GOLDMAN vs WEINBERGER (54 LW 4298, March 25 1986)

FACTS : Goldman was an officer in the U.S. Air Force and served
as a clinical psychologist at a base's mental health clinic. He was
an Orthodox Jew and ordained rabbi. Military regulations
prohibited him from wearing his yarmulke indoors because
headgear could not be worn inside "except by armed security
police in the performance of their duties." While outdoors,
Goldman wore his yarmulke underneath his service cap, but was
warned that he would face disciplinary action if he was caught
wearing his yarmulke inside.
ISSUE : wether or not the Air Force Regulation violate the Free
Exercise Clause of the First Amendment?
HELD : The Court held that the Air Force regulation did not
violate the Constitution. Justice Rehnquist argued that, generally,
First Amendment challenges to military regulations are examined
with less scrutiny than similar challenges from civilian society,
given the need for the military to "foster instinctive obedience,
unity, commitment, and esprit de corps." Since allowing overt
religious apparel "would detract from the uniformity sought by
dress regulations," the Air Force regulation was necessary and
legitimate. In 1987, Congress passed legislation which reversed
this decision and allowed members of the armed forces to wear
religious apparel in a "neat and conservative" manner.




LEE vs WEISMAN (505 US 577 June 24 1992)
Facts: Rhode Island public schools frequently invited local clergy
members to participate in graduation ceremonies at the middle
and high school level. These clergy were provided with guidelines
for non-denominational and non-sectarian prayers for invocations
and benedictions. The father of a student at Nathan Bishop
Middle School sued, claiming that inviting a rabbi to lead prayers
at the middle school graduation was a violation of the
Establishment Clause.
Issue: Whether or not in including clerical members who offer
prayers as part of the official school graduation ceremony is
consistent with the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment
HELD : The Court found that the Establishment Clause forbids
government from coercing people into participating in a religious
activity. Forcing students to choose between attending a
graduation ceremony containing religious elements with which
they disagree or avoiding the offending practices by not attending
their graduation ceremony was inherently coercive and unlawful.
The Court found that students who do attend are exposed to
subtle coercion to appear as though they approve of or are
participating in the prayer.
The principle that government may accommodate the free
exercise of religion does not supersede the fundamental
limitations imposed by the Establishment Clause. It is beyond
dispute that, at a minimum, the Constitution guarantees that
government may not coerce anyone to support or participate in
religion or its exercise, or otherwise act in a way which
'establishes a [state] religion or religious faith, or tends to do so.

CHURCH OF LUKUMI BABALU AYE, INC vs CITY of HIALEAH
(508 US 520, JUNE 11 1993)

FACTS : Santeria is a religion that fused African religion with
Roman Catholicism. It called for animal sacrifices to keep the
orishas (spirits) alive. In response to the news that a Santeria
church was to be built in the city of Hialeah, the city council held
an emergency public session in order to pass three laws
outlawing any animal sacrifices in connection with Santeria rituals.
All ordinances were passed by a unanimous vote. Violations were
punishable by fines not exceeding $500.00 or imprisonment no
longer than sixty days, or both.

ISSUE : Whether or not the city ordinances violate the Free
Exercise Clause of the Constitution.

HELD : Under the Free Exercise Clause, a law that burdens
religious practice need not be justified by a compelling
governmental interest if it is neutral and of general applicability.
However, where such a law is not neutral or not of general
application, it must undergo the most rigorous of scrutiny: it must
be justified by a compelling governmental interest, and must be
narrowly tailored to advance that interest
The ordinances cannot withstand the strict scrutiny that is
required. They are not narrowly tailored to accomplish the
asserted governmental interests. All four are overbroad or
underinclusive in substantial respects because the proffered
objectives are not pursued with respect to analogous nonreligious
conduct, and those interests could be achieved by narrower
ordinances that burdened religion to a far lesser degree.
Moreover, where, as here, government restricts only conduct
protected by the First Amendment and fails to enact feasible
measures to restrict other conduct producing substantial harm or
alleged harm of the same sort, the governmental interests given
in justification of the restriction cannot be regarded as compelling.
LAMBS CHAPEL vs CENTER MORICHES SCHOOL DISTRICT
(508 US 384, JUNE 7 1993)

FACTS ; A New York law authorized schools to regulate the after-
hour use of school property and facilities. The Center Moriches
School District, acting under the statute, prohibited the use of its
property by any religious group. The District refused repeated
requests by Lamb's Chapel to use the school's facilities for an
after-hours religious-oriented film series on family values and
child rearing. The Chapel brought suit against the School District
in federal court.

ISSUE ; Wether or not the District violate the First Amendment's
freedom of speech when it denied Lamb's Chapel the use of
school premises to show religious-oriented films.

HELD : Yes, by a unaminous vote. The Supreme Court's holding
consisted of two parts. First, the District violated freedom of
speech by refusing the Chapel's request to show movies on
school premises solely because such movies were religiously
oriented. While non-public schools are permitted under New York
law to restrict access to their premises based on subject matter or
speaker identity, such restrictions must be reasonable and
"viewpoint neutral." In this case, the District's restriction was
neither reasonable nor viewpoint neutral, since it allowed the
presentation of all other views about family values and child
rearing - except those which were presented from a religious
perspective. Second, a grant of permission to the Chapel to use
the District's premises would not have amounted to an
establishment of religion. This is because the showing of the films
would neither be school-sponsored during school hours nor
closed to the public.

ESTRADA VS ESCRITOR ( 49 SCRA 1, AUGUST 4 2003)
FACTS: Soledad S. Escritor, a court interpreter, admittedly while
still married to another, cohabited to Luciano Quilapio, Jr. since
1980, who was himself married to another. Escritor and Quilapio
had a nineteen-year old son. Alejandro Estrada, the private
complainant herein, was not personally related to Escritor nor did
he personally know her. However, he wanted the Court to declare
the relationship of Escritor with Quilapio as immoral in
consonance with the pertinent provision of the Administrative
Code. In her defense, Escritor contended that under the rules of
the Jehovah's Witnesses, a religious sect of whom she is a
member, the act of signing a Declaration Pledging Faithfulness, is
sufficient to legitimize a union which would otherwise be classified
as adulterous and bigamous. Escritor and Quilapio's declarations
are recorded in the Watch Tower Central office. They were
executed in the usual and approved form prescribed by the Watch
Tower Bible and Tract Society which was lifted from the article,
"Maintaining Marriage in Honor Before God and Men," in the
March 15, 1977 issue of the Watch Tower magazine, entitled The
Watchtower. Escritor alleged that in compliance with the foregoing
rules, she and her partner signed the Declaration Pledging
Faithfulness in 1991, and by virtue of such act, they are for all
purposes, regarded as husband and wife by the religious
denomination of which they are devout adherents. Although in
1998 Escritor was widowed, thereby lifting the legal impediment to
marry on her part, her mate is still not capacitated to remarry.
Thus, their declarations remain valid. Once all legal impediments
for both are lifted, the couple can already register their marriage
with the civil authorities and the validity of the declarations
ceases. The elders in the congregations can then solemnize their
marriage as authorized by Philippine law. In sum, therefore,
insofar as the congregation is concerned, there is nothing immoral
about the conjugal arrangement between Escritor and Quilapio
and they remain members in good standing in the congregation
ISSUE : Whether or not respondent's right to religious freedom
should carve out an exception from the prevailing jurisprudence
on illicit relations for which government employees are held
administratively liable.
HELD : Escritor's cohabitation with Quilapio conforms to the
religious beliefs of the Jehovah's Witnesses, the cohabitation
violates Article 334 of the Revised Penal Code. The State cannot
interfere with the religious beliefs of the Jehovah's Witnesses, in
the same way that the Jehovah's Witnesses cannot interfere with
the State's prohibition on concubinage. The free exercise of
religion protects practices based on religious grounds provided
such practices do not violate existing laws enacted in the
reasonable exercise of the State's police power. Under the
Revised Administrative Code of 1987, one of the grounds for
disciplinary action is "conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the
service." The penalty for a first offense is suspension of six
months and one day to one year. A second offense is punishable
with dismissal from the service. Escritor, however, deserves the
same compassionate treatment accorded to a similarly situated
court employee in De Dios v. Alejo if Escritor should end her
unlawful relationship with Quilapio. In De Dios, the Court, in
deciding not to dismiss an employee because he finally
terminated his cohabitation with another woman Given the
circumstances, it would deem unduly harsh to penalize Escritor
for cohabiting for the last 23 years with a man she believes is her
husband and she knows is the father of her son. No third party
has claimed or suffered injury because of their cohabitation. On
the contrary, suspending or even dismissing her for her continued
cohabitation would only work hardship on her family. Accordingly,
respondent Soledad S. Escritor is suspended for six months and
one day without pay for conduct prejudicial to the best interest of
the service. However, the suspension shall be lifted immediately
upon Escritor's manifestation to this Court that she has ceased
cohabiting with Luciano D. Quilapio, Jr. Moreover, respondent
Escritor is warned that her continued cohabitation with Quilapio,
during or after her suspension and while Quilapio's marriage with
his legal wife still subsists, shall merit the penalty of dismissal
from the service.









FERDINAND E. MARCOS vs MANGLAPUS (177 SCRA
668,September 15, 1989)
FACTS : Ferdinand E. Marcos was deposed from the presidency
and was forced into exile. Corazon Aquinos ascension into
presidency was challenged by failed coup attempts as well as by
plots of Marcos loyalists and the Marcoses themselves. Marcos,
in his deathbed, has signified his wish to return to the Philipppines
to die. But President Aquino, considering the dire consequences
to the nation of his return has stood firmly on the decision to bar
the return of Mr. Marcos and his family. Hence, this petition for
mandamus and prohibition asks the Courts to order the
respondents to issue travel documents to Mr. Marcos and the
immediate members of his family and to enjoin the
implementation of the President's decision to bar their return to
the Philippines.
ISSUE: Wther or not the president have the power to bar the
Marcoses from returning to the Philippines.
HELD ; The President has the obligation, under the Constitution
to protect the people, promote their welfare and advance national
interest. This case calls for the exercise of the Presidents power
as protector of the peace. The president is not only clothed with
extraordinary powers in times of emergency, but is also tasked
with day-to-day problems of maintaining peace and order and
ensuring domestic tranquility in times when no foreign foe
appears on the horizon. The documented history of the efforts of
the Marcoses and their followers to destabilize the country
bolsters the conclusion that their return at this time would only
exacerbate and intensify the violence directed against the state
and instigate more chaos. The State, acting through the
Government, is not precluded from taking preemptive actions
against threats to its existence if, though still nascent they are
perceived as apt to become serious and direct protection of the
people is the essence of the duty of the government. The
Supreme Court held that the President did not act arbitrarily or
with grave abuse of discretion in determining the return of the
petitioners at the present time and under present circumstances
poses a serious threat to national interest and welfare prohibiting
their return to the Philippines. The petition is DISMISSED.









Defensor-Santiago Vs. Vasquez (217 SCRA 633,
January 27, 1993)

Facts: An information was filed against petitioner with the
Sandiganbayan for violation of the Anti Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act. The order of arrest was issued with bail for release
fixed at Php. 15,000 so she filed a motion for acceptance of cash
bail bond. On the same day the Sandiganbayan issued a
resolution authorizing the petitioner to post cash bond which the
later filed in the amount of Php.15, 000. Her arraignment was set,
but petitioner asked for the cancellation of her bail bond and that
she be allowed provisional release on recognizance. The
Sandiganbayan deferred it. The Sandiganbayan issued a hold
departure order against petitioner, by reason of the
announcement she made that she would be leaving for the U.S.
to accept a fellowship a Harvard. In the instant motion she
submitted before the S.C. she argues that her right to travel is
impaired.
ISSUE : Whether or Not the petitioners right to travel is impaired.
HELD : The petitioner does not deny and as a matter of fact even
made a public statement, that she he every intension of leaving
the country to pursue higher studies abroad. The court upholds
the course of action of the Sandiganbayan in taking judicial notice
of such fact of petitioners pal to go abroad and in thereafter
issuing a sua sponte the hold departure order is but an exercise
of respondent courts inherent power to preserve and to maintain
effectiveness of its jurisdiction over the case and the person of the
accused.
YAP vs COURT of APPEALS (GR. No. 141529, june 6 2001)
Facts : The right against excessive bail, and the liberty of abode
and travel, are being invoked to set aside two resolutions of the
Court of Appeals which fixed bail at P5,500,000.00 and imposed
conditions on change of residence and travel abroad. For
misappropriating amounts equivalent to P5,500,000.00,
petitioner was convicted of estafa and was sentenced to four years
and two months of prision correccional, as minimum, to eight
years of prision mayor as maximum, in addition to one (1) year
for each additional P10,000.00 in excess of P22,000.00 but in no
case shall it exceed twenty (20) years. He filed a notice of appeal,
and moved to be allowed provisional liberty under the cash bond
he had filed earlier in the proceedings.
ISSUE : Wether or not the condition imposed by the CA on
accuseds bail bond violative the liberty of abode and right to
travel.
HELD : Imposing bail in an excessive amount could render
meaningless the right to bail. Under the circumstances of this
case, we find that appropriate conditions have been imposed in
the bail bond to ensure against the risk of flight, particularly, the
combination of the hold-departure order and the requirement
that petitioner inform the court of any change of residence and of
his whereabouts. Although an increase in the amount of bail while
the case is on appeal may be meritorious, we find that the setting
of the amount at P5,500,000.00 is unreasonable, excessive, and
constitutes an effective denial of petitioners right to bail.


LEGASPI vs CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION (150 scra 530.
May 29, 1987)

Facts : Civil Service Commission denied Valentin Legaspis
request for information on the civil service eligibilities of 2 people
employed as sanitarians, Julian Sibonghanoy and Mariano Agas,
in the Health Department in Cebu. Petitioner claims that his right
to information is guaranteed by the Constitution prays for the
issuance of the extraordinary writ of mandamus to compel the
respondent Commission to disclose said information. the Solicitor
General challenges the petitioners standing to sue upon the
ground that the latter does not possess any legal right to be
informed of the civil services eligibilities of the government
employees concerned.The Sol. Gen. further argues that there is
no ministerial duty on the part of the Commission to furnish the
petitioner with the information he seeks.
ISSUE ; Wether or not the petitioner has legal to access
government records to validate the civil service eligibilities of the
Health Department employees.
HELD ; The petitioner, being a citizen who, as such is clothed with
personality to seek redress for the alleged obstruction of the
exercise of the public right. We find no cogent reason to deny his
standing to bring the present suit. In recognizing the people's right
to be informed, both the 1973 Constitution and the New Charter
expressly mandate the duty of the State and its agents to afford
access to official records, documents, papers and in addition,
government research data used as basis for policy development,
subject to such limitations as may be provided by law.while the
manner of examining public records may be subject to reasonable
regulation by the government agency in custody thereof, the duty
to disclose the information of public concern, and to afford access
to public records cannot be discretionary on the part of said
agencies. Certainly, its performance cannot be made contingent
upon the discretion of such agencies. Otherwise, the enjoyment of
the constitutional right may be rendered nugatory by any
whimsical exercise of agency discretion. The constitutional duty,
not being discretionary, its performance may be compelled by a
writ of mandamus in a proper case. But the constitutional
guarantee to information on matters of public concern is not
absolute. It does not open every door to any and all information.
Under the Constitution, access to official records, papers, etc., are
"subject to limitations as may be provided by law" (Art. III, Sec. 7,
second sentence). The law may therefore exempt certain types of
information from public scrutiny, such as those affecting national
security. It follows that, in every case, the availability of access to
a particular public record must be circumscribed by the nature of
the information sought, i.e., (a) being of public concern or one that
involves public interest, and, (b) not being exempted by law from
the operation of the constitutional guarantee. case of denial of
access, the government agency has the burden of showing that
the information requested is not of public concern, or, if it is of
public concern, that the same has been exempted by law from the
operation of the guarantee.



IGLESIA NI CRISTO vs COURT of APPEALS (259 scra 529,JULY 26,1996)
FACTS : Petitioner has a television program entitled
"Ang Iglesia ni Cristo" aired on Channel 2 every Saturday
and on Channel 13 every Sunday. The program presents
and propagates petitioner's religious beliefs, doctrines
and practices often times in comparative studies with
other religions. Petitioner submitted to the respondent
Board of Review for Moving Pictures and Television the
VTR tapes of its TV program Series Nos. 116, 119, 121
and 128. The Board classified the series as "X" or not for
public viewing on the ground that they "offend and
constitute an attack against other religions which is
expressly prohibited by law." On November 28, 1992, it
appealed to the Office of the President the classification
of its TV Series No. 128 which allowed it through a letter
of former Executive Secretary Edelmiro A. Amante, Sr.,
addressed for Henrietta S. Mendez reversing the decision
of the respondent Board. According to the letter the
episode in is protected by the constitutional guarantee of
free speech and expression and no indication that the
episode poses any clear and present danger. Petitioner
also filed Civil Case. Petitioner alleged that the
respondent Board acted without jurisdiction or with grave
abuse of discretion in requiring petitioner to submit the
VTR tapes of its TV program and in x-rating them. It
cited its TV Program Series Nos. 115, 119, 121 and 128.
In their Answer, respondent Board invoked its power
under PD No. 19861 in relation to Article 201 of the
Revised Penal Code. The Iglesia ni Cristo insists on the
literal translation of the bible and says that our (Catholic)
veneration of the Virgin Mary is not to be condoned
because nowhere it is found in the bible. The board
contended that it outrages Catholic and Protestant's
beliefs. RTC ruled in favor of petitioners. CA however
reversed it hence this petition.
ISSUE: Whether or Not the "ang iglesia ni cristo"
program is not constitutionally protected as a form of
religious exercise and expression.
HELD : Yes. Any act that restrains speech is accompanied
with presumption of invalidity. It is the burden of the
respondent Board to overthrow this presumption. If it
fails to discharge this burden, its act of censorship will be
struck down. The respondent Board may disagree with
the criticisms of other religions by petitioner but that
gives it no excuse to interdict such criticisms, however,
unclean they may be. Under our constitutional scheme, it
is not the task of the State to favor any religion by
protecting it against an attack by another religion.
Religious dogmas and beliefs are often at war and to
preserve peace among their followers, especially the
fanatics, the establishment clause of freedom of
religion prohibits the State from leaning towards any
religion. Respondent board cannot censor the speech of
petitioner Iglesia ni Cristo simply because it attacks other
religions, even if said religion happens to be the most
numerous church in our country. The basis of freedom of
religion is freedom of thought and it is best served by
encouraging the marketplace of dueling ideas. It is only
where it is unavoidably necessary to prevent an
immediate and grave danger to the security and welfare
of the community that infringement of religious freedom
may be justified, and only to the smallest extent
necessary to avoid the danger. There is no showing
whatsoever of the type of harm the tapes will bring about
especially the gravity and imminence of the threatened
harm. Prior restraint on speech, including religious
speech, cannot be justified by hypothetical fears but only
by the showing of a substantive and imminent evil. It is
inappropriate to apply the clear and present danger test
to the case at bar because the issue involves the content
of speech and not the time, place or manner of speech.
Allegedly, unless the speech is first allowed, its impact
cannot be measured, and the causal connection between
the speech and the evil apprehended cannot be
established. The determination of the question as to
whether or not such vilification, exaggeration or
fabrication falls within or lies outside the boundaries of
protected speech or expression is a judicial function
which cannot be arrogated by an administrative body
such as a Board of Censors." A system of prior restraint
may only be validly administered by judges and not left
to administrative agencies.