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The North and especially the Arctic have been a priority in Russian for-
eign policy since the early 2000s. This is due to many factors, above all a
stronger emphasis on the energy aspect of this policy. This includes
building export pipelines and implementing transport projects in north-
ern and northwestern Russia, ranging from the Baltic Pipeline System
(BPS), launched in 2001, to the Nord Stream gas pipeline, which will be
laid along the bottom of the Baltic Sea. I nterest in the Arctic increased
after the publication of reports about the enormous natural resource
potential of the region. Those reports sparked an unprecedented interest
in the region among the leading countries of the world, as well as among
major oil and gas companies, and caused Moscow to increase the pace
of delimiting the borders of its northern possessions.
Experts estimate oil and gas deposits in the Russian part of the Arc-
tic at 25 percent of the worlds hydrocarbon reserves (approximately 15.5
billion tons of oil and 84.5 trillion cubic meters of gas). At present, Rus-
sia is already extracting up to 90 percent of the nickel and cobalt in the
Arctic, 60 percent of the copper, 96 percent of platinoids and 100 per-
cent of apatite concentrate.
ARC T I C F E VE R
Expert estimates suggest that rapid climatic changes, which have affect-
ed the Arctic region as well, will make it possible to start geological
Labyrinths of the Arctic Policy
Russia Needs to Solve an Equation with Many Unknowns
Oleg Alexandrov
Oleg Alexandrov is an associate professor with the Department for I nternational Rela-
tions and Foreign Policy of Russia at the Moscow State I nstitute of I nternational Rela-
tions. He holds a Doctorate in Political Science.
RUSSI A I N GLOBAL AFFAI RS VOL. 7 No. 3 J ULY SEPTEMBER 2009 111
prospecting and commercial development of some areas already in 2020.
Simultaneously, it is becoming possible to further develop strategic trans-
port routes, of which the most promising ones include the Northern Sea
Route and cross-polar flights. Norway is more cautious in estimating the
prospects for the economic development of the Arctic. According to
Norwegian Foreign Minister J onas Gahr Stre, the Arctic Ocean could
be ice-free for a large part of the year by 2040, which would make it pos-
sible to open new transportation routes. At the same time, many ques-
tions will inevitably arise concerning sovereignty over these areas.
Yet the resumed demand for hydrocarbon resources has exacerbated
the problem of the international legal status of the Arctic and the need
to resolve long-standing territorial disputes and establish a multilateral
political dialogue among all the Arctic states Russia, the United
States, Canada, Norway and Denmark.
The institutional and legal structure of the Arctic region is still taking
shape. Back in 1996, Denmark, I celand, Norway, Sweden, Finland,
Russia, the U.S., Canada and several non-governmental organizations
established the Arctic Council. The Council has proved to be an impor-
tant platform for discussing key issues relating to the region and protect-
ing the unique Arctic environment. But politically it was overshadowed
for a long time by the Barents Euro-Arctic Council, as its activity was
largely limited to environmental issues and the Arctic countries did not
co-ordinate their policies.
Things changed in spring 2008 when the five countries that border
the Arctic Ocean Russia, Canada, the U.S., Norway and Denmark
met in I lulissat, Greenland, for the first international Arctic Ocean
Conference. I nterestingly, Arctic Council members that do not have
direct access to the Arctic were not invited to the conference.
The conference discussed Arctic climate change and its possible
impact on the Arctic ecosystem in light of the forthcoming development
of Arctic resources. The conference was held because of a Russian Arc-
tic expedition in 2007 that made a strong impression on surrounding
countries and which caused them to step up their own policies in the
region. Thus, the outgoing George W. Bush administration unveiled its
own Arctic doctrine in J anuary 2009 and expressed a desire to join the
UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (1982).
Labyrinths of the Arctic Policy
RUSSI A I N GLOBAL AFFAI RS VOL. 7 No. 3 J ULY SEPTEMBER 2009 112
The high conflict potential of the Arctic region is one of its main char-
acteristics. Disputes between Russia and the U.S. over the delimita-
tion of their Arctic possessions and economic zones in the Bering Sea
have still not been settled (Russia has not recognized the U.S.-Soviet
Maritime Boundary Agreement signed by Secretary of State J ames
Baker and Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze, and the
Russian parliament has not ratified it). Norway and some other states,
including Russia, have different views concerning the Svalbard
archipelago and the limits of an economic zone around it. There are
also unsettled territorial disputes between Canada and Denmark,
between Denmark and Russia, and between Russia and Canada.
Meanwhile, Canada and Denmark are actively drilling deep water
wells and mapping their Arctic sectors.
Against this background, the 2007 Russian Arctic expedition has
had a political and propagandistic effect rather than a scientific and
practical one, as Moscow has not yet started drilling wells in the
claimed Arctic sector nor begun drafting detailed maps. The troubled
political situation in the region has been exacerbated by Greenlands
plans to change its autonomous status within Denmark and seek polit-
ical independence. Broader self-government by Greenlanders rests on
a solid foundation as the government of Denmark has transferred to
Greenland the ownership of oil and other resources that may be pre-
sent in the Greenland shelf. Several Danish opposition parties have
protested the move.
Meanwhile, an increasing number of countries have said that they
have a right to participate in the division of the Arctic pie. I n the early
2000s, Britain came out with a surprise statement that only two
nations have the right to the Arctic Canada and Russia. Many ana-
lysts took this statement as Londons desire to get a piece of the Arc-
tic pie via Ottawa, which is an active member of the Commonwealth.
Finally, several countries that do not have direct access to the Arctic
can influence the course and results of the Arctic race via existing
international structures. For example, I celand, Sweden and Finland,
as member states of the Arctic Council, participate in the discussion
of long-term plans for the regions development.
Oleg Alexandrov
RUSSI A I N GLOBAL AFFAI RS VOL. 7 No. 3 J ULY SEPTEMBER 2009 113
P R E PAR I N G F OR BAT T L E
The division of the Arctic into national sectors began in 1909 when the
Canadian government declared its sovereignty over the territory between
the North Pole and mainland Canada. Soviet Russia followed suit and in
1926 it unilaterally demarcated the borders of its Arctic possessions,
which extended from Norways Svalbard in the west to the Bering Sea in
the east, and from the North Pole to the southern coasts of the Barents,
Kara, Laptev, East Siberian and Chukchi Seas. But that delimitation of
Arctic water areas did not apply to the continental shelf, as the bottom
of the Arctic seas was declared indivisible. I n 1997, Russia ratified the
1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, which later became a tan-
gible obstacle to its Arctic ambitions. From then on, Russia could claim
only a 200-mile economic zone which, in exceptional cases, could be
extended to 350 miles.
Russia opened a new chapter in its Arctic policy in 2001, when
Moscow made an official submission to the UN Commission on the
Limits of the Continental Shelf, asking that its continental shelf be
expanded to include 1.2 million square kilometers of Arctic territory.
Russia argued that the underwater Lomonosov and Mendeleev ridges
are extensions of the Eurasian continent (the Siberian Shelf). I f Russia
proves its claim, it could raise before UN experts the issue of extending
its influence to a Murmansk-Chukotka-North Pole triangle, which con-
tains enormous oil and natural gas deposits.
To substantiate its position, Moscow launched an Arctic expedition in
2007, during which two bathyscaphes, Mir-1 and Mir-2, took soil sam-
ples. In a symbolic gesture, Russian explorers planted the Russian nation-
al flag on the seabed below the North Pole. It was the symbolism of this
move that sparked angry reactions from other Arctic countries. Particular-
ly harsh criticism came from the Canadian foreign minister. An outraged
Peter MacKay said: This isnt the 15th century. You cant go around the
world and just plant flags and say Were claiming this territory.
Overall, the reaction of Western countries to Russias activity in the
Arctic ranged from indignant and alarmist (the U.S., Canada and Den-
mark) to restrained and pragmatic (Norway). I n response to the Russian
polar expedition, the government of Canada made several harsh state-
ments and decided to establish a permanent army reserve of about 100
Labyrinths of the Arctic Policy
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soldiers in Yellowknife, in northern Canada. The Canadian defense
minister said the reserve unit would cover an enormous amount of land
mass and they will also work closely with the Canadian Arctic Rangers.
The U.S. expressed surprise at the Russian expedition and
announced plans to build new icebreakers. A nervous reaction came
from Brussels. The EU High Representative for the Common Foreign
and Security Policy, J avier Solana, said in a March 2008 report that
European countries should prepare for conflicts with Russia over Arctic
energy resources. Norway was the only country that, in the person of its
military experts, expressed understanding of Russias motives and agreed
to a permanent deployment of an Arctic military force by Russia.
However, Norways former foreign minister, Thorvald Stoltenberg,
struck a somewhat different tone at a Nordic Council meeting in
February 2009, where he proposed setting up a joint Nordic deploy-
ment force within the framework of the Nordic Councils foreign and
defense policies. This force would ensure security in the Arctic region.
Nordic foreign ministers supported the Stoltenberg plan. The deploy-
ment group is expected to include well-trained and well-equipped Air
Force and Naval forces from Norway, Sweden and Denmark, which
will permanently patrol air and sea borders and monitor the Arctic.
J udging by this plan, Nordic Europe, along with the U.S. and Cana-
da, seems to see itself and Russia on different sides of the barricades
in the struggle for the Arctic. Thus, it calls into question prospects for
interaction between Russia and Nordic countries within the frame-
work of a renewed Northern Dimension policy. This project, launched
by Finland in the late 1990s, was conceived as a way to harmonize the
interests of countries in the region, with the European Union playing
the leading role.
The contraposition of rivalry for the Arctic versus cooperation with-
in the Northern Dimension frameworks only seems far-fetched at first
glance. The outwardly spontaneous nature of the Russian Arctic expedi-
tion raises the inevitable question about the coherence and integrity of
the northern vector of Russian foreign policy, if it should imply a com-
bination of three aspects Baltic and Northern European ones and the
Arctic aspect proper. The Northern Dimension, a recently renewed
regional format for interaction, intended to harmonize the interests of
Oleg Alexandrov
RUSSI A I N GLOBAL AFFAI RS VOL. 7 No. 3 J ULY SEPTEMBER 2009 115
the partners in this program the EU, Russia, Norway and I celand, can
unite these three aspects. The territorial frameworks of the Northern
Dimension go beyond the borders of the participating countries and
cover a large Arctic sector.
I n fact, the interests of only two Arctic countries Canada and the
United States remain outside the Northern Dimension initiative;
however, NATOs enlargement and the extension of its military and
political infrastructure to Nordic countries and the Baltics gives these
countries an additional opportunity to control political processes in the
Arctic region. For example, Reykjavik, I celand, hosted a seminar in
J anuary 2009 that was attended by NATO officials and which discussed
security prospects in the Arctic, the exploration of Arctic resources, and
the need for a proactive Arctic policy aimed at protecting the national
interests of Arctic states.
A NATO summit in Bucharest raised the issue of turning the Alliance
into an energy security instrument, which would reinforce the potential
role of the North Atlantic bloc in solving the Arctic puzzle. The U.S.
traditionally displayed the toughest approach among NATO members as
it made it clear that it would not remain an impartial observer to Russias
actions, which Washington views as a seizure. However, the U.S. has
limited possibilities for opposing Russias plans at the state level, as the
United States is the only Arctic country that has not signed and has not
ratified the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea.
R U SSI A S I N T E R E ST S
AN D OBST AC L E S I N T H E WAY
The consolidation of Russias claims to a large part of the Arctic shelf
may cause strife in Russias bilateral relations with other Arctic nations
and fuel a revision of some projects that are being implemented within
the frameworks of the Barents Euro-Arctic Council. For example, the
idea of joint development of the Northern Sea Route, codified in docu-
ments of this sub-regional forum, may result in the loss by Russia of part
of its sovereignty over this transport route. This refers, above all, to
Moscows ability to regulate legislatively the navigation regime in the
Arctic zone of Russian interests and in the immediate vicinity of Rus-
sias state borders.
Labyrinths of the Arctic Policy
RUSSI A I N GLOBAL AFFAI RS VOL. 7 No. 3 J ULY SEPTEMBER 2009 116
Obviously, the internationalization of Arctic areas located outside the
200-mile zone north of the Russian borders does not meet Russias
interests. The ratification by Russia of the UN Convention on the Law
of the Sea in 1997 and, especially, its use for the international legal reg-
ulation of actions by states in respect of Arctic territories, in particular
for identifying the borders of national Arctic sectors, looks rather
ambiguous in this context. I t would be useful therefore to study the
Canadian experience of fixing the boundaries of the countrys Arctic
sector, which was done on the basis of national legislation. The Russian
authorities could use the Canadian experience as a precedent in the
event of similar actions.
A similar situation is taking shape with regard to the Nord Stream
project. More and more of Russias partners in the Northern Dimension
have been joining the opponents of this Russian-German energy project.
Sweden, Poland, Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia have declared their open
opposition to Nord Stream. Swedish experts argue that the project,
which is intended to diversify energy supplies to the European market, is
threatening regional stability in the Baltic Sea region, is sowing discord
among Europeans, strengthening the positions of an authoritarian
Russia, and reducing the Baltic States opportunity to participate in
ensuring the security of the Northern Dimension region. Moscow will
hardly agree with this assessment of its policy in the region. However,
Russia is finding it increasingly difficult to reach a compromise with its
Western partners on both Arctic and energy security issues.
The situation is worsening as Brussels and Washington are becom-
ing new centers of decision-making with respect to the Northern
region. Russia reacts nervously to discussions about the possible
admission of Sweden and Finland to NATO, realizing that the lack of
consensus within the Northern Dimension frameworks on a wide
range of military-political issues will also impede economic coopera-
tion in Northern Europe. This, in turn, will create an undesirable sit-
uation in the context of disputes over Arctic resources, since all the
countries in the region, except for Russia, will be integrated into
European and Euro-Atlantic structures.
Despite having the status of a Northern power and partnership with-
in the frameworks of the renewed Northern Dimension, Russia remains
Oleg Alexandrov
RUSSI A I N GLOBAL AFFAI RS VOL. 7 No. 3 J ULY SEPTEMBER 2009 117
a largely non-regional actor with regard to Northern Europe and the
Baltic region due to its weak interaction with the European Union and
NATO, which oversee economic and military-political processes in the
region. The position of a non-regional actor offers some advantages, the
main one is that Russias hands are not tied and it can conduct a flexible
multi-vector policy and form alliances with other interested parties.
However, this status implies limitations as well, first of all the need to
promote ones interests on ones own, without support from regional
countries. Earlier, Russia already had to uphold the expediency of the
construction of new port facilities on the Baltic coast at the Council of
the Baltic Sea States, and to discuss with EU candidates possible solu-
tions to the problem of transit to the Kaliningrad region.
The creation of a regional security system, such as a Baltic Union,
would help to consolidate Russias positions in Northern Europe and in
the Arctic, as this system could be a prototype for a new, co-operative
security system in Europe. Discussions about the possible admission of
Sweden and Finland to NATO, actively encouraged by Washington,
mark the opposite trend. Sweden fully sided with the U.S. and shared the
latters assessments of the August 2008 events in Georgia and South
Ossetia. Swedish Foreign Minister Carl Bildt condemned Russias
recognition of the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia and
compared its actions to protect peacekeepers and Russian citizens living
in South Ossetia to the occupation of Czechoslovakia by Hitler in 1938-
1939. Earlier, Russian-Swedish relations became strained after Stock-
holm refused to extradite to Moscow several people suspected of terror-
ist activities in Russia.
At the height of the Arctic boom in September 2008, Russian Pres-
ident Dmitry Medvedev instructed the Russian Security Council to turn
the Arctic into a resource base of Russia and to fix the borders of Rus-
sias continental shelf as soon as possible. At the same meeting, the
Security Council approved the Fundamentals of the State Policy of Russia
in the Arctic in the Period Until 2020 and Beyondand announced Russias
plans to resubmit a claim to expand its continental shelf with the UN
Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf in 2010. Russian
General Vladimir Shamanov reiterated the Russian Armed Forces
readiness to ensure the protection of the claimed Arctic sector. Plans
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RUSSI A I N GLOBAL AFFAI RS VOL. 7 No. 3 J ULY SEPTEMBER 2009 118
were announced to set up an Arctic military force based on units of the
Leningrad, Siberian and Far Eastern military districts.
These developments inevitably bring up the issue of a future devel-
opment model for this vast region, its new geographical boundaries
and international legal status, and the need for a multilateral consen-
sus and the search for adequate ways to govern those vast territories. All
these factors sow uncertainty with regard to the renewed Northern
Dimension and serve as a test for the Northern vector of Russias
policy in new geopolitical realities. The economic crisis has already
caused Russia to amend and partially suspend its plans. I n particular,
the filing of the Russian application concerning new outer limits for its
continental shelf has been postponed until 2012; geological prospect-
ing in the Arctic has been frozen; and the deployment of an Arctic mil-
itary group is still a dim prospect.
Therefore, building the Northern vector of Russias policy is a
problem with many unknowns. Depending on changes in the situation
in the region, Russia may either try to fully integrate into a multilateral
cooperation system, which is being created in the region on the basis of
the renewed Northern Dimension, the Arctic Council or other institu-
tional structures, or put an emphasis on selective cooperation, presup-
posing the solution of the most acute problems on a bilateral basis.
Sooner or later, Russia will have to choose its priorities for the North-
ern vector of its policy and find a way out of the Arctic labyrinth.
Oleg Alexandrov