Topic: Legislative History

Francisco v. Boiser
G.R. No. 137677

Date of Promulgation: May 31, 2000
Ponente: Mendoza, J.
Petition: Petition for Review of CA decision
Petitioners: Adalia Francisco
Respondents: Zenaida Boiser

Facts:
Petitioner Adalia Francisco and three of her sisters, Ester, Elizabeth, and Adeluisa, were co-
owners of four parcels of registered land in Caloocan City. On August 1979, they sold 1/5 of their
undivided share to their mother, Adela Blas, for P10,000, making her a co-owner of the real
property to that extent. Then in 1987, Adela sold the said portion of land for P10,000 to Zenaida
Boiser, another sister of the petitioner.

In 1992, six years after the sale, Adalia received summons from the complaing by Zenaida
demanding her share in the rentals being collected from the tenants of the Ten Commandments
Building, which stands on her co-owned property. Adalia then informs Zenaida that she was
exercising her right of redemption as co-owner of the subject property, depositing for that
purpose P10,000 with the Clerk of Court. The case was however dismissed after Zenaida was
declared non-suited, and Adalias counterclaim was dismissed as well.

Three years after, Adalia institutes a complaint demanding the redemption of the property,
contending that the 30-day period for redemption under Art. 1623, CC had not begun to run
against her or any of the other co-owners, since the vendor Adela did not inform them about the
sale, which they only came to know when Adalia received the summons in 1992.

Zenaida on the other hand contends that Adalia already knew of the sale even before she
received the summons since Zenaida had informed Adalia by letter of the sale with a demand for
her share of the rentals three months before filing suit, attaching to it a copy of the deed of sale.

Adalias receipt of the said letter is proven by the fact that within a week, she advised the tenants
of the building to disregard Zenaidas demand letter.

The trial court dismissed the complaint for legal redemption, holding Art. 1623, CC does not
prescribe any particular form of notifying co-owners on appeal; the CA affirmed. They relied on
the ruling of:

Distrito v. CA

Art. 1623 does not prescribe any particular form of written notice, nor any distinctive
method for notifying the redemptioner.

De Conejero v. CA & Badillo v. Ferrer

That furnishing the redemptioner with a copy of the deed of sale is equivalent to giving
him the written notice required by law.

In ruling that the notice given by Zenaida was sufficient, the CA relied on its ruling in Etcuban v.
CA:

Petitioner contends that vendors should be the ones to give him written notice and not
the vendees citing the case of Butte vs. Manuel Uy & Sons, Inc. While it is true that
written notice is required by the law (Art. 1623), it is equally true that the same "Art.
1623 does not prescribe any particular form of notice, nor any distinctive method for
notifying the redemptioner. In the Conejero case, we ruled that the furnishing of a
copy of the disputed deed of sale to the redemptioner was equivalent to the
giving of written notice required by law in "a more authentic manner than any other
writing could have done," and that We cannot adopt a stand of having to sacrifice
substance to technicality. More so in the case at bar, where the vendors or co-owners
of petitioner stated under oath in the deeds of sale that notice of sale had been given
to prospective redemptioners in accordance with Art. 1623 of the Civil Code. A sworn
statement or clause in a deed of sale to the effect that a written notice of sale
was given to possible redemptioners or co-owners might be used to determine
whether an offer to redeem was made on or out of time, or whether there was
substantial compliance with the requirement of said Art. 1623.

Issue:
WON the letter-demand by Zenaida to Adalia can be considered as sufficient compliance with
the notice requirement of Art. 1623 for the purpose of legal redemption. NO

Side questions on the interpretation of Art. 1623, CC:
Who should send notice?; and
When do you start counting the 30-day period?

Ratio:
[WHO]
The text of Art. 1623 clearly and expressly prescribes that the 30 days for making the
redemption shall be counted from notice in writing by the vendor. It makes sense to require that
notice be given by the vendor and nobody else, since the vendor of an undivided interest is in
the best position to know who are his co-owners, who under the law must be notified of the sale.

In Etcuban, notice to the co-owners of the sale of the share of one of them was given by the
vendees through their counterclaim in the action for legal redemption. Despite the apparent
meaning of Art. 1623, it was held in that case that it was "of no moment" that the notice of
sale was given not by the vendor but by the vendees. "So long as the co-owner is informed
in writing of the sale and the particulars thereof, the 30 days for redemption start running, and
the redemptioner has no cause to complain," so it was held. The contrary doctrine of Butte v.
Manuel Uy and Sons, Inc. was thus overruled sub silencio.

However in a later ruling in Salatandol v. Retes, which was decided a year after Etcuban, the
Court expressly affirmed the ruling in Butte that the notice required by Art. 1623 must be given
by the vendor. In Salatandol, Justice J.B.L. Reyes upheld the following:

1. Reversion to the ruling of in Butte is proper. Art. 1623 of the Civil Code is clear in
requiring that the written notification should come from the vendor or prospective
vendor, not from any other person. There is, therefore, no room for construction.
2. It makes sense to require that the notice required in Art. 1623 be given by the
vendor and by nobody else. The vendor of an undivided interest is in the best
position to know who are his co-owners who under the law must be notified of the
sale. It is likewise the notification from the seller, which can remove all doubts as to
the fact of the sale, its perfection, and its validity, for in a contract of sale, the seller is
in the best position to confirm whether consent to the essential obligation of selling the
property and transferring ownership thereof to the vendee has been given.

[WHEN]
In the present case, for instance, the sale took place in 1986, but it was kept secret until 1992
when vendee (herein respondent) needed to notify petitioner about the sale to demand 1/5
rentals from the property sold. Compared to serious prejudice to petitioners right of legal
redemption, the only adverse effect to vendor Adela Blas and respondent-vendee is that the sale
could not be registered. It is, therefore, unjust when the subject sale has already been
established before both lower courts and now, before this Court, to further delay petitioners
exercise of her right of legal redemption by requiring that notice be given by the vendor before
petitioner can exercise her right. For this reason, we rule that the receipt by petitioner of
summons in August 1992 constitutes actual knowledge on the basis of which petitioner
may now exercise her right of redemption within 30 days from finality of this decision.
In Alonzo v. Intermediate Appellate Court, we stated that the 30-day period of
redemption started, not from the date of the sales in 1963 and 1964, but sometime
between those years and 1976, when the first complaint for redemption was actually
filed.
Decision
Petition granted. CA and RTC decision reversed.

Notes:
How is this related to legislative history?
Use of precedents to determine interpretation of the codal provision in Art. 1623 of the Civil
Code
Etcuban was abandonded
Butte as was used in Salatandol was upheld

Art. 1623, CC. The right of legal pre-emption or redemption shall not be exercised
except within thirty days from the notice in writing by the prospective vendor, or by the
vendor, as the case maybe. The deed of sale shall not be recorded in the Registry of
Property, unless accompanied by an affidavit of the vendor that he has given written
notice thereof to all possible redemptioners.