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Problem Set 6

This document contains a problem set covering several topics in mathematical economics, including: 1) Brouwer's fixed point theorem and conditions for a function to have a fixed point. 2) Kakutani's fixed point theorem and conditions for a correspondence to have a fixed point. 3) Examples of contraction mappings and finding fixed points numerically. 4) Convergence of iterative sequences defined by functions and correspondences. 5) Properties of largest fixed points for correspondences. 6) Conditions for continuous functions on homeomorphic spaces to have fixed points. 7) Showing any finite game has a Nash equilibrium in mixed strategies.

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Lee Zhi Kang
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171 views2 pages

Problem Set 6

This document contains a problem set covering several topics in mathematical economics, including: 1) Brouwer's fixed point theorem and conditions for a function to have a fixed point. 2) Kakutani's fixed point theorem and conditions for a correspondence to have a fixed point. 3) Examples of contraction mappings and finding fixed points numerically. 4) Convergence of iterative sequences defined by functions and correspondences. 5) Properties of largest fixed points for correspondences. 6) Conditions for continuous functions on homeomorphic spaces to have fixed points. 7) Showing any finite game has a Nash equilibrium in mixed strategies.

Uploaded by

Lee Zhi Kang
Copyright
© © All Rights Reserved
We take content rights seriously. If you suspect this is your content, claim it here.
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Download as PDF, TXT or read online on Scribd
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Satoru Takahashi EC5104/EC5104R

Department of Economics Mathematical Economics


National University of Singapore 2014/2015, Semester 1
Problem Set 6
due on September 29, Monday
Part A
1. Brouwers xed point theorem states the following:
If X is a nite-dimensional, nonempty, compact, and convex set, and f is
a continuous function from X to itself, then f has a xed point.
(a) Does f have a xed point if X is not compact?
(b) Does f have a xed point if X is not convex?
(c) Does f have a xed point if f is not continuous?
2. Kakutanis xed point theorem states the following:
If X is a nite-dimensional, nonempty, compact, and convex set, and is a
nonempty-, compact-, and convex-valued upper hemicontinuos correspon-
dence from X to itself, then has a xed point.
Does have a xed point if is not convex-valued?
3. Let f : [0, 1] [0, 1] be given by f(x) = e
x
/(1 + e
x
) for each x [0, 1].
(a) Show that f is a contraction mapping, hence has a unique xed point.
(b) Find the xed point using a computer.
Part B
1. Let f : [0, 1] [0, 1] be given by f(x) = rx(1 x) with some r [0, 4]. Pick any x
0
,
and let x
n+1
= f(x
n
) for n = 0, 1, 2, . . .
(a) Show that if {x
n
} converge to a limit x

, then x

is a xed point of f.
(b) Does {x
n
} converge?
2. Let (X, d) be a nonempty and compact metric space, and f : X X be a shrinking
mapping, i.e., d(f(x), f(y)) < d(x, y) whenever x = y.
(a) Show that f is continuous.
1
(b) Show that f has a unique xed point x

.
1
(c) Pick any x
0
, and let x
n+1
= f(x
n
) for n = 0, 1, 2, . . . Does {x
n
} converge to x

?
3. Let X be a nonempty compact metric space, and : X X a nonempty and
compact-valued upper hemicontinuous correspondence. For each A X, we dene
(A) =

xA
(x).
Show that has the largest xed point, which is nonempty and compact, i.e., there
exists a nonempty compact subset A

X such that
(A

) = A

, and
for any A X, if (A) A, then A A

.
4. We say that two topological spaces X and Y are homeomorphic if there exists a
continuous bijection : X Y whose inverse is also continuous.
(a) Show that if X is homeomorphic to a nite-dimensional nonempty, compact,
and convex set, then any continuous function f : X X admits a xed point.
(b) Show that the unit n-dimensional sphere
S
n
= {x R
n+1
: x = 1}
is not homeomorphic to any nite-dimensional nonempty, compact, and convex
set.
5. Show that any nonempty and nite game has a Nash equilibrium in mixed strategies.
1
Note that Browers xed point theorem does not apply since X may not be convex (and X may not
be a subset of a nite-dimensional Euclidean space). Neither does the contraction mapping theorem apply
since a shrinking map is not necessarily contracting.
2

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