1.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 118978 May 23, 1997
PHILIPPINE TELEGRAPH AND TELEPHONE COMPANY, * petitioner,
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and GRACE DE GUZMAN,
respondents.
REGALADO, J .:
Seeking relief through the extraordinary writ of certiorari, petitioner Philippine
Telegraph and Telephone Company (hereafter, PT & T) invokes the alleged
concealment of civil status and defalcation of company funds as grounds to
terminate the services of an employee. That employee, herein private respondent
Grace de Guzman, contrarily argues that what really motivated PT & T to
terminate her services was her having contracted marriage during her
employment, which is prohibited by petitioner in its company policies. She thus
claims that she was discriminated against in gross violation of law, such a
proscription by an employer being outlawed by Article 136 of the Labor Code.
Grace de Guzman was initially hired by petitioner as a reliever, specifically as a
"Supernumerary Project Worker," for a fixed period from November 21, 1990 until
April 20, 1991 vice one C.F. Tenorio who went on maternity leave.
1
Under the
Reliever Agreement which she signed with Petitioner Company, her employment
was to be immediately terminated upon expiration of the agreed period.
Thereafter, from June 10, 1991 to July 1, 1991, and from July 19, 1991 to August
8, 1991, private respondent's services as reliever were again engaged by
petitioner, this time in replacement of one Erlinda F. Dizon who went on leave
during both periods.
2
After August 8, 1991, and pursuant to their Reliever
Agreement, her services were terminated.
On September 2, 1991, private respondent was once more asked to join
Petitioner Company as a probationary employee, the probationary period to
cover 150 days. In the job application form that was furnished her to be filled up
for the purpose, she indicated in the portion for civil status therein that she was
single although she had contracted marriage a few months earlier, that is, on
May 26, 1991.
3

It now appears that private respondent had made the same representation in the
two successive reliever agreements which she signed on June 10, 1991 and July
8, 1991. When petitioner supposedly learned about the same later, its branch
supervisor in Baguio City, Delia M. Oficial, sent to private respondent a
memorandum dated January 15, 1992 requiring her to explain the discrepancy.
In that memorandum, she was reminded about the company's policy of not
accepting married women for employment.
4

In her reply letter dated January 17, 1992, private respondent stated that she
was not aware of PT&T's policy regarding married women at the time, and that all
along she had not deliberately hidden her true civil status.
5
Petitioner
nonetheless remained unconvinced by her explanations. Private respondent was
dismissed from the company effective January 29, 1992,
6
which she readily
contested by initiating a complaint for illegal dismissal, coupled with a claim for
non-payment of cost of living allowances (COLA), before the Regional Arbitration
Branch of the National Labor Relations Commission in Baguio City.
At the preliminary conference conducted in connection therewith, private
respondent volunteered the information, and this was incorporated in the
stipulation of facts between the parties, that she had failed to remit the amount of
P2, 380.75 of her collections. She then executed a promissory note for that
amount in favor of petitioner
7
. All of these took place in a formal proceeding and
with the agreement of the parties and/or their counsel.
On November 23, 1993, Labor Arbiter Irenarco R. Rimando handed down a
decision declaring that private respondent, who had already gained the status of
a regular employee, was illegally dismissed by petitioner. Her reinstatement, plus
payment of the corresponding back wages and COLA, was correspondingly
ordered, the labor arbiter being of the firmly expressed view that the ground
relied upon by petitioner in dismissing private respondent was clearly insufficient,
and that it was apparent that she had been discriminated against on account of
her having contracted marriage in violation of company rules.
On appeal to the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), said public
respondent upheld the labor arbiter and, in its decision dated April 29, 1994, it
ruled that private respondent had indeed been the subject of an unjust and
unlawful discrimination by her employer, PT & T. However, the decision of the
labor arbiter was modified with the qualification that Grace de Guzman deserved
to be suspended for three months in view of the dishonest nature of her acts
which should not be condoned. In all other respects, the NLRC affirmed the
decision of the labor arbiter, including the order for the reinstatement of private
respondent in her employment with PT & T.
The subsequent motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner was rebuffed by
respondent NLRC in its resolution of November 9, 1994, hence this special civil
action assailing the aforestated decisions of the labor arbiter and respondent
NLRC, as well as the denial resolution of the latter.
1. Decreed in the Bible itself is the universal norm that women should be
regarded with love and respect but, through the ages, men have responded to
that injunction with indifference, on the hubristic conceit that women constitute
the inferior sex. Nowhere has that prejudice against womankind been so
pervasive as in the field of labor, especially on the matter of equal employment
opportunities and standards. In the Philippine setting, women have traditionally
been considered as falling within the vulnerable groups or types of workers who
must be safeguarded with preventive and remedial social legislation against
discriminatory and exploitative practices in hiring, training, benefits, promotion
and retention.
The Constitution, cognizant of the disparity in rights between men and women in
almost all phases of social and political life, provides a gamut of protective
provisions. To cite a few of the primordial ones, Section 14, Article II
8
on the
Declaration of Principles and State Policies, expressly recognizes the role of
women in nation-building and commands the State to ensure, at all times, the
fundamental equality before the law of women and men. Corollary thereto,
Section 3 of Article XIII
9
(the progenitor whereof dates back to both the 1935 and
1973 Constitution) pointedly requires the State to afford full protection to labor
and to promote full employment and equality of employment opportunities for all,
including an assurance of entitlement to tenurial security of all workers. Similarly,
Section 14 of Article XIII
10
mandates that the State shall protect working women
through provisions for opportunities that would enable them to reach their full
potential.
2. Corrective labor and social laws on gender inequality have emerged with more
frequency in the years since the Labor Code was enacted on May 1, 1974 as
Presidential Decree No. 442, largely due to our country's commitment as a
signatory to the United Nations Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW).
11

Principal among these laws are Republic Act No. 6727
12
which explicitly
prohibits discrimination against women with respect to terms and conditions of
employment, promotion, and training opportunities; Republic Act No. 6955
13

which bans the "mail-order-bride" practice for a fee and the export of female
labor to countries that cannot guarantee protection to the rights of women
workers; Republic Act No. 7192
14
also known as the "Women in Development
and Nation Building Act," which affords women equal opportunities with men to
act and to enter into contracts, and for appointment, admission, training,
graduation, and commissioning in all military or similar schools of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine National Police; Republic Act No.
7322
15
increasing the maternity benefits granted to women in the private sector;
Republic Act No. 7877
16
which outlaws and punishes sexual harassment in the
workplace and in the education and training environment; and Republic Act No.
8042,
17
or the "Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995," which
prescribes as a matter of policy, inter alia, the deployment of migrant workers,
with emphasis on women, only in countries where their rights are secure.
Likewise, it would not be amiss to point out that in the Family Code,
18
women's
rights in the field of civil law have been greatly enhanced and expanded.
In the Labor Code, provisions governing the rights of women workers are found
in Articles 130 to 138 thereof. Article 130 involves the right against particular
kinds of night work while Article 132 ensures the right of women to be provided
with facilities and standards which the Secretary of Labor may establish to
ensure their health and safety. For purposes of labor and social legislation, a
woman working in a nightclub, cocktail lounge, massage clinic, bar or other
similar establishments shall be considered as an employee under Article 138.
Article 135, on the other hand, recognizes a woman's right against discrimination
with respect to terms and conditions of employment on account simply of sex.
Finally, and this brings us to the issue at hand, Article 136 explicitly prohibits
discrimination merely by reason of the marriage of a female employee.
3. Acknowledged as paramount in the due process scheme is the constitutional
guarantee of protection to labor and security of tenure. Thus, an employer is
required, as a condition sine qua non prior to severance of the employment ties
of an individual under his employ, to convincingly establish, through substantial
evidence, the existence of a valid and just cause in dispensing with the services
of such employee, one's labor being regarded as constitutionally protected
property.
On the other hand, it is recognized that regulation of manpower by the company
falls within the so-called management prerogatives, which prescriptions
encompass the matter of hiring, supervision of workers, work assignments,
working methods and assignments, as well as regulations on the transfer of
employees, lay-off of workers, and the discipline, dismissal, and recall of
employees.
19
As put in a case, an employer is free to regulate, according to his
discretion and best business judgment, all aspects of employment, "from hiring to
firing," except in cases of unlawful discrimination or those which may be provided
by law.
20

In the case at bar, petitioner's policy of not accepting or considering as
disqualified from work any woman worker who contracts marriage runs afoul of
the test of, and the right against, discrimination, afforded all women workers by
our labor laws and by no less than the Constitution. Contrary to petitioner's
assertion that it dismissed private respondent from employment on account of
her dishonesty, the record discloses clearly that her ties with the company were
dissolved principally because of the company's policy that married women are
not qualified for employment in PT & T, and not merely because of her supposed
acts of dishonesty.
That it was so can easily be seen from the memorandum sent to private
respondent by Delia M. Oficial, the branch supervisor of the company, with the
reminder, in the words of the latter, that "you're fully aware that the company is
not accepting married women employee (sic), as it was verbally instructed to
you."
21
Again, in the termination notice sent to her by the same branch
supervisor, private respondent was made to understand that her severance from
the service was not only by reason of her concealment of her married status but,
over and on top of that, was her violation of the company's policy against
marriage ("and even told you that married women employees are not applicable
[sic] or accepted in our company.")
22
Parenthetically, this seems to be the
curious reason why it was made to appear in the initiatory pleadings that
petitioner was represented in this case only by its said supervisor and not by its
highest ranking officers who would otherwise be solidarily liable with the
corporation.
23

Verily, private respondent's act of concealing the true nature of her status from
PT & T could not be properly characterized as willful or in bad faith as she was
moved to act the way she did mainly because she wanted to retain a permanent
job in a stable company. In other words, she was practically forced by that very
same illegal company policy into misrepresenting her civil status for fear of being
disqualified from work. While loss of confidence is a just cause for termination of
employment, it should not be simulated.
24
It must rest on an actual breach of
duty committed by the employee and not on the employer's caprices.
25

Furthermore, it should never be used as a subterfuge for causes which are
improper, illegal, or unjustified.
26

In the present controversy, petitioner's expostulations that it dismissed private
respondent, not because the latter got married but because she concealed that
fact, does have a hollow ring. Her concealment, so it is claimed, bespeaks
dishonesty hence the consequent loss of confidence in her which justified her
dismissal.
Petitioner would asseverate, therefore, that while it has nothing against marriage,
it nonetheless takes umbrage over the concealment of that fact. This improbable
reasoning, with interstitial distinctions, perturbs the Court since private
respondent may well be minded to claim that the imputation of dishonesty should
be the other way around.
Petitioner would have the Court believe that although private respondent defied
its policy against its female employees contracting marriage, what could be an
act of insubordination was inconsequential. What it submits as unforgivable is her
concealment of that marriage yet, at the same time, declaring that marriage as a
trivial matter to which it supposedly has no objection. In other words, PT & T says
it gives its blessings to its female employees contracting marriage, despite the
maternity leaves and other benefits it would consequently respond for and which
obviously it would have wanted to avoid. If that employee confesses such fact of
marriage, there will be no sanction; but if such employee conceals the same
instead of proceeding to the confessional, she will be dismissed. This line of
reasoning does not impress us as reflecting its true management policy or that
we are being regaled with responsible advocacy.
This Court should be spared the ennui of strained reasoning and the tedium of
propositions which confuse through less than candid arguments. Indeed,
petitioner glosses over the fact that it was its unlawful policy against married
women, both on the aspects of qualification and retention, which compelled
private respondent to conceal her supervenient marriage. It was, however, that
very policy alone which was the cause of private respondent's secretive conduct
now complained of. It is then apropos to recall the familiar saying that he who is
the cause of the cause is the cause of the evil caused.
Finally, petitioner's collateral insistence on the admission of private respondent
that she supposedly misappropriated company funds, as an additional ground to
dismiss her from employment, is somewhat insincere and self-serving.
Concededly, private respondent admitted in the course of the proceedings that
she failed to remit some of her collections, but that is an altogether different
story. The fact is that she was dismissed solely because of her concealment of
her marital status, and not on the basis of that supposed defalcation of company
funds. That the labor arbiter would thus consider petitioner's submissions on this
supposed dishonesty as a mere afterthought, just to bolster its case for
dismissal, is a perceptive conclusion born of experience in labor cases. For,
there was no showing that private respondent deliberately misappropriated the
amount or whether her failure to remit the same was through negligence and, if
so, whether the negligence was in nature simple or grave. In fact, it was merely
agreed that private respondent execute a promissory note to refund the same,
which she did, and the matter was deemed settled as a peripheral issue in the
labor case.
Private respondent, it must be observed, had gained regular status at the time of
her dismissal. When she was served her walking papers on January 29, 1992,
she was about to complete the probationary period of 150 days as she was
contracted as a probationary employee on September 2, 1991. That her
dismissal would be effected just when her probationary period was winding down
clearly raises the plausible conclusion that it was done in order to prevent her
from earning security of tenure.
27
On the other hand, her earlier stints with the
company as reliever were undoubtedly those of a regular employee, even if the
same were for fixed periods, as she performed activities which were essential or
necessary in the usual trade and business of PT & T.
28
The primary standard of
determining regular employment is the reasonable connection between the
activity performed by the employee in relation to the business or trade of the
employer.
29

As an employee who had therefore gained regular status, and as she had been
dismissed without just cause, she is entitled to reinstatement without loss of
seniority rights and other privileges and to full back wages, inclusive of
allowances and other benefits or their monetary equivalent.
30
However, as she
had undeniably committed an act of dishonesty in concealing her status, albeit
under the compulsion of an unlawful imposition of petitioner, the three-month
suspension imposed by respondent NLRC must be upheld to obviate the
impression or inference that such act should be condoned. It would be unfair to
the employer if she were to return to its fold without any sanction whatsoever for
her act which was not totally justified. Thus, her entitlement to back wages, which
shall be computed from the time her compensation was withheld up to the time of
her actual reinstatement, shall be reduced by deducting therefrom the amount
corresponding to her three months suspension.
4. The government, to repeat, abhors any stipulation or policy in the nature of
that adopted by petitioner PT & T. The Labor Code state, in no uncertain terms,
as follows:
Art. 136. Stipulation against marriage. It shall be unlawful for an
employer to require as a condition of employment or continuation of
employment that a woman shall not get married, or to stipulate expressly
or tacitly that upon getting married, a woman employee shall be deemed
resigned or separated, or to actually dismiss, discharge, discriminate or
otherwise prejudice a woman employee merely by reason of marriage.
This provision had a studied history for its origin can be traced to Section 8 of
Presidential Decree No. 148,
31
better known as the "Women and
Child Labor Law," which amended paragraph (c), Section 12 of Republic Act No.
679,
32
entitled "An Act to Regulate the Employment of Women and Children, to
Provide Penalties for Violations Thereof, and for Other Purposes." The
forerunner to Republic Act No. 679, on the other hand, was Act No. 3071 which
became law on March 16, 1923 and which regulated the employment of women
and children in shops, factories, industrial, agricultural, and mercantile
establishments and other places of labor in the then Philippine Islands.
It would be worthwhile to reflect upon and adopt here the rationalization in
Zialcita, et al. vs. Philippine Air Lines,
33
a decision that emanated from the Office
of the President. There, a policy of Philippine Air Lines requiring that prospective
flight attendants must be single and that they will be automatically separated
from the service once they marry was declared void, it being violative of the clear
mandate in Article 136 of the Labor Code with regard to discrimination against
married women. Thus:
Of first impression is the incompatibility of the respondent's policy or
regulation with the codal provision of law. Respondent is resolute in its
contention that Article 136 of the Labor Code applies only to women
employed in ordinary occupations and that the prohibition against marriage
of women engaged in extraordinary occupations, like flight attendants, is
fair and reasonable, considering the pecularities of their chosen
profession.
We cannot subscribe to the line of reasoning pursued by respondent. All
along, it knew that the controverted policy has already met its doom as
early as March 13, 1973 when Presidential Decree No. 148, otherwise
known as the Women and Child Labor Law, was promulgated. But for the
timidity of those affected or their labor unions in challenging the validity of
the policy, the same was able to obtain a momentary reprieve. A close look
at Section 8 of said decree, which amended paragraph (c) of Section 12 of
Republic Act No. 679, reveals that it is exactly the same provision
reproduced verbatim in Article 136 of the Labor Code, which was
promulgated on May 1, 1974 to take effect six (6) months later, or on
November 1, 1974.
It cannot be gainsaid that, with the reiteration of the same provision in the
new Labor Code, all policies and acts against it are deemed illegal and
therefore abrogated. True, Article 132 enjoins the Secretary of Labor to
establish standards that will ensure the safety and health of women
employees and in appropriate cases shall by regulation require employers
to determine appropriate minimum standards for termination in special
occupations, such as those of flight attendants, but that is precisely the
factor that militates against the policy of respondent. The standards have
not yet been established as set forth in the first paragraph, nor has the
Secretary of Labor issued any regulation affecting flight attendants.
It is logical to presume that, in the absence of said standards or regulations
which are as yet to be established, the policy of respondent against
marriage is patently illegal. This finds support in Section 9 of the New
Constitution, which provides:
Sec. 9. The State shall afford protection to labor, promote full employment
and equality in employment, ensure equal work opportunities regardless of
sex, race, or creed, and regulate the relations between workers and
employees. The State shall assure the rights of workers to self-
organization, collective bargaining, security of tenure, and just and humane
conditions of work . . . .
Moreover, we cannot agree to the respondent's proposition that
termination from employment of flight attendants on account of marriage is
a fair and reasonable standard designed for their own health, safety,
protection and welfare, as no basis has been laid therefor. Actually,
respondent claims that its concern is not so much against the continued
employment of the flight attendant merely by reason of marriage as
observed by the Secretary of Labor, but rather on the consequence of
marriage-pregnancy. Respondent discussed at length in the instant appeal
the supposed ill effects of pregnancy on flight attendants in the course of
their employment. We feel that this needs no further discussion as it had
been adequately explained by the Secretary of Labor in his decision of
May 2, 1976.
In a vain attempt to give meaning to its position, respondent went as far as
invoking the provisions of Articles 52 and 216 of the New Civil Code on the
preservation of marriage as an inviolable social institution and the family as
a basic social institution, respectively, as bases for its policy of non-
marriage. In both instances, respondent predicates absence of a flight
attendant from her home for long periods of time as contributory to an
unhappy married life. This is pure conjecture not based on actual
conditions, considering that, in this modern world, sophisticated technology
has narrowed the distance from one place to another. Moreover,
respondent overlooked the fact that married flight attendants can program
their lives to adapt to prevailing circumstances and events.
Article 136 is not intended to apply only to women employed in ordinary
occupations, or it should have categorically expressed so. The sweeping
intendment of the law, be it on special or ordinary occupations, is reflected
in the whole text and supported by Article 135 that speaks of non-
discrimination on the employment of women.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals in Gualberto, et al. vs. Marinduque Mining
& Industrial Corporation
34
considered as void a policy of the same nature. In said
case, respondent, in dismissing from the service the complainant, invoked a
policy of the firm to consider female employees in the project it was undertaking
as separated the moment they get married due to lack of facilities for married
women. Respondent further claimed that complainant was employed in the
project with an oral understanding that her services would be terminated when
she gets married. Branding the policy of the employer as an example of
"discriminatory chauvinism" tantamount to denying equal employment
opportunities to women simply on account of their sex, the appellate court struck
down said employer policy as unlawful in view of its repugnance to the Civil
Code, Presidential Decree No. 148 and the Constitution.
Under American jurisprudence, job requirements which establish employer
preference or conditions relating to the marital status of an employee are
categorized as a "sex-plus" discrimination where it is imposed on one sex and
not on the other. Further, the same should be evenly applied and must not inflict
adverse effects on a racial or sexual group which is protected by federal job
discrimination laws. Employment rules that forbid or restrict the employment of
married women, but do not apply to married men, have been held to violate Title
VII of the United States Civil Rights Act of 1964, the main federal statute
prohibiting job discrimination against employees and applicants on the basis of,
among other things, sex.
35

Further, it is not relevant that the rule is not directed against all women but just
against married women. And, where the employer discriminates against married
women, but not against married men, the variable is sex and the discrimination is
unlawful.
36
Upon the other hand, a requirement that a woman employee must
remain unmarried could be justified as a "bona fide occupational qualification," or
BFOQ, where the particular requirements of the job would justify the same, but
not on the ground of a general principle, such as the desirability of spreading
work in the workplace. A requirement of that nature would be valid provided it
reflects an inherent quality reasonably necessary for satisfactory job
performance. Thus, in one case, a no-marriage rule applicable to both male and
female flight attendants, was regarded as unlawful since the restriction was not
related to the job performance of the flight attendants.
37

5. Petitioner's policy is not only in derogation of the provisions of Article 136 of
the Labor Code on the right of a woman to be free from any kind of stipulation
against marriage in connection with her employment, but it likewise assaults
good morals and public policy, tending as it does to deprive a woman of the
freedom to choose her status, a privilege that by all accounts inheres in the
individual as an intangible and inalienable right.
38
Hence, while it is true that the
parties to a contract may establish any agreements, terms, and conditions that
they may deem convenient, the same should not be contrary to law, morals,
good customs, public order, or public policy.
39
Carried to its logical
consequences, it may even be said that petitioner's policy against legitimate
marital bonds would encourage illicit or common-law relations and subvert the
sacrament of marriage.
Parenthetically, the Civil Code provisions on the contract of labor state that the
relations between the parties, that is, of capital and labor, are not merely
contractual, impressed as they are with so much public interest that the same
should yield to the common good.
40
It goes on to intone that neither capital nor
labor should visit acts of oppression against the other, nor impair the interest or
convenience of the public.
41
In the final reckoning, the danger of just such a
policy against marriage followed by petitioner PT & T is that it strikes at the very
essence, ideals and purpose of marriage as an inviolable social institution and,
ultimately, of the family as the foundation of the nation.
42
That it must be
effectively interdicted here in all its indirect, disguised or dissembled forms as
discriminatory conduct derogatory of the laws of the land is not only in order but
imperatively required.
ON THE FOREGOING PREMISES, the petition of Philippine Telegraph and
Telephone Company is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit, with double costs
against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Romero, Puno, Mendoza and Torres, Jr., JJ., concur.






2. Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 164774 April 12, 2006
STAR PAPER CORPORATION, JOSEPHINE ONGSITCO & SEBASTIAN
CHUA, Petitioners,
vs.
RONALDO D. SIMBOL, WILFREDA N. COMIA & LORNA E. ESTRELLA,
Respondents.
D E C I S I O N
PUNO, J .:
We are called to decide an issue of first impression: whether the policy of the
employer banning spouses from working in the same company violates the rights
of the employee under the Constitution and the Labor Code or is a valid exercise
of management prerogative.
At bar is a Petition for Review on Certiorari of the Decision of the Court of
Appeals dated August 3, 2004 in CA-G.R. SP No. 73477 reversing the decision
of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) which affirmed the ruling of
the Labor Arbiter.
Petitioner Star Paper Corporation (the company) is a corporation engaged in
trading principally of paper products. Josephine Ongsitco is its Manager of the
Personnel and Administration Department while Sebastian Chua is its Managing
Director.
The evidence for the petitioners show that respondents Ronaldo D. Simbol
(Simbol), Wilfreda N. Comia (Comia) and Lorna E. Estrella (Estrella) were all
regular employees of the company.
1

Simbol was employed by the company on October 27, 1993. He met Alma Dayrit,
also an employee of the company, whom he married on June 27, 1998. Prior to
the marriage, Ongsitco advised the couple that should they decide to get
married, one of them should resign pursuant to a company policy promulgated in
1995,
2
viz.:
1. New applicants will not be allowed to be hired if in case he/she has [a]
relative, up to [the] 3rd degree of relationship, already employed by the
company.
2. In case of two of our employees (both singles [sic], one male and
another female) developed a friendly relationship during the course of their
employment and then decided to get married, one of them should resign to
preserve the policy stated above.
3

Simbol resigned on June 20, 1998 pursuant to the company policy.
4

Comia was hired by the company on February 5, 1997. She met Howard Comia,
a co-employee, whom she married on June 1, 2000. Ongsitco likewise reminded
them that pursuant to company policy, one must resign should they decide to get
married. Comia resigned on June 30, 2000.
5

Estrella was hired on July 29, 1994. She met Luisito Zuiga (Zuiga), also a co-
worker. Petitioners stated that Zuiga, a married man, got Estrella pregnant. The
company allegedly could have terminated her services due to immorality but she
opted to resign on December 21, 1999.
6

The respondents each signed a Release and Confirmation Agreement. They
stated therein that they have no money and property accountabilities in the
company and that they release the latter of any claim or demand of whatever
nature.
7

Respondents offer a different version of their dismissal. Simbol and Comia allege
that they did not resign voluntarily; they were compelled to resign in view of an
illegal company policy. As to respondent Estrella, she alleges that she had a
relationship with co-worker Zuiga who misrepresented himself as a married but
separated man. After he got her pregnant, she discovered that he was not
separated. Thus, she severed her relationship with him to avoid dismissal due to
the company policy. On November 30, 1999, she met an accident and was
advised by the doctor at the Orthopedic Hospital to recuperate for twenty-one
(21) days. She returned to work on December 21, 1999 but she found out that
her name was on-hold at the gate. She was denied entry. She was directed to
proceed to the personnel office where one of the staff handed her a
memorandum. The memorandum stated that she was being dismissed for
immoral conduct. She refused to sign the memorandum because she was on
leave for twenty-one (21) days and has not been given a chance to explain. The
management asked her to write an explanation. However, after submission of the
explanation, she was nonetheless dismissed by the company. Due to her urgent
need for money, she later submitted a letter of resignation in exchange for her
thirteenth month pay.
8

Respondents later filed a complaint for unfair labor practice, constructive
dismissal, separation pay and attorneys fees. They averred that the
aforementioned company policy is illegal and contravenes Article 136 of the
Labor Code. They also contended that they were dismissed due to their union
membership.
On May 31, 2001, Labor Arbiter Melquiades Sol del Rosario dismissed the
complaint for lack of merit, viz.:
[T]his company policy was decreed pursuant to what the respondent corporation
perceived as management prerogative. This management prerogative is quite
broad and encompassing for it covers hiring, work assignment, working method,
time, place and manner of work, tools to be used, processes to be followed,
supervision of workers, working regulations, transfer of employees, work
supervision, lay-off of workers and the discipline, dismissal and recall of workers.
Except as provided for or limited by special law, an employer is free to regulate,
according to his own discretion and judgment all the aspects of employment.
9

(Citations omitted.)
On appeal to the NLRC, the Commission affirmed the decision of the Labor
Arbiter on January 11, 2002.
10

Respondents filed a Motion for Reconsideration but was denied by the NLRC in a
Resolution
11
dated August 8, 2002. They appealed to respondent court via
Petition for Certiorari.
In its assailed Decision dated August 3, 2004, the Court of Appeals reversed the
NLRC decision, viz.:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the May 31, 2002 (sic)
12
Decision of the
National Labor Relations Commission is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE
and a new one is entered as follows:
(1) Declaring illegal, the petitioners dismissal from employment and
ordering private respondents to reinstate petitioners to their former
positions without loss of seniority rights with full backwages from the time
of their dismissal until actual reinstatement; and
(2) Ordering private respondents to pay petitioners attorneys fees
amounting to 10% of the award and the cost of this suit.
13

On appeal to this Court, petitioners contend that the Court of Appeals erred in
holding that:
1. x x x the subject 1995 policy/regulation is violative of the constitutional
rights towards marriage and the family of employees and of Article 136 of
the Labor Code; and
2. x x x respondents resignations were far from voluntary.
14

We affirm.
The 1987 Constitution
15
states our policy towards the protection of labor under
the following provisions, viz.:
Article II, Section 18. The State affirms labor as a primary social economic force.
It shall protect the rights of workers and promote their welfare.
x x x
Article XIII, Sec. 3. The State shall afford full protection to labor, local and
overseas, organized and unorganized, and promote full employment and equality
of employment opportunities for all.
It shall guarantee the rights of all workers to self-organization, collective
bargaining and negotiations, and peaceful concerted activities, including the right
to strike in accordance with law. They shall be entitled to security of tenure,
humane conditions of work, and a living wage. They shall also participate in
policy and decision-making processes affecting their rights and benefits as may
be provided by law.
The State shall promote the principle of shared responsibility between workers
and employers, recognizing the right of labor to its just share in the fruits of
production and the right of enterprises to reasonable returns on investments, and
to expansion and growth.
The Civil Code likewise protects labor with the following provisions:
Art. 1700. The relation between capital and labor are not merely contractual.
They are so impressed with public interest that labor contracts must yield to the
common good. Therefore, such contracts are subject to the special laws on labor
unions, collective bargaining, strikes and lockouts, closed shop, wages, working
conditions, hours of labor and similar subjects.
Art. 1702. In case of doubt, all labor legislation and all labor contracts shall be
construed in favor of the safety and decent living for the laborer.
The Labor Code is the most comprehensive piece of legislation protecting labor.
The case at bar involves Article 136 of the Labor Code which provides:
Art. 136. It shall be unlawful for an employer to require as a condition of
employment or continuation of employment that a woman employee shall not get
married, or to stipulate expressly or tacitly that upon getting married a woman
employee shall be deemed resigned or separated, or to actually dismiss,
discharge, discriminate or otherwise prejudice a woman employee merely by
reason of her marriage.
Respondents submit that their dismissal violates the above provision. Petitioners
allege that its policy "may appear to be contrary to Article 136 of the Labor Code"
but it assumes a new meaning if read together with the first paragraph of the rule.
The rule does not require the woman employee to resign. The employee spouses
have the right to choose who between them should resign. Further, they are free
to marry persons other than co-employees. Hence, it is not the marital status of
the employee, per se, that is being discriminated. It is only intended to carry out
its no-employment-for-relatives-within-the-third-degree-policy which is within the
ambit of the prerogatives of management.
16

It is true that the policy of petitioners prohibiting close relatives from working in
the same company takes the nature of an anti-nepotism employment policy.
Companies adopt these policies to prevent the hiring of unqualified persons
based on their status as a relative, rather than upon their ability.
17
These policies
focus upon the potential employment problems arising from the perception of
favoritism exhibited towards relatives.
With more women entering the workforce, employers are also enacting
employment policies specifically prohibiting spouses from working for the same
company. We note that two types of employment policies involve spouses:
policies banning only spouses from working in the same company (no-spouse
employment policies), and those banning all immediate family members,
including spouses, from working in the same company (anti-nepotism
employment policies).
18

Unlike in our jurisdiction where there is no express prohibition on marital
discrimination,
19
there are twenty state statutes
20
in the United States prohibiting
marital discrimination. Some state courts
21
have been confronted with the issue
of whether no-spouse policies violate their laws prohibiting both marital status
and sex discrimination.
In challenging the anti-nepotism employment policies in the United States,
complainants utilize two theories of employment discrimination: the disparate
treatment and the disparate impact. Under the disparate treatment analysis,
the plaintiff must prove that an employment policy is discriminatory on its face.
No-spouse employment policies requiring an employee of a particular sex to
either quit, transfer, or be fired are facially discriminatory. For example, an
employment policy prohibiting the employer from hiring wives of male employees,
but not husbands of female employees, is discriminatory on its face.
22

On the other hand, to establish disparate impact, the complainants must prove
that a facially neutral policy has a disproportionate effect on a particular class.
For example, although most employment policies do not expressly indicate which
spouse will be required to transfer or leave the company, the policy often
disproportionately affects one sex.
23

The state courts rulings on the issue depend on their interpretation of the scope
of marital status discrimination within the meaning of their respective civil rights
acts. Though they agree that the term "marital status" encompasses
discrimination based on a person's status as either married, single, divorced, or
widowed, they are divided on whether the term has a broader meaning. Thus,
their decisions vary.
24

The courts narrowly
25
interpreting marital status to refer only to a person's status
as married, single, divorced, or widowed reason that if the legislature intended a
broader definition it would have either chosen different language or specified its
intent. They hold that the relevant inquiry is if one is married rather than to whom
one is married. They construe marital status discrimination to include only
whether a person is single, married, divorced, or widowed and not the "identity,
occupation, and place of employment of one's spouse." These courts have
upheld the questioned policies and ruled that they did not violate the marital
status discrimination provision of their respective state statutes.
The courts that have broadly
26
construed the term "marital status" rule that it
encompassed the identity, occupation and employment of one's spouse. They
strike down the no-spouse employment policies based on the broad legislative
intent of the state statute. They reason that the no-spouse employment policy
violate the marital status provision because it arbitrarily discriminates against all
spouses of present employees without regard to the actual effect on the
individual's qualifications or work performance.
27
These courts also find the no-
spouse employment policy invalid for failure of the employer to present any
evidence of business necessity other than the general perception that spouses
in the same workplace might adversely affect the business.
28
They hold that the
absence of such a bona fide occupational qualification
29
invalidates a rule
denying employment to one spouse due to the current employment of the other
spouse in the same office.
30
Thus, they rule that unless the employer can prove
that the reasonable demands of the business require a distinction based on
marital status and there is no better available or acceptable policy which would
better accomplish the business purpose, an employer may not discriminate
against an employee based on the identity of the employees spouse.
31
This is
known as the bona fide occupational qualification exception.
We note that since the finding of a bona fide occupational qualification justifies an
employers no-spouse rule, the exception is interpreted strictly and narrowly by
these state courts. There must be a compelling business necessity for which no
alternative exists other than the discriminatory practice.
32
To justify a bona fide
occupational qualification, the employer must prove two factors: (1) that the
employment qualification is reasonably related to the essential operation of the
job involved; and, (2) that there is a factual basis for believing that all or
substantially all persons meeting the qualification would be unable to properly
perform the duties of the job.
33

The concept of a bona fide occupational qualification is not foreign in our
jurisdiction. We employ the standard of reasonableness of the company policy
which is parallel to the bona fide occupational qualification requirement. In the
recent case of Duncan Association of Detailman-PTGWO and Pedro Tecson
v. Glaxo Wellcome Philippines, Inc.,
34
we passed on the validity of the policy of
a pharmaceutical company prohibiting its employees from marrying employees of
any competitor company. We held that Glaxo has a right to guard its trade
secrets, manufacturing formulas, marketing strategies and other confidential
programs and information from competitors. We considered the prohibition
against personal or marital relationships with employees of competitor
companies upon Glaxos employees reasonable under the circumstances
because relationships of that nature might compromise the interests of Glaxo. In
laying down the assailed company policy, we recognized that Glaxo only aims to
protect its interests against the possibility that a competitor company will gain
access to its secrets and procedures.
35

The requirement that a company policy must be reasonable under the
circumstances to qualify as a valid exercise of management prerogative was also
at issue in the 1997 case of Philippine Telegraph and Telephone Company v.
NLRC.
36
In said case, the employee was dismissed in violation of petitioners
policy of disqualifying from work any woman worker who contracts marriage. We
held that the company policy violates the right against discrimination afforded all
women workers under Article 136 of the Labor Code, but established a
permissible exception, viz.:
[A] requirement that a woman employee must remain unmarried could be
justified as a "bona fide occupational qualification," or BFOQ, where the
particular requirements of the job would justify the same, but not on the ground of
a general principle, such as the desirability of spreading work in the workplace. A
requirement of that nature would be valid provided it reflects an inherent quality
reasonably necessary for satisfactory job performance.
37
(Emphases supplied.)
The cases of Duncan and PT&T instruct us that the requirement of
reasonableness must be clearly established to uphold the questioned
employment policy. The employer has the burden to prove the existence of a
reasonable business necessity. The burden was successfully discharged in
Duncan but not in PT&T.
We do not find a reasonable business necessity in the case at bar.
Petitioners sole contention that "the company did not just want to have two (2) or
more of its employees related between the third degree by affinity and/or
consanguinity"
38
is lame. That the second paragraph was meant to give teeth to
the first paragraph of the questioned rule
39
is evidently not the valid reasonable
business necessity required by the law.
It is significant to note that in the case at bar, respondents were hired after they
were found fit for the job, but were asked to resign when they married a co-
employee. Petitioners failed to show how the marriage of Simbol, then a
Sheeting Machine Operator, to Alma Dayrit, then an employee of the Repacking
Section, could be detrimental to its business operations. Neither did petitioners
explain how this detriment will happen in the case of Wilfreda Comia, then a
Production Helper in the Selecting Department, who married Howard Comia,
then a helper in the cutter-machine. The policy is premised on the mere fear that
employees married to each other will be less efficient. If we uphold the
questioned rule without valid justification, the employer can create policies based
on an unproven presumption of a perceived danger at the expense of an
employees right to security of tenure.
Petitioners contend that their policy will apply only when one employee marries a
co-employee, but they are free to marry persons other than co-employees. The
questioned policy may not facially violate Article 136 of the Labor Code but it
creates a disproportionate effect and under the disparate impact theory, the only
way it could pass judicial scrutiny is a showing that it is reasonable despite the
discriminatory, albeit disproportionate, effect. The failure of petitioners to prove a
legitimate business concern in imposing the questioned policy cannot prejudice
the employees right to be free from arbitrary discrimination based upon
stereotypes of married persons working together in one company.
40

Lastly, the absence of a statute expressly prohibiting marital discrimination in our
jurisdiction cannot benefit the petitioners. The protection given to labor in our
jurisdiction is vast and extensive that we cannot prudently draw inferences from
the legislatures silence
41
that married persons are not protected under our
Constitution and declare valid a policy based on a prejudice or stereotype. Thus,
for failure of petitioners to present undisputed proof of a reasonable business
necessity, we rule that the questioned policy is an invalid exercise of
management prerogative. Corollarily, the issue as to whether respondents
Simbol and Comia resigned voluntarily has become moot and academic.
As to respondent Estrella, the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC based their ruling on
the singular fact that her resignation letter was written in her own handwriting.
Both ruled that her resignation was voluntary and thus valid. The respondent
court failed to categorically rule whether Estrella voluntarily resigned but ordered
that she be reinstated along with Simbol and Comia.
Estrella claims that she was pressured to submit a resignation letter because she
was in dire need of money. We examined the records of the case and find
Estrellas contention to be more in accord with the evidence. While findings of
fact by administrative tribunals like the NLRC are generally given not only respect
but, at times, finality, this rule admits of exceptions,
42
as in the case at bar.
Estrella avers that she went back to work on December 21, 1999 but was
dismissed due to her alleged immoral conduct. At first, she did not want to sign
the termination papers but she was forced to tender her resignation letter in
exchange for her thirteenth month pay.
The contention of petitioners that Estrella was pressured to resign because she
got impregnated by a married man and she could not stand being looked upon or
talked about as immoral
43
is incredulous. If she really wanted to avoid
embarrassment and humiliation, she would not have gone back to work at all.
Nor would she have filed a suit for illegal dismissal and pleaded for
reinstatement. We have held that in voluntary resignation, the employee is
compelled by personal reason(s) to dissociate himself from employment. It is
done with the intention of relinquishing an office, accompanied by the act of
abandonment.
44
Thus, it is illogical for Estrella to resign and then file a complaint
for illegal dismissal. Given the lack of sufficient evidence on the part of petitioners
that the resignation was voluntary, Estrellas dismissal is declared illegal.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
73477 dated August 3, 2004 is AFFIRMED.1avvphil.net
SO ORDERED.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
ANGELINA SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ
Associate Justice
RENATO C. CORONA
Associate Justice
ADOLFO S. AZCUNA
Asscociate Justice
CANCIO C. GARCIA
Associate Justice
A T T E S T A T I O N
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Associate Justice
Chairman
C E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division
Chairmans Attestation, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above
Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer
of the opinion of the Courts Division.
ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
Chief Justice







3. Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 162994 September 17, 2004
DUNCAN ASSOCIATION OF DETAILMAN-PTGWO and PEDRO A. TECSON,
petitioners,
vs.
GLAXO WELLCOME PHILIPPINES, INC., Respondent.
R E S O L U T I O N
TINGA, J .:
Confronting the Court in this petition is a novel question, with constitutional
overtones, involving the validity of the policy of a pharmaceutical company
prohibiting its employees from marrying employees of any competitor company.
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the Decision
1
dated May 19,
2003 and the Resolution dated March 26, 2004 of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. SP No. 62434.
2

Petitioner Pedro A. Tecson (Tecson) was hired by respondent Glaxo Wellcome
Philippines, Inc. (Glaxo) as medical representative on October 24, 1995, after
Tecson had undergone training and orientation.
Thereafter, Tecson signed a contract of employment which stipulates, among
others, that he agrees to study and abide by existing company rules; to disclose
to management any existing or future relationship by consanguinity or affinity
with co-employees or employees of competing drug companies and should
management find that such relationship poses a possible conflict of interest, to
resign from the company.
The Employee Code of Conduct of Glaxo similarly provides that an employee is
expected to inform management of any existing or future relationship by
consanguinity or affinity with co-employees or employees of competing drug
companies. If management perceives a conflict of interest or a potential conflict
between such relationship and the employees employment with the company,
the management and the employee will explore the possibility of a "transfer to
another department in a non-counterchecking position" or preparation for
employment outside the company after six months.
Tecson was initially assigned to market Glaxos products in the Camarines Sur-
Camarines Norte sales area.
Subsequently, Tecson entered into a romantic relationship with Bettsy, an
employee of Astra Pharmaceuticals
3
(Astra), a competitor of Glaxo. Bettsy was
Astras Branch Coordinator in Albay. She supervised the district managers and
medical representatives of her company and prepared marketing strategies for
Astra in that area.
Even before they got married, Tecson received several reminders from his
District Manager regarding the conflict of interest which his relationship with
Bettsy might engender. Still, love prevailed, and Tecson married Bettsy in
September 1998.
In January 1999, Tecsons superiors informed him that his marriage to Bettsy
gave rise to a conflict of interest. Tecsons superiors reminded him that he and
Bettsy should decide which one of them would resign from their jobs, although
they told him that they wanted to retain him as much as possible because he was
performing his job well.
Tecson requested for time to comply with the company policy against entering
into a relationship with an employee of a competitor company. He explained that
Astra, Bettsys employer, was planning to merge with Zeneca, another drug
company; and Bettsy was planning to avail of the redundancy package to be
offered by Astra. With Bettsys separation from her company, the potential
conflict of interest would be eliminated. At the same time, they would be able to
avail of the attractive redundancy package from Astra.
In August 1999, Tecson again requested for more time resolve the problem. In
September 1999, Tecson applied for a transfer in Glaxos milk division, thinking
that since Astra did not have a milk division, the potential conflict of interest
would be eliminated. His application was denied in view of Glaxos "least-
movement-possible" policy.
In November 1999, Glaxo transferred Tecson to the Butuan City-Surigao City-
Agusan del Sur sales area. Tecson asked Glaxo to reconsider its decision, but
his request was denied.
Tecson sought Glaxos reconsideration regarding his transfer and brought the
matter to Glaxos Grievance Committee. Glaxo, however, remained firm in its
decision and gave Tescon until February 7, 2000 to comply with the transfer
order. Tecson defied the transfer order and continued acting as medical
representative in the Camarines Sur-Camarines Norte sales area.
During the pendency of the grievance proceedings, Tecson was paid his salary,
but was not issued samples of products which were competing with similar
products manufactured by Astra. He was also not included in product
conferences regarding such products.
Because the parties failed to resolve the issue at the grievance machinery level,
they submitted the matter for voluntary arbitration. Glaxo offered Tecson a
separation pay of one-half () month pay for every year of service, or a total of
P50,000.00 but he declined the offer. On November 15, 2000, the National
Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB) rendered its Decision declaring as
valid Glaxos policy on relationships between its employees and persons
employed with competitor companies, and affirming Glaxos right to transfer
Tecson to another sales territory.
Aggrieved, Tecson filed a Petition for Review with the Court of Appeals assailing
the NCMB Decision.
On May 19, 2003, the Court of Appeals promulgated its Decision denying the
Petition for Review on the ground that the NCMB did not err in rendering its
Decision. The appellate court held that Glaxos policy prohibiting its employees
from having personal relationships with employees of competitor companies is a
valid exercise of its management prerogatives.
4

Tecson filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the appellate courts Decision, but
the motion was denied by the appellate court in its Resolution dated March 26,
2004.
5

Petitioners filed the instant petition, arguing therein that (i) the Court of Appeals
erred in affirming the NCMBs finding that the Glaxos policy prohibiting its
employees from marrying an employee of a competitor company is valid; and (ii)
the Court of Appeals also erred in not finding that Tecson was constructively
dismissed when he was transferred to a new sales territory, and deprived of the
opportunity to attend products seminars and training sessions.
6

Petitioners contend that Glaxos policy against employees marrying employees of
competitor companies violates the equal protection clause of the Constitution
because it creates invalid distinctions among employees on account only of
marriage. They claim that the policy restricts the employees right to marry.
7

They also argue that Tecson was constructively dismissed as shown by the
following circumstances: (1) he was transferred from the Camarines Sur-
Camarines Norte sales area to the Butuan-Surigao-Agusan sales area, (2) he
suffered a diminution in pay, (3) he was excluded from attending seminars and
training sessions for medical representatives, and (4) he was prohibited from
promoting respondents products which were competing with Astras products.
8

In its Comment on the petition, Glaxo argues that the company policy prohibiting
its employees from having a relationship with and/or marrying an employee of a
competitor company is a valid exercise of its management prerogatives and does
not violate the equal protection clause; and that Tecsons reassignment from the
Camarines Norte-Camarines Sur sales area to the Butuan City-Surigao City and
Agusan del Sur sales area does not amount to constructive dismissal.
9

Glaxo insists that as a company engaged in the promotion and sale of
pharmaceutical products, it has a genuine interest in ensuring that its employees
avoid any activity, relationship or interest that may conflict with their
responsibilities to the company. Thus, it expects its employees to avoid having
personal or family interests in any competitor company which may influence their
actions and decisions and consequently deprive Glaxo of legitimate profits. The
policy is also aimed at preventing a competitor company from gaining access to
its secrets, procedures and policies.
10

It likewise asserts that the policy does not prohibit marriage per se but only
proscribes existing or future relationships with employees of competitor
companies, and is therefore not violative of the equal protection clause. It
maintains that considering the nature of its business, the prohibition is based on
valid grounds.
11

According to Glaxo, Tecsons marriage to Bettsy, an employee of Astra, posed a
real and potential conflict of interest. Astras products were in direct competition
with 67% of the products sold by Glaxo. Hence, Glaxos enforcement of the
foregoing policy in Tecsons case was a valid exercise of its management
prerogatives.
12
In any case, Tecson was given several months to remedy the
situation, and was even encouraged not to resign but to ask his wife to resign
form Astra instead.
13

Glaxo also points out that Tecson can no longer question the assailed company
policy because when he signed his contract of employment, he was aware that
such policy was stipulated therein. In said contract, he also agreed to resign from
respondent if the management finds that his relationship with an employee of a
competitor company would be detrimental to the interests of Glaxo.
14

Glaxo likewise insists that Tecsons reassignment to another sales area and his
exclusion from seminars regarding respondents new products did not amount to
constructive dismissal.
It claims that in view of Tecsons refusal to resign, he was relocated from the
Camarines Sur-Camarines Norte sales area to the Butuan City-Surigao City and
Agusan del Sur sales area. Glaxo asserts that in effecting the reassignment, it
also considered the welfare of Tecsons family. Since Tecsons hometown was in
Agusan del Sur and his wife traces her roots to Butuan City, Glaxo assumed that
his transfer from the Bicol region to the Butuan City sales area would be
favorable to him and his family as he would be relocating to a familiar territory
and minimizing his travel expenses.
15

In addition, Glaxo avers that Tecsons exclusion from the seminar concerning the
new anti-asthma drug was due to the fact that said product was in direct
competition with a drug which was soon to be sold by Astra, and hence, would
pose a potential conflict of interest for him. Lastly, the delay in Tecsons receipt of
his sales paraphernalia was due to the mix-up created by his refusal to transfer
to the Butuan City sales area (his paraphernalia was delivered to his new sales
area instead of Naga City because the supplier thought he already transferred to
Butuan).
16

The Court is tasked to resolve the following issues: (1) Whether the Court of
Appeals erred in ruling that Glaxos policy against its employees marrying
employees from competitor companies is valid, and in not holding that said policy
violates the equal protection clause of the Constitution; (2) Whether Tecson was
constructively dismissed.
The Court finds no merit in the petition.
The stipulation in Tecsons contract of employment with Glaxo being questioned
by petitioners provides:

10. You agree to disclose to management any existing or future
relationship you may have, either by consanguinity or affinity with co-
employees or employees of competing drug companies. Should it pose a
possible conflict of interest in management discretion, you agree to resign
voluntarily from the Company as a matter of Company policy.

17

The same contract also stipulates that Tescon agrees to abide by the existing
company rules of Glaxo, and to study and become acquainted with such
policies.
18
In this regard, the Employee Handbook of Glaxo expressly informs its
employees of its rules regarding conflict of interest:
1. Conflict of Interest
Employees should avoid any activity, investment relationship, or interest
that may run counter to the responsibilities which they owe Glaxo
Wellcome.
Specifically, this means that employees are expected:
a. To avoid having personal or family interest, financial or otherwise,
in any competitor supplier or other businesses which may
consciously or unconsciously influence their actions or decisions and
thus deprive Glaxo Wellcome of legitimate profit.
b. To refrain from using their position in Glaxo Wellcome or
knowledge of Company plans to advance their outside personal
interests, that of their relatives, friends and other businesses.
c. To avoid outside employment or other interests for income which
would impair their effective job performance.
d. To consult with Management on such activities or relationships
that may lead to conflict of interest.
1.1. Employee Relationships
Employees with existing or future relationships either by consanguinity or
affinity with co-employees of competing drug companies are expected to
disclose such relationship to the Management. If management perceives a
conflict or potential conflict of interest, every effort shall be made, together
by management and the employee, to arrive at a solution within six (6)
months, either by transfer to another department in a non-counter checking
position, or by career preparation toward outside employment after Glaxo
Wellcome. Employees must be prepared for possible resignation within six
(6) months, if no other solution is feasible.
19

No reversible error can be ascribed to the Court of Appeals when it ruled that
Glaxos policy prohibiting an employee from having a relationship with an
employee of a competitor company is a valid exercise of management
prerogative.
Glaxo has a right to guard its trade secrets, manufacturing formulas, marketing
strategies and other confidential programs and information from competitors,
especially so that it and Astra are rival companies in the highly competitive
pharmaceutical industry.
The prohibition against personal or marital relationships with employees of
competitor companies upon Glaxos employees is reasonable under the
circumstances because relationships of that nature might compromise the
interests of the company. In laying down the assailed company policy, Glaxo only
aims to protect its interests against the possibility that a competitor company will
gain access to its secrets and procedures.
That Glaxo possesses the right to protect its economic interests cannot be
denied. No less than the Constitution recognizes the right of enterprises to adopt
and enforce such a policy to protect its right to reasonable returns on
investments and to expansion and growth.
20
Indeed, while our laws endeavor to
give life to the constitutional policy on social justice and the protection of labor, it
does not mean that every labor dispute will be decided in favor of the workers.
The law also recognizes that management has rights which are also entitled to
respect and enforcement in the interest of fair play.
21

As held in a Georgia, U.S.A case,
22
it is a legitimate business practice to guard
business confidentiality and protect a competitive position by even-handedly
disqualifying from jobs male and female applicants or employees who are
married to a competitor. Consequently, the court ruled than an employer that
discharged an employee who was married to an employee of an active
competitor did not violate Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
23
The Court
pointed out that the policy was applied to men and women equally, and noted
that the employers business was highly competitive and that gaining inside
information would constitute a competitive advantage.
The challenged company policy does not violate the equal protection clause of
the Constitution as petitioners erroneously suggest. It is a settled principle that
the commands of the equal protection clause are addressed only to the state or
those acting under color of its authority.
24
Corollarily, it has been held in a long
array of U.S. Supreme Court decisions that the equal protection clause erects no
shield against merely private conduct, however, discriminatory or wrongful.
25
The
only exception occurs when the state
29
in any of its manifestations or actions has
been found to have become entwined or involved in the wrongful private
conduct.
27
Obviously, however, the exception is not present in this case.
Significantly, the company actually enforced the policy after repeated requests to
the employee to comply with the policy. Indeed, the application of the policy was
made in an impartial and even-handed manner, with due regard for the lot of the
employee.
In any event, from the wordings of the contractual provision and the policy in its
employee handbook, it is clear that Glaxo does not impose an absolute
prohibition against relationships between its employees and those of competitor
companies. Its employees are free to cultivate relationships with and marry
persons of their own choosing. What the company merely seeks to avoid is a
conflict of interest between the employee and the company that may arise out of
such relationships. As succinctly explained by the appellate court, thus:
The policy being questioned is not a policy against marriage. An employee
of the company remains free to marry anyone of his or her choosing. The
policy is not aimed at restricting a personal prerogative that belongs only to
the individual. However, an employees personal decision does not detract
the employer from exercising management prerogatives to ensure
maximum profit and business success. . .
28

The Court of Appeals also correctly noted that the assailed company policy which
forms part of respondents Employee Code of Conduct and of its contracts with
its employees, such as that signed by Tescon, was made known to him prior to
his employment. Tecson, therefore, was aware of that restriction when he signed
his employment contract and when he entered into a relationship with Bettsy.
Since Tecson knowingly and voluntarily entered into a contract of employment
with Glaxo, the stipulations therein have the force of law between them and, thus,
should be complied with in good faith."
29
He is therefore estopped from
questioning said policy.
The Court finds no merit in petitioners contention that Tescon was constructively
dismissed when he was transferred from the Camarines Norte-Camarines Sur
sales area to the Butuan City-Surigao City-Agusan del Sur sales area, and when
he was excluded from attending the companys seminar on new products which
were directly competing with similar products manufactured by Astra.
Constructive dismissal is defined as a quitting, an involuntary resignation
resorted to when continued employment becomes impossible, unreasonable, or
unlikely; when there is a demotion in rank or diminution in pay; or when a clear
discrimination, insensibility or disdain by an employer becomes unbearable to the
employee.
30
None of these conditions are present in the instant case. The record
does not show that Tescon was demoted or unduly discriminated upon by reason
of such transfer. As found by the appellate court, Glaxo properly exercised its
management prerogative in reassigning Tecson to the Butuan City sales area:
. . . In this case, petitioners transfer to another place of assignment was
merely in keeping with the policy of the company in avoidance of conflict of
interest, and thus validNote that [Tecsons] wife holds a sensitive
supervisory position as Branch Coordinator in her employer-company
which requires her to work in close coordination with District Managers and
Medical Representatives. Her duties include monitoring sales of Astra
products, conducting sales drives, establishing and furthering relationship
with customers, collection, monitoring and managing Astras
inventoryshe therefore takes an active participation in the market war
characterized as it is by stiff competition among pharmaceutical
companies. Moreover, and this is significant, petitioners sales territory
covers Camarines Sur and Camarines Norte while his wife is supervising a
branch of her employer in Albay. The proximity of their areas of
responsibility, all in the same Bicol Region, renders the conflict of interest
not only possible, but actual, as learning by one spouse of the others
market strategies in the region would be inevitable. [Managements]
appreciation of a conflict of interest is therefore not merely illusory and
wanting in factual basis
31

In Abbott Laboratories (Phils.), Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission,
32

which involved a complaint filed by a medical representative against his employer
drug company for illegal dismissal for allegedly terminating his employment when
he refused to accept his reassignment to a new area, the Court upheld the right
of the drug company to transfer or reassign its employee in accordance with its
operational demands and requirements. The ruling of the Court therein, quoted
hereunder, also finds application in the instant case:
By the very nature of his employment, a drug salesman or medical
representative is expected to travel. He should anticipate reassignment
according to the demands of their business. It would be a poor drug
corporation which cannot even assign its representatives or detail men to
new markets calling for opening or expansion or to areas where the need
for pushing its products is great. More so if such reassignments are part of
the employment contract.
33

As noted earlier, the challenged policy has been implemented by Glaxo
impartially and disinterestedly for a long period of time. In the case at bar, the
record shows that Glaxo gave Tecson several chances to eliminate the conflict of
interest brought about by his relationship with Bettsy. When their relationship was
still in its initial stage, Tecsons supervisors at Glaxo constantly reminded him
about its effects on his employment with the company and on the companys
interests. After Tecson married Bettsy, Glaxo gave him time to resolve the
conflict by either resigning from the company or asking his wife to resign from
Astra. Glaxo even expressed its desire to retain Tecson in its employ because of
his satisfactory performance and suggested that he ask Bettsy to resign from her
company instead. Glaxo likewise acceded to his repeated requests for more time
to resolve the conflict of interest. When the problem could not be resolved after
several years of waiting, Glaxo was constrained to reassign Tecson to a sales
area different from that handled by his wife for Astra. Notably, the Court did not
terminate Tecson from employment but only reassigned him to another area
where his home province, Agusan del Sur, was included. In effecting Tecsons
transfer, Glaxo even considered the welfare of Tecsons family. Clearly, the
foregoing dispels any suspicion of unfairness and bad faith on the part of
Glaxo.
34

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED for lack of merit. Costs against
petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, Austria-Martinez, Callejo, Sr., and Chico-Nazario
*
, JJ., concur.













4. Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 107383 February 20, 1996
CECILIA ZULUETA, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and ALFREDO MARTIN, respondents.
D E C I S I O N
MENDOZA, J .:
This is a petition to review the decision of the Court of Appeals, affirming the
decision of the Regional Trial Court of Manila (Branch X) which ordered petitioner
to return documents and papers taken by her from private respondent's clinic
without the latter's knowledge and consent.
The facts are as follows:
Petitioner Cecilia Zulueta is the wife of private respondent Alfredo Martin. On
March 26, 1982, petitioner entered the clinic of her husband, a doctor of
medicine, and in the presence of her mother, a driver and private respondent's
secretary, forcibly opened the drawers and cabinet in her husband's clinic and
took 157 documents consisting of private correspondence between Dr. Martin
and his alleged paramours, greetings cards, cancelled checks, diaries, Dr.
Martin's passport, and photographs. The documents and papers were seized for
use in evidence in a case for legal separation and for disqualification from the
practice of medicine which petitioner had filed against her husband.
Dr. Martin brought this action below for recovery of the documents and papers
and for damages against petitioner. The case was filed with the Regional Trial
Court of Manila, Branch X, which, after trial, rendered judgment for private
respondent, Dr. Alfredo Martin, declaring him "the capital/exclusive owner of the
properties described in paragraph 3 of plaintiff's Complaint or those further
described in the Motion to Return and Suppress" and ordering Cecilia Zulueta
and any person acting in her behalf to a immediately return the properties to Dr.
Martin and to pay him P5,000.00, as nominal damages; P5,000.00, as moral
damages and attorney's fees; and to pay the costs of the suit. The writ of
preliminary injunction earlier issued was made final and petitioner Cecilia Zulueta
and her attorneys and representatives were enjoined from "using or
submitting/admitting as evidence" the documents and papers in question. On
appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court.
Hence this petition.
There is no question that the documents and papers in question belong to private
respondent, Dr. Alfredo Martin, and that they were taken by his wife, the herein
petitioner, without his knowledge and consent. For that reason, the trial court
declared the documents and papers to be properties of private respondent,
ordered petitioner to return them to private respondent and enjoined her from
using them in evidence. In appealing from the decision of the Court of Appeals
affirming the trial court's decision, petitioner's only ground is that in Alfredo Martin
v. Alfonso Felix, Jr.,
1
this Court ruled that the documents and papers (marked as
Annexes A-1 to J-7 of respondent's comment in that case) were admissible in
evidence and, therefore, their use by petitioner's attorney, Alfonso Felix did not
constitute malpractice or gross misconduct, For this reason it is contended that
the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the decision of the trial court instead of
dismissing private respondent's complaint.
Petitioner's contention has no merit. The case against Atty. Felix, Jr. was for
disbarment. Among other things, private respondent, Dr. Alfredo Martin, as
complainant in that case, charged that in using the documents in evidence, Atty.
Felix, Jr. committed malpractice or gross misconduct because of the injunctive
order of the trial court. In dismissing the complaint against Atty. Felix, Jr., this
Court took note of the following defense of Atty. Felix; Jr. which it found to be
"impressed with merit:"
2

On the alleged malpractice or gross misconduct of respondent [Alfonso
Felix, Jr.], he maintains that:
. . . .
4. When respondent refiled Cecilia's case for legal separation before the
Pasig Regional Trial Court, there was admittedly an order of the Manila
Regional Trial Court prohibiting Cecilia from using the documents Annex
"A-1 to J-7." On September 6, 1983, however having appealed the said
order to this Court on a petition for certiorari, this Court issued a restraining
order on aforesaid date which order temporarily set aside the order of the
trial court. Hence, during the enforceability of this Court's order,
respondent's request for petitioner to admit the genuineness and
authenticity of the subject annexes cannot be looked upon as malpractice.
Notably, petitioner Dr. Martin finally admitted the truth and authenticity of
the questioned annexes, At that point in time, would it have been
malpractice for respondent to use petitioner's admission as evidence
against him in the legal separation case pending in the Regional Trial
Court of Makati? Respondent submits it is not malpractice.
Significantly, petitioner's admission was done not thru his counsel but by
Dr. Martin himself under oath, Such verified admission constitutes an
affidavit, and, therefore, receivable in evidence against him. Petitioner
became bound by his admission. For Cecilia to avail herself of her
husband's admission and use the same in her action for legal separation
cannot be treated as malpractice.
Thus, the acquittal of Atty. Felix, Jr. in the administrative case amounts to no
more than a declaration that his use of the documents and papers for the
purpose of securing Dr. Martin's admission as to their genuiness and authenticity
did not constitute a violation of the injunctive order of the trial court. By no means
does the decision in that case establish the admissibility of the documents and
papers in question.
It cannot be overemphasized that if Atty. Felix, Jr. was acquitted of the charge of
violating the writ of preliminary injunction issued by the trial court, it was only
because, at the time he used the documents and papers, enforcement of the
order of the trial court was temporarily restrained by this Court. The TRO issued
by this Court was eventually lifted as the petition for certiorari filed by petitioner
against the trial court's order was dismissed and, therefore, the prohibition
against the further use of the documents and papers became effective again.

Indeed the documents and papers in question are inadmissible in evidence. The
constitutional injunction declaring "the privacy of communication and
correspondence [to be] inviolable"
3
is no less applicable simply because it is the
wife (who thinks herself aggrieved by her husband's infidelity) who is the party
against whom the constitutional provision is to be enforced. The only exception to
the prohibition in the Constitution is if there is a "lawful order [from a] court or
when public safety or order requires otherwise, as prescribed by law."
4
Any
violation of this provision renders the evidence obtained inadmissible "for any
purpose in any proceeding."
5

The intimacies between husband and wife do not justify any one of them in
breaking the drawers and cabinets of the other and in ransacking them for any
telltale evidence of marital infidelity. A person, by contracting marriage, does not
shed his/her integrity or his right to privacy as an individual and the constitutional
protection is ever available to him or to her.
The law insures absolute freedom of communication between the spouses by
making it privileged. Neither husband nor wife may testify for or against the other
without the consent of the affected spouse while the marriage subsists.
6
Neither
may be examined without the consent of the other as to any communication
received in confidence by one from the other during the marriage, save for
specified exceptions.
7
But one thing is freedom of communication; quite another
is a compulsion for each one to share what one knows with the other. And this
has nothing to do with the duty of fidelity that each owes to the other.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review is DENIED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Regalado, Romero and Puno, JJ., concur.
















5. Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 174689 October 22, 2007
ROMMEL JACINTO DANTES SILVERIO, petitioner,
vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
D E C I S I O N
CORONA, J.:
When God created man, He made him in the likeness of God; He created them
male and female. (Genesis 5:1-2)
Amihan gazed upon the bamboo reed planted by Bathala and she heard voices
coming from inside the bamboo. Oh North Wind! North Wind! Please let us out!,
the voices said. She pecked the reed once, then twice. All of a sudden, the
bamboo cracked and slit open. Out came two human beings; one was a male
and the other was a female. Amihan named the man Malakas (Strong) and the
woman Maganda (Beautiful). (The Legend of Malakas and Maganda)
When is a man a man and when is a woman a woman? In particular, does the
law recognize the changes made by a physician using scalpel, drugs and
counseling with regard to a persons sex? May a person successfully petition for
a change of name and sex appearing in the birth certificate to reflect the result of
a sex reassignment surgery?
On November 26, 2002, petitioner Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio filed a petition
for the change of his first name and sex in his birth certificate in the Regional
Trial Court of Manila, Branch 8. The petition, docketed as SP Case No. 02-
105207, impleaded the civil registrar of Manila as respondent.
Petitioner alleged in his petition that he was born in the City of Manila to the
spouses Melecio Petines Silverio and Anita Aquino Dantes on April 4, 1962. His
name was registered as Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio in his certificate of live
birth (birth certificate). His sex was registered as male.
He further alleged that he is a male transsexual, that is, anatomically male but
feels, thinks and acts as a female and that he had always identified himself with
girls since childhood.
1
Feeling trapped in a mans body, he consulted several
doctors in the United States. He underwent psychological examination, hormone
treatment and breast augmentation. His attempts to transform himself to a
woman culminated on January 27, 2001 when he underwent sex reassignment
surgery
2
in Bangkok, Thailand. He was thereafter examined by Dr. Marcelino
Reysio-Cruz, Jr., a plastic and reconstruction surgeon in the Philippines, who
issued a medical certificate attesting that he (petitioner) had in fact undergone
the procedure.
From then on, petitioner lived as a female and was in fact engaged to be married.
He then sought to have his name in his birth certificate changed from Rommel
Jacinto to Mely, and his sex from male to female.
An order setting the case for initial hearing was published in the Peoples Journal
Tonight, a newspaper of general circulation in Metro Manila, for three
consecutive weeks.
3
Copies of the order were sent to the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG) and the civil registrar of Manila.
On the scheduled initial hearing, jurisdictional requirements were established. No
opposition to the petition was made.
During trial, petitioner testified for himself. He also presented Dr. Reysio-Cruz, Jr.
and his American fianc, Richard P. Edel, as witnesses.
On June 4, 2003, the trial court rendered a decision
4
in favor of petitioner. Its
relevant portions read:
Petitioner filed the present petition not to evade any law or judgment or any
infraction thereof or for any unlawful motive but solely for the purpose of making
his birth records compatible with his present sex.
The sole issue here is whether or not petitioner is entitled to the relief asked for.
The [c]ourt rules in the affirmative.
Firstly, the [c]ourt is of the opinion that granting the petition would be more in
consonance with the principles of justice and equity. With his sexual [re-
assignment], petitioner, who has always felt, thought and acted like a woman,
now possesses the physique of a female. Petitioners misfortune to be trapped in
a mans body is not his own doing and should not be in any way taken against
him.
Likewise, the [c]ourt believes that no harm, injury [or] prejudice will be caused to
anybody or the community in granting the petition. On the contrary, granting the
petition would bring the much-awaited happiness on the part of the petitioner and
her [fianc] and the realization of their dreams.
Finally, no evidence was presented to show any cause or ground to deny the
present petition despite due notice and publication thereof. Even the State,
through the [OSG] has not seen fit to interpose any [o]pposition.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered GRANTING the petition and
ordering the Civil Registrar of Manila to change the entries appearing in the
Certificate of Birth of [p]etitioner, specifically for petitioners first name from
Rommel Jacinto to MELY and petitioners gender from Male to FEMALE.
5

On August 18, 2003, the Republic of the Philippines (Republic), thru the OSG,
filed a petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals.
6
It alleged that there is no law
allowing the change of entries in the birth certificate by reason of sex alteration.
On February 23, 2006, the Court of Appeals
7
rendered a decision
8
in favor of the
Republic. It ruled that the trial courts decision lacked legal basis. There is no law
allowing the change of either name or sex in the certificate of birth on the ground
of sex reassignment through surgery. Thus, the Court of Appeals granted the
Republics petition, set aside the decision of the trial court and ordered the
dismissal of SP Case No. 02-105207. Petitioner moved for reconsideration but it
was denied.
9
Hence, this petition.
Petitioner essentially claims that the change of his name and sex in his birth
certificate is allowed under Articles 407 to 413 of the Civil Code, Rules 103 and
108 of the Rules of Court and RA 9048.
10

The petition lacks merit.
A Persons First Name Cannot Be Changed On the Ground of Sex
Reassignment
Petitioner invoked his sex reassignment as the ground for his petition for change
of name and sex. As found by the trial court:
Petitioner filed the present petition not to evade any law or judgment or any
infraction thereof or for any unlawful motive but solely for the purpose of
making his birth records compatible with his present sex. (emphasis
supplied)
Petitioner believes that after having acquired the physical features of a female,
he became entitled to the civil registry changes sought. We disagree.
The State has an interest in the names borne by individuals and entities for
purposes of identification.
11
A change of name is a privilege, not a
right.
12
Petitions for change of name are controlled by statutes.
13
In this
connection, Article 376 of the Civil Code provides:
ART. 376. No person can change his name or surname without judicial authority.
This Civil Code provision was amended by RA 9048 (Clerical Error Law). In
particular, Section 1 of RA 9048 provides:
SECTION 1. Authority to Correct Clerical or Typographical Error and Change of
First Name or Nickname. No entry in a civil register shall be changed or
corrected without a judicial order, except for clerical or typographical errors and
change of first name or nickname which can be corrected or changed by the
concerned city or municipal civil registrar or consul general in accordance with
the provisions of this Act and its implementing rules and regulations.
RA 9048 now governs the change of first name.
14
It vests the power and
authority to entertain petitions for change of first name to the city or municipal
civil registrar or consul general concerned. Under the law, therefore, jurisdiction
over applications for change of first name is now primarily lodged with the
aforementioned administrative officers. The intent and effect of the law is to
exclude the change of first name from the coverage of Rules 103 (Change of
Name) and 108 (Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the Civil Registry) of the
Rules of Court, until and unless an administrative petition for change of name is
first filed and subsequently denied.
15
It likewise lays down the corresponding
venue,
16
form
17
and procedure. In sum, the remedy and the proceedings
regulating change of first name are primarily administrative in nature, not judicial.
RA 9048 likewise provides the grounds for which change of first name may be
allowed:
SECTION 4. Grounds for Change of First Name or Nickname. The petition for
change of first name or nickname may be allowed in any of the following cases:
(1) The petitioner finds the first name or nickname to be ridiculous, tainted with
dishonor or extremely difficult to write or pronounce;
(2) The new first name or nickname has been habitually and continuously used
by the petitioner and he has been publicly known by that first name or nickname
in the community; or
(3) The change will avoid confusion.
Petitioners basis in praying for the change of his first name was his sex
reassignment. He intended to make his first name compatible with the sex he
thought he transformed himself into through surgery. However, a change of
name does not alter ones legal capacity or civil status.
18
RA 9048 does not
sanction a change of first name on the ground of sex reassignment. Rather than
avoiding confusion, changing petitioners first name for his declared purpose may
only create grave complications in the civil registry and the public interest.
Before a person can legally change his given name, he must present proper or
reasonable cause or any compelling reason justifying such change.
19
In addition,
he must show that he will be prejudiced by the use of his true and official
name.
20
In this case, he failed to show, or even allege, any prejudice that he
might suffer as a result of using his true and official name.
In sum, the petition in the trial court in so far as it prayed for the change of
petitioners first name was not within that courts primary jurisdiction as the
petition should have been filed with the local civil registrar concerned, assuming
it could be legally done. It was an improper remedy because the proper remedy
was administrative, that is, that provided under RA 9048. It was also filed in the
wrong venue as the proper venue was in the Office of the Civil Registrar of
Manila where his birth certificate is kept. More importantly, it had no merit since
the use of his true and official name does not prejudice him at all. For all these
reasons, the Court of Appeals correctly dismissed petitioners petition in so far as
the change of his first name was concerned.
No Law Allows The Change of Entry In The Birth Certificate As To Sex On
the Ground of Sex Reassignment
The determination of a persons sex appearing in his birth certificate is a legal
issue and the court must look to the statutes.
21
In this connection, Article 412 of
the Civil Code provides:
ART. 412. No entry in the civil register shall be changed or corrected without a
judicial order.
Together with Article 376 of the Civil Code, this provision was amended by RA
9048 in so far as clerical or typographical errors are involved. The correction or
change of such matters can now be made through administrative proceedings
and without the need for a judicial order. In effect, RA 9048 removed from the
ambit of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court the correction of such errors.
22
Rule 108
now applies only to substantial changes and corrections in entries in the civil
register.
23

Section 2(c) of RA 9048 defines what a clerical or typographical error is:
SECTION 2. Definition of Terms. As used in this Act, the following terms shall
mean:
xxx xxx xxx
(3) Clerical or typographical error refers to a mistake committed in the
performance of clerical work in writing, copying, transcribing or typing an entry in
the civil register that is harmless and innocuous, such as misspelled name or
misspelled place of birth or the like, which is visible to the eyes or obvious to the
understanding, and can be corrected or changed only by reference to other
existing record or records: Provided, however, That no correction must involve
the change of nationality, age, status or sex of the petitioner. (emphasis
supplied)
Under RA 9048, a correction in the civil registry involving the change of sex is not
a mere clerical or typographical error. It is a substantial change for which the
applicable procedure is Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.
The entries envisaged in Article 412 of the Civil Code and correctable under Rule
108 of the Rules of Court are those provided in Articles 407 and 408 of the Civil
Code:
24

ART. 407. Acts, events and judicial decrees concerning the civil status of
persons shall be recorded in the civil register.
ART. 408. The following shall be entered in the civil register:
(1) Births; (2) marriages; (3) deaths; (4) legal separations; (5) annulments of
marriage; (6) judgments declaring marriages void from the beginning; (7)
legitimations; (8) adoptions; (9) acknowledgments of natural children; (10)
naturalization; (11) loss, or (12) recovery of citizenship; (13) civil interdiction; (14)
judicial determination of filiation; (15) voluntary emancipation of a minor; and (16)
changes of name.
The acts, events or factual errors contemplated under Article 407 of the Civil
Code include even those that occur after birth.
25
However, no reasonable
interpretation of the provision can justify the conclusion that it covers the
correction on the ground of sex reassignment.
To correct simply means to make or set aright; to remove the faults or error
from while to change means to replace something with something else of the
same kind or with something that serves as a substitute.
26
The birth certificate of
petitioner contained no error. All entries therein, including those corresponding to
his first name and sex, were all correct. No correction is necessary.
Article 407 of the Civil Code authorizes the entry in the civil registry of
certain acts (such as legitimations, acknowledgments of illegitimate children and
naturalization), events (such as births, marriages, naturalization and deaths)
and judicial decrees (such as legal separations, annulments of marriage,
declarations of nullity of marriages, adoptions, naturalization, loss or recovery of
citizenship, civil interdiction, judicial determination of filiation and changes of
name). These acts, events and judicial decrees produce legal consequences that
touch upon the legal capacity, status and nationality of a person. Their effects are
expressly sanctioned by the laws. In contrast, sex reassignment is not among
those acts or events mentioned in Article 407. Neither is it recognized nor even
mentioned by any law, expressly or impliedly.
Status refers to the circumstances affecting the legal situation (that is, the sum
total of capacities and incapacities) of a person in view of his age, nationality and
his family membership.
27

The status of a person in law includes all his personal qualities and
relations, more or less permanent in nature, not ordinarily terminable at his
own will, such as his being legitimate or illegitimate, or his being married or not.
The comprehensive term status include such matters as the beginning and end
of legal personality, capacity to have rights in general, family relations, and its
various aspects, such as birth, legitimation, adoption, emancipation, marriage,
divorce, and sometimes even succession.
28
(emphasis supplied)
A persons sex is an essential factor in marriage and family relations. It is a part
of a persons legal capacity and civil status. In this connection, Article 413 of the
Civil Code provides:
ART. 413. All other matters pertaining to the registration of civil status shall be
governed by special laws.
But there is no such special law in the Philippines governing sex reassignment
and its effects. This is fatal to petitioners cause.
Moreover, Section 5 of Act 3753 (the Civil Register Law) provides:
SEC. 5. Registration and certification of births. The declaration of the physician
or midwife in attendance at the birth or, in default thereof, the declaration of
either parent of the newborn child, shall be sufficient for the registration of a birth
in the civil register. Such declaration shall be exempt from documentary stamp
tax and shall be sent to the local civil registrar not later than thirty days after the
birth, by the physician or midwife in attendance at the birth or by either parent of
the newborn child.
In such declaration, the person above mentioned shall certify to the following
facts: (a) date and hour of birth; (b) sex and nationality of infant; (c) names,
citizenship and religion of parents or, in case the father is not known, of the
mother alone; (d) civil status of parents; (e) place where the infant was born; and
(f) such other data as may be required in the regulations to be issued.
xxx xxx xxx (emphasis supplied)
Under the Civil Register Law, a birth certificate is a historical record of the facts
as they existed at the time of birth.
29
Thus, the sex of a person is determined at
birth, visually done by the birth attendant (the physician or midwife) by examining
the genitals of the infant. Considering that there is no law legally recognizing sex
reassignment, the determination of a persons sex made at the time of his or her
birth, if not attended by error,
30
is immutable.
31

When words are not defined in a statute they are to be given their common and
ordinary meaning in the absence of a contrary legislative intent. The words sex,
male and female as used in the Civil Register Law and laws concerning the
civil registry (and even all other laws) should therefore be understood in their
common and ordinary usage, there being no legislative intent to the contrary. In
this connection, sex is defined as the sum of peculiarities of structure and
function that distinguish a male from a female
32
or the distinction between male
and female.
33
Female is the sex that produces ova or bears young
34
and male
is the sex that has organs to produce spermatozoa for fertilizing ova.
35
Thus,
the words male and female in everyday understanding do not include persons
who have undergone sex reassignment. Furthermore, words that are employed
in a statute which had at the time a well-known meaning are presumed to have
been used in that sense unless the context compels to the contrary.
36
Since the
statutory language of the Civil Register Law was enacted in the early 1900s and
remains unchanged, it cannot be argued that the term sex as used then is
something alterable through surgery or something that allows a post-operative
male-to-female transsexual to be included in the category female.
For these reasons, while petitioner may have succeeded in altering his body and
appearance through the intervention of modern surgery, no law authorizes the
change of entry as to sex in the civil registry for that reason. Thus, there is no
legal basis for his petition for the correction or change of the entries in his birth
certificate.
Neither May Entries in the Birth Certificate As to First Name or Sex Be
Changed on the Ground of Equity
The trial court opined that its grant of the petition was in consonance with the
principles of justice and equity. It believed that allowing the petition would cause
no harm, injury or prejudice to anyone. This is wrong.
The changes sought by petitioner will have serious and wide-ranging legal and
public policy consequences. First, even the trial court itself found that the petition
was but petitioners first step towards his eventual marriage to his male fianc.
However, marriage, one of the most sacred social institutions, is a special
contract of permanent union between a man and a woman.
37
One of its essential
requisites is the legal capacity of the contracting parties who must be a male and
a female.
38
To grant the changes sought by petitioner will substantially
reconfigure and greatly alter the laws on marriage and family relations. It will
allow the union of a man with another man who has undergone sex reassignment
(a male-to-female post-operative transsexual). Second, there are various laws
which apply particularly to women such as the provisions of the Labor Code on
employment of women,
39
certain felonies under the Revised Penal Code
40
and
the presumption of survivorship in case of calamities under Rule 131 of the Rules
of Court,
41
among others. These laws underscore the public policy in relation to
women which could be substantially affected if petitioners petition were to be
granted.
It is true that Article 9 of the Civil Code mandates that [n]o judge or court shall
decline to render judgment by reason of the silence, obscurity or insufficiency of
the law. However, it is not a license for courts to engage in judicial legislation.
The duty of the courts is to apply or interpret the law, not to make or amend it.
In our system of government, it is for the legislature, should it choose to do so, to
determine what guidelines should govern the recognition of the effects of sex
reassignment. The need for legislative guidelines becomes particularly important
in this case where the claims asserted are statute-based.
To reiterate, the statutes define who may file petitions for change of first name
and for correction or change of entries in the civil registry, where they may be
filed, what grounds may be invoked, what proof must be presented and what
procedures shall be observed. If the legislature intends to confer on a person
who has undergone sex reassignment the privilege to change his name and sex
to conform with his reassigned sex, it has to enact legislation laying down the
guidelines in turn governing the conferment of that privilege.
It might be theoretically possible for this Court to write a protocol on when a
person may be recognized as having successfully changed his sex. However,
this Court has no authority to fashion a law on that matter, or on anything else.
The Court cannot enact a law where no law exists. It can only apply or interpret
the written word of its co-equal branch of government, Congress.
Petitioner pleads that [t]he unfortunates are also entitled to a life of happiness,
contentment and [the] realization of their dreams. No argument about that. The
Court recognizes that there are people whose preferences and orientation do not
fit neatly into the commonly recognized parameters of social convention and that,
at least for them, life is indeed an ordeal. However, the remedies petitioner seeks
involve questions of public policy to be addressed solely by the legislature, not by
the courts.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, C.J., Chairperson, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Azcuna, Garcia, JJ., concur.







6. Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Petitioner,
- versus -
JENNIFER B. CAGANDAHAN,
Respondent.
G.R. No. 166676
Present:
Quisumbing, J., Chairperson,
Carpio Morales,
Tinga,
VELASCO, JR., and
BRION, JJ.
Promulgated:
September 12, 2008
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
This is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court raising purely
questions of law and seeking a reversal of the Decision[1] dated January 12,
2005 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 33 of Siniloan, Laguna, which
granted the Petition for Correction of Entries in Birth Certificate filed by Jennifer
B. Cagandahan and ordered the following changes of entries in Cagandahans
birth certificate: (1) the name "Jennifer Cagandahan" changed to "Jeff
Cagandahan" and (2) gender from "female" to "male."
The facts are as follows.
On December 11, 2003, respondent Jennifer Cagandahan filed a Petition for
Correction of Entries in Birth Certificate
2
before the RTC, Branch 33 of Siniloan,
Laguna.
In her petition, she alleged that she was born on January 13, 1981 and was
registered as a female in the Certificate of Live Birth but while growing up, she
developed secondary male characteristics and was diagnosed to have
Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia (CAH) which is a condition where persons thus
afflicted possess both male and female characteristics. She further alleged that
she was diagnosed to have clitoral hyperthropy in her early years and at age six,
underwent an ultrasound where it was discovered that she has small ovaries. At
age thirteen, tests revealed that her ovarian structures had minimized, she has
stopped growing and she has no breast or menstrual development. She then
alleged that for all interests and appearances as well as in mind and emotion,
she has become a male person. Thus, she prayed that her birth certificate be
corrected such that her gender be changed from female to male and her first
name be changed from Jennifer to Jeff.
The petition was published in a newspaper of general circulation for three (3)
consecutive weeks and was posted in conspicuous places by the sheriff of the
court. The Solicitor General entered his appearance and authorized the Assistant
Provincial Prosecutor to appear in his behalf.
To prove her claim, respondent testified and presented the testimony of Dr.
Michael Sionzon of the Department of Psychiatry, University of the Philippines-
Philippine General Hospital. Dr. Sionzon issued a medical certificate stating that
respondents condition is known as CAH. He explained that genetically
respondent is female but because her body secretes male hormones, her female
organs did not develop normally and she has two sex organs female and male.
He testified that this condition is very rare, that respondents uterus is not fully
developed because of lack of female hormones, and that she has no monthly
period. He further testified that respondents condition is permanent and
recommended the change of gender because respondent has made up her mind,
adjusted to her chosen role as male, and the gender change would be
advantageous to her.
The RTC granted respondents petition in a Decision dated January 12, 2005
which reads:
The Court is convinced that petitioner has satisfactorily shown that he is entitled
to the reliefs prayed [for]. Petitioner has adequately presented to the Court very
clear and convincing proofs for the granting of his petition. It was medically
proven that petitioners body produces male hormones, and first his body as well
as his action and feelings are that of a male. He has chosen to be male. He is a
normal person and wants to be acknowledged and identified as a male.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Civil Register of Pakil, Laguna is
hereby ordered to make the following corrections in the birth [c]ertificate of
Jennifer Cagandahan upon payment of the prescribed fees:
a) By changing the name from Jennifer Cagandahan to JEFF CAGANDAHAN;
and
b) By changing the gender from female to MALE.
It is likewise ordered that petitioners school records, voters registry, baptismal
certificate, and other pertinent records are hereby amended to conform with the
foregoing corrected data.
SO ORDERED.[3]
Thus, this petition by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) seeking a reversal
of the abovementioned ruling.
The issues raised by petitioner are:
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE PETITION CONSIDERING
THAT:
I.
THE REQUIREMENTS OF RULES 103 AND 108 OF THE RULES OF COURT
HAVE NOT BEEN COMPLIED WITH; AND,
II.
CORRECTION OF ENTRY UNDER RULE 108 DOES NOT ALLOW CHANGE
OF "SEX" OR "GENDER" IN THE BIRTH CERTIFICATE, WHILE
RESPONDENTS MEDICAL CONDITION, i.e., CONGENITAL ADRENAL
HYPERPLASIA DOES NOT MAKE HER A "MALE."
4

Simply stated, the issue is whether the trial court erred in ordering the correction
of entries in the birth certificate of respondent to change her sex or gender, from
female to male, on the ground of her medical condition known as CAH, and her
name from "Jennifer" to "Jeff," under Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court.
The OSG contends that the petition below is fatally defective for non-compliance
with Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court because while the local civil
registrar is an indispensable party in a petition for cancellation or correction of
entries under Section 3, Rule 108 of the Rules of Court, respondents petition
before the court a quo did not implead the local civil registrar.
5
The OSG further
contends respondents petition is fatally defective since it failed to state that
respondent is a bona fide resident of the province where the petition was filed for
at least three (3) years prior to the date of such filing as mandated under Section
2(b), Rule 103 of the Rules of Court.
6
The OSG argues that Rule 108 does not
allow change of sex or gender in the birth certificate and respondents claimed
medical condition known as CAH does not make her a male.
7

On the other hand, respondent counters that although the Local Civil Registrar of
Pakil, Laguna was not formally named a party in the Petition for Correction of
Birth Certificate, nonetheless the Local Civil Registrar was furnished a copy of
the Petition, the Order to publish on December 16, 2003 and all pleadings, orders
or processes in the course of the proceedings,
8
respondent is actually a male
person and hence his birth certificate has to be corrected to reflect his true
sex/gender,
9
change of sex or gender is allowed under Rule 108,
10
and
respondent substantially complied with the requirements of Rules 103 and 108 of
the Rules of Court.
11

Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court provide:
Rule 103
CHANGE OF NAME
Section 1. Venue. A person desiring to change his name shall present the
petition to the Regional Trial Court of the province in which he resides, [or, in the
City of Manila, to the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court].
Sec. 2. Contents of petition. A petition for change of name shall be signed and
verified by the person desiring his name changed, or some other person on his
behalf, and shall set forth:
(a) That the petitioner has been a bona fide resident of the province where the
petition is filed for at least three (3) years prior to the date of such filing;
(b) The cause for which the change of the petitioner's name is sought;
(c) The name asked for.
Sec. 3. Order for hearing. If the petition filed is sufficient in form and substance,
the court, by an order reciting the purpose of the petition, shall fix a date and
place for the hearing thereof, and shall direct that a copy of the order be
published before the hearing at least once a week for three (3) successive weeks
in some newspaper of general circulation published in the province, as the court
shall deem best. The date set for the hearing shall not be within thirty (30) days
prior to an election nor within four (4) months after the last publication of the
notice.
Sec. 4. Hearing. Any interested person may appear at the hearing and oppose
the petition. The Solicitor General or the proper provincial or city fiscal shall
appear on behalf of the Government of the Republic.
Sec. 5. Judgment. Upon satisfactory proof in open court on the date fixed in the
order that such order has been published as directed and that the allegations of
the petition are true, the court shall, if proper and reasonable cause appears for
changing the name of the petitioner, adjudge that such name be changed in
accordance with the prayer of the petition.
Sec. 6. Service of judgment. Judgments or orders rendered in connection with
this rule shall be furnished the civil registrar of the municipality or city where the
court issuing the same is situated, who shall forthwith enter the same in the civil
register.
Rule 108
CANCELLATION OR CORRECTION OF ENTRIES
IN THE CIVIL REGISTRY
Section 1. Who may file petition. Any person interested in any act, event, order
or decree concerning the civil status of persons which has been recorded in the
civil register, may file a verified petition for the cancellation or correction of any
entry relating thereto, with the Regional Trial Court of the province where the
corresponding civil registry is located.
Sec. 2. Entries subject to cancellation or correction. Upon good and valid
grounds, the following entries in the civil register may be cancelled or corrected:
(a) births; (b) marriages; (c) deaths; (d) legal separations; (e) judgments of
annulments of marriage; (f) judgments declaring marriages void from the
beginning; (g) legitimations; (h) adoptions; (i) acknowledgments of natural
children; (j) naturalization; (k) election, loss or recovery of citizenship; (l) civil
interdiction; (m) judicial determination of filiation; (n) voluntary emancipation of a
minor; and (o) changes of name.
Sec. 3. Parties. When cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil register
is sought, the civil registrar and all persons who have or claim any interest which
would be affected thereby shall be made parties to the proceeding.
Sec. 4. Notice and publication. Upon the filing of the petition, the court shall, by
an order, fix the time and place for the hearing of the same, and cause
reasonable notice thereof to be given to the persons named in the petition. The
court shall also cause the order to be published once a week for three (3)
consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in the province.
Sec. 5. Opposition. The civil registrar and any person having or claiming any
interest under the entry whose cancellation or correction is sought may, within
fifteen (15) days from notice of the petition, or from the last date of publication of
such notice, file his opposition thereto.
Sec. 6. Expediting proceedings. The court in which the proceedings is brought
may make orders expediting the proceedings, and may also grant preliminary
injunction for the preservation of the rights of the parties pending such
proceedings.
Sec. 7. Order. After hearing, the court may either dismiss the petition or issue
an order granting the cancellation or correction prayed for. In either case, a
certified copy of the judgment shall be served upon the civil registrar concerned
who shall annotate the same in his record.
The OSG argues that the petition below is fatally defective for non-compliance
with Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court because respondents petition did
not implead the local civil registrar. Section 3, Rule 108 provides that the civil
registrar and all persons who have or claim any interest which would be affected
thereby shall be made parties to the proceedings. Likewise, the local civil
registrar is required to be made a party in a proceeding for the correction of
name in the civil registry. He is an indispensable party without whom no final
determination of the case can be had.[12] Unless all possible indispensable
parties were duly notified of the proceedings, the same shall be considered as
falling much too short of the requirements of the rules.
13
The corresponding
petition should also implead as respondents the civil registrar and all other
persons who may have or may claim to have any interest that would be affected
thereby.
14
Respondent, however, invokes Section 6,[15] Rule 1 of the Rules of
Court which states that courts shall construe the Rules liberally to promote their
objectives of securing to the parties a just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of
the matters brought before it. We agree that there is substantial compliance with
Rule 108 when respondent furnished a copy of the petition to the local civil
registrar.
The determination of a persons sex appearing in his birth certificate is a legal
issue and the court must look to the statutes. In this connection, Article 412 of the
Civil Code provides:
ART. 412. No entry in a civil register shall be changed or corrected without a
judicial order.
Together with Article 376[16] of the Civil Code, this provision was amended by
Republic Act No. 9048[17] in so far as clerical or typographical errors are
involved. The correction or change of such matters can now be made through
administrative proceedings and without the need for a judicial order. In effect,
Rep. Act No. 9048 removed from the ambit of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court the
correction of such errors. Rule 108 now applies only to substantial changes and
corrections in entries in the civil register.
18

Under Rep. Act No. 9048, a correction in the civil registry involving the change of
sex is not a mere clerical or typographical error. It is a substantial change for
which the applicable procedure is Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.
19

The entries envisaged in Article 412 of the Civil Code and correctable under Rule
108 of the Rules of Court are those provided in Articles 407 and 408 of the Civil
Code:
ART. 407. Acts, events and judicial decrees concerning the civil status of
persons shall be recorded in the civil register.
ART. 408. The following shall be entered in the civil register:
(1) Births; (2) marriages; (3) deaths; (4) legal separations; (5) annulments of
marriage; (6) judgments declaring marriages void from the beginning; (7)
legitimations; (8) adoptions; (9) acknowledgments of natural children; (10)
naturalization; (11) loss, or (12) recovery of citizenship; (13) civil interdiction; (14)
judicial determination of filiation; (15) voluntary emancipation of a minor; and (16)
changes of name.
The acts, events or factual errors contemplated under Article 407 of the Civil
Code include even those that occur after birth.
20

Respondent undisputedly has CAH. This condition causes the early or
"inappropriate" appearance of male characteristics. A person, like respondent,
with this condition produces too much androgen, a male hormone. A newborn
who has XX chromosomes coupled with CAH usually has a (1) swollen clitoris
with the urethral opening at the base, an ambiguous genitalia often appearing
more male than female; (2) normal internal structures of the female reproductive
tract such as the ovaries, uterus and fallopian tubes; as the child grows older,
some features start to appear male, such as deepening of the voice, facial hair,
and failure to menstruate at puberty. About 1 in 10,000 to 18,000 children are
born with CAH.
CAH is one of many conditions[21] that involve intersex anatomy. During the
twentieth century, medicine adopted the term "intersexuality" to apply to human
beings who cannot be classified as either male or female.[22] The term is now of
widespread use. According to Wikipedia, intersexuality "is the state of a living
thing of a gonochoristic species whose sex chromosomes, genitalia, and/or
secondary sex characteristics are determined to be neither exclusively male nor
female. An organism with intersex may have biological characteristics of both
male and female sexes."
Intersex individuals are treated in different ways by different cultures. In most
societies, intersex individuals have been expected to conform to either a male or
female gender role.[23] Since the rise of modern medical science in Western
societies, some intersex people with ambiguous external genitalia have had their
genitalia surgically modified to resemble either male or female genitals.[24] More
commonly, an intersex individual is considered as suffering from a "disorder"
which is almost always recommended to be treated, whether by surgery and/or
by taking lifetime medication in order to mold the individual as neatly as possible
into the category of either male or female.
In deciding this case, we consider the compassionate calls for recognition of the
various degrees of intersex as variations which should not be subject to outright
denial. "It has been suggested that there is some middle ground between the
sexes, a no-mans land for those individuals who are neither truly male nor truly
female."[25] The current state of Philippine statutes apparently compels that a
person be classified either as a male or as a female, but this Court is not
controlled by mere appearances when nature itself fundamentally negates such
rigid classification.
In the instant case, if we determine respondent to be a female, then there is no
basis for a change in the birth certificate entry for gender. But if we determine,
based on medical testimony and scientific development showing the respondent
to be other than female, then a change in the
subjects birth certificate entry is in order.
Biologically, nature endowed respondent with a mixed (neither consistently and
categorically female nor consistently and categorically male) composition.
Respondent has female (XX) chromosomes. However, respondents body
system naturally produces high levels of male hormones (androgen). As a result,
respondent has ambiguous genitalia and the phenotypic features of a male.
Ultimately, we are of the view that where the person is biologically or naturally
intersex the determining factor in his gender classification would be what the
individual, like respondent, having reached the age of majority, with good reason
thinks of his/her sex. Respondent here thinks of himself as a male and
considering that his body produces high levels of male hormones (androgen)
there is preponderant biological support for considering him as being male.
Sexual development in cases of intersex persons makes the gender classification
at birth inconclusive. It is at maturity that the gender of such persons, like
respondent, is fixed.
Respondent here has simply let nature take its course and has not taken
unnatural steps to arrest or interfere with what he was born with. And
accordingly, he has already ordered his life to that of a male. Respondent could
have undergone treatment and taken steps, like taking lifelong medication,[26] to
force his body into the categorical mold of a female but he did not. He chose not
to do so. Nature has instead taken its due course in respondents development to
reveal more fully his male characteristics.
In the absence of a law on the matter, the Court will not dictate on respondent
concerning a matter so innately private as ones sexuality and lifestyle
preferences, much less on whether or not to undergo medical treatment to
reverse the male tendency due to CAH. The Court will not consider respondent
as having erred in not choosing to undergo treatment in order to become or
remain as a female. Neither will the Court force respondent to undergo treatment
and to take medication in order to fit the mold of a female, as society commonly
currently knows this gender of the human species. Respondent is the one who
has to live with his intersex anatomy. To him belongs the human right to the
pursuit of happiness and of health. Thus, to him should belong the primordial
choice of what courses of action to take along the path of his sexual development
and maturation. In the absence of evidence that respondent is an
"incompetent"[27] and in the absence of evidence to show that classifying
respondent as a male will harm other members of society who are equally
entitled to protection under the law, the Court affirms as valid and justified the
respondents position and his personal judgment of being a male.
In so ruling we do no more than give respect to (1) the diversity of nature; and (2)
how an individual deals with what nature has handed out. In other words, we
respect respondents congenital condition and his mature decision to be a male.
Life is already difficult for the ordinary person. We cannot but respect how
respondent deals with his unordinary state and thus help make his life easier,
considering the unique circumstances in this case.
As for respondents change of name under Rule 103, this Court has held that a
change of name is not a matter of right but of judicial discretion, to be exercised
in the light of the reasons adduced and the consequences that will follow.[28]
The trial courts grant of respondents change of name from Jennifer to Jeff
implies a change of a feminine name to a masculine name. Considering the
consequence that respondents change of name merely recognizes his preferred
gender, we find merit in respondents change of name. Such a change will
conform with the change of the entry in his birth certificate from female to male.
WHEREFORE, the Republics petition is DENIED. The Decision dated January
12, 2005 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 33 of Siniloan, Laguna, is
AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES
Associate Justice
DANTE O. TINGA
Associate Justice
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice
ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice
A T T E S T A T I O N
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Courts Division.
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairperson
C E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division
Chairpersons Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had
been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Courts Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice

















7. Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-19671 November 29, 1965
PASTOR B. TENCHAVEZ, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
VICENTA F. ESCAO, ET AL., defendants-appellees.
I. V. Binamira & F. B. Barria for plaintiff-appellant.
Jalandoni & Jarnir for defendants-appellees.
REYES, J.B.L., J .:
Direct appeal, on factual and legal questions, from the judgment of the Court of
First Instance of Cebu, in its Civil Case No. R-4177, denying the claim of the
plaintiff-appellant, Pastor B. Tenchavez, for legal separation and one million
pesos in damages against his wife and parents-in-law, the defendants-appellees,
Vicente, Mamerto and Mena,
1
all surnamed "Escao," respectively.
2

The facts, supported by the evidence of record, are the following:
Missing her late afternoon classes on 24 February 1948 in the University of San
Carlos, Cebu City, where she was then enrolled as a second year student of
commerce, Vicenta Escao, 27 years of age (scion of a well-to-do and socially
prominent Filipino family of Spanish ancestry and a "sheltered colegiala"),
exchanged marriage vows with Pastor Tenchavez, 32 years of age, an engineer,
ex-army officer and of undistinguished stock, without the knowledge of her
parents, before a Catholic chaplain, Lt. Moises Lavares, in the house of one Juan
Alburo in the said city. The marriage was the culmination of a previous love affair
and was duly registered with the local civil register.
Vicenta's letters to Pastor, and his to her, before the marriage, indicate that the
couple were deeply in love. Together with a friend, Pacita Noel, their matchmaker
and go-between, they had planned out their marital future whereby Pacita would
be the governess of their first-born; they started saving money in a piggy bank. A
few weeks before their secret marriage, their engagement was broken; Vicenta
returned the engagement ring and accepted another suitor, Joseling Lao. Her
love for Pastor beckoned; she pleaded for his return, and they reconciled. This
time they planned to get married and then elope. To facilitate the elopement,
Vicenta had brought some of her clothes to the room of Pacita Noel in St. Mary's
Hall, which was their usual trysting place.
Although planned for the midnight following their marriage, the elopement did
not, however, materialize because when Vicente went back to her classes after
the marriage, her mother, who got wind of the intended nuptials, was already
waiting for her at the college. Vicenta was taken home where she admitted that
she had already married Pastor. Mamerto and Mena Escao were surprised,
because Pastor never asked for the hand of Vicente, and were disgusted
because of the great scandal that the clandestine marriage would provoke (t.s.n.,
vol. III, pp. 1105-06). The following morning, the Escao spouses sought priestly
advice. Father Reynes suggested a recelebration to validate what he believed to
be an invalid marriage, from the standpoint of the Church, due to the lack of
authority from the Archbishop or the parish priest for the officiating chaplain to
celebrate the marriage. The recelebration did not take place, because on 26
February 1948 Mamerto Escao was handed by a maid, whose name he claims
he does not remember, a letter purportedly coming from San Carlos college
students and disclosing an amorous relationship between Pastor Tenchavez and
Pacita Noel; Vicenta translated the letter to her father, and thereafter would not
agree to a new marriage. Vicenta and Pastor met that day in the house of Mrs.
Pilar Mendezona. Thereafter, Vicenta continued living with her parents while
Pastor returned to his job in Manila. Her letter of 22 March 1948 (Exh. "M"), while
still solicitous of her husband's welfare, was not as endearing as her previous
letters when their love was aflame.
Vicenta was bred in Catholic ways but is of a changeable disposition, and Pastor
knew it. She fondly accepted her being called a "jellyfish." She was not prevented
by her parents from communicating with Pastor (Exh. "1-Escao"), but her letters
became less frequent as the days passed. As of June, 1948 the newlyweds were
already estranged (Exh. "2-Escao"). Vicenta had gone to Jimenez, Misamis
Occidental, to escape from the scandal that her marriage stirred in Cebu society.
There, a lawyer filed for her a petition, drafted by then Senator Emmanuel
Pelaez, to annul her marriage. She did not sign the petition (Exh. "B-5"). The
case was dismissed without prejudice because of her non-appearance at the
hearing (Exh. "B-4").
On 24 June 1950, without informing her husband, she applied for a passport,
indicating in her application that she was single, that her purpose was to study,
and she was domiciled in Cebu City, and that she intended to return after two
years. The application was approved, and she left for the United States. On 22
August 1950, she filed a verified complaint for divorce against the herein plaintiff
in the Second Judicial District Court of the State of Nevada in and for the County
of Washoe, on the ground of "extreme cruelty, entirely mental in character." On
21 October 1950, a decree of divorce, "final and absolute", was issued in open
court by the said tribunal.
In 1951 Mamerto and Mena Escao filed a petition with the Archbishop of Cebu
to annul their daughter's marriage to Pastor (Exh. "D"). On 10 September 1954,
Vicenta sought papal dispensation of her marriage (Exh. "D"-2).
On 13 September 1954, Vicenta married an American, Russell Leo Moran, in
Nevada. She now lives with him in California, and, by him, has begotten children.
She acquired American citizenship on 8 August 1958.
But on 30 July 1955, Tenchavez had initiated the proceedings at bar by a
complaint in the Court of First Instance of Cebu, and amended on 31 May 1956,
against Vicenta F. Escao, her parents, Mamerto and Mena Escao, whom he
charged with having dissuaded and discouraged Vicenta from joining her
husband, and alienating her affections, and against the Roman Catholic Church,
for having, through its Diocesan Tribunal, decreed the annulment of the
marriage, and asked for legal separation and one million pesos in damages.
Vicenta claimed a valid divorce from plaintiff and an equally valid marriage to her
present husband, Russell Leo Moran; while her parents denied that they had in
any way influenced their daughter's acts, and counterclaimed for moral damages.
The appealed judgment did not decree a legal separation, but freed the plaintiff
from supporting his wife and to acquire property to the exclusion of his wife. It
allowed the counterclaim of Mamerto Escao and Mena Escao for moral and
exemplary damages and attorney's fees against the plaintiff-appellant, to the
extent of P45,000.00, and plaintiff resorted directly to this Court.
The appellant ascribes, as errors of the trial court, the following:
1. In not declaring legal separation; in not holding defendant Vicenta F.
Escao liable for damages and in dismissing the complaint;.
2. In not holding the defendant parents Mamerto Escano and the heirs of
Doa Mena Escao liable for damages;.
3 In holding the plaintiff liable for and requiring him to pay the damages to
the defendant parents on their counterclaims; and.
4. In dismissing the complaint and in denying the relief sought by the
plaintiff.
That on 24 February 1948 the plaintiff-appellant, Pastor Tenchavez, and the
defendant-appellee, Vicenta Escao, were validly married to each other, from the
standpoint of our civil law, is clearly established by the record before us. Both
parties were then above the age of majority, and otherwise qualified; and both
consented to the marriage, which was performed by a Catholic priest (army
chaplain Lavares) in the presence of competent witnesses. It is nowhere shown
that said priest was not duly authorized under civil law to solemnize marriages.
The chaplain's alleged lack of ecclesiastical authorization from the parish priest
and the Ordinary, as required by Canon law, is irrelevant in our civil law, not only
because of the separation of Church and State but also because Act 3613 of the
Philippine Legislature (which was the marriage law in force at the time) expressly
provided that
SEC. 1. Essential requisites. Essential requisites for marriage are the legal
capacity of the contracting parties and consent. (Emphasis supplied)
The actual authority of the solemnizing officer was thus only a formal
requirement, and, therefore, not essential to give the marriage civil effects,
3
and
this is emphasized by section 27 of said marriage act, which provided the
following:
SEC. 27. Failure to comply with formal requirements. No marriage shall be
declared invalid because of the absence of one or several of the formal
requirements of this Act if, when it was performed, the spouses or one of
them believed in good faith that the person who solemnized the marriage
was actually empowered to do so, and that the marriage was perfectly
legal.
The good faith of all the parties to the marriage (and hence the validity of their
marriage) will be presumed until the contrary is positively proved (Lao vs. Dee
Tim, 45 Phil. 739, 745; Francisco vs. Jason, 60 Phil. 442, 448). It is well to note
here that in the case at bar, doubts as to the authority of the solemnizing priest
arose only after the marriage, when Vicenta's parents consulted Father Reynes
and the archbishop of Cebu. Moreover, the very act of Vicenta in abandoning her
original action for annulment and subsequently suing for divorce implies an
admission that her marriage to plaintiff was valid and binding.
Defendant Vicenta Escao argues that when she contracted the marriage she
was under the undue influence of Pacita Noel, whom she charges to have been
in conspiracy with appellant Tenchavez. Even granting, for argument's sake, the
truth of that contention, and assuming that Vicenta's consent was vitiated by
fraud and undue influence, such vices did not render her marriage ab initio void,
but merely voidable, and the marriage remained valid until annulled by a
competent civil court. This was never done, and admittedly, Vicenta's suit for
annulment in the Court of First Instance of Misamis was dismissed for non-
prosecution.
It is equally clear from the record that the valid marriage between Pastor
Tenchavez and Vicenta Escao remained subsisting and undissolved under
Philippine law, notwithstanding the decree of absolute divorce that the wife
sought and obtained on 21 October 1950 from the Second Judicial District Court
of Washoe County, State of Nevada, on grounds of "extreme cruelty, entirely
mental in character." At the time the divorce decree was issued, Vicenta Escao,
like her husband, was still a Filipino citizen.
4
She was then subject to Philippine
law, and Article 15 of the Civil Code of the Philippines (Rep. Act No. 386),
already in force at the time, expressly provided:
Laws relating to family rights and duties or to the status, condition and
legal capacity of persons are binding upon the citizens of the Philippines,
even though living abroad.
The Civil Code of the Philippines, now in force, does not admit absolute divorce,
quo ad vinculo matrimonii; and in fact does not even use that term, to further
emphasize its restrictive policy on the matter, in contrast to the preceding
legislation that admitted absolute divorce on grounds of adultery of the wife or
concubinage of the husband (Act 2710). Instead of divorce, the present Civil
Code only provides for legal separation (Title IV, Book 1, Arts. 97 to 108), and,
even in that case, it expressly prescribes that "the marriage bonds shall not be
severed" (Art. 106, subpar. 1).
For the Philippine courts to recognize and give recognition or effect to a foreign
decree of absolute divorce betiveen Filipino citizens could be a patent violation of
the declared public policy of the state, specially in view of the third paragraph of
Article 17 of the Civil Code that prescribes the following:
Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and those
which have for their object public order, policy and good customs, shall not
be rendered ineffective by laws or judgments promulgated, or by
determinations or conventions agreed upon in a foreign country.
Even more, the grant of effectivity in this jurisdiction to such foreign divorce
decrees would, in effect, give rise to an irritating and scandalous discrimination in
favor of wealthy citizens, to the detriment of those members of our polity whose
means do not permit them to sojourn abroad and obtain absolute divorces
outside the Philippines.
From this point of view, it is irrelevant that appellant Pastor Tenchavez should
have appeared in the Nevada divorce court. Primarily because the policy of our
law cannot be nullified by acts of private parties (Civil Code,Art. 17, jam quot.);
and additionally, because the mere appearance of a non-resident consort cannot
confer jurisdiction where the court originally had none (Area vs. Javier, 95 Phil.
579).
From the preceding facts and considerations, there flows as a necessary
consequence that in this jurisdiction Vicenta Escao's divorce and second
marriage are not entitled to recognition as valid; for her previous union to plaintiff
Tenchavez must be declared to be existent and undissolved. It follows, likewise,
that her refusal to perform her wifely duties, and her denial of consortium and her
desertion of her husband constitute in law a wrong caused through her fault, for
which the husband is entitled to the corresponding indemnity (Civil Code, Art.
2176). Neither an unsubstantiated charge of deceit nor an anonymous letter
charging immorality against the husband constitute, contrary to her claim,
adequate excuse. Wherefore, her marriage and cohabitation with Russell Leo
Moran is technically "intercourse with a person not her husband" from the
standpoint of Philippine Law, and entitles plaintiff-appellant Tenchavez to a
decree of "legal separation under our law, on the basis of adultery" (Revised
Penal Code, Art. 333).
The foregoing conclusions as to the untoward effect of a marriage after an invalid
divorce are in accord with the previous doctrines and rulings of this court on the
subject, particularly those that were rendered under our laws prior to the approval
of the absolute divorce act (Act 2710 of the Philippine Legislature). As a matter of
legal history, our statutes did not recognize divorces a vinculo before 1917, when
Act 2710 became effective; and the present Civil Code of the Philippines, in
disregarding absolute divorces, in effect merely reverted to the policies on the
subject prevailing before Act 2710. The rulings, therefore, under the Civil Code of
1889, prior to the Act above-mentioned, are now, fully applicable. Of these, the
decision in Ramirez vs. Gmur, 42 Phil. 855, is of particular interest. Said this
Court in that case:
As the divorce granted by the French Court must be ignored, it results that
the marriage of Dr. Mory and Leona Castro, celebrated in London in 1905,
could not legalize their relations; and the circumstance that they afterwards
passed for husband and wife in Switzerland until her death is wholly
without legal significance. The claims of the very children to participate in
the estate of Samuel Bishop must therefore be rejected. The right to inherit
is limited to legitimate, legitimated and acknowledged natural children. The
children of adulterous relations are wholly excluded. The word
"descendants" as used in Article 941 of the Civil Code cannot be
interpreted to include illegitimates born of adulterous relations. (Emphasis
supplied)
Except for the fact that the successional rights of the children, begotten from
Vicenta's marriage to Leo Moran after the invalid divorce, are not involved in the
case at bar, the Gmur case is authority for the proposition that such union is
adulterous in this jurisdiction, and, therefore, justifies an action for legal
separation on the part of the innocent consort of the first marriage, that stands
undissolved in Philippine law. In not so declaring, the trial court committed error.
True it is that our ruling gives rise to anomalous situations where the status of a
person (whether divorced or not) would depend on the territory where the
question arises. Anomalies of this kind are not new in the Philippines, and the
answer to them was given in Barretto vs. Gonzales, 58 Phil. 667:
The hardship of the existing divorce laws in the Philippine Islands are well
known to the members of the Legislature. It is the duty of the Courts to
enforce the laws of divorce as written by Legislature if they are
constitutional. Courts have no right to say that such laws are too strict or
too liberal. (p. 72)
The appellant's first assignment of error is, therefore, sustained.
However, the plaintiff-appellant's charge that his wife's parents, Dr. Mamerto
Escao and his wife, the late Doa Mena Escao, alienated the affections of their
daughter and influenced her conduct toward her husband are not supported by
credible evidence. The testimony of Pastor Tenchavez about the Escao's
animosity toward him strikes us to be merely conjecture and exaggeration, and
are belied by Pastor's own letters written before this suit was begun (Exh. "2-
Escao" and "Vicenta," Rec. on App., pp. 270-274). In these letters he expressly
apologized to the defendants for "misjudging them" and for the "great
unhappiness" caused by his "impulsive blunders" and "sinful pride," "effrontery
and audacity" [sic]. Plaintiff was admitted to the Escao house to visit and court
Vicenta, and the record shows nothing to prove that he would not have been
accepted to marry Vicente had he openly asked for her hand, as good manners
and breeding demanded. Even after learning of the clandestine marriage, and
despite their shock at such unexpected event, the parents of Vicenta proposed
and arranged that the marriage be recelebrated in strict conformity with the
canons of their religion upon advice that the previous one was canonically
defective. If no recelebration of the marriage ceremony was had it was not due to
defendants Mamerto Escao and his wife, but to the refusal of Vicenta to
proceed with it. That the spouses Escao did not seek to compel or induce their
daughter to assent to the recelebration but respected her decision, or that they
abided by her resolve, does not constitute in law an alienation of affections.
Neither does the fact that Vicenta's parents sent her money while she was in the
United States; for it was natural that they should not wish their daughter to live in
penury even if they did not concur in her decision to divorce Tenchavez (27 Am.
Jur. 130-132).
There is no evidence that the parents of Vicenta, out of improper motives, aided
and abetted her original suit for annulment, or her subsequent divorce; she
appears to have acted independently, and being of age, she was entitled to judge
what was best for her and ask that her decisions be respected. Her parents, in so
doing, certainly cannot be charged with alienation of affections in the absence of
malice or unworthy motives, which have not been shown, good faith being
always presumed until the contrary is proved.
SEC. 529. Liability of Parents, Guardians or Kin. The law distinguishes
between the right of a parent to interest himself in the marital affairs of his
child and the absence of rights in a stranger to intermeddle in such affairs.
However, such distinction between the liability of parents and that of
strangers is only in regard to what will justify interference. A parent isliable
for alienation of affections resulting from his own malicious conduct, as
where he wrongfully entices his son or daughter to leave his or her spouse,
but he is not liable unless he acts maliciously, without justification and from
unworthy motives. He is not liable where he acts and advises his child in
good faith with respect to his child's marital relations in the interest of his
child as he sees it, the marriage of his child not terminating his right and
liberty to interest himself in, and be extremely solicitous for, his child's
welfare and happiness, even where his conduct and advice suggest or
result in the separation of the spouses or the obtaining of a divorce or
annulment, or where he acts under mistake or misinformation, or where his
advice or interference are indiscreet or unfortunate, although it has been
held that the parent is liable for consequences resulting from recklessness.
He may in good faith take his child into his home and afford him or her
protection and support, so long as he has not maliciously enticed his child
away, or does not maliciously entice or cause him or her to stay away,
from his or her spouse. This rule has more frequently been applied in the
case of advice given to a married daughter, but it is equally applicable in
the case of advice given to a son.
Plaintiff Tenchavez, in falsely charging Vicenta's aged parents with racial or
social discrimination and with having exerted efforts and pressured her to seek
annulment and divorce, unquestionably caused them unrest and anxiety, entitling
them to recover damages. While this suit may not have been impelled by actual
malice, the charges were certainly reckless in the face of the proven facts and
circumstances. Court actions are not established for parties to give vent to their
prejudices or spleen.
In the assessment of the moral damages recoverable by appellant Pastor
Tenchavez from defendant Vicente Escao, it is proper to take into account,
against his patently unreasonable claim for a million pesos in damages, that (a)
the marriage was celebrated in secret, and its failure was not characterized by
publicity or undue humiliation on appellant's part; (b) that the parties never lived
together; and (c) that there is evidence that appellant had originally agreed to the
annulment of the marriage, although such a promise was legally invalid, being
against public policy (cf. Art. 88, Civ. Code). While appellant is unable to remarry
under our law, this fact is a consequence of the indissoluble character of the
union that appellant entered into voluntarily and with open eyes rather than of her
divorce and her second marriage. All told, we are of the opinion that appellant
should recover P25,000 only by way of moral damages and attorney's fees.
With regard to the P45,000 damages awarded to the defendants, Dr. Mamerto
Escao and Mena Escao, by the court below, we opine that the same are
excessive. While the filing of this unfounded suit must have wounded said
defendants' feelings and caused them anxiety, the same could in no way have
seriously injured their reputation, or otherwise prejudiced them, lawsuits having
become a common occurrence in present society. What is important, and has
been correctly established in the decision of the court below, is that said
defendants were not guilty of any improper conduct in the whole deplorable
affair. This Court, therefore, reduces the damages awarded to P5,000 only.
Summing up, the Court rules:
(1) That a foreign divorce between Filipino citizens, sought and decreed after the
effectivity of the present Civil Code (Rep. Act 386), is not entitled to recognition
as valid in this jurisdiction; and neither is the marriage contracted with another
party by the divorced consort, subsequently to the foreign decree of divorce,
entitled to validity in the country;
(2) That the remarriage of divorced wife and her co-habitation with a person other
than the lawful husband entitle the latter to a decree of legal separation
conformably to Philippine law;
(3) That the desertion and securing of an invalid divorce decree by one consort
entitles the other to recover damages;
(4) That an action for alienation of affections against the parents of one consort
does not lie in the absence of proof of malice or unworthy motives on their part.
WHEREFORE, the decision under appeal is hereby modified as follows;
(1) Adjudging plaintiff-appellant Pastor Tenchavez entitled to a decree of legal
separation from defendant Vicenta F. Escao;
(2) Sentencing defendant-appellee Vicenta Escao to pay plaintiff-appellant
Tenchavez the amount of P25,000 for damages and attorneys' fees;
(3) Sentencing appellant Pastor Tenchavez to pay the appellee, Mamerto
Escao and the estate of his wife, the deceased Mena Escao, P5,000 by way of
damages and attorneys' fees.
Neither party to recover costs.
Bengzon, C.J., Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Dizon, Regala, Makalintal,
Bengzon, J.P. and Zaldivar, JJ., concur.
















8. Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 154380 October 5, 2005
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
CIPRIANO ORBECIDO III, Respondent.
D E C I S I O N
QUISUMBING, J .:
Given a valid marriage between two Filipino citizens, where one party is later
naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains a valid divorce decree capacitating
him or her to remarry, can the Filipino spouse likewise remarry under Philippine
law?
Before us is a case of first impression that behooves the Court to make a definite
ruling on this apparently novel question, presented as a pure question of law.
In this petition for review, the Solicitor General assails the Decision
1
dated May
15, 2002, of the Regional Trial Court of Molave, Zamboanga del Sur, Branch 23
and its Resolution
2
dated July 4, 2002 denying the motion for reconsideration.
The court a quo had declared that herein respondent Cipriano Orbecido III is
capacitated to remarry. The fallo of the impugned Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, by virtue of the provision of the second paragraph of Art. 26 of
the Family Code and by reason of the divorce decree obtained against him by his
American wife, the petitioner is given the capacity to remarry under the Philippine
Law.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
3

The factual antecedents, as narrated by the trial court, are as follows.
On May 24, 1981, Cipriano Orbecido III married Lady Myros M. Villanueva at the
United Church of Christ in the Philippines in Lam-an, Ozamis City. Their marriage
was blessed with a son and a daughter, Kristoffer Simbortriz V. Orbecido and
Lady Kimberly V. Orbecido.
In 1986, Ciprianos wife left for the United States bringing along their son
Kristoffer. A few years later, Cipriano discovered that his wife had been
naturalized as an American citizen.
Sometime in 2000, Cipriano learned from his son that his wife had obtained a
divorce decree and then married a certain Innocent Stanley. She, Stanley and
her child by him currently live at 5566 A. Walnut Grove Avenue, San Gabriel,
California.
Cipriano thereafter filed with the trial court a petition for authority to remarry
invoking Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code. No opposition was filed.
Finding merit in the petition, the court granted the same. The Republic, herein
petitioner, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), sought
reconsideration but it was denied.
In this petition, the OSG raises a pure question of law:
WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT CAN REMARRY UNDER ARTICLE 26 OF
THE FAMILY CODE
4

The OSG contends that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code is not
applicable to the instant case because it only applies to a valid mixed marriage;
that is, a marriage celebrated between a Filipino citizen and an alien. The proper
remedy, according to the OSG, is to file a petition for annulment or for legal
separation.
5
Furthermore, the OSG argues there is no law that governs
respondents situation. The OSG posits that this is a matter of legislation and not
of judicial determination.
6

For his part, respondent admits that Article 26 is not directly applicable to his
case but insists that when his naturalized alien wife obtained a divorce decree
which capacitated her to remarry, he is likewise capacitated by operation of law
pursuant to Section 12, Article II of the Constitution.
7

At the outset, we note that the petition for authority to remarry filed before the trial
court actually constituted a petition for declaratory relief. In this connection,
Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court provides:
RULE 63
DECLARATORY RELIEF AND SIMILAR REMEDIES
Section 1. Who may file petitionAny person interested under a deed, will,
contract or other written instrument, or whose rights are affected by a statute,
executive order or regulation, ordinance, or other governmental regulation may,
before breach or violation thereof, bring an action in the appropriate Regional
Trial Court to determine any question of construction or validity arising, and for a
declaration of his rights or duties, thereunder.
. . .
The requisites of a petition for declaratory relief are: (1) there must be a
justiciable controversy; (2) the controversy must be between persons whose
interests are adverse; (3) that the party seeking the relief has a legal interest in
the controversy; and (4) that the issue is ripe for judicial determination.
8

This case concerns the applicability of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 to a marriage
between two Filipino citizens where one later acquired alien citizenship, obtained
a divorce decree, and remarried while in the U.S.A. The interests of the parties
are also adverse, as petitioner representing the State asserts its duty to protect
the institution of marriage while respondent, a private citizen, insists on a
declaration of his capacity to remarry. Respondent, praying for relief, has legal
interest in the controversy. The issue raised is also ripe for judicial determination
inasmuch as when respondent remarries, litigation ensues and puts into question
the validity of his second marriage.
Coming now to the substantive issue, does Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the
Family Code apply to the case of respondent? Necessarily, we must dwell on
how this provision had come about in the first place, and what was the intent of
the legislators in its enactment?
Brief Historical Background
On July 6, 1987, then President Corazon Aquino signed into law Executive Order
No. 209, otherwise known as the "Family Code," which took effect on August 3,
1988. Article 26 thereof states:
All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance with the laws in
force in the country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall
also be valid in this country, except those prohibited under Articles 35, 37, and
38.
On July 17, 1987, shortly after the signing of the original Family Code, Executive
Order No. 227 was likewise signed into law, amending Articles 26, 36, and 39 of
the Family Code. A second paragraph was added to Article 26. As so amended,
it now provides:
ART. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance with the
laws in force in the country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such,
shall also be valid in this country, except those prohibited under Articles 35(1),
(4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated
and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse
capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to
remarry under Philippine law. (Emphasis supplied)
On its face, the foregoing provision does not appear to govern the situation
presented by the case at hand. It seems to apply only to cases where at the time
of the celebration of the marriage, the parties are a Filipino citizen and a
foreigner. The instant case is one where at the time the marriage was
solemnized, the parties were two Filipino citizens, but later on, the wife was
naturalized as an American citizen and subsequently obtained a divorce granting
her capacity to remarry, and indeed she remarried an American citizen while
residing in the U.S.A.
Noteworthy, in the Report of the Public Hearings
9
on the Family Code, the
Catholic Bishops Conference of the Philippines (CBCP) registered the following
objections to Paragraph 2 of Article 26:
1. The rule is discriminatory. It discriminates against those whose spouses are
Filipinos who divorce them abroad. These spouses who are divorced will not be
able to re-marry, while the spouses of foreigners who validly divorce them abroad
can.
2. This is the beginning of the recognition of the validity of divorce even for
Filipino citizens. For those whose foreign spouses validly divorce them abroad
will also be considered to be validly divorced here and can re-marry. We propose
that this be deleted and made into law only after more widespread consultation.
(Emphasis supplied.)
Legislative Intent
Records of the proceedings of the Family Code deliberations showed that the
intent of Paragraph 2 of Article 26, according to Judge Alicia Sempio-Diy, a
member of the Civil Code Revision Committee, is to avoid the absurd situation
where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after
obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse.
Interestingly, Paragraph 2 of Article 26 traces its origin to the 1985 case of Van
Dorn v. Romillo, Jr.
10
The Van Dorn case involved a marriage between a Filipino
citizen and a foreigner. The Court held therein that a divorce decree validly
obtained by the alien spouse is valid in the Philippines, and consequently, the
Filipino spouse is capacitated to remarry under Philippine law.
Does the same principle apply to a case where at the time of the celebration of
the marriage, the parties were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them obtains
a foreign citizenship by naturalization?
The jurisprudential answer lies latent in the 1998 case of Quita v. Court of
Appeals.
11
In Quita, the parties were, as in this case, Filipino citizens when they
got married. The wife became a naturalized American citizen in 1954 and
obtained a divorce in the same year. The Court therein hinted, by way of obiter
dictum, that a Filipino divorced by his naturalized foreign spouse is no longer
married under Philippine law and can thus remarry.
Thus, taking into consideration the legislative intent and applying the rule of
reason, we hold that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 should be interpreted to include
cases involving parties who, at the time of the celebration of the marriage were
Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them becomes naturalized as a foreign
citizen and obtains a divorce decree. The Filipino spouse should likewise be
allowed to remarry as if the other party were a foreigner at the time of the
solemnization of the marriage. To rule otherwise would be to sanction absurdity
and injustice. Where the interpretation of a statute according to its exact and
literal import would lead to mischievous results or contravene the clear purpose
of the legislature, it should be construed according to its spirit and reason,
disregarding as far as necessary the letter of the law. A statute may therefore be
extended to cases not within the literal meaning of its terms, so long as they
come within its spirit or intent.
12

If we are to give meaning to the legislative intent to avoid the absurd situation
where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after
obtaining a divorce is no longer married to the Filipino spouse, then the instant
case must be deemed as coming within the contemplation of Paragraph 2 of
Article 26.
In view of the foregoing, we state the twin elements for the application of
Paragraph 2 of Article 26 as follows:
1. There is a valid marriage that has been celebrated between a Filipino citizen
and a foreigner; and
2. A valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her
to remarry.
The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time of the
celebration of the marriage, but their citizenship at the time a valid divorce is
obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating the latter to remarry.
In this case, when Ciprianos wife was naturalized as an American citizen, there
was still a valid marriage that has been celebrated between her and Cipriano. As
fate would have it, the naturalized alien wife subsequently obtained a valid
divorce capacitating her to remarry. Clearly, the twin requisites for the application
of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 are both present in this case. Thus Cipriano, the
"divorced" Filipino spouse, should be allowed to remarry.
We are also unable to sustain the OSGs theory that the proper remedy of the
Filipino spouse is to file either a petition for annulment or a petition for legal
separation. Annulment would be a long and tedious process, and in this
particular case, not even feasible, considering that the marriage of the parties
appears to have all the badges of validity. On the other hand, legal separation
would not be a sufficient remedy for it would not sever the marriage tie; hence,
the legally separated Filipino spouse would still remain married to the naturalized
alien spouse.
However, we note that the records are bereft of competent evidence duly
submitted by respondent concerning the divorce decree and the naturalization of
respondents wife. It is settled rule that one who alleges a fact has the burden of
proving it and mere allegation is not evidence.
13

Accordingly, for his plea to prosper, respondent herein must prove his allegation
that his wife was naturalized as an American citizen. Likewise, before a foreign
divorce decree can be recognized by our own courts, the party pleading it must
prove the divorce as a fact and demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law
allowing it.
14
Such foreign law must also be proved as our courts cannot take
judicial notice of foreign laws. Like any other fact, such laws must be alleged and
proved.
15
Furthermore, respondent must also show that the divorce decree
allows his former wife to remarry as specifically required in Article 26. Otherwise,
there would be no evidence sufficient to declare that he is capacitated to enter
into another marriage.
Nevertheless, we are unanimous in our holding that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of
the Family Code (E.O. No. 209, as amended by E.O. No. 227), should be
interpreted to allow a Filipino citizen, who has been divorced by a spouse who
had acquired foreign citizenship and remarried, also to remarry. However,
considering that in the present petition there is no sufficient evidence submitted
and on record, we are unable to declare, based on respondents bare allegations
that his wife, who was naturalized as an American citizen, had obtained a divorce
decree and had remarried an American, that respondent is now capacitated to
remarry. Such declaration could only be made properly upon respondents
submission of the aforecited evidence in his favor.
ACCORDINGLY, the petition by the Republic of the Philippines is GRANTED.
The assailed Decision dated May 15, 2002, and Resolution dated July 4, 2002, of
the Regional Trial Court of Molave, Zamboanga del Sur, Branch 23, are hereby
SET ASIDE.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
HILARIO G. DAVIDE, JR.
Chief Justice
Chairman
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO, ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice Associate Justice
ADOLFO S. AZCUNA
Associate Justice
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that
the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the
case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.
HILARIO G. DAVIDE, JR.
Chief Justice
9. Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 124862 December 22, 1998
FE D. QUITA, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and BLANDINA DANDAN, * respondents.
BELLOSILLO, J .:
FE D. QUITA and Arturo T. Padlan, both Filipinos, were married in the
Philippines on 18 May 1941. They were not however blessed with children.
Somewhere along the way their relationship soured. Eventually Fe sued Arturo
for divorce in San Francisco, California, U.S.A. She submitted in the divorce
proceedings a private writing dated 19 July 1950 evidencing their agreement to
live separately from each other and a settlement of their conjugal properties. On
23 July 1954 she obtained a final judgment of divorce. Three (3) weeks thereafter
she married a certain Felix Tupaz in the same locality but their relationship also
ended in a divorce. Still in the U.S.A., she married for the third time, to a certain
Wernimont.
On 16 April 1972 Arturo died. He left no will. On 31 August 1972 Lino Javier
Inciong filed a petition with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City for issuance
of letters of administration concerning the estate of Arturo in favor of the
Philippine Trust Company. Respondent Blandina Dandan (also referred to as
Blandina Padlan), claiming to be the surviving spouse of Arturo Padlan, and
Claro, Alexis, Ricardo, Emmanuel, Zenaida and Yolanda, all surnamed Padlan,
named in the children of Arturo Padlan opposed the petition and prayed for the
appointment instead of Atty. Leonardo Casaba, which was resolved in favor of
the latter. Upon motion of the oppositors themselves, Atty. Cabasal was later
replaced by Higino Castillon. On 30 April 1973 the oppositors (Blandina and
Padlan children) submitted certified photocopies of the 19 July 1950 private
writing and the final judgment of divorce between petitioner and Arturo. Later
Ruperto T. Padlan, claiming to be the sole surviving brother of the deceased
Arturo, intervened.
On 7 October 1987 petitioner moved for the immediate declaration of heirs of the
decedent and the distribution of his estate. At the scheduled hearing on 23
October 1987, private respondent as well as the six (6) Padlan children and
Ruperto failed to appear despite due notice. On the same day, the trial court
required the submission of the records of birth of the Padlan children within ten
(10) days from receipt thereof, after which, with or without the documents, the
issue on the declaration of heirs would be considered submitted for resolution.
The prescribed period lapsed without the required documents being submitted.
The trial court invoking Tenchavez v. Escao
1
which held that "a foreign divorce
between Filipino citizens sought and decreed after the effectivity of the present
Civil Code (Rep. Act 386) was not entitled to recognition as valid in this
jurisdiction,"
2
disregarded the divorce between petitioner and Arturo.
Consecuently, it expressed the view that their marriage subsisted until the death
of Arturo in 1972. Neither did it consider valid their extrajudicial settlement of
conjugal properties due to lack of judicial approval.
3
On the other hand, it opined
that there was no showing that marriage existed between private respondent and
Arturo, much less was it shown that the alleged Padlan children had been
acknowledged by the deceased as his children with her. As regards Ruperto, it
found that he was a brother of Arturo. On 27 November 1987
4
only petitioner
and Ruperto were declared the intestate heirs of Arturo. Accordingly, equal
adjudication of the net hereditary estate was ordered in favor of the two intestate
heirs.
5

On motion for reconsideration, Blandina and the Padlan children were allowed to
present proofs that the recognition of the children by the deceased as his
legitimate children, except Alexis who was recognized as his illegitimate child,
had been made in their respective records of birth. Thus on 15 February 1988
6

partial reconsideration was granted declaring the Padlan children, with the
exception of Alexis, entitled to one-half of the estate to the exclusion of Ruperto
Padlan, and petitioner to the other half.
7
Private respondent was not declared an
heir. Although it was stated in the aforementioned records of birth that she and
Arturo were married on 22 April 1947, their marriage was clearly void since it was
celebrated during the existence of his previous marriage to petitioner.
In their appeal to the Court of Appeals, Blandina and her children assigned as
one of the errors allegedly committed by the trial court the circumstance that the
case was decided without a hearing, in violation of Sec. 1, Rule 90, of the Rules
of Court, which provides that if there is a controversy before the court as to who
are the lawful heirs of the deceased person or as to the distributive shares to
which each person is entitled under the law, the controversy shall be heard and
decided as in ordinary cases.
Respondent appellate court found this ground alone sufficient to sustain the
appeal; hence, on 11 September 1995 it declared null and void the 27 November
1987 decision and 15 February 1988 order of the trial court, and directed the
remand of the case to the trial court for further proceedings.
8
On 18 April 1996 it
denied reconsideration.
9

Should this case be remanded to the lower court for further proceedings?
Petitioner insists that there is no need because, first, no legal or factual issue
obtains for resolution either as to the heirship of the Padlan children or as to the
decedent; and, second, the issue as to who between petitioner and private
respondent is the proper hier of the decedent is one of law which can be resolved
in the present petition based on establish facts and admissions of the parties.
We cannot sustain petitioner. The provision relied upon by respondent court is
clear: If there is a controversy before the court as to who are the lawful heirs of
the deceased person or as to the distributive shares to which each person is
entitled under the law, the controversy shall be heard and decided as in ordinary
cases.
We agree with petitioner that no dispute exists either as to the right of the six (6)
Padlan children to inherit from the decedent because there are proofs that they
have been duly acknowledged by him and petitioner herself even recognizes
them as heirs of Arturo Padlan;
10
nor as to their respective hereditary shares.
But controversy remains as to who is the legitimate surviving spouse of Arturo.
The trial court, after the parties other than petitioner failed to appear during the
scheduled hearing on 23 October 1987 of the motion for immediate declaration of
heirs and distribution of estate, simply issued an order requiring the submission
of the records of birth of the Padlan children within ten (10) days from receipt
thereof, after which, with or without the documents, the issue on declaration of
heirs would be deemed submitted for resolution.
We note that in her comment to petitioner's motion private respondent raised,
among others, the issue as to whether petitioner was still entitled to inherit from
the decedent considering that she had secured a divorce in the U.S.A. and in fact
had twice remarried. She also invoked the above quoted procedural rule.
11
To
this, petitioner replied that Arturo was a Filipino and as such remained legally
married to her in spite of the divorce they obtained.
12
Reading between the lines,
the implication is that petitioner was no longer a Filipino citizen at the time of her
divorce from Arturo. This should have prompted the trial court to conduct a
hearing to establish her citizenship. The purpose of a hearing is to ascertain the
truth of the matters in issue with the aid of documentary and testimonial evidence
as well as the arguments of the parties either supporting or opposing the
evidence. Instead, the lower court perfunctorily settled her claim in her favor by
merely applying the ruling in Tenchavez v. Escao.
Then in private respondent's motion to set aside and/or reconsider the lower
court's decision she stressed that the citizenship of petitioner was relevant in the
light of the ruling in Van Dorn v. Romillo Jr.
13
that aliens may obtain divorces
abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid
according to their national law. She prayed therefore that the case be set for
hearing.
14
Petitioner opposed the motion but failed to squarely address the issue
on her citizenship.
15
The trial court did not grant private respondent's prayer for a
hearing but proceeded to resolve her motion with the finding that both petitioner
and Arturo were "Filipino citizens and were married in the Philippines."
16
It
maintained that their divorce obtained in 1954 in San Francisco, California,
U.S.A., was not valid in Philippine jurisdiction. We deduce that the finding on their
citizenship pertained solely to the time of their marriage as the trial court was not
supplied with a basis to determine petitioner's citizenship at the time of their
divorce. The doubt persisted as to whether she was still a Filipino citizen when
their divorce was decreed. The trial court must have overlooked the materiality of
this aspect. Once proved that she was no longer a Filipino citizen at the time of
their divorce, Van Dorn would become applicable and petitioner could very well
lose her right to inherit from Arturo.
Respondent again raised in her appeal the issue on petitioner's citizenship;
17
it
did not merit enlightenment however from petitioner.
18
In the present proceeding,
petitioner's citizenship is brought anew to the fore by private respondent. She
even furnishes the Court with the transcript of stenographic notes taken on 5 May
1995 during the hearing for the reconstitution of the original of a certain transfer
certificate title as well as the issuance of new owner's duplicate copy thereof
before another trial court. When asked whether she was an American citizen
petitioner answered that she was since 1954.
19
Significantly, the decree of
divorce of petitioner and Arturo was obtained in the same year. Petitioner
however did not bother to file a reply memorandum to erase the uncertainty
about her citizenship at the time of their divorce, a factual issue requiring
hearings to be conducted by the trial court. Consequently, respondent appellate
court did not err in ordering the case returned to the trial court for further
proceedings.
We emphasize however that the question to be determined by the trial court
should be limited only to the right of petitioner to inherit from Arturo as his
surviving spouse. Private respondent's claim to heirship was already resolved by
the trial court. She and Arturo were married on 22 April 1947 while the prior
marriage of petitioner and Arturo was subsisting thereby resulting in a bigamous
marriage considered void from the beginning under Arts. 80 and 83 of the Civil
Code. Consequently, she is not a surviving spouse that can inherit from him as
this status presupposes a legitimate relationship.
20

As regards the motion of private respondent for petitioner and a her counsel to
be declared in contempt of court and that the present petition be dismissed for
forum shopping,
21
the same lacks merit. For forum shopping to exist the actions
must involve the same transactions and same essential facts and circumstances.
There must also be identical causes of action, subject matter and issue.
22
The
present petition deals with declaration of heirship while the subsequent petitions
filed before the three (3) trial courts concern the issuance of new owner's
duplicate copies of titles of certain properties belonging to the estate of Arturo.
Obviously, there is no reason to declare the existence of forum shopping.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The decision of respondent Court of
Appeals ordering the remand of the case to the court of origin for further
proceedings and declaring null and void its decision holding petitioner Fe D.
Quita and Ruperto T. Padlan as intestate heirs is AFFIRMED. The order of the
appellate court modifying its previous decision by granting one-half (1/2) of the
net hereditary estate to the Padlan children, namely, Claro, Ricardo, Emmanuel,
Zenaida and Yolanda, with the exception of Alexis, all surnamed Padlan, instead
of Arturo's brother Ruperto Padlan, is likewise AFFIRMED. The Court however
emphasizes that the reception of evidence by the trial court should he limited to
the hereditary rights of petitioner as the surviving spouse of Arturo Padlan.
The motion to declare petitioner and her counsel in contempt of court and to
dismiss the present petition for forum shopping is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, Mendoza and Martinez, JJ., concur.







10. Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. L-68470 October 8, 1985
ALICE REYES VAN DORN, petitioner,
vs.
HON. MANUEL V. ROMILLO, JR., as Presiding Judge of Branch CX,
Regional Trial Court of the National Capital Region Pasay City and
RICHARD UPTON respondents.
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J .:\
In this Petition for certiorari and Prohibition, petitioner Alice Reyes Van Dorn
seeks to set aside the Orders, dated September 15, 1983 and August 3, 1984, in
Civil Case No. 1075-P, issued by respondent Judge, which denied her Motion to
Dismiss said case, and her Motion for Reconsideration of the Dismissal Order,
respectively.
The basic background facts are that petitioner is a citizen of the Philippines while
private respondent is a citizen of the United States; that they were married in
Hongkong in 1972; that, after the marriage, they established their residence in
the Philippines; that they begot two children born on April 4, 1973 and December
18, 1975, respectively; that the parties were divorced in Nevada, United States,
in 1982; and that petitioner has re-married also in Nevada, this time to Theodore
Van Dorn.
Dated June 8, 1983, private respondent filed suit against petitioner in Civil Case
No. 1075-P of the Regional Trial Court, Branch CXV, in Pasay City, stating that
petitioner's business in Ermita, Manila, (the Galleon Shop, for short), is conjugal
property of the parties, and asking that petitioner be ordered to render an
accounting of that business, and that private respondent be declared with right to
manage the conjugal property. Petitioner moved to dismiss the case on the
ground that the cause of action is barred by previous judgment in the divorce
proceedings before the Nevada Court wherein respondent had acknowledged
that he and petitioner had "no community property" as of June 11, 1982. The
Court below denied the Motion to Dismiss in the mentioned case on the ground
that the property involved is located in the Philippines so that the Divorce Decree
has no bearing in the case. The denial is now the subject of this certiorari
proceeding.
Generally, the denial of a Motion to Dismiss in a civil case is interlocutory and is
not subject to appeal. Certiorari and Prohibition are neither the remedies to
question the propriety of an interlocutory order of the trial Court. However, when
a grave abuse of discretion was patently committed, or the lower Court acted
capriciously and whimsically, then it devolves upon this Court in a certiorari
proceeding to exercise its supervisory authority and to correct the error
committed which, in such a case, is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction.
1
Prohibition
would then lie since it would be useless and a waste of time to go ahead with the
proceedings.
2
Weconsider the petition filed in this case within the exception, and
we have given it due course.
For resolution is the effect of the foreign divorce on the parties and their alleged
conjugal property in the Philippines.
Petitioner contends that respondent is estopped from laying claim on the alleged
conjugal property because of the representation he made in the divorce
proceedings before the American Court that they had no community of property;
that the Galleon Shop was not established through conjugal funds, and that
respondent's claim is barred by prior judgment.
For his part, respondent avers that the Divorce Decree issued by the Nevada
Court cannot prevail over the prohibitive laws of the Philippines and its declared
national policy; that the acts and declaration of a foreign Court cannot, especially
if the same is contrary to public policy, divest Philippine Courts of jurisdiction to
entertain matters within its jurisdiction.
For the resolution of this case, it is not necessary to determine whether the
property relations between petitioner and private respondent, after their marriage,
were upon absolute or relative community property, upon complete separation of
property, or upon any other regime. The pivotal fact in this case is the Nevada
divorce of the parties.
The Nevada District Court, which decreed the divorce, had obtained jurisdiction
over petitioner who appeared in person before the Court during the trial of the
case. It also obtained jurisdiction over private respondent who, giving his address
as No. 381 Bush Street, San Francisco, California, authorized his attorneys in the
divorce case, Karp & Gradt Ltd., to agree to the divorce on the ground of
incompatibility in the understanding that there were neither community property
nor community obligations.
3
As explicitly stated in the Power of Attorney he
executed in favor of the law firm of KARP & GRAD LTD., 336 W. Liberty, Reno,
Nevada, to represent him in the divorce proceedings:
xxx xxx xxx
You are hereby authorized to accept service of Summons, to file an
Answer, appear on my behalf and do an things necessary and proper to
represent me, without further contesting, subject to the following:
1. That my spouse seeks a divorce on the ground of incompatibility.
2. That there is no community of property to be adjudicated by the Court.
3. 'I'hat there are no community obligations to be adjudicated by the court.
xxx xxx xxx
4

There can be no question as to the validity of that Nevada divorce in any of the
States of the United States. The decree is binding on private respondent as an
American citizen. For instance, private respondent cannot sue petitioner, as her
husband, in any State of the Union. What he is contending in this case is that the
divorce is not valid and binding in this jurisdiction, the same being contrary to
local law and public policy.
It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil
Code,
5
only Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against absolute
divorces the same being considered contrary to our concept of public police and
morality. However, aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized
in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national law.
6
In this
case, the divorce in Nevada released private respondent from the marriage from
the standards of American law, under which divorce dissolves the marriage. As
stated by the Federal Supreme Court of the United States in Atherton vs.
Atherton, 45 L. Ed. 794, 799:
The purpose and effect of a decree of divorce from the bond of matrimony
by a court of competent jurisdiction are to change the existing status or
domestic relation of husband and wife, and to free them both from the
bond. The marriage tie when thus severed as to one party, ceases to bind
either. A husband without a wife, or a wife without a husband, is unknown
to the law. When the law provides, in the nature of a penalty. that the guilty
party shall not marry again, that party, as well as the other, is still
absolutely freed from the bond of the former marriage.
Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the husband
of petitioner. He would have no standing to sue in the case below as petitioner's
husband entitled to exercise control over conjugal assets. As he is bound by the
Decision of his own country's Court, which validly exercised jurisdiction over him,
and whose decision he does not repudiate, he is estopped by his own
representation before said Court from asserting his right over the alleged
conjugal property.
To maintain, as private respondent does, that, under our laws, petitioner has to
be considered still married to private respondent and still subject to a wife's
obligations under Article 109, et. seq. of the Civil Code cannot be just. Petitioner
should not be obliged to live together with, observe respect and fidelity, and
render support to private respondent. The latter should not continue to be one of
her heirs with possible rights to conjugal property. She should not be
discriminated against in her own country if the ends of justice are to be served.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is granted, and respondent Judge is hereby ordered
to dismiss the Complaint filed in Civil Case No. 1075-P of his Court.
Without costs.
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee (Chairman), Plana, Relova, Gutierrez, Jr., De la Fuente and Patajo,
JJ., concur.











11. Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 80116 June 30, 1989
IMELDA MANALAYSAY PILAPIL, petitioner,
vs.
HON. CORONA IBAY-SOMERA, in her capacity as Presiding Judge of the
Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch XXVI; HON. LUIS C. VICTOR, in his
capacity as the City Fiscal of Manila; and ERICH EKKEHARD GEILING,
respondents.
REGALADO, J .:
An ill-starred marriage of a Filipina and a foreigner which ended in a foreign
absolute divorce, only to be followed by a criminal infidelity suit of the latter
against the former, provides Us the opportunity to lay down a decisional rule on
what hitherto appears to be an unresolved jurisdictional question.
On September 7, 1979, petitioner Imelda Manalaysay Pilapil, a Filipino citizen,
and private respondent Erich Ekkehard Geiling, a German national, were married
before the Registrar of Births, Marriages and Deaths at Friedensweiler in the
Federal Republic of Germany. The marriage started auspiciously enough, and
the couple lived together for some time in Malate, Manila where their only child,
Isabella Pilapil Geiling, was born on April 20, 1980.
1

Thereafter, marital discord set in, with mutual recriminations between the
spouses, followed by a separation de facto between them.
After about three and a half years of marriage, such connubial disharmony
eventuated in private respondent initiating a divorce proceeding against petitioner
in Germany before the Schoneberg Local Court in January, 1983. He claimed
that there was failure of their marriage and that they had been living apart since
April, 1982.
2

Petitioner, on the other hand, filed an action for legal separation, support and
separation of property before the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch XXXII,
on January 23, 1983 where the same is still pending as Civil Case No. 83-15866.
3

On January 15, 1986, Division 20 of the Schoneberg Local Court, Federal
Republic of Germany, promulgated a decree of divorce on the ground of failure of
marriage of the spouses. The custody of the child was granted to petitioner. The
records show that under German law said court was locally and internationally
competent for the divorce proceeding and that the dissolution of said marriage
was legally founded on and authorized by the applicable law of that foreign
jurisdiction.
4

On June 27, 1986, or more than five months after the issuance of the divorce
decree, private respondent filed two complaints for adultery before the City Fiscal
of Manila alleging that, while still married to said respondent, petitioner "had an
affair with a certain William Chia as early as 1982 and with yet another man
named Jesus Chua sometime in 1983". Assistant Fiscal Jacinto A. de los Reyes,
Jr., after the corresponding investigation, recommended the dismissal of the
cases on the ground of insufficiency of evidence.
5
However, upon review, the
respondent city fiscal approved a resolution, dated January 8, 1986, directing the
filing of two complaints for adultery against the petitioner.
6
The complaints were
accordingly filed and were eventually raffled to two branches of the Regional Trial
Court of Manila. The case entitled "People of the Philippines vs. Imelda Pilapil
and William Chia", docketed as Criminal Case No. 87-52435, was assigned to
Branch XXVI presided by the respondent judge; while the other case, "People of
the Philippines vs. Imelda Pilapil and James Chua", docketed as Criminal Case
No. 87-52434 went to the sala of Judge Leonardo Cruz, Branch XXV, of the
same court.
7

On March 14, 1987, petitioner filed a petition with the Secretary of Justice asking
that the aforesaid resolution of respondent fiscal be set aside and the cases
against her be dismissed.
8
A similar petition was filed by James Chua, her co-
accused in Criminal Case No. 87-52434. The Secretary of Justice, through the
Chief State Prosecutor, gave due course to both petitions and directed the
respondent city fiscal to inform the Department of Justice "if the accused have
already been arraigned and if not yet arraigned, to move to defer further
proceedings" and to elevate the entire records of both cases to his office for
review.
9

Petitioner thereafter filed a motion in both criminal cases to defer her arraignment
and to suspend further proceedings thereon.
10
As a consequence, Judge
Leonardo Cruz suspended proceedings in Criminal Case No. 87-52434. On the
other hand, respondent judge merely reset the date of the arraignment in
Criminal Case No. 87-52435 to April 6, 1987. Before such scheduled date,
petitioner moved for the cancellation of the arraignment and for the suspension of
proceedings in said Criminal Case No. 87-52435 until after the resolution of the
petition for review then pending before the Secretary of Justice.
11
A motion to
quash was also filed in the same case on the ground of lack of jurisdiction,
12

which motion was denied by the respondent judge in an order dated September
8, 1987. The same order also directed the arraignment of both accused therein,
that is, petitioner and William Chia. The latter entered a plea of not guilty while
the petitioner refused to be arraigned. Such refusal of the petitioner being
considered by respondent judge as direct contempt, she and her counsel were
fined and the former was ordered detained until she submitted herself for
arraignment.
13
Later, private respondent entered a plea of not guilty.
14

On October 27, 1987, petitioner filed this special civil action for certiorari and
prohibition, with a prayer for a temporary restraining order, seeking the
annulment of the order of the lower court denying her motion to quash. The
petition is anchored on the main ground that the court is without jurisdiction "to try
and decide the charge of adultery, which is a private offense that cannot be
prosecuted de officio (sic), since the purported complainant, a foreigner, does not
qualify as an offended spouse having obtained a final divorce decree under his
national law prior to his filing the criminal complaint."
15

On October 21, 1987, this Court issued a temporary restraining order enjoining
the respondents from implementing the aforesaid order of September 8, 1987
and from further proceeding with Criminal Case No. 87-52435. Subsequently, on
March 23, 1988 Secretary of Justice Sedfrey A. Ordoez acted on the aforesaid
petitions for review and, upholding petitioner's ratiocinations, issued a resolution
directing the respondent city fiscal to move for the dismissal of the complaints
against the petitioner.
16

We find this petition meritorious. The writs prayed for shall accordingly issue.
Under Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code,
17
the crime of adultery, as well as
four other crimes against chastity, cannot be prosecuted except upon a sworn
written complaint filed by the offended spouse. It has long since been
established, with unwavering consistency, that compliance with this rule is a
jurisdictional, and not merely a formal, requirement.
18
While in point of strict law
the jurisdiction of the court over the offense is vested in it by the Judiciary Law,
the requirement for a sworn written complaint is just as jurisdictional a mandate
since it is that complaint which starts the prosecutory proceeding
19
and without
which the court cannot exercise its jurisdiction to try the case.
Now, the law specifically provides that in prosecutions for adultery and
concubinage the person who can legally file the complaint should be the
offended spouse, and nobody else. Unlike the offenses of seduction, abduction,
rape and acts of lasciviousness, no provision is made for the prosecution of the
crimes of adultery and concubinage by the parents, grandparents or guardian of
the offended party. The so-called exclusive and successive rule in the
prosecution of the first four offenses above mentioned do not apply to adultery
and concubinage. It is significant that while the State, as parens patriae, was
added and vested by the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure with the power to
initiate the criminal action for a deceased or incapacitated victim in the aforesaid
offenses of seduction, abduction, rape and acts of lasciviousness, in default of
her parents, grandparents or guardian, such amendment did not include the
crimes of adultery and concubinage. In other words, only the offended spouse,
and no other, is authorized by law to initiate the action therefor.
Corollary to such exclusive grant of power to the offended spouse to institute the
action, it necessarily follows that such initiator must have the status, capacity or
legal representation to do so at the time of the filing of the criminal action. This is
a familiar and express rule in civil actions; in fact, lack of legal capacity to sue, as
a ground for a motion to dismiss in civil cases, is determined as of the filing of the
complaint or petition.
The absence of an equivalent explicit rule in the prosecution of criminal cases
does not mean that the same requirement and rationale would not apply.
Understandably, it may not have been found necessary since criminal actions are
generally and fundamentally commenced by the State, through the People of the
Philippines, the offended party being merely the complaining witness therein.
However, in the so-called "private crimes" or those which cannot be prosecuted
de oficio, and the present prosecution for adultery is of such genre, the offended
spouse assumes a more predominant role since the right to commence the
action, or to refrain therefrom, is a matter exclusively within his power and option.
This policy was adopted out of consideration for the aggrieved party who might
prefer to suffer the outrage in silence rather than go through the scandal of a
public trial.
20
Hence, as cogently argued by petitioner, Article 344 of the Revised
Penal Code thus presupposes that the marital relationship is still subsisting at the
time of the institution of the criminal action for, adultery. This is a logical
consequence since the raison d'etre of said provision of law would be absent
where the supposed offended party had ceased to be the spouse of the alleged
offender at the time of the filing of the criminal case.
21

In these cases, therefore, it is indispensable that the status and capacity of the
complainant to commence the action be definitely established and, as already
demonstrated, such status or capacity must indubitably exist as of the time he
initiates the action. It would be absurd if his capacity to bring the action would be
determined by his status before or subsequent to the commencement thereof,
where such capacity or status existed prior to but ceased before, or was acquired
subsequent to but did not exist at the time of, the institution of the case. We
would thereby have the anomalous spectacle of a party bringing suit at the very
time when he is without the legal capacity to do so.
To repeat, there does not appear to be any local precedential jurisprudence on
the specific issue as to when precisely the status of a complainant as an
offended spouse must exist where a criminal prosecution can be commenced
only by one who in law can be categorized as possessed of such status. Stated
differently and with reference to the present case, the inquiry ;would be whether it
is necessary in the commencement of a criminal action for adultery that the
marital bonds between the complainant and the accused be unsevered and
existing at the time of the institution of the action by the former against the latter.
American jurisprudence, on cases involving statutes in that jurisdiction which are
in pari materia with ours, yields the rule that after a divorce has been decreed,
the innocent spouse no longer has the right to institute proceedings against the
offenders where the statute provides that the innocent spouse shall have the
exclusive right to institute a prosecution for adultery. Where, however,
proceedings have been properly commenced, a divorce subsequently granted
can have no legal effect on the prosecution of the criminal proceedings to a
conclusion.
22

In the cited Loftus case, the Supreme Court of Iowa held that
'No prosecution for adultery can be commenced except on the complaint of
the husband or wife.' Section 4932, Code. Though Loftus was husband of
defendant when the offense is said to have been committed, he had
ceased to be such when the prosecution was begun; and appellant insists
that his status was not such as to entitle him to make the complaint. We
have repeatedly said that the offense is against the unoffending spouse, as
well as the state, in explaining the reason for this provision in the statute;
and we are of the opinion that the unoffending spouse must be such when
the prosecution is commenced. (Emphasis supplied.)
We see no reason why the same doctrinal rule should not apply in this case and
in our jurisdiction, considering our statutory law and jural policy on the matter. We
are convinced that in cases of such nature, the status of the complainant vis-a-
vis the accused must be determined as of the time the complaint was filed. Thus,
the person who initiates the adultery case must be an offended spouse, and by
this is meant that he is still married to the accused spouse, at the time of the filing
of the complaint.
In the present case, the fact that private respondent obtained a valid divorce in
his country, the Federal Republic of Germany, is admitted. Said divorce and its
legal effects may be recognized in the Philippines insofar as private respondent
is concerned
23
in view of the nationality principle in our civil law on the matter of
status of persons.
Thus, in the recent case of Van Dorn vs. Romillo, Jr., et al.,
24
after a divorce was
granted by a United States court between Alice Van Dornja Filipina, and her
American husband, the latter filed a civil case in a trial court here alleging that
her business concern was conjugal property and praying that she be ordered to
render an accounting and that the plaintiff be granted the right to manage the
business. Rejecting his pretensions, this Court perspicuously demonstrated the
error of such stance, thus:
There can be no question as to the validity of that Nevada divorce in any of
the States of the United States. The decree is binding on private
respondent as an American citizen. For instance, private respondent
cannot sue petitioner, as her husband, in any State of the Union. ...
It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the
Civil Code, only Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against
absolute divorces the same being considered contrary to our concept of
public policy and morality. However, aliens may obtain divorces abroad,
which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid
according to their national law. ...
Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the
husband of petitioner. He would have no standing to sue in the case below
as petitioner's husband entitled to exercise control over conjugal assets. ...
25

Under the same considerations and rationale, private respondent, being no
longer the husband of petitioner, had no legal standing to commence the adultery
case under the imposture that he was the offended spouse at the time he filed
suit.
The allegation of private respondent that he could not have brought this case
before the decree of divorce for lack of knowledge, even if true, is of no legal
significance or consequence in this case. When said respondent initiated the
divorce proceeding, he obviously knew that there would no longer be a family nor
marriage vows to protect once a dissolution of the marriage is decreed. Neither
would there be a danger of introducing spurious heirs into the family, which is
said to be one of the reasons for the particular formulation of our law on adultery,
26
since there would thenceforth be no spousal relationship to speak of. The
severance of the marital bond had the effect of dissociating the former spouses
from each other, hence the actuations of one would not affect or cast obloquy on
the other.
The aforecited case of United States vs. Mata cannot be successfully relied upon
by private respondent. In applying Article 433 of the old Penal Code, substantially
the same as Article 333 of the Revised Penal Code, which punished adultery
"although the marriage be afterwards declared void", the Court merely stated that
"the lawmakers intended to declare adulterous the infidelity of a married woman
to her marital vows, even though it should be made to appear that she is entitled
to have her marriage contract declared null and void, until and unless she
actually secures a formal judicial declaration to that effect". Definitely, it cannot
be logically inferred therefrom that the complaint can still be filed after the
declaration of nullity because such declaration that the marriage is void ab initio
is equivalent to stating that it never existed. There being no marriage from the
beginning, any complaint for adultery filed after said declaration of nullity would
no longer have a leg to stand on. Moreover, what was consequently
contemplated and within the purview of the decision in said case is the situation
where the criminal action for adultery was filed before the termination of the
marriage by a judicial declaration of its nullity ab initio. The same rule and
requisite would necessarily apply where the termination of the marriage was
effected, as in this case, by a valid foreign divorce.
Private respondent's invocation of Donio-Teves, et al. vs. Vamenta, hereinbefore
cited,
27
must suffer the same fate of inapplicability. A cursory reading of said
case reveals that the offended spouse therein had duly and seasonably filed a
complaint for adultery, although an issue was raised as to its sufficiency but
which was resolved in favor of the complainant. Said case did not involve a
factual situation akin to the one at bar or any issue determinative of the
controversy herein.
WHEREFORE, the questioned order denying petitioner's motion to quash is SET
ASIDE and another one entered DISMISSING the complaint in Criminal Case
No. 87-52435 for lack of jurisdiction. The temporary restraining order issued in
this case on October 21, 1987 is hereby made permanent.
SO ORDERED.
Melencio-Herrera, Padilla and Sarmiento, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
PARAS, J ., concurring:
It is my considered opinion that regardless of whether We consider the German
absolute divorce as valid also in the Philippines, the fact is that the husband in
the instant case, by the very act of his obtaining an absolute divorce in Germany
can no longer be considered as the offended party in case his former wife
actually has carnal knowledge with another, because in divorcing her, he already
implicitly authorized the woman to have sexual relations with others. A contrary
ruling would be less than fair for a man, who is free to have sex will be allowed to
deprive the woman of the same privilege.
In the case of Recto v. Harden (100 Phil. 427 [1956]), the Supreme Court
considered the absolute divorce between the American husband and his
American wife as valid and binding in the Philippines on the theory that their
status and capacity are governed by their National law, namely, American law.
There is no decision yet of the Supreme Court regarding the validity of such a
divorce if one of the parties, say an American, is married to a Filipino wife, for
then two (2) different nationalities would be involved.
In the book of Senate President Jovito Salonga entitled Private International Law
and precisely because of the National law doctrine, he considers the absolute
divorce as valid insofar as the American husband is concerned but void insofar
as the Filipino wife is involved. This results in what he calls a "socially grotesque
situation," where a Filipino woman is still married to a man who is no longer her
husband. It is the opinion however, of the undersigned that very likely the
opposite expresses the correct view. While under the national law of the husband
the absolute divorce will be valid, still one of the exceptions to the application of
the proper foreign law (one of the exceptions to comity) is when the foreign law
will work an injustice or injury to the people or residents of the forum.
Consequently since to recognize the absolute divorce as valid on the part of the
husband would be injurious or prejudicial to the Filipino wife whose marriage
would be still valid under her national law, it would seem that under our law
existing before the new Family Code (which took effect on August 3, 1988) the
divorce should be considered void both with respect to the American husband
and the Filipino wife.
The recent case of Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. (139 SCRA [1985]) cannot apply
despite the fact that the husband was an American can with a Filipino wife
because in said case the validity of the divorce insofar as the Filipino wife is
concerned was NEVER put in issue.
Separate Opinions
PARAS, J ., concurring:
It is my considered opinion that regardless of whether We consider the German
absolute divorce as valid also in the Philippines, the fact is that the husband in
the instant case, by the very act of his obtaining an absolute divorce in Germany
can no longer be considered as the offended party in case his former wife
actually has carnal knowledge with another, because in divorcing her, he already
implicitly authorized the woman to have sexual relations with others. A contrary
ruling would be less than fair for a man, who is free to have sex will be allowed to
deprive the woman of the same privilege.
In the case of Recto v. Harden (100 Phil. 427 [1956]), the Supreme Court
considered the absolute divorce between the American husband and his
American wife as valid and binding in the Philippines on the theory that their
status and capacity are governed by their National law, namely, American law.
There is no decision yet of the Supreme Court regarding the validity of such a
divorce if one of the parties, say an American, is married to a Filipino wife, for
then two (2) different nationalities would be involved.
In the book of Senate President Jovito Salonga entitled Private International Law
and precisely because of the National law doctrine, he considers the absolute
divorce as valid insofar as the American husband is concerned but void insofar
as the Filipino wife is involved. This results in what he calls a "socially grotesque
situation," where a Filipino woman is still married to a man who her husband is
no longer. It is the opinion however, of the undersigned that very likely the
opposite expresses the correct view. While under the national law of the husband
the absolute divorce will be valid, still one of the exceptions to the application of
the proper foreign law (one of the exceptions to comity) is when the foreign law
will work an injustice or injury to the people or residents of the forum.
Consequently since to recognize the absolute divorce as valid on the part of the
husband would be injurious or prejudicial to the Filipino wife whose marriage
would be still valid under her national law, it would seem that under our law
existing before the new Family Code (which took effect on August 3, 1988) the
divorce should be considered void both with respect to the American husband
and the Filipino wife.
The recent case of Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. (139 SCRA [1985]) cannot apply
despite the fact that the husband was an American can with a Filipino wife
because in said case the validity of the divorce insofar as the Filipino wife is
concerned was NEVER put in issue.

12. Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 175581 March 28, 2008
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
JOSE A. DAYOT, Respondent.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
G.R. No. 179474
FELISA TECSON-DAYOT, Petitioner,
vs.
JOSE A. DAYOT, Respondent.
D E C I S I O N
CHICO-NAZARIO, J .:
Before us are two consolidated petitions. G.R. No. 175581 and G.R. No. 179474
are Petitions for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court filed by the Republic
of the Philippines and Felisa Tecson-Dayot (Felisa), respectively, both
challenging the Amended Decision
1
of the Court of Appeals, dated 7 November
2006, in CA-G.R. CV No. 68759, which declared the marriage between Jose
Dayot (Jose) and Felisa void ab initio.
The records disclose that on 24 November 1986, Jose and Felisa were married
at the Pasay City Hall. The marriage was solemnized by Rev. Tomas V. Atienza.
2

In lieu of a marriage license, Jose and Felisa executed a sworn affidavit,
3
also
dated 24 November 1986, attesting that both of them had attained the age of
maturity, and that being unmarried, they had lived together as husband and wife
for at least five years.
On 7 July 1993, Jose filed a Complaint
4
for Annulment and/or Declaration of
Nullity of Marriage with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Bian, Laguna, Branch
25. He contended that his marriage with Felisa was a sham, as no marriage
ceremony was celebrated between the parties; that he did not execute the sworn
affidavit stating that he and Felisa had lived as husband and wife for at least five
years; and that his consent to the marriage was secured through fraud.
In his Complaint, Jose gave his version of the events which led to his filing of the
same. According to Jose, he was introduced to Felisa in 1986. Immediately
thereafter, he came to live as a boarder in Felisas house, the latter being his
landlady. Some three weeks later, Felisa requested him to accompany her to the
Pasay City Hall, ostensibly so she could claim a package sent to her by her
brother from Saudi Arabia. At the Pasay City Hall, upon a pre-arranged signal
from Felisa, a man bearing three folded pieces of paper approached them. They
were told that Jose needed to sign the papers so that the package could be
released to Felisa. He initially refused to do so. However, Felisa cajoled him, and
told him that his refusal could get both of them killed by her brother who had
learned about their relationship. Reluctantly, he signed the pieces of paper, and
gave them to the man who immediately left. It was in February 1987 when he
discovered that he had contracted marriage with Felisa. He alleged that he saw a
piece of paper lying on top of the table at the sala of Felisas house. When he
perused the same, he discovered that it was a copy of his marriage contract with
Felisa. When he confronted Felisa, the latter feigned ignorance.
In opposing the Complaint, Felisa denied Joses allegations and defended the
validity of their marriage. She declared that they had maintained their relationship
as man and wife absent the legality of marriage in the early part of 1980, but that
she had deferred contracting marriage with him on account of their age
difference.
5
In her pre-trial brief, Felisa expounded that while her marriage to
Jose was subsisting, the latter contracted marriage with a certain Rufina Pascual
(Rufina) on 31 August 1990. On 3 June 1993, Felisa filed an action for bigamy
against Jose. Subsequently, she filed an administrative complaint against Jose
with the Office of the Ombudsman, since Jose and Rufina were both employees
of the National Statistics and Coordinating Board.
6
The Ombudsman found Jose
administratively liable for disgraceful and immoral conduct, and meted out to him
the penalty of suspension from service for one year without emolument.
7

On 26 July 2000, the RTC rendered a Decision
8
dismissing the Complaint. It
disposed:
WHEREFORE, after a careful evaluation and analysis of the evidence presented
by both parties, this Court finds and so holds that the [C]omplaint does not
deserve a favorable consideration. Accordingly, the above-entitled case is hereby
ordered DISMISSED with costs against [Jose].
9

The RTC ruled that from the testimonies and evidence presented, the marriage
celebrated between Jose and Felisa on 24 November 1986 was valid. It
dismissed Joses version of the story as implausible, and rationalized that:
Any person in his right frame of mind would easily suspect any attempt to make
him or her sign a blank sheet of paper. [Jose] could have already detected that
something was amiss, unusual, as they were at Pasay City Hall to get a package
for [Felisa] but it [was] he who was made to sign the pieces of paper for the
release of the said package. Another indirect suggestion that could have put him
on guard was the fact that, by his own admission, [Felisa] told him that her
brother would kill them if he will not sign the papers. And yet it took him, more or
less, three months to "discover" that the pieces of paper that he signed was [sic]
purportedly the marriage contract. [Jose] does not seem to be that ignorant, as
perceived by this Court, to be "taken in for a ride" by [Felisa.]
[Joses] claim that he did not consent to the marriage was belied by the fact that
he acknowledged Felisa Tecson as his wife when he wrote [Felisas] name in the
duly notarized statement of assets and liabilities he filled up on May 12, 1988,
one year after he discovered the marriage contract he is now claiming to be
sham and false. [Jose], again, in his company I.D., wrote the name of [Felisa] as
the person to be contacted in case of emergency. This Court does not believe
that the only reason why her name was written in his company I.D. was because
he was residing there then. This is just but a lame excuse because if he really
considers her not his lawfully wedded wife, he would have written instead the
name of his sister.
When [Joses] sister was put into the witness stand, under oath, she testified that
she signed her name voluntarily as a witness to the marriage in the marriage
certificate (T.S.N., page 25, November 29, 1996) and she further testified that the
signature appearing over the name of Jose Dayot was the signature of his [sic]
brother that he voluntarily affixed in the marriage contract (page 26 of T.S.N.
taken on November 29, 1996), and when she was asked by the Honorable Court
if indeed she believed that Felisa Tecson was really chosen by her brother she
answered yes. The testimony of his sister all the more belied his claim that his
consent was procured through fraud.
10

Moreover, on the matter of fraud, the RTC ruled that Joses action had
prescribed. It cited Article 87
11
of the New Civil Code which requires that the
action for annulment of marriage must be commenced by the injured party within
four years after the discovery of the fraud. Thus:
That granting even for the sake of argument that his consent was obtained by
[Felisa] through fraud, trickery and machinations, he could have filed an
annulment or declaration of nullity of marriage at the earliest possible
opportunity, the time when he discovered the alleged sham and false marriage
contract. [Jose] did not take any action to void the marriage at the earliest
instance. x x x.
12

Undeterred, Jose filed an appeal from the foregoing RTC Decision to the Court of
Appeals. In a Decision dated 11 August 2005, the Court of Appeals found the
appeal to be without merit. The dispositive portion of the appellate courts
Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the Decision appealed from is AFFIRMED.
13

The Court of Appeals applied the Civil Code to the marriage between Jose and
Felisa as it was solemnized prior to the effectivity of the Family Code. The
appellate court observed that the circumstances constituting fraud as a ground
for annulment of marriage under Article 86
14
of the Civil Code did not exist in the
marriage between the parties. Further, it ruled that the action for annulment of
marriage on the ground of fraud was filed beyond the prescriptive period
provided by law. The Court of Appeals struck down Joses appeal in the following
manner:
Nonetheless, even if we consider that fraud or intimidation was employed on
Jose in giving his consent to the marriage, the action for the annulment thereof
had already prescribed. Article 87 (4) and (5) of the Civil Code provides that the
action for annulment of marriage on the ground that the consent of a party was
obtained by fraud, force or intimidation must be commenced by said party within
four (4) years after the discovery of the fraud and within four (4) years from the
time the force or intimidation ceased. Inasmuch as the fraud was allegedly
discovered by Jose in February, 1987 then he had only until February, 1991
within which to file an action for annulment of marriage. However, it was only on
July 7, 1993 that Jose filed the complaint for annulment of his marriage to
Felisa.
15

Likewise, the Court of Appeals did not accept Joses assertion that his marriage
to Felisa was void ab initio for lack of a marriage license. It ruled that the
marriage was solemnized under Article 76
16
of the Civil Code as one of
exceptional character, with the parties executing an affidavit of marriage between
man and woman who have lived together as husband and wife for at least five
years. The Court of Appeals concluded that the falsity in the affidavit to the effect
that Jose and Felisa had lived together as husband and wife for the period
required by Article 76 did not affect the validity of the marriage, seeing that the
solemnizing officer was misled by the statements contained therein. In this
manner, the Court of Appeals gave credence to the good-faith reliance of the
solemnizing officer over the falsity of the affidavit. The appellate court further
noted that on the dorsal side of said affidavit of marriage, Rev. Tomas V. Atienza,
the solemnizing officer, stated that he took steps to ascertain the ages and other
qualifications of the contracting parties and found no legal impediment to their
marriage. Finally, the Court of Appeals dismissed Joses argument that neither
he nor Felisa was a member of the sect to which Rev. Tomas V. Atienza
belonged. According to the Court of Appeals, Article 56
17
of the Civil Code did not
require that either one of the contracting parties to the marriage must belong to
the solemnizing officers church or religious sect. The prescription was
established only in Article 7
18
of the Family Code which does not govern the
parties marriage.
Differing with the ruling of the Court of Appeals, Jose filed a Motion for
Reconsideration thereof.1avvphi1 His central opposition was that the requisites
for the proper application of the exemption from a marriage license under Article
76 of the Civil Code were not fully attendant in the case at bar. In particular, Jose
cited the legal condition that the man and the woman must have been living
together as husband and wife for at least five years before the marriage.
Essentially, he maintained that the affidavit of marital cohabitation executed by
him and Felisa was false.
The Court of Appeals granted Joses Motion for Reconsideration and reversed
itself. Accordingly, it rendered an Amended Decision, dated 7 November 2006,
the fallo of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated August 11, 2005 is RECALLED and SET
ASIDE and another one entered declaring the marriage between Jose A. Dayot
and Felisa C. Tecson void ab initio.
Furnish a copy of this Amended Decision to the Local Civil Registrar of Pasay
City.
19

In its Amended Decision, the Court of Appeals relied on the ruling of this Court in
Nial v. Bayadog,
20
and reasoned that:
In Nial v. Bayadog, where the contracting parties to a marriage solemnized
without a marriage license on the basis of their affidavit that they had attained the
age of majority, that being unmarried, they had lived together for at least five (5)
years and that they desired to marry each other, the Supreme Court ruled as
follows:
"x x x In other words, the five-year common-law cohabitation period, which is
counted back from the date of celebration of marriage, should be a period of
legal union had it not been for the absence of the marriage. This 5-year period
should be the years immediately before the day of the marriage and it should be
a period of cohabitation characterized by exclusivity meaning no third party was
involved at any time within the 5 years and continuity that is unbroken.
Otherwise, if that continuous 5-year cohabitation is computed without any
distinction as to whether the parties were capacitated to marry each other during
the entire five years, then the law would be sanctioning immorality and
encouraging parties to have common law relationships and placing them on the
same footing with those who lived faithfully with their spouse. Marriage being a
special relationship must be respected as such and its requirements must be
strictly observed. The presumption that a man and a woman deporting
themselves as husband and wife is based on the approximation of the
requirements of the law. The parties should not be afforded any excuse to not
comply with every single requirement and later use the same missing element as
a pre-conceived escape ground to nullify their marriage. There should be no
exemption from securing a marriage license unless the circumstances clearly fall
within the ambit of the exception. It should be noted that a license is required in
order to notify the public that two persons are about to be united in matrimony
and that anyone who is aware or has knowledge of any impediment to the union
of the two shall make it known to the local civil registrar.
Article 80(3) of the Civil Code provides that a marriage solemnized without a
marriage license, save marriages of exceptional character, shall be void from the
beginning. Inasmuch as the marriage between Jose and Felisa is not covered by
the exception to the requirement of a marriage license, it is, therefore, void ab
initio because of the absence of a marriage license.
21

Felisa sought reconsideration of the Amended Decision, but to no avail. The
appellate court rendered a Resolution
22
dated 10 May 2007, denying Felisas
motion.
Meanwhile, the Republic of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG), filed a Petition for Review before this Court in G.R. No. 175581,
praying that the Court of Appeals Amended Decision dated 7 November 2006 be
reversed and set aside for lack of merit, and that the marriage between Jose and
Felisa be declared valid and subsisting. Felisa filed a separate Petition for
Review, docketed as G.R. No. 179474, similarly assailing the appellate courts
Amended Decision. On 1 August 2007, this Court resolved to consolidate the two
Petitions in the interest of uniformity of the Court rulings in similar cases brought
before it for resolution.
23

The Republic of the Philippines propounds the following arguments for the
allowance of its Petition, to wit:
I
RESPONDENT FAILED TO OVERTHROW THE PRESUMPTION OF THE
VALIDITY OF HIS MARRIAGE TO FELISA.
II
RESPONDENT DID NOT COME TO THE COURT WITH CLEAN HANDS
AND SHOULD NOT BE ALLOWED TO PROFIT FROM HIS OWN
FRAUDULENT CONDUCT.
III
RESPONDENT IS ESTOPPED FROM ASSAILING THE LEGALITY OF
HIS MARRIAGE FOR LACK OF MARRIAGE LICEN[S]E.
24

Correlative to the above, Felisa submits that the Court of Appeals misapplied
Nial.
25
She differentiates the case at bar from Nial by reasoning that one of the
parties therein had an existing prior marriage, a circumstance which does not
obtain in her cohabitation with Jose. Finally, Felisa adduces that Jose only
sought the annulment of their marriage after a criminal case for bigamy and an
administrative case had been filed against him in order to avoid liability. Felisa
surmises that the declaration of nullity of their marriage would exonerate Jose
from any liability.
For our resolution is the validity of the marriage between Jose and Felisa. To
reach a considered ruling on the issue, we shall jointly tackle the related
arguments vented by petitioners Republic of the Philippines and Felisa.
The Republic of the Philippines asserts that several circumstances give rise to
the presumption that a valid marriage exists between Jose and Felisa. For her
part, Felisa echoes the claim that any doubt should be resolved in favor of the
validity of the marriage by citing this Courts ruling in Hernandez v. Court of
Appeals.
26
To buttress its assertion, the Republic points to the affidavit executed
by Jose and Felisa, dated 24 November 1986, attesting that they have lived
together as husband and wife for at least five years, which they used in lieu of a
marriage license. It is the Republics position that the falsity of the statements in
the affidavit does not affect the validity of the marriage, as the essential and
formal requisites were complied with; and the solemnizing officer was not
required to investigate as to whether the said affidavit was legally obtained. The
Republic opines that as a marriage under a license is not invalidated by the fact
that the license was wrongfully obtained, so must a marriage not be invalidated
by the fact that the parties incorporated a fabricated statement in their affidavit
that they cohabited as husband and wife for at least five years. In addition, the
Republic posits that the parties marriage contract states that their marriage was
solemnized under Article 76 of the Civil Code. It also bears the signature of the
parties and their witnesses, and must be considered a primary evidence of
marriage. To further fortify its Petition, the Republic adduces the following
documents: (1) Joses notarized Statement of Assets and Liabilities, dated 12
May 1988 wherein he wrote Felisas name as his wife; (2) Certification dated 25
July 1993 issued by the Barangay Chairman 192, Zone ZZ, District 24 of Pasay
City, attesting that Jose and Felisa had lived together as husband and wife in
said barangay; and (3) Joses company ID card, dated 2 May 1988, indicating
Felisas name as his wife.
The first assignment of error compels this Court to rule on the issue of the effect
of a false affidavit under Article 76 of the Civil Code. A survey of the prevailing
rules is in order.
It is beyond dispute that the marriage of Jose and Felisa was celebrated on 24
November 1986, prior to the effectivity of the Family Code. Accordingly, the Civil
Code governs their union. Article 53 of the Civil Code spells out the essential
requisites of marriage as a contract:
ART. 53. No marriage shall be solemnized unless all these requisites are
complied with:
(1) Legal capacity of the contracting parties;
(2) Their consent, freely given;
(3) Authority of the person performing the marriage; and
(4) A marriage license, except in a marriage of exceptional character.
(Emphasis ours.)
Article 58
27
makes explicit that no marriage shall be solemnized without a license
first being issued by the local civil registrar of the municipality where either
contracting party habitually resides, save marriages of an exceptional character
authorized by the Civil Code, but not those under Article 75.
28
Article 80(3)
29
of
the Civil Code makes it clear that a marriage performed without the
corresponding marriage license is void, this being nothing more than the
legitimate consequence flowing from the fact that the license is the essence of
the marriage contract.
30
This is in stark contrast to the old Marriage Law,
31

whereby the absence of a marriage license did not make the marriage void. The
rationale for the compulsory character of a marriage license under the Civil Code
is that it is the authority granted by the State to the contracting parties, after the
proper government official has inquired into their capacity to contract marriage.
32

Under the Civil Code, marriages of exceptional character are covered by Chapter
2, Title III, comprising Articles 72 to 79. To wit, these marriages are: (1)
marriages in articulo mortis or at the point of death during peace or war, (2)
marriages in remote places, (2) consular marriages,
33
(3) ratification of marital
cohabitation, (4) religious ratification of a civil marriage, (5) Mohammedan or
pagan marriages, and (6) mixed marriages.
34

The instant case pertains to a ratification of marital cohabitation under Article 76
of the Civil Code, which provides:
ART. 76. No marriage license shall be necessary when a man and a woman who
have attained the age of majority and who, being unmarried, have lived together
as husband and wife for at least five years, desire to marry each other. The
contracting parties shall state the foregoing facts in an affidavit before any person
authorized by law to administer oaths. The official, priest or minister who
solemnized the marriage shall also state in an affidavit that he took steps to
ascertain the ages and other qualifications of the contracting parties and that he
found no legal impediment to the marriage.
The reason for the law,
35
as espoused by the Code Commission, is that the
publicity attending a marriage license may discourage such persons who have
lived in a state of cohabitation from legalizing their status.
36

It is not contested herein that the marriage of Jose and Felisa was performed
without a marriage license. In lieu thereof, they executed an affidavit declaring
that "they have attained the age of maturity; that being unmarried, they have lived
together as husband and wife for at least five years; and that because of this
union, they desire to marry each other."
37
One of the central issues in the Petition
at bar is thus: whether the falsity of an affidavit of marital cohabitation, where the
parties have in truth fallen short of the minimum five-year requirement, effectively
renders the marriage void ab initio for lack of a marriage license.
We answer in the affirmative.
Marriages of exceptional character are, doubtless, the exceptions to the rule on
the indispensability of the formal requisite of a marriage license. Under the rules
of statutory construction, exceptions, as a general rule, should be strictly
38
but
reasonably construed.
39
They extend only so far as their language fairly warrants,
and all doubts should be resolved in favor of the general provisions rather than
the exception.
40
Where a general rule is established by statute with exceptions,
the court will not curtail the former or add to the latter by implication.
41
For the
exception in Article 76 to apply, it is a sine qua non thereto that the man and the
woman must have attained the age of majority, and that, being unmarried, they
have lived together as husband and wife for at least five years.
A strict but reasonable construction of Article 76 leaves us with no other
expediency but to read the law as it is plainly written. The exception of a
marriage license under Article 76 applies only to those who have lived together
as husband and wife for at least five years and desire to marry each other. The
Civil Code, in no ambiguous terms, places a minimum period requirement of five
years of cohabitation. No other reading of the law can be had, since the language
of Article 76 is precise. The minimum requisite of five years of cohabitation is an
indispensability carved in the language of the law. For a marriage celebrated
under Article 76 to be valid, this material fact cannot be dispensed with. It is
embodied in the law not as a directory requirement, but as one that partakes of a
mandatory character. It is worthy to mention that Article 76 also prescribes that
the contracting parties shall state the requisite facts
42
in an affidavit before any
person authorized by law to administer oaths; and that the official, priest or
minister who solemnized the marriage shall also state in an affidavit that he took
steps to ascertain the ages and other qualifications of the contracting parties and
that he found no legal impediment to the marriage.
It is indubitably established that Jose and Felisa have not lived together for five
years at the time they executed their sworn affidavit and contracted marriage.
The Republic admitted that Jose and Felisa started living together only in June
1986, or barely five months before the celebration of their marriage.
43
The Court
of Appeals also noted Felisas testimony that Jose was introduced to her by her
neighbor, Teresita Perwel, sometime in February or March 1986 after the EDSA
Revolution.
44
The appellate court also cited Felisas own testimony that it was
only in June 1986 when Jose commenced to live in her house.
45

Moreover, it is noteworthy that the question as to whether they satisfied the
minimum five-year requisite is factual in nature. A question of fact arises when
there is a need to decide on the truth or falsehood of the alleged facts.
46
Under
Rule 45, factual findings are ordinarily not subject to this Courts review.
47
It is
already well-settled that:
The general rule is that the findings of facts of the Court of Appeals are binding
on this Court. A recognized exception to this rule is when the Court of Appeals
and the trial court, or in this case the administrative body, make contradictory
findings. However, the exception does not apply in every instance that the Court
of Appeals and the trial court or administrative body disagree. The factual
findings of the Court of Appeals remain conclusive on this Court if such findings
are supported by the record or based on substantial evidence.
48

Therefore, the falsity of the affidavit dated 24 November 1986, executed by Jose
and Felisa to exempt them from the requirement of a marriage license, is beyond
question.
We cannot accept the insistence of the Republic that the falsity of the statements
in the parties affidavit will not affect the validity of marriage, since all the
essential and formal requisites were complied with. The argument deserves
scant merit. Patently, it cannot be denied that the marriage between Jose and
Felisa was celebrated without the formal requisite of a marriage license. Neither
did Jose and Felisa meet the explicit legal requirement in Article 76, that they
should have lived together as husband and wife for at least five years, so as to
be excepted from the requirement of a marriage license.
Anent petitioners reliance on the presumption of marriage, this Court holds that
the same finds no applicability to the case at bar. Essentially, when we speak of
a presumption of marriage, it is with reference to the prima facie presumption that
a man and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered
into a lawful contract of marriage.
49
Restated more explicitly, persons dwelling
together in apparent matrimony are presumed, in the absence of any counter-
presumption or evidence special to the case, to be in fact married.
50
The present
case does not involve an apparent marriage to which the presumption still needs
to be applied. There is no question that Jose and Felisa actually entered into a
contract of marriage on 24 November 1986, hence, compelling Jose to institute a
Complaint for Annulment and/or Declaration of Nullity of Marriage, which
spawned the instant consolidated Petitions.
In the same vein, the declaration of the Civil Code
51
that every intendment of law
or fact leans towards the validity of marriage will not salvage the parties
marriage, and extricate them from the effect of a violation of the law. The
marriage of Jose and Felisa was entered into without the requisite marriage
license or compliance with the stringent requirements of a marriage under
exceptional circumstance. The solemnization of a marriage without prior license
is a clear violation of the law and would lead or could be used, at least, for the
perpetration of fraud against innocent and unwary parties, which was one of the
evils that the law sought to prevent by making a prior license a prerequisite for a
valid marriage.
52
The protection of marriage as a sacred institution requires not
just the defense of a true and genuine union but the exposure of an invalid one
as well.
53
To permit a false affidavit to take the place of a marriage license is to
allow an abject circumvention of the law. If this Court is to protect the fabric of the
institution of marriage, we must be wary of deceptive schemes that violate the
legal measures set forth in our laws.
Similarly, we are not impressed by the ratiocination of the Republic that as a
marriage under a license is not invalidated by the fact that the license was
wrongfully obtained, so must a marriage not be invalidated by a fabricated
statement that the parties have cohabited for at least five years as required by
law. The contrast is flagrant. The former is with reference to an irregularity of the
marriage license, and not to the absence of one. Here, there is no marriage
license at all. Furthermore, the falsity of the allegation in the sworn affidavit
relating to the period of Jose and Felisas cohabitation, which would have
qualified their marriage as an exception to the requirement for a marriage
license, cannot be a mere irregularity, for it refers to a quintessential fact that the
law precisely required to be deposed and attested to by the parties under oath. If
the essential matter in the sworn affidavit is a lie, then it is but a mere scrap of
paper, without force and effect. Hence, it is as if there was no affidavit at all.
In its second assignment of error, the Republic puts forth the argument that
based on equity, Jose should be denied relief because he perpetrated the
fabrication, and cannot thereby profit from his wrongdoing. This is a misplaced
invocation. It must be stated that equity finds no room for application where there
is a law.
54
There is a law on the ratification of marital cohabitation, which is set in
precise terms under Article 76 of the Civil Code. Nonetheless, the authorities are
consistent that the declaration of nullity of the parties marriage is without
prejudice to their criminal liability.
55

The Republic further avers in its third assignment of error that Jose is deemed
estopped from assailing the legality of his marriage for lack of a marriage license.
It is claimed that Jose and Felisa had lived together from 1986 to 1990,
notwithstanding Joses subsequent marriage to Rufina Pascual on 31 August
1990, and that it took Jose seven years before he sought the declaration of
nullity; hence, estoppel had set in.
This is erroneous. An action for nullity of marriage is imprescriptible.
56
Jose and
Felisas marriage was celebrated sans a marriage license. No other conclusion
can be reached except that it is void ab initio. In this case, the right to impugn a
void marriage does not prescribe, and may be raised any time.
Lastly, to settle all doubts, jurisprudence has laid down the rule that the five-year
common-law cohabitation period under Article 76 means a five-year period
computed back from the date of celebration of marriage, and refers to a period of
legal union had it not been for the absence of a marriage.
57
It covers the years
immediately preceding the day of the marriage, characterized by exclusivity -
meaning no third party was involved at any time within the five years - and
continuity that is unbroken.
58

WHEREFORE, the Petitions are DENIED. The Amended Decision of the Court of
Appeals, dated 7 November 2006 in CA-G.R. CV No. 68759, declaring the
marriage of Jose Dayot to Felisa Tecson-Dayot void ab initio, is AFFIRMED,
without prejudice to their criminal liability, if any. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ
Associate Justice
Acting Chairperson
DANTE O. TINGA
*

Associate Justice
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
**

Associate Justice
RUBEN T. REYES
Associate Justice
A T T E S T A T I O N
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.
MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ
Associate Justice
Acting Chairperson, Third Division
C E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Acting
Chairpersons attestation, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above
Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer
of the opinion of the Courts Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice




13. Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 160172 February 13, 2008
REINEL ANTHONY B. DE CASTRO, petitioner,
vs.
ANNABELLE ASSIDAO-DE CASTRO, respondent.
D E C I S I O N
TINGA, J .:
This is a petition for review of the Decision
1
of the Court of Appeals in CA-GR
CV. No. 69166,
2
declaring that (1) Reianna Tricia A. De Castro is the legitimate
child of the petitioner; and (2) that the marriage between petitioner and
respondent is valid until properly nullified by a competent court in a proceeding
instituted for that purpose.
The facts of the case, as culled from the records, follow.
Petitioner and respondent met and became sweethearts in 1991. They planned
to get married, thus they applied for a marriage license with the Office of the Civil
Registrar of Pasig City in September 1994. They had their first sexual relation
sometime in October 1994, and had regularly engaged in sex thereafter. When
the couple went back to the Office of the Civil Registrar, the marriage license had
already expired. Thus, in order to push through with the plan, in lieu of a
marriage license, they executed an affidavit dated 13 March 1995 stating that
they had been living together as husband and wife for at least five years. The
couple got married on the same date, with Judge Jose C. Bernabe, presiding
judge of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasig City, administering the civil rites.
Nevertheless, after the ceremony, petitioner and respondent went back to their
respective homes and did not live together as husband and wife.
On 13 November 1995, respondent gave birth to a child named Reinna Tricia A.
De Castro. Since the childs birth, respondent has been the one supporting her
out of her income as a government dentist and from her private practice.
On 4 June 1998, respondent filed a complaint for support against petitioner
before the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City (trial court.
3
In her complaint,
respondent alleged that she is married to petitioner and that the latter has
"reneged on his responsibility/obligation to financially support her "as his wife and
Reinna Tricia as his child."
4

Petitioner denied that he is married to respondent, claiming that their marriage is
void ab initio since the marriage was facilitated by a fake affidavit; and that he
was merely prevailed upon by respondent to sign the marriage contract to save
her from embarrassment and possible administrative prosecution due to her
pregnant state; and that he was not able to get parental advice from his parents
before he got married. He also averred that they never lived together as husband
and wife and that he has never seen nor acknowledged the child.
In its Decision dated 16 October 2000,
5
the trial court ruled that the marriage
between petitioner and respondent is not valid because it was solemnized
without a marriage license. However, it declared petitioner as the natural father of
the child, and thus obliged to give her support. Petitioner elevated the case to the
Court of Appeals, arguing that the lower court committed grave abuse of
discretion when, on the basis of mere belief and conjecture, it ordered him to
provide support to the child when the latter is not, and could not have been, his
own child.
The Court of Appeals denied the appeal. Prompted by the rule that a marriage is
presumed to be subsisting until a judicial declaration of nullity has been made,
the appellate court declared that the child was born during the subsistence and
validity of the parties marriage. In addition, the Court of Appeals frowned upon
petitioners refusal to undergo DNA testing to prove the paternity and filiation, as
well as his refusal to state with certainty the last time he had carnal knowledge
with respondent, saying that petitioners "forgetfulness should not be used as a
vehicle to relieve him of his obligation and reward him of his being
irresponsible."
6
Moreover, the Court of Appeals noted the affidavit dated 7 April
1998 executed by petitioner, wherein he voluntarily admitted that he is the
legitimate father of the child.
The appellate court also ruled that since this case is an action for support, it was
improper for the trial court to declare the marriage of petitioner and respondent
as null and void in the very same case. There was no participation of the State,
through the prosecuting attorney or fiscal, to see to it that there is no collusion
between the parties, as required by the Family Code in actions for declaration of
nullity of a marriage. The burden of proof to show that the marriage is void rests
upon petitioner, but it is a matter that can be raised in an action for declaration of
nullity, and not in the instant proceedings. The proceedings before the trial court
should have been limited to the obligation of petitioner to support the child and
his wife on the basis of the marriage apparently and voluntarily entered into by
petitioner and respondent.
7
The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision dated 16 October 2000,
of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, National Capital Judicial Region,
Brach 70, in JDRC No. 4626, is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATIONS (1)
declaring Reianna Tricia A. De Castro, as the legitimate child of the
appellant and the appellee and (2) declaring the marriage on 13 March
1995 between the appellant and the appellee valid until properly annulled
by a competent court in a proceeding instituted for that purpose. Costs
against the appellant.
8

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but the motion was denied by the
Court of Appeals.
9
Hence this petition.
Before us, petitioner contends that the trial court properly annulled his marriage
with respondent because as shown by the evidence and admissions of the
parties, the marriage was celebrated without a marriage license. He stresses that
the affidavit they executed, in lieu of a marriage license, contained a false
narration of facts, the truth being that he and respondent never lived together as
husband and wife. The false affidavit should never be allowed or admitted as a
substitute to fill the absence of a marriage license.
10
Petitioner additionally
argues that there was no need for the appearance of a prosecuting attorney in
this case because it is only an ordinary action for support and not an action for
annulment or declaration of absolute nullity of marriage. In any case, petitioner
argues that the trial court had jurisdiction to determine the invalidity of their
marriage since it was validly invoked as an affirmative defense in the instant
action for support. Citing several authorities,
11
petitioner claims that a void
marriage can be the subject of a collateral attack. Thus, there is no necessity to
institute another independent proceeding for the declaration of nullity of the
marriage between the parties. The refiling of another case for declaration of
nullity where the same evidence and parties would be presented would entail
enormous expenses and anxieties, would be time-consuming for the parties, and
would increase the burden of the courts.
12
Finally, petitioner claims that in view of
the nullity of his marriage with respondent and his vigorous denial of the childs
paternity and filiation, the Court of Appeals gravely erred in declaring the child as
his legitimate child.
In a resolution dated 16 February 2004, the Court required respondent and the
Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) to file their respective comments on the
petition.
13

In her Comment,
14
respondent claims that the instant petition is a mere dilatory
tactic to thwart the finality of the decision of the Court of Appeals. Echoing the
findings and rulings of the appellate court, she argues that the legitimacy of their
marriage cannot be attacked collaterally, but can only be repudiated or contested
in a direct suit specifically brought for that purpose. With regard to the filiation of
her child, she pointed out that compared to her candid and straightforward
testimony, petitioner was uncertain, if not evasive in answering questions about
their sexual encounters. Moreover, she adds that despite the challenge from her
and from the trial court, petitioner strongly objected to being subjected to DNA
testing to prove paternity and filiation.
15

For its part, the OSG avers that the Court of Appeals erred in holding that it was
improper for the trial court to declare null and void the marriage of petitioner and
respondent in the action for support. Citing the case of Nial v. Bayadog,
16
it
states that courts may pass upon the validity of a marriage in an action for
support, since the right to support from petitioner hinges on the existence of a
valid marriage. Moreover, the evidence presented during the proceedings in the
trial court showed that the marriage between petitioner and respondent was
solemnized without a marriage license, and that their affidavit (of a man and
woman who have lived together and exclusively with each other as husband and
wife for at least five years) was false. Thus, it concludes the trial court correctly
held that the marriage between petitioner and respondent is not valid.
17
In
addition, the OSG agrees with the findings of the trial court that the child is an
illegitimate child of petitioner and thus entitled to support.
18

Two key issues are presented before us. First, whether the trial court had the
jurisdiction to determine the validity of the marriage between petitioner and
respondent in an action for support and second, whether the child is the daughter
of petitioner.
Anent the first issue, the Court holds that the trial court had jurisdiction to
determine the validity of the marriage between petitioner and respondent. The
validity of a void marriage may be collaterally attacked.
19
Thus, in Nial v.
Bayadog, we held:
However, other than for purposes of remarriage, no judicial action is
necessary to declare a marriage an absolute nullity. For other purposes,
such as but not limited to determination of heirship, legitimacy or
illegitimacy of a child, settlement of estate, dissolution of property regime,
or a criminal case for that matter, the court may pass upon the validity of
marriage even in a suit not directly instituted to question the same so long
as it is essential to the determination of the case. This is without prejudice
to any issue that may arise in the case. When such need arises, a final
judgment of declaration of nullity is necessary even if the purpose is other
than to remarry. The clause "on the basis of a final judgment declaring
such previous marriage void" in Article 40 of the Family Code connotes
that such final judgment need not be obtained only for purpose of
remarriage.
20

Likewise, in Nicdao Cario v. Yee Cario,
21
the Court ruled that it is clothed with
sufficient authority to pass upon the validity of two marriages despite the main
case being a claim for death benefits. Reiterating Nial, we held that the Court
may pass upon the validity of a marriage even in a suit not directly instituted to
question the validity of said marriage, so long as it is essential to the
determination of the case. However, evidence must be adduced, testimonial or
documentary, to prove the existence of grounds rendering such a marriage an
absolute nullity.
22

Under the Family Code, the absence of any of the essential or formal requisites
shall render the marriage void ab initio, whereas a defect in any of the essential
requisites shall render the marriage voidable.
23
In the instant case, it is clear from
the evidence presented that petitioner and respondent did not have a marriage
license when they contracted their marriage. Instead, they presented an affidavit
stating that they had been living together for more than five years.
24
However,
respondent herself in effect admitted the falsity of the affidavit when she was
asked during cross-examination, thus
ATTY. CARPIO:
Q But despite of (sic) the fact that you have not been living together as
husband and wife for the last five years on or before March 13, 1995, you
signed the Affidavit, is that correct?
A Yes, sir.
25

The falsity of the affidavit cannot be considered as a mere irregularity in the
formal requisites of marriage. The law dispenses with the marriage license
requirement for a man and a woman who have lived together and exclusively
with each other as husband and wife for a continuous and unbroken period of at
least five years before the marriage. The aim of this provision is to avoid
exposing the parties to humiliation, shame and embarrassment concomitant with
the scandalous cohabitation of persons outside a valid marriage due to the
publication of every applicants name for a marriage license.
26
In the instant case,
there was no "scandalous cohabitation" to protect; in fact, there was no
cohabitation at all. The false affidavit which petitioner and respondent executed
so they could push through with the marriage has no value whatsoever; it is a
mere scrap of paper. They were not exempt from the marriage license
requirement. Their failure to obtain and present a marriage license renders their
marriage void ab initio.
Anent the second issue, we find that the child is petitioners illegitimate daughter,
and therefore entitled to support.
Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the same way and
on the same evidence as legitimate children.
27
Thus, one can prove illegitimate
filiation through the record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final
judgment, an admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private
handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned, or the open and
continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child, or any other means
allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.
28

The Certificate of Live Birth
29
of the child lists petitioner as the father. In addition,
petitioner, in an affidavit waiving additional tax exemption in favor of respondent,
admitted that he is the father of the child, thus stating:
1. I am the legitimate father of REIANNA TRICIA A. DE CASTRO who was
born on November 3, 1995 at Better Living, Paraaque, Metro Manila;
30

We are likewise inclined to agree with the following findings of the trial court:
That Reinna Tricia is the child of the respondent with the petitioner is
supported not only by the testimony of the latter, but also by respondents
own admission in the course of his testimony wherein he conceded that
petitioner was his former girlfriend. While they were sweethearts, he used
to visit petitioner at the latters house or clinic. At times, they would go to a
motel to have sex. As a result of their sexual dalliances, petitioner became
pregnant which ultimately led to their marriage, though invalid, as earlier
ruled. While respondent claims that he was merely forced to undergo the
marriage ceremony, the pictures taken of the occasion reveal otherwise
(Exhs. "B," "B-1," to "B-3," "C," "C-1" and "C-2," "D," "D-1" and "D-2," "E,"
"E-1" and "E-2," "F," "F-1" and "F-2," "G," "G-1" and "G-2" and "H," "H-1" to
"H-3"). In one of the pictures (Exhs. "D," "D-1" and "D-2"), defendant is
seen putting the wedding ring on petitioners finger and in another picture
(Exhs. "E," "E-1" and "E-2") respondent is seen in the act of kissing the
petitioner.
31

WHEREFORE, the petition is granted in part. The assailed Decision and
Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-GR CV No. 69166 are SET ASIDE and
the decision of the Regional Trial Court Branch 70 of Pasig City in JDRC No.
4626 dated 16 October 2000 is hereby REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.
DANTE O. TINGA
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairperson
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES
Associate Justice
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice

ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Courts Division.
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Second Division

CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division
Chairpersons Attestation, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above
Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the
writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
















14. Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

G.R. No. 112019 January 4, 1995
LEOUEL SANTOS, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS AND JULIA ROSARIO BEDIA-
SANTOS, respondents.
VITUG, J .:
Concededly a highly, if not indeed the most likely, controversial provision
introduced by the Family Code is Article 36 (as amended by E.O. No. 227 dated
17 July 1987), which declares:
Art. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the
celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential
marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such
incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.
The present petition for review on certiorari, at the instance of Leouel
Santos ("Leouel"), brings into fore the above provision which is now
invoked by him. Undaunted by the decisions of the court a quo
1
and the
Court of Appeal,
2
Leouel persists in beseeching its application in his
attempt to have his marriage with herein private respondent, Julia Rosario
Bedia-Santos ("Julia"), declared a nullity.
It was in Iloilo City where Leouel, who then held the rank of First Lieutenant in the
Philippine Army, first met Julia. The meeting later proved to be an eventful day
for Leouel and Julia. On 20 September 1986, the two exchanged vows before
Municipal Trial Court Judge Cornelio G. Lazaro of Iloilo City, followed, shortly
thereafter, by a church wedding. Leouel and Julia lived with the latter's parents at
the J. Bedia Compound, La Paz, Iloilo City. On 18 July 1987, Julia gave birth to a
baby boy, and he was christened Leouel Santos, Jr. The ecstasy, however, did
not last long. It was bound to happen, Leouel averred, because of the frequent
interference by Julia's parents into the young spouses family affairs.
Occasionally, the couple would also start a "quarrel" over a number of other
things, like when and where the couple should start living independently from
Julia's parents or whenever Julia would express resentment on Leouel's
spending a few days with his own parents.
On 18 May 1988, Julia finally left for the United Sates of America to work as a
nurse despite Leouel's pleas to so dissuade her. Seven months after her
departure, or on 01 January 1989, Julia called up Leouel for the first time by long
distance telephone. She promised to return home upon the expiration of her
contract in July 1989. She never did. When Leouel got a chance to visit the
United States, where he underwent a training program under the auspices of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines from 01 April up to 25 August 1990, he
desperately tried to locate, or to somehow get in touch with, Julia but all his
efforts were of no avail.
Having failed to get Julia to somehow come home, Leouel filed with the regional
trial Court of Negros Oriental, Branch 30, a complaint for "Voiding of marriage
Under Article 36 of the Family Code" (docketed, Civil Case No. 9814). Summons
was served by publication in a newspaper of general circulation in Negros
Oriental.
On 31 May 1991, respondent Julia, in her answer (through counsel), opposed the
complaint and denied its allegations, claiming, in main, that it was the petitioner
who had, in fact, been irresponsible and incompetent.
A possible collusion between the parties to obtain a decree of nullity of their
marriage was ruled out by the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor (in its report to
the court).
On 25 October 1991, after pre-trial conferences had repeatedly been set, albeit
unsuccessfully, by the court, Julia ultimately filed a manifestation, stating that she
would neither appear nor submit evidence.
On 06 November 1991, the court a quo finally dismissed the complaint for lack of
merit.
3

Leouel appealed to the Court of Appeal. The latter affirmed the decision of the
trial court.
4

The petition should be denied not only because of its non-compliance with
Circular 28-91, which requires a certification of non-shopping, but also for its lack
of merit.
Leouel argues that the failure of Julia to return home, or at the very least to
communicate with him, for more than five years are circumstances that clearly
show her being psychologically incapacitated to enter into married life. In his own
words, Leouel asserts:
. . . (T)here is no leave, there is no affection for (him) because
respondent Julia Rosario Bedia-Santos failed all these years to
communicate with the petitioner. A wife who does not care to inform
her husband about her whereabouts for a period of five years, more
or less, is psychologically incapacitated.
The family Code did not define the term "psychological incapacity." The
deliberations during the sessions of the Family Code Revision Committee, which
has drafted the Code, can, however, provide an insight on the import of the
provision.
Art. 35. The following marriages shall be void from the beginning:
xxx xxx xxx
Art. 36. . . .
(7) Those marriages contracted by any party who, at the time of the
celebration, was wanting in the sufficient use of reason or judgment to
understand the essential nature of marriage or was psychologically or
mentally incapacitated to discharge the essential marital obligations, even
if such lack of incapacity is made manifest after the celebration.
On subparagraph (7), which as lifted from the Canon Law, Justice (Jose
B.L.) Reyes suggested that they say "wanting in sufficient use," but Justice
(Eduardo) Caguioa preferred to say "wanting in the sufficient use." On the
other hand, Justice Reyes proposed that they say "wanting in sufficient
reason." Justice Caguioa, however, pointed out that the idea is that one is
not lacking in judgment but that he is lacking in the exercise of judgment.
He added that lack of judgment would make the marriage voidable. Judge
(Alicia Sempio-) Diy remarked that lack of judgment is more serious than
insufficient use of judgment and yet the latter would make the marriage null
and void and the former only voidable. Justice Caguioa suggested that
subparagraph (7) be modified to read:
"That contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was
psychologically incapacitated to discharge the essential marital obligations,
even if such lack of incapacity is made manifest after the celebration."
Justice Caguioa explained that the phrase "was wanting in sufficient use of
reason of judgment to understand the essential nature of marriage" refers
to defects in the mental faculties vitiating consent, which is not the idea in
subparagraph (7), but lack of appreciation of one's marital obligations.
Judge Diy raised the question: Since "insanity" is also a psychological or
mental incapacity, why is "insanity" only a ground for annulment and not for
declaration or nullity? In reply, Justice Caguioa explained that in insanity,
there is the appearance of consent, which is the reason why it is a ground
for voidable marriages, while subparagraph (7) does not refer to consent
but to the very essence of marital obligations.
Prof. (Araceli) Baviera suggested that, in subparagraph (7), the word
"mentally" be deleted, with which Justice Caguioa concurred. Judge Diy,
however, prefers to retain the word "mentally."
Justice Caguioa remarked that subparagraph (7) refers to psychological
impotence. Justice (Ricardo) Puno stated that sometimes a person may be
psychologically impotent with one but not with another. Justice (Leonor
Ines-) Luciano said that it is called selective impotency.
Dean (Fortunato) Gupit stated that the confusion lies in the fact that in
inserting the Canon Law annulment in the Family Code, the Committee
used a language which describes a ground for voidable marriages under
the Civil Code. Justice Caguioa added that in Canon Law, there are
voidable marriages under the Canon Law, there are no voidable marriages
Dean Gupit said that this is precisely the reason why they should make a
distinction.
Justice Puno remarked that in Canon Law, the defects in marriage cannot
be cured.
Justice Reyes pointed out that the problem is: Why is "insanity" a ground
for void ab initio marriages? In reply, Justice Caguioa explained that
insanity is curable and there are lucid intervals, while psychological
incapacity is not.
On another point, Justice Puno suggested that the phrase "even if such
lack or incapacity is made manifest" be modified to read "even if such lack
or incapacity becomes manifest."
Justice Reyes remarked that in insanity, at the time of the marriage, it is
not apparent.
Justice Caguioa stated that there are two interpretations of the phrase
"psychological or mentally incapacitated" in the first one, there is
vitiation of consent because one does not know all the consequences of
the marriages, and if he had known these completely, he might not have
consented to the marriage.
xxx xxx xxx
Prof. Bautista stated that he is in favor of making psychological incapacity
a ground for voidable marriages since otherwise it will encourage one who
really understood the consequences of marriage to claim that he did not
and to make excuses for invalidating the marriage by acting as if he did not
understand the obligations of marriage. Dean Gupit added that it is a loose
way of providing for divorce.
xxx xxx xxx
Justice Caguioa explained that his point is that in the case of incapacity by
reason of defects in the mental faculties, which is less than insanity, there
is a defect in consent and, therefore, it is clear that it should be a ground
for voidable marriage because there is the appearance of consent and it is
capable of convalidation for the simple reason that there are lucid intervals
and there are cases when the insanity is curable. He emphasized that
psychological incapacity does not refer to mental faculties and has nothing
to do with consent; it refers to obligations attendant to marriage.
xxx xxx xxx
On psychological incapacity, Prof. (Flerida Ruth P.) Romero inquired if
they do not consider it as going to the very essence of consent. She asked
if they are really removing it from consent. In reply, Justice Caguioa
explained that, ultimately, consent in general is effected but he stressed
that his point is that it is not principally a vitiation of consent since there is a
valid consent. He objected to the lumping together of the validity of the
marriage celebration and the obligations attendant to marriage, which are
completely different from each other, because they require a different
capacity, which is eighteen years of age, for marriage but in contract, it is
different. Justice Puno, however, felt that psychological incapacity is still a
kind of vice of consent and that it should not be classified as a voidable
marriage which is incapable of convalidation; it should be convalidated but
there should be no prescription. In other words, as long as the defect has
not been cured, there is always a right to annul the marriage and if the
defect has been really cured, it should be a defense in the action for
annulment so that when the action for annulment is instituted, the issue
can be raised that actually, although one might have been psychologically
incapacitated, at the time the action is brought, it is no longer true that he
has no concept of the consequence of marriage.
Prof. (Esteban) Bautista raised the question: Will not cohabitation be a
defense? In response, Justice Puno stated that even the bearing of
children and cohabitation should not be a sign that psychological
incapacity has been cured.
Prof. Romero opined that psychological incapacity is still insanity of a
lesser degree. Justice Luciano suggested that they invite a psychiatrist,
who is the expert on this matter. Justice Caguioa, however, reiterated that
psychological incapacity is not a defect in the mind but in the
understanding of the consequences of marriage, and therefore, a
psychiatrist will not be a help.
Prof. Bautista stated that, in the same manner that there is a lucid interval
in insanity, there are also momentary periods when there is an
understanding of the consequences of marriage. Justice Reyes and Dean
Gupit remarked that the ground of psychological incapacity will not apply if
the marriage was contracted at the time when there is understanding of the
consequences of marriage.
5

xxx xxx xxx
Judge Diy proposed that they include physical incapacity to copulate
among the grounds for void marriages. Justice Reyes commented that in
some instances the impotence that in some instances the impotence is
only temporary and only with respect to a particular person. Judge Diy
stated that they can specify that it is incurable. Justice Caguioa remarked
that the term "incurable" has a different meaning in law and in medicine.
Judge Diy stated that "psychological incapacity" can also be cured. Justice
Caguioa, however, pointed out that "psychological incapacity" is incurable.
Justice Puno observed that under the present draft provision, it is enough
to show that at the time of the celebration of the marriage, one was
psychologically incapacitated so that later on if already he can comply with
the essential marital obligations, the marriage is still void ab initio. Justice
Caguioa explained that since in divorce, the psychological incapacity may
occur after the marriage, in void marriages, it has to be at the time of the
celebration of marriage. He, however, stressed that the idea in the
provision is that at the time of the celebration of the marriage, one is
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital
obligations, which incapacity continues and later becomes manifest.
Justice Puno and Judge Diy, however, pointed out that it is possible that
after the marriage, one's psychological incapacity become manifest but
later on he is cured. Justice Reyes and Justice Caguioa opined that the
remedy in this case is to allow him to remarry.
6

xxx xxx xxx
Justice Puno formulated the next Article as follows:
Art. 37. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the
celebration, was psychologically incapacitated, to comply with the
essential obligations of marriage shall likewise be void from the
beginning even if such incapacity becomes manifest after its
solemnization.
Justice Caguioa suggested that "even if" be substituted with
"although." On the other hand, Prof. Bautista proposed that the
clause "although such incapacity becomes manifest after its
solemnization" be deleted since it may encourage one to create the
manifestation of psychological incapacity. Justice Caguioa pointed
out that, as in other provisions, they cannot argue on the basis of
abuse.
Judge Diy suggested that they also include mental and physical
incapacities, which are lesser in degree than psychological
incapacity. Justice Caguioa explained that mental and physical
incapacities are vices of consent while psychological incapacity is
not a species of vice or consent.
Dean Gupit read what Bishop Cruz said on the matter in the minutes
of their February 9, 1984 meeting:
"On the third ground, Bishop Cruz indicated that the phrase
"psychological or mental impotence" is an invention of some
churchmen who are moralists but not canonists, that is why it is
considered a weak phrase. He said that the Code of Canon
Law would rather express it as "psychological or mental
incapacity to discharge . . ."
Justice Caguioa remarked that they deleted the word "mental"
precisely to distinguish it from vice of consent. He explained that
"psychological incapacity" refers to lack of understanding of the
essential obligations of marriage.
Justice Puno reminded the members that, at the last meeting, they
have decided not to go into the classification of "psychological
incapacity" because there was a lot of debate on it and that this is
precisely the reason why they classified it as a special case.
At this point, Justice Puno, remarked that, since there having been
annulments of marriages arising from psychological incapacity, Civil
Law should not reconcile with Canon Law because it is a new
ground even under Canon Law.
Prof. Romero raised the question: With this common provision in
Civil Law and in Canon Law, are they going to have a provision in
the Family Code to the effect that marriages annulled or declared
void by the church on the ground of psychological incapacity is
automatically annulled in Civil Law? The other members replied
negatively.
Justice Puno and Prof. Romero inquired if Article 37 should be
retroactive or prospective in application.
Justice Diy opined that she was for its retroactivity because it is their
answer to the problem of church annulments of marriages, which are
still valid under the Civil Law. On the other hand, Justice Reyes and
Justice Puno were concerned about the avalanche of cases.
Dean Gupit suggested that they put the issue to a vote, which the
Committee approved.
The members voted as follows:
(1) Justice Reyes, Justice Puno and Prof. Romero were for
prospectivity.
(2) Justice Caguioa, Judge Diy, Dean Gupit, Prof. Bautista and
Director Eufemio were for retroactivity.
(3) Prof. Baviera abstained.
Justice Caguioa suggested that they put in the prescriptive period of
ten years within which the action for declaration of nullity of the
marriage should be filed in court. The Committee approved the
suggestion.
7

It could well be that, in sum, the Family Code Revision Committee in ultimately
deciding to adopt the provision with less specificity than expected, has in fact, so
designed the law as to allow some resiliency in its application. Mme. Justice
Alicia V. Sempio-Diy, a member of the Code Committee, has been quoted by Mr.
Justice Josue N. Bellosillo in Salita vs. Hon. Magtolis (G.R. No. 106429, 13 June
1994); thus:
8

The Committee did not give any examples of psychological
incapacity for fear that the giving of examples would limit the
applicability of the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis.
Rather, the Committee would like the judge to interpret the provision
on a case-to-case basis, guided by experience, the findings of
experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and by
decisions of church tribunals which, although not binding on the civil
courts, may be given persuasive effect since the provision was taken
from Canon Law.
A part of the provision is similar to Canon 1095 of the New Code of Canon Law,
9

which reads:
Canon 1095. They are incapable of contracting marriage:
1. who lack sufficient use of reason;
2. who suffer from a grave defect of discretion of judgment
concerning essentila matrimonial rights and duties, to be given and
accepted mutually;
3. who for causes of psychological nature are unable to assume the
essential obligations of marriage. (Emphasis supplied.)
Accordingly, although neither decisive nor even perhaps all that persuasive for
having no juridical or secular effect, the jurisprudence under Canon Law
prevailing at the time of the code's enactment, nevertheless, cannot be dismissed
as impertinent for its value as an aid, at least, to the interpretation or construction
of the codal provision.
One author, Ladislas Orsy, S.J., in his treaties,
10
giving an account on how the
third paragraph of Canon 1095 has been framed, states:
The history of the drafting of this canon does not leave any doubt
that the legislator intended, indeed, to broaden the rule. A strict and
narrow norm was proposed first:
Those who cannot assume the essential obligations of
marriage because of a grave psycho-sexual anomaly
(ob gravem anomaliam psychosexualem) are unable to
contract marriage (cf. SCH/1975, canon 297, a new
canon, novus);
then a broader one followed:
. . . because of a grave psychological anomaly (ob gravem
anomaliam psychicam) . . . (cf. SCH/1980, canon 1049);
then the same wording was retained in the text submitted to the
pope (cf. SCH/1982, canon 1095, 3);
finally, a new version was promulgated:
because of causes of a psychological nature (ob causas naturae
psychiae).
So the progress was from psycho-sexual to psychological anomaly,
then the term anomaly was altogether eliminated. it would be,
however, incorrect to draw the conclusion that the cause of the
incapacity need not be some kind of psychological disorder; after all,
normal and healthy person should be able to assume the ordinary
obligations of marriage.
Fr. Orsy concedes that the term "psychological incapacity" defies any precise
definition since psychological causes can be of an infinite variety.
In a book, entitled "Canons and Commentaries on Marriage," written by Ignatius
Gramunt, Javier Hervada and LeRoy Wauck, the following explanation appears:
This incapacity consists of the following: (a) a true inability to commit
oneself to the essentials of marriage. Some psychosexual disorders
and other disorders of personality can be the psychic cause of this
defect, which is here described in legal terms. This particular type of
incapacity consists of a real inability to render what is due by the
contract. This could be compared to the incapacity of a farmer to
enter a binding contract to deliver the crops which he cannot
possibly reap; (b) this inability to commit oneself must refer to the
essential obligations of marriage: the conjugal act, the community of
life and love, the rendering of mutual help, the procreation and
education of offspring; (c) the inability must be tantamount to a
psychological abnormality. The mere difficulty of assuming these
obligations, which could be overcome by normal effort, obviously
does not constitute incapacity. The canon contemplates a true
psychological disorder which incapacitates a person from giving
what is due (cf. John Paul II, Address to R. Rota, Feb. 5, 1987).
However, if the marriage is to be declared invalid under this
incapacity, it must be proved not only that the person is afflicted by a
psychological defect, but that the defect did in fact deprive the
person, at the moment of giving consent, of the ability to assume the
essential duties of marriage and consequently of the possibility of
being bound by these duties.
Justice Sempio-Diy
11
cites with approval the work of Dr. Gerardo Veloso, a
former Presiding Judge of the Metropolitan Marriage Tribunal of the Catholic
Archdiocese of Manila (Branch 1), who opines that psychological incapacity must
be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability. The
incapacity must be grave or serious such that the party would be incapable of
carrying out the ordinary duties required in marriage; it must be rooted in the
history of the party antedating the marriage, although the overt manifestations
may emerge only after the marriage; and it must be incurable or, even if it were
otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means of the party involved.
It should be obvious, looking at all the foregoing disquisitions, including, and
most importantly, the deliberations of the Family Code Revision Committee itself,
that the use of the phrase "psychological incapacity" under Article 36 of the Code
has not been meant to comprehend all such possible cases of psychoses as,
likewise mentioned by some ecclesiastical authorities, extremely low intelligence,
immaturity, and like circumstances (cited in Fr. Artemio Baluma's "Void and
Voidable Marriages in the Family Code and their Parallels in Canon Law,"
quoting from the Diagnostic Statistical Manual of Mental Disorder by the
American Psychiatric Association; Edward Hudson's "Handbook II for Marriage
Nullity Cases"). Article 36 of the Family Code cannot be taken and construed
independently of, but must stand in conjunction with, existing precepts in our law
on marriage. Thus correlated, "psychological incapacity" should refer to no less
than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive
of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and
discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as so expressed by Article 68 of
the Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love,
respect and fidelity and render help and support. There is hardly any doubt that
the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of "psychological
incapacity" to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly
demonstrative of an utter intensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance
to the marriage. This pschologic condition must exist at the time the marriage is
celebrated. The law does not evidently envision, upon the other hand, an inability
of the spouse to have sexual relations with the other. This conclusion is implicit
under Article 54 of the Family Code which considers children conceived prior to
the judicial declaration of nullity of the void marriage to be "legitimate."
The other forms of psychoses, if existing at the inception of marriage, like the
state of a party being of unsound mind or concealment of drug addiction, habitual
alcoholism, homosexuality or lesbianism, merely renders the marriage contract
voidable pursuant to Article 46, Family Code. If drug addiction, habitual
alcholism, lesbianism or homosexuality should occur only during the marriage,
they become mere grounds for legal separation under Article 55 of the Family
Code. These provisions of the Code, however, do not necessarily preclude the
possibility of these various circumstances being themselves, depending on the
degree and severity of the disorder, indicia of psychological incapacity.
Until further statutory and jurisprudential parameters are established, every
circumstance that may have some bearing on the degree, extent, and other
conditions of that incapacity must, in every case, be carefully examined and
evaluated so that no precipitate and indiscriminate nullity is peremptorily
decreed. The well-considered opinions of psychiatrists, psychologists, and
persons with expertise in psychological disciplines might be helpful or even
desirable.
Marriage is not an adventure but a lifetime commitment. We should continue to
be reminded that innate in our society, then enshrined in our Civil Code, and
even now still indelible in Article 1 of the Family Code, is that
Art. 1. Marriage is a special contract of permanent union between a man a
woman entered into in accordance with law for the establishment of
conjugal and family life. It is the foundation of the family and an inviolable
social institution whose nature, consequences, and incidents are governed
by law and not subject to stipulation, except that marriage settlements may
fix the property relations during the marriage within the limits provided by
this Code. (Emphasis supplied.)
Our Constitution is no less emphatic:
Sec. 1. The State recognizes the Filipino family as the foundation of
the nation. Accordingly, it shall strengthen its solidarity and actively
promote its total development.
Sec. 2. Marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation
of the family and shall be protected by the State. (Article XV, 1987
Constitution).
The above provisions express so well and so distinctly the basic nucleus of our
laws on marriage and the family, and they are doubt the tenets we still hold on to.
The factual settings in the case at bench, in no measure at all, can come close to
the standards required to decree a nullity of marriage. Undeniably and
understandably, Leouel stands aggrieved, even desperate, in his present
situation. Regrettably, neither law nor society itself can always provide all the
specific answers to every individual problem.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Bidin, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Quiason,
Puno Kapunan and Mendoza, JJ., concur.
Feliciano, J., is on leave.
Separate Opinions
PADILLA, J ., dissenting:
It is difficult to dissent from a well-written and studied opinion as Mr. Justice
Vitug's ponencia. But, after an extended reflection on the facts of this case, I
cannot see my way clear into holding, as the majority do, that there is no ground
for the declaration of nullity of the marriage between petitioner and private
respondent.
To my mind, it is clear that private respondent has been shown to be
psychologically incapacitated to comply with at least one essential marital
obligation i.e. that of living and cohabiting with her husband, herein petitioner. On
the other hand, it has not been shown that petitioner does not deserve to live and
cohabit with his wife, herein private respondent.
There appears to be no disagreement that the term "psychological incapacity"
defies precision in definition. But, as used in Article 36 of the Family Code as a
ground for the declaration of nullity of a marriage, the intent of the framers of the
Code is evidently to expand and liberalize the grounds for nullifying a marriage,
as well pointed out by Madam Justice Flerida Ruth P. Romero in her separate
opinion in this case.
While it is true that the board term "psychological incapacity" can open the doors
to abuse by couples who may wish to have an easy way out of their marriage,
there are, however, enough safeguards against this contingency, among which,
is the intervention by the State, through the public prosecutor, to guard against
collusion between the parties and/or fabrication of evidence.
In their case at bench, it has been abundantly established that private
respondent Julia Rosario Bedia-Santos exhibits specific behavior which, to my
mind, shows that she is psychologically incapacitated to fulfill her essential
marital obligations, to writ:
a. It took her seven (7) months after she left for the United States to call up
her husband.
b. Julia promised to return home after her job contract expired in July
1989, but she never did and neither is there any showing that she informed
her husband (herein petitioner) of her whereabouts in the U.S.A.
c. When petitioner went to the United States on a mission for the Philippine
Army, he exerted efforts to "touch base" with Julia; there were no similar
efforts on the part of Julia; there were no similar efforts on the part of Julia
to do the same.
d. When petitioner filed this suit, more than five (5) years had elapsed,
without Julia indicating her plans to rejoin the petitioner or her
whereabouts.
e. When petitioner filed this case in the trial court, Julia, in her answer,
claimed that it is the former who has been irresponsible and incompetent.
f. During the trial, Julia waived her right to appear and submit evidence.
A spouse's obligation to live and cohabit with his/her partner in marriage is a
basic ground rule in marriage, unless there are overpowering compelling reasons
such as, for instance, an incurable contagious disease on the part of a spouse or
cruelty of one partner, bordering on insanity. There may also be instances when,
for economic and practical reasons, husband and wife have to live separately,
but the marital bond between the spouses always remains. Mutual love and
respect for each other would, in such cases, compel the absent spouse to at
least have regular contracts with the other to inform the latter of his/her condition
and whereabouts.
In the present case, it is apparent that private respondent Julia Rosario Bedia-
Santos has no intention of cohabiting with petitioner, her husband, or maintaining
contact with him. In fact, her acts eloquently show that she does not want her
husband to know of her whereabouts and neither has she any intention of living
and cohabiting with him.
To me there appears to be, on the part of private respondent, an unmistakeable
indication of psychological incapacity to comply with her essential marital
obligations, although these indications were made manifest after the celebration
of the marriage.
It would be a great injustice, I believe, to petitioner for this Court to give a much
too restrictive interpretation of the law and compel the petitioner to continue to be
married to a wife who for purposes of fulfilling her marital duties has, for all
practical purposes, ceased to exist.
Besides, there are public policy considerations involved in the ruling the Court
makes today. Is it not, in effect directly or indirectly, facilitating the transformation
of petitioner into a "habitual tryster" or one forced to maintain illicit relations with
another woman or women with emerging problems of illegitimate children, simply
because he is denied by private respondent, his wife, the companionship and
conjugal love which he has sought from her and to which he is legally entitled?
I do not go as far as to suggest that Art. 36 of the Family Code is a sanction for
absolute divorce but I submit that we should not constrict it to non-recognition of
its evident purpose and thus deny to one like petitioner, an opportunity to turn a
new leaf in his life by declaring his marriage a nullity by reason of his wife's
psychological incapacity to perform an essential marital obligation.
I therefore vote to GRANT the petition and to DECLARE the marriage between
petitioner Leouel Santos and private respondent Julia Rosario Bedia-Santos
VOID on the basis of Article 36 of the Family Code.
ROMERO, J ., concurring:
I agree under the circumstances of the case, petitioner is not entitled to have his
marriage declared a nullity on the ground of psychological incapacity of private
respondent.
However, as a member of both the Family Law Revision Committee of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Civil Code Revision Committee of the
UP Law Center, I wish to add some observations. The letter
1
dated April 15,
1985 of then Judge Alicia V. Sempio-Diy written in behalf of the Family Law and
Civil Code Revision Committee to then Assemblywoman Mercedes Cojuangco-
Teodoro traced the background of the inclusion of the present Article 36 in the
Family Code.
During its early meetings, the Family Law Committee had thought of
including a chapter on absolute divorce in the draft of a new Family Code
(Book I of the Civil Code) that it had been tasked by the IBP and the UP
Law Center to prepare. In fact, some members of the Committee were in
favor of a no-fault divorce between the spouses after a number of years of
separation, legal or de-facto. Justice J.B.L. Reyes was then requested to
prepare a proposal for an action for dissolution of marriage and the effects
thereof based on two grounds: (a) five continuous years of separation
between the spouses, with or without a judicial decree of legal separation,
and (b) whenever a married person would have obtained a decree of
absolute divorce in another country. Actually, such a proposal is one for
absolute divorce but called by another name. Later, even the Civil Code
Revision Committee took time to discuss the proposal of Justice Reyes on
this matter.
Subsequently, however, when the Civil Code Revision Committee and
Family Law Committee started holding joint meetings on the preparation of
the draft of the New Family Code, they agreed and formulated the
definition of marriage as
"a special contract of permanent partnership between a man and a
woman entered into in accordance with law for the establishment of
conjugal and family life. It is an inviolable social institution whose
nature, consequences, and incidents are governed by law and not
subject to stipulation, except that marriage settlements may fix the
property relations during the marriage within the limits provided by
law."
With the above definition, and considering the Christian traditional concept
of marriage of the Filipino people as a permanent, inviolable, indissoluble
social institution upon which the family and society are founded, and also
realizing the strong opposition that any provision on absolute divorce
would encounter from the Catholic Church and the Catholic sector of our
citizenry to whom the great majority of our people belong, the two
Committees in their joint meetings did not pursue the idea of absolute
divorce and instead opted for an action for judicial declaration of invalidity
of marriage based on grounds available in the Canon Law. It was thought
that such an action would not only be an acceptable alternative to divorce
but would also solve the nagging problem of church annulments of
marriages on grounds not recognized by the civil law of the State. Justice
Reyes was thus requested to again prepare a draft of provisions on such
action for celebration of invalidity of marriage. Still later, to avoid the
overlapping of provisions on void marriages as found in the present Civil
Code and those proposed by Justice Reyes on judicial declaration of
invalidity of marriage on grounds similar to the Canon Law, the two
Committees now working as a Joint Committee in the preparation of a New
Family Code decided to consolidate the present provisions on void
marriages with the proposals of Justice Reyes. The result was the
inclusion of an additional kind of void marriage in the enumeration of void
marriages in the present Civil Code, to wit:
"(7) Those marriages contracted by any party who, at the time of the
celebration, was wanting in the sufficient use of reason or judgment
to understand the essential nature of marriage or was
psychologically or mentally incapacitated to discharge the essential
marital obligations, even if such lack of incapacity is made manifest
after the celebration."
as well as the following implementing provisions:
"Art. 32. The absolute nullity of a marriage may be invoked or
pleaded only on the basis of a final judgment declaring the marriage
void, without prejudice to the provision of Article 34."
"Art. 33. The action or defense for the declaration of the absolute
nullity of a marriage shall not prescribe."
xxx xxx xxx
It is believed that many hopelessly broken marriages in our country today
may already dissolved or annulled on the grounds proposed by the Joint
Committee on declaration of nullity as well as annulment of marriages,
thus rendering an absolute divorce law unnecessary. In fact, during a
conference with Father Gerald Healy of the Ateneo University as well as
another meeting with Archbishop Oscar Cruz of the Archdiocese of
Pampanga, the Joint Committee was informed that since Vatican II, the
Catholic Church has been declaring marriages null and void on the ground
of "lack of due discretion" for causes that, in other jurisdictions, would be
clear grounds for divorce, like teen-age or premature marriages; marriage
to a man who, because of some personality disorder or disturbance,
cannot support a family; the foolish or ridiculous choice of a spouse by an
otherwise perfectly normal person; marriage to a woman who refuses to
cohabit with her husband or who refuses to have children. Bishop Cruz
also informed the Committee that they have found out in tribunal work that
a lot of machismo among husbands are manifestations of their sociopathic
personality anomaly, like inflicting physical violence upon their wives,
constitutional indolence or laziness, drug dependence or addiction, and
psychological anomaly. . . . (Emphasis supplied)
Clearly, by incorporating what is now Article 36 into the Family Code, the
Revision Committee referred to above intended to add another ground to those
already listed in the Civil Code as grounds for nullifying a marriage, thus
expanding or liberalizing the same. Inherent in the inclusion of the provision on
psychological incapacity was the understanding that every petition for declaration
of nullity based on it should be treated on a case-to-case basis; hence, the
absence of a definition and an enumeration of what constitutes psychological
incapacity. Moreover, the Committee feared that the giving of examples would
limit the applicability of the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis. But
the law requires that the same be existing at the time of marriage although it be
manifested later.
Admittedly, the provision on psychological incapacity, just like any other provision
of law, is open to abuse. To prevent this, "the court shall take order the
prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned to it to appear on behalf of the State to
take steps to prevent collusion between the parties and to take care that
evidence is not fabricated or suppressed."
2
Moreover, the judge, in interpreting
the provision on a case-to-case basis, must be guided by "experience, the
findings of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and by decisions
of church tribunals which, although not binding on the civil courts, may be given
persuasive effect since the provisions was taken from Canon Law."
3

The constitutional and statutory provisions on the family
4
will remain the lodestar
which our society will hope to achieve ultimately. Therefore, the inclusion of
Article 36 is not to be taken as an abandonment of the ideal which we all cherish.
If at all, it is a recognition of the reality that some marriages, by reason of the
incapacity of one of the contracting parties, fall short of this ideal; thus, the
parties are constrained to find a way of putting an end to their union through
some legally-accepted means.
Any criticism directed at the way that judges have interpreted the provision since
its enactment as to render it easier for unhappily-married couples to separate is
addressed, not to the wisdom of the lawmakers but to the manner by which some
members of the Bench have implemented the provision. These are not
interchangeable, each being separate and distinct from the other.
Separate Opinions
PADILLA, J ., dissenting:
It is difficult to dissent from a well-written and studied opinion as Mr. Justice
Vitug's ponencia. But, after an extended reflection on the facts of this case, I
cannot see my way clear into holding, as the majority do, that there is no ground
for the declaration of nullity of the marriage between petitioner and private
respondent.
To my mind, it is clear that private respondent has been shown to be
psychologically incapacitated to comply with at least one essential marital
obligation, i.e. that of living and cohabiting with her husband, herein petitioner.
On the other hand, it has not been shown that petitioner does not deserve to live
and cohabit with his wife, herein private respondent.
There appears to be no disagreement that the term "psychological incapacity"
defies precision in definition. But, as used in Article 36 of the Family Code as a
ground for the declaration of nullity of a marriage, the intent of the framers of the
Code is evidently to expand and liberalize the grounds for nullifying a marriage,
as well pointed out by Madam Justice Flerida Ruth P. Romero in her separate
opinion in this case.
While it is true that the board term "psychological incapacity" can open the doors
to abuse by couples who may wish to have an easy way out of their marriage,
there are, however, enough safeguards against this contingency, among which,
is the intervention by the State, through the public prosecutor, to guard against
collusion between the parties and/or fabrication of evidence.
In their case at bench, it has been abundantly established that private
respondent Julia Rosario Bedia-Santos exhibits specific behavior which, to my
mind, shows that she is psychologically incapacitated to fulfill her essential
marital obligations, to writ:
a. It took her seven (7) months after she left for the United States to call up
her husband.
b. Julia promised to return home after her job contract expired in July
1989, but she never did and neither is there any showing that she informed
her husband (herein petitioner) of her whereabouts in the U.S.A.
c. When petitioner went to the United States on a mission for the Philippine
Army, he exerted efforts to "touch base" with Julia; there were no similar
efforts on the part of Julia; there were no similar efforts on the part of Julia
to do the same.
d. When petitioner filed this suit, more than five (5) years had elapsed,
without Julia indicating her plans to rejoin the petitioner or her
whereabouts.
e. When petitioner filed this case in the trial court, Julia, in her answer,
claimed that it is the former who has been irresponsible and incompetent.
f. During the trial, Julia waived her right to appear and submit evidence.
A spouse's obligation to live and cohabit with his/her partner in marriage is a
basic ground rule in marriage, unless there are overpowering compelling reasons
such as, for instance, an incurable contagious disease on the part of a spouse or
cruelty of one partner, bordering on insanity. There may also be instances when,
for economic and practical reasons, husband and wife have to live separately,
but the marital bond between the spouses always remains. Mutual love and
respect for each other would, in such cases, compel the absent spouse to at
least have regular contracts with the other to inform the latter of his/her condition
and whereabouts.
In the present case, it is apparent that private respondent Julia Rosario Bedia-
Santos has no intention of cohabiting with petitioner, her husband, or maintaining
contact with him. In fact, her acts eloquently show that she does not want her
husband to know of her whereabouts and neither has she any intention of living
and cohabiting with him.
To me there appears to be, on the part of private respondent, an unmistakeable
indication of psychological incapacity to comply with her essential marital
obligations, although these indications were made manifest after the celebration
of the marriage.
It would be a great injustice, I believe, to petitioner for this Court to give a much
too restrictive interpretation of the law and compel the petitioner to continue to be
married to a wife who for purposes of fulfilling her marital duties has, for all
practical purposes, ceased to exist.
Besides, there are public policy considerations involved in the ruling the Court
makes today. Is it not, in effect directly or indirectly, facilitating the transformation
of petitioner into a "habitual tryster" or one forced to maintain illicit relations with
another woman or women with emerging problems of illegitimate children, simply
because he is denied by private respondent, his wife, the companionship and
conjugal love which he has sought from her and to which he is legally entitled?
I do not go as far as to suggest that Art. 36 of the Family Code is a sanction for
absolute divorce but I submit that we should not constrict it to non-recognition of
its evident purpose and thus deny to one like petitioner, an opportunity to turn a
new leaf in his life by declaring his marriage a nullity by reason of his wife's
psychological incapacity to perform an essential marital obligation.
I therefore vote to GRANT the petition and to DECLARE the marriage between
petitioner Leouel Santos and private respondent Julia Rosario Bedia-Santos
VOID on the basis of Article 36 of the Family Code.
ROMERO, J ., concurring:
I agree under the circumstances of the case, petitioner is not entitled to have his
marriage declared a nullity on the ground of psychological incapacity of private
respondent.
However, as a member of both the Family Law Revision Committee of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Civil Code Revision Committee of the
UP Law Center, I wish to add some observations. The letter
1
dated April 15,
1985 of then Judge Alicia V. Sempio-Diy written in behalf of the Family Law and
Civil Code Revision Committee to then Assemblywoman Mercedes Cojuangco-
Teodoro traced the background of the inclusion of the present Article 36 in the
Family Code.
During its early meetings, the Family Law Committee had thought of
including a chapter on absolute divorce in the draft of a new Family Code
(Book I of the Civil Code) that it had been tasked by the IBP and the UP
Law Center to prepare. In fact, some members of the Committee were in
favor of a no-fault divorce between the spouses after a number of years of
separation, legal or de-facto. Justice J.B.L. Reyes was then requested to
prepare a proposal for an action for dissolution of marriage and the effects
thereof based on two grounds: (a) five continuous years of separation
between the spouses, with or without a judicial decree of legal separation,
and (b) whenever a married person would have obtained a decree of
absolute divorce in another country. Actually, such a proposal is one for
absolute divorce but called by another name. Later, even the Civil Code
Revision Committee took time to discuss the proposal of Justice Reyes on
this matter.
Subsequently, however, when the Civil Code Revision Committee and
Family Law Committee started holding joint meetings on the preparation of
the draft of the New Family Code, they agreed and formulated the
definition of marriage as
"a special contract of permanent partnership between a man and a
woman entered into in accordance with law for the establishment of
conjugal and family life. It is an inviolable social institution whose
nature, consequences, and incidents are governed by law and not
subject to stipulation, except that marriage settlements may fix the
property relations during the marriage within the limits provided by
law."
With the above definition, and considering the Christian traditional concept
of marriage of the Filipino people as a permanent, inviolable, indissoluble
social institution upon which the family and society are founded, and also
realizing the strong opposition that any provision on absolute divorce
would encounter from the Catholic Church and the Catholic sector of our
citizenry to whom the great majority of our people belong, the two
Committees in their joint meetings did not pursue the idea of absolute
divorce and instead opted for an action for judicial declaration of invalidity
of marriage based on grounds available in the Canon Law. It was thought
that such an action would not only be an acceptable alternative to divorce
but would also solve the nagging problem of church annulments of
marriages on grounds not recognized by the civil law of the State. Justice
Reyes was thus requested to again prepare a draft of provisions on such
action for celebration of invalidity of marriage. Still later, to avoid the
overlapping of provisions on void marriages as found in the present Civil
Code and those proposed by Justice Reyes on judicial declaration of
invalidity of marriage on grounds similar to the Canon Law, the two
Committees now working as a Joint Committee in the preparation of a New
Family Code decided to consolidate the present provisions on void
marriages with the proposals of Justice Reyes. The result was the
inclusion of an additional kind of void marriage in the enumeration of void
marriages in the present Civil Code, to wit:
"(7) Those marriages contracted by any party who, at the time of the
celebration, was wanting in the sufficient use of reason or judgment
to understand the essential nature of marriage or was
psychologically or mentally incapacitated to discharge the essential
marital obligations, even if such lack of incapacity is made manifest
after the celebration."as well as the following implementing
provisions:
"Art. 32. The absolute nullity of a marriage may be invoked or
pleaded only on the basis of a final judgment declaring the marriage
void, without prejudice to the provision of Article 34."
"Art. 33. The action or defense for the declaration of the absolute
nullity of a marriage shall not prescribe."
xxx xxx xxx
It is believed that many hopelessly broken marriages in our country today
may already dissolved or annulled on the grounds proposed by the Joint
Committee on declaration of nullity as well as annulment of marriages,
thus rendering an absolute divorce law unnecessary. In fact, during a
conference with Father Gerald Healy of the Ateneo University as well as
another meeting with Archbishop Oscar Cruz of the Archdiocese of
Pampanga, the Joint Committee was informed that since Vatican II, the
Catholic Church has been declaring marriages null and void on the ground
of "lack of due discretion" for causes that, in other jurisdictions, would be
clear grounds for divorce, like teen-age or premature marriages; marriage
to a man who, because of some personality disorder or disturbance,
cannot support a family; the foolish or ridiculous choice of a spouse by an
otherwise perfectly normal person; marriage to a woman who refuses to
cohabit with her husband or who refuses to have children. Bishop Cruz
also informed the Committee that they have found out in tribunal work that
a lot of machismo among husbands are manifestations of their sociopathic
personality anomaly, like inflicting physical violence upon their wives,
constitutional indolence or laziness, drug dependence or addiction, and
psychological anomaly. . . . (Emphasis supplied)
Clearly, by incorporating what is now Article 36 into the Family Code, the
Revision Committee referred to above intended to add another ground to those
already listed in the Civil Code as grounds for nullifying a marriage, thus
expanding or liberalizing the same. Inherent in the inclusion of the provision on
psychological incapacity was the understanding that every petition for declaration
of nullity based on it should be treated on a case-to-case basis; hence, the
absence of a definition and an enumeration of what constitutes psychological
incapacity. Moreover, the Committee feared that the giving of examples would
limit the applicability of the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis. But
the law requires that the same be existing at the time of marriage although it be
manifested later.
Admittedly, the provision on psychological incapacity, just like any other provision
of law, is open to abuse. To prevent this, "the court shall take order the
prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned to it to appear on behalf of the State to
take steps to prevent collusion between the parties and to take care that
evidence is not fabricated or suppressed."
2
Moreover, the judge, in interpreting
the provision on a case-to-case basis, must be guided by "experience, the
findings of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and by decisions
of church tribunals which, although not binding on the civil courts, may be given
persuasive effect since the provisions was taken from Canon Law."
3

The constitutional and statutory provisions on the family
4
will remain the lodestar
which our society will hope to achieve ultimately. Therefore, the inclusion of
Article 36 is not to be taken as an abandonment of the ideal which we all cherish.
If at all, it is a recognition of the reality that some marriages, by reason of the
incapacity of one of the contracting parties, fall short of this ideal; thus, the
parties are constrained to find a way of putting an end to their union through
some legally-accepted means.
Any criticism directed at the way that judges have interpreted the provision since
its enactment as to render it easier for unhappily-married couples to separate is
addressed, not to the wisdom of the lawmakers but to the manner by which some
members of the Bench have implemented the provision. These are not
interchangeable, each being separate and distinct from the other.


















15. Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 119190 January 16, 1997
CHI MING TSOI, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and GINA LAO-TSOI, respondents.
TORRES, JR., J .:
Man has not invented a reliable compass by which to steer a marriage in its
journey over troubled waters. Laws are seemingly inadequate. Over time, much
reliance has been placed in the works of the unseen hand of Him who created all
things.
Who is to blame when a marriage fails?
This case was originally commenced by a distraught wife against her uncaring
husband in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City (Branch 89) which decreed
the annulment of the marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity.
Petitioner appealed the decision of the trial court to respondent Court of Appeals
(CA-G.R. CV No. 42758) which affirmed the Trial Court's decision November 29,
1994 and correspondingly denied the motion for reconsideration in a resolution
dated February 14, 1995.
The statement of the case and of the facts made by the trial court and
reproduced by the Court of Appeals
1
its decision are as follows:
From the evidence adduced, the following acts were preponderantly
established:
Sometime on May 22, 1988, the plaintiff married the defendant at the
Manila Cathedral, . . . Intramuros Manila, as evidenced by their Marriage
Contract. (Exh. "A")
After the celebration of their marriage and wedding reception at the South
Villa, Makati, they went and proceeded to the house of defendant's mother.
There, they slept together on the same bed in the same room for the first
night of their married life.
It is the version of the plaintiff, that contrary to her expectations, that as
newlyweds they were supposed to enjoy making love, or having sexual
intercourse, with each other, the defendant just went to bed, slept on one
side thereof, then turned his back and went to sleep . There was no sexual
intercourse between them during the first night. The same thing happened
on the second, third and fourth nights.
In an effort to have their honeymoon in a private place where they can
enjoy together during their first week as husband and wife, they went to
Baguio City. But, they did so together with her mother, an uncle, his
mother and his nephew. They were all invited by the defendant to join
them. [T]hey stayed in Baguio City for four (4) days. But, during this period,
there was no sexual intercourse between them, since the defendant
avoided her by taking a long walk during siesta time or by just sleeping on
a rocking chair located at the living room. They slept together in the same
room and on the same bed since May 22, 1988 until March 15, 1989. But
during this period, there was no attempt of sexual intercourse between
them. [S]he claims, that she did not: even see her husband's private parts
nor did he see hers.
Because of this, they submitted themselves for medical examinations to
Dr. Eufemio Macalalag, a urologist at the Chinese General Hospital, on
January 20, 1989.
The results of their physical examinations were that she is healthy, normal
and still a virgin, while that of her husband's examination was kept
confidential up to this time. While no medicine was prescribed for her, the
doctor prescribed medications for her husband which was also kept
confidential. No treatment was given to her. For her husband, he was
asked by the doctor to return but he never did.
The plaintiff claims, that the defendant is impotent, a closet homosexual as
he did not show his penis. She said, that she had observed the defendant
using an eyebrow pencil and sometimes the cleansing cream of his
mother. And that, according to her, the defendant married her, a Filipino
citizen, to acquire or maintain his residency status here in the country and
to publicly maintain the appearance of a normal man.
The plaintiff is not willing to reconcile with her husband.
On the other hand, it is the claim of the defendant that if their marriage
shall be annulled by reason of psychological incapacity, the fault lies with
his wife.
But, he said that he does not want his marriage with his wife annulled for
several reasons, viz: (1) that he loves her very much; (2) that he has no
defect on his part and he is physically and psychologically capable; and,
(3) since the relationship is still very young and if there is any differences
between the two of them, it can still be reconciled and that, according to
him, if either one of them has some incapabilities, there is no certainty that
this will not be cured. He further claims, that if there is any defect, it can be
cured by the intervention of medical technology or science.
The defendant admitted that since their marriage on May 22, 1988, until
their separation on March 15, 1989, there was no sexual contact between
them. But, the reason for this, according to the defendant, was that
everytime he wants to have sexual intercourse with his wife, she always
avoided him and whenever he caresses her private parts, she always
removed his hands. The defendant claims, that he forced his wife to have
sex with him only once but he did not continue because she was shaking
and she did not like it. So he stopped.
There are two (2) reasons, according to the defendant , why the plaintiff
filed this case against him, and these are: (1) that she is afraid that she will
be forced to return the pieces of jewelry of his mother, and, (2) that her
husband, the defendant, will consummate their marriage.
The defendant insisted that their marriage will remain valid because they
are still very young and there is still a chance to overcome their
differences.
The defendant submitted himself to a physical examination. His penis was
examined by Dr. Sergio Alteza, Jr., for the purpose of finding out whether
he is impotent . As a result thereof, Dr. Alteza submitted his Doctor's
Medical Report. (Exh. "2"). It is stated there, that there is no evidence of
impotency (Exh. "2-B"), and he is capable of erection. (Exh. "2-C")
The doctor said, that he asked the defendant to masturbate to find out
whether or not he has an erection and he found out that from the original
size of two (2) inches, or five (5) centimeters, the penis of the defendant
lengthened by one (1) inch and one centimeter. Dr. Alteza said, that the
defendant had only a soft erection which is why his penis is not in its full
length. But, still is capable of further erection, in that with his soft erection,
the defendant is capable of having sexual intercourse with a woman.
In open Court, the Trial Prosecutor manifested that there is no collusion
between the parties and that the evidence is not fabricated."
2

After trial, the court rendered judgment, the dispositive portion of which reads:
ACCORDINGLY, judgment is hereby rendered declaring as VOID the
marriage entered into by the plaintiff with the defendant on May 22, 1988
at the Manila Cathedral, Basilica of the Immaculate Conception,
Intramuros, Manila, before the Rt. Rev. Msgr. Melencio de Vera. Without
costs. Let a copy of this decision be furnished the Local Civil Registrar of
Quezon City. Let another copy be furnished the Local Civil Registrar of
Manila.
SO ORDERED.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision.
Hence, the instant petition.
Petitioner alleges that the respondent Court of Appeals erred:
I
in affirming the conclusions of the lower court that there was no sexual
intercourse between the parties without making any findings of fact.
II
in holding that the refusal of private respondent to have sexual communion
with petitioner is a psychological incapacity inasmuch as proof thereof is
totally absent.
III
in holding that the alleged refusal of both the petitioner and the private
respondent to have sex with each other constitutes psychological
incapacity of both.
IV
in affirming the annulment of the marriage between the parties decreed by
the lower court without fully satisfying itself that there was no collusion
between them.
We find the petition to be bereft of merit.
Petitioner contends that being the plaintiff in Civil Case No. Q-89-3141, private
respondent has the burden of proving the allegations in her complaint; that since
there was no independent evidence to prove the alleged non-coitus between the
parties, there remains no other basis for the court's conclusion except the
admission of petitioner; that public policy should aid acts intended to validate
marriage and should retard acts intended to invalidate them; that the conclusion
drawn by the trial court on the admissions and confessions of the parties in their
pleadings and in the course of the trial is misplaced since it could have been a
product of collusion; and that in actions for annulment of marriage, the material
facts alleged in the complaint shall always be proved.
3

Section 1, Rule 19 of the Rules of Court reads:
Section 1. Judgment on the pleadings. Where an answer fails to tender
an issue, or otherwise admits the material allegations of the adverse
party's pleading, the court may, on motion of that party, direct judgment on
such pleading. But in actions for annulment of marriage or for legal
separation the material facts alleged in the complaint shall always be
proved.
The foregoing provision pertains to a judgment on the pleadings. What said
provision seeks to prevent is annulment of marriage without trial. The assailed
decision was not based on such a judgment on the pleadings. When private
respondent testified under oath before the trial court and was cross-examined by
oath before the trial court and was cross-examined by the adverse party, she
thereby presented evidence in form of a testimony. After such evidence was
presented, it be came incumbent upon petitioner to present his side. He admitted
that since their marriage on May 22, 1988, until their separation on March 15,
1989, there was no sexual intercourse between them.
To prevent collusion between the parties is the reason why, as stated by the
petitioner, the Civil Code provides that no judgment annulling a marriage shall be
promulgated upon a stipulation of facts or by confession of judgment (Arts. 88
and 101[par. 2]) and the Rules of Court prohibit such annulment without trial
(Sec. 1, Rule 19).
The case has reached this Court because petitioner does not want their marriage
to be annulled. This only shows that there is no collusion between the parties.
When petitioner admitted that he and his wife (private respondent) have never
had sexual contact with each other, he must have been only telling the truth. We
are reproducing the relevant portion of the challenged resolution denying
petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration, penned with magisterial lucidity by
Associate Justice Minerva Gonzaga-Reyes, viz:
The judgment of the trial court which was affirmed by this Court is not
based on a stipulation of facts. The issue of whether or not the appellant is
psychologically incapacitated to discharge a basic marital obligation was
resolved upon a review of both the documentary and testimonial evidence
on record. Appellant admitted that he did not have sexual relations with his
wife after almost ten months of cohabitation, and it appears that he is not
suffering from any physical disability. Such abnormal reluctance or
unwillingness to consummate his marriage is strongly indicative of a
serious personality disorder which to the mind of this Court clearly
demonstrates an 'utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and
significance to the marriage' within the meaning of Article 36 of the Family
Code (See Santos vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 112019, January 4,
1995).
4

Petitioner further contends that respondent court erred in holding that the alleged
refusal of both the petitioner and the private respondent to have sex with each
other constitutes psychological incapacity of both. He points out as error the
failure of the trial court to make "a categorical finding about the alleged
psychological incapacity and an in-depth analysis of the reasons for such refusal
which may not be necessarily due to physchological disorders" because there
might have been other reasons, i.e., physical disorders, such as aches, pains
or other discomforts, why private respondent would not want to have sexual
intercourse from May 22, 1988 to March 15, 1989, in a short span of 10 months.
First, it must be stated that neither the trial court nor the respondent court made a
finding on who between petitioner and private respondent refuses to have sexual
contact with the other. The fact remains, however, that there has never been
coitus between them. At any rate, since the action to declare the marriage void
may be filed by either party, i.e., even the psychologically incapacitated, the
question of who refuses to have sex with the other becomes immaterial.
Petitioner claims that there is no independent evidence on record to show that
any of the parties is suffering from phychological incapacity. Petitioner also
claims that he wanted to have sex with private respondent; that the reason for
private respondent's refusal may not be psychological but physical disorder as
stated above.
We do not agree. Assuming it to be so, petitioner could have discussed with
private respondent or asked her what is ailing her, and why she balks and avoids
him everytime he wanted to have sexual intercourse with her. He never did. At
least, there is nothing in the record to show that he had tried to find out or
discover what the problem with his wife could be. What he presented in evidence
is his doctor's Medical Report that there is no evidence of his impotency and he
is capable of erection.
5
Since it is petitioner's claim that the reason is not
psychological but perhaps physical disorder on the part of private respondent, it
became incumbent upon him to prove such a claim.
If a spouse, although physically capable but simply refuses to perform his
or her essential marriage obligations, and the refusal is senseless and
constant, Catholic marriage tribunals attribute the causes to psychological
incapacity than to stubborn refusal. Senseless and protracted refusal is
equivalent to psychological incapacity. Thus, the prolonged refusal of a
spouse to have sexual intercourse with his or her spouse is considered a
sign of psychological incapacity.
6

Evidently, one of the essential marital obligations under the Family Code is "To
procreate children based on the universal principle that procreation of children
through sexual cooperation is the basic end of marriage." Constant non-
fulfillment of this obligation will finally destroy the integrity or wholeness of the
marriage. In the case at bar, the senseless and protracted refusal of one of the
parties to fulfill the above marital obligation is equivalent to psychological
incapacity.
As aptly stated by the respondent court,
An examination of the evidence convinces Us that the husband's plea that
the wife did not want carnal intercourse with him does not inspire belief.
Since he was not physically impotent, but he refrained from sexual
intercourse during the entire time (from May 22, 1988 to March 15, 1989)
that he occupied the same bed with his wife, purely out of symphaty for her
feelings, he deserves to be doubted for not having asserted his right seven
though she balked (Tompkins vs. Tompkins, 111 Atl. 599, cited in I Paras,
Civil Code, at p. 330). Besides, if it were true that it is the wife was
suffering from incapacity, the fact that defendant did not go to court and
seek the declaration of nullity weakens his claim. This case was instituted
by the wife whose normal expectations of her marriage were frustrated by
her husband's inadequacy. Considering the innate modesty of the Filipino
woman, it is hard to believe that she would expose her private life to public
scrutiny and fabricate testimony against her husband if it were not
necessary to put her life in order and put to rest her marital status.
We are not impressed by defendant's claim that what the evidence proved
is the unwillingness or lack of intention to perform the sexual act, which is
not phychological incapacity, and which can be achieved "through proper
motivation." After almost ten months of cohabitation, the admission that the
husband is reluctant or unwilling to perform the sexual act with his wife
whom he professes to love very dearly, and who has not posed any
insurmountable resistance to his alleged approaches, is indicative of a
hopeless situation, and of a serious personality disorder that constitutes
psychological incapacity to discharge the basic marital covenants within
the contemplation of the Family Code.
7

While the law provides that the husband and the wife are obliged to live together,
observe mutual love, respect and fidelity (Art. 68, Family Code), the sanction
therefor is actually the "spontaneous, mutual affection between husband and wife
and not any legal mandate or court order" (Cuaderno vs. Cuaderno 120 Phil.
1298). Love is useless unless it is shared with another. Indeed, no man is an
island, the cruelest act of a partner in marriage is to say "I could not have cared
less." This is so because an ungiven self is an unfulfilled self. The egoist has
nothing but himself. In the natural order, it is sexual intimacy which brings
spouses wholeness and oneness. Sexual intimacy is a gift and a participation in
the mystery of creation. It is a function which enlivens the hope of procreation
and ensures the continuation of family relations.
It appears that there is absence of empathy between petitioner and private
respondent. That is a shared feeling which between husband and wife must
be experienced not only by having spontaneous sexual intimacy but a deep
sense of spiritual communion. Marital union is a two-way process. An expressive
interest in each other's feelings at a time it is needed by the other can go a long
way in deepening the marital relationship. Marriage is definitely not for children
but for two consenting adults who view the relationship with love amor gignit
amorem, respect, sacrifice and a continuing commitment to compromise,
conscious of its value as a sublime social institution.
This Court, finding the gravity of the failed relationship in which the parties found
themselves trapped in its mire of unfulfilled vows and unconsummated marital
obligations, can do no less but sustain the studied judgment of respondent
appellate court.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING PREMISES, the assailed decision of the Court
of Appeals dated November 29, 1994 is hereby AFFIRMED in all respects and
the petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Regalado, Romero, Puno and Mendoza, JJ., concur.





















16. Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 149498 May 20, 2004
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
LOLITA QUINTERO-HAMANO, respondent.
D E C I S I O N
CORONA, J .:
Before us is a petition for review of the decision
1
dated August 20, 2001 of the
Court of Appeals
2
affirming the decision
3
dated August 28, 1997 of the Regional
Trial Court of Rizal, Branch 72, declaring as null and void the marriage
contracted between herein respondent Lolita M. Quintero-Hamano and her
husband Toshio Hamano.
On June 17, 1996, respondent Lolita Quintero-Hamano filed a complaint for
declaration of nullity of her marriage to her husband Toshio Hamano, a Japanese
national, on the ground of psychological incapacity.
Respondent alleged that in October 1986, she and Toshio started a common-law
relationship in Japan. They later lived in the Philippines for a month. Thereafter,
Toshio went back to Japan and stayed there for half of 1987. On November 16,
1987, she gave birth to their child.
On January 14, 1988, she and Toshio were married by Judge Isauro M. Balderia
of the Municipal Trial Court of Bacoor, Cavite. Unknown to respondent, Toshio
was psychologically incapacitated to assume his marital responsibilities, which
incapacity became manifest only after the marriage. One month after their
marriage, Toshio returned to Japan and promised to return by Christmas to
celebrate the holidays with his family. After sending money to respondent for two
months, Toshio stopped giving financial support. She wrote him several times but
he never responded. Sometime in 1991, respondent learned from her friends that
Toshio visited the Philippines but he did not bother to see her and their child.
The summons issued to Toshio remained unserved because he was no longer
residing at his given address. Consequently, on July 8, 1996, respondent filed an
ex parte motion for leave to effect service of summons by publication. The trial
court granted the motion on July 12, 1996. In August 1996, the summons,
accompanied by a copy of the petition, was published in a newspaper of general
circulation giving Toshio 15 days to file his answer. Because Toshio failed to file
a responsive pleading after the lapse of 60 days from publication, respondent
filed a motion dated November 5, 1996 to refer the case to the prosecutor for
investigation. The trial court granted the motion on November 7, 1996.
On November 20, 1996, prosecutor Rolando I. Gonzales filed a report finding
that no collusion existed between the parties. He prayed that the Office of the
Provincial Prosecutor be allowed to intervene to ensure that the evidence
submitted was not fabricated. On February 13, 1997, the trial court granted
respondents motion to present her evidence ex parte. She then testified on how
Toshio abandoned his family. She thereafter offered documentary evidence to
support her testimony.
On August 28, 1997, the trial court rendered a decision, the dispositive portion of
which read:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the marriage between petitioner
Lolita M. Quintero-Hamano and Toshio Hamano, is hereby declared NULL
and VOID.
The Civil Register of Bacoor, Cavite and the National Statistics Office are
ordered to make proper entries into the records of the afore-named parties
pursuant to this judgment of the Court.
SO ORDERED.
4

In declaring the nullity of the marriage on the ground of Toshios psychological
incapacity, the trial court held that:
It is clear from the records of the case that respondent spouses failed to
fulfill his obligations as husband of the petitioner and father to his daughter.
Respondent remained irresponsible and unconcerned over the needs and
welfare of his family. Such indifference, to the mind of the Court, is a clear
manifestation of insensitivity and lack of respect for his wife and child
which characterizes a very immature person. Certainly, such behavior
could be traced to respondents mental incapacity and disability of entering
into marital life.
5

The Office of the Solicitor General, representing herein petitioner Republic of the
Philippines, appealed to the Court of Appeals but the same was denied in a
decision dated August 28, 1997, the dispositive portion of which read:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, and pursuant to applicable law
and jurisprudence on the matter and evidence on hand, judgment is
hereby rendered denying the instant appeal. The decision of the court a
quo is AFFIRMED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
6

The appellate court found that Toshio left respondent and their daughter a month
after the celebration of the marriage, and returned to Japan with the promise to
support his family and take steps to make them Japanese citizens. But except for
two months, he never sent any support to nor communicated with them despite
the letters respondent sent. He even visited the Philippines but he did not bother
to see them. Respondent, on the other hand, exerted all efforts to contact Toshio,
to no avail.
The appellate court thus concluded that respondent was psychologically
incapacitated to perform his marital obligations to his family, and to "observe
mutual love, respect and fidelity, and render mutual help and support" pursuant
to Article 68 of the Family Code of the Philippines. The appellate court
rhetorically asked:
But what is there to preserve when the other spouse is an unwilling party
to the cohesion and creation of a family as a social inviolable institution?
Why should petitioner be made to suffer in a marriage where the other
spouse is not around and worse, left them without even helping them cope
up with family life and assist in the upbringing of their daughter as required
under Articles 68 to 71 of the Family Code?
7

The appellate court emphasized that this case could not be equated with
Republic vs. Court of Appeals and Molina
8
and Santos vs. Court of Appeals.
9
In
those cases, the spouses were Filipinos while this case involved a "mixed
marriage," the husband being a Japanese national.
Hence, this appeal by petitioner Republic based on this lone assignment of error:
I
The Court of Appeals erred in holding that respondent was able to prove
the psychological incapacity of Toshio Hamano to perform his marital
obligations, despite respondents failure to comply with the guidelines laid
down in the Molina case.
10

According to petitioner, mere abandonment by Toshio of his family and his
insensitivity to them did not automatically constitute psychological incapacity. His
behavior merely indicated simple inadequacy in the personality of a spouse
falling short of reasonable expectations. Respondent failed to prove any severe
and incurable personality disorder on the part of Toshio, in accordance with the
guidelines set in Molina.
The Office of the Public Attorney, representing respondent, reiterated the ruling
of the courts a quo and sought the denial of the instant petition.
We rule in favor of petitioner.
The Court is mindful of the policy of the 1987 Constitution to protect and
strengthen the family as the basic autonomous social institution and marriage as
the foundation of the family.
11
Thus, any doubt should be resolved in favor of the
validity of the marriage.
12

Respondent seeks to annul her marriage with Toshio on the ground of
psychological incapacity. Article 36 of the Family Code of the Philippines
provides that:
Art. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration,
was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations
of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only
after its solemnization.
In Molina, we came up with the following guidelines in the interpretation and
application of Article 36 for the guidance of the bench and the bar:
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the
plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and
continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. This is
rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our laws cherish the
validity of marriage and unity of the family. x x x
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: (a)
medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c)
sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the
decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must
be psychological - not physical, although its manifestations and/or
symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince the court that the
parties, or one of them, was mentally or psychically ill to such an extent
that the person could not have known the obligations he was assuming, or
knowing them, could not have given valid assumption thereof. Although no
example of such incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the
application of the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis (Salita
vs. Magtolis, 233 SCRA 100, June 13, 1994), nevertheless such root
cause must be identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating
nature fully explained. Expert evidence may be given by qualified
psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the
celebration" of the marriage. The evidence must show that the illness was
existing when the parties exchanged their "I dos." The manifestation of the
illness need not be perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must
have attached at such moment, or prior thereto.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically
permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even relative
only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against
everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant
to the assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not
related to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or employment in a
job. Hence, a pediatrician may be effective in diagnosing illnesses of
children and prescribing medicine to cure them but may not be
psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear and raise his/her own
children as an essential obligation of marriage.
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the
party to assume the essential obligations of marriage. Thus, "mild
characteriological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional
outbursts" cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness must be shown
as downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much
less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or supervening disabling factor
in the person, an adverse integral element in the personality structure that
effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby
complying with the obligations essential to marriage.
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles
68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as
Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their
children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in
the petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the decision.
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of
the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive,
should be given great respect by our courts. x x x
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the
Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall be
handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a certification, which will
be quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for his
agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor-
General, along with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such
certification within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is deemed
submitted for resolution of the court. The Solicitor-General shall discharge
the equivalent function of the defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon
1095.
13
(emphasis supplied)
The guidelines incorporate the three basic requirements earlier mandated by the
Court in Santos: "psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity
(b) juridical antecedence and (c) incurability."
14
The foregoing guidelines do not
require that a physician examine the person to be declared psychologically
incapacitated. In fact, the root cause may be "medically or clinically identified."
What is important is the presence of evidence that can adequately establish the
partys psychological condition. For indeed, if the totality of evidence presented is
enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity, then actual medical
examination of the person concerned need not be resorted to.
15

We now proceed to determine whether respondent successfully proved Toshios
psychological incapacity to fulfill his marital responsibilities.
Petitioner showed that Toshio failed to meet his duty to live with, care for and
support his family. He abandoned them a month after his marriage to
respondent. Respondent sent him several letters but he never replied. He made
a trip to the Philippines but did not care at all to see his family.
We find that the totality of evidence presented fell short of proving that Toshio
was psychologically incapacitated to assume his marital responsibilities. Toshios
act of abandonment was doubtlessly irresponsible but it was never alleged nor
proven to be due to some kind of psychological illness. After respondent testified
on how Toshio abandoned his family, no other evidence was presented showing
that his behavior was caused by a psychological disorder. Although, as a rule,
there was no need for an actual medical examination, it would have greatly
helped respondents case had she presented evidence that medically or clinically
identified his illness. This could have been done through an expert witness. This
respondent did not do.
We must remember that abandonment is also a ground for legal separation.
16

There was no showing that the case at bar was not just an instance of
abandonment in the context of legal separation. We cannot presume
psychological defect from the mere fact that Toshio abandoned his family
immediately after the celebration of the marriage. As we ruled in Molina, it is not
enough to prove that a spouse failed to meet his responsibility and duty as a
married person; it is essential that he must be shown to be incapable of doing so
due to some psychological, not physical, illness.
17
There was no proof of a natal
or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the
personality structure that effectively incapacitates a person from accepting and
complying with the obligations essential to marriage.
18

According to the appellate court, the requirements in Molina and Santos do not
apply here because the present case involves a "mixed marriage," the husband
being a Japanese national. We disagree. In proving psychological incapacity, we
find no distinction between an alien spouse and a Filipino spouse. We cannot be
lenient in the application of the rules merely because the spouse alleged to be
psychologically incapacitated happens to be a foreign national. The medical and
clinical rules to determine psychological incapacity were formulated on the basis
of studies of human behavior in general. Hence, the norms used for determining
psychological incapacity should apply to any person regardless of nationality.
In Pesca vs. Pesca,
19
this Court declared that marriage is an inviolable social
institution that the State cherishes and protects. While we commiserate with
respondent, terminating her marriage to her husband may not necessarily be the
fitting denouement.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review is hereby GRANTED. The decision dated
August 28, 1997 of the Court of Appeals is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.
Vitug, Sandoval-Gutierrez, and Carpio-Morales, JJ., concur.





















17. Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 173294 February 27, 2008
RENNE ENRIQUE BIER, petitioner,
vs.
MA. LOURDES A. BIER and THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,
respondents.
D E C I S I O N
CORONA, J .:
This petition for review on certiorari
1
seeks to set aside the March 20, 2006
decision
2
and July 3, 2006 resolution
3
of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R.
CV No. 66952.
Petitioner Renne Enrique E. Bier met respondent Ma. Lourdes A. Bier through
his sister. Their courtship, which blossomed as a result of the exchange of long
distance calls between them, lasted six months. Back then, petitioner observed
respondent to be a very sweet and thoughtful person. This, he said, made him
fall in love with her.
On July 26, 1992, six months after their first meeting, they were married at the
UST Santissimo Rosario Parish Church. Everything went well for the first three
years of their marriage. Respondent was everything petitioner could hope for in a
wife sweet, loving and caring. She also took good care of the house. As
petitioner was based in Saudi Arabia as an electronics technician at Saudia
Airlines, the parties decided to maintain two residences, one in the Philippines
and another in Saudi Arabia. They took turns shuttling between the two countries
just so they could spend time together.
The couple started experiencing marital problems after three years of marriage.
According to petitioner, respondent ceased to be the person he knew and
married. She started becoming aloof towards him and began to spend more time
with her friends than with him, refusing even to have sexual relations with him for
no apparent reason. She became an alcoholic and a chain-smoker. She also
started neglecting her husband's needs and the upkeep of their home, and
became an absentee wife. After being gone from their home for days on end, she
would return without bothering to account for her absence. As a result, they
frequently quarreled. Finally, on April 10, 1997, respondent suddenly left for the
United States. Petitioner has not heard from her since.
On April 1, 1998, petitioner instituted in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon
City, Branch 89, a petition for the declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground
that respondent was psychologically incapacitated to fulfill her essential marital
obligations to petitioner. It was docketed as Civil Case No. Q-98-33993.
Per sheriff's return, summons was served through substituted service as
personal service proved futile. Respondent, however, did not file an answer.
Thereafter, the RTC ordered Assistant City Prosecutor Edgardo T. Paragua to
investigate if there was collusion between the parties and to intervene for the
State to see to it that evidence was not fabricated. Assistant City Prosecutor
Paragua manifested that, since both parties failed to appear before him, he was
unable to make a ruling on the issue of collusion and determine if the evidence
was fabricated.
After petitioner filed his pre-trial brief, Prosecutor Paragua filed a second
manifestation stating that petitioner had appeared before him and that, after
investigation, he was convinced that there was no collusion between the parties
and that the evidence was not fabricated.
At pre-trial, only petitioner appeared. As respondent failed to attend the same,
the RTC declared her to have waived the pre-trial. Thereafter, trial on the merits
ensued. Again, respondent did not take part in the proceedings.
Petitioner filed a written offer of exhibits which was admitted by the trial court.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed a certification and manifested its
disfavor towards declaring the marriage null and void. It argued that no
persuasive evidence was presented warranting the grant of the petition, specially
since petitioner failed to comply with the guidelines laid down in Republic v. CA
and Molina
4
(Molina).
After trial, the trial court rendered judgment
5
granting the petition:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered
declaring as VOID, based upon the respondent's psychological incapacity,
the marriage contracted on July 26, 1992 between Renne Enrique E. Bier
and Ma. Lourdes A. Bier. As such, their property relations shall be
governed by the rules on co-ownership pursuant to Article 147 of the
Family Code. Henceforth, their property relations shall be governed by the
regime of complete separation of property.
Let a copy of this decision be furnished the Civil Registrar General,
National Census and Statistics Office and the Local Civil Registrar of
Manila, ordering them to attach a copy of this Decision to the Marriage
Contract of herein petitioner and respondent on file with respective office.
With costs against the respondent.
SO ORDERED.
Respondent Republic of the Philippines, through the OSG, appealed the decision
of the RTC to the CA, docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 66952. The CA held that
petitioner failed to comply with the guidelines laid down in Molina as the root
cause of respondent's psychological incapacity was not medically or clinically
identified. Worse, the same was not even alleged in the petition filed in the court
a quo. As such, it granted the appeal and reversed the decision of the trial court.
The dispositive portion of the assailed decision
6
read:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is GRANTED. The
Decision dated 06 March 2000 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City,
Branch 89 in Civil Case No. Q-98-33993, which declared as void the
marriage between appellee and respondent, is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The marriage of Renne Enrique E. Bier and respondent Ma.
Lourdes A. Bier remains valid and subsisting. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration of the CA decision. The same was denied.
Hence, this recourse.
Petitioner contends that the guidelines enunciated in Molina, specifically its
directive that the root cause of the psychological incapacity must be identified as
a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully explained, and that it
must be proven to be existing at the inception of the marriage, need not be
strictly complied with as Molina itself stated the guidelines were merely "handed
down for the guidance of the bench and bar" and were not meant to be a
checklist of requirements in deciding cases involving psychological incapacity.
Furthermore, even assuming arguendo that the Molina doctrine should be
applied, the RTC erred in ruling that he failed to comply therewith.
The petition must fail.
Preliminarily, we must pass upon petitioners argument that the finding of the trial
court on the existence or non-existence of psychological incapacity is final and
binding on us absent any showing that its factual findings and evaluation of the
evidence were clearly and manifestly erroneous.
7
Petitioners position is of
course the general rule. In the instant case, however, it is the exception to the
general rule which must be applied; the court a quo clearly erred in granting the
petition. It stated in the body of its decision that:
While this Court agrees with the observation of the Office of the
Solicitor General that the juridical antecedence of the psychological
disorder and its root cause were not established, the same will not
serve as a hindrance for the Court to declare that respondent is
indeed suffering from a psychological incapacity. The failure of the
Psychological Report to identify the root cause of respondent's
psychological incapacity is not a fatal flaw that will prevent the Court from
declaring a marriage a nullity based on psychological incapacity.
(Emphasis supplied)
The trial court apparently overlooked the fact that this Court has been consistent
in holding that if a petition for nullity based on psychological incapacity is to be
given due course, its gravity, root cause, incurability and the fact that it existed
prior to or at the time of celebration of the marriage must always be proved.
8
As
early as Santos v. CA, et al.,
9
we already held that:
[P]sychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b)
juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability. The incapacity must be
grave or serious such that the party would be incapable of carrying out the
ordinary duties required in marriage; it must be rooted in the history of the
party antedating the marriage, although the overt manifestations may
emerge only after the marriage; and it must be incurable or, even if it were
otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means of the party involved.
xxx This psychologic condition must exist at the time the marriage is
celebrated. xxx (Emphasis supplied)
These must be strictly complied with as the granting of a petition for nullity of
marriage based on psychological incapacity must be confined only to the most
serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter
insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage.
10
This is
specially so since the Family Code does not define psychological incapacity. The
determination thereof is left solely to the discretion of the courts and must be
made on a case-to-case basis.
11

Also, even if Molina was never meant to be a checklist of the requirements in
deciding cases involving Article 36 (psychological incapacity) of the Family Code,
a showing of the gravity, juridical antecedence and incurability of the party's
psychological incapacity and its existence at the inception of the marriage cannot
be dispensed with. In Marcos v. Marcos (Marcos),
12
a case cited by petitioner to
support his argument that the totality of evidence presented was enough to prove
the existence of respondent's psychological incapacity, this Court reiterated that:
The [Molina] guidelines incorporate the three basic requirements
earlier mandated by the Court in Santos v. Court of Appeals:
"psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b)
juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability. The foregoing guidelines do
not require that a physician examine the person to be declared
psychologically incapacitated. In fact, the root cause may be "medically or
clinically identified." What is important is the presence of evidence that can
adequately establish the party's psychological condition. For indeed, if the
totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of
psychological incapacity, then actual medical examination of the person
concerned need not be resorted to.
xxx xxx xxx
[t]he totality of his acts does not lead to a conclusion of psychological
incapacity on his part. There is absolutely no showing that his
"defects" were already present at the inception of the marriage or
that they are incurable. (Emphasis supplied)
Furthermore, the 2005 case of Republic v. Iyoy
13
held that even if Marcos (2000)
relaxed the rules such that the personal examination of the party alleged to be
psychologically incapacitated by a psychiatrist or psychologist is no longer
mandatory for the declaration of nullity of the marriage under Article 36 of the
Family Code, the totality of evidence must still prove the gravity, juridical
antecedence and incurability of the alleged psychological incapacity. Failure in
this regard will spell the failure of the petition.
From the foregoing, one can conclude that petitioner's insistence that Marcos
effectively overturned the need to present evidence on the aforesaid
requirements has no merit. Thus, unless the law itself or the Court provides
otherwise, these requirements must be established before a petition for nullity of
the marriage based on psychological incapacity can be granted.
We hold that the trial court's decision to declare the parties' marriage void ab
initio by reason of respondent's psychological incapacity was clearly and
manifestly erroneous as it overlooked the need to show the gravity, root cause
and incurability of respondent's psychological incapacity and that it was already
present at the inception of the marriage.
Be that as it may, the main question that begs to be answered in the instant case
is whether the totality of the evidence presented was enough to establish that
respondent was psychologically incapacitated to perform her essential marital
obligations. We rule in the negative.
Petitioner had the burden of proving the nullity of his marriage with respondent.
14

He failed to discharge it.
The evidence for petitioner consisted of his own testimony and that of his brother,
Roderico Bier. He also presented as evidence a psychological report written by
Dr. Nedy Tayag, a clinical psychologist, who also testified on the matters
contained therein.
Dr. Tayag's report, which found respondent to be suffering from psychological
incapacity, particularly a narcissistic personality disorder, relied only on the
information fed by petitioner. This was admitted by petitioner in his petition for
review on certiorari and memorandum filed in this Court. In both instances,
petitioner reasoned out that the personal examination of respondent was
impossible as her whereabouts were unknown despite diligent efforts on his part
to find her. Consequently, Dr. Tayag's report was really hearsay evidence since
she had no personal knowledge of the alleged facts she was testifying on. Her
testimony should have thus been dismissed for being unscientific and
unreliable.
15

Furthermore, as already stated, the report also failed to identify the root cause of
respondent's narcissistic personality disorder and to prove that it existed at the
inception of the marriage. It merely concluded that:
This extremely egocentric attitude manifest a person suffering Narcissistic
Personality Disorder that is considered to be severe, incurable and deeply
rooted with her functioning. Thus, making herself psychologically
incapacitated so as to comply with the essential marital functions.
Although there is no requirement that a party to be declared psychologically
incapacitated should be personally examined by a physician or a psychologist
(as a condition sine qua non), there is nevertheless still a need to prove the
psychological incapacity through independent evidence adduced by the person
alleging said disorder.
16

In the case at bar, petitioner was able to establish that respondent was remiss in
her duties as a wife and had become a happy-go-lucky woman who failed to
attend to her husband's needs and who eventually abandoned him. However, the
totality of her acts, as testified to by petitioner and his brother, was not
tantamount to a psychological incapacity, as petitioner would have us believe.
Habitual alcoholism, chain-smoking, failure or refusal to meet one's duties and
responsibilities as a married person and eventual abandonment of a spouse do
not suffice to nullify a marriage on the basis of psychological incapacity, if not
shown to be due to some psychological (as opposed to physical) illness.
17

The undeniable fact is that the marriage, according to petitioner's own evidence,
was off to a good start. According to him, respondent used to be a sweet, loving
and caring wife who took good care of him and their home. She even willingly
consented to the difficult living arrangement of taking turns in going back and
forth between the Philippines and Saudi Arabia just so they could be together.
Perhaps it was this unusual arrangement which took a heavy toll on their
relationship. They barely saw and spent time with each other. Respondent could
have gotten used to petitioners absence. And although absence can indeed
make the heart grow fonder, the opposite can just as well be true: out of sight,
out of mind. The couple drifted apart and respondent obviously fell out of love
with petitioner.
Nevertheless, we agree with the CA that the change in respondent's feelings
towards petitioner could hardly be described as a psychological illness. It was not
enough that respondent, the party adverted to as psychologically incapacitated to
comply with her marital obligations, had difficulty or was unwilling to perform the
same. Proof of a natal or supervening disabling factor, an adverse integral
element in respondent's personality structure that effectively incapacitated her
from complying with her essential marital obligations,
18
had to be shown. This
petitioner failed to do. Consequently, we are unconvinced that respondent's
condition was rooted in some incapacitating or debilitating disorder.
Even if we assume the correctness of petitioner's contention that the Molina
guidelines are not set in stone, there is still no reason to disavow the same as the
facts and circumstances in this case do not warrant a deviation therefrom.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. The March 20, 2006 decision and
July 3, 2006 resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 66952 are
AFFIRMED.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
RENATO C. CORONA
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
Chairperson
ANGELINA SANDOVAL-
GUTIERREZ
Associate Justice
ADOLFO S. AZCUNA
Associate Justice
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO
Associate Justice

C E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the
conclusions in the above decision had been reached in consultation before the
case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
18. Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 171042 June 30, 2008
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
LYNNETTE CABANTUG-BAGUIO, respondent.
D E C I S I O N
CARPIO MORALES, J .:
From the Decision of the Court of Appeals which affirmed that of the Regional
Trial Court of Cebu, Branch 24 nullifying the marriage of respondent, Lynnette
Cabantug-Baguio (Lynnette), to Martini Dico Baguio (Martini), the Republic
through the Office of the Solicitor General filed the present petition for review.
Lynnette and Martini contracted marriage on August 12, 1997. Less than three
years later or on October 12, 2000, Lynnette filed before the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Cebu City a complaint
1
for declaration of nullity of marriage, docketed
as Civil Case No. CEB 25700, on the ground of Martinis psychological incapacity
to comply with the essential marital duties and obligations under Articles 68-70
2

of the Family Code.
Despite service of summons upon Martini, he never filed any responsive pleading
to the complaint.
3
No collusion was established between the parties.
4
Upon the
authority of the Solicitor General, the provincial prosecutor of Cebu City
appeared in the case under the formers supervision and control.
5

From the deposition of Lynnette taken before Branch Clerk of Court Atty.
Monalila S. Tecson on January 10, 2001,
6
the following are gathered:
Lynnette and Martini, a seaman working overseas, became pen pals in 1995.
In 1996, the two met in person during Martinis vacation after the expiration of his
contract on board an ocean-going vessel.
On August 12, 1997, Martini, then 32, and Lynnette, then 34, contracted
marriage,
7
following which they moved to the house of Lynnettes parents at 33-B
La Guardia Extension, Lahug, Cebu City. Martini, however, stayed there only on
weekends, and during weekdays he stayed with his parents in Looc, Lapu-lapu
City. While Lynnette suggested that the two of them stay in the house of Martinis
parents, Martini disagreed, claiming that there were many already living with his
parents.
Lynnette noticed that every time she conversed with Martini, he always
mentioned his mother and his family, and she soon realized that he was a
"mamas boy." And she noticed too that when she would call up Martini at his
parents house and his mother was the one who answered the call, she would
deny that he was around.
In 1998, after Martini again returned following an almost 10-month contract
overseas,
8
he stayed with Lynnette. When in 1999 Martini again disembarked, he
stayed with his parents.
On the insistence of his mother, Martinis monetary allotment was shared equally
between her and Lynnette.
Lynnette had since January 1999 not heard from Martini. And since April 1999,
Lynnette stopped receiving her share of the allotment, drawing her to inquire
from Martinis employer who informed her that he had already disembarked on
even month. She soon found out that Martini was in Alabang, Muntinlupa.
When Lynnette and Martini finally met in Cebu City, he told her that they are not
compatible and should just part ways.
The last time the couple talked was on October 14, 1999 when Martini was at the
Ninoy Aquino International Airport (NAIA) about to depart for abroad. Since then,
Martini never communicated with Lynnette. On investigation, Lynnette learned
that Martini declared in his employment records that he was "single" and named
his mother as principal allottee.
9

Hence, Lynnettes filing of the complaint for declaration of nullification of
marriage.
Aside from her deposition,
10
Lynnette presented her Certificate of Marriage,
11

Martinis undated Seafarer Information Sheet,
12
the letter of clinical psychologist
Dr. Andres S. Gerong (Dr. Gerong) to Martini requesting for a personal
interview,
13
Dr. Gerongs testimony,
14
and the Psychological Evaluation Report
15

prepared by Dr. Gerong after his interview of Lynnette and her sister Dr.
Rosemarie Sistoza.
16

In the Psychological Evaluation Report, Dr. Gerong noted as follows:
1. The couples [sic] were married on August 12, 1997 in Danao City,
Cebu[;]
2. After the wedding the couple stayed at the petitioners residence, but the
defendant would always go home to his parents in Looc, Lapu-lapu City;
3. Defendant did not show any directions to establish their home, [is]
happy-go-lucky, and would just see the plaintiff for his physical and sexual
needs;
4. Plaintiff felt being used, exploited, uncared for, taken for granted,
abandoned;
5. Defendants parents appeared to control the son to the extent of
meddling [with] the finances coming from the income as a seaman;
6. Defendant never showed respect for his parents-in-law;
7. Parents of the defendant insisted [on] a co-allot[ment without] any
protestations from the plaintiff who has been generous all the time;
8. Defendant remained immature, could not stand by his wife and would
still depend upon the decisions of his parents and without any personal
directions as to what to do with his family;
9. Strictly speaking, the couple never really live[d] together as husband
and wife like any ordinary couple
17
(underscoring supplied),
and concluded that
Defendant shows immature personality disorder, dependency patterns,
and self-centered motives. Th[ese are] the core personality dysfunctions
noted and have been exaggeratedly expressed which are detrimental to
the familial well-being;
The situation is serious, grave, existing already during the adolescent
period, and incurable because personality and character are stable
whether or not it is normal and adaptive.
x x x x
The defendant is psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential
obligations in marriage and family.
18
(Underscoring supplied)
Expounding on his findings, Dr. Gerong testified, thus:
ATTY. SINGCO: (To witness)
Q: In gist, what were your findings as to the psychological capacity or
incapacity of defendant Martini Dico Baguio?
A: x x x [T]o sum it up, the synopsis of the findings, the defendant husband
appeared to be [a] dependent person to his family and unable to [sever . .
.] the connection being a married man and to establish a domicile for his
family and to support his family.
x x x x
ATTY. SINGCO: (To witness)
Q: Dr. Gerong, how grave or serious is the psychological incapacity of the
defendant?
A: Being, I would say in our popular parlance, "mamas boy" as alleged,
that will endanger the integrity of the marriage because instead of
establishing a permanent conjugal relationship with the wife the husband-
defendant would remain dependent on his family.
x x x x
ATTY. SINGCO: (To witness)
Q: Okay, in terms of the chances that this incapacity will be cured, what
are the chances, if any?
A: As to curability, since I am using a clinical term ["]personality or
character disorder or dysfunction["] and as I have said many times that the
personality is stable and pervasive over time. And if it is established as
early as adolescent period and up to the present it has remained persistent
thru the years and therefore its a permanent trait of the defendant-
husband, therefore its incurable.
19
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
By Decision
20
of January 2, 2002, Branch 24 of the Cebu City RTC found Martini
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of
marriage, and that the same incapacity existed "at the time the couple
exchanged their marriage vows."
The Solicitor General, via appeal,
21
challenged before the Court of Appeals the
trial courts decision
. . . DECLARING THE PARTIES MARRIAGE NULL AND VOID,
DEFENDANTS MARTINI DICO BAGUIOS PSYCHOLOGICAL
INCAPACITY NOT HAVING BEEN PROVEN TO EXIST.
22

By Decision
23
of January 13, 2005, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial courts
decision. Addressing the Solicitor Generals argument that Dr. Gerongs
testimony failed to establish the cause of Martinis psychological incapacity and
to show that it existed at the inception of the marriage,
24
the Court of Appeals
held:
x x x [I]n contradiction of the Republics contention and its supporting
above-cited doctrine, this Court cites the more recent jurisprudence laid
down in the case of Marcos v. Marcos,
25
in which the High Tribunal has
foregone with the requirement that the defendant should be examined by a
physician or psychologist as a conditio sine qua non for declaration of
nullity of marriage. It held thus:
"The x x x guidelines do not require that a physician examine the
person to be declared psychologically incapacitated x x x [w]hat is
important is the presence of evidence that can adequately establish
the partys psychological condition, [f]or indeed, if the totality of
evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological
incapacity, then actual medical examination for the person
concerned need not be resorted to."
26

Therefore, the oral deposition [of Lynette] and the Psychological
Evaluation Report by Dr. Andres S. Gerong, Ph.D. as Clinical
Psychologist declaring the defendant psychologically incapacitated to
comply with the essential obligations in marriage and family life was
sufficient for US to believe that undeniably the defendant suffers
psychological incapacity.
27
(Italics in the original; emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
On the Solicitor Generals contention that Martinis abandonment of Lynnette is a
ground for legal separation and not for declaration of nullity of marriage,
28
and
that Martinis alleged personality traits are not of the nature contemplated by
Article 36 of the Family Code,
29
the Court of Appeals declared:
x x x WE note that it was not the abandonment which was the ground
relied upon by the plaintiff-appellee but the defendants being a mamas
boy.
30

x x x x
Being a Mamas Boy, his uncaring attitude towards his wife, declaring
himself single and naming his mother as the beneficiary, spending
more time with his family and less with his wife and ultimately,
abandoning her manifested defendants psychological incapacity. These,
to sum it all, to US are manifestations of severe psychological disorder
rather than a mere obstinate refusal to comply with his marital
obligations.
31
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
The Solicitor Generals Motion for Reconsideration
32
having been denied by the
Court of Appeals,
33
the present petition
34
was filed, faulting the appellate court to
have gravely erred:
I
. . . IN RULING THAT THE PSYCHOLOGICAL EVALUATION AND
TESTIMONY OF DR. ANDRES GERONG THAT DEFENDANT IS
PSYCHOLOGICALLY INCAPACITATED HAVE LEGAL BASIS.
II
. . . IN FAILING TO TAKE INTO CONSIDERATION THAT
ABANDONMENT BY ONES SPOUSE IS ONLY A GROUND FOR LEGAL
SEPARATION AND NOT FOR THE DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF
MARRIAGE.
III
. . . IN RULING THAT DEFENDANTS BEING A MAMAS BOY IS A
MANIFESTATION OF A PSYCHOLOGICAL DISORDER.
35
(Italics in the
original)
The Solicitor Generals arguments persuade.
The Solicitor General argued as follows:
Dr. Gerong merely testified that defendants alleged psychological incapacity
(being a mamas boy) began in his adolescent stage and has remained
persistent through the years (p. 20, Brief). Dr. Gerong did not detail this finding.
He made no effort to look into and testify on defendants past life, attitudes,
habits and character to explain defendants alleged psychological incapacity as
required by this Honorable Court in the case of Republic vs. Court of Appeals
and Molina, 268 SCRA 198 (1998).
Again, while it is true that Dr. Gerong testified that defendants alleged defect is
incurable, he failed to explain why it is clinically or medically permanent. His only
basis for saying that it is incurable is his finding that defendant has been a
mamas boy since his adolescence (p. 7, TSN, June 19, 2001). During the trial,
Dr. Gerong also failed to explain in detail why the defendants alleged
psychological incapacity is grave and to discuss what kind of disorder defendant
is suffering from.
36
(Emphasis in the original; italics and underscoring supplied)
On the doctors findings in his Report, the Solicitor General argued:
The said findings reveal nothing in defendants past life and acts that
shows a behavior pattern that would prove his alleged psychological
incapacity. Dr. Gerongs finding that defendants parents are too controlling
because they were made co-allottees of the remittances sent by their son
does not prove the alleged psychological incapacity of defendant. The
report likewise failed to explain the gravity of the alleged psychological
incapacity of defendant and state whether or not it incapacitates defendant
from carrying out the normal and ordinary duties of marriage and family.
There is likewise no explanation by Dr. Gerong why he found defendants
incapacity to be incurable. This Honorable Court has held that such illness
must be shown to be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party
to assume the essential obligation of the marriage. Such incapacity must
also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable and
grave [Republic vs. Court of Appeals and Molina, supra]. These Dr.
Gerong failed to do.
Even when the rules have been relaxed and the personal examination
of the defendant by a psychiatrist or psychologist is no longer
mandatory for the declaration of nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the
Family Code, the totality of evidence presented during trial by private
respondent must still prove the gravity, juridical antecedence, and
incurability of the alleged psychological incapacity (Marcos v.
Marcos, 343 SCRA 755 [2000]; Santos v. Court of Appeals, 240 SCRA
20 [1995]). (Emphasis in the original; italics and underscoring supplied)
In fine, the Solicitor General concluded that there was no showing that Martinis
alleged personality traits are of the nature contemplated by Article 36 of the
Family Code and the rulings of this Court in the cited cases,
37
and that Martinis
abandonment of Lynnette constitutes only a ground for legal separation but not
for declaration of nullity of marriage.
38

Article 36 of the Family Code on which Lynnette anchors her complaint provides
that "[a] marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of
marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only
after its solemnization."
Article 36 must be read in conjunction with the other articles in the Family Code,
specifically Articles 35, 37, 38, and 41 which provide different grounds to render
a marriage void ab initio, as well as Article 45 which dwell on voidable marriages,
and Article 55 on legal separation.
39
Care must be observed so that these
various circumstances are not to be applied indiscriminately as if the law were
indifferent on the matter.
40

And Article 36 should not be confused with a divorce law that cuts the marital
bond at the time the causes therefor manifest themselves, nor with legal
separation in which the grounds need not be rooted in psychological incapacity
but on physical violence, moral pressure, moral corruption, civil interdiction, drug
addiction, habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity, abandonment, and the like.
41

"Psychological incapacity" has been elucidated on as follows:
The term "psychological incapacity" to be a ground for the nullity of
marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code, refers to a serious
psychological illness afflicting a party even before the celebration of the
marriage. It is a malady so grave and so permanent as to deprive one of
awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is
about to assume. As all people may have certain quirks and
idiosyncrasies, or isolated characteristics associated with certain
personality disorders, there is hardly a doubt that the intendment of the law
has been to confine the meaning of "psychological incapacity" to the most
serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter
insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the
marriage. x x x [T]he root cause must be identified as a psychological
illness, and its incapacitating nature must be fully explained x x x.
42

(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
The mere showing of "irreconcilable differences" and "conflicting personalities"
does not constitute psychological incapacity.
43
Nor does failure of the parties to
meet their responsibilities and duties as married persons.
It is essential that the parties to a marriage must be shown to be insensitive to or
incapable of meeting their duties and responsibilities due to some psychological
(not physical) illness,
44
which insensitivity or incapacity should have been existing
at the time of the celebration of the marriage even if it becomes manifest only
after its solemnization.
45

In fine, for psychological incapacity to render a marriage void ab initio, it must be
characterized by
(a) Gravity It must be grave and serious such that the party would be
incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in a marriage;
(b) Juridical Antecedence It must be rooted in the history of the party
antedating the marriage, although the overt manifestations may emerge
only after the marriage; and
(c) Incurability It must be incurable, or even if it were otherwise, the cure
would be beyond the means of the party involved.
46

Dr. Gerong found that Martinis "personality disorders" including his being a
"mamas boy" are "serious, grave, existing already during the adolescent period
and incurable" and concluded that Martini "appeared" to be dependent upon his
family and unable "to establish a domicile for his family and to support his family."
The doctors findings and conclusion were derived from his interview of Lynnette
and her sister and Lynnettes deposition. From Lynnettes deposition, however, it
is gathered that Martinis failure to establish a common life with her stems from
his refusal, not incapacity, to do so. It is downright incapacity, not refusal or
neglect or difficulty, much less ill will,
47
which renders a marriage void on the
ground of psychological incapacity. In another vein, how the doctor arrived at the
conclusion, after interviewing Lynnette and considering her deposition, that any
such personality disorders of Martini have been existing since Martinis
adolescent years has not been explained. It bears recalling that Martini and
Lynnette became pen pals in 1995 and contracted marriage in 1997 when Martini
was already 32 years old, far removed from adolescent years.
Dr. Gerongs citing of Martinis appointment of his mother as a beneficiary and
his representing himself as single in his Seafarer Information Sheet, without
more, as indications of Martinis dependence on his family amounting to his
incapacity to fulfill his duties as a married man does not logically follow,
especially given that the Seafarers Information Sheet is not even dated
48
and,
therefore, there is no certainty that it was prepared after Martini contracted
marriage.
While the examination by a physician of a person in order to declare him/her
psychological incapacitated is not required, the root cause thereof must be
"medically or clinically identified." There must thus be evidence to adequately
establish the same. There is none such in the case at bar, however.
The Constitution sets out a policy of protecting and strengthening the family as
the basic social institution and marriage as the foundation of the family.
49

Marriage, an inviolable institution protected by the State,
50
cannot be dissolved at
the whim of the parties.
51
In petitions for the declaration of nullity of marriage, the
burden of proof to show the nullity of marriage lies on the plaintiff.
52
Any doubt
should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and
against its dissolution and nullity.
53

As reflected above, Lynnette failed to discharge the onus probandi. While the
Court sympathizes with her predicament, its first and foremost duty is to apply
the law.
54
Dura lex sed lex.
Lynnettes marriage with Martini may have failed then, but it cannot be declared
void ab initio on the ground of psychological incapacity in light of the insufficient
evidence presented.
55

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the Court of Appeals
dated January 13, 2005 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Civil Case No. CEB
25700 of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu, Branch 24, is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairperson
DANTE O. TINGA
Associate Justice
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice
ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice

ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Courts Division.
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairperson

CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division
Chairpersons Attestation, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above
Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer
of the opinion of the Courts Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice



















19. Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 147824 August 2, 2007
ROSA YAP PARAS, petitioner,
vs.
JUSTO J. PARAS, respondent.
D E C I S I O N
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J .:
This case presents another occasion to reiterate this Courts ruling that the
Guidelines set forth in Republic v. Court of Appeals and Ronidel Olaviano
Molina
1
"do not require that a physician should examine the person to be
declared psychologically incapacitated. What is important is the presence of
evidence that can adequately establish the partys psychological condition."
2

Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules
of Civil Procedure, as amended, are the (a) Decision
3
dated December 8, 2000
and (b) Resolution
4
dated April 5, 2001 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV
No. 49915, entitled "Rosa Yap-Paras, Plaintiff-Appellant vs. Justo J. Paras,
Defendant-Appellee."
On May 21, 1964, petitioner Rosa Yap married respondent Justo J. Paras in
Bindoy, Negros Oriental. They begot four (4) children, namely: Raoul (+), Cindy
Rose (+), Dahlia, and Reuel.
Twenty-nine (29) years thereafter, or on May 27, 1993, Rosa filed with the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 31, Dumaguete City, a complaint for
annulment of her marriage with Justo, under Article 36 of the Family Code,
docketed as Civil Case No. 10613. She alleged that Justo is psychologically
incapacitated to exercise the essential obligations of marriage as shown by the
following circumstances:
(a) he dissipated her business assets and forged her signature in one
mortgage transaction;
(b) he lived with a concubine and sired a child with her;
(c) he did not give financial support to his children; and
(d) he has been remiss in his duties both as a husband and as a father.
To substantiate her charges, Rosa offered documentary and testimonial
evidence.
This is her story. She met Justo in 1961 in Bindoy. She was then a student of
San Carlos University, Cebu City.
5
He courted her, frequently spending time at
her "Botica."
6
Eventually, in 1964, convinced that he loved her, she agreed to
marry him. Their wedding was considered one of the "most celebrated"
marriages in Bindoy.
7

After the wedding, she and Justo spent one (1) week in Davao for their
honeymoon.
8
Upon returning to Bindoy, they resided at her parents house. It
was their residence for three (3) years until they were able to build a house of
their own.
9
For the first five (5) years of their marriage, Justo did not support her
and their children because he shouldered his sisters schooling.
10
Consequently,
she was the one who spent for all their family needs, using the income from her
"Botica" and store.
11

Justo lived the life of a bachelor.
12
His usual routine was to spend time with his
"barkadas" until the wee hours of the morning. Oftentimes, he would scold her
when she sent for him during lunchtime.
13
He also failed to provide for their
childrens well-being.
14
Sometime in 1975, their daughter Cindy Rose was
afflicted with leukemia. It was her family who paid for her medication. Also, in
1984, their son Raoul was electrocuted while Justo was in their rest house with
his "barkadas." He did not heed her earlier advice to bring Raoul in the rest
house as the latter has the habit of climbing the rooftop.
15

To cope with the death of the children, the entire family went to the United
States. Her sisters supported them throughout their two-year stay there.
However, after three months, Justo abandoned them and left for the Philippines.
Upon her return to the Philippines, she was shocked to find her "Botica" and
other businesses heavy in debt. She then realized Justo was a profligate. At one
time, he disposed without her consent a conjugal piece of land.
16
At other times,
he permitted the municipal government to take gasoline from their gas station
free of charge.
She endured all of Justos shortcomings, but his act of maintaining a mistress
and siring an illegitimate child was the last straw that prompted her to file the
present case. She found that after leaving their conjugal house in 1988, Justo
lived with Jocelyn Ching. Their cohabitation resulted in the birth of a baby girl,
Cyndee Rose, obviously named after her (Rosa) and Justos deceased daughter
Cindy Rose Paras.
17

As expected, Justo has a different version of the story.
He met Rosa upon his return to Bindoy after taking the bar examinations in
Manila.
18
He frequently spent time in her store.
19
Believing he loved her, he
courted her and later on, they became sweethearts. In 1963, they decided to get
married. However, it was postponed because her family demanded a dowry.
Their marriage took place in 1964 upon his mothers signing a deed of
conveyance involving 28 hectares of coconut land in favor of Rosa.
20

He blamed the subsequent dissipation of their assets from the slump of the price
of sugar and not to his alleged profligacy.
21
Due to his business ventures, he and
Rosa were able to acquire a 10-room family house, expand their store, establish
their gasoline station, and purchase several properties. He also denied forging
her signature in one mortgage transaction. He maintained that he did not dispose
of a conjugal property and that he and Rosa personally signed the renewal of a
sugar crop loan before the banks authorized employee.
22

As to their marital relationship, he noticed the change in Rosas attitude after her
return from the United States. She became detached, cold, uncaring, and overly
focused on the familys businesses.
23
He tried to reach her but Rosa was
steadfast in her "new attitudinal outlook." Before other people, he merely
pretended that their relationship was blissful.
24

He did not abandon his family in the United States. It happened that they only
had tourist visas. When they were there, their childrens tourist visas were
converted into study visas, permitting them to stay longer. For his part, he was
granted only three (3) months leave as municipal mayor of Bindoy, thus, he
immediately returned to the Philippines.
25

He spent for his childrens education. At first, he resented supporting them
because he was just starting his law practice and besides, their conjugal assets
were more than enough to provide for their needs. He admitted though that there
were times he failed to give them financial support because of his lack of
income.
26

What caused the inevitable family break-out was Rosas act of embarrassing him
during his birthday celebration in 1987. She did not prepare food for the guests.
When confronted, she retorted that she has nothing to do with his birthday. This
convinced him of her lack of concern.
27
This was further aggravated when she
denied his request for engine oil when his vehicle broke down in a mountainous
and NPA-infested area.
28

As to the charge of concubinage, he alleged that Jocelyn Ching is not his
mistress, but her secretary in his Law Office. She was impregnated by her
boyfriend, a certain Grelle Leccioness. Cyndee Rose Ching Leccioness is not his
daughter.
After trial or on February 28, 1995, the RTC rendered a Decision upholding the
validity of the marriage. It found that: (a) Justo did not abandon the conjugal
home as he was forced to leave after Rosa posted guards at the gates of their
house;
29
(b) the conjugal assets were sufficient to support the family needs, thus,
there was no need for Justo to shell out his limited salary;
30
and (c) the charge of
infidelity is unsubstantiated.
31
The RTC observed that the relationship between
the parties started well, negating the existence of psychological incapacity on
either party at the time of the celebration of their marriage.
32
And lastly, it ruled
that there appeared to be a collusion between them as both sought the
declaration of nullity of their marriage.
33

Justo interposed an appeal to the Court of Appeals.
In the interim, Rosa filed with this Court a petition for disbarment against Justo,
docketed as A.C. No. 5333, premised on the same charges alleged in her
complaint for declaration of nullity of marriage. On October 18, 2000, this Court
rendered its Decision finding him guilty of falsifying Rosas signature in bank
documents, immorality, and abandonment of his family. He was suspended
from the practice of law, thus:
In the light of the foregoing, respondent is hereby SUSPENDED from the
practice of law for SIX (6) MONTHS on the charge of falsifying his wifes
signature in bank documents and other related loan instruments; and for
ONE (1) YEAR from the practice of law on the charges of immorality and
abandonment of his own family, the penalties to be served
simultaneously. Let notice of this Decision be spread in respondents
record as an attorney, and notice of the same served on the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines and on the Office of the Court Administrator for
circulation to all the courts concerned.
SO ORDERED.
On December 8, 2000 or nearly two months after this Court promulgated the
Decision in A.C. No. 5333, the Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC Decision in the
present case, holding that "the evidence of the plaintiff (Rosa) falls short of the
standards required by law to decree a nullity of marriage." It ruled that Justos
alleged defects or idiosyncracies "were sufficiently explained by the evidence,"
thus:
Certainly, we cannot ignore what is extant on the record first, the income
which supported their children came from the earnings of their conjugal
properties and not singularly from Rosas industry; second, Justo gave his
share of the support to his children in the form of allowances, albeit smaller
than that derived from the conjugal property; third, he was booted out from
their conjugal dwelling after he lost his bid for re-election and as such did
not voluntarily abandon his home; and fourth, although unjustifiable in the
eyes of the law and morality, Justos alleged infidelity came after he was
driven out of his house by Rosa. x x x.
The Court of Appeals likewise held that Rosas inability to offer the testimony of a
psychologist is fatal to her case, being in violation of the tenets laid down by this
Court in Molina.
34
Thus, she failed to substantiate her allegation that Justo is
psychologically incapacitated from complying with the essential obligations of
marriage.
35

Rosa filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied. Hence, the instant
petition for review on certiorari.
Rosa contends that this Courts factual findings in A.C. No. 5333 for disbarment
are conclusive on the present case. Consequently, the Court of Appeals erred in
rendering contrary factual findings. Also, she argues that she filed the instant
complaint sometime in May, 1993, well before this Courts pronouncement in
Molina relied upon by the Court of Appeals. She states that she could have
presented an expert to prove the root cause of Justos psychological incapacity
had she been required to do so. For relief, she prays that her marriage with Justo
be annulled on the bases of the Courts conclusive factual findings in A.C. No.
5333; or in the alternative, remand this case to the court a quo for reception of
expert testimony in the interest of due process.
In his comment on the petition, Justo asserts that the present case is a "new
matter completely foreign and removed" from A.C. No. 5333; hence, the
factual findings of this Court therein are not conclusive on this case. Besides, no
hearing was conducted in A.C. No. 5333 as it was decided merely on the bases
of pleadings and documents.
The parties opposing contentions lead us to the following three (3) vital issues:
first, whether the factual findings of this Court in A.C. No. 5333 are
conclusive on the present case;
second, whether a remand of this case to the RTC for reception of expert
testimony on the root cause of Justos alleged psychological incapacity is
necessary; and
third, whether the totality of evidence in the case shows psychological
incapacity on the part of Justo.
The petition is bereft of merit.
I
Whether the factual findings of this Court in
A.C. No. 5333 are conclusive on the present case.
Rosa, sad to say, had made much ado about nothing. A reading of the Court of
Appeals Decision shows that she has no reason to feel aggrieved. In fact, the
appellate court even assumed that her charges "are true," but concluded that
they are insufficient to declare the marriage void on the ground of psychological
incapacity. The pertinent portion of the Decision reads:
Applying these parameters to the sifted evidence, we find that even if we
assume Justos alleged infidelity, failure to support his family and alleged
abandonment of their family home are true, such traits are at best
indicators that he is unfit to become an ideal husband and father. However,
by themselves, these grounds are insufficient to declare the marriage void due to
an incurable psychological incapacity. These grounds, we must emphasize, do
not manifest that he was truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that he
must assume and discharge as a married person. While they may manifest the
"gravity" of his alleged psychological incapacity, they do not necessarily show
incurability, such that while his acts violated the covenants of marriage, they do
not necessarily show that such acts show an irreparably hopeless state of
psychological incapacity which prevents him from undertaking the basic
obligations of marriage in the future.
36

The Court of Appeals pointed this out in its Resolution denying Rosas motion for
reconsideration, thus:
Even as we are fully cognizant of the findings of the Supreme Court in the
disbarment case appellant filed against her husband, namely, appellees
falsification of documents to obtain loans and his infidelity, these facts, by
themselves, do not conclusively establish appellees psychological
incapacity as contemplated under Article 36 of the Family Code. In fact,
we already went as far as to presume the existence of such seeming
depravities in appellees character in our earlier judgment. However,
as we emphasized in our Decision, the existence of such
eventualities is not necessarily conclusive of an inherent incapacity
on the part of appellee to discern and perform the rudiments of
marital obligations as required under Article 36.
37

Clearly, Rosas insistence that the factual findings in A.C. No. 5333 be
considered "conclusive" on the present case is unmeritorious. The Court of
Appeals already "went as far as to presume the existence" of Justos depravities,
however, even doing so could not bring about her (Rosas) desired result. As
Rosas prayer for relief suggests, what she wants is for this Court to annul her
marriage on the bases of its findings in A.C. No. 5333.
38
Obviously, she is of the
impression that since her charges in A.C. No. 5333 were found to be true,
justifying the suspension of Justo from the practice of law, the same charges are
also sufficient to prove his psychological incapacity to comply with the essential
marital obligations.
Her premise is of course non-sequitur.
Jurisprudence abounds that administrative cases against lawyers belong to a
class of their own. They are distinct from and may proceed independently of civil
and criminal cases. The basic premise is that criminal and civil cases are
altogether different from administrative matters, such that the disposition
in the first two will not inevitably govern the third and vice versa.
39
The
Courts exposition in In re Almacen
40
is instructive, thus:
x x x Disciplinary proceedings against lawyers are sui generis. Neither
purely civil nor purely criminal, they do not involve a trial of an action or a
suit, but are rather investigations by the Court into the conduct of one of its
officers. Not being intended to inflict punishment, [they are] in no sense a
criminal prosecution. Accordingly, there is neither a plaintiff nor a
prosecutor therein. [They] may be initiated by the Court motu proprio.
Public interest is [their] primary objective, and the real question for
determination is whether or not the attorney is still a fit person to be
allowed the privileges as such. Hence, in the exercise of its disciplinary
powers, the Court merely calls upon a member of the Bar to account
for his actuations as an officer of the Court with the end in view of
preserving the purity of the legal profession and the proper and
honest administration of justice by purging the profession of
members who by their misconduct have prove[n] themselves no
longer worthy to be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities
pertaining to the office of an attorney. In such posture, there can thus
be no occasion to speak of a complainant or a prosecutor.
Accordingly, ones unfitness as a lawyer does not automatically mean ones
unfitness as a husband or vice versa.
41
The yardsticks for such roles are simply
different. This is why the disposition in a disbarment case cannot be conclusive
on an action for declaration of nullity of marriage. While Rosas charges
sufficiently proved Justos unfitness as a lawyer, however, they may not establish
that he is psychologically incapacitated to perform his duties as a husband. In the
disbarment case, "the real question for determination is whether or not the
attorney is still a fit person to be allowed the privileges as such." Its purpose is "to
protect the court and the public from the misconduct of officers of the court." On
the other hand, in an action for declaration of nullity of marriage based on the
ground of psychological incapacity, the question for determination is whether the
guilty party suffers a grave, incurable, and pre-existing mental incapacity that
renders him truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants. Its purpose is to free
the innocent party from a meaningless marriage. In this case, as will be seen in
the following discussion, Justos acts are not sufficient to conclude that he is
psychologically incapacitated, albeit such acts really fall short of what is expected
from a lawyer.
II
Whether a remand of this case to the RTC is necessary.
The presentation of an expert witness to prove psychological incapacity has its
origin in Molina.
42
One of the Guidelines set forth therein states:
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically
or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently
proven by experts, and (d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of
the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological -- not
physical, although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical.
The evidence must convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was
mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that the person could not have
known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have
given valid assumption thereof. Although no example of such incapacity
need be given here so as not to limit the application of the provision under
the principle of ejusdem generis, nevertheless such root cause must be
identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully
explained. Expert evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists
and clinical psychologists.
In the 2000 case of Marcos v. Marcos,
43
the Court clarified that the above
Guideline does not require that the respondent should be examined by a
physician or psychologist as a condition sine qua non for the declaration of the
nullity of marriage. What is important is "the presence of evidence that can
adequately establish the partys psychological condition."
Interestingly, in the same year (2000) that Marcos was decided, the Court
backtracked a bit when it held in Republic v. Dagdag
44
that, "the root cause of
psychological incapacity must be medically or clinically identified and
sufficiently proven by experts" and this requirement was not deemed complied
with where no psychiatrist or medical doctor testified on the alleged psychological
incapacity of one party.
Significantly, the New Rules on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages
and Annulment of Voidable Marriages,
45
promulgated by this Court on March 15,
2003, geared towards the relaxation of the requirement of expert opinion. Section
2, paragraph (d) states:
(d) What to allege.- A petition under Article 36 of the Family Code shall
specifically allege the complete facts showing that either or both parties
were psychologically incapacitated from complying with the essential
marital obligations of marriage at the time of the celebration of marriage
even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its celebration.
The complete facts should allege the physical manifestations, if any,
as are indicative of psychological incapacity at the time of the
celebration of the marriage but expert opinion need not be alleged.
In Barcelona v. Court of Appeals,
46
this Court categorically explained that under
the New Rules, a petition for declaration of nullity under Article 36 of the Family
Code need not allege expert opinion on the psychological incapacity or on its root
cause. What must be alleged are the physical manifestations indicative of
said incapacity. The Court further held that the New Rules, being procedural in
nature, apply to actions pending and unresolved at the time of their adoption.
Later, in 2005, the Court reiterated the Marcos doctrine in Republic v. Iyoy.
47

Thus:
A later case, Marcos v. Marcos, further clarified that there is no
requirement that the defendant/respondent spouse should be
personally examined by a physician or psychologist as a condition
sine qua non for the declaration of nullity of marriage based on
psychological incapacity. Accordingly, it is no longer necessary to allege
expert opinion in a petition under Article 36 of the Family Code of the
Philippines. Such psychological incapacity, however, must be established
by the totality of the evidence presented during the trial.
Significantly, the present case is exactly akin to Pesca v. Pesca.
48
Pesca
stemmed from a complaint for declaration of nullity of marriage under Article 36
filed by a battered wife sometime in April 1994. The trial court, in its Decision
dated November 15, 1995, decreed the marriage void ab initio on the ground of
psychological incapacity on the part of the husband. The Court of Appeals
reversed the trial courts Decision, applying the Guidelines set forth in Santos v.
Court of Appeals
49
and Molina.
50
When the matter was brought to this Court, the
wife argued that Santos and Molina should not have retroactive application, the
Guidelines being merely advisory and not mandatory in nature. She submitted
that the proper application of Santos and Molina warranted only a remand of her
case to the trial court for further proceedings, not a dismissal. The Court declined
to remand Pesca
51
on the premise that the Santos and Molina Guidelines
"constitute a part of the law as of the date the statute is enacted," thus:
The doctrine of stare decisis, ordained in Article 8 of the Civil Code,
expresses that judicial decisions applying or interpreting the law shall form
part of the legal system of the Philippines. The rule follows the settled legal
maxim legis interpretado legis vim obtinet that the interpretation placed
upon the written law by a competent court has the force of law. The
interpretation or construction placed by the courts establishes the
contemporaneous legislative intent of the law. The latter as so
interpreted and construed would thus constitute a part of the law as
of the date the statute is enacted. It is only when a prior ruling of this
Court finds itself later overruled, and a different view is adopted, that the
new doctrine may have to be applied prospectively in favor of parties who
have relied on the old doctrine and have acted in good faith in accordance
therewith under the familiar rule of lex prospicit, non replicit.
The Court then opted to examine the evidence. It affirmed that the wife failed,
both in her allegations in the complaint and in her evidence, to make out a case
of psychological incapacity on the part of her husband. The Court then concluded
that "emotional immaturity and irresponsibility" cannot be equated with
psychological incapacity.
Applying the foregoing cases, Marcos, Barcelona, Iyoy, and Pesca, to the instant
case, there is no reason to remand it to the trial court. The records clearly show
that there is sufficient evidence to establish the psychological condition of Justo.

III
Whether the totality of evidence in the case
shows psychological incapacity on the part of Justo
as to justify the declaration of nullity of marriage.
The last issue left for this Courts consideration is whether the totality of the
evidence is sufficient to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity on the part
of Justo so as to justify the dissolution of the marriage in question.
At this juncture, it is imperative that the parties be reminded of the States policy
on marriage. Article XV of the Constitution mandates that:
SEC. 1. The State recognizes the Filipino family as the foundation of the
nation. Accordingly, it shall strengthen its solidarity and actively promote its
total development.
SEC. 2. Marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the
family and shall be protected by the State.
This State policy on the inviolability of marriage has been enshrined in Article 1 of
the Family Code which states that:
ART. 1. Marriage is a special contract of permanent union, between a man
and a woman entered into in accordance with law for the establishment of
conjugal and family life. It is the foundation of the family and an inviolable
social institution whose nature, consequences, and incidents are governed
by law, and not subject to stipulation, except that marriage settlements
may fix the property relations during the marriage within the limits provided
by this Code.
Given the foregoing provisions of constitutional and statutory law, this Court has
held fast to the position that any doubt as to the validity of a marriage is to be
resolved in favor of its validity.
52
Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio.
Of course, the law recognizes that not all marriages are made in heaven.
Imperfect humans more often than not create imperfect unions. Thus, when the
imperfection is psychological in nature and renders a person incapacitated to
comply with the essential marital obligations, the State provides refuge to the
aggrieved spouse under Article 36 of the Family Code which reads:
ART. 36. A marriage contracted by a party who, at the time of celebration,
was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital
obligations of marriage shall likewise be void even if such incapacity
becomes manifest only after its solemnization.
In Molina,
53
the Court laid down the Guidelines for the interpretation and
application of Article 36, thus:
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the
plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and
continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. x x x.
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or
clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by
experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family
Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological -- not physical,
although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The
evidence must convince the court that the parties, or one of them, were
mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that the person could not have
known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have
given valid assumption thereof. Although no example of such incapacity
need be given here so as not to limit the application of the provision under
the principle of ejusdem generis, nevertheless such root cause must be
identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully
explained. Expert evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and
clinical psychologists.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the
celebration" of the marriage. The evidence must show that the illness was
existing when the parties exchanged their "I dos." The manifestation of the
illness need not be perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must
have attached at such moment, or prior thereto.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically
permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even
relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely
against everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must be
relevant to the assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those
not related to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or employment in
a job. Hence, a pediatrician may be effective in diagnosing illnesses of
children and prescribing medicine to cure them but may not be
psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear and raise his/her own
children as an essential obligation of marriage.
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the
party to assume the essential obligations of marriage. Thus, "mild
characteriological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional
outbursts" cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness must be shown
as downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much
less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or supervening disabling factor
in the person, an adverse integral element in the personality structure that
effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby
complying with the obligations essential to marriage.
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles
68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as
Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their
children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in
the petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the decision.
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of
the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive,
should be given great respect by our courts.
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the
Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall be
handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a certification, which will
be quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for his
agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor
General, along with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such
certification within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is deemed
submitted for resolution of the court. The Solicitor General shall discharge
the equivalent function of the defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon
1095.
The foregoing Guidelines incorporate the basic requirements mandated by the
Court in Santos,
54
to reiterate: psychological incapacity must be characterized by
(a) gravity; (b) juridical antecedence; and (c) incurability.
A review of the complaint, as well as the testimonial and documentary evidence,
shows that Rosas main grounds in seeking the declaration of nullity of her
marriage with Justo are his infidelity, profligacy which includes the
falsification of her signature in one of the loan documents, failure to
support the children, and abandonment of the family. Both the courts below
found the charges unsubstantiated and untrue. However, this Court, in A.C. No.
5333 for disbarment, found the evidence sufficient to support Rosas charges of
sexual infidelity, falsification of her signature, and abandonment of family, thus:
ON THE CHARGE OF FALSIFICATION OF COMPLAINANTS SIGNATURE
The handwriting examination conducted by the National Bureau of Investigation
on the signatures of complainant Rosa Yap Paras and respondent Justo de
Jesus Paras vis--vis the questioned signature "Rosa Y. Paras" appearing in the
questioned bank loan documents, contracts of mortgage and other related
instrument, yielded the following results:
CONCLUSION:
1. The questioned and the standard sample signatures JUSTO J.
PARAS were written by one and the same person.
2. The questioned and the standard sample signatures ROSA YAP
PARAS were not written by one and the same person. (Annex "B",
Rollo, p. 26, emphasis ours;)
The NBI did not make a categorical statement that respondent forged the
signatures of complainant. However, an analysis of the above findings lead
to no other conclusion than that the questioned or falsified signatures of
complainant Rosa Y. Paras were authored by respondent as said falsified
signatures were the same as the sample signatures of respondent.
To explain this anomaly, respondent presented a Special Power of
Attorney (SPA) executed in his favor by complainant to negotiate for an
agricultural or crop loan from the Bais Rural Bank of Bais City. Instead of
exculpating respondent, the presence of the SPA places him in hot water.
For if he was so authorized to obtain loans from the banks, then why did
he have to falsify his wifes signatures in the bank loan documents? The
purpose of an SPA is to especially authorize the attorney-in-fact to sign for
and on behalf of the principal using his own name.
ON THE CHARGE OF IMMORALITY AND CONCUBINAGE
The evidence against respondent is overwhelming. The affidavit-
statements of his children and three other persons who used to work with
him and have witnessed the acts indicative of his infidelity more than
satisfy this Court that respondent has strayed from the marital path. The
baptismal certificate of Cyndee Rose Paras where respondent was named
as the father of the child (Annex "J", Rollo, p. 108); his naming the child
after his deceased first-born daughter Cyndee Rose; and his allowing
Jocelyn Ching and the child to live in their house in Dumaguete City bolster
the allegation that respondent is carrying on an illicit affair with Ms. Ching,
the mother of his illegitimate child.
While this Court is convinced that the charges hurled against Justo by Rosa,
such as sexual infidelity, falsification of her signature, abandonment and
inadequate support of children, are true, nonetheless, there is nothing in the
records showing that they were caused by a psychological disorder on his part.
In other words, the totality of the evidence is not sufficient to show that Justo is
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations.
The records indicate that the marriage between the parties had a good start,
resulting in the birth of their four (4) children. The early days of their cohabitation
were blissful and harmonious. Justo was deeply in love with Rosa, even
persuading his mother to give her a dowry. They were able to build a 10-room
family home and acquire several properties, thus, proving themselves to be
responsible couple. Even Rosa admitted that Justo took care of their children
when they were young. Unfortunately, the passage of time appeared to have
taken its toll on their relationship. The acts committed by Justo appeared to have
been the result of irreconcilable differences between them caused by the death
of their two (2) children and financial difficulties due to his failure to win the
mayoralty election and to sustain his law practice. Furthermore, the superior
business acumen of Rosa, as well as the insolent attitude of her family towards
Justo, busted his ego and lowered his self-esteem.
There is no evidence that Justos "defects" were present at the inception of
the marriage. His "defects" surfaced only in the latter years when these events
took place; their two children died; he lost in the election; he failed in his business
ventures and law practice; and felt the disdain of his wife and her family. Surely,
these circumstances explain why Rosa filed the present case only after almost
30 years of their marriage.
Equally important is that records fail to indicate that Justos "defects" are
incurable or grave.
The following catena of cases provides an adequate basis why the marriage
between Justo and Rosa should not be annulled.
In Dedel v. Court of Appeals
55
which involved a promiscuous wife who left her
family to live with one of her many paramours, this Court ruled that the acts of
sexual infidelity and abandonment do not constitute psychological
incapacity absent a showing of the presence of such promiscuity at the
inception of the marriage, thus:
x x x. In this case, respondents sexual infidelity can hardly qualify as being
mentally or physically ill to such an extent that she could not have known
the obligations she was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given
a valid assumption thereof. It appears that respondents promiscuity
did not exist prior to or at the inception of the marriage. What is, in
fact, disclosed by the records is a blissful marital union at its
celebration, later affirmed in church rites, and which produced four
children.
Respondents sexual infidelity or perversion and abandonment do not by
themselves constitute psychological incapacity within the contemplation of
the Family Code. Neither could her emotional immaturity and
irresponsibility be equated with psychological incapacity. It must be shown
that these acts are manifestations of a disordered personality which make
respondent completely unable to discharge the essential obligations of the
marital state, not merely due to her youth, immaturity, or sexual
promiscuity.
In Carating-Siayngco v. Siayngco,
56
the wifes inability to conceive led her
husband to other women so he could fulfill his ardent wish to have a child of his
own flesh and blood. This Court ruled that this is not a manifestation of
psychological incapacity in the contemplation of the Family Code. In Choa v.
Choa,
57
this Court declared that a mere showing of irreconcilable differences
and conflicting personalities does not constitute psychological incapacity. And,
again, in Iyoy,
58
a Filipina left her husband, married an American and had a
family by him, which she flaunted to her former husband. This Court ruled that
these acts, while embarrassing and hurting to the latter, did not
satisfactorily establish a serious or grave psychological or mental defect of
an incurable nature present at the time of marriage; and that irreconcilable
differences, conflicting personalities, emotional immaturity, and
irresponsibility, physical abuse, habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity or
perversion, and abandonment per se do not warrant a finding of
psychological incapacity under Article 36.
What is clear in this case is a husband who has gone astray from the path of
marriage because of a conflicting relationship with his wife and her family and
repeated lifes setbacks. While these do not justify his sins, they are not sufficient
to establish that he is psychologically incapacitated.
It is worthy to emphasize that Article 36 contemplates downright incapacity or
inability to take cognizance of and assume the basic marital obligations, not a
mere refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less, ill will, on the part of the errant
spouse.
59
As this Court repeatedly declares, Article 36 of the Family Code is not
to be confused with a divorce law that cuts the marital bond at the time the
causes thereof manifest themselves. It refers to a serious psychological illness
afflicting a party even before the celebration of the marriage. It is a malady so
grave and so permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and
responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about to assume. These marital
obligations are those provided under Articles 68 to 71, 220, 221 and 225 of the
Family Code.
60

Neither should Article 36 be equated with legal separation, in which the grounds
need not be rooted in psychological incapacity but on physical violence, moral
pressure, moral corruption, civil interdiction, drug addiction, sexual infidelity,
and abandonment, and the like. At best the evidence presented by petitioner
refers only to grounds for legal separation, not for declaring a marriage void.
61

In sum, this Court finds no cogent reason to reverse the ruling of the Court of
Appeals. While this Court commiserates with Rosas plight, however, it has no
choice but to apply the law. Dura lex sed lex.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision and Resolution of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 49915 are AFFIRMED. No
pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, Chief Justice, Corona, Azcuna, Garcia, JJ., concur.

20. Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

G.R. No. 108763 February 13, 1997
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and RORIDEL OLAVIANO MOLINA, respondents.

PANGANIBAN, J.:
The Family Code of the Philippines provides an entirely new ground (in addition
to those enumerated in the Civil Code) to assail the validity of a marriage,
namely, "psychological incapacity." Since the Code's effectivity, our courts have
been swamped with various petitions to declare marriages void based on this
ground. Although this Court had interpreted the meaning of psychological
incapacity in the recent case of Santos vs. Court of Appeals, still many judges
and lawyers find difficulty in applying said novel provision in specific cases. In the
present case and in the context of the herein assailed Decision of the Court of
Appeals, the Solicitor General has labelled exaggerated to be sure but
nonetheless expressive of his frustration Article 36 as the "most liberal divorce
procedure in the world." Hence, this Court in addition to resolving the present
case, finds the need to lay down specific guidelines in the interpretation and
application of Article 36 of the Family Code.
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 challenging the
January 25, 1993 Decision
1
of the Court of Appeals
2
in CA-G.R. CV No. 34858
affirming in toto the May 14, 1991 decision of the Regional Trial Court of La
Trinidad,
3
Benguet, which declared the marriage of respondent Roridel Olaviano
Molina to Reynaldo Molina void ab initio, on the ground of "psychological
incapacity" under Article 36 of the Family Code.
The Facts
This case was commenced on August 16, 1990 with the filing by respondent
Roridel O. Molina of a verified petition for declaration of nullity of her marriage to
Reynaldo Molina. Essentially, the petition alleged that Roridel and Reynaldo
were married on April 14, 1985 at the San Agustin Church
4
in Manila; that a son,
Andre O. Molina was born; that after a year of marriage, Reynaldo showed signs
of "immaturity and irresponsibility" as a husband and a father since he preferred
to spend more time with his peers and friends on whom he squandered his
money; that he depended on his parents for aid and assistance, and was never
honest with his wife in regard to their finances, resulting in frequent quarrels
between them; that sometime in February 1986, Reynaldo was relieved of his job
in Manila, and since then Roridel had been the sole breadwinner of the family;
that in October 1986 the couple had a very intense quarrel, as a result of which
their relationship was estranged; that in March 1987, Roridel resigned from her
job in Manila and went to live with her parents in Baguio City; that a few weeks
later, Reynaldo left Roridel and their child, and had since then abandoned them;
that Reynaldo had thus shown that he was psychologically incapable of
complying with essential marital obligations and was a highly immature and
habitually quarrel some individual who thought of himself as a king to be served;
and that it would be to the couple's best interest to have their marriage declared
null and void in order to free them from what appeared to be an incompatible
marriage from the start.
In his Answer filed on August 28, 1989, Reynaldo admitted that he and Roridel
could no longer live together as husband and wife, but contended that their
misunderstandings and frequent quarrels were due to (1) Roridel's strange
behavior of insisting on maintaining her group of friends even after their
marriage; (2) Roridel's refusal to perform some of her marital duties such as
cooking meals; and (3) Roridel's failure to run the household and handle their
finances.
During the pre-trial on October 17, 1990, the following were stipulated:
1. That the parties herein were legally married on April 14, 1985 at
the Church of St. Augustine, Manila;
2. That out of their marriage, a child named Albert Andre Olaviano
Molina was born on July 29, 1986;
3. That the parties are separated-in-fact for more than three years;
4. That petitioner is not asking support for her and her child;
5. That the respondent is not asking for damages;
6. That the common child of the parties is in the custody of the
petitioner wife.
Evidence for herein respondent wife consisted of her own testimony and that of
her friends Rosemarie Ventura and Maria Leonora Padilla as well as of Ruth G.
Lalas, a social worker, and of Dr. Teresita Hidalgo-Sison, a psychiatrist of the
Baguio General Hospital and Medical Center. She also submitted documents
marked as Exhibits "A" to "E-1." Reynaldo did not present any evidence as he
appeared only during the pre-trial conference.
On May 14, 1991, the trial court rendered judgment declaring the marriage void.
The appeal of petitioner was denied by the Court of Appeals which affirmed in
toto the RTC's decision. Hence, the present recourse.
The Issue
In his petition, the Solicitor General insists that "the Court of Appeals made an
erroneous and incorrect interpretation of the phrase 'psychological incapacity' (as
provided under Art. 36 of the Family Code) and made an incorrect application
thereof to the facts of the case," adding that the appealed Decision tended "to
establish in effect the most liberal divorce procedure in the world which is
anathema to our culture."
In denying the Solicitor General's appeal, the respondent Court relied
5
heavily on
the trial court's findings "that the marriage between the parties broke up because
of their opposing and conflicting personalities." Then, it added it sown opinion
that "the Civil Code Revision Committee (hereinafter referred to as Committee)
intended to liberalize the application of our civil laws on personal and family
rights. . . ." It concluded that:
As ground for annulment of marriage, We view psychologically
incapacity as a broad range of mental and behavioral conduct on the
part of one spouse indicative of how he or she regards the marital
union, his or her personal relationship with the other spouse, as well
as his or her conduct in the long haul for the attainment of the
principal objectives of marriage. If said conduct, observed and
considered as a whole, tends to cause the union to self-destruct
because it defeats the very objectives of marriage, then there is
enough reason to leave the spouses to their individual fates.
In the case at bar, We find that the trial judge committed no
indiscretion in analyzing and deciding the instant case, as it did,
hence, We find no cogent reason to disturb the findings and
conclusions thus made.
Respondent, in her Memorandum, adopts these discussions of the Court of
Appeals.
The petitioner, on the other hand, argues that "opposing and conflicting
personalities" is not equivalent to psychological incapacity, explaining that such
ground "is not simply the neglect by the parties to the marriage of their
responsibilities and duties, but a defect in their psychological nature which
renders them incapable of performing such marital responsibilities and duties."
The Court's Ruling
The petition is meritorious.
In Leouel Santos vs. Court of Appeals
6
this Court, speaking thru Mr. Justice Jose
C. Vitug, ruled that "psychological incapacity should refer to no less than a
mental (nor physical) incapacity . . . and that (t)here is hardly any doubt that the
intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of 'psychological
incapacity' to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly
demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and
significance to the marriage. This psychologic condition must exist at the time the
marriage is celebrated." Citing Dr. Gerardo Veloso, a former presiding judge of
the Metropolitan Marriage Tribunal of the Catholic Archdiocese of Manila,
7

Justice Vitug wrote that "the psychological incapacity must be characterized by
(a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability."
On the other hand, in the present case, there is no clear showing to us that the
psychological defect spoken of is an incapacity. It appears to us to be more of a
"difficulty," if not outright "refusal" or "neglect" in the performance of some marital
obligations. Mere showing of "irreconciliable differences" and "conflicting
personalities" in no wise constitutes psychological incapacity. It is not enough to
prove that the parties failed to meet their responsibilities and duties as married
persons; it is essential that they must be shown to be incapable of doing so, due
to some psychological (nor physical) illness.
The evidence adduced by respondent merely showed that she and her husband
could nor get along with each other. There had been no showing of the gravity of
the problem; neither its juridical antecedence nor its incurability. The expert
testimony of Dr. Sison showed no incurable psychiatric disorder but only
incompatibility, not psychological incapacity. Dr. Sison testified:
8

COURT
Q It is therefore the recommendation of the psychiatrist based on
your findings that it is better for the Court to annul (sic) the
marriage?
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q There is no hope for the marriage?
A There is no hope, the man is also living with another woman.
Q Is it also the stand of the psychiatrist that the parties are
psychologically unfit for each other but they are psychologically fit
with other parties?
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q Neither are they psychologically unfit for their professions?
A Yes, Your Honor.
The Court has no more questions.
In the case of Reynaldo, there is no showing that his alleged personality traits
were constitutive of psychological incapacity existing at the time of marriage
celebration. While some effort was made to prove that there was a failure to fulfill
pre-nuptial impressions of "thoughtfulness and gentleness" on Reynaldo's part of
being "conservative, homely and intelligent" on the part of Roridel, such failure of
expectation is nor indicative of antecedent psychological incapacity. If at all, it
merely shows love's temporary blindness to the faults and blemishes of the
beloved.
During its deliberations, the Court decided to go beyond merely ruling on the
facts of this case vis-a-vis existing law and jurisprudence. In view of the novelty
of Art. 36 of the Family Code and the difficulty experienced by many trial courts
interpreting and applying it, the Court decided to invite two amici curiae, namely,
the Most Reverend Oscar V. Cruz,
9
Vicar Judicial (Presiding Judge) of the
National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines,
and Justice Ricardo C. Puno,
10
a member of the Family Code Revision
Committee. The Court takes this occasion to thank these friends of the Court for
their informative and interesting discussions during the oral argument on
December 3, 1996, which they followed up with written memoranda.
From their submissions and the Court's own deliberations, the following
guidelines in the interpretation and application of Art. 36 of the Family Code are
hereby handed down for the guidance of the bench and the bar:
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff.
Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the
marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both
our Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of marriage and unity of the
family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire Article on the Family,
11

recognizing it "as the foundation of the nation." It decrees marriage as legally
"inviolable," thereby protecting it from dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both
the family and marriage are to be "protected" by the state.
The Family Code
12
echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the family
and emphasizes the permanence, inviolability and solidarity
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or
clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts
and (d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires
that the incapacity must be psychological not physical. although its
manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince
the court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or physically ill to such an
extent that the person could not have known the obligations he was assuming, or
knowing them, could not have given valid assumption thereof. Although no
example of such incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the application
of the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis,
13
nevertheless such root
cause must be identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature
explained. Expert evidence may be given qualified psychiatrist and clinical
psychologists.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration"
of the marriage. The evidence must show that the illness was existing when the
parties exchanged their "I do's." The manifestation of the illness need not be
perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must have attached at such
moment, or prior thereto.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or
incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the
other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex.
Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of marriage
obligations, not necessarily to those not related to marriage, like the exercise of a
profession or employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may be effective in
diagnosing illnesses of children and prescribing medicine to cure them but may
not be psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear and raise his/her own
children as an essential obligation of marriage.
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to
assume the essential obligations of marriage. Thus, "mild characteriological
peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional outbursts" cannot be
accepted as root causes. The illness must be shown as downright incapacity or
inability, nor a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other words, there
is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral
element in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person from
really accepting and thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage.
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to
71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220,
221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their children. Such non-
complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by
evidence and included in the text of the decision.
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the
Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be
given great respect by our courts. It is clear that Article 36 was taken by the
Family Code Revision Committee from Canon 1095 of the New Code of Canon
Law, which became effective in 1983 and which provides:
The following are incapable of contracting marriage: Those who are
unable to assume the essential obligations of marriage due to
causes of psychological nature.
14

Since the purpose of including such provision in our Family Code is to harmonize
our civil laws with the religious faith of our people, it stands to reason that to
achieve such harmonization, great persuasive weight should be given to decision
of such appellate tribunal. Ideally subject to our law on evidence what is
decreed as canonically invalid should also be decreed civilly void.
This is one instance where, in view of the evident source and purpose of the
Family Code provision, contemporaneous religious interpretation is to be given
persuasive effect. Here, the State and the Church while remaining
independent, separate and apart from each other shall walk together in
synodal cadence towards the same goal of protecting and cherishing marriage
and the family as the inviolable base of the nation.
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor
General to appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall he handed down
unless the Solicitor General issues a certification, which will be quoted in the
decision, briefly staring therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as
the case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor General, along with the
prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such certification within fifteen (15)
days from the date the case is deemed submitted for resolution of the court. The
Solicitor General shall discharge the equivalent function of the defensor vinculi
contemplated under Canon 1095.
In the instant case and applying Leouel Santos, we have already ruled to grant
the petition. Such ruling becomes even more cogent with the use of the foregoing
guidelines.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision is REVERSED
and SET ASIDE. The marriage of Roridel Olaviano to Reynaldo Molina subsists
and remains valid.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Davide, Jr., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno Francisco, Hermosisima, Jr.,
and Torres, Jr., JJ., concur.
Regalado, Kapunan and Mendoza, JJ., concurs in the result.
Separate Opinions
PADILLA, J., concuring opinion:
I concur in the result of the decision penned by Mr. Justice Panganiban but only
because of the peculiar facts of the case. As to whether or not the psychological
incapacity exists in a given case calling for annulment of a marriage, depends
crucially, more than in any field of the law, on the facts of the case. In Leouel
Santos v. Court of Appeals and Julia Rosario-Bedia Santos, G.R. No. 112019, 4
January 1995, 240 SCRA 20-36, I maintained, and I still maintain, that there was
psychological incapacity on the part of the wife to discharge the duties of a wife
in a valid marriage. The facts of the present case, after an indepth study, do not
support a similar conclusion. Obviously, each case must be judged, not on the
basis of a priori assumptions, predilections or generalizations but according to its
own facts. In the field of psychological incapacity as a ground for annulment of
marriage, it is trite to say that no case is on "all fours" with another case. The trial
judge must take pains in examining the actual millieu and the appellate court
must, as much as possible, avoid substituting its own judgment for that of the trial
court.
ROMERO, J., separate opinion:
The majority opinion, overturning that of the Court of Appeals which affirmed the
Regional Trial Court ruling. upheld petitioner Solicitor General's position that
"opposing and conflicting personalities" is not equivalent to psychological
incapacity, for the latter "is not simply the neglect by the parties to the marriage
of their responsibilities and duties, but a defect in their Psychological nature
which renders them incapable of performing such marital responsibilities and
duties.
In the present case, the alleged personality traits of Reynaldo, the husband, did
not constitute so much "psychological incapacity" as a "difficulty," if not outright
"refusal" or "neglect" in the performance of some marital obligations. "It is not
enough to prove that the parties failed to meet their responsibilities and duties as
married persons; it is essential that they must be shown to be incapable of doing
so, due to some psychological (not physical) illness."
I would add that neither should the incapacity be the result of mental illness. For
if it were due to insanity or defects in the mental faculties short of insanity, there
is a resultant defect of vice of consent, thus rendering the marriage annulable
under Art. 45 of the Family Code.
That the intent of the members of the U.P. Law Center's Civil Code Revision
Committee was to exclude mental inability to understand the essential nature of
marriage and focus strictly on psychological incapacity is demonstrated in the
way the provision in question underwent revisions.
At the Committee meeting of July 26, 1986, the draft provision read:
(7) Those marriages contracted by any party who, at the time of the
celebration, was wanting in the sufficient use of reason or judgment
to understand the essential nature of marriage or was
psychologically or mentally incapacitated to discharge the essential
marital obligations, even if such lack of incapacity is made manifest
after the celebration.
The twists and turns which the ensuing discussion took finally produced the
following revised provision even before the session was over:
(7) That contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration,
was psychologically incapacitated to discharge the essential marital
obligations, even if such lack or incapacity becomes manifest after
the celebration.
Noticeably, the immediately preceding formulation above has dropped any
reference to "wanting in the sufficient use of reason or judgment to understand
the essential nature or marriage" and to "mentally incapacitated." It was
explained that these phrases refer to "defects in the mental faculties vitiating
consent, which is not the idea . . . but lack of appreciation of one's marital
obligation." There being a defect in consent, "it is clear that it should be a ground
for voidable marriage because there is the appearance of consent and it is
capable of convalidation for the simple reason that there are lucid intervals and
there are sanity is curable. . . . Psychological incapacity does not refer to mental
faculties and has nothing to do with consent; it refers to obligations attendant to
marriage."
1

My own position as a member of the Committee then was that psychological
incapacity is, in a sense, insanity of a lesser degree.
As to the proposal of Justice Caguioa to use the term "psychological or mental
impotence," Archbishop Oscar Cruz opined in he earlier February 9, 1984
session that this term "is an invention of some churchmen who are moralists but
not canonists, that is why it is considered a weak phrase." He said that the Code
of Canon Law would rather express it as "psychological or mental incapacity to
discharge. . . ." Justice Ricardo C. Puno opined that sometimes a person may be
psychologically impotent with one but not with another.
One of the guidelines enumerated in the majority opinion for the interpretation
and application of Art. 36 is: "Such incapacity must also be shown to be
medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be absolute
or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely
against everyone of the same sex."
The Committee, through Prof. Araceli T. Barrera, considered the inclusion of the
phrase" and is incurable" but Prof. Esteban B. Bautista commented that this
would give rise to the question of how they will determine curability and Justice
Caguioa agreed that it would be more problematic. Yet the possibility that one
may be cured after the psychological incapacity becomes manifest after the
marriage was not ruled out by Justice Puno and Justice Alice Sempio-Diy.
Justice Caguioa suggested that the remedy was to allow the afflicted spouse to
remarry.
For clarity, the Committee classified the bases for determining void marriages,
viz:
1. lack of one or more of the essential requisites of marriage as
contract;
2. reasons of public policy;
3. special cases and special situations.
The ground of psychological incapacity was subsumed under "special
cases and special situations," hence its special treatment in Art. 36 in the
Family Code as finally enacted.
Nowhere in the Civil Code provisions on Marriage is there a ground for avoiding
or annulling marriages that even comes close to being psychological in nature.
Where consent is vitiated due to circumstances existing at the time of the
marriage, such marriage which stands valid until annulled is capable of
ratification or convalidation.
On the other hand, for reasons of public policy or lack of essential requisites,
some marriages are void from the beginning.
With the revision of Book I of the Civil Code, particularly the provisions on
Marriage, the drafters, now open to fresh winds of change in keeping with the
more permissive mores and practices of the time, took a leaf from the relatively
liberal provisions of Canon Law.
Canon 1095 which states, inter alia, that the following persons are incapable of
contracting marriage: "3. (those) who, because of causes of a psychological
nature, are unable to assume the essential obligations of marriage" provided the
model for what is now Art. 36 of the Family Code: "A marriage contracted by any
party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to
comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void
even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.
It bears stressing that unlike in Civil Law, Canon Law recognizes only two types
of marriages with respect to their validity: valid and void. Civil Law, however,
recognizes an intermediate state, the voidable or annullable marriages. When the
Ecclesiastical Tribunal "annuls" a marriage, it actually declares the marriage null
and void, i.e., it never really existed in the first place, for a valid sacramental
marriage can never be dissolved. Hence, a properly performed and
consummated marriage between two living Roman Catholics can only be nullified
by the formal annulment process which entails a full tribunal procedure with a
Court selection and a formal hearing.
Such so-called church "annulments" are not recognized by Civil Law as severing
the marriage ties as to capacitate the parties to enter lawfully into another
marriage. The grounds for nullifying civil marriage, not being congruent with
those laid down by Canon Law, the former being more strict, quite a number of
married couples have found themselves in limbo freed from the marriage
bonds in the eyes of the Catholic Church but yet unable to contract a valid civil
marriage under state laws. Heedless of civil law sanctions, some persons
contract new marriages or enter into live-in relationships.
It was precisely to provide a satisfactory solution to such anomalous situations
that the Civil Law Revision Committee decided to engraft the Canon Law concept
of psychological incapacity into the Family Code and classified the same as a
ground for declaring marriages void ab initio or totally in existent from the
beginning.
A brief historical note on the Old Canon Law (1917). This Old Code, while it did
not provide directly for psychological incapacity, in effect recognized the same
indirectly from a combination of three old canons: "Canon #1081 required
persons to 'be capable according to law' in order to give valid consent; Canon
#1082 required that persons 'be at least not ignorant' of the major elements
required in marriage; and Canon #1087 (the force and fear category) required
that internal and external freedom be present in order for consent to be valid.
This line of interpretation produced two distinct but related grounds for
annulment, called 'lack of due discretion' and 'lack of due competence.' Lack of
due discretion means that the person did not have the ability to give valid
consent at the time of the wedding and therefore the union is invalid. Lack of due
competence means that the person was incapable of carrying out the obligations
of the promise he or she made during the wedding ceremony.
"Favorable annulment decisions by the Roman Rota in the 1950s and 1960s
involving sexual disorders such as homosexuality and nymphomania laid the
foundation for a broader approach to the kind of proof necessary for
psychological grounds for annulment. The Rota had reasoned for the first time in
several cases that the capacity to give valid consent at the time of marriage was
probably not present in persons who had displayed such problems shortly after
the marriage. The nature of this change was nothing short of revolutionary. Once
the Rota itself had demonstrated a cautious willingness to use this kind of
hindsight, the way was paved for what came after 1970. Diocesan Tribunals
began to accept proof of serious psychological problems that manifested
themselves shortly after the ceremony as proof of an inability to give valid
consent at the time of the ceremony.
Furthermore, and equally significant, the professional opinion of a psychological
expert became increasingly important in such cases. Data about the person's
entire life, both before and after the ceremony, were presented to these experts
and they were asked to give professional opinions about a party's mental at the
time of the wedding. These opinions were rarely challenged and tended to be
accepted as decisive evidence of lack of valid consent.
The Church took pains to point out that its new openness in this area did not
amount to the addition of new grounds for annulment, but rather was an
accommodation by the Church to the advances made in psychology during the
past decades. There was now the expertise to provide the all-important
connecting link between a marriage breakdown and premarital causes.
During the 1970s, the Church broadened its whole idea of marriage from that of a
legal contract to that of a covenant. The result of this was that it could no longer
be assumed in annulment cases that a person who could intellectually
understand the concept of marriage could necessarily give valid consent to
marry. The ability to both grasp and assume the real obligations of a mature,
lifelong commitment are now considered a necessary prerequisite to valid
matrimonial consent.
2

Rotal decisions continued applying the concept of incipient psychological
incapacity, "not only to sexual anomalies but to all kinds of personality disorders
that incapacitate a spouse or both spouses from assuming or carrying out the
essential obligations of marriage. For marriage . . . is not merely cohabitation or
the right of the spouses to each others' body for heterosexual acts, but is, in its
totality, the right to the community of the whole of life, i.e., the right to a
developing. lifelong relationship. Rotal decisions since 1973 have refined the
meaning of psychological or psychic capacity for marriage as presupposing the
development of an adult personality; as meaning the capacity of the spouses to
give themselves to each other and to accept the other as a distinct person; that
the spouses must be 'other oriented' since the obligations of marriage are rooted
in a self-giving love; and that the spouses must have the capacity for
interpersonal relationship because marriage is more than just a physical reality
but involves a true intertwining of personalities. The fulfillment of the obligations
of marriage depends. according to Church decisions, on the strength of this
interpersonal relationship. A serious incapacity for interpersonal sharing and
support is held to impair the relationship and consequently, the ability to fulfill the
essential marital obligations. The marital capacity of one spouse is not
considered in isolation but in reference to the fundamental relationship to the
other spouse.
3

Fr. Green, in an article in Catholic Mind, lists six elements necessary to the
mature marital relationship:
The courts consider the following elements crucial to the marital
commitment: (1) a permanent and faithful commitment to the marriage
partner; (2) openness to children and partner; (3) stability; (4) emotional
maturity; (5) financial responsibility; (6) an ability to cope with the ordinary
stresses and strains of marriage, etc.
Fr. Green goes on to speak about some of the psychological conditions
that might lead to the failure of a marriage:
At stake is a type of constitutional impairment precluding conjugal
communion even with the best intentions of the parties. Among the psychic
factors possibly giving rise to his or her inability to fulfill marital obligations
are the following: (1) antisocial personality with its fundamental lack of
loyalty to persons or sense of moral values; (2) hyperesthesia, where the
individual has no real freedom of sexual choice; (3) the inadequate
personality where personal responses consistently fallshort of reasonable
expectations.
xxx xxx xxx
The psychological grounds are the best approach for anyone who doubts
whether he or she has a case for an annulment on any other terms. A
situation that does not fit into any of the more traditional categories often
fits very easily into the psychological category.
As new as the psychological grounds are, experts are already detecting a
shift in their use. Whereas originally the emphasis was on the parties'
inability to exercise proper judgment at the time of the marriage (lack of
due discretion), recent cases seem to be concentrating on the parties' to
assume or carry out their responsibilities an obligations as promised (lack
of due competence). An advantage to using the ground of lack of due
competence is that the at the time the marriage was entered into civil
divorce and breakup of the family almost is of someone's failure out marital
responsibilities as promised at the time the marriage was entered into.
4

In the instant case, "opposing and conflicting personalities" of the spouses were
not considered equivalent to psychological incapacity. As well in Santos v. Court
of Appeals cited in the ponencia, the Court held that the failure of the wife to
return home from the U.S. or to communicate with her husband for more then
five years is not proof of her psychological incapacity as to render the marriage a
nullity.
5
Therefore, Art. 36 is inapplicable and the marriages remain valid and
subsisting.
However in the recent case of Chi Ming Tsoi v. Court of Appeals,
6
this Court
upheld both the Regional Trial Court and the Court of Appeals in declaring the
presence of psychological incapacity on the part of the husband. Said petitioner
husband, after ten (10) months' sleeping with his wife never had coitus with her,
a fact he did not deny but he alleged that it was due to the physical disorder of
his wife which, however, he failed to prove. Goaded by the indifference and
stubborn refusal of her husband to fulfill a basic marital obligation described as
"to procreate children based on the universal principle that procreation of children
through sexual cooperation is the basic end of marriage," the wife brought the
action in the lower court to declare the marriage null.
The Court, quoting Dr. Gerardo Veloso, a former Presiding Judge of the
Metropolitan Marriage Tribunal of the Catholic Archdiocese of Manila (Branch I)
on Psychological incapacity concluded:
If a spouse, although physically capable but simply refuses to perform his
or her essential marriage obligations, and the refusal is senseless and
constant, Catholic marriage tribunals attribute the causes to psychological
incapacity than to stubborn refusal. Senseless and protracted refusal is
equivalent to psychological incapacity. Thus, the prolonged refusal of a
spouse to have sexual intercourse with his or her spouse is considered a
sign of psychological incapacity.
We declared:
This Court, finding the gravity of the failed relationship in which the parties found
themselves trapped in its mire of unfulfilled vows and unconsummated marital
obligations, can do no less but sustain the studied judgment of respondent
appellate court.
1 concur with the majority opinion that the herein marriage remains valid and
subsisting absent psychological incapacity (under Art. 36 of the Family Code) on
the part of either or both of the spouses.

VITUG, J., concurring:
I fully concur with my esteemed 'colleague Mr. Justice Artemio V. Panganiban in
his ponencia, and I find to be most helpful the guidelines that he prepared for the
bench and the bar in the proper appreciation of Article 36 of Executive Order No.
209 ("The Family Code of the Philippines"). The term "psychological incapacity"
was neither defined nor exemplified by the Family Code. Thus
Art. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the
celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential
marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such
incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.
The Revision Committee, constituted under the auspices of the U.P. Law
Center, which drafted the Code explained:
(T)he Committee would like the judge to interpret the provision on a case-
to-case basis, guided by experience, the findings of experts and
researchers in psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church
tribunals which, although not binding on the civil courts, may be given
persuasive effect since the provision was taken from Canon Law.
1

Article 36 of the Family Code was concededly taken from Canon 1095 of the
New Code of Canon Law
Canon 1095. (The following persons) are incapable of contracting
marriage; (those)
1. who lack sufficient use of reason;
2. who suffer from a grave defect of discretion of judgment concerning
essential matrimonial rights and duties, to be given and accepted mutually;
3. who for causes of psychological nature are unable to assume the
essential obligations of marriage that should give that much value to
Canon Law jurisprudence as an aid to the interpretation and construction
of the statutory enactment.
2

The principles in the proper application of the law teach us that the several
provisions of a Code must be read like a congruent whole. Thus, in determining
the import of "psychological incapacity" under Article 36, one must also read it
along with, albeit to be taken as distinct from, the other grounds enumerated in
the Code, like Articles 35, 37, 38 and 41 that would likewise, but for distinct
reasons, render the marriage merely voidable, or Article 55 that could justify a
petition for legal separation. Care must be observed so that these various
circumstances are not applied so indiscriminately as if the law were indifferent on
the matter.
I would wish to reiterate the Court's' statement in Santos vs. Court of Appeals;
3

viz:
(T)he use of the phrase "psychological incapacity" under Article 36 of the
Code has not been meant to comprehend all such possible cases of
psychoses as, likewise mentioned by some ecclesiastical authorities,
extremely low intelligence, immaturity, and like circumstances. . . Article 36
of the Family Code cannot be taken and construed independently of, but
must stand in conjunction with, existing precepts in our law on marriage.
Thus correlated, "psychological incapacity" should refer to no less than a
mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive
of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and
discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as so expressed by
Article 68 of the Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live
together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and support.
There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to
confine the meaning of "psychological incapacity" to the most serious
cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity
or inability of the spouse to have sexual relations with the other. This
conclusion is implicit under Article 54 of the Family Code which considers
children conceived prior to the judicial declaration of nullity of the void
marriage to be "legitimate."
The other forms of psychoses, if existing at the inception of marriage, like
the state of a party being of unsound mind or concealment of drug
addiction, habitual alcoholism, homosexuality or lesbianism, merely
renders the marriage contract voidable pursuant to Article 46, Family
Code. If drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, lesbianism or homosexuality
should occur only during the marriage, they become mere grounds for
legal separation under Article 55 of the Family Code. These provisions of
the Code, however, do not necessarily preclude the possibility of these
various circumstances being themselves, depending on the degree and
severity of the disorder, indicia of psychological
incapacity.
4

In fine, the term "psychological incapacity," to be a ground for then nullity of
marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code, must be able to pass the following
tests; viz:
First, the incapacity must be psychological or mental, not physical, in nature;
Second, the psychological incapacity must relate to the inability, not mere
refusal, to understand, assume end discharge the basic marital obligations of
living together, observing love, respect and fidelity and rendering mutual help and
support;
Third, the psychologic condition must exist at the time the marriage is contracted
although its overt manifestations and the marriage may occur only thereafter; and
Fourth, the mental disorder must be grave or serious and incurable.
It may well be that the Family Code Revision Committee has envisioned Article
36, as not a few observers would suspect, as another form of absolute divorce
or, as still others would also put it, to be a alternative to divorce; however, the
fact still remains that the language of the law has failed to carry out, even if true,
any such intendment. It might have indeed turned out for the better, if it were
otherwise, there could be good reasons to doubt the constitutionality of the
measure. The fundamental law itself, no less, has laid down in terse language its
unequivocal command on how the State should regard marriage and the family,
thus
Section 2, Article XV:
Sec. 2. Marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the
family and shall be protected by the State.
Section 12, Article II:
Sec. 12. The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall protect
and strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social institution . . . .
Section 1, Article XV:
Sec. 1. The State recognizes the Filipino family as the foundation of the
nation. Accordingly, it shall strengthen its solidarity and actively promote its
total development. (The 1987 Constitution)
The case of Marcelino vs. Cruz, 121 SCRA 51, might here be significant not so
much for the specific issue there resolved but for the tone it has set. The Court
there has held that constitutional provisions are to be considered mandatory
unless by necessary implication, a different intention is manifest such that to
have them enforced strictly would cause more harm than by disregarding them. It
is quite clear to me that the constitutional mandate on marriage and the family
has not been meant to be simply directory in character, nor for mere expediency
or convenience, but one that demands a meaningful, not half-hearted, respect.

Separate Opinions
PADILLA, J., concuring opinion:
I concur in the result of the decision penned by Mr. Justice Panganiban but only
because of the peculiar facts of the case. As to whether or not the psychological
incapacity exists in a given case calling for annulment of a marriage, depends
crucially, more than in any field of the law, on the facts of the case. In Leouel
Santos v. Court of Appeals and Julia Rosario-Bedia Santos, G.R. No. 112019, 4
January 1995, 240 SCRA 20-36, I maintained, and I still maintain, that there was
psychological incapacity on the part of the wife to discharge the duties of a wife
in a valid marriage. The facts of the present case, after an indepth study, do not
support a similar conclusion. Obviously, each case must be judged, not on the
basis of a priori assumptions, predilections or generalizations but according to its
own facts. In the field of psychological incapacity as a ground for annulment of
marriage, it is trite to say that no case is on "all fours" with another case. The trial
judge must take pains in examining the actual millieu and the appellate court
must, as much as possible, avoid substituting its own judgment for that of the trial
court.
ROMERO, J., separate opinion:
The majority opinion, overturning that of the Court of Appeals which affirmed the
Regional Trial Court ruling. upheld petitioner Solicitor General's position that
"opposing and conflicting personalities" is not equivalent to psychological
incapacity, for the latter "is not simply the neglect by the parties to the marriage
of their responsibilities and duties, but a defect in their Psychological nature
which renders them incapable of performing such marital responsibilities and
duties.
In the present case, the alleged personality traits of Reynaldo, the husband, did
not constitute so much "psychological incapacity" as a "difficulty," if not outright
"refusal" or "neglect" in the performance of some marital obligations. "It is not
enough to prove that the parties failed to meet their responsibilities and duties as
married persons; it is essential that they must be shown to be incapable of doing
so, due to some psychological (not physical) illness."
I would add that neither should the incapacity be the result of mental illness. For
if it were due to insanity or defects in the mental faculties short of insanity, there
is a resultant defect of vice of consent, thus rendering the marriage annulable
under Art. 45 of the Family Code.
That the intent of the members of the U.P. Law Center's Civil Code Revision
Committee was to exclude mental inability to understand the essential nature of
marriage and focus strictly on psychological incapacity is demonstrated in the
way the provision in question underwent revisions.
At the Committee meeting of July 26, 1986, the draft provision read:
(7) Those marriages contracted by any party who, at the time of the
celebration, was wanting in the sufficient use of reason or judgment
to understand the essential nature of marriage or was
psychologically or mentally incapacitated to discharge the essential
marital obligations, even if such lack of incapacity is made manifest
after the celebration.
The twists and turns which the ensuing discussion took finally produced the
following revised provision even before the session was over:
(7) That contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration,
was psychologically incapacitated to discharge the essential marital
obligations, even if such lack or incapacity becomes manifest after
the celebration.
Noticeably, the immediately preceding formulation above has dropped any
reference to "wanting in the sufficient use of reason or judgment to understand
the essential nature or marriage" and to "mentally incapacitated." It was
explained that these phrases refer to "defects in the mental faculties vitiating
consent, which is not the idea . . . but lack of appreciation of one's marital
obligation." There being a defect in consent, "it is clear that it should be a ground
for voidable marriage because there is the appearance of consent and it is
capable of convalidation for the simple reason that there are lucid intervals and
there are sanity is curable. . . . Psychological incapacity does not refer to mental
faculties and has nothing to do with consent; it refers to obligations attendant to
marriage."
1

My own position as a member of the Committee then was that psychological
incapacity is, in a sense, insanity of a lesser degree.
As to the proposal of Justice Caguioa to use the term "psychological or mental
impotence," Archbishop Oscar Cruz opined in he earlier February 9, 1984
session that this term "is an invention of some churchmen who are moralists but
not canonists, that is why it is considered a weak phrase." He said that the Code
of Canon Law would rather express it as "psychological or mental incapacity to
discharge. . . ." Justice Ricardo C. Puno opined that sometimes a person may be
psychologically impotent with one but not with another.
One of the guidelines enumerated in the majority opinion for the interpretation
and application of Art. 36 is: "Such incapacity must also be shown to be
medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be absolute
or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely
against everyone of the same sex."
The Committee, through Prof. Araceli T. Barrera, considered the inclusion of the
phrase" and is incurable" but Prof. Esteban B. Bautista commented that this
would give rise to the question of how they will determine curability and Justice
Caguioa agreed that it would be more problematic. Yet the possibility that one
may be cured after the psychological incapacity becomes manifest after the
marriage was not ruled out by Justice Puno and Justice Alice Sempio-Diy.
Justice Caguioa suggested that the remedy was to allow the afflicted spouse to
remarry.
For clarity, the Committee classified the bases for determining void marriages,
viz:
1. lack of one or more of the essential requisites of marriage as
contract;
2. reasons of public policy;
3. special cases and special situations.
The ground of psychological incapacity was subsumed under "special
cases and special situations," hence its special treatment in Art. 36 in the
Family Code as finally enacted.
Nowhere in the Civil Code provisions on Marriage is there a ground for avoiding
or annulling marriages that even comes close to being psychological in nature.
Where consent is vitiated due to circumstances existing at the time of the
marriage, such marriage which stands valid until annulled is capable of
ratification or convalidation.
On the other hand, for reasons of public policy or lack of essential requisites,
some marriages are void from the beginning.
With the revision of Book I of the Civil Code, particularly the provisions on
Marriage, the drafters, now open to fresh winds of change in keeping with the
more permissive mores and practices of the time, took a leaf from the relatively
liberal provisions of Canon Law.
Canon 1095 which states, inter alia, that the following persons are incapable of
contracting marriage: "3. (those) who, because of causes of a psychological
nature, are unable to assume the essential obligations of marriage" provided the
model for what is now Art. 36 of the Family Code: "A marriage contracted by any
party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to
comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void
even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.
It bears stressing that unlike in Civil Law, Canon Law recognizes only two types
of marriages with respect to their validity: valid and void. Civil Law, however,
recognizes an intermediate state, the voidable or annullable marriages. When the
Ecclesiastical Tribunal "annuls" a marriage, it actually declares the marriage null
and void, i.e., it never really existed in the first place, for a valid sacramental
marriage can never be dissolved. Hence, a properly performed and
consummated marriage between two living Roman Catholics can only be nullified
by the formal annulment process which entails a full tribunal procedure with a
Court selection and a formal hearing.
Such so-called church "annulments" are not recognized by Civil Law as severing
the marriage ties as to capacitate the parties to enter lawfully into another
marriage. The grounds for nullifying civil marriage, not being congruent with
those laid down by Canon Law, the former being more strict, quite a number of
married couples have found themselves in limbo freed from the marriage
bonds in the eyes of the Catholic Church but yet unable to contract a valid civil
marriage under state laws. Heedless of civil law sanctions, some persons
contract new marriages or enter into live-in relationships.
It was precisely to provide a satisfactory solution to such anomalous situations
that the Civil Law Revision Committee decided to engraft the Canon Law concept
of psychological incapacity into the Family Code and classified the same as a
ground for declaring marriages void ab initio or totally in existent from the
beginning.
A brief historical note on the Old Canon Law (1917). This Old Code, while it did
not provide directly for psychological incapacity, in effect recognized the same
indirectly from a combination of three old canons: "Canon #1081 required
persons to 'be capable according to law' in order to give valid consent; Canon
#1082 required that persons 'be at least not ignorant' of the major elements
required in marriage; and Canon #1087 (the force and fear category) required
that internal and external freedom be present in order for consent to be valid.
This line of interpretation produced two distinct but related grounds for
annulment, called 'lack of due discretion' and 'lack of due competence.' Lack of
due discretion means that the person did not have the ability to give valid
consent at the time of the wedding and therefore the union is invalid. Lack of due
competence means that the person was incapable of carrying out the obligations
of the promise he or she made during the wedding ceremony.
"Favorable annulment decisions by the Roman Rota in the 1950s and 1960s
involving sexual disorders such as homosexuality and nymphomania laid the
foundation for a broader approach to the kind of proof necessary for
psychological grounds for annulment. The Rota had reasoned for the first time in
several cases that the capacity to give valid consent at the time of marriage was
probably not present in persons who had displayed such problems shortly after
the marriage. The nature of this change was nothing short of revolutionary. Once
the Rota itself had demonstrated a cautious willingness to use this kind of
hindsight, the way was paved for what came after 1970. Diocesan Tribunals
began to accept proof of serious psychological problems that manifested
themselves shortly after the ceremony as proof of an inability to give valid
consent at the time of the ceremony.
Furthermore, and equally significant, the professional opinion of a psychological
expert became increasingly important in such cases. Data about the person's
entire life, both before and after the ceremony, were presented to these experts
and they were asked to give professional opinions about a party's mental at the
time of the wedding. These opinions were rarely challenged and tended to be
accepted as decisive evidence of lack of valid consent.
The Church took pains to point out that its new openness in this area did not
amount to the addition of new grounds for annulment, but rather was an
accommodation by the Church to the advances made in psychology during the
past decades. There was now the expertise to provide the all-important
connecting link between a marriage breakdown and premarital causes.
During the 1970s, the Church broadened its whole idea of marriage from that of a
legal contract to that of a covenant. The result of this was that it could no longer
be assumed in annulment cases that a person who could intellectually
understand the concept of marriage could necessarily give valid consent to
marry. The ability to both grasp and assume the real obligations of a mature,
lifelong commitment are now considered a necessary prerequisite to valid
matrimonial consent.
2

Rotal decisions continued applying the concept of incipient psychological
incapacity, "not only to sexual anomalies but to all kinds of personality disorders
that incapacitate a spouse or both spouses from assuming or carrying out the
essential obligations of marriage. For marriage . . . is not merely cohabitation or
the right of the spouses to each others' body for heterosexual acts, but is, in its
totality, the right to the community of the whole of life, i.e., the right to a
developing. lifelong relationship. Rotal decisions since 1973 have refined the
meaning of psychological or psychic capacity for marriage as presupposing the
development of an adult personality; as meaning the capacity of the spouses to
give themselves to each other and to accept the other as a distinct person; that
the spouses must be 'other oriented' since the obligations of marriage are rooted
in a self-giving love; and that the spouses must have the capacity for
interpersonal relationship because marriage is more than just a physical reality
but involves a true intertwining of personalities. The fulfillment of the obligations
of marriage depends. according to Church decisions, on the strength of this
interpersonal relationship. A serious incapacity for interpersonal sharing and
support is held to impair the relationship and consequently, the ability to fulfill the
essential marital obligations. The marital capacity of one spouse is not
considered in isolation but in reference to the fundamental relationship to the
other spouse.
3

Fr. Green, in an article in Catholic Mind, lists six elements necessary to the
mature marital relationship:
The courts consider the following elements crucial to the marital
commitment: (1) a permanent and faithful commitment to the
marriage partner; (2) openness to children and partner; (3) stability;
(4) emotional maturity; (5) financial responsibility; (6) an ability to
cope with the ordinary stresses and strains of marriage, etc.
Fr. Green goes on to speak about some of the psychological
conditions that might lead to the failure of a marriage:
At stake is a type of constitutional impairment precluding conjugal
communion even with the best intentions of the parties. Among the
psychic factors possibly giving rise to his or her inability to fulfill
marital obligations are the following: (1) antisocial personality with its
fundamental lack of loyalty to persons or sense of moral values; (2)
hyperesthesia, where the individual has no real freedom of sexual
choice; (3) the inadequate personality where personal responses
consistently fallshort of reasonable expectations.
xxx xxx xxx
The psychological grounds are the best approach for anyone who
doubts whether he or she has a case for an annulment on any other
terms. A situation that does not fit into any of the more traditional
categories often fits very easily into the psychological category.
As new as the psychological grounds are, experts are already
detecting a shift in their use. Whereas originally the emphasis was
on the parties' inability to exercise proper judgment at the time of the
marriage (lack of due discretion), recent cases seem to be
concentrating on the parties' to assume or carry out their
responsibilities an obligations as promised (lack of due
competence). An advantage to using the ground of lack of due
competence is that the at the time the marriage was entered into civil
divorce and breakup of the family almost is of someone's failure out
marital responsibilities as promised at the time the marriage was
entered into.
4

In the instant case, "opposing and conflicting personalities" of the spouses were
not considered equivalent to psychological incapacity. As well in Santos v. Court
of Appeals cited in the ponencia, the Court held that the failure of the wife to
return home from the U.S. or to communicate with her husband for more then
five years is not proof of her psychological incapacity as to render the marriage a
nullity.
5
Therefore, Art. 36 is inapplicable and the marriages remain valid and
subsisting.
However in the recent case of Chi Ming Tsoi v. Court of Appeals,
6
this Court
upheld both the Regional Trial Court and the Court of Appeals in declaring the
presence of psychological incapacity on the part of the husband. Said petitioner
husband, after ten (10) months' sleeping with his wife never had coitus with her,
a fact he did not deny but he alleged that it was due to the physical disorder of
his wife which, however, he failed to prove. Goaded by the indifference and
stubborn refusal of her husband to fulfill a basic marital obligation described as
"to procreate children based on the universal principle that procreation of children
through sexual cooperation is the basic end of marriage," the wife brought the
action in the lower court to declare the marriage null.
The Court, quoting Dr. Gerardo Veloso, a former Presiding Judge of the
Metropolitan Marriage Tribunal of the Catholic Archdiocese of Manila (Branch I)
on Psychological incapacity concluded:
If a spouse, although physically capable but simply refuses to
perform his or her essential marriage obligations, and the refusal is
senseless and constant, Catholic marriage tribunals attribute the
causes to psychological incapacity than to stubborn refusal.
Senseless and protracted refusal is equivalent to psychological
incapacity. Thus, the prolonged refusal of a spouse to have sexual
intercourse with his or her spouse is considered a sign of
psychological incapacity.
We declared:
This Court, finding the gravity of the failed relationship in which the parties found
themselves trapped in its mire of unfulfilled vows and unconsummated marital
obligations, can do no less but sustain the studied judgment of respondent
appellate court.
1 concur with the majority opinion that the herein marriage remains valid and
subsisting absent psychological incapacity (under Art. 36 of the Family Code) on
the part of either or both of the spouses.

VITUG, J., concurring:
I fully concur with my esteemed 'colleague Mr. Justice Artemio V. Panganiban in
his ponencia, and I find to be most helpful the guidelines that he prepared for the
bench and the bar in the proper appreciation of Article 36 of Executive Order No.
209 ("The Family Code of the Philippines"). The term "psychological incapacity"
was neither defined nor exemplified by the Family Code. Thus
Art. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the
celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the
essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even
if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.
The Revision Committee, constituted under the auspices of the U.P. Law
Center, which drafted the Code explained:
(T)he Committee would like the judge to interpret the provision on a
case-to-case basis, guided by experience, the findings of experts
and researchers in psychological disciplines, and by decisions of
church tribunals which, although not binding on the civil courts, may
be given persuasive effect since the provision was taken from Canon
Law.
1

Article 36 of the Family Code was concededly taken from Canon 1095 of the
New Code of Canon Law
Canon 1095. (The following persons) are incapable of contracting
marriage; (those)
1. who lack sufficient use of reason;
2. who suffer from a grave defect of discretion of judgment
concerning essential matrimonial rights and duties, to be given and
accepted mutually;
3. who for causes of psychological nature are unable to assume the
essential obligations of marriage
that should give that much value to Canon Law jurisprudence as an aid to
the interpretation and construction of the statutory enactment.
2

The principles in the proper application of the law teach us that the several
provisions of a Code must be read like a congruent whole. Thus, in determining
the import of "psychological incapacity" under Article 36, one must also read it
along with, albeit to be taken as distinct from, the other grounds enumerated in
the Code, like Articles 35, 37, 38 and 41 that would likewise, but for distinct
reasons, render the marriage merely voidable, or Article 55 that could justify a
petition for legal separation. Care must be observed so that these various
circumstances are not applied so indiscriminately as if the law were indifferent on
the matter.
I would wish to reiterate the Court's' statement in Santos vs. Court of Appeals;
3

viz:
(T)he use of the phrase "psychological incapacity" under Article 36 of the
Code has not been meant to comprehend all such possible cases of
psychoses as, likewise mentioned by some ecclesiastical authorities,
extremely low intelligence, immaturity, and like circumstances. . . Article 36
of the Family Code cannot be taken and construed independently of, but
must stand in conjunction with, existing precepts in our law on marriage.
Thus correlated, "psychological incapacity" should refer to no less than a
mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive
of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and
discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as so expressed by
Article 68 of the Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live
together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and support.
There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to
confine the meaning of "psychological incapacity" to the most serious
cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity
or inability of the spouse to have sexual relations with the other. This
conclusion is implicit under Article 54 of the Family Code which considers
children conceived prior to the judicial declaration of nullity of the void
marriage to be "legitimate."
The other forms of psychoses, if existing at the inception of marriage, like
the state of a party being of unsound mind or concealment of drug
addiction, habitual alcoholism, homosexuality or lesbianism, merely
renders the marriage contract voidable pursuant to Article 46, Family
Code. If drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, lesbianism or homosexuality
should occur only during the marriage, they become mere grounds for
legal separation under Article 55 of the Family Code. These provisions of
the Code, however, do not necessarily preclude the possibility of these
various circumstances being themselves, depending on the degree and
severity of the disorder, indicia of psychological
incapacity.
4

In fine, the term "psychological incapacity," to be a ground for then nullity of
marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code, must be able to pass the following
tests; viz:
First, the incapacity must be psychological or mental, not physical, in nature;
Second, the psychological incapacity must relate to the inability, not mere
refusal, to understand, assume end discharge the basic marital obligations of
living together, observing love, respect and fidelity and rendering mutual help and
support;
Third, the psychologic condition must exist at the time the marriage is contracted
although its overt manifestations and the marriage may occur only thereafter; and
Fourth, the mental disorder must be grave or serious and incurable.
It may well be that the Family Code Revision Committee has envisioned Article
36, as not a few observers would suspect, as another form of absolute divorce
or, as still others would also put it, to be a alternative to divorce; however, the
fact still remains that the language of the law has failed to carry out, even if true,
any such intendment. It might have indeed turned out for the better, if it were
otherwise, there could be good reasons to doubt the constitutionality of the
measure. The fundamental law itself, no less, has laid down in terse language its
unequivocal command on how the State should regard marriage and the family,
thus
Section 2, Article XV:
Sec. 2. Marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the
family and shall be protected by the State.
Section 12, Article II:
Sec. 12. The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall protect
and strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social institution . . . .
Section 1, Article XV:
Sec. 1. The State recognizes the Filipino family as the foundation of the
nation. Accordingly, it shall strengthen its solidarity and actively promote its
total development. (The 1987 Constitution)
The case of Marcelino vs. Cruz, 121 SCRA 51, might here be significant not so
much for the specific issue there resolved but for the tone it has set. The Court
there has held that constitutional provisions are to be considered mandatory
unless by necessary implication, a different intention is manifest such that to
have them enforced strictly would cause more harm than by disregarding them. It
is quite clear to me that the constitutional mandate on marriage and the family
has not been meant to be simply directory in character, nor for mere expediency
or convenience, but one that demands a meaningful, not half-hearted, respect.