68 airforcesmonthly.

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FORCE REPORT SRI LANKA AIR FORCE
FTER 26 years of war, Sri Lankas military
appears to be edging towards an all-out
victory against the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam
(LTTE). The LTTE more commonly known as the
Tamil Tigers has been fighting for an independent
Tamil homeland since 1983. While there have been
three periods of peace over the years, brokered by
Norway and the United Nations, the latest lasted
from 2002 until 2006 and it doesnt look like there
will be any respite in the conflict this time until the Sri
Lanka Government claims all out victory.
Joint Operations
The Sri Lankan Air Force (SLAF is among one of
the most active air forces in the world and flies
regular sorties in maritime strike, Close Air Support,
CASEVAC, ground attack, air defence, transport,
maritime and surveillance. It packs a lot of punch
for such a small air arm and is one of the most
flexible air forces in the world of those I have
visited, allowing its small command chain to make
quick decisions to alter the course of a battle.
During the authors visit, in mid-February, the SLAF
was emerging from one of the busiest periods in its
38-year history. With the Army pushing the LTTE
back into a 100 square mile area around Mullaitivu
it was calling in air support for its fighting troops,
logistical supply lines and air transport requirements.
Joint operations with the Army and Navy, is one of
the main reasons why Eelam IV looks likely to be an
all-out victory for the Government. Over the past
seven years, since my last visit in 2002, the SLAF
has taken huge strides in training staff in the
Tigers
After a gap of seven years, AFMs Alan
Warnes returns to Sri Lanka, to see how
the Sri Lanka Air Force is faring in what
looks likely to be the final months of a long
bloody war.
Taming the
SRI LANKAN HOSTILITIES/CEASEFIRES
Eelam I War July 13, 1983-July 29, 1987
Ceasefire July 29, 1987-June 10, 1990
Eelam II War June 10, 1990-January 9, 1995
Ceasefire: January 9, 1995- April 19, 1995
Eelam III April 19, 1995-February 22, 2002
Ceasefire February 22, 2002-July 26, 2006
Eelam IV July 26, 2006 present
A

It would have seemed

unimaginable 26 years
ago that the SLAF would
be operating a combat
force of ex-Ukraine Air
Force MiG-27Ms (nearest),
Israeli Kfirs (middle) and
Chinese F-7GS. ALL PHOTOS,
AUTHOR
The need for a good air-to-air interceptor led the SLAF
to acquire four F-7GS in 2007. For this role the dou-
ble-delta winged F-7GS, flown by 5 Sqn, is equipped
with Chinese PL-5E air-to-air missiles. They have been
involved in several skirmishes with the Tamil Tigers Air
Wing Zlin 143s, with one being shot down by a F-7GS
in September 2009.
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FORCE REPORT SRI LANKA AIR FORCE
importance of joint operations, by sending them on
courses in India, Pakistan and the UK.
Air Vice Marshal (AVM) Kolitha A Gunatilleke,
Director Air Ops highlighted this when he told
me: Up until 2002, the four or five Army divisions
would attack the LTTE from different directions
without any real dialogue involving the SLAF.
Today they are attacking one area, we are then
inserting SLAF Regiment to hold on to it before the
Army move on towards another area and hit that.
During 2002-05 we concentrated our training
on joint operations so when war did break out
again in 2006, each service knew what was
expected from them. The jet squadrons trained
on their targeting while the helicopters were
upgraded with better self-protection systems.
In 2002-05 we carried out a lot of training to
master our equipment, this involved more recce
work with UAVs and Beechcraft 200s. The LTTE
exposed themselves during those years and we
were able to determine all their important sites right
under their noses! They complained that we were
flying over their territory but the air space is ours!
When war did break out we knew exactly where
everything was including their ammunition dumps.
So we sent in MiG-27s, Kfirs and Mi-24/35s with
the UAVs provided much of the recce. We had
purchased Kfir C7s in 2000/01 that had a better
Weapons Delivery Navigation System (WDNS).
The Kfir missions are more targeted with their
more accurate systems we can use them for pin-
point bombings on lorries, cars, buildings etc. The
MiG-27s are great for big blasts in big areas. The
Blue Horizon UAVs are being very effective too and
can stay up for 4 1/2 hours and are as good as the
Searcher that we have been using, although those
are bigger and stay up for eight hours.
Record Flying Hours
It was against this backdrop that the SLAF had a
considerable increase in their flying hours during
December 2008, when the operational tempo was
gathering momentum against a retreating LTTE.
In November the SLAF had flown around 1,553
hours, which by December had increased to 1,983
flying hours and by January had gone up again to
2,326 hours 1,184 hours on fixed wing including
UAVs and 1,142 hours on helicopters.
For many months the 7 Sqn Bell 212s were flying
more hours than any other unit due primarily to
their CASEVAC role, which led to them evacuating
injured soldiers and civilians that had been caught
up in the battles. However in January, 6 Sqn and
its Mi-17s beat all squadron flying records for
recent years, by recording 354 hours transporting
troops into different locations not bad when you
consider that the total was split between six crews.
One pilot, a Flt Lt who was OC, Flying Training
with 6 Sqn, flew a massive 118.55 hours because
of a lack of available personnel. When you
consider that much of this was done in the dark,
without night vision goggles (NVGs) you get an
idea on how skilled the SLAF pilots are. The SLAF
do not use NVGS in any of their aircraft, much to
the dismay of US personnel who were recently in
Sri Lanka for training purposes not to train the
Sri Lankans but to be trained by the Sri Lankans.
According to one SLAF helicopter pilot: one US
pilot was explaining that for some operations it
would be best to operate at 3,500 feet with your
night vision goggles on. But when we told him
we dont use night vision goggles and we fly at
50 feet in that role he responded with you guys
are mad I cant teach you anything. So we
ended up showing him our methods we use in our
war. These days much of the flights involve the
rescue of civilians. On April 20, SLAF helicopters
were flying in to the so called no-fire zone where
Army troops were not allowed to fire, to airlift
fleeing civilian injured, according to locals, by LTTE
gunfire. Despite the risks involved, the helicopters
landed in the no-fire zone at around 4 pm to
evacuate nearly 200 severely injured civilians to
the Vavuniya and Anuradhapura hospitals for
immediate treatment.
Not having NVGs mean that the helicopter pilots
learn to recognise the landmarks and lights as they
fly their routes. SLAF aircrews have regularly risked
their lives for Navy and Army colleagues, whom
they often know personally. Pilots fly helicopters
at night into army camps and other government
facilities to pick up soldiers under siege or to drop
off much needed food. There are many stories
of bravery within the SLAF that have never been
told, but once the conflict is over, these tales
When the Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF)
tried to disarmall the various military groups
as a prelude to peace, it soon got dragged
into a battle with the LTTE. The Indian Army
found out to its cost around 1200 lives during
1987-1990 just howvicious the war was. In
one battle, the heads of Indian soldiers were
severed and stuck on poles along the road to
Jaffna. While the Indian Air Force may have
flown around 70,000 sorties mainly with Mi-8
Hips, Mi-25 Hinds and An 32 Clines during
the 32 month period, with no losses, it is
generally agreed that Operation Pawana was
ill-conceived and that the Indian Army was
ill-prepared for such a conflict and it became
Indias own Vietnam. Once the Indians left,
the SLAF realised it would have to play a
bigger role in the fight against the LTTE, in
providing Close Air Support to the Army.
Indias Vietnam
Air Marshal WDRMJ Goonetileke was appointed
as the 12th Commander of the Sri Lanka Air
Force (SLAF) on June 12, 2006, following in the
footsteps of his father, the late Air Chief Marshal
Harry Goonetileke who commanded from
November 1976 to April 1981.
The SLAF runs through the veins of the family
because the current Chiefs brother, Group
Captain Shirantha Goonetileke, served the SLAF
but was sadly killed in the HS 748 that crashed
on April 29, 1994. Air Marshal Goonetileke joined
the SLAF as an Officer Cadet in the General Duties
Pilot Branch on January 13, 1978 and upon the
successful completion of his flying training, was
commissioned in the rank of Pilot Officer on
August 14, 1979. During his 31-year career he
has held a number of command, operational
and administrative appointments. He logged
many flying hours both in fixed-wing and
rotary-wing aircraft when serving as an
operational pilot as well as the Commanding
Officer of No. 3 Maritime Squadron & No. 4
Helicopter Wing. Vital operational experience
gained in his career up to then had earned him
senior operational command appointments
thereafter as the Zonal Commander in both
Northern Zone and Eastern Zone on two
separate occasions. He commanded the Air
Force bases at Katunayake, Anuradhapura and
China Bay as well. Air Marshal Goonetileke
served as the Director Operations/Deputy Chief
of Staff Operations of the Air Force before being
appointed as the Chief of Staff on 01 April 2006.
He graduated fromthe Air Command and Staff
College, Air University, Alabama, USA in 1994
and attended the prestigious National Defence
College in Pakistan in 2001.
In recognition of his distinguished service
career, he has been awarded with the Vishista
Seva Vibhooshanaya and Uttama Seva
Padakkama. For the bravery displayed in
conducting operations, he has been awarded
with the Gallantry Medal Rana Wikrama
Padakkama twice. Air Marshal Goonetileke, is
married to Mrs. Nelun Goonatileke. They have a
son and a daughter, Rehan and Ronali.
The SLAF Commander,
Air Marshal
Goonetileke, followed
in his late fathers
footsteps when he
became Chief on June
12, 2006.
Air Marshal WDRMJ Goonetileke RWP & Bar, VSV, USP, ndc, psc, Commander, SLAF
Above: Until the arrival of the Hind the gunship role was occupied by the Bell 212s, acquired in the mid-80s.
Many aircrews have been lost over the years and one Bell 212 has been rebuilt three times due to serious mis-
haps. Today, 6 Sqn is the busiest unit in the SLAF carrying out a casualty evacuation (CASEVAC) role as well as
some very daring rescue missions guided by Mi-24/35s.
Below: While the fighters deal with strategic bombing and air-to-air, the important role of close air support has been
fulfilled by the 9 Sqn Mi-24/35 Hinds since 1995. Such a dangerous role, has taken its toll on the unit with seven
Hinds lost to date claiming 18 lives while another four are missing in action. The CO, Wg Cdr Rodrigo, was killed
in October 2000 along with his co-pilot and two gunners when his helicopter was hit by a missile. Fortunately, the
Hinds electronic warfare system has been upgraded since then and no more personnel have been lost.
The SLAFs bomb-truck! The days of 12 Sqn
MiG-27M operations in Sri Lanka are numbered
with the war now coming to a close and the
need for wide area wide blast bombing now
a thing of the past.
In recent months, the evacuation of injured civilians in the northeast of the island has led to the unit flying around
the clock. Here civilian casualties are dropped off at Anuradhapura for transfer to a hospital for treatment.
Two air gunners sit either side of the helicopter ready to
fire at the enemy should the need arise. The Bell 212 air
gunner is probably one of the most dangerous jobs in
the world even with the aid of body armour, it is still a
very risky way to earn a living! Sadly several air gunners
I have met over the years are no longer with us.
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will hopefully come out. Sri Lankas war is an

unconventional, low intensity Vietnam-style conflict
fought mainly in the jungle where Army soldiers
can often see the colours of their enemys eyes.
Battl es at El ephant Pass, Pooner yn and
Malaittivvu have all gone down in Sri Lankan
military folklore because the army camps were
under continuous attack from the Tamil Tigers
often being overrun in the early days and
regularly running short of food. In one attack at
Pooneryn in November 1994, over 4,000 Tamil
Tigers attacked the camp overnight, killing up to
750 soldiers and in another attack at Mallaittivu
in August 1996 1,200 army soldiers were killed,
many of whom were never traced. The latter was
the largest defeat suffered by Sri Lankas military.
The arrival of the Mi-24/35s in 1995/96 and the
subsequent establishment of 9 Sqn at Minneriya-
Hingakurogda set about providing the SLAF with
the punch that was needed to support the Army.
Unfortunately though many good aircrews were
lost in the early days, between 1997 and 2000,
when the SLAF lacked any real credible self-defence
systems. During that period, 9 Sqn lost seven
Mi-24/35s including the units commander Wing
Cdr Rodrigo, due to enemy fire.
Training
By the turn of the century, the SLAF was looking
to set up its own training syllabus after an absence
of several years, which meant most of the flying
training went abroad. With the inventory
burgeoning to a size never seen before, and an
urgent requirement for pilot training as long as
the war continued, the SLAF leadership took the
decision to buy a fleet of Nanchang PT-6 basic flying
training aircraft as well as four K-8 Korakorum.
The first three PT-6s were air freighted into
Colombo during late December 2001 and declared
operational in April 2001. The first two instructor
pilots were trained by Chinese instructors, while the
next batch came from Bangladesh and Pakistan.
The first eight student pilots started flying the
PT-6s with the 1 Flying Training Wing (FTW) at
Anuradhapura in May 2001, a little later than the
flying training course had actually started so the
students eventually gained their wings by flying 75
hours on the Cessna 150s and 50 hours with PT-6s.
This flexible approach to flying doesnt just end at
training though, it is to be found throughout the SLAF
as you would expect with any professional air force at
war.
Upon completing their 100-hour course at
Anuradhapura, the newly qualified pilots could
transfer to 14 Squadron, based at Katunayake,
whi ch stood up wi th K-8s i n J ul y, 2001.
Unfortunately, of the six that were initially
delivered, three were blown up in a Tamil Tiger
attack that hit the international headlines because
of the foreign tourists who were affected at the
international terminal adjacent to the military
ramp. The Tamil Tiger cadres had ended up
running amok around the tourists after attacking
the military facility, blowing up airliners before
they were all shot dead by SLAF and Army
marksmen. This serious breach of security led to
the Katunayake Base Commander and his Head of
Security losing their jobs.
The four Pakistan Air Force instructor pilots who
were assisting in the training of SLAF students
commenced their work on July 27, 2001, just two
days after the attack. As they taxied out on their
first mission that day, they went past three burnt out
K-8 hulks. The PAF instructors had been seconded
to the SLAF for 18 months, but due to an increased
threat from India and the build up of their troops on
Pakistans border the pilots were subsequently posted
back to their units by mid-2002. Unfortunately, one
of them, Sqn Ldr Niswan, was subsequently killed in
a Mirage crash in 2003. A Pakistan flag flies along
with Chinese and Sri Lankan flags outside the COs
office as a tribute to those countries that assisted in
the creation of the unit.
Three replacement K-8s were delivered in 2005
and today 14 Squadron is on the verge of moving
to China Bay, where all the SLAF flying training
will be consolidated. This will help to ease the air
traffic worries at Sri Lankas international airport,
The Harbin Y-12s as well as the original
Shaanxi Y-8B (Chinese built An-12) flew lay
down attacks as well as dive-bombing for
accuracy during the late-80s and early-90s.
Using transport aircraft for dropping bombs,
designed solely for transport purposes with
a limited manoeuvrability, was a challenging
task to the pilots. Their threat increased as
they regularly had to fly low altitude in the
combat zone often under enemy fire. The
squadron aircrews showed great courage,
dedication and skill in achieved many
successes in the battlefield under great risk.
Unfortunately the Y-8B (CR-872) crashed,
with the loss of all five on board, during a
bombing mission on Iyakachchi during July
5, 1992, which curtailed further bombing
operations by transport aircraft.
Much of todays fighting force can be traced
back to around 1995 when the SLAF decided
to get tough and take the fight to the enemy
hitting them harder with the purchase of
heavyweight offensive aircraft.
Air Marshal Oliver M Ranasinghe, who led the
SLAF fromFebruary 17, 1994 until March 5,
1998 was the instigator of this bold new policy,
while his successor, ACM Jayalath Weerakody
continued his predecessors work when he
succeeded him until he retired in 2002. Air
Cdre Lal Pereira (who went on to become AVM),
was the Director of Aeronautical Engineering
and served both men from1994-2004, looking
after the evaluation, induction training as well
as the standing up of new squadrons to ensure
they became operational. The author was
fortunate enough to meet all three of these
dedicated men, who were driven to defeat the
LTTE, however desperate things looked.
Until then, the SLAF had relied on the F-7BSs,
SF-260Ws and the Pucaras but the SLAF were
looking for something that could inflict real
damage something that would give them
the edge over the LTTE. It went ahead with
the lease of three Mi-24Vs from Konotop,
Ukraine to provide ground troops some real
fire support from the air. There was also
the purchase of six ex-Israeli Kfir C2/TC.2s,
from Israel Aircraft Industries. The SLAF had
looked at several options, including the Su-25
Frogfoot with its large bomb load and the
Chinese A-5. However, in the end the SLAF
opted for the Kfir. According to AVM (Retd) Lal
Pereira, Director of Aeronautical Engineering
at the time: the Israelis offered the Kfirs at a
fair price and, while the WDNS capability was
a driver behind the purchase, it was not the
deciding factor. One of the main priorities was
that whatever we bought it must have power
to get away from the target after a dive onto
the target.
Negotiations for a laser designator pod (LDP)
also got underway. Initially the SLAF fitted an
LDP to an An-32 and carried out trials on the
bombing ranges up north, but the Kfir missed
the target by 1-2 miles (3-5 kms).
Mediumlift helicopters were also an urgent
requirement to transport troops and, by the
end of 1993, three Mi-17s had been delivered
and 6 Sqn was established, initially at
Katunayake before relocating to Vavuniya.
Its complement of helicopters had increased
to 12 Mi1-7s and Mi-171s by the end of 1996
and today the unit is based at Anuradhapura.
In November 1995, 9 Squadron was formed
at Minneriya-Hingurakgoda with an initial
three Mi-24s, which has grown over the years.
Thereby allowing 7 Squadron and its Bell 212s
to concentrate on the CASEVAC role rather
than close air support. There was also an
urgent requirement for an airborne Electronic
Intelligence (ELINT)/Communications
Intelligence (COMINT) platform that led the
Israel Aircraft Industries to upgrade the
SLAFs sole Beech 200 in 1996. The aircraft
spent nearly a year in Tel Aviv, Israel and was
back in Sri Lanka by early-1997 but this was
blown up on October 23, 2007 during the Tamil
Tigers attack on SLAF Base Anuradhapura.
Today, another aircraft, fitted with the Hughes
Integrated Synthetic Aperture Radar (HISAR),
flies regularly out of Anuradhapura where it is
closer to the action and thus spends more time
monitoring the enemy below.
Taking The Fight to The Enemy
Left: During the mid-90s when the SLAF started taking
the war to the Tamil Tigers, the Kfir C.2, flown by 10
Sqn, marked an upturn in accurate medium level bomb-
ing. However, it has only recently been able to drop its
laser guided bombs with the aid of a laser designator
pod fitted to a Searcher Mk II unmanned aerial vehicle.
Below: The F-7BS and a FT-7BS acquired in 1991
provides 5 Sqn with a suitable platform for an opera-
tional conversion course. Pilots progressing from 14
Sqn, where they would have finished their advanced
flying training to will move across to 5 Sqn to gain fly-
ing experience on a fats jet, before moving on to the
F-7GS, Kfir or MiG-27.
Early SLAF Bombers
No.7 Sqn and its Mi-17s recorded the largest number of flying hours in January, due primarily to the large
number of troop movements in the north of the country. Up until, these robust helicopters, arrived in 1993, the
Army had serious problems moving around north of the Frontier Defence Line.
The K-8 Korakoram was introduced into service in 2001, when the SLAF began a proper flying training syllabus.
Until then much of the training had been done overseas because of the ongoing conflict. No. 14 Sqn now oper-
ates five K-8s, but is likely to move to China Bay on the east coast near Trincomalee, within the near future.
Above: After returning from overhaul at the Pakistan
Aeronautical Complex (PAC) Kamra in 2004, the two
FT-5s never flew. Their role was taken over by the K-8
and F-7BS.
Right: The K-8 started life with a bang literally
when three K-8s were blown up by the LTTE on July
24, 2001. This photo serves as a memento to all
those visiting the unit.

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where so many military aircraft are based.

From K-8s the pilots were originally posted to
any of the three main frontline fighters F-7,
Kfir or MiG-27. However, the training process
has recently changed because of several incidents
caused primarily by the big leap in capabilities
from a K-8 to these jets. This means that all
graduates now move from 14 Sqn to 5 Sqn, where
they will continue their advanced jet training on
the more basic F-7BS before moving on to the
F-7GS, Kfir or MiG-27.
Todays Fighter Bombers
As the tempo and successful territorial gains of the
LTTE increased due to substantial funding from
foreign Tamils living outside of Sri Lanka and other
governments in the late-90s, the SLAF became
desperate to strengthen its offensive capabilities
with the purchase of more fighter-bombers.
This time it looked to Ukraine, with whom the
SLAF had enjoyed a good working relationship over
the previous 5-6 years, buying An-32s and Mi-24s.
The MiG-27M was an ideal bomb truck, which
could carry up to six Russian 500 kg bombs on
one sortie ideal for regular raids into the northern
UNHCR), or any religious buildings. Having to pick
through all these is like eating with chopsticks.
Unfortunately the Ukrainians stay in Sri Lanka
was marred by a tragic accident, when one of the
MiG-27 pilots crashed his aircraft while flying an
unauthorised flying display on August 18, 2001,
which is also Ukraines Aviation Day. The pilot,
Captain L Veralli, was flying inverted very low
across the international runway and was levelling
off and turning towards a lagoon when the aircraft
hit a telephone wire and crashed into a row of
During EelamIV Surface to Air Missiles (SAMs)
have not been used, probably because they have
run out of stocks or been rendered useless in Sri
Lankas damp field conditions. The SLAF has
been grateful for this. If all the operational SLAF
pilots are nowfully trained in electronic warfare
tactics and their aircraft have been upgraded
with Israeli self-protection systems, it is one less
obstacle they have to overcome to support their
colleagues on the ground. However it wasnt
always like this.
The SLAF suffered their heaviest losses shortly
after the LTTE ended the three-month ceasefire
on April 19, 1995. No one could have imagined
that by the end of April, the SLAF would have
lost two HS 748s (known as Avros) claiming 95
personnel including 27 fromthe SLAF, which
is more lives than it had lost in the previous 13
years of conflict. The aircraft had carried large
groups of high-ranking officers fromall three
services, attending a seminar at Jaffna, and their
deaths meant that it wasnt just the SLAF that
lost a huge amount of military knowledge and
experience all wiped out in a fewfateful hours.
It soon became evident the Tigers had used this
latest ceasefire to take stock of the lethal SA-7
Grail surface-to-air missiles. The SAMs marked
a turning point in the war, and for the first time
the SLAF were on the back foot with morale
probably at an all time low.
Before the end of 1995, the Ratmalanas 2
Transport Wing had also lost two of its recently
acquired An 32s and one of its Shanxi Y-8s
(Chinese built An-12) in addition to the two HS
748s. During these six months the unit lost 15
pilots and nine flight engineers. Flying transport
aircraft in Sri Lanka had become a high-risk
business.
To counter these losses, the leased Y-8 aircraft
(CR-873) was eventually purchased and three
more An-32s were acquired but the remaining HS
748s were grounded and never played any further
part in the war.

April 28, 1995
HS 748 CR-835/4R-HVB was hit by a SAMfired by
the LTTE shortly after the aircraft had taken off
fromPalali air base for a troop flight to Colombo.
The pilot turned in an attempt to land at the
airfield but came down 650 ft (200m) short of
the runway as the fire spread through the whole
wing. All 43 military personnel, including the
three crewand two civilians on board were killed.
April 29, 1995
The second HS 748, CR-834/4R-HVAwas hit by
another SAMat about 0845hrs around 4 1/2 miles
(7 km) fromPalali air base while descending
through 3,000 ft (1,000m) as it prepared to land
there, following a flight fromAnuradhapura. The
aircraft crashed at Madagal, about a mile from
Palali. All 52 on board, comprising 47 military
personnel, two policemen and three Sri Lankan
journalists were killed and the aircraft destroyed.
Surface Air Missiles the SLAFs Darkest Hours
Sitting on the ramp at Ratmalana in March 1994 in the civilian colour scheme it wore during its SLAF career.
The aircraft was shot down while flying with 201 Heavy Transport Squadron (which later became 2 Squadron)
on April 28, 1995, resulting in the loss of all 43 personnel on board. ALAN WARNES
Within hours of the first HS 748 going down, a second 748 was shot down by a SAM. When this aircraft was lost,
with 47 personnel on board, many senior officers were lost and with them, many years of experience. ALAN WARNES
territories and, more importantly, it was affordable
and much cheaper to operate than the Kfir, which
it had been using since 1996. The SLAF meant
business. The aircrafts air data computer provided
the Russian built bomber with the intelligence to
hit the target accurately even though they were
purchased to hit wider areas (see Sri Lankas Fighter
Bombers, AFM, April 2001, p30-33).
By summer 2000 the first four had been delivered
and it wasnt long before they were called into
action. On August 8, 2000 three MiG-27s carried
out a rocket attack on LTTE targets on the Jaffna
peninsular. It was a true baptism of fire for one
of them as it was damaged by ground fire, but
still managed to limp back to base. At that time
no SLAF pilots were qualified to fly the MiG-27,
so Ukrainian pilots were hired from Lviv Aircraft
Company, which sold the aircraft that flew all
the combat missions. Meanwhile another two
MiG-27Ms and a dual-seat MiG-23UB arrived in
October 2000, the latter meant that Sri Lankan
pilots could at last get the chance to fly the MiGs
and eventually take over from the Ukrainians.
The CO of 10 Squadron, the Kfir unit, was
responsible for the MiG-27s in the initial days of
operations and confided in me: Bombing the
LTTE is not easy. We try to ensure there are no
civilians in the vicinity of our targets no troops,
no non-Government organisations (such as
All ten PT-6s serving the 1 Flying Training Wing sit on the ramp at their former base, Anuradhapura. There are
currently around two PT-6s operational, while another two were going through overhaul in Sri Lanka during
February. Another pair is on order to bolster their numbers.
The first Nanchang PT-6s arrived in late 2001, for use as a basic flying training aircraft. A popular choice
among air forces in this region, with Myanmar and Bangladesh operating them in the same role.
Above: The An-32 is a great transport aircraft for the Sri Lankan climate. Being overpowered it is ideal for a
high rate of climb as well as a high rate of descent ideal for climbing out of the air base at Palali on the Jaffna
peninsula, where Tamil Tiger SAMs were often a threat. They serve with 2 Sqn at Ratmalana.
Below: Two former RAF C-130Ks, which were de-converted from being air-to-air refuelling aircraft by Marshalls
of Cambridge, were supplied in a Defence Export Service Organisation (DESO) deal to the SLAF in 2000. They are
used for heavy lift transport, often picking up arms from overseas.

As the Director of Air Operations, Air Vice

Marshal Kolitha A Gunatilleke is in charge of
all offensive missions, CASEVAC, transport
and VVIP. In addition to air defence he has
strict control over flying clubs, flights into
the Jaffna peninsula although the emphasis
on this is non-scheduled civilian flights.
He was the Katunayake Base Commander
in October 2007, when it was attacked by
a Zlin: We suspected they had aircraft
but we never had a clue they would attack
us. There were serious lapses in our air
defences, mainly because the radars were
switched off. Now we are better equipped
and more vigilant. We purchased the F-7GS
for the interceptor role and Chinese air
defence radars.
Director of Air
Operations
Air Vice Marshal
Kolitha A Gunatilleke
is the SLAFs Director
of Air Operations.
The author first
met him when he
was a Squadron
Leader based at
Anurahapura, in
March 1994.
76 [Link]
FORCE REPORT SRI LANKA AIR FORCE
#255 June 77
The Online Air Arms Database
[Link]
In association with

because as we recover more land from the LTTE we

need these people to hold on it. This allows the
Army troops to concentrate on the job of moving
forward. The SLAF Regiment has been doing a fine
job, one that should never be underestimated. There
are now 28,000 people serving the SLAF but this will
be increased to 35,000 by end of next year because
we are currently undermanned in some areas.
Currently on order are two Harbin Y12-IVs
equipped with weather radar, which the current
fleet does not have as well as two K-8s, two PT-6s
and a Beechcraft.
Needless to say, there will be dramatic cuts to the
SLAF when the war ends and already many personnel
are looking to the future, one that will hopefully see
Sri Lanka revert back to the peaceful idyllic island it
was 26 years ago. When it does there will still be a
job for the SLAF protecting its waters in a bid
to ensure that peace remains in Sri Lanka.
houses near the base killing and injuring at least
six occupants. The other MiG-27 involved in the
formation landed safely. Two other MiG-27s have
been lost since the aircraft were delivered, one was
blown up in the attack on July 24, 2001 and the
other was lost in a non-combat accident on June 9,
2004. After the ceasefire ended on July 26, 2006
the SLAF went ahead with the acquisition of four
more MiG-27Ms as attrition replacements. On
December 18, 2007 the MiG-27s split away from
the Kfirs and stood up as a separate unit, 12 Sqn.
The aircraft continue to play a big part in the war.
In 2001, the Kfir C.2s and single TC.2 were
augmented by the much more sophisticated C.7
which boasts a drooped nose and an advanced
weapons delivery navigation system. Until recently
the Kfirs lacked any laser designator pod (LDP)
capability, to guide in their laser-guided bombs.
However this has now been overcome by the SLAFs
LDP-equipped UAVs, which can lase for the Kfirs in
their targeting the first such sortie took place in
February 2009. It has provided the veteran Israeli
fighter with a new lease of life in the war.
Furthermore, the surveillance UAVs also provide
a real-time picture of the targets so that pilots can
familiarise themselves with the surrounding area
while in their operations room prior to the mission.
Prior to this, pilots would be given a grid reference
and a position on the map they were aiming for.
Unfortunately, a lack of spare parts for the C.7s
sophisticated avionics meant the aircraft were
temporarily grounded during the authors visit.
Sri Lankas First Air-to-Air Kill
As soon as the Zlins attacked, the SLAF looked for an
air-to-air interceptor. It was an urgent requirement
the current Chief of the Air Staff, Air Marshal Roshan
Goonetileke told me: In a strange way it taught
us a lesson we probably deserved and we bought
four double-delta winged F-7GS equipped with a
Chinese-built air radar and armed with Chinese air-
to-air missiles. They joined 5 Sqn at Katunayake.
While the F-7BS continues to serve the unit, it is
now mainly in a training role, preparing fighter
pilots for the F-7GS, Kfir or MiG-27. The squadron
currently has six pilots, three were trained at
Chengdu and the other three came from SLAF
aircraft (K-8, Kfir and MiG-27). Four of these
improved F-7s have brought the SLAFs air defence
capabilities up to a new level, when worked in
conjunction with 2d radars that are being installed
by the Indian Air Force.
No 5 Sqn is the SLAFs only interceptor squadron
and its F-7GS armed with two PL-5E air-to-air
missiles, stands on a 24-hour alert. Since being
introduced into service in January 2008, 5 Sqn
pilots have been called into action several times.
The CO of 5 Sqn told me of several F-7GS
interceptions that had taken place over the past
few months: In early September 2008, two Zlin
43s flown by the Tamil Tigers Air Tigers were
picked up in the north coming from Iranamadu
heading west towards Manna, where they bombed
an army post. While one of them flew back to its
airstrip, the other flying low started heading south.
Our radars picked it up at 22.22 and we were
scrambled to intercept the aircraft.
The pilot spotted the aircraft and then had a
radar lock while tracking it in the darkness, he then
went to fire the missile but unfortunately there was
not enough heat coming from the aircrafts engine,
so the missile could not lock on to it. Two further
jets were called in on the small piston-engined
aircraft, but a missile lock could not be gained by
either of them and the aircraft escaped.
It was a dangerous mission, not just for the two
Tamil Tiger Air Wings pilots, but for the F-7GS
pilots, who had to fly their aircraft at very low level
in the dark looking for the enemy, without the aid
of night vision goggles. The CO continues: On
September 9, 2008 a Zlin 143 dropped a bomb
on SLAF Base Vavuniya while the base was under
attack from mortars and rockets. One of our jets
was scrambled to intercept the aircraft. When
it turned back it went down very low and our
ground radars lost him, but the F-7GS pilot still
had him on his radar. He was tracked back to the
west of Malaitivu where the Chinese PL-5E air-to-
air missile was fired, some 1,650 feet (500 metres)
away from the Zlin 143. There was an almighty
explosion and that was all the pilot could say
about the destruction.
We monitored the LTTEs transmissions by their
High Commander and it was clear from all the chat
that they had lost an aircraft. However because
the aircraft fell down into their territory we had no
tangible evidence so their leadership continued to
maintain that both aircraft had returned to base.
On October 30, 2008 another Zlin 143 flew
south along the coast, then managing to fly
between the air gunner positions at Katunayake
and Colombo AFHQ dropped a bomb on a
electricity power station, before flying low back to
the north. Clearly the LTTE had infiltrated the SLAF
to know how to get through their air defences.
The Tamil Tigers Air Wing was known to have
around five Zlin 143s, two are believed to have
been lost in training accidents while three have
subsequently been shot down. While the F-7GS
shot down one on September 9, 2008 the other
two were forced down by air gunners positioned
at Katunayake and Colombo AFHQ, on February
20, 2008. In the latest incident, one of the
Zlins was aiming to drop bombs on the SLAF Air
Headquarters but was shot down by the gunners
positioned on top of the high-rise building as
it was diving on. The aircraft crashed into the
Revenue Building with both pilots being killed.
A second aircraft meanwhile was targeting the 10
Sqn Kfir hangar at Katunayake, which the author
had visited several hours earlier, when it was shot
down and crashed into marshes just short of the
perimeter fence. Again both pilots were killed.
This is believed to be the last of the aircraft that the
Tamil Tigers Air Wing had managed to smuggle
into the country. Now the SLAF has the wreckage
of one of the Zlins, an investigation is currently
underway as to who sold the aircraft to the LTTE.

After the War the SLAF CAS
The air-to-ground operations [MiG-27 and Kfir]
are likely to stop or at least decrease substantially.
However we will need maritime patrol aircraft
possibly long range; Search and Rescue cover for
flying emergencies and evacuations.
We will keep our new air defence system in place,
Unit Insignias
4 Squadron
unavailable
12 Squadron
doesnt have
its own badge
14 Squadron
(currently
unavailable)
SRI LANKA AIR FORCE ORDER OF BATTLE
HQ Sri Lanka Air Force Colombo
1 Flying Training Wing
NAMC PT-6,
Cessna 150L
China Bay
2 Transport Squadron
(Heavy)
An-32B, C-130K,
Cessna 421C
Ratmalana
4 Helicopter Squadron
(VIP)
Bell 206A/206B,
Bell 412/412EP
Katunayake
5 Squadron
Chengdu F-7BS/GS,
GAIG FT-7
Katunayake
6 Helicopter Squadron Mi-17, Mi-17-1V, Mi-171 Anuradhapura
7 Helicopter Squadron
Bell 206A/206B,
Bell 212
Hingurakgoda
- Minneriya
8 Transport Squadron
(Light)
Beech B200 HISAR,
HAMC Y-12 II
Katunayake
9 Attack Helicopter
Squadron
Mi-24P, Mi-24V,
Mi-35P
Hingurakgoda
- Minneriya
10 Squadron Kfir C.2, C.7, TC.2 Katunayake
111 Air Surveillance
Squadron
IAI Searcher II Vavuniya
112 Air Surveillance
Squadron
EMIT Blue Horizon-2 Vavuniya
12 Squadron MiG-27M, MiG-23UB Katunayake
14 Squadron HAIG K-8 Karakorum Katunayake
but will enhance our airborne capabilities with the
purchase of an additional Beechcraft and probably
a long range maritime patrol aircraft. This will mean
we are likely to re-establish 3 Squadron, [which the
Chief once commanded in the 1980s].
The MiG-29 is another option for the future,
but so far there have only been discussions, no
contract has been signed. Both, the MiG-27s and
the Kfirs (some 30-35 years old) are getting old
and we need aircraft to eventually replace them.
The MiG-29 would be a good option.
While we moved the helicopters out of Vavuniya
because it was constantly coming under attack,
it is likely a squadron will relocate there once
peace does come. We have recently installed an
air-defence radar there in a bid to improve our
defences, which are now 85-90% complete.
We have also increased the SLAF Regiment from
6,000 to 12,000 personnel over the past two years
China Bay March 6*, 1997 by LTTE cadres on
ground. Destroyed a Y-12, which was parked
overnight.
Katunayake July 24, 2001 by LTTE cadres on
ground. Two Kfir C.7s were blown up during
the Tamil Tiger attack on July 24, 2001,
as were three K-8 Karakorums, a MiG-27M&
two Mi-17 Hips.

Katunayake March 26, 2007 first attack by
LTTE Zlin, causing little damage.
Anuradhapura October 22, 2007 by LTTE Zlin
which bombed the military ramp. Four PT-6s
were destroyed, a single K-8 Karakorum, the
SLAFs SIGINT-configured Beech B200T, two
Mi-17 Hips, an Mi-35P Hind, a Bell 206A plus a
Bell 212 which crashed whilst responding to
the incident.
Kayunayake October 22, 2007 by LTTE Zlin
which bombed the military ramp.
Katunayake February 20, 2009 by LTTE Zlin
but was shot down by gunners just
short of the perimeter fence.
Air Force HQ February 20, 2009 by LTTE Zlin
but it was shot down by gunners
positioned on top of the AFHQ block of offices
and the aircraft crashed into the Revenue
building.
Major Attacks on SLAF facilities
On February 20, 2009 two Tamil Tigers Zlinn 143s
tried to attack the SLAF. One was shot down and
hit a building in the centre of the capital, Colombo
while the other example suffered a similar fate, on
the edge of Katunayake as it was lining up to hit
the Kfir hangar. SLAF
The Harbin Y-12 has been flying for the SLAF since 1986 in a wide variety of roles that have included bombing,
CASEVAC, food dropping in isolated areas and surveillance. Its an underrated light transport aircraft that has
brought a lot to the SLAF.
1 FTW 2 Transport
Squadron
An 32, C-130k
5 Squadron 6 Helicopter
Squadron
7 Helicopter
Squadron
8 Transport
Squadron
Beech 200
8 Transport
Squadron
Y-12
9 Attack
Helicopter
Squadron
10 Squadron
One of the most important aircraft in the SLAF is this HISAR-configured Beech 200, which can monitor all the
enemy troop movements and their bases. Since its arrival in late 2002, the SLAF have been gaining intelligence
that once it could only dream about. The aircraft spends much of its time at Anuradhapura, although it is based
with 8 Squadron at Ratmalana.
afm