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Summary Dismissal Board v. Torcita

330 SCRA 153 (2000)

FACTS: Sometime in April 26, 1994, after attending a social function, the group of Alex Edwin del Rosario
proceeded towards the direction of Cadiz City riding a Mazda pick-up. Upon reaching Sitio Puting Tubig, it
overtaken the red Cortina Ford being driven by C/Insp. Torcita. Maj. Torcita signaled them to stop which
they refused to abide and instead accelerated and proceeded to Hacienda Aimee owned by
Congressman Manuel Puey. The red Cortina Ford followed also at high speed until it reached Hda. Aimee
where C/Insp. Torcita and PO2 Java alighted and the confrontation with Alex Edwin del Rosario and Jesus
Puey.
Twelve verified complaints complaints were filed against C/Insp. Lazaro Torcita, herein respondent,
by Manuel Puey, Jesus Puey, Alex Edwin del Rosario before the Summary Dismissal Board (SDB) of the PNP
which was later on consolidated into one "major complaint" for "conduct unbecoming of a police officer."
The complainants alleged that Major Torcita approached and entered the compound of Hda. Aimee, very
drunk, with back-up vehicle full of armed policemen, confronted Jesus H. Puey and Alex Edwin del Rosario
as who stopped him at the gate, shouting in a very, very loud voice, invectives and remarks. That such act
of Maj. Torcita constitute Conduct Unbecoming of an Officer not worth of respect. In his answer Maj.
Torcita admitted that he entered the premises of the complainants, however, the same was done on a
regular, lawful and proper way for he was in the performance of his official duties in pursuing the suspect
who committed a crime in his presence.
However, during trial, the witnesses for the complainants withdrew the statement in their affidavit
and denied seeing or hearing what happened. The only piece of evidence presented in connection with
the incident which happened near the gate of the compound is the affidavit of C/Insp. Torcita and his
testimony. Thus, the Board dismissed the complaint. However he Board find him to have committed SIMPLE
IRREGULARITY IN THE PERFORMANCE OF DUTY and is ordered suspended for twenty (20) days and forfeiture
of salary. Torcita appealed his conviction to the Regional Appellate Board of the PNP, Region VI, Iloilo City,
but the appeal was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. Whereupon, C/Insp. Torcita filed a petition for certiorari
in the regional trial court of Iloilo City, Branch 31, questioning the legality of the conviction of an offense for
which he was not charged, "which conviction is a nullity because of the lack of procedural due process of
law." which the court granted. Hence this appeal by the Private respondent.

ISSUE:
1) Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the petition granted by the Regional Trial
Court that the decision of the petitioners Board was rendered without or in excess of jurisdiction
due to lack of due process.
2) Whether or not the decision of the SDB and Napolcom Regional Appelate Board has become final
and executory.

HELD :
1) No. The Court of Appeals did not err in affirming the decision of the trial court granting the petition
for certiorari. The SC held that the Court of Appeals correctly found that the decision of the
petitioners Board was rendered without or in excess of jurisdiction, as respondent Torcita was found
guilty of an offense for which he was not properly charged. Torcita was entitled to know that he
was being charged with being drunk while in the performance of duty, so that he could traverse
the accusation squarely and adduce evidence in his defense. The absence of specification of the
offense for which he was eventually found guilty is not a proper observance of due process. There
can be no short-cut to the legal process. It is a requirement of due process that the parties be
informed of how the litigation was decided with an explanation of the factual and legal reasons
that led to the conclusions of the Court. Memorandum Circular No. 92-006 specifically prescribes
that the decision shall contain "a brief statement of the material facts and the findings of the
summary dismissal authority as well as the disposition thereof" (Sec. 6). The cursory conclusion of the
Dismissal Board that Torcita "committed breach of internal discipline by taking drinks while in the
performance of same" should have been substantiated by factual findings referring to this
particular offense. As it turned out, the dismissal Board believed his allegation that he was not
drunk and found that he was in full command of his senses during the incident.
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2) No, it is has not become final and executor. The SC held that a decision is void for lack of due
process if, as a result, a party is deprived of the opportunity of being heard. A void judgment never
acquires finality. Hence, aforementioned decision cannot be deemed to have become final and
executory.
WHEREFORE, the assailed decision dated September l, 1997 of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED
and the instant petition is DISMISSED.

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Secretary of Justice v. Lantion
G.R. No. 139466, October 17, 2000


FACTS: On January 18, 2000, by a vote of 9-6, the SC dismissed the petition at bar and ordered the
petitioner to furnish private respondent copies of the extradition request and its supporting papers and to
grant him a reasonable period within which to file his comment with supporting evidence. On February 3,
2000, the petitioner timely filed an Urgent Motion for Reconsideration which was opposed by private
respondent Jimenez on March 28, 2000.
On April 5, 2000, petitioner filed an Urgent Motion to Allow Continuation and Maintenance of
Action and Filing of Reply. Thereafter, petitioner filed on June 7, 2000 a Manifestation with the attached
Note 327/00 from the Embassy of Canada and Note No. 34 from the Security Bureau of the Hongkong SAR
Government Secretariat. On August 15, 2000, private respondent filed a Manifestation and Motion for
Leave to File Rejoinder in the event that petitioner's April 5, 2000 Motion would be granted. Private
respondent also filed on August 18, 2000, a Motion to Expunge from the records petitioner's June 7, 2000
Manifestation with its attached note verbales. Except for the Motion to Allow Continuation and
Maintenance of Action, the Court denies these pending motions and hereby resolves petitioner's Urgent
Motion for Reconsideration.
.

ISSUE: Whether or not the private respondent is entitled to the due process right to notice and hearing
during the evaluation stage of the extradition process.

HELD : The Supreme Court held that private respondent is bereft of the right to notice and hearing during
the evaluation stage of the extradition process. An extradition proceeding is sui generis. It is not a criminal
proceeding which will call into operation all the rights of an accused as guaranteed by the Bill of Rights. As
a rule, constitutional rights that are only relevant to determine the guilt or innocence of an accused cannot
be invoked by an extradite especially by one whose extradition papers are still undergoing evaluation.
As an extradition proceeding is not criminal in character and the evaluation stage in an extradition
proceeding is not akin to a preliminary investigation, the due process safeguards in the latter do not
necessarily apply to the former. The Court held that for the procedural due process required by a given set
of circumstances "must begin with a determination of the precise nature of the government function
involved as well as the private interest that has been affected by governmental action." The concept of
due process is flexible for "not all situations calling for procedural safeguards call for the same kind of
procedure." Considering that in the case at bar, the extradition proceeding is only at its evaluation stage,
the nature of the right being claimed by the private respondent is nebulous and the degree of prejudice
he will allegedly suffer is weak. The court accord greater weight to the interests espoused by the
government thru the petitioner Secretary of Justice. In tilting the balance in favor of the interests of the
State, the Court stresses that it is not ruling that the private respondent has no right to due process at all
throughout the length and breadth of the extrajudicial proceedings. Procedural due process requires a
determination of what process is due, when it is due, and the degree of what is due. Stated otherwise, a
prior determination should be made as to whether procedural protections are at all due and when they
are due, which in turn depends on the extent to which an individual will be "condemned to suffer grievous
loss." There is no denial of due process as long as fundamental fairness is assured a party.

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People vs. Estrada
G.R. 130487 June 19, 2000


FACTS: On December 27, 1994 while the Sacrament of Confirmation was being performed by Bishop of
Dagupan City at the St. John's Cathedral, Dagupan City, accused-appellant Roberto Estrada y Lopez went
up and walked towards the center of the altar and sat at the bishops chair. Rogelio Mararac, the security
guard at the cathedral who tried to push him away was stabbed by the accused-appellant. After the
stabbing incident the later got up, went to the microphone and shouted: "Anggapuy nayan dia!" (No one
can beat me here!). He returned to the Bishop's chair and sat on it again. Mararac, wounded and
bleeding, slowly dragged himself down the altar. He was later on apprehended by the police and brought
to the Police station. Meantime, Maraac was brought to hospital but expired few minutes after. Estrada
was charged with the crime of murder.
At the arraignment on January 6, 1995, accused-appellant's counsel, the Public Attorney's Office,
filed an "Urgent
Motion to Suspend Arraignment and to Commit Accused to Psychiatric Ward at Baguio General Hospital."
It was alleged that accused-appellant could not properly and intelligently enter a plea because he was
suffering from a mental defect; that before the commission of the crime, he was confined at the
psychiatric ward of the Baguio General Hospital in Baguio City. He prayed for the suspension of his
arraignment and the issuance of an order confining him at the said hospital. The motion was opposed by
the City Prosecutor. The trial court, motu proprio, propounded several questions on accused-appellant.
Finding that the questions were understood and answered by him "intelligently," the court denied the
motion that same day. The arraignment proceeded and a plea of not guilty was entered by the court on
accused-appellant's behalf.
One month after the prosecution rested its case, the Jail Warden of Dagupan City wrote the trial
judge informing him of accused-appellant's unusual behavior and requesting that he be examined at the
hospital to determine whether he should remain in jail or be placed in some other institution. The trial judge
ignored this letter. One year later, accused-appellant's counsel filed a
"Motion to Confine Accused for Physical, Mental and Psychiatric Examination." Attached to this motion was
a second letter by the new Jail Warden of Dagupan City accompanied by a letter-complaint of the
members of the Bukang Liwayway Association of the city jail. The trial court rendered a decision on June
23, 1997 finding the accused-appellant guilty of the crime charged and thereby sentenced him to death.
Hence, this automatic reviews of the death penalty.

ISSUE: Whether or not the accused-appellant was accorded the constitutional rights to a fair trial and due process of law.

HELD : The Court held that in the case at bar, there is no direct proof that accused-appellant was afflicted
with insanity at the time he killed Mararac. The absence of direct proof, nevertheless, does not entirely
discount the probability that appellant was not of sound mind at that time. From the affidavit of witness
Santillan attached to the Information, there are certain circumstances that should have placed the trial
court on notice that appellant may not have been in full possession of his mental faculties when he
attacked Mararac. It was highly unusual for a sane person to go up to the altar and sit in the Bishop's chair
while the Bishop was administering the Holy Sacrament of Confirmation to children in a jam-packed
cathedral. It goes against normal and ordinary behavior for appellant, without sufficient provocation from
the security guard, to stab the latter at the altar, during sacramental rites and in front of all the Catholic
faithful to witness. Appellant did not flee, or at least attempt to flee after the stabbing. He nonchalantly
approached the microphone and, over the public address system, uttered words to the faithful which the
rational person would have been made. He then returned to the Bishop's chair and sat there as if nothing
happened.
The rule barring trial or sentence of an insane person is for the protection of the accused, rather
than of the public. It has been held that it is inhuman to require an accused disabled by act of God to
make a just defense for his life or liberty. To put a legally incompetent person on trial or to convict and
sentence him is a violation of the constitutional rights to a fair trial and due process of law. By depriving
appellant of a mental examination, the trial court effectively deprived appellant of a fair trial.1 a w p h il
The trial court's negligence was a violation of the basic requirements of due process; and for this reason,
the proceedings before the said court must be nullified.
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IN VIEW WHEREOF, the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 44, Dagupan City in Criminal
Case No. 94- 00860-D convicting accused-appellant Roberto Estrada and sentencing him to death is
vacated and the case is remanded to the court a quo for the conduct of a proper mental examination on
accused-appellant, a determination of his competency to stand trial, and for further proceedings.

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Lim v. Court of Appeals
G.R. 111397, August 12, 2002


FACTS: On December 7, 1992 Bistro filed before the trial court a petition for mandamus and prohibition,
with prayer for temporary restraining order or writ of preliminary injunction, against Lim in his capacity as
Mayor of the City of Manila. Bistro filed the case because policemen under Lims instructions inspected and
investigated Bistros license as well as the work permits and health certificates of its staff. This caused the
stoppage of work in Bistros night club and restaurant operations.6 Lim also refused to accept Bistros
application for a BUSINESS LICENSE , as well as the work permit applications of Bistros staff, for the year
1993.
The Trial Court granted Petitioners application for a writ of prohibitory preliminary injunction, and
Respondent, and any/all persons acting under his authority, are and (sic) ordered to cease and desist from
inspecting, investigating and otherwise closing or impeding the business operations of Petitioner
Corporations establishments while the petition here is pending resolution on the merits. However, despite
the trial courts order, Lim still issued a closure order on Bistros operations effective January 23, 1993, even
sending policemen to carry out his closure order. Hence, petition for review on certiorari1 of the Decision of
the Court of Appeals

ISSUE: Whether or not the Mayor has regulatory powers to has no authority to close down Bistros business
or any business establishment in Manila without due process of law.

HELD : The court held that Lim has no authority to close down Bistros business or any business establishment
in Manila without due process of law. Lim cannot take refuge under the Revised Charter of the City of
Manila and the Local Government Code. There is no provision in these laws expressly or impliedly granting
the mayor authority to close down private commercial establishments without notice and hearing, and
even if there is, such provision would be void. The due process clause of the Constitution requires that Lim
should have given Bistro an opportunity to rebut the allegations that it violated the conditions of its licenses
and permits. The regulatory powers granted to municipal corporations must always be exercised in
accordance with law, with utmost observance of the rights of the people to due process and equal
protection of the law. Such power cannot be exercised whimsically, arbitrarily or despotically. In the instant
case, we find that Lims exercise of this power violated Bistros property rights that are protected under the
due process clause of the Constitution. Lims zeal in his campaign against prostitution is commendable. The
presumption is that he acted in good faith and was motivated by his concern for his constituents when he
implemented his campaign against prostitution in the Ermita-Malate area. However, there is no excusing
Lim for arbitrarily closing down, without due process of law, the business operations of Bistro. For this reason,
the trial court properly restrained the acts of Lim..