explained that he just came from his
house where he was roused by his Kagawads from his sleep. Not being able
to talk sense with Ernita Pantinople, Petitioner and his companions backed
o to avoid a heated confrontation. Petitioner instead decided to go back to
his house along with his companions.
"12.
Upon reaching his house, Petitioner instructed Kagawad Jimmy
Balugo to contact the Bunawan Police Station and inform them what
transpired. Not knowing the radio frequency of the local police, Kagawad
Balugo instead radioed ocials of nearby Barangay San Isidro requesting
them to contact the Bunawan PNP for police assistance since someone was
shot in their locality.
"13.
Moments later, PO2 Mariano Operario and another police ocer
arrived at the house of Petitioner and when confronted by the latter, he was
informed by PO2 Operario that he was the principal suspect in the slaying of

Artemio Pantinople. Upon their invitation, Petitioner immediately went with

the said police ocers for questioning at the Bunawan Police Station. He
also took with him his government-issued M-14 Rie and one magazine of
live M-14 ammunition which Petitioner turned over for safe keeping with the
Bunawan PNP. The police blotter showed that Petitioner surrendered his M14 rie with live ammunition to SPO1 Estrellan and PO3 Sendrijas of the
Bunawan PNP at around 10:45 p.m. of November 4, 1998.
"14.
When the shooting incident was rst recorded in the Daily Record
of Events of the Bunawan PNP it was indicated therein that deceased may
have been shot by unidentified armed men viz:
'Entry No.
2289

Date

110498

Time
2105H

Incident/Events
SHOOTING INCIDENT-

'One Dominador Lopez 43 years old, married, farmer and a resident of

Puro[k] 5, Barangay Gatungan, Davao City appeared at this Precinct
and reported that shortly before this writing, one ARTEMIO
PANTINOPLE, former barangay kagawad of Barangay Gatungan was
allegedly shot to death by an unidentied armed men at the
aforementioned Barangay. . . . .'
"15.
The extract from the police blotter prepared by SPO2 Dario B. Undo
dated November 9, 1998 already had a little modication indicating therein
that deceased was shot by an unidentied armed man and the following
entry was made.
'2105H: Shooting Incident: One Dominador Lopez, 43 years old,
married, farmer and a resident of Purok 5, Barangay Gatungan
Bunawan District, Davao City appeared at this Police Precinct and
reported that prior to these writing, one Artemio Pantinople, former
Barangay Kagawad of Barangay Gatungan was allegedly shot to death
by unidentified armed man at the aforementioned barangay. . . . .'
"16.
On November 5, 1998 at around 7:15 a.m. PO2 Mariano Operario
indorsed with the Bunawan PNP an empty shell red from a carbine rie
which was recovered by the said police ocer from the crime scene in the
night of the incident. Owing to his pre-occupation in organizing and
preparing the adavits of the Complainant and her witnesses the previous
evening, he was only able to indorse the same the following morning. At the
same time, P/Chief Insp. Julito M. Diray, Station Commander of the Bunawan
PNP made a written request addressed to the District Commander of the
PNP Crime Laboratory requesting that a paran test be conducted on
Petitioner and that a ballistics examination be made on the M-14 rie which
he surrendered to Bunawan PNP.
EATcHD

"17.
At around 9:30 a.m. of November 5, 1998, Dr. Danilo P. Ledesma,
M.D., Medico-Legal Ocer for Davao City conducted an autopsy on the
cadaver of deceased and made the following Post-Mortem Findings
contained in Necropsy Report No. 76 dated November 6, 1998, viz:

'Pallor, marked, generalized

'Body in rigor mortis
'Wound, gunshot, ENTRANCE, 0.9-0.8 cm. ovaloid located at the
anterior chest wall, right side, .0 cm. from the anterior median line, at
the level of the third (3rd) intercostal space and 131.0 cms. above the
right neck, directed backwards, upwards, medially, crossing the
midline from the right to left, involving the soft tissues, perforating the
body of the sternum into the pericardial cavity, perforating the heart
into the left thoracic cavity, perforating the upper lobe of the left lung
forming an irregular EXIT, 1.5x1.1 cms. at the posterior chest wall, left
side, 13.0 cms. from the posterior median line and 139.0 cms. above
the left neck.
'Hemopericadium, 300 ml.
'Hemothorax, left 1,000 ml.
'Stomach filled with partially digested food particles.
'Other visceral organs, pale
'CAUSE OF DEATH: Gunshot wound of the chest.'
"18.
After the fatal shooting of deceased, Celestino Marturillas was
subjected to paran testing by the PNP Crime Laboratory in Davao City at
10:30 a.m. November 5, 1998. The next day, November 6, 1998, the PNP
Crime Laboratory released Physical Sciences Report No. C-074-98 regarding
the paran test results which found Petitioner NEGATIVE for gunpowder
nitrates based on the following findings of the PNP Crime Laboratory:
'FINDINGS:
'Qualitative examination conducted on the above-mentioned specimen
gave NEGATIVE result to the test for the presence of gunpowder
nitrates. . . .
'CONCLUSION:
'Both hands of Celestino Marturillas do not contain gunpowder
nitrates.[.]'
"19.
After preparing all the adavits of Ernita Pantinople and her
witnesses PO2 Mariano R. Operario Jr., the police ocer as[s]igned to
investigate the shooting of the deceased, prepared and transmitted, on
November 5, 1998, a Complaint to the City Prosecution Oce
recommending that Petitioner be indicted for Murder, attaching therewith
the Sworn Adavits of Ernita O. Pantinople (Complainant), Lito D. Santos
(witness) and the Sworn Joint Adavit of SPO1 Rodel Estrellan and PO2
Mariano R. Operario Jr. of the PNP.

"20.
The following is the Adavit-Complaint of Ernita Pantinople as well
as the supporting adavits of her witnesses all of which are quoted in full
hereunder:
'Ernita Pantinople's Affidavit-Complaint dated November 5, 1998:
'That last November 4, 1998 at about 7:30 in the evening, I was
attending and caring my baby boy at that time to let him sleep
and that moment I heard rst one gun shot burst after then
somebody shouting seeking for help in Visayan words 'tabangi
ko Pre gipusil ko ni Kapitan ' I estimated a distance to more or
less ten (10) meters away from my house;
'That I immediately peep at the windows, wherein I very saw a
person of Brgy. Capt. Celestino Marturillas of Brgy. Gatungan,
Bunawan District, Davao City, wearing black jacket and
camouage pants carrying his M-14 rie running to the direction
to the left side portion of the house of Lito Santos who was my
neighbor respectively;
'That I hurriedly go down from my house and proceeded to the
victims body, wherein when I came nearer I got surprised for
the victim was my beloved husband;
'That I was always shouting in visayan words 'kapitan nganong
imo mang gipatay and akong bana';
'That I let my husband body still at that placed until the police
officers will arrived and investigate the incident;
SEIDAC

'That I know personally Brgy. Capt. Celestino Marturillas for he is

my nearby neighbor at that placed;
'That I am executing this adavit to apprise the authorities
concern of the truthfulness of the foregoing and my desire to
file necessary charges against Celestino Marturillas.'
'Witness Affidavit of Lito Santos dated November 5, 1998 reads :
'I, LITO D. SANTOS, 43 yrs. old, married, farmer, a resident of
Purok 5, Brgy. Gatungan, Bunawan District, Davao City after
having been duly sworn to in accordance with law do hereby
depose and say:
'That last November 4, 1998 at about 7:30 in the evening I was
taking my dinner at the kitchen of my house and after nished
eating I stood up then got a glass of water and at that time I
heard one gun shot burst estimated to more or less ten (10)
meters from my possession then followed somebody shouting
seeking for help in Visayan words 'tabangi ko pre gipusil ko ni
Kapitan';

'That I really saw the victim moving backward to more or less

ve (5) meters away from where he was shot then and there
the victim slumped at the grassy area;
'That I immediately go out from my house and proceeded to the
victims body, wherein, when I came nearer I found and
identied the victim one Artemio Pantinople who was my nearby
neighbor sprawled on his own blood at the grassy area;
'That no other person named by the victim other than Brgy.
Capt. Celestino Marturillas of Brgy. Gatungan, Bunawan District,
Davao City;
'That I am executing this adavit to apprised the authorities
concern of the true facts and circumstances that surrounds the
incident.'
"21.
Based on the Adavits executed by Ernita Pantinople and Lito
Santos, then 2nd Asst. City Prosecutor Raul B. Bendigo issued a Resolution
on November 5, 1998 nding sucient evidence to indict Appellant for the
crime of Homicide and not Murder as alleged in Private Complainant's
Affidavit Complaint. The Information states:
'Above-mentioned Accused, armed with a gun, and with intent to kill,
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously shot one Artemio Pantinople,
thereby inflicting fatal wound upon the latter which caused his death.
'CONTRARY TO LAW.'
xxx xxx xxx
"23.
The theory of the Defense was anchored on the testimony of the
following individuals:
'23.1
Jimmy Balugo, was one of the Barangay Kagawads who went
to the house of Petitioner after receiving a radio message from Brgy.
Kagawad Glenda Lascua that a shooting incident took place in their
barangay. He also testified that together with Kagawad Norberto Libre,
he proceeded to the house of Petitioner to inform him of the shooting
incident involving a certain Artemio 'Titing' Pantinople. After informing
Petitioner about what happened, the latter instructed him and
Norberto Libre to gather the SCAA's and to accompany them to the
crime scene. He also narrated to the court that Petitioner and their
group were not able to render any assistance at the crime scene since
the widow and the relatives of deceased were already belligerent. As a
result of which, the group of Petitioner including himself, went back to
the former's house where he asked Petitioner if it would be alright to
contact the police and request for assistance. He claimed that he was
able to contact the Bunawan PNP with the help of the Barangay Police
of Barangay San Isidro.
aSEHDA

'23.2) Norberto Libre testied that in the evening of November 4,

1998, he heard a gunburst which resembled a recracker and after a
few minutes Barangay Kagawad Jimmy Balugo went to his house and
informed him that their neighbor Titing Pantinople was shot. Kagawad
Balugo requested him to accompany the former to go to the house of
then Barangay Captain Celestino Marturillas; that he and Kagawad
Balugo proceeded to the house of Petitioner and shouted to awaken
the latter; that Barangay Captain Marturillas went out rubbing his eyes
awakened from his sleep and was informed of the killing of Artemio
Pantinople; that Petitioner immediately instructed them to fetch the
SCAA and thereafter their group went to the crime scene.
'23.3) Ronito Bedero testied that he was in his house on the night
Artemio Pantinop[l]e was shot. The material point raised by this
witness in his testimony was the fact that he saw an unidentied
armed man ee from the crime scene who later joined two other
armed men near a nangka tree not far from where deceased was
shot. All three later ed on foot towards the direction of the Purok
Center in Barangay Gatungan. This witness noticed that one of the
three men was armed with a rie but could not make out their
identities since the area where the three men converged was a very
dark place. After the three men disappeared, he saw from the
opposite direction Petitioner, Barangay Kagawad Jimmy Balugo and
three (3) SCAA members going to the scene of the crime but they did
not reach the crime scene. A little later, he saw the group of Petitioner
return to where they came from.
'23.4) Police C/Insp. Noemi Austero, Forensic Chemist of the PNP
Crime Laboratory, testied that she conducted a paran test on both
hands of Petitioner on November 5, 1999 at around 10:30 a.m. She
also testied that Petitioner tested NEGATIVE for gunpowder nitrates
indicating that he never red a weapon at any time between 7:30 p.m.
of November 4, 1999 until the next day, November 5, 1999. She also
testied that as a matter of procedure at the PNP Crime Laboratory,
they do not conduct paran testing on a crime suspect seventy two
(72) hours after an alleged shooting incident. She also testied that
based on her experience she is not aware of any chemical that could
extract gunpowder nitrates from the hands of a person who had just
fired his weapon.
'23.5) Dominador Lapiz testied that he lived on the land of the victim,
Artemio Pantinople for ten (10) years. He was one of the rst persons
who went to the crime scene where he personally saw the body of
deceased lying at a very dark portion some distance from the victim's
house and that those with him at that time even had to light the place
with a lamp so that they could clearly see the deceased. He also
testied that there were many coconut and other trees and bananas
in the crime scene. He also testied that the house of Lito Santos was
only about four (4) meters from the crime scene, while the house of
victim-Artemio Pantinople was about FIFTY (50) meters away. He

testied that there was no lighted uorescent at the store of deceased

at the time of the shooting. He was also the one who informed
Kagawad Glenda Lascuna about the shooting of Artemio Pantinople.
His testimony also revealed that when the responding policemen
arrived, Lito Santos immediately approached the policemen,
volunteered himself as a witness and even declared that he would
testify that it was Petitioner who shot Artemio Pantinople.
EaDATc

'On cross-examination, this witness declared that the crime scene was
very dark and one cannot see the body of the victim without light. On
cross-examination, this witness also testied that Lito Santos
approached the service vehicle of the responding policemen and
volunteered to be a witness that Petitioner was the assailant of the
victim, Artemio Pantinople. This witness further testied that
immediately after he went to the crime scene, the widow of the victim
and the children were merely shouting and crying and it was only after
the policemen arrived that the widow uttered in a loud voice, 'Kapitan
nganong gipatay mo and akong bana?'
'23.6) Celestino Marturillas, former Barangay Captain of Barangay
Gatungan, Bunawan District, Davao City testied that he learned of
Pantinople's killing two hours later through information personally
relayed to him by Kagawads Jimmy Balugo and Norberto Libre. He
intimated to the Court that he did try to extend some assistance to
the family of the deceased but was prevented from so doing since the
wife of deceased herself and her relatives were already hostile with
him when he was about to approach the crime scene. He also testied
that he voluntarily went with the police ocers who arrested him at
his residence on the same evening after the victim was shot. He also
turned over to police custody the M-14 rie issued to him and
voluntarily submitted himself to paran testing a few hours after he
was taken in for questioning by the Bunawan PNP. Petitioner, during
the trial consistently maintained that he is innocent of the charge
against him.'" 10

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

The CA armed the ndings of the RTC that the guilt of petitioner had been
established beyond reasonable doubt. According to the appellate court, he was
positively identied as the one running away from the crime scene immediately
after the gunshot. This fact, together with the declaration of the victim himself that
he had been shot by the captain, clearly established the latter's complicity in the
crime.
No ill motive could be ascribed by the CA to the prosecution witnesses. Thus, their
positive, credible and unequivocal testimonies were accepted as sucient to
establish the guilt of petitioner beyond reasonable doubt.
On the other hand, the CA also rejected his defenses of denial and alibi. It held that

they were necessarily suspect, especially when established by friends or relatives,

and should thus be subjected to the strictest scrutiny. At any rate, his alibi and
denial cannot prevail over the positive testimonies of the prosecution witnesses
found to be more credible.
The appellate court upheld petitioner's conviction, as well as the award of damages.
In addition, it awarded actual damages representing unearned income.
Hence, this Petition. 11
The Issues
In his Memorandum, petitioner submits the following issues for the Court's
consideration:
"I
The Court of Appeals committed a reversible error when it gave credence to
the claim of the solicitor general that the prosecution's witnesses positively
identified petitioner as the alleged triggerman
"II
The Court of Appeals was in serious error when it armed the trial court's
blunder in literally passing the blame on petitioner for the lapses in the
investigation conducted by the police thereby shifting on him the burden of
proving his innocence
ISDHcT

"III
The Court of Appeals committed a serious and palpable error when it failed
to consider that the deceased was cut o by death before he could convey
a complete or sensible communication to whoever heard such declaration
assuming there was any
"IV
Petit[i]oner's alibi assumed signicance considering that evidence and
testimonies of the prosecution's witnesses arrayed against petitioner failed
to prove that he was responsible for the commission of the crime." 12

In sum, petitioner raises two main issues: 1) whether the prosecution's evidence is
credible; and 2) whether it is sucient to convict him of homicide. Under the rst
main issue, he questions the positive identication made by the prosecution
witnesses; the alleged inconsistencies between their Adavits and court
testimonies; and the plausibility of the allegation that the victim had uttered,
"Tabangi ko p're, gipusil ko ni kapitan " ("Help me p're, I was shot by the captain"),
which was considered by the two lower courts either as his dying declaration or as
part of res gestae.
Under the second main issue, petitioner contends that the burden of proof was

erroneously shifted to him; that there should have been no nding of guilt because
of the negative results of the paran test; and that the prosecution miserably failed
to establish the type of gun used in the commission of the crime.
The Court's Ruling
The Petition is unmeritorious.
First Main Issue:
Credibility of the Prosecution Evidence
According to petitioner, the charge of homicide should be dismissed, because the
inherent weakness of the prosecution's case against him was revealed by the
evidence presented. He submits that any doubt as to who really perpetrated the
crime should be resolved in his favor.
We do not agree. This Court has judiciously reviewed the ndings and records of this
case and nds no reversible error in the CA's ruling arming petitioner's conviction
for homicide.
Basic is the rule that this Court accords great weight and a high degree of respect to
factual ndings of the trial court, especially when armed by the CA, as in the
present case. 13 Here, the RTC was unequivocally upheld by the CA, which was
clothed with the power to review whether the trial court's conclusions were in
accord with the facts and the relevant laws. 14 Indeed, the ndings of the trial court
are not to be disturbed on appeal, unless it has overlooked or misinterpreted some
facts or circumstances of weight and substance. 15 Although there are recognized
exceptions 16 to the conclusiveness of the ndings of fact of the trial and the
appellate courts, petitioner has not convinced this Court of the existence of any.
Having laid that basic premise, the Court disposes seriatim the arguments proered
by petitioner under the first main issue.

Positive Identification
Petitioner contends that it was inconceivable for Prosecution Witness Ernita
Pantinople the victim's wife to have identied him as the assassin. According
to him, her house was "a good fty (50) meters away from the crime scene," 17
which was "enveloped in pitch darkness." 18 Because of the alleged improbability,
he insists that her testimony materially contradicted her Adavit. The Adavit
supposedly proved that she had not recognized her husband from where she was
standing during the shooting. If she had failed to identify the victim, petitioner asks,
"how was it possible for her to conclude that it was [p]etitioner whom she claims
she saw fleeing from the scene?" 19
All these doubts raised by petitioner are suciently addressed by the clear, direct
and convincing testimony of the witness. She positively identied him as the one
"running away" immediately after the sound of a gunshot. Certain that she had
seen him, she even described what he was wearing, the rearm he was carrying,

and the direction towards which he was running. She also claried that she had
heard the statement, "Help me p're, I was shot by the captain," uttered after the
shooting incident. Accepting her testimony, the CA ruled thus:
"Ernita's testimony that she saw [petitioner] at the crime scene is credible
because the spot where Artemio was shot was only 30 meters away from
her house. Undoubtedly, Ernita is familiar with [petitioner], who is her
neighbor, and a long-time barangay captain of Barangay Gatungan,
Bunawan District, Davao City when the incident took place. Ernita was also
able to see his face while he was running away from the crime scene. The
identication of a person can be established through familiarity with one's
physical features. Once a person has gained familiarity with one another,
identication becomes quite an easy task even from a considerable distance.
Judicial notice can also be taken of the fact that people in rural communities
generally know each other both by face and name, and can be expected to
know each other's distinct and particular features and characteristics." 20

This holding conrms the ndings of fact of the RTC. Settled is the rule that on
questions of the credibility of witnesses and the veracity of their testimonies,
ndings of the trial court are given the highest degree of respect. 21 It was the trial
court that had the opportunity to observe the manner in which the witnesses had
testied; as well as their furtive glances, calmness, sighs, and scant or full
realization of their oaths. 22 It had the better opportunity to observe them rsthand;
and to note their demeanor, conduct and attitude under grueling examination. 23
Petitioner doubts whether Ernita could have accurately identied him at the scene
of the crime, considering that it was dark at that time; that there were trees
obstructing her view; and that her house was fty (50) meters away from where
the crime was committed.
cTDECH

These assertions are easily belied by the ndings of the courts below, as borne by
the records. Ernita testied on the crime scene conditions that had enabled her to
make a positive identication of petitioner. Her testimony was even corroborated by
other prosecution witnesses, who bolstered the truth and veracity of those
declarations. Consequently, the CA ruled as follows:
". . . Ernita's recognition of the assailant was made possible by the lighted
two uorescent lamps in their store and by the full moon. . . . . In
corroboration, Lito testied that the place where the shooting occurred was
bright.
"The trees and plants growing in between Ernita's house and the place
where Artemio was shot to death did not impede her view of the assailant.
To be sure, the prosecution presented photographs of the scene of the
crime and its immediate vicinities. These photographs gave a clear picture of
the place where Artemio was shot. Admittedly, there are some trees and
plants growing in between the place where the house of Ernita was located
and the spot where Artemio was shot. Notably, however, there is only one
gemilina tree, some coconut trees and young banana plants growing in the
place where Artemio was shot. The trees and banana plants have slender

trunks which could not have posed an obstacle to Ernita's view of the crime
scene from the kitchen window of her house especially so that she was in an
elevated position." 24

This Court has consistently held that given the proper conditions the
illumination produced by a kerosene lamp, a ashlight, a wick lamp, moonlight, or
starlight is considered sucient to allow the identication of persons. 25 In this case,
the full moon and the light coming from two uorescent lamps of a nearby store
were sucient to illumine the place where petitioner was; and to enable the
eyewitness to identify him as the person who was present at the crime scene.
Settled is the rule that when conditions of visibility are favorable and the witnesses
do not appear to be biased, their assertion as to the identity of the malefactor
should normally be accepted. 26
But even where the circumstances were less favorable, the familiarity of Ernita with
the face of petitioner considerably reduced any error in her identication of him. 27
Since the circumstances in this case were reasonably sucient for the identication
of persons, this fact of her familiarity with him erases any doubt that she could have
erred in identifying him. Those related to the victim of a crime have a natural
tendency to remember the faces of those involved in it. These relatives, more than
anybody else, would be concerned with seeking justice for the victim and bringing
the malefactor before the law. 28

Neither was there any indication that Ernita was impelled by ill motives in
positively identifying petitioner. The CA was correct in observing that it would be
"unnatural for a relative who is interested in vindicating the crime to accuse
somebody else other than the real culprit. For her to do so is to let the guilty go
free." 29 Where there is nothing to indicate that witnesses were actuated by
improper motives on the witness stand, their positive declarations made under
solemn oath deserve full faith and credence. 30

Inconsistency Between
Affidavit and Testimony
Petitioner contends that the testimony of Ernita materially contradicted her
Adavit. According to him, she said in her testimony that she had immediately
recognized her husband as the victim of the shooting; but in her Adavit she stated
that it was only when she had approached the body that she came to know that he
was the victim.
We nd no inconsistency. Although Ernita stated in her testimony that she had
recognized the victim as her husband through his voice, it cannot necessarily be
inferred that she did not see him. Although she recognized him as the victim, she
was still hoping that it was not really he. Thus, the statement in her Adavit that
she was surprised to see that her husband was the victim of the shooting.
To be sure, ex parteadavits are usually incomplete, as these are frequently

prepared by administering ocers and cast in their language and understanding of

what aants have said. 31 Almost always, the latter would simply sign the
documents after being read to them. Basic is the rule that, taken ex parte, adavits
are considered incomplete and often inaccurate. They are products sometimes of
partial suggestions and at other times of want of suggestions and inquiries, without
the aid of which witnesses may be unable to recall the connected circumstances
necessary for accurate recollection. 32
Nevertheless, the alleged inconsistency is inconsequential to the ascertainment of
the presence of petitioner at the crime scene. Ruled the CA:
". . . . They referred only to that point wherein Ernita . . . ascertained the
identity of Artemio as the victim. They did not relate to Ernita's identication
of [petitioner] as the person running away from the crime scene immediately
after she heard a gunshot." 33

Statements Uttered
Contemporaneous with the Crime
Ernita positively testied that immediately after the shooting, she had heard her
husband say, "Help me p're, I was shot by the captain." This statement was
corroborated by another witness, Lito Santos, who testied on the events
immediately preceding and subsequent to the shooting.
It should be clear that Santos never testied that petitioner was the one who had
actually shot the victim. Still, the testimony of this witness is valuable, because it
validates the statements made by Ernita. He conrms that after hearing the
gunshot, he saw the victim and heard the latter cry out those same words.
ISCHET

Petitioner insinuates that it was incredible for Santos to have seen the victim, but
not the assailant. The CA dismissed this argument thus:
". . . . The natural reaction of a person who hears a loud or startling
command is to turn towards the speaker. Moreover, witnessing a crime is
an unusual experience that elicits dierent reactions from witnesses, for
which no clear-cut standard of behavior can be prescribed. Lito's reaction is
not unnatural. He was more concerned about Artemio's condition than the
need to ascertain the identity of Artemio's assailant. 34

It was to be expected that, after seeing the victim stagger and hearing the cry for
help, Santos would shift his attention to the person who had uttered the plea
quoted earlier. A shift in his focus of attention would suciently explain why Santos
was not able to see the assailant. Petitioner then accuses this witness of harboring
"a deep-seated grudge," 35 which would explain why the latter allegedly fabricated a
serious accusation.
This contention obviously has no basis. No serious accusation against petitioner was
ever made by Santos. What the latter did was merely to recount what he heard the
victim utter immediately after the shooting. Santos never pointed to petitioner as
the perpetrator of the crime. The statements of the former corroborated those of

Ernita and therefore simply added credence to the prosecution's version of the facts.
If it were true that he had an ulterior motive, it would have been very easy for him
to say that he had seen petitioner shoot the victim.
The two witnesses unequivocally declared and corroborated each other on the fact
that the plea, "Help me p're, I was shot by the captain," had been uttered by the
victim. Nevertheless, petitioner contends that it was highly probable that the
deceased died instantly and was consequently unable to shout for help. We do not
discount this possibility, which petitioner himself admits to be a probability. In the
face of the positive declaration of two witnesses that the words were actually
uttered, we need not concern ourselves with speculations, probabilities or
possibilities. Said the CA:
". . . . Thus, as between the positive and categorical declarations of the
prosecution witnesses and the mere opinion of the medical doctor, the
former must necessarily prevail.
"Moreover, it must be stressed that the post-mortem examination of the
cadaver of Artemio was conducted by Dr. Ledesma only about 9:30 in the
morning of November 5, 1998 or the day following the fatal shooting of
Artemio. Evidently, several hours had elapsed prior to the examination.
Thus, Dr. Ledesma could not have determined Artemio's physical condition a
few seconds after the man was shot." 36

Dying Declaration
Having established that the victim indeed uttered those words, the question to be
resolved is whether they can be considered as part of the dying declaration of the
victim.
Rule 130, Section 37 of the Rules of Court, provides:
"The declaration of a dying person, made under the consciousness of
impending death, may be received in any case wherein his death is the
subject of inquiry, as evidence of the cause and surrounding circumstances
of such death."

Generally, witnesses can testify only to those facts derived from their own
perception. A recognized exception, though, is a report in open court of a dying
person's declaration made under the consciousness of an impending death that is
the subject of inquiry in the case. 37
Statements identifying the assailant, if uttered by a victim on the verge of death,
are entitled to the highest degree of credence and respect. 38 Persons aware of an
impending death have been known to be genuinely truthful in their words and
extremely scrupulous in their accusations. 39 The dying declaration is given
credence, on the premise that no one who knows of one's impending death will
make a careless and false accusation. 40 Hence, not infrequently, pronouncements
of guilt have been allowed to rest solely on the dying declaration of the deceased
victim. 41

To be admissible, a dying declaration must 1) refer to the cause and circumstances

surrounding the declarant's death; 2) be made under the consciousness of an
impending death; 3) be made freely and voluntarily without coercion or suggestions
of improper inuence; 4) be oered in a criminal case, in which the death of the
declarant is the subject of inquiry; and 5) have been made by a declarant competent
to testify as a witness, had that person been called upon to testify. 42
The statement of the deceased certainly concerned the cause and circumstances
surrounding his death. He pointed to the person who had shot him. As established
by the prosecution, petitioner was the only person referred to as kapitan in their
place. 43 It was also established that the declarant, at the time he had given the
dying declaration, was under a consciousness of his impending death.
True, he made no express statement showing that he was conscious of his
impending death. The law, however, does not require the declarant to state
explicitly a perception of the inevitability of death. 44 The perception may be
established from surrounding circumstances, such as the nature of the declarant's
injury and conduct that would justify a conclusion that there was a consciousness of
impending death. 45 Even if the declarant did not make an explicit statement of that
realization, the degree and seriousness of the words and the fact that death
occurred shortly afterwards may be considered as sucient evidence that the
declaration was made by the victim with full consciousness of being in a dying
condition. 46
Also, the statement was made freely and voluntarily, without coercion or
suggestion, and was oered as evidence in a criminal case for homicide. In this case,
the declarant was the victim who, at the time he uttered the dying declaration, was
competent as a witness.
As found by the CA, the dying declaration of the victim was complete, as it was "a
full expression of all that he intended to say as conveying his meaning. It [was]
complete and [was] not merely fragmentary." 47 Testied to by his wife and
neighbor, his dying declaration was not only admissible in evidence as an exception
to the hearsay rule, but was also a weighty and telling piece of evidence.

Res Gestae
The fact that the victim's statement constituted a dying declaration does not
preclude it from being admitted as part of the res gestae, if the elements of both are
present. 48
Section 42 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court provides:
"Part of the res gestae. Statements made by a person while a startling
occurrence is taking place or immediately prior or subsequent thereto with
respect to the circumstances thereof, may be given in evidence as part of
the res gestae. So, also, statements accompanying an equivocal act material
to the issue, and giving it a legal signicance, may be received as part of the
res gestae."

Res gestae refers to statements made by the participants or the victims of, or the
spectators to, a crime immediately before, during, or after its commission. 49 These
statements are a spontaneous reaction or utterance inspired by the excitement of
the occasion, without any opportunity for the declarant to fabricate a false
statement. 50 An important consideration is whether there intervened, between the
occurrence and the statement, any circumstance calculated to divert the mind and
thus restore the mental balance of the declarant; and aord an opportunity for
deliberation. 51
A declaration is deemed part of the res gestae and admissible in evidence as an
exception to the hearsay rule, when the following requisites concur: 1) the principal
act, the res gestae, is a startling occurrence; 2) the statements were made before
the declarant had time to contrive or devise; and 3) the statements concerned the
occurrence in question and its immediately attending circumstances. 52
All these requisites are present in this case. The principal act, the shooting, was a
startling occurrence. Immediately after, while he was still under the exciting
inuence of the startling occurrence, the victim made the declaration without any
prior opportunity to contrive a story implicating petitioner. Also, the declaration
concerned the one who shot the victim. Thus, the latter's statement was correctly
appreciated as part of the res gestae.
DaHISE

Aside from the victim's statement, which is part of the res gestae, that of Ernita
"Kapitan, ngano nimo gipatay ang akong bana ?' ("Captain, why did you shoot my
husband?") may be considered to be in the same category. Her statement was
about the same startling occurrence; it was uttered spontaneously, right after the
shooting, while she had no opportunity to concoct a story against petitioner; and it
related to the circumstances of the shooting.
Second Main Issue:
Sufficiency of Evidence
Having established the evidence for the prosecution, we now address the argument
of petitioner that the appellate court had eectively shifted the burden of proof to
him. He asserts that the prosecution should never rely on the weakness of the
defense, but on the strength of its evidence, implying that there was no sucient
evidence to convict him.
We disagree. The totality of the evidence presented by the prosecution is sucient
to sustain the conviction of petitioner. The dying declaration made by the victim
immediately prior to his death constitutes evidence of the highest order as to the
cause of his death and of the identity of the assailant. 53 This damning evidence,
coupled with the proven facts presented by the prosecution, leads to the logical
conclusion that petitioner is guilty of the crime charged.
The following circumstances proven by the prosecution produce a conviction beyond
reasonable doubt:

First. Santos testied that he had heard a gunshot; and seen smoke coming from
the muzzle of a gun, as well as the victim staggering backwards while shouting,
"Help me p're, I was shot by the captain." This statement was duly established, and
the testimony of Santos conrmed the events that had occurred. It should be
understandable that "p're" referred to Santos, considering that he and the victim
were conversing just before the shooting took place. It was also established that the
two called each other "p're," because Santos was the godfather of the victim's child.
54

Second. Ernita testied that she had heard a gunshot and her husband's utterance,
"Help me p're, I was shot by the captain," then saw petitioner in a black jacket and
camouflage pants running away from the crime scene while carrying a firearm.
Third. Ernita's statement, "Captain, why did you shoot my husband?" was
established as part of the res gestae.
Fourth. The version of the events given by petitioner is simply implausible. As the
incum bent barangay captain, it should have been his responsibility to go
immediately to the crime scene and investigate the shooting. Instead, he avers that
when he went to the situs of the crime, the wife of the victim was already shouting
and accusing him of being the assailant, so he just left. This reaction was very
unlikely of an innocent barangay captain, who would simply want to investigate a
crime. Often have we ruled that the rst impulse of innocent persons when accused
of wrongdoing is to express their innocence at the first opportune time. 55
Fifth. The prosecution was able to establish motive on the part of petitioner. The
victim's wife positively testied that prior to the shooting, her husband was trying
to close a real estate transaction which petitioner tried to block. This showed
petitioner's antagonism towards the victim. 56
These pieces of evidence indubitably lead to the conclusion that it was petitioner
who shot and killed the victim. This Court has consistently held that, where an
eyewitness saw the accused with a gun seconds after the gunshot and the victim's
fall, the reasonable conclusion is that the accused had killed the victim. 57 Further
establishing petitioner's guilt was the denitive statement of the victim that he had
been shot by the barangay captain.
Clearly, petitioner's guilt was established beyond reasonable doubt. To be sure,
conviction in a criminal case does not require a degree of proof that, excluding the
possibility of error, produces absolute certainty. 58 Only moral certainty is required
or that degree of proof that produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind. 59
That some pieces of the above-mentioned evidence are circumstantial does not
diminish the fact that they are of a nature that would lead the mind intuitively, or
by a conscious process of reasoning, toward the conviction of petitioner. 60
Circumstantial, vis--vis direct, evidence is not necessarily weaker 61 Moreover, the
circumstantial evidence described above satises the requirements of the Rules of
Court, which we quote:

"SEC. 4.
Circumstantial evidence, when sucient . Circumstantial
evidence is sufficient for conviction if:
(a)

There is more than one circumstance;

(b)
and

ADaEIH

The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven;

(c)
The combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce
a conviction beyond reasonable doubt." 62

Paraffin Test
Petitioner takes issue with the negative results of the paran test done on him.
While they were negative, that fact alone did not ipso facto prove that he was
innocent. Time and time again, this Court has held that a negative paran test
result is not a conclusive proof that a person has not fired a gun. 63 In other words, it
is possible to re a gun and yet be negative for nitrates, as when culprits wear
gloves, wash their hands afterwards, or are bathed in perspiration. 64 Besides, the
prosecution was able to establish the events during the shooting, including the
presence of petitioner at the scene of the crime. Hence, all other matters, such as
the negative paraffin test result, are of lesser probative value.

Corpus Delicti
Petitioner then argues that the prosecution miserably failed to establish the type of
gun used in the shooting. Suce it to say that this contention hardly dents the
latter's case. As correctly found by the appellate court, the prosecution was able to
give sucient proof of the corpus delicti the fact that a crime had actually been
committed. Ruled this Court in another case:
"[Corpus delicti] is the fact of the commission of the crime that may be
proved by the testimony of eyewitnesses. In its legal sense, corpus delicti
does not necessarily refer to the body of the person murdered, to the
rearms in the crime of homicide with the use of unlicensed rearms, to the
ransom money in the crime of kidnapping for ransom, or . . . to the seized
contraband cigarettes." 65

To undermine the case of the prosecution against him, petitioner depends heavily
on its failure to present the gun used in the shooting and on the negative paran
test result. These pieces of evidence alone, according to him, should exculpate him
from the crime. His reliance on them is denitely misplaced, however. In a similar
case, this Court has ruled as follows:
"Petitioner likewise harps on the prosecution's failure to present the records
from the Firearms and Explosives Department of the Philippine National
Police at Camp Crame of the .45 caliber Remington pistol owned by
petitioner for comparison with the specimen found at the crime scene with
the hope that it would exculpate him from the trouble he is in. Unfortunately
for petitioner, we have previously held that 'the choice of what evidence to

present, or who should testify as a witness is within the discretionary power

of the prosecutor and definitely not of the courts to dictate.'
"Anent the failure of the investigators to conduct a paran test on
petitioner, this Court has time and again held that such failure is not fatal to
the case of the prosecution as scientic experts agree that the paran test
is extremely unreliable and it is not conclusive as to an accused's complicity
in the crime committed." 66

Finally, as regards petitioner's alibi, we need not belabor the point. It was easily,
and correctly, dismissed by the CA thus:
"[Petitioner's] alibi is utterly untenable. For alibi to prosper, it must be shown
that it was physically impossible for the accused to have been at the scene
of the crime at the time of its commission. Here, the locus criminis was only
several meters away from [petitioner's] home. In any event, this defense
cannot be given credence in the face of the credible and positive
identification made by Ernita." 67

Third Issue:
Damages
An appeal in a criminal proceeding throws the whole case open for review. It then
becomes the duty of this Court to correct any error in the appealed judgment,
whether or not included in the assignment of error. 68 The CA upheld the RTC in the
latter's award of damages, with the modification that unearned income be added.
We uphold the award of P50,000 indemnity ex delicto 69 to the heirs of the victim.
When death occurs as a result of a crime, the heirs of the deceased are entitled to
this amount as indemnity for the death, without need of any evidence or proof of
damages. 70 As to actual damages, we note that the prosecution was able to
establish suciently only P22,200 for funeral and burial costs. The rest of the
expenses, although presented, were not duly receipted. We cannot simply accept
them as credible evidence. This Court has already ruled, though, that when actual
damages proven by receipts during the trial amount to less than P25,000, the
award of P25,000 for temperate damages is justied, in lieu of the actual damages
of a lesser amount. 71 In effect, the award granted by the lower court is upheld.
As to the award of moral damages, the P500,000 given by the RTC and upheld by
the CA should be reduced to P50,000, consistent with prevailing jurisprudence. 72
We also arm the award of loss of earning capacity 73 in the amount of P312,000;
attorney's fees of P20,000; and payment of the costs.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED and the assailed Decision and Resolution are
AFFIRMED, subject to the modication in the award of damages set forth here.
Costs against petitioner.
cDAISC

SO ORDERED.

Ynares-Santiago, Austria-Martinez, Callejo, Sr. and Chico-Nazario, JJ., concur.

Footnotes
1.

Rollo, pp. 10-38.

2.

Id. at 39-71. First Division. Penned by Justice Renato C. Dacudao and concurred in
by Justices Cancio C. Garcia (then presiding justice and Division chair, now a
member of this Court) and Danilo B. Pine (member).

3.

Id. at 85-86.

4.

Written by Judge Augusto Breva.

5.

Assailed CA Decision, p. 32; rollo, p. 70.

6.

Rollo, pp. 72-84.

7.

C A rollo, p. 8. Signed by 2nd Assistant City Prosecutor Raul B. Bendigo and

approved by City Prosecutor Calixto A. Esparagoza.

8.

Id.

9.

Respondent's Memorandum, pp. 3-13; rollo, unnumbered.

10.
11.

12.

Petitioner's Memorandum, pp. 6-21; id. at 173-188.

This case was deemed submitted for decision on May 30, 2005, upon this Court's
receipt of respondent's Memorandum, signed by Solicitor General Alfredo L.
Benipayo, Assistant Solicitor General Amparo M. Cabotaje-Tang, and Solicitor
Edilberto R. Rebato, Jr. Petitioner's Memorandum, signed by Atty. Israelito P.
Torreon of Torreon De Vera-Torreon Law Firm, was filed on May 6, 2005.
Petitioner's Memorandum, pp. 22-23; rollo, pp. 189-190. Original in uppercase.

13.

People v. Delmo , 439 Phil. 212, October 4, 2002; People v. Jalon , 215 SCRA 680,
November 13, 1992; People v. Timtiman , 215 SCRA 364, November 4, 1992;
People v. Pletado, 210 SCRA 634, July 1, 1992.

14.

Mariano v. People , 216 SCRA 541, December 14, 1992; Caubang v. People , 210
SCRA 377, June 26, 1992.

15.

Sullon v. People, 461 SCRA 248, June 27, 2005, People v. Norrudin, 425 Phil. 453,
January 25, 2002; People v. Francisco, 389 Phil. 243, June 19, 2000.

16.

These are some of the recognized exceptions:

"1)
when the factual ndings of the Court of Appeals and the trial court are
contradictory;
2)
when the ndings are grounded entirely on speculation, surmises, or
conjectures;

3)
when the inference made by the Court of Appeals from its ndings of
fact is manifestly mistaken, absurd, or impossible;
4)

when there is grave abuse of discretion in the appreciation of facts;

5)
when the appellate court, in making its ndings, goes beyond the issues
of the case, and such ndings are contrary to the admissions of both appellant
and appellee;
6)
when the judgment of the Court of Appeals is premised on a
misapprehension of facts;
7)
when the Court of Appeals fails to notice certain relevant facts which, if
properly considered, will justify a different conclusion;
8)

when the findings of fact are themselves conflicting;

9)
when the ndings of fact are conclusions without citation of the specic
evidence on which they are based; and
10)
when the ndings of fact of the Court of Appeals are premised on the
absence of evidence but such ndings are contradicted by the evidence on
record." (Fuentes v. CA , 268 SCRA 703, February 26, 1997; Geronimo v. CA , 224
SCRA 494, July 5, 1993; Angelo v. CA, 210 SCRA 402, June 26, 1992).
17.

Petitioner's Memorandum, p. 25; rollo, p. 192.

18.

Id. at 23; id. at 190.

19.

Id. at 25; id. at 192.

20.

Assailed CA Decision, p. 17; rollo, p. 55.

21.

Siccuan v. People , 457 SCRA 458, April 28, 2005; People v. Sevilleno , 425 SCRA
247, March 10, 2004; People v. Guihama, 452 Phil. 824, June 25, 2003.

22.

Siccuan v. People, supra , April 28, 2005; Reyes, Jr. v. CA , 424 Phil. 829, January
18, 2002; People v. Tropa , 424 Phil. 783, January 17, 2002; People v. Cledoro, Jr .,
412 Phil. 772, June 29, 2001.

23.

Rivera v. People , 462 SCRA 350, June 30, 2005; People v. Corral , 446 Phil. 652,
February 28, 2003; People v. Wad-as , 440 Phil. 924, November 21, 2002.

24.

Assailed CA Decision, pp. 16-17; rollo, pp. 54-55.

25.

People v. Escote , 431 SCRA 345, June 8, 2004; People v. Caraang , 418 SCRA
321, December 11, 2003; People v. Coca, Jr., 432 Phil. 264, May 29, 2002.

26.

People v. Escote, supra ; People v. Torrecampo , 423 SCRA 433, February 23,
2004; People v. Caraang, supra.

27.

People v. Abes , 420 SCRA 259, January 20, 2004. See also People v. Colonia, 451
Phil. 856, June 12, 2003.

28.

People v. De la Cruz , 446 Phil. 549, February 28, 2003; People v. Gallego , 392
Phil. 552, August 15, 2000.

29.

Assailed CA Decision, pp. 17-18; rollo, pp. 55-56. See People v. Tulop , 352 Phil.
130, April 21, 1998.

30.

People v. Abes, supra note 27; People v. Surio , 435 Phil. 586, August 7, 2002;
People v. Ebrada, 357 Phil. 345, September 25, 1998.

31.

People v. Caraang, supra note 25; People v. Cueto , 443 Phil. 425, January 16,
2003.

32.

People v. Delmindo, 429 SCRA 546, May 27, 2004; People v. Caraang, supra note
25; People v. Sara, 417 SCRA 431, December 10, 2003.

33.

Assailed CA Decision, p. 18; rollo, p. 56. Italics supplied.

34.

Id. at 19; id at 57.

35.

Id.

36.

Id. at 27; id. at 65.

37.

People v. Medina , 435 SCRA 610, July 30, 2004; People v. Leonor , 364 Phil. 766,
March 25, 1999.

38.

People v. Manguera, 446 Phil. 808, March 5, 2003.

39.

People v. Manguera, supra.

40.

People v. Latayada, 423 SCRA 237, February 18, 2004; People v. Cortezano , 425
Phil. 696, January 29, 2002; People v. Bautista, 344 Phil. 158, September 5, 1997.

41.

People v. Manguera, supra note 38 citing People v. Sagario , 121 Phil. 1257, June
29, 1965.

42.

People v. Medina, supra note 37; People v. Comiling , 424 SCRA 698, March 4,
2004; People v. Latayada, supra note 40; People v. Dungca , 428 Phil. 682, March
7, 2002; People v. Maramara , 375 Phil. 641, October 22, 1999; People v.
Umadhay, 355 Phil. 289, August 3, 1998.

43.

See RTC Decision dated January 16, 2001, pp. 1-2; CA rollo, pp. 16-17.

44.

People v. Latayada, supra note 40; People v. Gonzales , 210 SCRA 44, June 16,
1992.

45.

People v Latayada, supra note 40; People v. Calago, 431 Phil. 168, April 22, 2002;
People v. Marollano, 342 Phil. 38, July 24, 1997.

46.

People v. Montaez , 425 SCRA 675, March 17, 2004; People v. Tanaman , 152
SCRA 385, July 28, 1987.

47.

Assailed CA Decision, p. 29; rollo, p. 67.

48.

F. REGALADO, REMEDIAL LAW COMPENDIUM, Vol. II, 649-650 (2001); citing

People v. Balbas , 207 Phil. 734, June 24, 1983.

49.

People v. Fegidero , 392 Phil. 36, August 4, 2000; People v. Mansueto , 391 Phil.
611, July 31, 2000; People v. Palmones , 390 Phil. 1208, July 18, 2000; People v.
Cleopas , 384 Phil. 286, March 9, 2000; People v. Sanchez , 213 SCRA 70, August
28, 1992.

50.

People v. Jorolan, 452 Phil. 698, June 23, 2003; People v. Sanchez, supra.

51.

People v. Jorolan, supra; People v. Manhuyod, Jr., 352 Phil. 866, May 20, 1998.

52.

Regalado, supra note 48. See also People v. Guillermo , 420 SCRA 326, January
20, 2004; People v. Dela Cruz , 412 SCRA 503, October 1, 2003; People v. Ignas ,
412 SCRA 311, September 30, 2003; People v. Lobrigas , 442 SCRA 503,
December 17, 2002.

53.

People v. De las Eras , 418 Phil. 509, September 28, 2001.

54.

Assailed CA Decision, p. 3; rollo, p. 41.

55.
56.
57.

People v. Mamarion , 412 SCRA 438, October 1, 2003; People v. Gallo , 419 Phil.
937, October 19, 2001.
Assailed CA Decision, p. 4; rollo, p. 42.

People v. Ignas, supra note 52; People v. Sesbreo , 372 Phil. 762, September 9,
1999; People v. Salveron, 228 SCRA 92, November 22, 1993.

58.

RULES OF COURT, Rule 133, Sec. 2.

59.

Id.

60.

People v. Bernal , 437 Phil. 11, September 2, 2002; People v. Oliva , 349 SCRA
435, January 18, 2001; People v. Acuram, 387 Phil. 142, April 27, 2000.

61.

People v. Matito, 423 SCRA 617, February 24, 2004; People v. Asis , 439 Phil. 707,
October 15, 2002; People v. Felixminia, 429 Phil. 309, March 20, 2002.

62.
63.
64.

RULES OF COURT, Rule 133, Sec. 4.

People v. Brecinio , 425 SCRA 616, March 17, 2004; People v. Pascual , 387 Phil.
266, April 28, 2000; Abalos v. CA, 378 Phil. 1059, December 22, 1999.
People v. Brecinio, supra; People v. Pascual, supra; Abalos v. CA., supra.

65.

Rieta v. People , 436 SCRA 273, 282-283, August 12, 2004, per Panganiban, J.
(now CJ). Italics supplied.

66.

Ungsod v. People , G.R. No. 158904, December 16, 2005, per Chico-Nazario, J.
Italics supplied. Citations omitted.

67.

Assailed CA Decision, p. 26; rollo, p. 64.

68.

Ungsod v. People, supra note 66; Cabuslay v. People , G.R. No. 129875,
September 30, 2005; People v. Pansensoy , 437 Phil. 499, September 12, 2002;
People v. Lab-eo, 424 Phil. 482, January 16, 2002.

69.

Guiyab v. People , G.R. No. 152527, October 20, 2005; Senoja v. People , 440
SCRA 695, October 19, 2004; People v. Magbanua, 428 SCRA 617, May 20, 2004.

70.

Cabuslay v. People, supra note 68; People v. Bernabe , 448 Phil. 269, April 1,
2003; People v. Calabroso, 394 Phil. 658, September 14, 2000.

71.

People v. Garin , 432 SCRA 394, June 17, 2004; People v. Werba , 431 SCRA 482,
June 9, 2004; People v. Villanueva, 408 SCRA 571, August 11, 2003.

72.

People v. Vasquez , 430 SCRA 52, May 28, 2004; People v. Magbanua, supra note
69; People v. Ramos , 427 SCRA 299, April 14, 2004.

73.

See Tuburan v. People , 436 SCRA 327, August 12, 2004; People v. Caratao , 451
Phil. 588, June 10, 2003; People v. Visperas, Jr., 443 Phil. 164, January 13, 2003.