Tesco (2012) Merged Merged
Tesco (2012) Merged Merged
Tesco (2012) Merged Merged
TESCO
ANALYST REPORT
Volume 1, Issue 1
#1$#1$%#1&
406.10p
26 February 2011
Summary
Recommendation Target price (p) Shares (millions) BUY 485.50 8046 13.93% 0.709 2.34 14.12
ROCE (E2012) Exceptional Performance over and beyond. The four year period rec- Beta orded an increasing revenues (7% on average) and comprehensive in- P/E (E2012) come. And expected to continue to do so for the foreseeable future. International Expansion. Borrowings have increased greatly in light of the reduced interest rate (0.5%) in financing capital (Tesco bank) expenditures and expansion abroad (Mostly Asia). Tescos courage and strength to survive downturn, and potential to outperform. With the financial downturn still looming in the economy. The increase in returns generated on assets coupled with the drop in borrowing costs were some of the main contributors for the continuous growth in return o shareholders. Dividends on the Rise. Tesco has certainly proved to be successful and confident in maximising shareholders wealth. Financial year 2011 revealed the 27th consecutive increase in dividends. P/B (E2012)
Com'a(y O)er)*e+
Tesco is the third largest retail company in the world and the largest British UK retailer - in terms of profit. Tesco has proved to be a highly successful company as it comfortably operates in other sectors i.e. health, financial services - apart from its specialty, food and drinks. It operates globally in around 14 countries and continuously to gain a fine edge over its competitors (Tesco, 2013) in its ability to operate profitably, even during recession periods. Appendix 1.1 summarises Tesco SWOT analysis which reveal its strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats.
(Tesco, 2013)
O,-e./*)e o0 Re'or/
This report will examine and analyse the financial statement for Tesco for the past five years - 2008 to 2012 (including 2012E forecast). This report is divided into three different sections for full detail breakdown for analysis and interpretation purposes.
The first section of the report will analyse Tescos financial performance (Credit status and ROCE - profitability) over a four year period through the use of various useful financial analysis tools such as ratio analysis and common size analysis, in order to give a clearer transparency on Tescos performance. Tescos ratio performance will be analysed and compared with that of one of Tescos peer and major competitor - Sainsbury J Plc and the industry mean average where ever possible from a reliable source (industry average as at 26/02/2011 - Thomson One Banker) - Appendix 3.3. The second section will involve the exercise of using the common size analysis, analysts projected revenue figure (2012E) and CAGR model to forecast the financial position and performance (Income Statement) of Tesco into its fifth financial year (2012) - this will be compared with its actual 2012 performance. In addition, I will utilise the annual compound growth model in order to form my perspective on Tescos forecast income statement. Finally, the final section will attempt to calculate the - companys forecasted value of equity per share at the end of the fourth -financial year by using one equity valuation model (the Residual Earning model).
Share price movement between Tesco (Blue Line) and Sainsbury (Red Line) from 20082011
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Reformulation
In order to make an effective equity analysis of Tescos financial position and performance through the use of ratio analysis, the financial statements (i.e. Income statement) were reformulated. Reformulation separates the operating and financing items in the financial statement, compared to the traditional credit analysis which classifies them into current and long term categories (Penman, 2010). Penman (2010) reveals that a benefit of reformulation allows additional information to be brought from footnotes. The profitability analysis (ROCE) is broken down into three distinct levels. The first level is the separation of operating and financial profitability and the effects of leverage. The second break-down level are the drivers of operating profitability. Finally, the third level containsProfit margin drivers, asset turnover drivers and analysis of Net borrowing cost. I will evaluate the three break-down levels of profitably (excluding the full break-down analysis of net borrowing cost - due to lack of sufficient information in the annual reports). In addition to these ratios, I will also calculate other Credit ratios to assist in solidifying my analysis.
Return on Common Equity Return on Net Opera ng assets Opera ng ro!t "argin Asset #urno$er %inan&ia' (e$erage Net ,orro-ing Cost
ROCE RNOA
PM
Opera ng (e$erage
Ratio analysis for J SAINSBURY's: Ratios (Level 1&2)
Abbreviations
2008
2009
2010
2011
Return on Common Equity Return on Net Opera ng assets Opera ng ro!t "argin Asset #urno$er %inan&ia' (e$erage Net ,orro-ing Cost
ROCE RNOA
PM
Opera ng (e$erage
OLLEV
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ROCE (200)*2011)
0.25 0.2 0.15 0.1 0.05 0 .0.05 .0.1 .0.15
ROCE (profitability) for Tesco and J Sainsbury's were positive over the four year period - except for Sainsburys in 2009 where their profitability was negative. In 2009, Tescos profitability also declined. However,
#es&o 2 3ains4ury5s
ROCE (%)
for both company after 2009 there was steady growth in their ROCE. The decline of ROCE in 2009, could have been due to the aftershock of the credit crunch and after this
2008
200+
2010
2011
Year
ROCE movements of Tesco & Sainsbury's between the four year period.
year there was improvements. We would need to break down the ROCE into different levels in order to evaluate in detail and try to explain their respectively effects on the overall ROCE.
RNOA for both retailers were growing steadily after 2009, although Sainsburys experienced a negative RONA in 2009 (Tesco also experienced a fall in this ratio in 2009). It seems as though the recession
affected Sainsburys more than Tesco even though they operate in the Asset Turnover (efficiency) for Tesco and same industry - Tesco are the market leaders in the UK market and are Sainsburys averages at 2.30 and 2.73 reable to resist the shocks of downturns in the economy better than its spectively. Over the four year period it has
competitors. In Tescos defence for the fall in RNOA in 2009 was due been fairly stable. Even though 2009 has to the decline in Operating Income in comparison to 2008. The causes been the main focus when analysing the othof this must have been the losses on the benefit pension scheme and foreign currency translation differences. During this time the global market was still unstable and losses were made on investments and overseas transactions. Sainsburys had a negative Operating Income in 2009, although they were able to cover their cost of sales - other costs exceeded their incomes. In addition to the negative impact on RNOA was the losses made on pension schemes and lower finance income subsequently in 2009 for J Sainsburys. Operating Profit Margin (PM) was rather stable for both retailers in years 2008, 2010 & 2011 - apart from in year 2009 where both company had a decline in PM (negative in the case of Sainsburys). Although both retailers had an increased revenue in all four years the operating margin does not seem to be influenced favourably. One reason for the fall in this ratio in 2009 was due to the reason stated above (RNOA). During the rest of the other years, the stability in the ratio was caused by price wars during the recession periods. Other retailers such as Morrison's and Asda were forced to drop their price in order to compete. This explains the continuous rise in revenue, but also a proportionate rise in costs means the ratio is kept rather steady. er ratios. Surprisingly there was an adverse impact on Tesco ATO while J Sainsburys triumphed during 2009. Although Tesco generated a much higher revenue than Sainsburys during this particular period, it can be concluded that Sainsburys were more efficient in using their Net Operating assets to generate revenue - Tesco were inefficient. It is evidently clear from various sources that Tesco adopted a low-cost strategy especially during 2009. This must have trigger an anticipatory increase in demand and subsequently sales. Looking at the cash flow statement (Cash Investment) Tesco therefore invested heavily, the highest investment over the four year period - especially the extensive purchase in PPE and Investment property. Sainsburys on the other hand invested less in PPE. Thus if Tesco ought to improve their ATO they needed to recognise cautious peri-
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'M
FLEV (Financial Leverage) - Tesco were much more highly geared in comparison to Sainsburys. Especially in 2009 FLEV ratio for Tesco was at 0.96 while Sainsburys stood at 0.50. The reason for the high gearing is due to the dramatically fall in interest rates to 0.5% in 2009 (BBC News, 2013) in the UK and also Asia (Japan). The government made it relatively easier to borrow funds in order to stimulate the economy. Tesco took advantage of the historic low interest rate
Net Borrowing costs (NBC) - effective cost of borrowings for Tesco was lowest during 2008 and 2009 and a sudden increase in 2010, followed by a drop in 2011. Unlike, for Sainsburys its NBC ratio was highest during 2008 and 2009 and lowest during 2010 and 2011. From the Chart
drop while Sainsburys, still played very cau- above and the line graph below are connected and it extiously. During this year Tesco borrowed plains clearly why both retail firms experienced differences 16,450m (highest over the four year period in their Net borrowing costs. In 2010, Tescos finance costs in comparison to the previous year - were at the highest over the four year period as outstand8,056m. After this year borrowings in 2010 ing borrowings increased in the previous year. But in 2011, & 2011 didnt drop as far to 2008, rather when borrowings started to decline, this is reflected on the stayed close to 2009 borrowings. NBC ratio - as financial costs also started to drop.
On the other hand, Sainsburys increased In the case of Sainsburys, finance costs rose steadily over borrowings from 2008 to 2009 was 129m three years and dropped to its lowest in 2011. Its NBC racompared to Tesco 8,394m. In my opinion tio was expected to drop in 2011 as finance costs declined.. Sainsburys could have been reluctant to borrow due to the unstable financial markets. Although, borrowings are cheap it can bring financial distress to the firm. However, on the positive aspects of extra funds to support
(%)
operations,
according
to
Modigliani
and Miller's models (Arnold, 2012) an increase in borrowings lead to a potential increase in returns to shareholders.
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0.40 0.20 0.00 2008 200+ 2010 2011 Year #es&o 2 3ains4ury5s
loss on cash. Sainsburys OLLEV peak in 2009 was partly due to a gradual increase in Trade and other payables and a lower NOA figure. Sainsburys also experienced a steady sales growth, however in three out of the four year period delivered a decrease in cash. In this case, it seems like good news that their OLLEV is falling. But if it falls too much, it might impact adversely on sales.
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Cre !t $tat4& Ra5o& Cre6itors 7ays 3to&8 #urno$er 7ays Current Ra o 0to 11 9ui&8 Ra o 0to 11 7e4tors 7ays :nterest Co$er 0 mes1 ;ross ro!t "argin0<1 Cas= %'o- to Assets0<1 Cas= %'o- to 3a'es0<1
Ratio analysis for J Sainsbury's:
2008
2009
2010
2011
Cre !t $tat4& Ra5o& Cre6itors 7ays 3to&8 #urno$er 7ays Current Ra o 0to 11 9ui&8 Ra o 0to 11 7e4tors 7ays :nterest Co$er 0 mes1 ;ross ro!t "argin0<1 Cas= %'o- to Assets0<1 Cas= %'o- to 3a'es0<1
2008
2009
2010
2011
Debtors Days - On average, Sainsburys has a much shorter debtors days in comparison to Tesco and the industry average (11.48 days). The impact of a shorter debtors days would mean a more healthy cash flow for J Sainsburys. However, less sales on credit for Sainsburys customers thus; this strategy may have limited additional potential revenues that could have been gained. While in the case of Tesco seems to be offering more sales on credit to customers should lead to improvements in revenue, but could also increase the likelihood of bad debts. The strategy based on how much sales credit is offered depends on both retailers management (cash flow to sales ratio is the closest to reveal an insight into this). Over the four year period, debtors days for Sainsburys seem rather stable, while Tescos ratio continues to rise steadily. Reason for the rise could be due high levels of unemployment during economic downturn and offering more credit sales to attract more these type of customers. Creditors Days - Sainsburys has lower creditors days compared to Tesco over the four year period. This isnt much of a surprise as Tesco are the market leader, price setters and have the ability to obtain large economies of scale, hence obtaining better payment terms with suppliers. Tesco can be seen to have a much higher bargaining power than that of its competitors. As these days increases over the four years, the better cash flow is expected to be. Tesco are taking longer to pay its suppliers than J Sainsburys. Tesco have succeeded in maintaining good relationship with its suppliers as stated in its mission statement, in order to improve their chances of maintaining better contracts from suppliers (Clark, 2010). Sainsburys have a similar believe in maintaining closer relationship with its suppliers, but this is not reflected from this ratio. Because over the four years creditors days seems to be decreasing.
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industry (0.6:1 - Year 2011). Sainsburys current ratio looks to be fluctuating over the four years, while Tescos ratio seems to increase in 2009 and starts to drop steadily again in 2010 & 2011. Again, in reference to 2009 it is thought to be a difficult year for all retailers in this industry. However, it attained the highest current ratio in comparison to all other years due to the fall in interest rate and in turn Tescos borrowings to increase cash held. This in turn increased current assets and in turn favoured the ratio. In addition, Tesco might have needed the cash in order to survive in the short-term during 2009. Because after 2009, the cash held by Tesco (Statement of Financial position) started to decline; having studied their statement of financial position, some of these cash were used for Investments. Quick Ratio - my calculation of quick ratio is the ability for the firm to survive excluding stock. Also this ratio gives an insight as to how reliant the retailers are on stock. Once again by looking at the illustrations, Tesco seems to rely more on stocks in 2008 in comparison to other years. Through a deeper analysis, Sainsburys relied on stock the most in 2011 and relied less on stock in 2009 - as the difference between the current ratio and quick ratio revealed this insight. It comes as no surprise that in 2011, thats when cash held by Sainsburys was at its lowest over the four year period. Does this suggest confidence from Sainsburys in their stocks to sell within one year, and projected prediction for better revenue in years to come? I personally think this is true as the economy gets better. However, in 2011 industry...
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0.40 0.30 0.20 0.10 0.00 2008 200+ Year 2010 2011 Current Ratio0to 11 9ui&8 Ratio0to 11
Stock Turnover - Sainsburys has a much lower stock turnover days than Tesco and the industry average (23 days) - both averaging at 14 and 20 days respectively. Both retailers did better than industry average. Tesco took six days longer to replenish its inventory, compared to J Sainsburys. This is mainly due to the fact that Tesco holds more stocks than Sainsburys as they expect more demand, therefore takes longer to sell. Both retailer ratios seems rather steady. This is the case, if other functions of the organisation (such as marketing) have done their market research well enough to know how much demand they are expecting, in order to be able to hold the right amount of stocks they are able to sell. However, if these stocks are piled up as demand has been wrongly forecasted, costs can be incurred to the retailers - i.e. storage costs. Both retailer seems to have succeeded to a certain degree in forecasting the demands for its goods. Because over the four year period stocks are increasing for both retailers and the ratio remains fairly constant.
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twelve times interest cover. In 2010 Tesco ratio fell due to higher finance costs (579m), this must have been due to the increased in borrowings in 2009 (refer to borrowing chart in previous pages). It makes sense for the ratio to be adversely affected, especially if the borrowings in 2009 was a short-term borrowing (< 1 year) and it falls due in 2010. If this ratio was part of the determinants in dividends policy by Tesco directors in this particular year; hypothetically ordinary shareholders are less likely to receive
#es&o 3ains4ury5s
dividends - but dividends was actually received. Sainsburys had a lower interest cover rate compared to Tesco simply because Tesco had a higher Operating Income before Interest. In 2011, the Interest Cover ratio for Sainsburys was at its highest over the four year period because the finance cost was at its lowest over the four year period. One reason is because Sainsburys reduced its short-term borrowings in years 2010 & 2011 dramatically. It is unclear as
to why this strategy was implemented, even when interest rate was still low (0.5%). More positively, Operating income before interest increased during 2011.
*.00 4.00 2.00 0.00 2008 200+ Year& 2010 2011 #es&o 3ains4urys
Gross Profit - The rate of return for every 100 of sales. Tescos Gross profit kept improving over the four year period and out-performed the industry average of 6.85, mainly because of increasing turnover - even when cost of sales continued to rise. However, this is not the case for Sainsburys. They experienced a falling gross profit margin ratio in years 2009 & 2010. Although revenue improved gradually over the these period, the rate at which cost of sales was increasing was faster than the rate in which revenue was increasing. This adversely impacted on the ratio. In the fourth year Sainsbury performed below the industry benchmark The fall in gross profit shows that maybe Sainsburys are not bargaining for the lowest costs when purchasing from suppliers or they were not willing to switch to a more cheaper supplier.
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#es&o 3ains4ury5s
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My predicted Revenue was surprisingly close to the actual 2012 Revenue. The next process was to be able to calculate the cost of equity as this will be needed for the calculation of Tescos share price through the Residual Earnings m o d e l . I obtained twenty-four years worth of Tesco share price and FTSE ALL SHARE Price Index. I calculated returns from the price indexes for both Tesco and FTSE ALL SHARE from DataStream. This enabled me to draw a regression analysis and to be able to obtain Beta (Appendix 1.3).
Coefficients Intercept X Variable 1 0.005649666 0.709382196 Standard Error 0.00317605 0.063222352 t Stat 1.778834 11.22043 P-value 0.076325 1.82E-24 Lower 95% -0.000601639 0.58494391 Upper 95% 0.011901 0.83382 Lower 95.0% -0.0006 0.584944 Upper 95.0% 0.011901 0.83382
From the result analysis Summary Output, the figure that is circled is the BETA and this was used with CAPM to calculate the Cost of Equity Beta measures the sensitivity of Tescos stock in relative to market changes. From this figure (0.709) - Tesco is not very sensitive to changes in the market environment, this truly reflects the company.
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CA "
RA 0gi$en1 4.20<
equity 4eta
0.70+3821+*
ke
8.07<
The Risk-free rate is the returns on treasury bills in the UK in 2011. The Beta measures the sensitivity of a stock (Tesco shares) in relative to market conditions. Through this method, I was able to obtain Cost of Equity (Ke) 8.07% The common size analysis was used in conjunction with my final forecasted average Revenue and all the analysts forecasted Revenue figure in order to forecast year 2012E (Appendix 3.2), as some of these figures will be used in the Residual Earnings model (Appendix 2.1 -Trend & common size analysis).
All the components have been gathered and the Residual Earnings can now be used to calculate the share price.
Charles Stanley - believes that sales will be rather flat in 2012E due to food price inflation and sales growth will be around 2%. In addition, they believe that competitors behave more rational, evidenced from the returns they are delivering to their shareholders. This is all reflected in Charles Stanleys projected revenue forecast. They initiated a BUY advice at a target price of 411p. UniCredit - Similarly recommended a BUY advice at a target price of 454p. This analyst seems more certain that the value of Tesco will rise and it is currently been undervalued. Tescos 2012E revenue was forecasted at a much higher figure compared to Charles Stanley. This is justified through the believe that as the increases of services in the UK, it gives Tesco a huge advantage over its competitors. Moreover, due to the new CEO promises of better marketing strategy is at go. Evolutions Securities - In contrary to the other analysts advice, Evolutions Securities recommended a SELL advice to its clients at a price target of 375p. After the examination of competitors (i.e. Sainsburys and Asda) space war actions in their plans to expand, this analyst believe that food share is at risk been taken away from Tesco. In addition, the flaws that has been realised in Tescos strategy and competitors are hungry for more shares - as Tesco loses.
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Reform. Balance Sheet Net operating assets Net financial obligations Ordinary shareholders' equity (included MI) 25884.00 9261.00
1**23.00
1634.6
1712.8
1597.1
1632.9
Case 1: Assume that RE after 2012 would be zero because of strong competition in the industry. Intrinsic value of Tesco's equity in 2011 Intrinsic per share value ('s) Intrinsic P/B Intrinsic P/E
Case 2: if it assumes that REs after 2012 will remain as R-E forever. Intrinsic value of Tesco's equity in 2011 Intrinsic per share value ('s) Intrinsic P/B Intrinsic P/E
3*878.5*
4.58
3784*.72
4.70
3*413.01
4.53
3*85*.*3
4.58
2.22 13.38
2.28 13.73
2.1+ 13.21
2.22 13.37
Case 3: I have assumed a growth in RE after 2012 of 0.7%, to keep in line with 2011 GDP Intrinsic value of BT's equity in 2011 Intrinsic per share value ('s) Intrinsic P/B Intrinsic P/E
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38802.43 4.82
39862.54 4.95
38292.66 4.76
38778.41 4.82
2.33 14.07
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2.30 13.8+
2.33 14.07
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Judging from the output of the model based on Scenario 2; share price prediction value ranges from 4.53p - 4.70p. Based on scenario 3 however; share price prediction value ranges from 4.76p - 4.95p. As at 26th February 2011, Tescos actual share price stood at 4.061p.
*ummary
In conclusion
this illustrates that the market has jointly UNDERVALUED the share price of Tesco . The Residual Earnings model calculation appreciated the share price by around 19.55% (Using average of 4.76p & 4.95p = 4.855p). Target price should be 485.5p. Because of this reason I would advice my clients to BUY Tescos shares. Although, other competitors such as ASDA, Morrison's and Sainsburys are becoming more rational and competitive in this retail industry. Tesco are still market leaders and most of the examined analysts have provided no evidence that the share will decline in the foreseeable future - continuously growing revenue. Furthermore, their historic past performance has shown that they are a company with bright future, as most of their ratios continues to improve and remain favourable. Other Main Points
We believe Tescos current share price is cheap and undervalued. Huge opportunity for future growth in sales and ROCE in an international context Cost of equity is 7.33%. Both are quite low considering the downturn in the financial market. Cash investment of subsidiaries and capital expenditures shows positive future prospects. Free cash flow have improved dramatically as a result of extra borrowings to fund cash investments.
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"PP./D&I.*
APPENDIX 1.1 - TESCOS SWOT ANALYSIS (Adopted from MarketLine/DataMonitor)
STRENGTHS
Sustainable business model through diversification and value oriented retailing
WEAKNESSES
Losing customers to competitors
SWOT
OPPORTUNITIES
Strong growth in Chinese, Indian and Thailand markets provide long term growth prospects Growing use of online channel for making purchases Strong private label portfolio enables the company to effectively differentiate
THREATS
Restrictive legislations and strong lash out from the communities is limiting expansion opportunities Restrictive legislations and strong lash out from the communities is limiting expansion opportunities Demographic factors and change in consumer shopping preferences leading to decline in customer traffic at hypermarkets
APPENDIX 1.2 - Asset Turn Over drivers for Tesco & J Sainsburys
Ratios (Level 3) Asset Turnover (ATO) Drivers: 2008 2009 2010 2011
TESCO PLC
PPE Turnover Inventory Turnover Accounts Receivable Turnover Other Assets Turnover Accounts Payable Turnover Other Liability Turnover 1/+,O
Ratios (Level 3)
J SAINSBURYS
2011
+&&et ,4r"o;er (+,O) 3r!;er&B E #urno$er :n$entory #urno$er A&&ount Re&ei$a4'e #urno$er Ot=er Asset #urno$er A&&ount aya4'e #urno$er Ot=er (ia4i'i es #urno$er 1/+,O 0.42 0.04 0.01 0.0+ 0.13 0.04 0.40 0.41 0.04 0.01 0.0* 0.13 0.04 0.35 0.41 0.04 0.01 0.08 0.12 0.05 0.3* 0.42 0.04 0.02 0.0* 0.12 0.04 0.3*
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"PP./D&I.* #,ont'($
APPENDIX 1.3 - Industry Average Credit Analysis as at 26th/Feb/2011 (Thomson One Banker)
Cre !t $tat4& Ra5o& 3to&8 #urno$er 7ays Current Ra o 0to 11 9ui&8 Ra o 0to 11 7e4tors 7ays ;ross ro!t "argin0<1 Cas= %'o- to 3a'es0<1
2011
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APPENDCIES (contd)
APPENDIX 2.1 - Trend & Common Size Analysis TREND AND COMMOM SIZE ANALYSIS 2008 m Operating Income
Revenue Cost of sales Administrative Expenses
2008 m 100
2009 m
2009 m 114.86
2010 m
2010 m 120.32
2011 m
2011 m 128.82
Operating Income from Sales (After tax) Other Operating Income (before tax)
Profit arising from Property-related items Less: Tax Loss from operating activities Share of post-tax profits of joint ventures and assosiates
0.00 0.00
0.43 -0.12
0.66 -0.19
0.70 -0.20
Other Operating Income (After tax) Dirty Surplus Items of Operating activities
Foreign currency translation differences Total gain/Loss on defined benefit pension scheme Tax relating to Components of other C.Income Tax on item taken directly to equity Total Other operating Income
0.00 0.00
0.20 0.51
0.06 0.53
0.09 0.60
0.00
-0.48
-0.40
-0.39
APPENDCIES (contd)
APPENDIX 2.2a - Tescos Reformulated Statement of Financial Position
29266
7277 455 23 4
Post-employment benefit Obligation Deferred tax Liabilities Deposits by banks Cash Flow Hedges (2012 - Plus Net Investment Hedges) Net Investment Hedges Other non-current payables Net Operating Assets (NOA) Financial Assets (FA) Short-term Investments Fair Value Hedges Financial Instrument not qualifying for hedge accounting Cash and Cash equivalents Less: Financial Obligations Borrowings: amount falling due within 1 year Borrowings: amount falling due after more than 1 year Liabilities of the disposal group classified as held for sale Fair Value Hedges Financial Instrument not qualifying for hedge accounting Net Financial Obligation (NFO) Common Shareholders' Equity (CSE)
9866 19400
898
4296
3378
2241
SAINSBURY'S REFORMATED GROUP BALANCE SHEET FOR THE PERIODS 2009- 2012
2008 2008 2009 2009 2010 2010 2011 2011 m m m m m m m m Operating Assets (OA) Property Plant and Machinery Intangible Assets Investment in Joint Venture Other Receivables Retirement Benefit Assets Inventories Non-current assets held for sale Trade and Other Receivables Cash and cash equivalents Less: Operating Liabilities (OL) Trade and other payables Current Provisions Non-current Provisions Taxes Payable Other Payables Deferred income tax liability Retirement benefit obligation Net Operating Assets(NOA) Financial Assets (FA) Available for Sales Non-current derivative financial instruments 7424 165 148 55 495 681 112 206 719 7821 160 288 45 689 21 195 627 8203 144 449 36 702 56 215 837 8784 151 502 36 812 13 343 501
10005
9846
10642
11142
2954 7051
3262 6584
3416 7226
3503 7639
106 -
97 31
150 20
176 29
4 110 7161
Less: Financial Obligations (FO) Current Derivatives Financial Instrument liabilities Non-Current Derivatives Financial Instrument liabilities Borrowings: amount falling due within 1 year Borrowings: amount falling due after more than 1 year Net Financial Obligations (NFO) Non- Controlling Interest (NCI) Common Shareholders' Equity (CSE)
6 18 118 2084
2008 m
2009 m
2010 m 5947
2010 m
2011 m 5366
2011 m
-512 -760 170.52 682.52 136.08 896.08 35 62 4577.90 49 5348.48 -46 4485.92 4577.90 5348.48 4485.92
-89
Free CashFlow C - I
-2149 2336.92
360 410 128 282 84.6 197.4 9333 7593 -119 32 746 -523.6 -523.6 562 -90 472
1264 -1314
Tax On Interest
Increase in borrowings Repayments of Borrowing New Finance Leases Repayments of Obligations under Finance Leases Increase/Decrease in Cash
2009 m
2010 m
2011
905.8 905.8
1016.57 1016.57
1092.96 1092.96
952.11 952.11
-820 85.8
65.8 36
82.57 8 30
66.96 10 74
78.11 50 61
Interest elements of Obligations under Finance Leases payments Repayment of capital element of obligations under finance lease payment Proceeds from Long-term borrowing Proceeds from Short-term borrowing Repayments of Short-term Borrowing Increase/Decrease in Cash
3 -164
3 -152 -43 -2
3 2 -235 36 235
4 3 -45 11 -334
-59.2 -59.2
-73.43 -73.43
191.96 191.96
-171.89 -171.89
2008 m 47298
2009 m
2009 m 54327
2010 m
2010 m 56910
2011 m
2011 m 60931
Operating Income from Sales (After tax) Other Operating Income (before tax)
Profit arising from Property-related items Less: Tax Loss from operating activities Share of post-tax profits of joint ventures and assosiates
Other Operating Income (After tax) Dirty Surplus Items of Operating activities
Foreign currency translation differences Total gain/Loss on defined benefit pension scheme
38 187
-275 -629
343 -322
-344 595
Tax relating to Components of other C.Income Tax on item taken directly to equity Total Other operating Income
-44.1
-259.92
-226.08
-239.76
-4 -29 66
3 -334 505
1 5 -168
2 8 -22
2008 m 17837
2009 m
2009 m 18911
2010 m
2010 m 19964
2011 m
2011 m 21102
16835 -502 -150 9 -14.7 -155.7 344.3 30 -9 -2 19 542 -151 754.3 -132 83 -49 17337 500
-17875 -420 -177 16.074 -27.072 -187.998 428.002 57 -16.074 -111 -70.074 -903 253 -292.072 -148 52 -96 -18295 616
18882 -399 -148 7.56 -32.2 -172.64 510.36 27 -7.56 138 157.44 -173 48 542.8 -148 33 -115 -19281 683
19942 -417 -187 30.24 -23.52 -180.28 562.72 108 -30.24 60 137.76 29 -3 726.48 -116 32 -84 -20359 743
Operating Income from Sales (After tax) Other Operating Income (before tax)
Other Income Less: Tax Share of Post-Tax loss from Joint Ventures
Other Operating Income (After tax) Dirty Surplus Items of Operating Activities
Actuarial gains on defined benefit pension schemes Less Tax impact on above item
27.072 -68.928 -16 9 -32 -84.3 670 670 4 -103.928 -396 -396
APPENDIX 3.2 - Analysts Forecasts & My Predicted Forecast & Actual 2012 Results
64943 59549.82 -1786.36 61336.18 3606.82 -920.89 118.33 -92.28 -894.84 2711.98 -957.15 122.99 -95.91 61894.48 -1856.69
67500 60275.14 -1808.11 63751.17 3748.83 -932.11 119.77 -93.40 -930.07 2818.76
65734
-60930 3609
Operating Income from Sales (After tax) Other Operating Income (before tax)
Profit arising from Property-related items Less: Tax Loss from operating activities Share of post-tax profits of joint ventures and assosiates
-843.9 2765.1
Other Operating Income (After tax) Dirty Surplus Items of Operating activities
Foreign currency translation differences Total gain/Loss on defined benefit pension scheme Tax relating to Components of other C.Income Tax on item taken directly to equity Total Other operating Income
-262.65
-272.99
-265.84
-266.00
-178.34
13 -142 241
APPENDCIES (contd)
APPENDIX 3.3a - 24 years historic Share prices, Index and Returns for TESCO & FTSE ALL SHARES (from DataStream)
Start End
Frequency Name Code CURRENCY 26/01/1987 26/02/1987 26/03/1987 26/04/1987 26/05/1987 26/06/1987 26/07/1987 26/08/1987 26/09/1987 26/10/1987 26/11/1987 26/12/1987 26/01/1988 26/02/1988 26/03/1988 26/04/1988 26/05/1988 26/06/1988 26/07/1988 26/08/1988 26/09/1988 26/10/1988 26/11/1988 26/12/1988 26/01/1989 26/02/1989 26/03/1989 26/04/1989 26/05/1989 26/06/1989 26/07/1989 26/08/1989 26/09/1989 26/10/1989 26/11/1989 M
26/01/1987 26/02/2011
TESCO - PRICE LNGBP
900803(P.LNGBP) 45.5 49.7 51.75 52.08 55.96 61.24 64.37 58.87 63.4 51.75 53.37 52.08 51.11 49.17 50.14 50.46 47.87 50.14 46.25 45.93 43.34 44.96 42.7 41.73 49.17 49.49 49.65 56.28 56.93 59.84 62.1 69.54 68.25 60.49 60.16
0.092308 0.041247 0.006377 0.074501 0.094353 0.05111 -0.08544 0.076949 -0.18375 0.031304 -0.02417 -0.01863 -0.03796 0.019727 0.006382 -0.05133 0.04742 -0.07758 -0.00692 -0.05639 0.037379 -0.05027 -0.02272 0.178289 0.006508 0.003233 0.133535 0.011549 0.051115 0.037767 0.119807 -0.01855 -0.1137 -0.00546
0.104458 0.037146 -0.01776 0.075392 0.069624 0.035511 -0.03971 0.043761 -0.27747 -0.03368 0.072462 0.010356 0.003406 0.002391 0.018117 -0.00243 0.047344 -0.00972 -0.03811 0.006434 0.038173 -0.02976 -0.02016 0.103963 0.039349 0.017335 0.009086 0.023572 0.009667 0.039382 0.046393 -0.02118 -0.0935 0.035788
26/12/1989 26/01/1990 26/02/1990 26/03/1990 26/04/1990 26/05/1990 26/06/1990 26/07/1990 26/08/1990 26/09/1990 26/10/1990 26/11/1990 26/12/1990 26/01/1991 26/02/1991 26/03/1991 26/04/1991 26/05/1991 26/06/1991 26/07/1991 26/08/1991 26/09/1991 26/10/1991 26/11/1991 26/12/1991 26/01/1992 26/02/1992 26/03/1992 26/04/1992 26/05/1992 26/06/1992 26/07/1992 26/08/1992 26/09/1992 26/10/1992 26/11/1992 26/12/1992 26/01/1993 26/02/1993 26/03/1993 26/04/1993 26/05/1993 26/06/1993 26/07/1993 26/08/1993 26/09/1993 26/10/1993
62.43 63.72 64.37 65.18 64.04 70.51 73.42 76.34 71.16 71.48 74.07 74.72 74.4 79.25 82 89.33 91 93.33 87.83 91.67 90.67 82.67 77.33 75 71 80.17 89.33 85.33 97.67 87.67 92 83.33 74 72.67 80 82.67 86.67 89.67 78.33 79 75 71 71.67 68.33 76.67 67.33 73.5
1177.11 1158.48 1118.85 1134.34 1060.85 1120.03 1181.1 1154.8 1018.83 966.97 997.77 1035.23 1036.52 1006.76 1123.31 1185.32 1197.4 1192.72 1170.72 1235.92 1264.73 1257.16 1216.26 1192.58 1142.61 1200.51 1228.94 1185.64 1275.75 1314.03 1224.17 1138.01 1087.44 1228.23 1256.9 1297.56 1355.18 1373.49 1396.53 1398.13 1392.17 1406.5 1425.65 1409.55 1527.83 1494.49 1564.82
0.037733 0.020663 0.010201 0.012584 -0.01749 0.101031 0.041271 0.039771 -0.06785 0.004497 0.036234 0.008775 -0.00428 0.065188 0.0347 0.08939 0.018695 0.025604 -0.05893 0.043721 -0.01091 -0.08823 -0.06459 -0.03013 -0.05333 0.129155 0.114257 -0.04478 0.144615 -0.10239 0.04939 -0.09424 -0.11196 -0.01797 0.100867 0.033375 0.048385 0.034614 -0.12646 0.008554 -0.05063 -0.05333 0.009437 -0.0466 0.122055 -0.12182 0.091638
0.056652 -0.01583 -0.03421 0.013845 -0.06479 0.055785 0.054525 -0.02227 -0.11774 -0.0509 0.031852 0.037544 0.001246 -0.02871 0.115767 0.055203 0.010191 -0.00391 -0.01845 0.055692 0.023311 -0.00599 -0.03253 -0.01947 -0.0419 0.050673 0.023682 -0.03523 0.076001 0.030006 -0.06839 -0.07038 -0.04444 0.129469 0.023343 0.032349 0.044406 0.013511 0.016775 0.001146 -0.00426 0.010293 0.013615 -0.01129 0.083913 -0.02182 0.04706
26/11/1993 26/12/1993 26/01/1994 26/02/1994 26/03/1994 26/04/1994 26/05/1994 26/06/1994 26/07/1994 26/08/1994 26/09/1994 26/10/1994 26/11/1994 26/12/1994 26/01/1995 26/02/1995 26/03/1995 26/04/1995 26/05/1995 26/06/1995 26/07/1995 26/08/1995 26/09/1995 26/10/1995 26/11/1995 26/12/1995 26/01/1996 26/02/1996 26/03/1996 26/04/1996 26/05/1996 26/06/1996 26/07/1996 26/08/1996 26/09/1996 26/10/1996 26/11/1996 26/12/1996 26/01/1997 26/02/1997 26/03/1997 26/04/1997 26/05/1997 26/06/1997 26/07/1997 26/08/1997 26/09/1997
65.33 70.67 76.67 74.5 70.83 68 71.67 75 78.83 84.5 76 77.33 81 81.33 84.67 84 87.67 91.83 95.83 93.67 104.67 112.33 106.33 102 95.33 98 98.5 89.33 90.67 94.33 99.33 98.67 95.67 103.83 101.33 108 112 118.33 120 115 114.33 121.33 125.33 124 144.33 139.83 162.83
1533.3 1677.01 1723.99 1654.67 1581.24 1579.75 1524.54 1445.85 1557.85 1630.33 1505.22 1496.6 1509.03 1526.37 1489.05 1500.15 1541.81 1580.39 1628.35 1625.33 1698.31 1735.64 1737.86 1730.57 1772.82 1788.21 1829.35 1830.26 1826.17 1921.09 1885.87 1853.24 1824.11 1930.75 1939.2 1973.9 1988.83 2000.54 2066.62 2115.81 2094.89 2112.15 2216.7 2206.71 2273.55 2306.04 2445.86
-0.11116 0.081739 0.084902 -0.0283 -0.04926 -0.03995 0.053971 0.046463 0.051067 0.071927 -0.10059 0.0175 0.047459 0.004074 0.041067 -0.00791 0.04369 0.047451 0.043559 -0.02254 0.117434 0.073182 -0.05341 -0.04072 -0.06539 0.028008 0.005102 -0.0931 0.015001 0.040366 0.053005 -0.00664 -0.0304 0.085293 -0.02408 0.065825 0.037037 0.056518 0.014113 -0.04167 -0.00583 0.061226 0.032968 -0.01061 0.163952 -0.03118 0.164485
-0.02014 0.093726 0.028014 -0.04021 -0.04438 -0.00094 -0.03495 -0.05162 0.077463 0.046526 -0.07674 -0.00573 0.008305 0.011491 -0.02445 0.007454 0.027771 0.025023 0.030347 -0.00185 0.044902 0.021981 0.001279 -0.00419 0.024414 0.008681 0.023006 0.000497 -0.00223 0.051978 -0.01833 -0.0173 -0.01572 0.058461 0.004377 0.017894 0.007564 0.005888 0.033031 0.023802 -0.00989 0.008239 0.049499 -0.00451 0.030289 0.01429 0.060632
26/10/1997 26/11/1997 26/12/1997 26/01/1998 26/02/1998 26/03/1998 26/04/1998 26/05/1998 26/06/1998 26/07/1998 26/08/1998 26/09/1998 26/10/1998 26/11/1998 26/12/1998 26/01/1999 26/02/1999 26/03/1999 26/04/1999 26/05/1999 26/06/1999 26/07/1999 26/08/1999 26/09/1999 26/10/1999 26/11/1999 26/12/1999 26/01/2000 26/02/2000 26/03/2000 26/04/2000 26/05/2000 26/06/2000 26/07/2000 26/08/2000 26/09/2000 26/10/2000 26/11/2000 26/12/2000 26/01/2001 26/02/2001 26/03/2001 26/04/2001 26/05/2001 26/06/2001 26/07/2001 26/08/2001
158.67 159.33 161.17 174.33 174 192.33 184.33 188.33 192.67 191 159 163.5 161.25 180.25 171 177.25 177 169 190.75 172.75 166.75 163.25 178 179.5 180.75 175 187 162.75 169 197.75 217.5 206.25 208.25 218 220 239.75 262.75 275 276 251 263.5 251 251.25 241 265 238 260
2361.32 2308.9 2358.07 2451 2675.64 2771.33 2764.67 2841.04 2762 2760.92 2576.02 2343.85 2413.62 2660.89 2663.74 2676.66 2825.39 2835.04 3003.72 2894.77 2990.6 2900.9 2992.59 2789.94 2837.05 3119.07 3189.42 3027.96 2975.05 3195.29 2973.36 2954.55 3064.26 3072.15 3154.07 2999.23 3018.36 3029.55 2927.44 3027.15 2867.1 2683.31 2821.75 2852.69 2692.05 2556.71 2645.93
-0.02555 0.00416 0.011548 0.081653 -0.00189 0.105345 -0.0416 0.0217 0.023045 -0.00867 -0.16754 0.028302 -0.01376 0.117829 -0.05132 0.03655 -0.00141 -0.0452 0.128698 -0.09436 -0.03473 -0.02099 0.090352 0.008427 0.006964 -0.03181 0.068571 -0.12968 0.038402 0.170118 0.099874 -0.05172 0.009697 0.046819 0.009174 0.089773 0.095933 0.046622 0.003636 -0.09058 0.049801 -0.04744 0.000996 -0.0408 0.099585 -0.10189 0.092437
-0.03456 -0.0222 0.021296 0.039409 0.091652 0.035763 -0.0024 0.027624 -0.02782 -0.00039 -0.06697 -0.09013 0.029767 0.102448 0.001071 0.00485 0.055566 0.003415 0.059498 -0.03627 0.033105 -0.02999 0.031607 -0.06772 0.016886 0.099406 0.022555 -0.05062 -0.01747 0.074029 -0.06946 -0.00633 0.037133 0.002575 0.026665 -0.04909 0.006378 0.003707 -0.0337 0.03406 -0.05287 -0.0641 0.051593 0.010965 -0.05631 -0.05027 0.034896
26/09/2001 26/10/2001 26/11/2001 26/12/2001 26/01/2002 26/02/2002 26/03/2002 26/04/2002 26/05/2002 26/06/2002 26/07/2002 26/08/2002 26/09/2002 26/10/2002 26/11/2002 26/12/2002 26/01/2003 26/02/2003 26/03/2003 26/04/2003 26/05/2003 26/06/2003 26/07/2003 26/08/2003 26/09/2003 26/10/2003 26/11/2003 26/12/2003 26/01/2004 26/02/2004 26/03/2004 26/04/2004 26/05/2004 26/06/2004 26/07/2004 26/08/2004 26/09/2004 26/10/2004 26/11/2004 26/12/2004 26/01/2005 26/02/2005 26/03/2005 26/04/2005 26/05/2005 26/06/2005 26/07/2005
245 244.25 244.5 247.5 235.25 246 242.25 262.75 254 238 205.25 219.25 204 204.5 194.5 190.25 178 159.5 187.25 194 201.75 217.25 218 214 241 235 248.5 249.25 242.5 253.75 248.75 255 250 269.75 251.5 267 286 285.5 305.5 319.5 306 308.5 316.75 310 314.5 316 315
2251.61 2481.68 2561.31 2502.13 2511.73 2480.03 2522.2 2509.4 2514.04 2206.42 1947.63 2120.19 1860.24 1942.05 1956.55 1893.09 1749.49 1731.5 1814.79 1863.06 1932.15 1973.89 2029.54 2069.36 2057.18 2100.15 2157.77 2190.98 2210.19 2252.33 2182.61 2280.32 2203.69 2238.29 2135.4 2211.06 2272.41 2278.21 2362.13 2400 2435.72 2510.72 2470.58 2428.05 2494.64 2544.34 2627.62
-0.05769 -0.00306 0.001024 0.01227 -0.04949 0.045696 -0.01524 0.084623 -0.0333 -0.06299 -0.13761 0.06821 -0.06956 0.002451 -0.0489 -0.02185 -0.06439 -0.10393 0.173981 0.036048 0.039948 0.076828 0.003452 -0.01835 0.126168 -0.0249 0.057447 0.003018 -0.02708 0.046392 -0.0197 0.025126 -0.01961 0.079 -0.06766 0.06163 0.071161 -0.00175 0.070053 0.045827 -0.04225 0.00817 0.026742 -0.02131 0.014516 0.004769 -0.00316
-0.14903 0.10218 0.032087 -0.02311 0.003837 -0.01262 0.017004 -0.00507 0.001849 -0.12236 -0.11729 0.0886 -0.12261 0.043978 0.007466 -0.03243 -0.07585 -0.01028 0.048103 0.026598 0.037084 0.021603 0.028193 0.01962 -0.00589 0.020888 0.027436 0.015391 0.008768 0.019066 -0.03095 0.044768 -0.0336 0.015701 -0.04597 0.035431 0.027747 0.002552 0.036836 0.016032 0.014883 0.030792 -0.01599 -0.01721 0.027425 0.019923 0.032731
26/08/2005 26/09/2005 26/10/2005 26/11/2005 26/12/2005 26/01/2006 26/02/2006 26/03/2006 26/04/2006 26/05/2006 26/06/2006 26/07/2006 26/08/2006 26/09/2006 26/10/2006 26/11/2006 26/12/2006 26/01/2007 26/02/2007 26/03/2007 26/04/2007 26/05/2007 26/06/2007 26/07/2007 26/08/2007 26/09/2007 26/10/2007 26/11/2007 26/12/2007 26/01/2008 26/02/2008 26/03/2008 26/04/2008 26/05/2008 26/06/2008 26/07/2008 26/08/2008 26/09/2008 26/10/2008 26/11/2008 26/12/2008 26/01/2009 26/02/2009 26/03/2009 26/04/2009 26/05/2009 26/06/2009
326.75 317.75 297.25 310 326.75 318.75 335.5 346 323 323 330 363.5 368 367 400.5 398 402.75 410.25 448 438.5 467.5 453.5 426.25 405.5 420 436.5 464.75 465 478 420.75 409.25 391.25 426.5 414 364.7 377.3 385 370.9 318 290.4 340.4 360.6 338.2 331.1 355.4 363.3 354.9
2627.58 2732.4 2623.01 2782.87 2835.12 2907.51 2986.44 3081.68 3114.54 2954.92 2891.56 2979.1 2990.21 3005.71 3168.27 3148.68 3203.05 3223.26 3336.16 3274.82 3364.52 3413.63 3384.04 3228.93 3209.46 3296.97 3421.31 3160.2 3292.18 2990.24 3113.58 2897.77 3097.2 3098.46 2808.24 2722.39 2786.12 2581.97 1950.15 2065.25 2111.37 2105.48 1970.18 1984.18 2127.37 2247.79 2167.29
0.037302 -0.02754 -0.06452 0.042893 0.054032 -0.02448 0.052549 0.031297 -0.06647 0 0.021672 0.101515 0.01238 -0.00272 0.091281 -0.00624 0.011935 0.018622 0.092017 -0.02121 0.066135 -0.02995 -0.06009 -0.04868 0.035758 0.039286 0.064719 0.000538 0.027957 -0.11977 -0.02733 -0.04398 0.090096 -0.02931 -0.11908 0.034549 0.020408 -0.03662 -0.14263 -0.08679 0.172176 0.059342 -0.06212 -0.02099 0.073392 0.022228 -0.02312
-1.5E-05 0.039892 -0.04003 0.060945 0.018776 0.025533 0.027147 0.031891 0.010663 -0.05125 -0.02144 0.030274 0.003729 0.005184 0.054084 -0.00618 0.017268 0.00631 0.035027 -0.01839 0.027391 0.014596 -0.00867 -0.04584 -0.00603 0.027266 0.037713 -0.07632 0.041763 -0.09171 0.041248 -0.06931 0.068822 0.000407 -0.09367 -0.03057 0.02341 -0.07327 -0.2447 0.059021 0.022331 -0.00279 -0.06426 0.007106 0.072166 0.056605 -0.03581
26/07/2009 26/08/2009 26/09/2009 26/10/2009 26/11/2009 26/12/2009 26/01/2010 26/02/2010 26/03/2010 26/04/2010 26/05/2010 26/06/2010 26/07/2010 26/08/2010 26/09/2010 26/10/2010 26/11/2010 26/12/2010 26/01/2011 26/02/2011
368.4 371.9 387.1 388 429.3 426.95 418.9 419.7 434.2 454.4 399 398.65 395.4 401.9 439 428.95 430 439 403 406.05
2336.39 2511.29 2608.38 2661.7 2648.56 2752.28 2700.86 2736.8 2922.85 2963.38 2598.08 2609.05 2762.54 2660.35 2889.12 2953.87 2930.78 3107.71 3096.38 3109.27
0.038039 0.009501 0.040871 0.002325 0.106443 -0.00547 -0.01885 0.00191 0.034548 0.046522 -0.12192 -0.00088 -0.00815 0.016439 0.092312 -0.02289 0.002448 0.02093 -0.082 0.007568
0.078024 0.074859 0.038661 0.020442 -0.00494 0.039161 -0.01868 0.013307 0.067981 0.013867 -0.12327 0.004222 0.05883 -0.03699 0.085992 0.022412 -0.00782 0.06037 -0.00365 0.004163
APPENDCIES (contd)
APPENDIX 3.3b - Regression Analysis
SUMMARY OUTPUT Regression Statistics Multiple R 0.552189547 R Square 0.304913295 Adjusted R Square 0.302491391 Standard Error 0.05365089 Observations 289 ANOVA df Regression Residual Total SS MS F 1 0.362387436 0.362387 125.8981 287 0.826105954 0.002878 288 1.188493391 Standard Error Significance F 1.81872E-24
t Stat
P-value
Lower 95%
Upper 95%
Lower 95.0%
Upper 95.0%
0.005649666 0.00317605 1.778834 0.076325 0.000601639 0.011901 0.00060164 0.01190097 0.709382196 0.063222352 11.22043 1.82E-24 0.58494391 0.8338205 0.58494391 0.83382048
Tesco
Upgrade to Buy
Company Note
TSCO.L
12m Range Net Debt Weight in Sector (350) Weight in Index (100) Basic Shares 455-368p 1.8bn 66.7% 2.1% 8,030m
403p
32.3bn
01 February 2011
TESCO
460
1/2/11
440
420
400
380
360
340
320
300
280
260 F TESCO M A M J J A S O N D J F M A M J J A S O N D J
Sam Hart
020 7149 6504 sam.hart@charles-stanley.co.uk
Company Activities
Tesco is the worlds 3rd largest retailer, with 5,000 stores and 97m sq ft of space. In the UK, it is the leading food retailer, with 2,545 stores, 33m sq ft of space and a c30% market share. It operates through a range of retail formats, including hypermarkets (Extra), superstores, convenience (Metro / Express) and on-line (tesco.com). It also owns Dobbies Garden Centres. Tesco Bank has 6.5m customer accounts and offers a range of savings, insurance, loan and credit card products. Tesco Mobile has 2.3m mobile phone customers. Overseas, the Group has 1,300 stores (35m sq ft) in Asia and 1,000 stores (29m sq ft) in Europe. In the US, there are 165 Fresh & Easy stores (1.7m sq ft) following launch in November 2007. The Group has a 90% stake in dunnhumby, a global consumer insight business with data on 350m consumers.
UK Christmas trading. Like-for-like sales excluding fuel (but including VAT) in the six
th
weeks to 8 January were up by 0.6%, weaker than consensus expectations of +1.7% (source: Reuters). Adjusting for changes to the VAT rate, however, like-for-like sales are estimated to have been down by 0.3-0.4%. The performance represents the first period in which Tesco has reported negative like-for-like sales for c.20 years. Nonfood appears to have been the key area of weakness, impacted by bad weather which prevented customers travelling to larger out of town stores (greatest exposure to nonfood). Tesco is particularly vulnerable to weakness in non-food categories, given much higher exposure than peers. Non-food represents c.25% of UK sales, compared with c.15% for Sainsbury and c.8% at Morrison. The food category was said to have delivered a strong like-for-like sales performance. UK performance vs. peers. The Christmas trading performance was unquestionably behind the industry average, but perhaps not to the extent it appears at first sight. Sainsbury like-for-like sales excluding fuel (but including VAT) were up by 3.6% over
th
the 14 weeks to 8 January, but this was boosted by a c.1% contribution from store extensions, 0.8% from the higher VAT rate and a strong performance from the nonfood range, which remains at a relatively early stage of development. Morrisons likend
for-like sales were up by c.2% in the six weeks to 2 January, but similarly benefited by c.0.9% from the higher VAT rate and remains in turnaround mode. UK like-for-like sales outlook. We expect like-for-like sales in the UK food retail industry to remain relatively subdued in 2011. The demand environment is likely to be
Year to February Sales (m) Pre-tax Profit (m) EPS (p) DPS (p) 2009A 53,898 2,917 27.0 12.0 14.9x 3.0% 2010A 56,910 3,176 29.2 13.1 13.8x 3.2% 2011E 62,450 3,500 32.5 14.5 12.4x 3.6% 2012E 67,500 3,950 35.8 16.0 11.2x 4.0% 2013E 72,500 4,350 40.0 17.9 10.1x 4.4%
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constrained, with consumers under pressure from higher direct and indirect taxes, subinflation wage growth and concerns over future employment prospects amongst workers in the public sector. Underlying sales volumes are likely to be flat or in slightly negative territory. Food price inflation is therefore anticipated to be the main driver of like-for-like sales growth. Price inflation in the industry is currently believed to be in the 1.5-2.0% range and we would expect it to continue to tick up as commodity price increases continue to feed through to food prices. We forecast Tescos like-for-like sales growth (ex-fuel and VAT) to be c.2% in the 2011/12 fiscal year, broadly in line with managements planning assumptions. UK competitive environment is expected to remain intense but rational. Rational players. We believe the main players in the UK food retail industry are behaving rationally and expect them to continue to do so. Tesco, Sainsbury and Morrison all have to justify returns to shareholders. Initiation of a price war would be suicidal and lead to a collapse in profitability for all in the market. Perhaps the greatest threat comes from Asda, given that it is a division of the much larger Walmart and therefore has more limited disclosure requirements. We see no logical reason, however, why Walmart would want to initiate a price war and further reduce already disappointing returns from the business. Asdas latest 10% cheaper promise should be regarded as a marketing gimmick, rather than a sign of aggressive price reductions. Promotional activity is running at a historic high of 35-40% of industry sales (historic average 20-25% of sales). Such a high level of promotional participation is disruptive to supply chains and customer shopping habits. The impact on gross margins, however, is believed to be relatively limited, with a high proportion of promotions being funded by suppliers of branded goods eager to support volumes. New space. Total industry space is believed to have grown by c.6% in 2010 and is forecast to increase by a further c.4.5% in 2011. The rate of space expansion is well above the historic rate of 2-3% and has raised concerns that the market might be becoming saturated. We remain relatively sanguine, however, about the rate of new space expansion. Approximately 40% of all new space is being allocated to non-food and a further 20% to the convenience segment. The new space data also includes some recycled space, such as Asdas acquisition of 193 Netto stores and Tescos 77 Mills convenience stores. International is expected to become an increasingly important driver of profit growth. The profit contribution is currently being held back by heavy investment in a number of markets, but we expect it to increase as assets mature. We briefly remind investors of the Groups activities in its major overseas markets and future growth prospects.
th Europe (13% 2010 operating profit). As at 28 August 2010, the Group had 1,004 stores in Europe covering 28.8m sq ft of space. It operates in Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, the Republic of Ireland and Turkey, listed in descending order by space. The region was the worst hit by the global economic downturn, but firm evidence of recovery in sales and profits was seen in the interim results and the improving trend is expected to continue. Guidance is for total space to increase by 2.9m sq ft (+10%) in the 2010/11 fiscal year. Development of the business in Turkey (branded Kipa) is a key strategic priority, given its large, growing and relatively under-developed retail market.
Asia (12% 2010 operating profit). The Group has 1,300 stores in the region covering 32.8m sq ft of space. It operates in South Korea, Thailand, China, Malaysia and Japan, listed in descending order by total space. The region was relatively unaffected by the global economic downturn, meaning the business continued to deliver solid growth in sales and profits throughout. The trend is expected to continue, although profitability is likely to be held back by heavy investment. Guidance is for total space to increase by 3.7m sq ft (+12%) in 2010/11. Korea has proven to be the most successful market for Tesco to date and it is now joint market leader. China, however, has been identified as a significant opportunity for the future. Its current strategy in China is focused around building Lifespace shopping malls (as part of a JV) in second and third tier cities in the east of the country. The Group plans to build 80 malls in the 2010-15 period, of which three are currently open. The approach ensures that Tesco is the anchor tenant in the shopping malls and therefore guarantees high footfall locations for its stores. China is expected to breakeven in 2010/11, with operating profit potentially building to c.100m by 2015.
US (loss-making). Tesco entered the US in November 2007 with the opening of its first Fresh & Easy neighbourhood store. The format is almost unique in the US
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Equity Research
Company Report
United Kingdom
24 January 2011
Tesco
More room for maneuver than you think
Tesco's growth profile is changing as UK LFL normalizes. While we agree that using a historical rating is not appropriate given the change in profile, the resilience of the UK profit (thanks to services) deserves a re-rating in our view. We initiate coverage on Tesco with a Buy and a 454p target price, suggesting 11.5% upside.
Tesco is not the growth company it used to be. UK LFL is normalizing as competitors improve. Things will remain tough in the UK as the impact of fiscal tightening as well as the increase in petrol prices hit consumers.
However, our analysis shows that Tesco, thanks to its services, can further reduce its UK retail margin without hitting UK total profitability. Our conservative forecasts imply a 30bp lower UK retail margin in 2013E vs. today.
Reuters/Bloomberg Average daily volume ('000) Free float (%) Market capitalization (GBP bn) No. of shares issued (mn)
Moreover, Philip Clarke, the incoming CEO, has recalled senior management from abroad to the UK. We believe Tesco is looking at ways to reignite its UK top-line growth. We may hear more on 19 April in connection with the full-year results.
Shareholders
3.02% Berkshire Hathaway Inc., 5.24% Blackrock Inc., 3.65% Legal & General Investment Management Limited
UPCOMING EVENTS FY10 results 19 Apr 2011 Jun 2011 Oct 2011
At the current share price, Tesco offers lower P/E than Metro or Casino for similar growth. We value Tesco on a DCF basis and derive a 454p target price. This would imply a 13x P/E 2011E calendarized 12M, which in our view appears justified.
250
2009 Sales (GBP mn) yoy (%) Trading profit (GBP mn) margin (%) EPS reported (p) EPS diluted before non recurring and property (p) yoy (%) ROCE (%) P/E (x) P/CF (x) EV/Sales (%) EV/EBITDA (x) EV/EBIT (x) Div. yield (%) 54164 14.5 3090.0 5.7 27.50 25.19 -5.9 7.8 13.7 7.2 68.7 8.2 11.6 3.2
2010 56910 5.1 3412.0 6.0 29.33 27.34 8.5 7.4 13.9 6.9 68.8 8.1 11.4 3.1
2011E 60813 6.9 3688.4 6.1 34.38 30.71 12.3 7.8 11.9 7.6 62.5 7.2 10.0 3.5
2012E 64943 6.8 4055.4 6.2 37.39 34.68 12.9 8.1 10.4 6.8 55.5 6.3 8.6 3.8
200
150
TESCO EURO STOXX 50 - PRICE INDEX
2008
2009
2010
Source: Thomson Datastream
STOCK PERFORMANCE (% CHG.) 1M FTSE 100 -6.9 -10.4 -5.9 3M -10.2 -10.5 -4.7 6M -11.9 -9.2 -2.0
Fabienne Caron, Equity Analyst (UniCredit Bank London) +44 20 7826 7951 fabienne.caron@unicreditgroup.de Rupert Trotter, Marketing Analyst (UniCredit Bank London) +44 20 7826 7890 rupert.trotter@unicreditgroup.de
UniCredit Research
page 1
24 January 2011
Equity Research
Tesco
Tesco share price relative to FTSE 100 Annual relative performance vs FTSE 100 (RHS) 3.5 3 2.5 2 1.5 1 0.5 0 Jan-97 Jan-98 Jan-99 Jan-00 Jan-01 Jan-02 Jan-03 Jan-04 Jan-05 Jan-06 Jan-07 Jan-08 Jan-09 Jan-10 60% 50% 40% 30% 20% 10% 0% -10% -20%
UniCredit Research
page 4
19 January 2011
Tesco
(TSCO.L)
Sell
550 500 450 400 350 300 250 Jan 06 Jul 06 Jan 07 Jul 07 Jan 08 Jul 08 Jan 09 Jul 09 Jan 10 Jul 10 Jan 11
Source: FactSet Estimates
Price
Rolling Forward: Tesco operates c36m. sq ft of space in the UK. In 5 years, at current expansion rates, Tesco would have over 46m sq ft, having invested an incremental 10bn+. The returns on this capex are questionable, cannibalisation will increase and public reaction to "Tescopoly" could be harmful. But Tesco cannot unilaterally stop opening space - it needs the competition to stop as well.
Status quo favours the competition: At current expansion rates Sainsbury space will rise to c26m sq ft (18m currently), ASDA will rise to c25m sq ft (from 19m)and Morrisons to c16m sq ft (12m now). Cannibalisation is not an issue for these retailers and collectively they are likely to take food share from Tesco. Stopping industry expansion suits Tesco: The current space war is costing the Big 4 over 4bn in capex pa, including c2bn for Tesco (see "Capital Wars" 3/11/2010). By lowering industry profits and cash flow, Tesco can make new stores unviable for the competition while protecting its own long term returns. Tesco can then curtail its UK openings and harvest cash flow to invest overseas. A repositioned UK Tesco could generate more cash post capex than now.
Will Tesco do it? We are not changing forecasts, but we are highlighting the crash to industry profits if Tesco repositions. We are also saying that the prospect of Tesco doing this is rising as performance deteriorates. Sector share prices would get hit very hard, but Tesco would emerge as a clear winner and its shares would rerate after the market had digested the implications of such a bold move.
Year End Feb Sales (m) EBITDA (m) EVO PBT (m) EPS (p) DPS (p) Growth PBT (%) Growth EPS (%) P/E (x) EV/Sales (x) EV/EBITDA (x) Yield (%) Dave McCarthy
+44 (0)20 7071 4715 dave.mccarthy@evosecurities.com
2009A 53,898 4,275 2,834 24.5 12.0 +3% +5% 16.8x 0.8x 13.3x 2.9%
2010A 56,911 4,796 3,131 27.6 13.1 +10% +13% 14.9x 0.7x 11.8x 3.2%
2011E 60,984 5,031 3,414 30.5 14.9 +9% +10% 13.5x 0.7x 10.5x 3.6%
2012E 65,734 5,543 3,868 34.8 16.0 +13% +14% 11.8x 0.6x 9.4x 3.9%
2013E 70,434 6,064 4,306 38.7 17.4 +11% +11% 10.6x 0.6x 8.6x 4.2%
Andrew Porteous
+44 (0)20 7071 4441 andrew.porteous@evosecurities.com
EVO Securities makes markets in Tesco This publication was produced by Evolution Securities Limited (ESL). This publication is disseminated in the EEA by ESL. This publication is disseminated in the US by Evolution Securities US (ESUS); it has not been altered in any way by ESUS prior to distribution. ESUS is a wholly owned subsidiary of ESL. Under the Markets in Financial Instruments Directive and the Financial Services Authoritys Conduct of Business Rules, this document is a marketing communication and has not been prepared in accordance with legal requirements designed to promote the independence of investment research. Although it is not subject to any legal requirement prohibiting dealing ahead of the dissemination of investment research, Evolution Securities Ltd upholds this standard through its internal systems and controls.
The company has reviewed a draft of this research note and factual changes have been made
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