Reachin Resolution: Public Sector Dispute Resolution System
Reachin Resolution: Public Sector Dispute Resolution System
A Guide to Designing
Public Sector
Dispute Resolution Systems
Contents
FORWARD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1
STEP 6 – Implementation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
CONTACT INFORMATION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
Forward
The Dispute Resolution Office
It is undeniable that mediation and other dispute resolution techniques are important tools. The
Ministry of Attorney General established the Dispute Resolution Office (DRO) in 1996 with a
view to developing and implementing the widest possible range of dispute resolution options in
the court system and in government generally. To this end, the DRO provides advice and
information, develops dispute resolution policy and programs, conducts research into dispute
resolution-related issues, and acts as a liaison between dispute resolution resources both inside
and outside of government. The DRO exists to help people use mediation and other dispute
resolution processes better and more often.
In response to the demand for information about public sector dispute resolution design, the
DRO has developed this guide. While it is not an exhaustive resource, it is a useful starting
point for agencies or organizations interested in the use of mediation or other collaborative
approaches to conflict.
Clearly, a well planned and articulated dispute resolution system is not only preferable but
crucial to the efficient functioning to most public agencies or bodies. A strong system is one in
which processes for dealing with disputes are organized along a continuum. At one end are
dispute resolution options which afford disputants the most control over the process and the
outcome (e.g. negotiation and mediation). At the other end are options in which disputants
exercise little control over the process and the outcome is imposed (e.g. adjudication).
Dispute resolution design attempts to tailor the conflict resolution options to the specific needs
of an organization, including the volume and frequency of disputes with which it is faced. Any
organization can benefit from considering dispute resolution design since even undertaking an
initial assessment of whether a dispute resolution system is appropriate raises awareness of the
organization's structure and functioning.
1. Access: that appropriate options for preventing conflicts and resolving them at every stage
of a dispute be available and easily accessible.
2. Community Participation: that conflict resolution resources exist within various
communities and that these communities, in appropriate circumstances, assume an active
role in resolving disputes.
3. Individual Satisfaction: that dispute resolution options maximize individual involvement
and satisfaction with the process.
4. Equality: that dispute resolution processes be structured to balance power inequities
between the parties.
5. Quality of Resolutions: that settlements be fair and equitable and that the parties
honour them.
6. Efficiency: that dispute resolution options:
(a) be well-matched to the dispute,
(b) be cost-effective, and
(c) minimize delay in reaching resolution.
7. Awareness:
(a) that the public be aware of alternative dispute resolution options;
(b) that individuals understand how co-operative approaches to dispute resolution
work.
Design team members may be drawn from both internal and external sources. Possible
internal stakeholders include:
• decision makers within the current dispute resolution process
(e.g. tribunal members)
In the end, conflict management systems will be more effective if they are designed with, not
for, those who use or are affected by them. This has not been the traditional approach, but it
is strongly recommended. While it can add time and complexity to the task of designing the
system, this approach has two important implications. First, those who use the system can
provide a great deal of practical information about what will and will not work. Second,
stakeholders who have participated in the design ultimately own the design, with the result
that there is better buy-in, significantly reducing the number of potential implementation
problems.
Resources and time permitting, engaging external stakeholders should go beyond a simple
public consultation stage and embrace an active collaborative process. A collaborative
process is not simply submitting public feedback and responding to the concerns raised. In
a collaborative process, stakeholders work directly with the agency in building or improving
the agency's dispute resolution system.
There are many other advantages of engaging the users of a dispute resolution system in its
establishment or renovation. Collaborative design processes are useful for building trust
among diverse communities. Second, such processes can help to ensure that issues,
especially those which cut across jurisdictional lines, are dealt with in a comprehensive way.
This, in turn, will not only improve the quality of dispute resolution options but ensure public
resources are used in the most efficient way possible. Third, directly involving stakeholders
in the design process provides an excellent educational opportunity since they will return
and report their progress to their constituencies. Finally, it is an effective way to establish or
to improve ongoing relationships. As people work through differences to reach a
collaborative approach to dispute resolution design, hopefully, they will develop a greater
sense of understanding and camaraderie, which will forge a stronger base for future
cooperation.
Particular attention should be paid to those stakeholders who seem resistant to the
introduction of changes. Including them on the design team may prove an effective way to
offer reassurance. The more they participate in designing the ultimate dispute resolution
system, the more likely they will embrace the new changes.
Effective communication between members of the design team lies at the heart of ensuring
that the team acts with a common purpose. Members of the team bring different experience
and knowledge with them to the table. Some may be very knowledgeable about dispute
resolution. Others may possess extensive information about the organization and its history.
Allowing team members to educate one another so that everyone is working with the same
basic information ensures that the team best capitalize on its full potential.
C. Workplan
The next step for the design team is to create a work plan outlining specific tasks, deadlines
and the people responsible for those targets. Such a plan provides focus to the design
project and helps to ensure that the project does not get bogged down.
The answers to these questions will greatly impact the design process. For example, if
the purpose of the agency is to resolve external disputes, such as a human rights body or
a public complaints commission, then it is more likely to establish a sophisticated array
of dispute resolution options. On the other hand, if the disputes are internal, then
perhaps a less formal mechanism, with an emphasis on improving the organization's
communication structure would be most suitable.
The roots of disputes are equally influential for the design team. Consider a government
body that is faced with public resistance to land-use decisions based on environmental
concerns. Assume that the public agency is responsible for building a pipeline, and the
public fears that owl habitant will be detrimentally affected by the planned project.
Factual information about owl habitat and nesting areas is at the heart of finding a
workable resolution. Such fact-driven disputes may lend themselves to dispute
resolution techniques such as joint fact-finding sessions.
In contrast, if the dispute is interpersonal, an apology might be the necessary first step to
resolution. Unaddressed emotional needs may block other dispute resolution
techniques.
(2) Number
• How many disputes does the organization experience?
• Which disputes are most prevalent?
• How frequent are disputes?
• Does the volume of disputes fluctuate over time?
Again, the answers to these questions will influence the design of a dispute resolution
system. If few complaints arise, then an organization may choose to focus on improving
how those disputes are addressed rather than using its resources to try to prevent
disputes in the first place.
An analysis of the frequency of conflicts may provide valuable insight with respect to
structural roots of conflict or bring to light any important facts. For example, if the level
of conflict suddenly spikes after the implementation of a new policy, it may be a sign that
(3) Disputants
• Who are the parties to a typical dispute?
• Do the same parties appear time and again?
• Are they sophisticated users of the system?
• Are they normally represented by lawyers or advocates?
• Is the preservation of ongoing relationships important?
• Is there an actual or perceived imbalance of power between disputants?
• Are they individuals or organizations?
• Does the agency have an ongoing relationship with the parties?
• Does the agency always serve the same pool of disputants?
Any dispute resolution system must carefully consider the needs and expectations of its
users. If the users of the system are unrepresented members of the general public, then
the dispute resolution options should be straightforward and easy to use. This is less
important if the users are professional advocates or lawyers.
If ongoing relationships are at stake, then dispute resolution options that are weighted to
party control of both procedure and outcome are likely preferable. Parties that actively
participate in crafting a solution to a given conflict are more likely to abide by that
agreement and are more likely to be satisfied with it than those on whom a solution is
imposed by a third party.
C. Current System
• If there is one, what is the current process for resolving disputes?
• Is there legislation that prescribes any aspect of the process?
• Are there written policies and guidelines that govern the process?
• How is the system tracked?
• How much does it cost?
• Do disputants, staff or other stakeholders express dissatisfaction with the process?
If so, how do they express that dissatisfaction, and what are their concerns?
• What are the strengths of the current system? What makes them work?
Of course, it is not sensible to begin a new design project without first taking stock of what
is already present. If there is an existing dispute resolution system, then building on its
strengths whilst attempting to correct its weaknesses will be an important task for the
design team. Mandatory elements of the system, such as those required by legislation or
policy will need to be taken into account.
Other barriers to change may lie in objective circumstances. The organization may be
strapped for resources or lack the leadership required to spearhead change.
Flexibility – The system must take into account the needs of a multicultural or otherwise
diverse client base.
Coordination – The delivery of the dispute resolution process should be coordinated with all
other agency or ministry functions.
Quality – Standards for training, service delivery and professional performance should be of
the highest level and guaranteed by regular evaluations and assessments.
B. Objectives
Dispute resolution processes should be applied only where they can be effective, and they
should not be overburdened with expectations. Possible objectives include:
• dispute resolution
• enhanced privancy and confidentiality
Ultimately, the success of the project will be measured against these objectives and
guiding principles.
Managing to resolution – The traditional approach to dispute resolution has been to place
all disputes on a procedural track aimed towards adjudication, relying on the fact that most
will resolve before actually reaching the hearing. In other words, even though most cases
settle, they are still managed and administered as if they will be adjudicated. An alternative
approach is to recognize that settlement is the norm not adjudication and, thus, to design
systems and create policy to support settlement at every stage of case administration.
Adopting this latter approach facilitates earlier settlements by expressly managing for and
towards resolution.
Bringing ADR into administrative law involves more than just simply engrafting
upon the mandate of an agency additional statutory powers authorizing mediation
and arbitration. It requires thinking deeply about regulation, government, law and
administration.
Conciliation can range from a approach that is essentially mediation with a more
interventionist third party or shuttle negotiations where the third party neutral shuttles
between the disputants who are unwilling to meet in person.
Facilitation includes the use of techniques to improve the flow of information in a meeting
between parties to a dispute, or in a decision-making meeting.
Joint fact finding involves disputants choosing a neutral fact finder who investigates,
reviews documents, and interviews witnesses to determine the facts in a dispute.
Neutral evaluation is a process in which parties obtain from an experienced (and possibly
expert) neutral third party a non-binding, reasoned evaluation of their case on its merits. The
opinion or assessment is expected to have persuasive value, especially because the neutral
third party is jointly selected.
Med-Arb, short for mediation-arbitration, is a process in which one person acts first as a
mediator and then as an arbitrator. If the initial mediation is unsuccessful, the mediator
becomes an arbitrator and makes a binding decision.
Adjudication refers to any dispute resolution process in which a neutral third party hears
each party's evidence and arguments and renders a decision that is binding on them. This
includes arbitration and litigation.
Interest-based mediation, in contrast, involves framing the dispute not in terms of legal
rights but rather in terms of the parties' underlying concerns, goals, and needs. These are
the reasons behind the bargaining position of a party. The job of the mediator in this model
is to help the parties avoid getting locked into inflexible positions while identifying the real
issues and desires motivating a parties' bargaining stance. Positions, what parties say they
want in a mediation session, and the underlying interests motivating those positions are
often very divergent. For example, in a family mediation where the custodial parent wishes
to relocate to a different city to take up a new job, the non-custodial parent's opening
position may simply be an abject refusal. The underlying interest may be the desire to play a
meaningful role in the children's lives. Clearly, taking the dispute to the level of the parties'
deepest needs and desires creates more room to craft a creative solution.
Not only is interest-based approach attractive due to the increased range of potential
solutions, but also because it does not generate losers and winners. As a result of its
consensual nature, it is an invaluable tool for agencies that are seeking to increase party
satisfaction rates and more enduring agreements.
Generally, the DRO promotes the use of interest-based mediation. Its strength is its ability to
uncover and address the true roots of conflict, resulting in resolutions that are more
satisfying to the parties. However, in some circumstances, a more evaluative approach may
be appropriate, particularly where resolutions must conform to statutory standards. This is
discussed in greater detail below, in Section F.
Beginning with the least involved dispute resolution options, negotiations are well suited to
disputes that are uncomplicated or to disputes where the parties enjoy similar degrees of
power. Thus, when two levels of government disagree about the funding levels of a cost-
share program, the natural starting point is negotiation, something which would likely not
take place if the dispute involved an individual and the state.
Neutral evaluation is often used in tandem with mediation. It is particularly useful when
the parties are close to reaching an agreement but where unrealistic expectations are
creating a stumbling block. Unrealistic expectations on the part of the disputants may arise
in any conflict but may prove to be a special challenge for those bodies whose purpose is to
resolve disputes of unrepresented people. For example, many human rights commissions
are built around the notion that disputants will not have lawyers until a complaint is referred
to a hearing. Thus, for the bulk of the complaint process, parties are unlikely to have
received independent advice from a neutral party. To compound the problem, parties often
have had no previous experience with administrative tribunals and so may have no idea as to
typical settlement terms. In such situations, a neutral evaluation session conducted by an
impartial third party expert may prove invaluable as a "reality check." After the neutral
evaluation session, parties often resolve the dispute by negotiation or mediation.
If an organization deals frequently with factual disputes, then joint fact finding may be an
important option to build into any dispute resolution system. Disputes that involve asset
valuation provide a good illustration. Consider a public body that wishes to expropriate
private property for a public project such as a highway. A factual determination of what the
land value will always be at issue. Rather than engaging in a battle of the experts, it may
save time and resources for both parties to agree on the person to carry out the property
assessment at the beginning. It may also be an important way to build trust between the
parties early on in the process and to balance power between an individual and a
government.
Settlement conferences, case conferences, and pre-trial conferences can be very helpful
to agencies with quasi-judicial adjudicative functions, especially for that portion of the
caseload which is more complicated than normal, or for decision-making bodies with very
large caseloads. These case management tools can be used to identify those cases which
are likely to be responsive to early settlement processes. Factors to consider in applying
case management options include the number of parties, issues, and the presence of highly
technical matters.
Research reveals that settlement conferences are a useful tool for public bodies whose
mandate is regulatory in nature. For example, a provincial energy board used settlement
conferences when deciding how to tie natural gas rates to environmental costs and benefits.
The board reported that holding settlement conferences was particularly well suited to these
kinds of multi-party disputes.
(1) General
There are a number of ways conflicts enter non-adjudicative dispute resolution streams:
Mandatory by order of tribunal – Tribunals can be given the power to order parties to
mediation or other dispute resolution processes. This type of power fits well with a
closely case managed system, where the tribunal provides oversight and direction for
each case and so has more knowledge about how the case might best be resolved.
Party driven – In a party driven process, one party to the dispute can compel the other
parties to participate in the non-adjudicative process. This is a process unique to B.C.,
where the "Notice to Mediate", as it is called, is available for most civil, non-family
actions in Supreme Court. To date, it has not been used outside the court process but
remains an option to consider for organizations that want to go beyond a voluntary
model but are not prepared to embrace a fully mandatory one.
(2) When Disputes are Ill-suited for Non Adjudicative Dispute Resolution
In the enthusiasm for conciliatory processes like mediation, it is easy to overlook the fact
that some disputes are still best resolved by adjudication. Factors that may indicate the
necessity of an adjudicated decision include:
• The dispute involves a decision over which a statutory decision-maker had no
discretion. In some cases, in the presence of certain factors, a statutory decision
maker is required to make a certain decision. On an appeal of that decision,
mediation, for example, is pointless since there is no negotiable issue.
• A legal precedent is needed to govern similar cases in the future. However, many
tribunals are not bound by precedent and so this factor may not apply.
• An issue of law, public policy or interpretation needs to be clarified on the record.
The tribunal may desire an elaboration of a particular issue of law or policy and, in
some cases, a hearing may be seen as the best way to accomplish that.
• Public access or participation in the decision or resolution is desirable and cannot be
accomplished in the non-adjudicative process. It should be noted, however, the
collaborative dispute resolution has been used very successfully in many multi-
stakeholder processes involving broad stakeholder participation.
• People who are not parties to the dispute might be prejudiced by the outcome. One
of the tenets of collaborative decision making is that the interests of those affected by
the outcome should be represented at the table. If that is not possible, a hearing may
be required.
• The constitutional validity of an act or law is challenged. Obviously, a tribunal is not
going to submit questions of constitutional validity to a collaborative decision making
process. However, getting parties around a table discussing their interests in the
substance of the dispute can sometimes forestall constitutional or other challenges
that may be being used in a tactical way.
• The case is genuinely frivolous or opportunistic—tribunals will not want to waste
resources on attempting to settle with parties bringing truly frivolous or vexatious
cases, particularly if the hearing process allows for some type of summary
determination and dismissal.
For quasi judicial adjudicative agencies, a balance must be struck between providing an
early opportunity for collaborative resolution and ensuring that the agency has sufficient
information to screen out frivolous complaints. Some commentators point out that
pre-investigation mediation may be unfair and unnecessary if the complaint is
unfounded. On the other hand, if the agency waits too long, the benefits of early
settlement may be lost.
One possibility is to provide information about the agency's dispute resolution processes
as early as possible (e.g. at formalization of a complaint) rather than to provide the
services themselves. The advantage of this option is that it is timely and may help avoid
entrenched and defensive positions while at the same time making no assumptions
about the merits of the conflict.
E. Confidentiality
Confidentiality is fundamental to some DR processes. In particular, mediation, where the
parties are more likely to engage in a frank discussion of their interests - and be open to
considering a range of solutions—if they can be sure that the information shared will not
become evidence in an adjudicative proceeding. There are three issues to consider in
developing policy or legislation around confidentiality: compellability, non-disclosure, and
freedom of information legislation.
Compellability – Parties may want to ensure that no one who attended the mediation or
other DR process can be compelled to give evidence in subsequent proceedings (for
example, court proceedings or hearings by a tribunal).
Non-Disclosure – Parties also want to ensure that parties cannot disclose information
shared during the mediation in subsequent proceedings.
Although information released under FOIPPA may become public, it will continue to be
subject to any non-compellability and non-disclosure provisions in the legislation. In other
words, just because information is released to a person or organization under FOIPPA, that
does not mean it can be used in any other process.
Agreement – Parties are usually asked to sign an "Agreement to Mediate" which includes
confidentiality provisions.
Common law – The common law, the law developed by judges on a case by case basis,
protects the confidentiality of settlement discussions by the doctrine of settlement
privilege or the "without prejudice rule". This rule of privilege has been applied to protect
the confidentiality of mediation discussions.
On the other hand, one potential disadvantage of using staff is that of perceived bias.
First, the performance of staff mediators and their ability to succeed within the
organization may depend on their ability to resolve cases. This might mean that they
pursue settlement too zealously and are not objective about recognizing when the
As with staff mediators, concerns about bias or the perception of bias may need to be
addressed. For example, board members who have previously acted as neutrals in a case
may be barred from sitting as adjudicators if the matter does not settle. Exceptions to
this principle may apply to processes which envision the neutral becoming an arbitrator
(e.g. med-arb) or where parties expressly consent to the board member's dual role.
The risk of relying on external neutrals is twofold. First, they are often quite expensive:
the cost of a professional mediator for a two to five day hearing may range from $5,000 to
$30,000. Second, private contractors may not be familiar with the specific subject area or
regulatory context of a dispute. This, in turn, may generate distrust as one party may
doubt the ability of the neutral to truly understand "our type of disputes." This problem is
sometimes overcome by the development of specialist neutrals known to have subject-
matter expertise and the particular dispute resolution skills needed in a particular sector.
Labour arbitrators and mediators, for example, are a specialized subset of dispute
resolution professionals.
If external mediators are used, their qualifications and experience will be important.
Existing rosters, such as the B.C. Mediator Roster, with high standards for membership
provide a useful starting point.
One way is to require the neutral to be more directive or evaluative. To explain, there is a
continuum of styles of mediation. At the facilitative end of the continuum, the mediator tries
to help parties reach a settlement on their own terms without intervening in the substance of
the dispute. At the evaluative end, the mediator asserts a greater degree of control over
possible outcomes, providing information to the parties about appropriate settlement terms.
Consistency is key. Whether the agency mandates its dispute resolution providers to be
strictly neutral or whether the provider is to attempt to shape the dispute resolution process
to conform to the agency's public interest goals, the agency's expectations of its dispute
resolution providers must be clearly articulated. Inconsistent approaches result in
inconsistent outcomes and undermine not only the dispute resolution process but the
agency itself.
This being said, adopting a more directive or evaluative role in collaborative processes, such
as mediation raises difficult issues. For example:
• in a process where the parties do not require the agency's intervention to resolve the
dispute, disputants who are not satisfied with the directive role taken by the neutral
could take their dispute entirely outside the agency's process and therefore remove
themselves from the public policy goals of that agency;
• dispute resolution providers playing a more interventionist role must have sufficient
knowledge, experience and insight with respect to the range of acceptable outcomes
and must act consistently; and
• in contrast to an adjudicative process, if a dispute resolution provider is incorrect in his
interpretation of the acceptable outcomes and steers parties to a particular outcome on
the basis of faulty information, the parties may have no recourse.
It is debatable whether public funds should be used to support a dispute resolution system
that does not reflect and promote its mandate. There are alternatives. Agencies may choose
to exercise their supervisory roles not through the vehicle of the mediator but rather by
approving settlements or by streaming cases involving significant public policy issues to
more adjudicative processes.
Some commentators believe that only formal adjudicative processes are able to protect the
weaker party to a dispute. The DRO believes that the real issue is not about adjudication but
about fairness. Where power differentials become so great as to render consensual dispute
resolution processes meaningless, those processes either should not be employed or, if they
are, the dispute resolution provider has an obligation to end the session. While power
balances are sometimes difficult to recognize or predict and can shift in the course of a
dispute, experienced dispute resolution providers in carefully designed dispute resolution
systems can address this potential problem by employing strategies such as:
At a minimum, agencies should ensure that settlement terms are committed to writing and
signed. In addition, for long-term planning purposes, agencies may also wish to oblige
parties to file their agreements with them (perhaps anonymously to protect confidentiality),
Of course, not all disputes will be resolved in their entirety or at all. The design plan will
need to address what will happen to these cases. For example, if collaborative approaches
do not result in agreement, then parties may be routed back to an adjudicative track to
resolve the remaining issues.
(2) Enforcement
There are a number of approaches to monitoring and enforcing mediated settlements. The
approach taken by the agency depends on the extent to which it wishes to exercise oversight
over the outcome of the dispute resolution process. Options range from least intrusive to
most intrusive as follows:
Withdrawal – Parties who have reached agreement can simply withdraw their case from
the agency's conflict resolution process.
Parties file settlement – The agency can act as a depository for settlement agreements.
This may raise issues of confidentiality.
Agency order confirming that a settlement is reached – This agency simply records
the bare existence of a settlement via an order and then closes the case.
Agency order reflecting the settlement terms – The agency makes the terms of
settlement public through the vehicle of a formal order. As well, the agency's
enforcement powers will be engaged by any breach of the agreement.
Settlement approval – The agency takes an active supervisory role by approving terms
of settlement.
The less intrusive enforcement options such as withdrawal are well suited to public bodies
that do not have a strong public interest mandate and which encounter few conflicts. Such
bodies are unlikely to be constrained by statutory or policy considerations and consequently
have less of an interest in fulfilling a supervisory role.
Agencies in which dispute resolution is a primary function may be more inclined to track
typical settlement terms. However, a distinction must be drawn between those agencies that
are designed to influence behaviours or exert moral suasion and those whose principal task
is simply to manage and resolve large volumes of disputes as effectively as possible.
Agencies with a public interest mandate are more inclined to track settlement terms closely
and publicize them. Thus, bodies entrusted to protect constitutional or quasi-constitutional
rights such as human rights agencies may prefer public orders or settlement approval.
Those in the second category such as commercial arbitration boards are more likely to
choose options that preserve greater confidentiality such as the settlement depository
model.
1. ADR system design training – For those responsible for designing and implementing
the system. The objective is to provide a framework (such as this one) to guide systems
design.
2. ADR awareness training – For executive, senior managers, lawyers, supervisors,
operational staff and clients. The objective is to introduce basic concepts, show the
benefits of ADR and gain support and overcome resistance.
3. ADR methods and skills training – For program managers and staff actively involved in
ADR. The objective is to provide the knowledge and skill in the use of ADR methods
needed to build an effective ADR program.
4. Program specific ADR systems and procedural training –For program managers and
staff actively involved in ADR. The objective is to provide agency specific information to
those who use ADR methods.
5. ADR skills, training (advanced) – For neutral third parties.
While comprehensive training in all five categories may not be required, the list provides
some insight of where training might be beneficial.
Training can be obtained from established programs such as those offered at the Justice
Institute of British Columbia or private trainers. It may also be possible to use mentors.
Pairing less experienced dispute resolution providers with more senior people can be a very
productive way to build skills and confidence.
B. Qualifications
All dispute resolution providers should adhere to some minimum qualification standards.
Such standards could be set by the government agency itself or by an established roster or
professional body. There is a large body of literature on dispute resolution qualifications to
guide the design team in this area.
Another idea is to set up an implementation team including staff from the pilot's location. This
allows for fine-tuning of the design option being tested in the pilot and ensures integration with
operational practices. Integration of design and operations is so important because staff are
more likely to oppose a pilot project if they perceive it as simply an additional layer to their
workload.
Another option is to implement the dispute resolution design in stages. The advantage of this
strategy is that it is easier to marshal the resources required for the project over time.
Whatever approach is adopted, there will always be room for continued improvement. As a
result, the agency should develop ways to monitor the success of its design plan and make
changes as needed. A public feedback or complaints process would be an invaluable tool to
that end.
B. Evaluation Plans
Evaluation methods will vary depending on what aspect of the program is at issue.
Organizations implementing a dispute resolution system from scratch will likely wish to
conduct a general assessment. Those wishing to improve or streamline an existing dispute
resolution program may wish to undertake a more focused evaluation, such as determining
Identify Participants
(e.g., users: dispute resolution providers, clients, lawyers, etc.)
Discuss Findings
(e.g., tailor to fit audience: written report,
oral briefing or informal memorandum)
– JUNE 2003 –
#AG03103