!"#$%"&' )*#+ &", -*#.&/0.

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age 1


The Cost of Code Red

By John Mauldin | April 26, 2014

Speculative Bubbles
More from the BIS
How Does the Economy Adjust to Asset Purchases?
Trickle-Down Monetary Policy
The Fed & BoE Are Heading for the Exits
While the BoJ & ECB Are Just Getting Started
Amsterdam, Brussels, Geneva, San Diego, Rome, and Tuscany

(It is especially important to read the opening quotes this week. They set up the theme in
the proper context.)

There is no means of avoiding the final collapse of a boom brought about by credit
expansion. The alternative is only whether the crisis should come sooner as the result of a
voluntary abandonment of further credit expansion, or later as a final and total catastrophe
of the currency system involved.
Ludwig von Mises

No very deep knowledge of economics is usually needed for grasping the immediate
effects of a measure; but the task of economics is to foretell the remoter effects, and so to
allow us to avoid such acts as attempt to remedy a present ill by sowing the seeds of a
much greater ill for the future.
Ludwig von Mises

[Central banks are at] serious risk of exhausting the policy room for manoeuver over
time.
Jaime Caruana, General Manager of the Bank for International Settlements

The gap between the models in the world of monetary policymaking is now wider than at
any time since the 1930s.
Benjamin Friedman, William Joseph Maier Professor of Political Economy, Harvard

To listen to most of the heads of the worlds central banks, things are going along
swimmingly. The dogmatic majority exude a great deal of confidence in their ability to manage
their economies through whatever crisis may present itself. (Raghuram Rajan, the sober-minded
head of the Reserve Bank of India, is a notable exception.)

However, there is reason to believe that there have been major policy mistakes made by
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age 2

central banks and will be more of them that will lead to dislocations in the markets all types
of markets. And its not just the usual anti-central bank curmudgeon types (among whose number I
have been counted, quite justifiably) who are worried. Sources within the central bank community
are worried, too, which should give thoughtful observers of the market cause for concern.

Too often we as investors (and economists) are like the generals who are always fighting
the last war. We look at bank balance sheets (except those of Europe and China), corporate balance
sheets, sovereign bond spreads and yields, and say it isnt likely that we will repeat this mistakes
which led to 2008. And I smile and say, You are absolutely right; we are not going to repeat those
mistakes. We learned our lessons. Now we are going to make entirely new mistakes. And while
the root cause of the problems, then and now, may be the same central bank policy the outcome
will be somewhat different. But a crisis by any other name will still be uncomfortable.

If you look at some of the recent statements from the Bank for International Settlements,
you should come away with a view much more cautious than the optimistic one that is bandied
about in the media today. In fact, to listen to the former chief economist of the BIS, we should all
be quite worried.

I am of course referring to Bill White, who is one of my personal intellectual heroes. I hope to get
to meet him someday. We have discussed some of his other papers, written in conjunction with the
Dallas Federal Reserve, in past letters. He was clearly warning about imbalances and potential
bubbles in 2007 and has generally been one of the most prescient observers of the global economy.
The prestigious Swiss business newspaper Finanz und Wirtschaft did a far-reaching interview with
him a few weeks ago, and Ive taken the liberty to excerpt pieces that I think are very important.
The excerpts run a few pages, but this is really essential reading. (The article is by Mehr zum
Thema, and you can read the full piece here.)

Speculative Bubbles

The headline for the interview is I see speculative bubbles like in 2007. As the
interviewer rolls out the key questions, White warns of grave adverse effects of ultra-loose
monetary policy:

William White is worried. The former chief economist of the Bank for International
Settlements is highly skeptical of the ultra-loose monetary policy that most central banks
are still pursuing. It all feels like 2007, with equity markets overvalued and spreads in the
bond markets extremely thin, he warns.

Mr. White, all the major central banks have been running expansive monetary
policies for more than five years now. Have you ever experienced anything like this?

The honest truth is no one has ever seen anything like this. Not even during the Great
Depression in the Thirties has monetary policy been this loose. And if you look at the
details of what these central banks are doing, its all very experimental. They are making it
up as they go along. I am very worried about any kind of policies that have that nature.

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age 3

But didnt the extreme circumstances after the collapse of Lehman Brothers warrant
these extreme measures?

Yes, absolutely. After Lehman, many markets just seized up. Central bankers rightly tried
to maintain the basic functioning of the system. That was good crisis management. But in
my career I have always distinguished between crisis prevention, crisis management, and
crisis resolution. Today, the Fed still acts as if it was in crisis management. But were six
years past that. They are essentially doing more than what they did right in the beginning.
There is something fundamentally wrong with that. Plus, the Fed has moved to a
completely different motivation. From the attempt to get the markets going again, they
suddenly and explicitly started to inflate asset prices again. The aim is to make people feel
richer, make them spend more, and have it all trickle down to get the economy going again.
Frankly, I dont think it works, and I think this is extremely dangerous.

So, the first quantitative easing in November 2008 was warranted?

Absolutely.

But they should have stopped these kinds of policies long ago?

Yes. But heres the problem. When you talk about crisis resolution, its about attacking the
fundamental problems that got you into the trouble in the first place. And the fundamental
problem we are still facing is excessive debt. Not excessive public debt, mind you, but
excessive debt in the private and public sectors. To resolve that, you need restructurings
and write-offs. Thats government policy, not central bank policy. Central banks cant
rescue insolvent institutions. All around the western world, and I include Japan,
governments have resolutely failed to see that they bear the responsibility to deal with the
underlying problems. With the ultraloose monetary policy, governments have no incentive
to act. But if we dont deal with this now, we will be in worse shape than before.

But wouldnt large-scale debt write-offs hurt the banking sector again?

Absolutely. But you see, we have a lot of zombie companies and banks out there. Thats a
particular worry in Europe, where the banking sector is just a continuous story of denial,
denial and denial. With interest rates so low, banks just keep ever-greening everything,
pretending all the money is still there. But the more you do that, the more you keep the
zombies alive, they pull down the healthy parts of the economy. When you have made bad
investments, and the money is gone, its much better to write it off and get fifty percent
than to pretend its still there and end up getting nothing. So yes, we need more debt
reduction and more recapitalization of the banking system. This is called facing up to
reality.

Where do you see the most acute negative effects of this monetary policy?

The first thing I would worry about are asset prices. Every asset price you could think of is
in very odd territory. Equity prices are extremely high if you at valuation measures such as
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age 4

Tobins Q or a Shiller-type normalized P/E. Risk-free bond rates are at enormously low
levels, spreads are very low, you have all these funny things like covenant-lite loans again.
It all looks and feels like 2007. And frankly, I think its worse than 2007, because then it
was a problem of the developed economies. But in the past five years, all the emerging
economies have imported our ultra-low policy rates and have seen their debt levels rise.
The emerging economies have morphed from being a part of the solution to being a part of
the problem.

Do you see outright bubbles in financial markets?

Yes, I do. Investors try to attribute the rising stock markets to good fundamentals. But I
dont buy that. People are caught up in the momentum of all the liquidity that is provided
by the central banks. This is a liquidity-driven thing, not based on fundamentals.

So are we mostly seeing what the Fed has been doing since 1987 provide liquidity
and pump markets up again?

Absolutely. We just saw the last chapter of that long history. This is the last of a whole
series of bubbles that have been blown. In the past, monetary policy has always succeeded
in pulling up the economy. But each time, the Fed had to act more vigorously to achieve its
results. So, logically, at a certain point, it wont work anymore. Then well be in big
trouble. And we will have wasted many years in which we could have been following
better policies that would have maintained growth in much more sustainable ways. Now, to
make you feel better, I said the same in 1998, and I was way too early.

What about the moral hazard of all this?

The fact of the matter is that if you have had 25 years of central bank and government
bailout whenever there was a problem, and the bankers come to appreciate that fact, then
we are back in a world where the banks get all the profits, while the government socializes
all the losses. Then it just gets worse and worse. So, in terms of curbing the financial
system, my own sense is that all of the stuff that has been done until now, while very
useful, Basel III and all that, is not going to be sufficient to deal with the moral hazard
problem. I would have liked to see a return to limited banking, a return to private
ownership, a return to people going to prison when they do bad things. Moral hazard is a
real issue.

Do you have any indication that the Yellen Fed will be different than the Greenspan
and Bernanke Fed?

Not really. The one person in the FOMC that was kicking up a real fuss about asset bubbles
was Governor Jeremy Stein. Unfortunately, he has gone back to Harvard.

The markets seem to assume that the tapering will run very smoothly, though.
Volatility, as measured by the Vix index, is low.

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age 3

Dont forget that the Vix was at [a] record low in 2007. All that liquidity raises the asset
prices and lowers the cost of insurance. I see at least three possible scenarios how this will
all work out. One is: Maybe all this monetary stuff will work perfectly. I dont think this is
likely, but I could be wrong. I have been wrong so many times before. So if it works, the
long bond rates can go up slowly and smoothly, and the financial system will adapt nicely.
But even against the backdrop of strengthening growth, we could still see a disorderly
reaction in financial markets, which would then feed back to destroy the economic
recovery.

How?

We are such a long way away from normal long-term interest rates. Normal would be
perhaps around four percent. Markets have a tendency to rush to the end point immediately.
They overshoot. Keynes said in late Thirties that the long bond market could fluctuate at
the wrong levels for decades. If fears of inflation suddenly re-appear, this can move interest
rates quickly. Plus, there are other possible accidents. What about the fact that maybe most
of the collateral you need for normal trading is all tied up now? What about the fact that the
big investment dealers have got inventories that are 20 percent of what they were in 2007?
When things start to move, the inventory for the market makers might not be there. Thats a
particular worry in fields like corporate bonds, which can be quite illiquid to begin with.
Ive met so many people who are in the markets, thinking they are absolutely brilliantly
smart, thinking they can get out in the right time. The problem is, they all think that. And
when everyone races for the exit at the same time, we will have big problems. Im not
saying all of this will happen, but reasonable people should think about what could go
wrong, even against a backdrop of faster growth.

And what is the third scenario?

The strengthening growth might be a mirage. And if it does not materialize, all those
elevated prices will be way out of line of fundamentals.

Which of the major central banks runs the highest risk of something going seriously
wrong?

At the moment what I am most worried about is Japan. I know there is an expression that
the Japanese bond market is called the widowmaker. People have bet against it and lost
money. The reason I worry now is that they are much further down the line even than the
Americans. What is Abenomics really? As far as I see it, they print the money and tell
people that there will be high inflation. But I dont think it will work. The Japanese
consumer will say prices are going up, but my wages wont. Because they havent for
years. So I am confronted with a real wage loss, and I have to hunker down. At the same
time, financial markets might suddenly not want to hold Japanese Government Bonds
anymore with a perspective of 2 percent inflation. This will end up being a double
whammy, and Japan will just drop back into deflation. And now happens what Professor
Peter Bernholz wrote in his latest book. Now we have a stagnating Japanese economy, tax
revenues dropping like a stone, the deficit already at eight percent of GDP, debt at more
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age 6

than 200 percent and counting. I have no difficulty in seeing this thing tipping overnight
into hyperinflation. If you go back into history, a lot of hyperinflations started with
deflation.

Many people have warned of inflation in the past five years, but nothing has
materialized. Isnt the fear of inflation simply overblown?

One reason we dont see inflation is because monetary policy is not working. The signals
are not getting through. Consumers and corporates are not responding to the signals. We
still have a disinflationary gap. There has been a huge increase in base money, but it has
not translated into an increase in broader aggregates. And in Europe, the money supply is
still shrinking. My worry is that at some point, people will look at this situation and lose
confidence that stability will be maintained. If they do and they do start to fear inflation,
that change in expectations can have very rapid effects.

More from the BIS

The Bank for International Settlements is known as the central bankers central bank. It
hosts a meeting once a month for all the major central bankers to get together for an extravagant
dinner and candid conversation. Surprisingly, there has been no tell-all book about these meetings
by some retiring central banker. They take the code of omert (embed) seriously.

Jaime Caruana, the General Manager of the BIS, recently stated that monetary institutions
(central banks) are at serious risk of exhausting the policy room for manoeuver over time. He
followed that statement with a very serious speech at the Harvard Kennedy School two weeks ago.
Here is the abstract of the speech (emphasis mine):

This speech contrasts two explanatory views of what he characterizes as the sluggish and
uneven recovery from the global financial crisis of 2008-09. One view points to a
persistent shortfall of demand and the other to the specificities of a financial cycle-induced
recession the shortfall of demand vs. the balance sheet view. The speech summarizes
each diagnosis [and] then reviews evidence bearing on the two views and contrasts the
policy prescriptions to be inferred from each view. The speech concludes that the balance
sheet view provides a better overarching explanation of events. In terms of policy, the
implication is that there has been too much emphasis since the crisis on stimulating
demand and not enough on balance sheet repair and structural reforms to boost
productivity. Looking forward, policy frameworks need to ensure that policies are more
symmetrical over the financial cycle, so as to avoid the risks of entrenching instability and
eventually running out of policy ammunition.

Coming from the head of the BIS, the statement I have highlighted is quite remarkable. He
is basically saying (along with his predecessor, William White) that quantitative easing as it is
currently practiced is highly problematical. We wasted the past five years by avoiding balance
sheet repair and trying to stimulate demand. His analysis perfectly mirrors the one Jonathan Tepper
and I laid out in our book Code Red.

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age 7

How Does the Economy Adjust to Asset Purchases?
In 2011 the Bank of England gave us a paper outlining what they expected to be the
consequences of quantitative easing. Note that in the chart below they predict exactly what we
have seen. Real (inflation-adjusted) asset prices rise in the initial phase. Nominal demand rises
slowly, and there is a lagging effect on real GDP. But note what happens when a central bank
begins to flatten out its asset purchases or what is called broad money in the graph: real asset
prices begin to fall rather precipitously, and consumer price levels rise. I must confess that I look at
the graph and scratch my head and go, I can understand why you might want the first phase, but
what in the name of the wide, wide world of sports are you going to do for policy adjustment in the
second phase? Clearly the central bankers thought this QE thing was a good idea, but from my
seat in the back of the plane it seems like they are expecting a rather bumpy ride at some point in
the future.



Lets go to the quote in the BoE paper that explains this graph (emphasis mine):

The overall effect of asset purchases on the macroeconomy can be broken down into two
stages: an initial impact phase and an adjustment phase, during which the stimulus from
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age 8

asset purchases works through the economy, as illustrated in Chart 1. As discussed above,
in the impact phase, asset purchases change the composition of the portfolios held by the
private sector, increasing holdings of broad money and decreasing those of medium and
long-term gilts. But because gilts [gilts is the English term for bonds] and money are
imperfect substitutes, this creates an initial imbalance. As asset portfolios are rebalanced,
asset prices are bid up until equilibrium in money and asset markets is restored. This is
reinforced by the signalling channel and the other effects of asset purchases already
discussed, which may also act to raise asset prices. Through lower borrowing costs and
higher wealth, asset prices then raise demand, which acts to push up the consumer price
level.

[Quick note: I think Lacy Hunt thoroughly devastated the notion that there is a wealth
effect and that rising asset prices affect demand in last weeks Outside the Box. Lacy gives us the
results of numerous studies which show the theory to be wrong. Nevertheless, many economists
and central bankers cling to the wealth effect like shipwrecked sailors to a piece of wood on a
stormy sea. Now back to the BoE.]

In the adjustment phase, rising consumer and asset prices raise the demand for money
balances and the supply of long-term assets. So the initial imbalance in money and asset
markets shrinks, and real asset prices begin to fall back. The boost to demand
therefore diminishes and the price level continues to increase but by smaller amounts.
The whole process continues until the price level has risen sufficiently to restore real
money balances, real asset prices and real output to their equilibrium levels. Thus, from a
position of deficient demand, asset purchases should accelerate the return of the economy
to equilibrium.

This is the theory under which central banks of the world are operating. Look at this rather
cool chart prepared by my team (and specifically Worth Wray). The Fed (with a few notable
exceptions on the FOMC) has been openly concerned about deflationary trends. They are
purposely trying to induce a higher target inflation. The problem is, the inflation is only showing
up in stock prices and not just in large-cap equity markets but in all assets around the world that
price off of the supposedly risk-free rate of return.
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age 9



I hope you get the main idea, because understanding this dynamic is absolutely critical for
navigating what the Chairman of the South African Reserve Bank, Gill Marcus, is calling the next
phase of the global financial crisis. Every asset price (yes, even and especially in emerging
markets) that has been driven higher by unnaturally low interest rates, quantitative easing, and
forward guidance must eventually fall back to earth as real interest rates eventually normalize.

Trickle-Down Monetary Policy

For all intents and purposes we have adopted a trickle-down monetary policy, one which
manifestly does not work and has served only to enrich financial institutions and the already
wealthy. Now I admit that I benefit from that, but its a false type of enrichment, since it has come
at the expense of the general economy, which is where true wealth is created. I would rather have
my business and investments based on something more stably productive, thank you very much.

Monetary policies implemented by central banks around the world are beginning to diverge
in a major way. And dont look now, but that sort of divergence almost always spells disaster for
all or part of the global economy. Which is why Indian Central Bank Governor Rajan is pounding
the table for more coordinated policies. He can see what is going to happen to cross-border capital
flows and doesnt appreciate being caught in the middle of the field of fire with hardly more than a
small pistol to defend himself. And the central banks even smaller than his are bringing only a
knife to the gunfight.
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age 10


The Fed & BoE Are Heading for the Exits

In the United States, Federal Reserve Chairwoman Janet Yellen is clearly signaling her
interest if not outright intent to turn the Feds steady $10 billion tapering of its $55
billion/month quantitative easing program into a more formal exit strategy. The Fed is still actively
expanding its balance sheet, but by a smaller amount after every FOMC meeting (so far) and
global markets are already nervously anticipating any move to sell QE-era assets or explicitly raise
rates. Just like Chinas slowdown (which we have written about extensively), the Feds eventual
exit will be a global event with major implications for the rest of the world. And US rate
normalization could drastically disrupt cross-border real interest rate differentials and trigger the
strongest wave of emerging-market balance of payments crises since the 1930s.

In the United Kingdom, Bank of England Governor Mark Carney is carefully broadcasting
his intent to hike rates before selling QE-era assets. According to his view, financial markets tend
to respond rather mechanically to rate hikes, but unwinding the BoEs bloated balance sheet could
trigger a series of unintended and potentially destructive consequences. Delaying those asset sales
indefinitely and leaning on rate targeting once more allows him to guide the BoE toward tightening
without giving up the ability to rapidly reverse course if financial markets freeze. Then again,
Carney may be making a massive, credibility-cracking mistake.

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age 11



While the BoJ & ECB Are Just Getting Started

In Japan, Bank of Japan Governor Haruhiko Kuroda is resisting the equity markets call for
additional asset purchases as the Abe administration implements its national sales tax increase
precisely the same mistake that triggered Japans 1997 recession. As I have written repeatedly,
Japan is the most leveraged government in the world, with a government debt-to-GDP ratio of
more than 240%. Against the backdrop of a roughly $6 trillion economy, Japan needs to inflate
away something like 150% to 200% of its current debt-to-GDP thats roughly $9 trillion to $12
trillion in todays dollars.

Think about that for a moment. At some point I need to do a whole letter on this, but I
seriously believe the Bank of Japan will print something on the order of $8 trillion (give or take)
over the next six to ten years. In relative terms, this is the equivalent of the US Federal Reserve
printing $32 trillion. To think this will have no impact on the world is simply to ignore how capital
flows work. Japan is a seriously large economy with a seriously powerful central bank. This is not
Greece or Argentina. This is going to do some damage.

I have no idea whether Japans BANG! moment is just around the corner or still several
years off, but rest assured that Governor Kuroda and his colleagues at the Bank of Japan will
respond to economic weakness with more and more and more easing over the coming years.

In the euro area, European Central Bank Chairman Mario Draghi with unexpected
support from his two voting colleagues from the German Bundesbank is finally signaling that
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age 12

more quantitative easing may be on the way to lower painfully high exchange rates that constrain
competitiveness and to raise worryingly low inflation rates that can precipitate a debt crisis by
steepening debt-growth trajectories. This QE will be disguised under the rubric of fighting
inflation, and all sorts of other euphemisms will be applied to it, but at the end of the day, Europe
will have joined in an outright global currency war.

I dont expect the Japanese and Europeans to engage in modest quantitative easing. Both
central banks are getting ready to hit the panic button in response to too-low inflation, steepening
debt trajectories, and inconveniently strong exchange rates.

While the Federal Reserve, European Central Bank, Swiss National Bank, Bank of
England, and Bank of Japan have collectively grown their balance sheets to roughly $9 trillion
today, the next wave of asset purchases could more than double that balance in relatively quick
order.

This is what I mean by Code Red: frantic pounding on the central bank panic button that
invites tit-for-tat retaliation around the world and especially by emerging-market central banks,
leading to a DOUBLING of the assets shown in the chart below and a race to the bottom, as the
guardians of the worlds primary currencies become their executioners.



The opportunity for a significant policy mistake from a major central bank is higher today
than ever. I share Bill Whites concern about Japan. I worry about China and seriously hope they
can keep their deleveraging and rebalancing under control, although I doubt that many parts of the
world are ready for a China that only grows at 3 to 4% for the next five years. That will cause a
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age 13

serious adjustment in many business and government models.

It is time to hit the send button, but let me close with the point that was made graphically in
the Bank of Englands chart back in the middle of the letter. Once central bank asset purchases
cease, the BoE expects real asset prices to fall a lot. You will notice that there is no scale on the
vertical axis and no timeline along the bottom of the chart. No one really knows the timing. My
friend Doug Kass has an interview (subscribers only) in Barrons this week, talking about how to
handle what he sees as a bubble.

Sell in May and go away might be a very good adage to remember.

Amsterdam, Brussels, Geneva, San Diego, Rome, and Tuscany

I leave Tuesday night for Amsterdam to speak on Thursday afternoon for VBA
Beleggingsprofessionals. There will be a debate-style format around the theme of Are there any
safe havens left in this volatile world? I plan to write my letter from Amsterdam on Friday and
then play tourist on Saturday in that delightful city full of wonderful museums. Then, if all goes
well, I will rent a car and take a leisurely drive to Brussels through the countryside, something I
have always wanted to do. I may try to get lost, at least for a few hours. Who knows what you
might stumble on?

I will be speaking Monday night in Brussels for my good friend Geert Wellens of
Econopolis Wealth Management before we fly to Geneva for another speech with his firm, and of
course there will be the usual meetings with clients and friends. I find Geneva the most irrationally
expensive city I travel to, and the current exchange rates dont suggest I will find anything
different this time.

I come back for a few days before heading to San Diego and my Strategic Investment
Conference, cosponsored with Altegris. I have spent time with each of the speakers over the last
few weeks, going over their topics, and I have to tell you, I am like a kid in a candy store, about as
excited as I can get. This is going to be one incredible conference. You really want to make an
effort to get there, but if you cant, be sure to listen to the audio CDs. You can get a discounted
rate by purchasing prior to the conference.

The Dallas weather may be an analogy for the current economic environment. To look out
my window is to see nothing but blue sky with puffy little clouds, and the temperature is perfect.
My good friend and business partner Darrell Cain will be arriving in a little bit for a late lunch.
Well go somewhere and sit outside and then move on to an early Dallas Mavericks game against
the San Antonio Spurs. Contrary to expectations, the Mavs actually trounced the Spurs down in
San Antonio last week. Of course the local fans would like to see that trend continue, but I would
not encourage my readers to place any bets on the Mavericks winning the current playoff series.

I live only a few blocks from American Airlines Center, and so normally on such a
beautiful day we would leisurely walk to the game. But the local weather aficionados are warning
us that while we are at the game tornadoes and hail may appear, along with the attendant severe
thunderstorms. That kind of thing can happen in Texas. Then again, it could all blow south of here.
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age 14

That sort of thing also happens.

So when I warn people of an impending potential central bank policy mistake, which would
be the economic equivalent of tornadoes and hail storms, I also have to acknowledge that the
whole thing could blow away and miss us entirely. I think someone once said that the role of
economists is to make weathermen look good. Recently, 67 out of 67 economists said they expect
interest rates to rise this year. Well review that prediction at the end of the year.

Ive been interrupted while trying to finish this letter by daughter Tiffani, who is frantically
trying to figure out how to buy tickets to get us to Italy (Tuscany) for the first part of June for a
little vacation (along with a few friends who will be visiting). I am going to take advantage of
being in Rome at the end of that trip, in order to spend a few days with my friend Christian
Menegatti, the managing director of research for Roubini Global Economics. We will spend June
16-17

visiting with local businessmen, economists, central bankers, and politicians. Or thats the
plan. If youd like to be part of that visit, drop me a note.

Finally I should note that my Canadian partners, Nicola Wealth Management, are opening a
new office in Toronto. They will be having a special event there on May 8. If youre in the area,
you may want to check it out.

Have a great week, and make sure you take a little time to enjoy life. Avoid tornadoes.

Your hoping for a major upset analyst,


John Mauldin


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