REVISITING DEPENDENCY AND DEVELOPMENT

IN LATIN AMERICA
Jos Maurcio Domingues
1*

INTRODUCTION
Dependency and Development in Latin America, called as
DDLA (CARDOSO; FALETTO, 1969, 1979) is, certainly, the book
published by Latin Americans that has had ever the greatest impact in
the social sciences and in social and political thought across the world.
Fernando Henrique Cardoso, one of the book authors and former
president of Brazil, along with Enzo Faletto, has recently offered in
the pages of Studies in Comparative International Development a
reassessment of the book (CARDOSO, 2009). He has also, by way
of showing how the method of analysis they drew upon historical-
structuralism is still valid for analyzing the contemporary world,
provided an overview of the global situation, with special reference
to Latin America.
In the following pages, I will argue, however, that Cardosos
reassessment of the book conceptual scheme is partial and that
this has to do with his present conceptual and political views, as
shown in the very same article. This is deeply connected to the
*
PhD in Sociology, at the London School of Economics and Political Science.
Professor at the Institute for Social and Political Research of Rio de Janeiro State
University (IESP-UERJ), Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. Email: jmdomigues@iesp.uerj.br.
750 Ci. & Trp., Recife, v. 35, n 2, p. 753-780, 2011
Revisiting dependency and development in Latin America.
angle from which he sees globalization and especially present-day
Latin America. Although he argues Ior a 'global social democracy
and rejects the view that his government implemented neoliberal
reIorms, attacking also what he names 'populism in a new guise,
this former argument is hardly true, while the second is far too much
tributary oI a view that there would be 'two leIts in Latin America:
a good, rational, democratic one and a bad, demagogic and at least
potentially authoritarian other. I shall proceed without and beyond
polemical intentions, thus avoiding as much as more specifc political
discussions, as well as sticking basically to DDLA and Cardosos
recent formal assessment. Nevertheless, this is not entirely possible
insofar as an analysis of Latin America is at stake, with reference
specifcally to those concepts. Those issues must be, however, taken
up for both an assessment of the books present possibilities and of
Latin American and global realities. It is true that it might be simply
argued that dependency theory is no longer relevant. Conversely, it
can be argued that dependency theory has to a great extent vanished
from sight, but the problems it addressed remains as pressing as ever
(cf. PECAUT, 1985). That is the path this article will take, pointing
out why this is so.
I will proceed by, frst, pointing out the limitations oI
Cardosos reconstruction of his own argument. Next, I will relate this
to his view oI globalization and to an approach I fnd more adequate.
I will, then, deal with the Latin American predicament, summoning
also evidence that corroborates the usefulness of the concepts
originally presented in Cardoso and Faletto`s book. I shall fnally
make a last point, insofar as in the Latin American context DDLA
worked very much as a critical theory, questioning mainstream
views of development, although it refused the idea of absolute and
Ci. & Trp., Recife, v. 35, n 2, p. 753-780, 2011 751
Jos Maurcio Domingues
inevitable stagnation. How that would work now is something that
needs, at least, to be briefy addressed.
DDLA`S CENTRAL CONCEPTS
Although Cardoso aIfrms the validity oI his Iormer
framework to an analysis of the contemporary world, he does so
very selectively. In fact, the main stress of this contention is on the
political element that was present in DDLA. That was a very key
achievement, which did represent a break from the usual theories
oI dependency, mainly Frank`s (1967) defnition oI development
as necessarily creating underdevelopment, regardless of whatever
else happened, short of socialist revolutions, of course. Not that
Frank was entirely wrong from a descriptive standpoint, as I will
argue below. He had, however, turned in many cases an empirically
verifed situation into a teleological necessity, theoretically dressed.
Cardoso and Faletto did not accept this sort of point of view, though
how much the book was a reaction against it or an independently
craIted contribution should be open to scrutiny, since the frst draIt
of DDLA is of the same year as Franks publication. It is probably
the case that the book had much to do with Latin American debates
about the insurmountable stagnation that seemed to have come about
in the early 1960s of the regional economies (SERRA, 1976).
The fact is that Cardoso and Faletto argued, in variance
also with modernization theory (which Cardoso nevertheless
partly embraced before and to which he occasionally returns
1
), that
developmental paths are not, so to speak, divinely ordained. According
to a widespread conviction, worldwide and in Latin America,
including in particular the United Nations Economic Commission
1
See Cardoso, 1967.
752 Ci. & Trp., Recife, v. 35, n 2, p. 753-780, 2011
Revisiting dependency and development in Latin America.
for Latin America (ECLA), the state would mobilize society and to
a great extent assume the task of promoting development, when that
succeeded (CARDOSO; FALETTO, 1979, p. 3-4). But countries
differed according to the coalitions that would come to power in
each of them and make use of the state, within structural constraints
that were not, however, insurmountable (CARDOSO; FALETTO,
1979, p. 3-5). To use a current social science jargon, path dependence
was crucial, yet it did not determine outcomes, which were mediated
by human agency. Dependence was both an external relationship
and internally structured as 'a particular type oI relationship within
underdeveloped nation (CARDOSO; FALETTO, 1979, p.15). In
Iact, they went as Iar as observing, in the 1979 'Post scriptum to
the English edition of the book, that they did not intend to measure
'degrees oI dependency, but to enquiry into whom and which classes
and groups development served (CARDOSO; FALETTO, 1979, p.
201-212) missing, however, an opportunity to grasp what below
will be Iocused upon as the 'semiperipheral situation. It is curious
also that Cardoso pays no attention to the theme of coalitions in his
recent commentary of the classical text, consisting this in an issue
that must be explored, since it may tell us a lot about development
and even Cardosos perspectives.
Central as political underpins were, the structural elements of
the book were of paramount importance in the analysis too. I would
like specifcally to underline the defnitions oI dependency, center
and periphery, development and underdevelopment. Although he
mentions, in passing, 'underdevelopment as characteristic oI the
Brazilian economy in relation to the US, as well as the idea of center
and periphery (CARDOSO, 2009, p. 301), these plays basically
no role in his recent discussion. Furthermore, he does not actually
dismiss the idea oI 'dependency, but underplays its importance,
Ci. & Trp., Recife, v. 35, n 2, p. 753-780, 2011 753
Jos Maurcio Domingues
underscoring 'development instead as the core oI the book
(CARDOSO, 2009, p. 298). This seems not to withstand comparison
with the actual text by Cardoso and Faletto, though.
They defned very clearly and careIully these diIIerents and
key concepts. While dependency would imply the relative lack of
power of Latin American countries vis--vis the powerful countries
of the world the US and Europe, of course , those whose state and
other economic agents had the means to autonomously engage in
economic and political decisions, the ideas of centre and periphery
referred to the roles which each country played in the international
economy. These were, up to them, basically of two kinds: commodities
producers and exporters, on the one hand, and manufactures producers
and exporters, on the other. Development and underdevelopment
were characterized by the relative level of differentiation of the
economies at stake, comparatively which, at that point, related
to the industrial level of development which had been achieved in
each of them (CARDOSO; FALETTO, 1979, p.16-24). Of course,
there was an overlap of these categories, which formed two main,
self-reinforcing clusters. Moreover, although Cardoso (2009, p. 297)
dismisses now the vulgar theories of imperialism (without telling
us which exactly they were), he explicitly included the conceptual
apparatus of his own dependency theory, which would be no theory
at all, he argued then, within Lenins theory of imperialism. It was, he
added, merely complementary (CARDOSO, 1975). It is within this
sort of perspective that we should place one of the great innovations
oI the book: 'dependent development (CARDOSO; FALETTO,
1979, p. 6). Although there is some warrant to speak oI it as the frst
sparks oI what is usually misleadingly called 'globalization (too
vague a term, in Iact) and especially the aIfrmation that it is aIter
'development: dependent development meant the continuation oI
754 Ci. & Trp., Recife, v. 35, n 2, p. 753-780, 2011
Revisiting dependency and development in Latin America.
the lack of autonomy that beset those countries, the mere mitigation
of their peripheral position, as well as a relative diminution of their
underdeveloped character. The core of Ral Prebishs and the ECLA
strategy to overcome the problems that beset the periphery and
industrialization was becoming a more complex phenomenon.
To be sure, a lot has changed since the book was originally
published in 1969 and it would make no sense asking the authors
that they remain absolutely consistent with their former argument,
in particular at a moment when the world has changed so much. But
one could perfectly argue that, in fact, the structure of the global
economy to a great extent reproduces such patterns, however, with
greater variability, introducing ever greater complexity. Hence a
more faithful reading of the book may be totally warranted.
Two main elements have been crucial for changes in relation
to the 1970s. The frst is the third industrial or techno-scientifc
revolution, with all the accompanying changes in patterns of
production and consumption (post-Fordism, micro-electronics,
fexible accumulation and pluralized consumption, etc.), as well as
the Iurther fnancialization oI capitalism (CASTELLS, 1996, 2000).
On the other hand, the rise of a number of countries which have
managed to industrialize and to some extent emulate the patterns
oI the now so-called 'North economies has also been a Ieature
oI the same period. The frst issue has led to a great leap Iorward
for capitalism, inaugurating an entirely new pattern and period of
accumulation, which left behind precisely most of the countries
in the then 'Third World which were apparently catching up, in
a more dependent (like Brazil) or independent (like India) way
(AMSDEN, 2001). These were relatively successful, in any case,
in producing manufactures with reasonable levels of added value,
partly surpassing the mere commodities producing phase. The
Ci. & Trp., Recife, v. 35, n 2, p. 753-780, 2011 755
Jos Maurcio Domingues
differentiation this entailed in the global economy led indeed to what
some authors would call 'semiperiphery, although oIten the state,
rather the country, were the unit of analysis in such conceptualizations
(WALLERSTEIN, 1974, 1980, 1988).
2
While the existence of a
capital good sector (or Department I of the economy, in a Marxist
view) may be seem as differentiating these industrialized countries
among themselves, as suggested by the French Theory of Regulation
(BOYER; SAILLARD, 2000), due to their relative technological
prowess, countries such as Korea (and Taiwan, we might add) hardly
ft the defnition, as Evans (2009, p. 333) observed. But the concept
seems to describe the rise oI a number oI countries in the last fIty
years or so, although in itself it has remained rather imprecise.
That double, techno-scientifc and fnance capital, revolutions
have in any case pushed most of those countries strongly back into
their position. In this regard, development had indeed empirically
generated underdevelopment in a relative scale (although areas
such as Africa in particular, but also parts of Latin America,
have experienced it in absolute terms). To be sure, a mix of path
dependence, especially the US, much more prepared to make that
leap, and political possibilities answers for this disjunction and
the locations oI countries within the new confguration. The
differentiations in trajectory are too big to be treated here, even
if we do not take Korea and Taiwan, in consideration. But even
Brazil and India, whose unfolding would be relatively similar in
many respects (PEDERSEN, 2008). In this regard the theory seems
therefore still to hold water, since its main concepts dependency,
centre and periphery (plus semiperiphery), and development and
underdevelopment can do a good job in framing contemporary
2
This is however probably reductive, being therefore a better idea to keep the
focus on whole countries rather than merely on states.
756 Ci. & Trp., Recife, v. 35, n 2, p. 753-780, 2011
Revisiting dependency and development in Latin America.
realities. The issues, as well as the overlap between such categories,
remain real enough. In addition, realist political assumptions about
size, population, resources, weaponry, citizen allegiance, effective
government, diplomacy, etc. (MORGENTHAU, 1949, 1967) also
must, as usually, be seen as relevant to defne the power oI states in
the global arena as well as their interplay, including therein market
size, which stands out in the cases of China and India.
This is no mere globalization, though. Either countries remain
agrarian (as just too many in Latin America, where many were actually
totally, as Chile, or partly, as Argentina, 'reprimarized, losing much
or entirely its industry even Brazil suffering somewhat from this
syndrome), or they took mostly the path of dependent development
(the cases of Korea and Taiwan being, as already pointed out, more
complicated, demanding perhaps a category that could make more
relative their position within the global 'South). While multinational
or transnational corporations, as well as fnance capital, have their
own interests, they remain frmly tied to the central countries oI the
West and Japan. China has had indeed much more autonomy, which
has to do with its revolutionary past, but even in this case it is still
to be seen how it will develop, without prejudging its future stand
in the global society, even though the sheer size of its economy is
absolutely overwhelming.
Kohli (2004, 2009) has insisted on the role of the state, but
on its relation to social classes too, for an understanding of the
patterns and potentialities oI development in the 'South. In this
regard, although his excessive stress on the virtues oI the 'cohesive
capitalist state is problematic, working mainly for small countries
and specifc geopolitical conditions, he shares with Cardoso and
Falettos book the correct understanding that coalitions are crucial for
the outcomes of development. In fact, Cardoso and Faletto pointed
Ci. & Trp., Recife, v. 35, n 2, p. 753-780, 2011 757
Jos Maurcio Domingues
out that success cases were those in which 'elite coalitions with
some pro-development slant had been able to create legitimacy and
some stability insofar as they sorted out problems above, between
'elites, but also below, that is, attracting also the 'masses, the
popular classes to the dominant coalition (CARDOSO; FALETTO,
1979, p. 5).
This much is very relevant and, although logical issues, such
as the 'embeddedness oI an autonomous bureaucracy (EVANS,
1995) must be taken into account the decision to analyze social forces
in relation to the state helps capture a great deal of the history of
economic development, if not carried out in a reductive and determinist
way. Nevertheless, coalitions should also be more strongly inserted
within geopolitical and broader cultural-political frameworks. This
would lead us to a better comprehension of the different paths
globalization has assumed in the 'South. In his discussion, Cardoso
(2009) does not really address this sort of question in analyzing
the recent changes that occurred in Latin Americas relations with
the US government, the international fnancial institutions and the
transnational corporations. These agents have had an enormous
sway over Latin America, which has constituted its direct, albeit not
particularly relevant, zone oI infuence. More seriously, Cardoso
mentions just in passing the alliances that have been internally
established in order to steer 'development (or its contrary) in a
direction or another (CARDOSO, 2009, p. 306). Everything is
resolved thus a confrontation between good global social democracy
(whose defnition begs the question) and populism. No social
movements (unions are dismissed as irrelevant in the Brazilian case
in particular), no social classes, no left-right alignments, have room
in his analysis. This is entirely contrary to the method and the actual
demarche of DDLA. In fact, as Evans (2009, p. 323ff) pointed out,
758 Ci. & Trp., Recife, v. 35, n 2, p. 753-780, 2011
Revisiting dependency and development in Latin America.
as to the relation with so-called globalized forces, Cardoso seems to
merely accept as inevitable sheer 'adaptation (CARDOSO, 2009,
p. 300-1, 306).
These are the main points that a less skewed reading of
Cardoso and Falettos DDLA may present. They make, I believe, the
book even more contemporary. Its concepts are, to be sure, in need
of adaptation, but appear as widely relevant for an understanding of
the global society that the twenty-frst century carries on building.
LATIN AMERICA AND OTHER SEMIPERIPHERAL AND
PERIPHERAL AREAS
For someone who has so strongly criticized enclave
economies and embraced the Prebishian standpoint that is sticking
to commodities export, could not be good for a country in the long-
run (DDLA: passim), Cardosos (2009, p. 309-10) support of the
Chilean model (only partly transformed since the end of the military
dictatorship) may come as a surprise. Argentina paid dear for its
failure to industrialize further, in some part due to its being a very
rich meat and wheat export country in the frst halI oI the twentieth
century, despite, as his book had shown, it being included in those
dependent developing which he and Faletto had newly identifed.
Chile is not even like that. But, insofar as his is, a perspective which
embraces, at the economic level, a rather passive adaptation to
globalization, which in fact continued to a great extent during the
frst Luis Inacio Lula da Silva government (DOMINGUES, 2007),
this is perfectly understandable.
3
It is hardly understandable how he
can see Mxico, with its skewed development of export goods for the
3
However, it is true that Brazilian diplomacy has been very active, although
variations can be found in the Cardoso and Lula governments.
Ci. & Trp., Recife, v. 35, n 2, p. 753-780, 2011 759
Jos Maurcio Domingues
US in its Northern region, as a success case, except if we also grasp
his statement that seizing opportunities in the global market is the
only way possible in the contemporary world (CARDOSO, 2009, p.
310-13) in Mexicos case, indeed regardless of very problematic
consequences (especially in what concerns dependence, which he
seems now to Irame rather as 'asymmetric relations a point that
should not detract from the issues raised by dependency theory, as
noted by KEOHANE; NYE, 1977, p. 9-11).
It is true also that Brazil has a much bigger and much more
diversifed economy, with indeed a capital goods sector, only
comparable to India`s in the Iormer 'Third World. This provided
more leeway, yet the country took indeed a neoliberal route, although
later and with lesser depth than most of its neighbors. Cardoso
was instrumental in this respect, ahead of a coalition of center
and rightwing forces, including the main old oligarchies, rejecting
any alliance with social movements and socially organized forces
(even with industrial businessmen relationships were at best shaky;
fnance capital and new entrants in the privatized markets, especially
telecommunications, were much more highly regarded). Also
poverty alleviation programs were initiated during his presidency,
but in their form and extent were part of the neoliberal agenda.
Along with, but also beyond the needs of macroeconomic stability,
the political use oI the 'exchange rate, pushing semi-parity with
the dollar although never as absurd as what Carlos Menem did in
Argentina made possible the stability of his government and in
fact his reelection, leading to a currency crash just after the latter
(KOHLI, 2004; LAUTIER; MARQUES PEREIRA, 2004).
Let me make it clear: I do not mention these issues with a
polemical intention, but two points must be made. First, while
fghting over words is surely useless, it seems just too obvious that the
760 Ci. & Trp., Recife, v. 35, n 2, p. 753-780, 2011
Revisiting dependency and development in Latin America.
goals of the Cardosos governments were exactly the same as those
imposed everywhere by the US government and the international
fnancial institutions (International Monetary Fund and World Bank):
commercial opening, privatization, fscal and monetary orthodoxy,
even the poverty alleviation schemes, etc. But the widespread effect
of the monetary stabilization can hardly be exaggerated either. It had
two aspects. II the attempt at curbing infation Ior good was at its
core, a political feature soon became at least as important (in fact
it became the key issue, along with the interest of stakeholders in
the newly globalized Brazilian fnancial market): bringing along the
'poor oI the country, not through their organizations, with which
Cardosos government had no dialogue, but as individuals who were
desperately in need of economic security. Cardoso showed thereby
that he had learned the lessons of his own book: a coalition of
'elites had been put together, including Ioreign capital, that could
also cement an alliance with the popular sectors, but, in this case,
regardless and indeed to a great extent against social movements and
popular organizations. To be sure other Latin American countries
took this much further culminating in particular in the Argentine
tragedy oI 2001 in what may be called the 'transIormist path
taken by the subcontinent in the last decade of the twentieth century,
changing in order not to change much. The model is the same,
with differences of degree and emphasis (LAUTIER; MARQUES
PEREIRA, 2004; BOYER; NEFFA, 2004; DOMINGUES, 2008: ch.
2; 2012a: Part II; 2012b). And so is Cardosos acceptance of the
rules of the global, neoliberally steered global economy, as Evans,
as mentioned above, stresses.
Within the present order Latin Americas situation is not
good at all. If Brazil seems to make some progress, although its
economic growth has picked up with greater sustainability only very
Ci. & Trp., Recife, v. 35, n 2, p. 753-780, 2011 761
Jos Maurcio Domingues
recently and its economic structure is underdeveloped in relation
to that of the central countries (US, Europe, Japan maybe also
Korea and Taiwan and, possibly soon, China, too), in relation to
which it is a rather dependent and semiperipheral country, most
other countries are even in a worse position (DOMINGUES, 2008:
ch. 2; 2012a: Part II; 2012b). Chile is trapped in its primary export
pattern, Argentina has suffered industrial involution and Mexico was
caught up in the 'maquiladora pattern oI assemblage oI products
of low value-added production. The other countries of the region
have had very limited industrialization. They export oil, making
the richness of a rentier state, as in Venezuelas regular pattern, or
agrarian and pastoral commodities or else, cocaine. Investments
in science and technology, research and development, were
raised recently, but do not surpass one percent in Brazil, and 0,5
percent in Argentina and Mexico, Chile trailing behind, while the
other countries in the region invest almost nil in this key area for
contemporary economic development (data for 2008, from RICYT,
2008). Innovation clusters, also key to contemporary development,
practically do not exist in the region, with the exception of just a
handful in Brazil (BOTAGARAY; TIFFIN, 2002). That much can be
easily accommodated within DDLAs conceptual framework.
Yet, a different path has been trod by democracy, implying
a complicated and tense disjunction in the subcontinents recent
history. Cardoso (2009: 304-08) recognizes that much, although
duly qualifying some aspects, such as problems with the rule of
law, and mistakenly framing others, especially the absence of
a democratic culture which does not need to be Protestant and
individualist, contrary to what his curious outburst of modernization
theory demands. A true 'molecular democratic revolution was
staged throughout Latin America, led by popular movements in the
762 Ci. & Trp., Recife, v. 35, n 2, p. 753-780, 2011
Revisiting dependency and development in Latin America.
1980s-1990s. It implied far reaching changes in political culture,
institution building, with shortcomings in particular in what concerns
the civil citizenship of the popular classes (albeit not with regard
to the property of the upper ones, for two centuries always safely
protected above anything else), popular participation, in a situation
of increasing social complexity, pluralism and a changed pattern of
social movements, they themselves also very pluralized (LVAREZ;
DAGNINO; ESCOBAR, 1998; AVRITZER, 2002; ODONNELL et
al., 2004; DOMINGUES, 2008, ch. 1). Cardoso glosses over these
developments and is wont to concentrate on one issue, which Ialsifes
this unique process of democratic development: the opposition of the
bad populists to the good global social democrats. In this way rather
right-wing, authoritarian governments, such as that of Colombia, also
disappear from view, with attacks focused only on the anachronistic
armed struggle of the countrys guerrilla forces.
Cardoso clearly draws upon the division oI the 'two leIts
crafted by Castaeda (2006). For this author, populists, like Chvez
and Morales, are backward, while modernizers such as the Chilean
socialists and democrats, as well as Lula, are the way forward. But this
characterization does not correspond to reality: the Latin American
leIt is much more diversifed and, besides, to lump Chavez and
Morales together, for instance, is to totally misunderstand different
processes, one based on the status apparatus in Venezuela (a sort
oI 'Cesarism oriented to the poor) and a Iar-reaching process oI
democratization from below carried out by social movements under
the leadership and infuence oI Bolivia`s indigenous population (a
point Munk, 2009, makes in a different way).
It is hard to see in what Evo Morales could be characterized
as a populist (DOMINGUES; GUIMARES; MOTA; PEREIRA
DA SILVA, 2009), let alone the vacuity of the concept, problematic
Ci. & Trp., Recife, v. 35, n 2, p. 753-780, 2011 763
Jos Maurcio Domingues
in the past and at best totally unspecifed today (at worst it may work
more as a term of abuse than an interpretive category). As to Lula,
Cardoso does speak oI populism, albeit in a milder way. It is diIfcult
to see how he could be classifed as a populist, by any means. It
is true that the Lula government has been, since his re-election,
changing course toward what some have been calling a 'new
developmentalism (BOSCHI; GAITN, 2008), which is in any
case still a Iar-cry in relation to what we can fnd in other areas oI the
planet, especially in China and the East Asian countries. If there are
no strong departures in economic policy, investment in science and
technology has grown, as noted above, and social policies supporting
the poor, especially the Bolsa Famlia, have led to a strengthening
of the internal market. New links with business and labor, as well
as with social movements more broadly, have been crafted as well
(PEDERSEN, 2008, p. 156). Whether this will come to confgure a
new policy pattern and a new developmentalism remains to be seen.
The social democracy issue could lead us Iar afeld and I do
not want to go in any depth in this regard. SuIfce to note that in
this specifc coordinates such a label is more likely to conIuse than
to enlighten. First due to its being based on that false distinction
between the 'two leIts; but also because the context, the social
bases and especially the policies of social democracy used to be
very different from what has been put in practice. This obtains
especially in relation to the focused social grants that have come
to characterize so much of Latin American welfare (HAGGARD;
KAUFMAN, 2008), as well as to a myriad of new questions, raised
by new social movements, which have been at the forefront of the
political agenda. We need indeed to look at such issues with fresh
eyes, but confronting then would lead us into a discussion also about
defnitions that cannot be carried out here.
764 Ci. & Trp., Recife, v. 35, n 2, p. 753-780, 2011
Revisiting dependency and development in Latin America.
Let me expand the argument by comparing Brazil and India
economically, countries which Evans (1995) and Kohli (2004), in
fact, due to their ideal-typical method, did not even recognize as
'developmental states, although the latter was more hopeIul that
a more capitalist-class oriented state could be emerging in the late
1990s in South Asia.
Both Brazil and India have important industrial infra-
structures. These were originally partly developed by the state.
The former was always much more open to transnational capital.
As is well-known, it has Iaced in particular enormous diIfculties
in building any sort of inroad into high-technological areas. The
latter has been much more closed and has banked much less on
transnational capital, with a state-based economic framework until
the present, but has been growing much faster. While other issues
may account for its recent high rates of growth, this has happened
also with the considerable impulse of its software and call-centre
sectors. II Brazil has Iound diIfcult to develop high-technology
areas, Indias software sector remains also tied mainly to the low-
value operations oI international business: its frms are to a great
extent basically subcontractors for foreign companies. Call-centers
limitations speak for themselves (DOMINGUES, 2008, ch. 2, 2012a;
Part II, 2012b; PEDERSEN, 2008, p. 94-7; LIMA, 2009). That is,
neither of them has been able to breakthrough to a position of control
over the main technologies and patterns of accumulation of the center
of the global capitalist system and their economy remains largely
underdeveloped in relation to those of the US, Europe and Japan.
India seems to be less dependent, but both remain frmly within the
semiperiphery, for the sort of production they are actually able to
accomplish, except for some more or less important niches they
manage to occupy, which are sometimes anecdotally presented as
Ci. & Trp., Recife, v. 35, n 2, p. 753-780, 2011 765
Jos Maurcio Domingues
proof of their achievements. While, as argued above, other countries
in Latin America embraced an involutionary path, with Mexico
being caught in the 'maquiladora trap, the other countries in the
South Asian region having remained mainly agrarian (Pakistan) or
developed only light industrialization (Bangladesh) (ZAIDI, 2004;
MILAM, 2009). They remain underdeveloped, dependent and
peripheral.
China poses more complex problems. Nolan (2004), for
instance, observed that China is in fact, despite its size, a backward,
underdeveloped country, increasingly dependent, and faces
tremendous challenges for its development. Others authors stress the
push for development of the Chinese economy, its build-up of more
sophisticated industrial products, as well as its embrace of network
forms of production, including alliances with transnationals, which
have been in the forefront of recent advanced economic developments
everywhere. This is true in particular in the information technology
industries, which Evans (1995, p. 7-11) pointed out as the sector from
which a 'conspiration Ior development might gather strength and
where the relative fortunes of Korea and Taiwan were made, indeed.
Others still stress Chinas great autonomy in relation in particular
to the US. Although development is now the key theme of Chinese
life, and Chinas present and future remain rather controversial, most
would not deny that it may become a main that is, a 'central
economy in the next decades, for some even dislocating the US as the
most powerful country in the world, which is likely to be a very far-
fetched view (NAUGHTON, 2007; ARRIGHI, 2007; MACNALLY,
2008; BRANDT; RAWSKI, 2008).
In contrast, other former socialist economies traverse the
opposite route. Russia, which world-system theorists have considered
in any case, as always, a semiperipheral country, has been stuck in
766 Ci. & Trp., Recife, v. 35, n 2, p. 753-780, 2011
Revisiting dependency and development in Latin America.
this rank, despite efforts to move forward: all indicators, especially,
it could be argued, its backwardness in terms of technological
innovation, bog it down in a less favourable position than its
leadership might desire (LANDE, 2009).
4
In Eastern Europe, in
turn, many differences emerged. Some countries, especially in the
Visegrad region (Hungary, Poland, Slovenia, the Check Republic),
managed to thrive to a considerable extent, becoming however
dependent on foreign corporations, seemingly advancing perhaps
close to a central position, in any case maintaining a semiperipheral
one. Most other countries, such as Estonia, have been turned into
big 'sweat shops and export-platIorms Ior transnationals aiming
at the West European market, with very little internal differentiation
(BOHLE; GRESKOVITS, 2007).
In all these cases of course path dependence counts a lot. The
situation in which these countries faced the new phase of capitalist
accumulation and, more generally, 'modernity, which begun
basically in the 1990s, namely, their degree of previous development,
as in fact indicated by Cardoso (2009, p. 300-315) as to Latin America,
has been crucial for their further development. In addition, however,
the internal coalitions, different political systems, how ruling groups
not only agree among themselves but also bring along the population
in a 'hegemonic project, cultural traits, the sum oI which result
then in their distinct options, is pivotal. It answers for what could
be called distinct and contingent 'modernizing moves (more or
less centered, that is, with a clearer or less clear intentionality and
direction course), which are responsible Ior the specifc Iorms and
4
Along with, but against too, Wallerstein, who stated that the semiperiphery is
merely a transitory position (to the center or the periphery), Lande, with reference
to Russia, stresses that it is also a fxed one. It would probably be better to look
at the issue in a more open perspective: the semiperiphery might be then seen as
usually very stable, but allowing for a lot of dynamic change.
Ci. & Trp., Recife, v. 35, n 2, p. 753-780, 2011 767
Jos Maurcio Domingues
contents that development or lack thereof has assumed in all of
them. China in particular seems to be taking advantage of a number
of propitious elements, but these have been politically mobilized,
even though its future remains open, due to its internal dynamic as
well as to its relations with the outside world.
Be that as it may, these new questions do not by any means turn
the framework of DDLA obsolete, although they require more subtlety
indeed, as Cardoso (2009, p. 296) himself demands, considerable
updating. This is true in both theoretical and methodological terms.
Very much heir to classical political economy, via the old ECLA,
and Marxism, that book was not really concerned with culture and
had not therefore properly made an argument against modernization
theory, nor sketched a different theoretical framework in this regard.
This may certainly be useful to analyze different developmental
paths, without 'culturalisms and, even less, essentialisms what
I have called modernizing moves above replacing the teleology of
modernization theory. Greater social complexity, due to internal
pluralism and globalizing pressures need to be dealt with too, since
they imply, for instance, different social movements and orientations
to consumption. More empirically, the global economic situation,
rules of global trade, investment and intellectual property, democracy
and social mediations between state and society, military power and
geopolitical issues, new social movements, human development
indexes and social policies, just to name a few, in and outside Latin
America, are topics to be tackled in a renewed analysis. In fact,
contemporary sociological, political and social theory in general
must be brought to bear on such a renewal.
However, DDLA is still a vigorous classic, which speaks to
the present, not merely as a good exemplar of social science, but as a
theoretical statement whose underlying social reality, unfortunately,
768 Ci. & Trp., Recife, v. 35, n 2, p. 753-780, 2011
Revisiting dependency and development in Latin America.
has not changed as much as its authors had hoped. New elements
in the debate about development must be also addressed, which
do not necessarily ft well within this sort oI theory as it exists at
present, without however losing sight of their main trust, that is,
inequality of wealth and power within and between nations, which is
the clear consequence of dependency, center-periphery relations and
underdevelopment, as well as unequal internal structures.
CONCLUSION
This article has proposed a broader reading of Cardoso
and Falettos 1969 classic, emphasizing some different aspects in
relation to the appraisal of one of its authors. That is just natural:
a book as important and rich as it is, albeit not very large, allows
for different readings and interpretive selections and weights.
Beyond that, DDLA, although usually absent from discussion about
development, appears as a very useful conceptual tool for analyzing
the contemporary, globalized world. Its main contributions must,
however, as I have tried to show, resuming Cardosos discussion
of Latin America, but also pointing to the situation of countries in
Asia and Eastern Europe, need to be recovered and more strongly
underlined. Political agency is important, but so is the 'structural-
historical analysis that the authors provide. In particular Latin
America, along with Africa, seems to be far from overcoming the
questions and problems that gave rise to dependency analysis and
specifcally DDLA. If internal questions must be addressed, it is
also true that the global environment for development must also be
challenged, agency returning to the fore, although very careful and
clever strategies must be mobilized to accomplish this task.
Ci. & Trp., Recife, v. 35, n 2, p. 753-780, 2011 769
Jos Maurcio Domingues
Democracy in Latin America at least has continuously
developed and this may lead to a new breakthrough, whatever
other paths to development may be found in other regions. It is
impossible to imagine that authoritarian states might be able today to
mobilize its populations towards this goal, probably the democratic
mobilization of its citizenry being the only way instead to resume
such sort of effort. In Brazil, at least development is becoming a
more debated issue, concentrating thoughts and energies across
political and ideological differences. Latin America may follow suit.
Once again, this classical book is may have an important role to play
in the debate.
Finally, a word on critique. DDLA and its counterparts in
dependency theory were very important for the development of
critique in Latin America, seeping into other critical approaches
elsewhere in the world. Two issues stand out here. The frst is that the
concept Cardoso and Faletto developed in the book, completed by
the idea of semiperiphery, are much more precise, although perhaps
less rhetorically eIIective, than the vague idea oI the 'global North
and the 'global South. Secondly, this is directly connected to the
unequal global power and unequal material conditions that featured
in the books description and conceptualization of Latin American
history, its present and futures prospects. This is so regardless of
some ambivalence about the meaning oI 'dependent development.
It may receive a more positive signal as just the beginning of current
'globalization (CARDOSO, 2009, p. 298-315) recent appraisal,
caveats about different possibilities for the several countries in
the world notwithstanding) or a more negative one, as for instance
especially in the 1979 'post scriptum, where they stated that
socialism alone was the solution to the issues at stake in the book
(DDLA, p. 216). How to escape the peripheral (or semiperipheral)
770 Ci. & Trp., Recife, v. 35, n 2, p. 753-780, 2011
Revisiting dependency and development in Latin America.
predicament they pointed out remains in any event very much a
question for Latin America and indeed the whole world. A basis
for a critique of modernity as it actually exists remains therefore
valid today as it was before, from a peripheral or semiperipheral
standpoint. After all freedom, equality, solidarity, and responsibility,
at the individual and the collective levels, along with the benefts
of material development, were at the heart of the modern project
(DOMINGUES, 2002, 2006). They seem to remain so as well as
inscribed in the contemporary conscience of the human species.
REFERENCES
LVAREZ, S. DAGNINO E. and Escobar A. Cultures of Politics,
Politics of Culture. Re-envisioning Latin American Social
Movements. Boulder, CO: Westview, 1998.
AMSDEN, A. H. The Rise of the Rest. Challenges to the West
from Late Industrializing Economies. New York: Oxford University
Press, 2001.
ARRIGHI, G. Adam Smith in Beijing. Lineages of the Twenty-First
Century. London: Verso, 2007.
AVRITZER, L. Democracy and the Public Space in Latin America.
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2002.
BOHLE, D.; GRESKOVITS, B. 'Neoliberalism, embedded
neoliberalism, and neocorporatism: paths towards transnational
Ci. & Trp., Recife, v. 35, n 2, p. 753-780, 2011 771
Jos Maurcio Domingues
capitalism in Central-Eastern Europe, West European Politics, vol.
30, 2007.
BOSCHI, R.; GAITN, F. A. 'Empresas, capacidades estales y
estrategias de desarrollo en Brasil, Argentina y Chile, Ponto de
vista, no. 3, 2008.
BOYER, R.; SAILLARD, Y. (eds) La Thorie de la regulacin.
LEtat des savoirs. Paris: La Dcouverte, 2000.
BOYER, R.; NEFFA, J. La economa argentina y sus crises (1976-
2001): visiones institucionalistas y regulacionistas. Buenos Aires:
Mio y Dvila, 2004.
BRANDT, L.; RAWSKI, T. G. Chinas Great Economic
Transformation. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008.
BOTARAGAY, I.; TIFFIN, S. 'Innovation clusters in Latin America,
in M. Heitor, D. Gibson, M. Ibarra (eds), Technology Policy and
Innovation, vol. 1. New York: Quorum Books, 2002.
CARDOSO, F. H. Industrial Elites, in S. M. Lipset and A. Solari
(eds), Elites in Latin America. New York: Oxford University Press,
1967.
CARDOSO, F. H. 'Teoria da dependncia ou analise concreta de
situaes de dependncia?, in O modelo poltico brasileiro. So
Paulo: Difel, 1975.
772 Ci. & Trp., Recife, v. 35, n 2, p. 753-780, 2011
Revisiting dependency and development in Latin America.
CARDOSO, F. H. 'New paths: globalization in historical
perspective, Studies in Comparative International Development,
vol. 44, 2009.
CARDOSO, F. H. and Faletto E. Dependency and Development
in Latin America. Berkeley: University of California Press, [1969]
1970.
CASTAEDA, C. J. 'Latin America`s LeIt Turn, Foreign Affairs,
may/june, 2006.
CASTELLS, M. The Network Society. The Information Era:
Economy, Society and Culture, vol. 1. Oxford: Blackwel, (1996)
2000.
DOMINGUES, J. M. Modernity Reconstructed. Cardiff: Wales
University Press, (2002) 2006.
DOMINGUES, J. M. 'O primeiro governo Lula. Um balano critico,
in Aproximaes Amrica Latina. Rio de Janeiro: Civilizao
Brasileira, 2007.
DOMINGUES, J. M. Latin America and Contemporary Modernity:
a Sociological Interpretation. New York and London: Routledge,
2008.
DOMINGUES, J. M. Modernity, Development and Contemporary
Civilization: towards a renewal of critical theory. New York and
London: Routledge, 2012a.
Ci. & Trp., Recife, v. 35, n 2, p. 753-780, 2011 773
Jos Maurcio Domingues
DOMINGUES, J. M. Desarrollo, periferia y semiperiferia en la
tercera fase de la modernidad global. Buenos Aires: CLACSO,
2012b.
DOMINGUES, J. M., Guimares A. S., Mota A. and Pereira da Silva
F. (eds), A Bolvia no espelho do futuro. Belo Horizonte: Editora
UFMG, 2009.
EVANS, P. Embedded Autonomy. States and Industrial
Transformation. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995.
EVANS, P. 'From situations oI dependency to globalized social
democracy, Studies in Comparative International Development,
vol. 44, 2009.
HAGGARD, S.; KAUFMAN, R. R. Development, Democracy and
Welfare State in Latin America, Asia, and Eastern Europe. Princeton,
NJ: Princeton University Press, 2008.
FRANK, A. G. Development and Underdevelopment in Latin
America. New York: Monthly Review, 1967.
KEOHANE, R. O. and NYE J. S. Power and Interdependence.
World Politics in Transition. Boston and Toronto: Little, Brown and
Co., 1977.
KOHLI, A. State-Directed Development. Political Power and
Industrialization in the Global Periphery. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2004.
774 Ci. & Trp., Recife, v. 35, n 2, p. 753-780, 2011
Revisiting dependency and development in Latin America.
KOHLI, A. 'Nationalism versus dependent capitalist development.
Alternative pathways of Asia and Latin America in a globalized
world, Studies in Comparative International Development, vol. 44,
2009.
LANDE, D. 'Global capitalism and the transIormation oI state
socialism, Studies in Comparative International Development, vol.
44, 2009.
LAUTIER, B.; MARQUES PEREIRA, J. Brsil, Mxique. Deux
Trajectoires dans la mondialisacin. Paris: Karthala, 2004.
LIMA, M. C. 'As tecnologias da inIormao e da comunicao e
o desenvolvimento: modelos brasileiro e indiano, in M. R. Soares
de Lima and M. Hirst (eds), Brasil, ndia e frica do Sul. Desejos e
oportunidades para novas parcerias.So Paulo: Paz e Terra, 2009.
MACNALLY, C. A. (ed.) Chinas Emergent Political Economy.
Capitalism in the Dragons Lair. New York and London: Routledge,
2008.
MILAM, W. B. Bangladesh and Pakistan. Flirting with Failure in
South Asia. London: Hurst & Co., 2009.
MORGENTHAU, H. J. Politics among Nations. The Struggle for
Power and Peace. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, (1949) 1967.
MUNK, G. L. 'Development and democracy in a globalized world.
Thinking about Latin America from within, Studies in Comparative
International Development, vol. 44, 2009.
Ci. & Trp., Recife, v. 35, n 2, p. 753-780, 2011 775
Jos Maurcio Domingues
NAUGHTON, B. The Chinese Economy. Transformation and
Growth. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2007.
NOLAN, P. China at the Crossroads. Cambridge: Polity, 2004.
ODONNELL, G. et al. La democracia en Amrica Latina. Hacia
una democracia de ciudadanos y ciudadanas. PNUD, 2004.
PECAUT, D. 'Sur la theorie de la dependence, Cahiers des
Ameriques Latines, no. 4, 1985.
PEDERSEN, J. D. Globalization, Development and the State. The
Performance of Brazil and India since 1990. Houdmills, Basingstoke
and New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008.
RICYT. El estado de la ciencia. Buenos Aires: RICYT, 2008
(http//:www.ricyt.edu.ar).
SERRA, J. Amrica Latina. Ensaios de interpretao econmica.
Rio de Janeiro: Paz e Terra, 1976.
WALLERSTEIN, I. The Modern World System. New York: Academic
Press, 3 vols., 1974, 1980, 1988.
ZAID, S. A. Pakistans Economic and Social Development. The
Domestic, Regional and Global Context. New Delhi: Rupa, 2004.
776 Ci. & Trp., Recife, v. 35, n 2, p. 753-780, 2011
Revisiting dependency and development in Latin America.
ABSTRACT
This article revisits the main thesis of Cardoso and Falettos classic Development
and Dependency in Latin America, confronting the re-evaluation Cardoso himself
has recently made of the book. It revises and updates some of its theses, relating
them to global changes, in variation also with Cardosos newly found perspective.
Development is thereby revisited in the third, contemporary phase of global
modernity. The article closes with a brief discussion of critical theory.
KEYWORDS: Cardoso. Development. Global changes. Latin America.
RESUMO
Este artigo revisita a principal tese de Cardoso e Faletto sobre o desenvolvimento e
dependncia clssicos na Amrica Latina, enfrentando a reavaliao recentemente
feita, de Cardoso, do livro. Ele revisa e atualiza algumas das suas teses, relacionando-
as s mudanas globais, em variao tambm com a perspectiva recm encontrada
pelo autor. O desenvolvimento revisita na terceira fase contempornea da
modernidade global. O artigo termina com uma breve discusso da teoria crtica.
PALAVRAS-CHAVE: Cardoso. Desenvolvimento. Mudanas globais. Amrica
Latina.