Fear, Technology, and the State: Carl Schmitt, Leo Strauss, and the Revival of Hobbes in Weimar and

National Socialist Germany Author(s): John P. McCormick Reviewed work(s): Source: Political Theory, Vol. 22, No. 4 (Nov., 1994), pp. 619-652 Published by: Sage Publications, Inc. Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/192042 . Accessed: 22/03/2012 14:23
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FEAR, TECHNOLOGY, AND THE STATE Carl Schmitt, Leo Strauss, and the Revival of Hobbes in Weimar and National Socialist Germany

JOHN P. McCORMICK Universityof Chicago

of [the]abstractscientific It is strikingthatone of the most consequential representatives orientationof the seventeenthcentury[ThomasHobbes] became so personalistic.This is because as ajurstic thinkerhe wantedto graspthe realityof societal life just as much as he, as a philosopher and a naturalscientist, wanted to grasp the reality of nature. [J]unstic thoughtIn those days had not yet become so overpoweredby the should unsuspectingly naturalsciences thathe, in the intensityof his scientific approach, have overlooked the specific realityof legal life. Carl Schmitt,PoliticalTheology (1922) In the light of Hobbes's naturalscience, man and his works become a mere phantasmagoria. ThroughHobbes's naturalscience, "the native hue" of his political science "is sicklied o'er with the pale cast"of somethingwhich is remlmscentof death but utterly lacks the majestyof death--of somethingwhich foreshadowsthe positivism of our day. It seems then thatif we want to dojustice to the life which vibratesin Hobbes's political that teachingby itself, and not in the light of his natural teaching, we must understand science. Can this be done?2 Leo Strauss, "On the Basis of Hobbes'sPolitical Philosophy"(1959)

In the passages cited above, a masterand a studentassertthe existence of and a dissociation, if not a divorce, between thatwhich is natural-scientific thatwhich is "personalistic," "human," "specificallyreal,""alive"withinthe
AUTHOR'SNOTE: For their commentsand criticisms, I thank Richard Bernstein, Stephen Holmes, BernardManin,RobertPippin,Moishe Postone, TracyStrong,and GeorgeSchwab,as well as membersof thefollowing organizationsat the Universityof Chicago: the Interdisciplinand the Political Theory ary Social Theory Forum, the Modern EuropeanHistory Workshop, SundayNight Group.
POLITICAL THEORY,Vol. 22 No. 4, November 1994 619-652 ? 1994 Sage Publications,Inc.

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philosophyof ThomasHobbes.Butthequestionwith whichthe secondquote concludes might lead the readerto assume that even after the lapse of the almost fortyyearsthatseparatesthe statements, the master'spropositionhad and moreover,that the studentrecognizesthe yet to be fully demonstrated, nature of suchan assertion, with it. problematic despitehis obvioussympathies Carl Schmitt,in his Weimarwritingsas they pertainto Hobbes, particularlyin TheConceptof the Political, felt the needto emphasizethis supposed distinction or opposition in work of the great seventeenth-century English political theorist.This projectwas subsequentlytaken up by Leo Straussin The Political Philosophy of Hobbes as a resultof his intellectualexchange with Schmittover "theconcept of the political."As Hobbes remarked, "The Passion to be reckoned upon, is Fear" (I, 14, 99),3 and both interpreters recognize something vital, substantive, and fundamentally human in Hobbes's groundingof the statein the fearof death-or as Straussrepeatedly emphasizes,the fear of violent death.On the eve of Weimar'scollapse, they sought to retrieve this primalsource of political orderand free it from the elements thatHobbes himself had found necessaryto employ to constructa state on this foundation-natural science and technology. Schmitt and Strauss saw in these latterelements the very cause of the breakdown-the "neutralization"-of thatwhich they were intendedto help build,the modern state. The particular sociopoliticalsituationof Weimar-violence exercised by privategroups, a widespreadperceptionof technology as a "runaway" phenomenon,and so on-rendered it a critical moment to reintroducethe Hobbes issue of fearandthe issue of science, andconsequentlyto reformulate and the intellectualfoundationof the state. But, I will suggest, the issues of fear,violence, technology,and the state could not be so easily distinguishedwithinHobbes'sthought,and in light of the emergence of National Socialism, both Schmitt and Strauss felt compelled, in subsequentworks such as The Leviathanin The State Theoryof ThomasHobbesandNaturalRightand History,eitherto qualifysignificantly to Hobbes-in retrospect,an approach or abandoncompletelythis approach with ominous implications.4

THE CONCEPTOF THE POLITICAL SCHMITT'S (1932) In Der Begriff des Politischen,5Carl Schmittsets forth his most famous thesis on the essence of politics: "Thespecific political distinctionto which political actions and motives can be reduced is that between friend and enemy" (CP, 26). Yet despite the apparentnovelty of this proposition,one

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finds the shadowof ThomasHobbescast quiteprominently over this famous in humanity'snatural treatise.As Hobbeshimself had maintained, condition, in the state of nature,"everymanto every man,for wantof a common power to keep them all in awe is an Enemy" (I, 15, 102).6 Indeed, Schmltt's friend/enemy distinction is intended to serve a theoretical-politicalrole analogous to Hobbes's state of nature. If Hobbes predicatedthe modern state on the state of nature, Schmitt declares that "theconcept of the state presupposesthe concept of the political." And any inquiriesmade into the "essence"of the state thatdo not first take this foundationinto considerationwould be premature (CP, 19). Questions as to whetherthe state is "a machine or an organism,a person or an institution,a society or a community,an enterpriseor a beehive"-questions in which Schmitt will eventually become quite interested,as we will seemust be provisionallyset aside (CP, 19). Schmitt thus conceives of his formulation of "the political" as an "Archimedeanpoint"not unlike that which Hobbes sought to locate in the state of nature:
Insofar as it is not derved from other critera, the antithesis of frend and enemy critera of otherantitheses:good andevil in the correspondsto the relativelyindependent moral sphere, beautifuland ugly in the aesthetic sphere, and so on. In any event it is independent,not in the sense of a distinctnew domain,but in thatit can neitherbe based on any one antithesisor any combinationof otherantitheses,norcan it be tracedto these. (CP, 26)

"The political"is irreducibleto any otherelement. Indeed,Schmittenvisions the friend/enemydistinctionas so fundamental and elementarythat in the course of his argumenthe feels compelled at particular points to remark on the self-evidence of his thesis:"nothingcan escape this logical conclusion of the political" (CP, 36). Schmitt even resortsto the most questionableof Hobbes's arguments to demonstrate the actualexistence of the stateof affairs he describes:like the stateof nature,the politicalcan be shown to exist based on the behaviorof states In the arenaof international affairs(CP, 28). The heartof Schmitt's neo-Hobbeslanprojectderives from their similar sociopolitical situations.7Schmitt observes that Hobbes formulatedhis political theory "in the terribletimes of civil war"where
all legitimate and normative illusions with which men like to deceive themselves regardingpolitical realities in perods of untroubledsecurity vansh. If within the state thereare orgamzedpartiescapableof accordingtheirmembersmoreprotectionthanthe state, then the latterbecomes at best an annex of such parties,and the individualcitizen knows whom he has to obey. (CP, 52)

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This also happens to be an excellent descriptionof WeimarGermany during its crisis years.8Schmitt sees in the context of Hobbes's thought a parallelwith his own, andrelatedly,a parallelin theirprojects.In Leviathan, Hobbes sought "to instill in man again 'the mutualrelationbetween Protection andObedience'" (CP, 52) andso forestallthe strifeandchaos thatarises when armedautonomous groupsconfronteach other.This is not farremoved fromSchmitt'sown intentions.The exceptionalsituationof civil warreveals normallyconcealed political realities such as humanbehaviorin a state of nature:"In it, states exist among themselves in a condition of continual danger,and their acting subjects are evil for precisely the same reasons as animals who are stirredby theirdrives (hunger,greediness,fear,jealousy)" (CP, 59). Therefore,arguesSchmitt,all "genuine"political theones-those thathave observedthe normallyconcealed"politicalrealities"-presuppose and dynamic"(CP, 61). "manto be evil," meaning"dangerous Schmittthus shareswith Hobbesnot only a similarhistoricalcontext, but a similar outlook on humanityas well. What are the ramificationsof this9 outlook on humanityoffers the way out of the problemsof This particular civil war,or impendingcivil war.Regarding the "genuine" the stateof nature, political philosopherswho take the view thatthe humanbeing is essentially dangerous,Schmittwrites, "theirrealismcan frightenmen in need of security"(CP, 65). This is preciselythe point.Schmittrecognizes,as did Hobbes, thatby frightening"men"one can best "instill"in them thatprinclple-"the cogito ergo sum of the state"-protego ergo obligo (CP, 52). In otherwords, fear is the source of politicalorder.Humanbeings once confrontedwith the prospect of their own dangerousness will be terrified into the arms of authority. Thus, as Schmittexplains, "ForHobbes, trulya powerfuland systematic politicalthinker,the pessimisticconceptionof manis the elementarypresupposition of a specific system of political thought"(CP, 65). But, systematic does not mean, for Schmitt, scientific or technical. Technologyhas helped foster the liberal conception of man, which assumes that, with wealth and and hence blinds can be ameliorated, abundance,humanity'sdangerousness humanity to the eternal reality of "the political" (CP, 61). Technology, of the state and the accordingto Schmitt,has aided in the "neutralization" Europeanorder of states, again concealing the natureof the "political."9 Schmlttchides EduardSprangerfor taking"too technical"a perspectiveon of instinchumannature,for viewing It in light of "thetacticalmanipulation tive drives" (CP, 59). Hobbes's insight, on the contrary,is neither "the productof a frightfuland disquietingfantasy nor of a philosophybased on but is the free competition by a bourgeois society in its first stage fundamentalpresuppositionof a specific political philosophy" (CP, 65).

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Schmltt'stask then is to elaborateon Hobbes's view of humanityand revive of man's natural conditionin threeways: (1) by the fear that is characteristic demonstratingthe substantiveaffinity between his concept of the political and Hobbes's stateof nature,(2) by makingclearthe ever-present possibility of a returnto that situationin the form of civil war, and (3) by convincing individuals-partisans and nonpartisansalike-that only a state with a can guarantee whatis "political" monopoly on decisions regarding peace and do of this He must all while the elements of natural science avoiding security. and technologyoften associatedwith Hobbes,which undermined this project to begin with. of the politicalheightensthe danger The radicalsubjectivitycharacteristic of the Schmitt's concept political,andconsequentlyintensifies the regarding fear inspired by it. "Only the actual participantscan correctly recognize, understand,and judge the concrete situationand settle the extreme case of conflict. Each participantis in a position to judge whether the adversary intends to negate his opponent'sway of life and thereforemust be repulsed or fought to preserveone's own form of existence"(CP, 27). The fact thatin the absence of a centralizedpower there is no standardby which one can judge anotheras an enemy,or be so judged by them, clearly implies thatone must always be readyto be attackedor, more reasonably, compels one to be the first to strike. This is obviously a revival of the Hobbesianscenario of "theconditionof meerNature"where all "are judges of thejustnesse of their own fears" (I, 14, 96). In this light Pasquale Pasqulno observes that it is exactly "the absence or eplstemological impossibilityof defining an obJective criterionof whatconstitutesa threatto the individual'sself preservation which transformsthe naturalright into the origin of the potentialwar of all againstall."'?Schmittdropsthe naturalrightand reemphasizesthe potential war. Hence this radicalsubjectivityis the source of the dangerin Schmitt's "political,"and accordingto Pasquino,"theessentialreasonwhy the Hobbeslan state of natureis one of total uncertaintyand lack of freedom.""l This for war and the which arises this from radical subpotentiality uncertainty fear because insure the of the jectivlty intensify they constancy danger.In fact, the threatof danger is always present,even when the actual danger is not. As Hobbes remarks,the essence of the war which is the state of nature "consistethnot in actuall fighting; but in the known disposition thereto"(I, 13, 88-9). Accordingly,Schmittmaintainsthat"totheenemy conceptbelongs the ever presentpossibility of combat"(CP, 32, emphasis added). The continuedexistence of this kindof subjectivitywithinsociety implies the preservation of the state of war and the fearthatit engenders.As Hobbes makes explicit, it is a "diseased"commonwealththat toleratesthe doctrine, "Thateveryprivate man is Judge of Good and Evil actions"(I, 29, 223); and

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worse, one which allows persons to resort to violence to defend such judgments,"Forthose menthatareso remisselygoverned,thatthey daretake up Armes, to defend, or introducean Opinion, are still in Warre"(I, 18). Schmittsaw in the pluralisttheoriesof the early twentiethcenturya justification for just such behavior (CP, 52), and like Hobbes, evaluated the outcome as state vulnerabilityboth domesticallyand with regardto foreign powers as well:
The intensificationof internalantagonismshas the effect of weakemng the common state.If domesticconflictsamongpoliticalpartieshave become vis-a-vis another Identity the sole political difference, the most extreme degree of internalpolitical tension is thereby reached; i.e., the domestic, not the foreign fnend-and-enemygroupings are decisive for armedconflict. The ever presentpossibilityof conflict mustalways be kept in mind. If one wants to speak of politics in the context of the primacy of internal politics, then this conflict no longerrefersto war betweenorganizednationsbut to civil war.(CP, 32)

Hobbes adamantlymaintainsthatthe existence of violent factions, whether constituted by familial ties, religious affiliation, or economic status, is to the peace and safety of the people, a takingof the Sword out of "contrary the hand of the Sovereign"(II, 22, 164). And it is precisely these kinds of armedantagonismsthathad reemergedin late Weimar:tradeunions versus companygoons, communistmobs versusfascistgangs, politicalpartyversus political party, and so on.12Each had declared the rght to evaluate selfprotectionin one's own way, and to act accordingly.Each had claimed the rightto judge the political (CP, 37). that this situationimplies the Schmitt wants desperatelyto demonstrate likelihoodof combustionintocivil warandHobbes'sstateof nature.He must of the stateof natureto preventthe revive the fear thatled to the termination reversionback to it. If groups other than the state have power, particularly such as thatover declaringwar,or worse if they do not possess such a power themselves but can preventthe state from exercising that power, the state disappears:
It would be an indicationthatthese counterforceshad not reachedthe decisive point in the political if they turnedout to be not sufficientlypowerfulto preventa war contrary be strongenoughto hindera war to theirinterestsor pnnciples.Shouldthe counterforces desired by the state thatwas contraryto theirinterestsor pnnciples but not sufficiently capablethemselvesof decidingaboutwar,thena unifiedpoliticalentity would no longer exist. (CP, 39)

Schmltt'simplicitreadingof Hobbes,therefore,is thata returnto the stateof natureis an ever presentpossibility for a society. This reading is generally

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countered by those who see Hobbes's state of nature as either a mere rhetoricaldevice or an anthropological suppositionabouta very distantpast. But as Pasqulnopersuasivelyargues,the stateof natureis not nearlyso distant from present reality as all that. Hobbes viewed the state of naturenot as a as a politicallypossible present;he viewed factuallyhistoricalpast,butrather the state of natureas "a hypotheticalcrumblingof the state"and society "as if It were dissolved."'3Hobbes conceived of this condition as one of "terror, that is to say a condition in which no individualis certainof his/herborders or even his physical identity,that is his life"; and he was "anxiousto show that the state of natureactually exists."'4The state of natureas it exists in relationship to the present is Hobbes's utmost concern, according to Pasquino:"It can happenat any time and must always be avoided. It is the face of the threatthatpolitical ordermust wardoff."s5 This buttressingof Schmitt's reading of Hobbes more clearly demonstrateshis own project.Schmittseeks to make real the terrorof what is and what might be so as to strengthenthe existing order.The citizens of Weimar must reaffirmthe pact that delivers humanbeings out of the state of nature theirillegitimatelyexercised subjectivand into civil society by transferring back friend and to the sovereign state. "Tothe state as enemy ity regarding an essentially political entity belongs thejus belli, i.e., the real possibility of deciding in a concrete situationupon the enemy and the ability to fight him with the power emanatingfrom the entity"(CP, 45). The state, and the state alone, decides on internalenemies (CP, 46), and externalones as well (CP, 28-9). Regardinginternalenemies, Schmittseeks to reversethepluralistview of the state as merely one interestgroup among many others in society or even as a servantthereof (CP, 44). The state must stand above society as a thanhelpprecipitate civil warby existing as one quasi-objectiveentity,rather others. external enemies, subjectivityamong Regarding just as Hobbes had Catholics in mind when he warned against allegiance to extra-national powers, Schmitt surely thinks of the communists when he writes that one should not "love and supportthe enemies of one's own people" (CP, 29). Moscow should come before Berlin no more than Rome before London or Pans. Only one's own statecan ask one to surrender one's life for it (CP, 46), and Schmittmocks liberalindividualismfor not being able to commandthis from citizens (CP, 71). But here he partscompany with Hobbes, who is the most famous exponent of this kind of right-the right not to lay down one's life in response to a political command. It is here that we should turn to of Schmltt'sproject,because it is on this Strauss'scritiqueand radicalization and it the issues that Strauss'sessay pivots. However,some surrounding point issues need be to addressed first. preliminary

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In his recent work, RichardWolin identifies Schmitt as the archetypal Weimarexponentof "politicalexistentialism"' the obsession with the "brute "brute of human existence and an accompanyingaesprimacy" facticlty," thetizationof conflict, violence, and death as ends in themselves.'6What thus far is thatSchmittseeks to make should be clear from my presentation the threatof conflict-of war-felt andfearednotas anend in itself, as Wolin all the more so as to makewar'soutbreak and othercriticssuggest, butrather and its more facilitated abroad. That prosecution easily unlikelydomestically, Schmittaestheticlzedviolentconflictto generatethe fearnecessaryto prevent disorderis not contestable-that he did so for its own sake is.17This serves as a more adequateexplanationof Schmltt's intentionsratherthan a mere justificationof them,becauseas we will see, Schmittmust be held accountable for aestheticizingviolent conflict in the Weimarcontext, whateverhis intentions. In Political Romanticism,Schmitt declared that for romantics, A question that must be asked is how much "the state is a work of art."'8 Schmitthimself aestheticlzedmattersof state. related of violence is, however,inherently The issue of theaestheticization to a subjectonly implicitin TheConceptof the Political, but which becomes explicit in Schmitt'slaterworkon Hobbes:the questionof myth.In the wake of the emergence of National Socialism, several notable Germanscholars the returnor persistenceof myth in whatis supposattemptedto understand theirrespectiveanalysesof myth,Max Horkheimer In of reason. the age edly and T. W. Adorno,ErnstCasslrerandHansBlumenberg focus, in one way or on the elementof fear.'9 another, Mythis a humanresponseto the fearinspired Ratherthan to use Blumenberg'sformulation. by "theabsolutismof nature," variableapand incomprehensibly confront the amorphous,unpredictable, pearanceof natureas a whole, humanityprefersto fixate on specific entities and subsequentlyntualize with more clearlydiscernibletraitsas surrogates, theminto myths.To thisextent,bothHobbes'sandSchmitt'stheoriesfunction as myths. Accordingto the Germantheoristsof myth, humanityexchanges and chaotic for the fear of somethingmore certain the fear of the unordered and identifiable.Such is the very exchangethatHobbesoffers:subjectsgive the totalityof humannatureregarding up theirepistemologlcaluncertainty andeveryoneat every moment-for the moretolerable theirfearof everything knowledgethatit is onlythestatethatis to be feared,andthenonlyundercertain conditions.Indeed,Hobbesnameshis stateafterthe mythicbiblicalmonster, of the the Leviathan.The extentto which Schmitt'srevivalandreformulation Hobbeslanexchangein TheConceptof thePolitical succumbsto the element of myth and the questionconcerningthe potentialramificationsof this are subjectsthatwill be takenup in latersections of this essay.

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STRA USS'S COMMENTARY ON THE CONCEPTOF THE POLITICAL (1932) The young Leo Straussrecognizes Schmitt'sprojectas I have described it and its relationshipto that of Hobbes;he confirmsthe necessity of such a projectbased on "thepresentsituation"of Weimar;he criticizes the project on the basis of Schmitt's own assumptionsand alms; and finally, he refashions, redirects,and radicalizesthe projectitself.20 Straussrealizes that Schmitt's inquiryinto "theorderof humanthings," into "the political," is necessarily an examinationof the foundationof the state(CCP, 81), for the statewas foundedwith "thefundamental andextreme status of man"in mind (CCP, 88). Indeed,as Straussrecognizes explicitly, "the political, which Schmitt brings out as fundamental,is 'the state of nature.' ... SchmittrestoresHobbes's conceptionof the state of natureto a place of honor"(CCP, 87-8). Just as "inspiringfear"is a primarycharacteristicof Hobbes'sstateof nature, the samecan be said of Schmltt'spolitical, (CCP, 95). As Straussobservedregardaccordingto Strauss'sinterpretation ing Hobbes in a work publishedonly a few years earlierin 1930:
Fear is not only alarmand flight, but also distrust,suspicion, caution,care lest one fear. Now it is not deathin itself thatcan be avoided,but only deathby violence, which is the greatest of possible evils. For life itself can be of such misery that death comes to be rankedwith the good. In the final instance what is of prmary concern is ensunng the continuanceof life in the sense of ensunng defense against other men. Concern with self-protectionis the fundamentalconsideration,the one most fully in accord with the humansituation. The fear of death,the fearof deathby violence, is [for Hobbes] the source of all right,the prmary basis of naturalright.21

Straussthus acknowledges as justified Schmitt'srevival of the image of the stateof natureandthe notionof fearthatmustaccompanyit. The "present situation"in "the age of neutralizations and depoliticlzlng"calls for such a revival, accordingto Strauss,echoing anotherof Schmltt'sworks (CCP, 82). The prevailingpluralistand liberaltheories of society and "culture," which view these entities as "autonomous"-that is, as legitimatelyseparatefrom the state-have neutralizedthe political (CCP, 86). Because such theories view cultureas something naturalin the sense thathumanbeings develop it more or less spontaneously,they overlook thatthereis somethingthatexists prior to culture. "This conception makes us forget that 'culture' always presupposessomething which is cultivated:cultureis always cultivationof nature" (CCP, 86). Straussmakesexplicit thatnaturein this sense also entails humannatureand hence the state of nature:

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Since we understand above all the cultureof humannature,the presuppoby "culture" sitionof cultureis, aboveall, humannature, andsince manis by nature an animalsociale, the humannatureunderlying cultureis the naturalliving togetherof men, i.e., the mode in which man-pror to culture-behaves towardsother men. The term for the natural living together thus understoodis the status naturalis. One may therefore say, the foundationof cultureis the status naturalis.(CCP, 87)

The cultivation of the state of nature is, as we know according to Hobbes and Schmitt, the state, not society initially. The state, by establishing order, makes possible the existence of society. Therefore, Strauss more firmly grounds the Schmlttian thesis against the proponents of the theory of "autonomous" culture and society, namely, liberals and pluralists. The latter overlook the fact that the state of nature and the state itself exist prior to culture commonly understood as It exists within society. Consequently, behavior that weakens the state increases the risk of reviving the state of nature. The status naturalis, and human nature as it exists within it-the political-do not go away simply because, according to Schmitt, liberalism has ignored it or even "negated" it. As Strauss reiterates Schmitt, liberalism merely "conceals" the political:
Liberalismhas not killed the political, but merely killed understanding of the political, the political.To clear the obfuscationof realitywhich liberalism and sincerityregarding has caused, the political must be broughtout and shown to be completely undemable. Liberalismis responsiblefor having covered over the political, and the political must once again be broughtto light, if the questionof the stateis to be put in full serousness. (CCP, 82-3)22

Strauss and Schmitt agree that liberalism has put the state into crisis by "obfuscating" the political, and that the specter of the state of nature must be made apparent-with all the fear that accompanies it-and that "a different system" must be made the basis of the state "thatdoes not negate the political, but brings the political into full recognition" (CCP, 83). However it is on the question of how to found this "different system" that the student challenges the master. The figure of Hobbes again proves central to the disagreement. On the issue of how one cultivates nature-how the state is founded or how culture is developed-Strauss identifies two ways of proceeding. The first "means culture develops the natural disposition; it is careful cultivation of nature-whether of the soil or of the human mind; in this it obeys the indications that nature itself gives" (CCP, 86). Strauss identifies the second kind of cultivation with Bacon: "culture is not so much faithful cultivation of nature as a harsh and cunning fight against nature"(CCP, 87). This second, "specifically modern conception of nature," can also be located in Hobbes according to Strauss, a conception that associates culture with "a disciplining of human will, as the opposite of the status naturalis" (CCP, 87). The

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implication for politics is that the authoritariansuppression of natureand ultimately more especially human nature-is easier, more "natural," stable than the disciplining and educatingentailed by popularself-rule. The latter is actually the "harsh and cunning fight against nature,"and the rule-while ostensibly "harsh,"is former-straightforward authoritarian nature. in accord with more actually pessimisticview Accordingto Strauss,Hobbesnot only held the "natural" and "dynamic,"that Schmittearlier identifies, of humanityas "dangerous" but simultaneously he held the more problematicand unnaturalview of humanityas educable, prudent,and capable of self-control for the sake of rationalself-interest.This latterview fuels the "autonomy" theoryof society, and gives it the justification for demandingsome degree of the subjectivity addressed in the previous section. Moreover, it provides society with the justification for holding leverageagainstthe state. Citizens must be allowed to rule themselves in some sense, andsociety must be allowed to remainfree of the state to some degree. The first view of cultivatinghuman natureput forthby Strausswould, in line with the empiricalrealityof the stateof nature, deem humanity as "morally depraved"and simply and unequivocally in or "needof being ruled"(CCP, 97). It would hence rule out any "autonomy" instead must or which be for individuals, culture, society, kept "subjectivity" underthe tight controlof the state.Straussfaults Schmitt,following Hobbes, for not being truly and exclusively pessimistic, for not identifyingthis more extreme dangerousnessof humanity,and for not advocatingsingularlyand explicitly a more direct mode to govern it. And as Strausssubtly asserts in much of his early writings,this severe mode of rule,contraryto conventional wisdom, is actually less, ratherthanmore, dependenton technology. In his book on Spinoza,Straussexplainedhow the "disclpliningof human will," the less pessimistic cultivationof humannatureprescribedby Hobbes, necessarily requiresthe dominationof naturein general: "Physics,"which Straussidentifies explicitly with technology,
is concerned with man's happiness, anthropology[which he identifies likewise with "politicalphilosophy"]with man'smisery.The greatestmisfortuneis deathby violence; happinessconsists in the limitless increaseof power over men and over things. Fearof violent death, and the pursuit of domination over things-it is basically these two determnants of willing which Hobbes accepts as justified.2

Insteadof adoptingthe firstkindof cultivationpreviouslydescribedwhich "obeysthe indicationsthatnatureitself gives" (which observeshumanbeings in the state of nature,recognizes them as incapableof rulingthemselves, and governs them accordingly), Hobbes opts for the other kind of cultivation,

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which eventually distracts human beings from their own nature by the conquest of outer nature-by providing for their potential happiness with the promise of a commodious life. The direct domination of humanity, suggested by "anthropology," is more natural than the direct domination of external nature, for the latter, relying more explicitly on physics, is actually "the harsh and cunning fight against nature" described above. According to Strauss, Hobbes chooses physics over anthropology, and hence ultimately technology over political philosophy. Technology is employed by Hobbes to neutralize precisely those characteristics that make man dangerous, that create the likelihood of violent death, and emphasizes that charactenstic that makes man capable of improvement, namely, reason:
Reason, the provident outlook on the future, thus justifies the strving after power, desire possessions, gain, wealth,since these providethe meansto gratifythe underlying for pleasuresof the senses. Reasondoes notjustify, but indeed refutes,all strivingafter reputation,honor,fame: in a word and thatword used in the sense appliedby Hobbes, The legitimatestriving after pleasureis sublatedinto strving after power. vanity. What is condemned is the striving after reputation.Philosophy (or more accurately physics as distinct from anthropology)is to be understoodas arsing from the strving after power scientia propterpotentiam.Its aim is cultivation,the cultivationof nature. Whatnatureoffers to manwithoutsupplementary activityon the partof manis sufficient for no more than a life of penury.So that life may become more comfortable,human nature. The purposepursued exertion is required,and the regulationof unregulated by science is conquestover nature.2

Reason, science, and technology tame man by reducing vanity, physical needs, and religion. Yet it is precisely the continued existence of this subJective reason pursued toward private ends within civil society that will undermine Hobbes's state. Strauss focuses on the contradiction within Schmitt that we observed at the close of the last section. Schmitt maintains that the nature of "the political" allows that the state, of which Hobbes is the founder, "may . from those belonging to a nation readiness to die,' and the 'demand this demand is at least qualified by Hobbes: the man in the of legitimacy deserts by reason of fear for his life acts 'only' dishonorably, who battle-ranks not but unjustly" (CCP, 88). And it is precisely the reservation of such a rlght-subjectively determined by an individual's reason-regarding how and when and in what capacity one's life can be employed, which becomes a powerful weapon against the state. The normative consequences of Hobbes's grant of subjectivity (however narrow) to individuals for the question of what is right retains no real force, according to Strauss. SubJective freedom is maintained "at the price of the when man abandons the task of raising the meaning of human life, for is what right, and when man abandons this question, he question regarding

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abandons his humanity"(CP, 101). Schmitt, to the extent that he models himself on Hobbes, betrays the fact that he is "under the spell" of the liberalismhe criticizes. He defines his political as beyond objective normative standards-by defining it as if it were neutral(CP, 103). Schmltt's depiction of the political is hence reduced to a subjective Interpretation characteristicof "the individualistic-liberal society" he wishes to replace (CP, 102). According to Strauss, Schmitt's project, as it stands, is hence "provisional"for it is "forced to make use of liberal elements" (CP, 83). Schmltt's critique"is detainedon the plane createdby liberalism. [H]is critique of liberalism takes place within the horizon of liberalism"(CP, 104-5).25 Strauss is familiar with Schmitt's attempt to separate the substantive Hobbesfromthe mechanisticHobbes(CCP,97, 103). Straussis in full accord with this projectto the extent that the substantiveHobbes recognized what characterizesman's fundamentalcondition and the element with which to manage it-fear. But one must furtherdistance this from the other Hobbes who undermineshis own insight by setting in motion the forces that will neutralizehis system. Schmitt,in his failureto emphasizethe radicaldangerousness of man ratherthan what amountsto mere "liberal" dangerousness, is susceptible to the subjectivity and the tendency toward neutralityand the latterHobbes. "A radicalcritiqueof liberaltechnology thatcharacterize ism," according to Strauss, "is thereforepossible only on the basis of an adequate understandingof Hobbes" (CCP, 105). This understandingis crucial if "the decisive battle between 'the spint of technology,' the 'mass faith of an antireligious,this-worldly activism' and the opposite spirit and faith, which, it seems, does not yet have a name,"is to be won (CCP, 104). Hobbes negated the political; Schmitt affirms it (CCP, 90). According to Strauss, he opens the possibility of starting the project over again. This "urgenttask"(CCP, 105), initiatedby Schmitt,is takenup by Straussin his own projecton Hobbes.In the Germanyof 1933, Straussexalts thepossibility that" 'the orderof humanthings' may arise afresh"(CCP, 101).

STRAUSS'SUNDERTAKING OF THE POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY OF HOBBES (1933) Based on the quality of Strauss's commentaryon The Concept of the Political, as well as a draftof the beginningof his work on Hobbes, Schmitt obtained for Strauss a Rockefeller FoundationFellowship to continue this endeavorin FranceandEnglandin 1933. Apparently, whatwas writtenat this

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point were the first five chaptersof what was eventually publishedas The Political Philosophyof Hobbes in Englandin 1936.26 In these sections, we find the most explicit and detailedattemptof the Weimarprojectof Schmitt and StraussregardingHobbes.27 Strauss declares that "the particularobject of the present study" is to demonstratethat "the real basis of [Hobbes's] political philosophy is not modern science" (PPH, ix). Strausscites with approvalG. C. Robertson's thatHobbes'spoliticalinsightsweremadelong beforehe became observation "a mechanicalphilosopher"(PPH, ix) and wishes to apprehendHobbes's beforetheywere"distorted" by the influence thoughtson "menandmanners" of modernscience (PPH, ix). ThroughStrauss'sproject,"we areenabledto perceivethat[Hobbes's]originalconceptionof humanlife was presentin his mind before he was acquaintedwith modernscience, and thus to establish the fact that that conception is independentof modem science" (PPH, xi). Certainly,Hobbes developed his "method"in the fashion of Descartes and Galileo,butthe significanceof his thoughtdoes not lie in this similarity."The universal importanceof Hobbes's political philosophy cannot but remain unrecognizedso long as, in accordancewith Hobbes's own statements,the method is considered to be the decisive featureof his politics. Now it is characobvious that the methodis not its only and even its most important teristic" (PPH, 2). Reminiscent of his commentaryon Schmitt, Strauss of Hobbes's thought is its maintainsthat the most importantcharacteristic substance,its insight into humanity,the insightrelatedto the fact that "man is by nature evil,""rapacious" (PPH, 3). Accordingto Strauss,Hobbesfounds his theoryof the state at the root, not on science and technology,but on the fear generatedby this insight. "His contentionthatthe State originatesonly in mutualfearandcan only so originatehas thus moral,not merelytechnical significance"(PPH, 23). It is Spinozawho completelytechnifiespolitics, not Hobbes (PPH, 28). For Strauss(as for Schmitt),there is something vital to be graspedbeyond Hobbes's method. on Schmltt'swork,Strausschastisedhis seniorfor not In his commentary distinguishing between that kind of pessimism that views humanity as prudentanimals, dangerousyet educable, on one hand, and that kind that views it as dangerous,period, on the other, in need of nothing other than thanmaking "beingruled."HereStraussemphasizesthatman'sreason,rather him educable and improvable,as even the former more moderatekind of makeshim even moredangerousand in even more pessimismargues,rather, dire need of being ruled:
The specific differencebetween man and all otheranimalsis reason.Thus man is much he canenvisagethe futuremuchbetter less atthe mercyof momentary sense-impressions,

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thancan animals;for this very reasonhe is not like ammalshungryonly with the hunger the most of the moment, but also with futurehunger,and thus he is the most predatory, cunning, the strongest,and the most dangerousammal.(PPH, 9)

Straussnotes the tension in Hobbes between this "vitalistic"conception of one (PPH, 9), which Strausscharachumanappetitesand the "mechanistic" terized in his commentaryon Schmittas the specifically liberalconception. The latterposits humanappetite"asa resultof the infinitenumberof external impressions"made from withoutthe body, and hence manageable,controllable. Controlthe stimuliandyou controlthe desires.Science andtechnology are of course indispensablefor this kind of control. The former theory of appetites,on the otherhand,posits "thathumanappetiteis infinite in itself," and hence unquenchableand volatile (PPH, 9). "The mechanistic [technoliberal]conceptionis basedon the mechanisticexplanationof perceptionand therewithon the generaltheoryof motion;on the otherhand,the apparently vitalistic [trulypessimistic] conceptionis based not on any generalscientific (PPH, 9). The lattertheory,which theory,but on insight into humannature" Straussearlieridentifiedas anthropology, recognizes the differencebetween animal and man: "the animal desires only finite objects as such, while man spontaneouslydesires infinitely"(PPH, 9). Straussasserts,despite the contradiction,"therecan be no doubtthatonly this latterview of humanappetite corresponds to the intention of Hobbes's political philosophy" (PPH, 9). Hence, "thewarof everyone againsteveryonearises of necessity fromman's (PPH, 12). Infiniteappetitesgenerateinfinite conflicts.28 very nature" It is precisely "the fear each man has of every otherman as his potential murderer" that serves as "theoriginof law and the State"(PPH, 17). Strauss He focuses more dramaticallyon this fear of death than any other author.29 explains the precise reason Hobbes chose to base his theoryon the negative life" "because expression"avoidingdeath"over thepositive one "preserving we feel death and not life; because we fear death immediatelyand directly, while we desire life only because rationalreflection tells us that it is the condition of our happiness;because we fear death infinitely more than we desire life" (PPH, 16). To make the fear with which he is concernedmore intense, Straussmakes the source of that fear more extreme than it appearsin Hobbes himself, or even in Schmitt.It is not merelyfearof deaththatis at the base of Hobbesian politics and hence the politics of the modernstate, but fear of violent death. Because man, unlike the animals, is not content with limited satisfactions, but desires limitless ones as well, such as recognition,he inflicts the worst damage, the worst pain. It is well worth quoting Strauss at length here: Because man craves recognition,he can be offended, slighted,

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and to be slighted is the greatestanimi molestia, and from the feeling of being slighted anses the greatestwill to injure.The one slightedlongs for revenge. In orderto avenge whetherhe loses his life in so doing.Unconcerned himselfhe attackstheother,indifferent of his own life, he desires,however,above all thatthe othershould as to the preservation remainalive; for "revengeaimethnot at the death,but at the captivityand subjectionof which over the deadis not" The strugglewhich an enemy . revengeaimethat triumph, thus breaksout, in which, accordingto the opimon of both opponents,the object is not killing but the subjectionof the other, of necessity becomes serous, because it is a struggle between bodies, a real struggle. From the beginmng of the conflict the two world. opponentshave, withoutrealizingandforeseeingit, completelyleft the imaginary At some point in the conflict, actualinjury,or more accuratelyphysical pain, arousesa fear for life. Fear moderates anger, puts the sense of being slighted into the background, and transformsthe desire for revenge into hatred.The aim of the hateris no longer triumphover the enemy, but his death. The struggle for pre-eminence,about "trifles",has become a life-and-death struggle.In this way naturalman happensunforeseen uponthe dangerof death. .. Only fora momentcan he free himself fromthedanger of deathby killing his enemy, for since every man is his enemy, after the killing of his indeed of all others.The killing first enemy he is "againin the like dangerof another", of the enemy is thus the least far-sightedconsequence of the withdrawalfrom death. (PPH, 20-1)3

With his thoroughly existential reading of Hobbes's state of nature, Strauss demonstrates how the subjective desires of men lead to their struggle with other men with the deliberate aim of inflicting pain on them. However, in the heat of battle the opponents become focused no longer on the trigger, the external cause of the original altercation, but rather on life and death. Schmitt described how realms such as economics and religion become so intense as to no longer concern themselves with economic or religious issues as they become political but rather with the destruction of a decided enemy "the negation of the other." The prospect of this negation, the fear it inspires, is sufficient to compel man to abandon the subjective trifles that serve as sources of conflict and potential harbingers of violence, pain, and death. The religious impulses, which Hobbes regarded in his day as nothing more than expressions of pride, the class identity that was seen in much the same way by Schmitt, must no longer inspire feelings of "slight." According to Strauss, the fear of violent death serves as an antidote to the realm of pride as most broadly interpreted by Hobbes:
Prde, far from being the ongin of thejust attitude,is ratherthe only orgin of the unjust attitude. Not prde, and still less obedience,but fear of violent death,is accordingto [Hobbes] the orgin of the just intention.What man does from fear of death, in the consciousness of the weaknessof othermen, when he honestlyconfesses to himself and to othershis weakness and his fearof death,unconcernedabouthis honour,this alone is fundamentally just. (PPH, 25)

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Fearof violent deathdefeats the frivolous butdangeroussubjectiveattitudes that characterizethe state of nature and the epoch of religious wars for Hobbes, and potentially, the era of malignant pluralism for Schmitt and Strauss.In a passagereminiscentof Schmltt'sthatdescribedhow in civil war "men"recognizethat"alllegitimateandnormative illusions"with whichthey like to "deceive themselves" in periods of peace "vanish,"Strauss asserts how thatwhich is the productof civil war,death,dissolves such illusions that in the end can only be viewed as the productof vanity: "Because man by naturelives in the dreamof the happinessof triumph, of glittering,imposing, a no he less to good, requires imposingpower awakenhim fromhis apparent dream:this imposing power is the imperiousmajestyof death... The ideal condition for self knowledge is, therefore,unforeseenmortaldanger"(PPH,
19).31

Thus, argues Strauss,Hobbes's politics is based not on science, but on humansubstance.Any relationshipbetweenthe two substance,fundamental must recognize the substanceas the antecedentof the science, not vice versa. Only the fearof violentdeathconquersthe subjectivevanitythatignitesstrife, and only it subdues the prejudicethatinterfereswith science:
Hobbes identifies conscience with the fear of death;only throughknowledge of mortal danger,knowledge which is at the same time a retreatfrom death can man be radically liberatedfromnaturalvanity,fromthe natural in the worldof hls imagination. absorption If this is the case, the fear of death, the fear of violent death, is the necessarycondition not only of society but also of science. Just as life in common is hinderedby passion, science is hinderedby prejudice.(PPH, 26)

Fear,the stateof nature,andthe stateitself all exist priorto science, which must lie within the realmof cultureand society. Thereforea trulyHobbesian theory of the state cannotbe based on science; science is possible only after the state has already been established. Science can even be more or less discardedwhen one understands these priorities.Because Hobbes'spolitical philosophy is based on the fear of violent death,
because it is basedon experence of humanlife, it can never,in spite of all the temptations of naturalscience, fall completely into the danger of abstractionfrom moral life and forget moral difference. Hobbes's political philosophy has thus for that very reason a moral basis, because it is not derved from naturalscience but is foundedon first-hand experence of humanlife. (PPH, 29)

It can never completely fall into such dangerwhen it can be retrievedby the likes of Schmitt and Strauss.For they, particularly Strauss,have articulated what is priorto science in Hobbes'sthought.Strausshas successfully cared

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out Schmitt's projectand his own correctionof it by getting "beyond the horizon of liberalism"by supposedly adequatelyunderstandingHobbes. that will Straussisolates Hobbes's thoughtfrom the forces of neutralization the basis of politics as fear undermineit. Once one adequatelyunderstands of violent death,a fear based not on a somewhatdangerous,yet improvable and educable humannature,but simply on an infinitely dangeroushuman one no longerhas anyneedfor science.Onceone correctsthe mistakes nature, of Hobbes'sliberalsuccessors,who takeup the taskof tryingto have citizens of theconquestof nature rulethemselvesby providingthemwiththe products and allay theirfears by showing them the orderlinessof nature,one can set up a state more In accord with the naturalcondition of humanity,more in accord with "the political." The logical outcome of Strauss's turning of Schmitt's view of man to one which views him simply in need of "being ruled,"is a theoryof state thatconsistentlyinstills in citizens the fear of the "humansituation" by constantlyremindingthemof its proximity.If this is to of physical dominabe achieved withouttechnology,withoutthe apparatus tion, somethingelse must hold sway. The myth of the state-the Leviathan, the sea monsterafterwhich Hobbes namedhis greatestwork on the statethateach citizen the terror must invoke uniformlyand in a controlledmanner felt individually and overwhelmingly in the state of nature.Myth is the from society while simulelement which can maintainthe state's separation too taneouslykeepingit in check. Thus, for the stateto keep fromintegrating extensively within society and hence weakening itself, myth must hold sway.32 Despite the mythic title of Leviathan,Hobbes was to emphasize myth on Hobbes'sBehemoth, moreheavily in his laterwritings.In his commentary that "the ultimate to realize came how Hobbes describes Holmes Stephen is not coercionof the body,butcaptivationof the sourceof politicalauthority It is to this issue in HobbesthatStrauss'sworkpoints and to which mind."33 Schmitthimself turnsin his laterwork on Hobbes, although,as we will see, his attitude toward the project as a whole has become significantly less sanguine.34

THE LEVIATHANIN THE STATE SCHMITT'S THEORYOF THOMASHOBBES. MEANING SYMBOL(1938) AND FAILUREOF A POLITICAL Much happened in both Schmltt's personal life and German politics between 1933 and 1938, the publicationdate of Schmltt'sbook on Hobbes's

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Leviathan.35 Schmitt,enticed by the promiseof prestigiouspositions,joined the NationalSocialist Partynot long afterItcame to power.Following several years in which Schmittheldjudicial posts and wrote treatisesfor the regime, his unorthodoxNational Socialism, his past connection with political Catholicism, and his previous public denunciationsof the partyeventuallyran him afoul of the SS, and he retiredinto privatelife after 1936.36 Schmitt had not taken up the Welmar-Hobbesian projecthe sharedwith Strausssince 1933. Perhapshe thoughthe hadfounda solutionin thepolitical choice he made in May of thatyear.But afterthe events of the ensuing years, he returnedto Hobbes and his Leviathan,which Schmitt declared was the and "mortal" "earthly" god that must time and time again bring man out of condition"(L, 22). This statementhighlightsthe the "chaos"of the "natural themesof Schmitt'streatisethatarenew to theproject:mythandits mortality. In the Leviathanbook, we still find SchmittdefendingHobbes againstthose him "superficially" as strictlya "rationalist, who would interpret mechanist, sensualist, individualist"(L, 22). Schmitt is more forthrightin admitting, themechanistic,arepresent(L, 30), however,thatthese elements,particularly but that they do not constituteHobbes's theoryas a whole. Schmittemphasizes that for Hobbes there are three Leviathans:the mythical monster,the representativeperson, and the machine (L, 30). Schmitt's thesis is that Leviathanas mythical monster,or even as representativeperson-images that can sufficiently keep men in awe-hlstoncally become supersededby Leviathanthe machine-which is viewed as a meretool to be used by various groups of citizens (L, 54). In other words, Schmitt admits that the Weimar from the "vital"in Hobbes has been attemptto divorce the "mechanistic" What accounts for this change of mind?37 historicallyimpossible. The neutralization of Hobbes's state-its transformation into mere machine-beglns, with good reason, as a response to the wars of religion, but led inevitably to "the neutralizationof every truth"(L, 64). Not only religious, but metaphysical,juristic, and political considerationseventually come to mean nothing to the "clean"and "exact" workings of the state mechanisms(L, 62-3). Liberalsand communistsboth agree that the state is a machine, an apparatus which the most "vared political constellationscan utilize as a technically neutralinstrument" (L, 62-3). In hindsight, writes in his The Schmitt,reversing argument Conceptof the Political, the statecan be viewed as "thefirst productof the age of technology"(L, 53). The fault does not lie fully with Hobbes, according to Schmitt, for he expected his state to continue to inspire awe as a myth that stood above society, maintainingpeace throughthe fear it engendered,and expected It to function as smoothly as a finely tuned machine. Schmitt elaborateson an the radicaltechniclzinsightby Straussnotedearlier,thatSpinozaperpetrates

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ing of Hobbeslanpolitics. Resortingto an anti-Semitismnot presentin his Weimarwrtings, Schmitthereblames"theJew"Spinozafor accelerating the of the Leviathan a into a from machine.38 myth neutralizingprocess turning Hobbes, the religious insider(nominallyChristianEnglishman),formulated in the following stable manner: the state/civil society relationship
publicpeace and sovereignpower Insures individualfreedom.

Spinoza, the religious outsider(a Jew), changes the prioritiesso as to make unstable: the relationshipfundamentally
individualfreedom insuredby publicpeace and sovereignpower.

Thus the dangerous subjectivity that was the concern of Schmitt in his
reformulation of Hobbes in The Concept of the Political is historically given

a place of prmacy over the state, which was foundedprecisely to keep it in check. As ReinhartKoselleck, himself a studentof Schmitt,explains it, the slightest traceof subjectivitythatHobbesgrantedto his citizens as compensation for giving up the "Natural Right"of the state of nature,latertakes its itself: state on the revenge
The Statecreateda new order,but then-in genuinelyhistoricfashion-fell prey to that order.As evident in Hobbes, the moralinnerspace thathad been excised from the State and reserved for man as a human being meant (even rudimentarily)a source of remnantof the state The authorityof conscience remainedan unconquered unrest. into the formallyperfectedState.39 of nature,protruding

and gained in power,they demandedof As the subjectivltiesproliferated the stateobjectivity-obJectivity towardits own existence-the logical result of the state. Accordingto Schmitt,Kant of which is the complete neutrality is guilty of finally sappingthe stateof any substantivecontentof its own, of disentangling the "organism" from the "mechanism"; simultaneously, Schelling and the Romantics disentangle "art"from "mechanics,"but in Hobbes these elements were all together,and hence the Leviathanstate, in this awesome totality, was potentially mythical (L, 61). After Kant, the decisions, but a mechanism dispensing rules: "The legislator humanus becomes a machina legislatoria"(L, 100).
reigning image for jurisprudence is no longer a personal judge pronouncing

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Because the government has no moral content, neither do the laws it thereby produces:"For the technically representedneutralityit is decisive fromevery substantive thatthe laws of the statebecome independent content, andshouldbe valid only as a result fromreligious or legal truthandpropriety, of the positive determinationsof the state's decision in the form of commands"(L, 67).40A state thatis purelymechanicaland has no value content whatsoever other than efficiency has no boundary,not even the Hobbeslan one of the protection of individual life. "Such a state can be tolerant or intolerantbut neutralnonetheless.It has its truth,andjustice in its technical perfection... The state machineeither functions or does not function"(L, 68-9). Ironically,it is the state'sgrantingbotha subjectiverealmandthe right to resist the state in the protectionof one's life that comes to endangerthe lives of citizens, accordingto Schmitt.Had the state recognized,as Schmitt and Strausswished, thatman simply neededto be ruledand thatto granthim any subjective determinationof self-preservationwas dangerousto order, peace, and life, it could have held for itself the moral content of protecting the lives of its citizens. As the subjectiveentities of civil society demanded more objectivity from the state,they drainedit of even this content.If any of these subjective entities, "autonomous" (L, 68) as they are from the state, should in their guaranteedsubjective freedom of conscience choose not to recognize the boundaryof the statein the safety of the people, and also seize the neutralized,efficient, but weakenedstate, the results would be horrific. It would be the state of naturewhere all are not equal in their ability to kill and be killed. It would be an entitywith the subjectivityof the stateof nature, and the objective efficiency of the sovereignstate.As Schmittso masterfully describedthe predicament of lateWeimarin Hobbesiantermsin TheConcept the he has here Political, of perhapsset forthjust such a Hobbesiandepiction of National Socialism. The aspect of myth in Hobbes's Leviathancould have kept the elements of society frombecomingautonomousandfrommakingdemandsagainstthe state; accordingto Schmitt, it could have ruled not throughthe apparatuses of technicalefficiency, but ratherby "captivating minds."Now it is reduced to the failure that Schmitt's title suggests. As Pasquinoobserves, Hobbes's statealways was in a rather precarious positionvls-A-vlsits subjects:"Behind the absolutecharacterof the Hobbeslansovereign one begins to discover its The frontispiece fragility ... its dependenceon those who dependupon it."41 that presently adorns Schmitt's Der Leviathanbears this out: it features a beachedwhale, harpoonedand subduedby the fishermenwho surround it. It is a far cry from the frontlspieceof Hobbes's English edition of his work, which featuredthe giant sovereign,madeup of an infinite numberof people,

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arisingover the horizon-presumably fromthe sea-with swordand staff in hand. The formeris the fate of this great Leviathan,accordingto Schmitt. How could Schmittenvision the stateto be dead at the very momenthe lived under the most powerful state-the totalitarianstate par excellence-in did not consult history?In his Weimarwritings(which the Nazis apparently beforesoliciting his services),Schmittnotesthata statethatis integrated into every facet of society is hardlya state at all. For a state to be a state, for Schmitt,it muststandover andabove society, governingit-no doubtfirmly And even in Hobbeslan terms, the and vigilantly-as a separateentity.42 NationalSocialist stateis no sovereignstatebuta pervertedly powerfulform of the state of nature,where no one is sure if he is friend or enemy to his fellow citizen or to the regime. However, Schmitt is not simply the historically legitimatedprophetof he is also doom he implicitlypresentshimselfto be in Der Leviathan.Rather, to the state of affairshe crticizes underNationalSocialism. In a contributor his Weimarwritings,Schmitthad warnedagainstthe takeoverof the stateby of "statewill-formation" nonneutral forces who would "seize"the apparatus for themselves, "without themselves ceasing to be social and non-state of the state in termsof He even describedsuch an appropriation entities."43 "Whenthe 'mortalgod' falls fromhis throne of the Leviathan: the dethroning and the realmof objectivereasonandcivil society becomes 'a greatgang of thieves,' then the partiesslaughterthe powerful Leviathanand slice pieces as Schmitthad promotedthe Reichsprasident from the flesh of his body."44 force to keep the social elements at bay-a neutralforce only the "neutral" with regardto the competingparties,but not neutraltowardits own power. Yet as Schmitt's WeimartheoreticaladversaryHans Kelsen so presciently asked at the time: whatis to preventthe supposedlyneutralentityfrombeing Schmitthadno answer in the social conflictSchmittdescribes?45 a participant in Weimar and he still has no answer under National Socialism in Der Leviathan. thatSchmittmaintained Thus the stanceof Hobbesianneutrality throughout the 1920s and 1930s turnsout to be somewhatmisleading.An important differencebetweenthe stateof natureandthe friend/enemydistinctionis that in the former,despite some occasionalreferencesby Hobbes to families or professions, there are no friends,and hence no antagonisticgroupings.The abstractindividualismof Hobbes's "war of all against all" points up his in theEnglishCivil therespectivecombatants ultimateagnosticismregarding War:Leviathanwas written,for the most part,in supportof the king, but was Schmitthad easily convertedby Hobbes into ajustification for Cromwell.46 in Weimar'snearcivil the participants much strongerpreferencesregarding war. It did matterto him, for instance, that the Social Democratsnot gain

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victory,let alone the Communists.Groupswho wouldbe theenemies of these groups would necessarily be, accordingto Schmltt's"conceptof the political," betterfriendsof the state. Shouldthese friendsgain controlof the state, for them to suppressthe enemies of that state. This it would be appropriate is in fact what the National Socialists did, albeit in a mannermore ruthless than Schmitt could have imagined.To this effect, Schmitt's theory encouraged as much as it forewarnedagainstthe seizure of the Leviathanstate by radicallysubjective social forces. Moreover,the potentiallylethalresultsof such a seizure arecompounded by Schmitt's theoreticaltamperingwith the Hobbeslanformulaof protego the state in the way in which ergo obligo. Had Hobbes originallyformulated Schmitt and Strausswished in 1933-by not grantingto the individualthe subjective rght of self-protection,even for the sake of betterinsuringthat individual'slife-the logic of the Leviathanwould have brokendown. It is that self-preservation only the retentionof some of thatsubjectivityregarding rules completely in the state of naturethatencourages"Hobbesianman"to make a compact and submit to the state. Schmittwas correctto recognize in Der Leviathanthat the state was, in a way, ultimatelythe productof the age a tool. It servedas a meansto something of technology;it was an instrument, and peace.47 The state itself else, namely security and stability,preservation could not, withoutmost unfortunate results,be what he and Strausswanted, namely the embodimentof these things, and not the means thereto.Such a formulation is as dangerousas it is incoherent. The statecould notbe expected fromthe stateof nature,and still to absorball of the rightto self-preservation at the same time guaranteeit. The radicalsubjectivity,the dangerousrightto judge, accruingto the state as it does in Schmltt'sandStrauss'sinterpretation of Hobbes, only increases that subjectivity's volatility exponentially. If Schmitt,and particularly Strauss,had only deigned to consult that "liberal," John Locke, as they engaged in their intellectualplaying-with-matchesin 1933, they might have paused to question,as did Locke:
I desire to know what kind of Governmentthat is, and how much better it is than the State of Nature,where one Man commandinga multitude,has Libertyto be Judgein hls own Case, and may do to all his Subjectswhateverhe pleases, withoutthe least liberty to anyoneto questionor controlethose who Executehis Pleasure?And in whatsoeverhe doth, whetherled by Reason, Mistakeor Passion, must be submittedto? Much betterit is in the State of Nature wherein Men are not bound to submit to the unjust will of another.4

In Locke's reformulationof Hobbes, it is absolute rule, not the state of The state of naturewhere each nature,which is the actual state of "Warre." individualhas an equal chance of remainingalive must surely be betterthan

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a situationwhere one has completelygiven over one's rightto and capacity for self-protectionto an inordinately strongerforce thatoffers no guarantee, no insuranceof protecting one's life. Schmitt surely must have come to for all of his crticisms of it, was certainlybetterthan thatWeimar, understand National Socialism; there, whateverthe social disturbancesand economic fluctuations,Schmitt'sacademiccontroversiesdid not cause him to fear for his life.49 If, in Der Leviathan,Schmitt perhapsimplicitly recognizes his earlier mistake in attemptingto reformulatethe Hobbesian protection/obedience does not recognize the relationshipin so dangerousa fashion,he apparently mistakein his earliercalling for the ruleof mythinsteadof the rule of technik in the art of statecraft.Like MartinHeldegger, but for different reasons, Schmittmust have originally seen in NationalSocialism a myth that could serve as an alternativeand antidoteto the age of technology.Schmitt must have viewed myth as an elementof the Hobbesianprojectthathad faded but could be revived to supplantthe presentlypredominant element,technology, which threatenedto bring down the whole structure.And like Heldegger, Schmitt must have realized somewhat late that in modernity,myth can be to technology.As we in relationship revivedonly very carefully,particularly hadalreadyobservedin his masterpiece now know,and as WalterBenJamin in of 1936, 'The Artworkin the Age of Its TechnologicalReproducibility," NationalSocialism, myth and technology were fatefullybound:
of aesthetics into political life. The The logical result of Fascism is the introduction violationof the masses, whom Fascism,with its Fiihrercult, forces to its knees, has its of ritual wuhch is pressedinto the production in the violence of an apparatus counterpart "Fiat All efforts to renderpolitics aestheticculminatein one thing:war. values. says Fascism,and expects war to supplythe artisticgratificaars-pereat mundus," Mankind['s] tion of a sense perception that has been changed by technology. as an self-alienationhas reachedsuch a degreethatit can experence its own destruction aestheticpleasureof the first order.

In 1933, how did Straussand Schmittexpect to revive thatprimalsubstance, that link to myth, the fear of violent death? Did they not realize, as did wouldbe neededto change"senseperception" Benjamin,that"anapparatus" such "ntualvalues"95' into and production" by "technology," "press In one of the two quotes that opened this study, Straussdisparagesthe to which the world is reducedundera certain concept of "phantasmagoria" can be described,according But if Hobbes. of phantasmagoria interpretation to Susan Buck-Morss, as "an appearanceof reality that tricks the senses that serves as "a as a "technoaesthetics" throughtechnical manipulation," means of social control,"this is precisely what Hobbes had in mind for his

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The Leviathanis intendedas a phantasmagoria; Leviathan.52 the technology and the myth are for Hobbes intrinsicallylinked from the start.Schmlttand Strauss might have paid better attentionto the opening lines of Hobbes's Introduction to Leviathan,wherehe describeshow humanscan manufacture a political machine,the state, in the way thatGod createda natural machine, the human being.53And it is this technical construction that necessarily underliesthe Leviathanpreferred God," by SchmittandStrauss:the "Mortall which "haththe use of so much Power and Strengthconferredon him, that by terrorthereof,he is enabledto conformethe wills of them all, to Peace at
home, and mutuall ayd against their enemies abroad" (II, 17, 120-1).54

In Hobbes, and consequentlyin modernity, the resultof this entwinement of mythandtechnology is the tragicfact thatthe formercan serve to intensify ratherthandiminishthe threatposed by the latter.Perhapsan attemptto exalt mythover science andtechnologybeyondHobbes'soriginalbalancebetween the two spheres paradoxicallyleads only to a greaterpredominanceof the latterwithinthe formeras a resultof theirintnnsiclink. The way to disengage the mutual relationship of myth and technology, or in the more familiar phrasingof Horkheimerand Adorno, myth and enlightenment,would perThis would, haps be throughthe thresholdof reasonand not that of myth.55 of course, necessitate the abandonment of fear as a contributingelement to politics. As Benjaminpoints out so well, the potentialresult of the opposite to myth,is war.At whatbettersite could strategy,of subordinating rationality fear, pain, violence, aesthetics,and technology gather?56 We observed that in The Concept of the Political, Schmitt found it necessary to aestheticize-to elevate to mythic proportions-conflict to generate the salutary fear that could restore order to society. But such aestheticization, such myth making, on the contrary,contributed to the fearandthe intensificationof disorder. Rather generationof far-from-salutary than, in Hobbes's words, insunng "Peace at home," and simply fostenng "mutuallayd"againstexternalenemies, the aestheticlzationandelevation of conflict to the statusof myth inspireda war,ghastly in mannerand scale, on Germany'sown citizens, and in unprecedented global termson othernations. Schmitt's student, FranzNeumann,in fact describes the National Socialist state, not as the Leviathan, but ratheras its opposite, the Behemoth: "a non-state,a situationof lawlessness, disorderand anarchy."57 Thus SchmittandStrauss'sWeimarattempt to supplantliberalismthrough a reinterpretation of Hobbes is a catastrophic failurein two ways. First,they tamperwith one Hobbesianformula-the protection-obedience relationshipthat had already been improved by the liberalism that succeeded Hobbes. Second, they experiment with another Hobbesian formula-the mythtechnology relationship-to which post-Hobbesianliberalismcontinues to

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more dangerous be oblivious. In both cases they renderthe reformulation thanthe original,supposedlyunstableproposition,and the historicalreality with which it correspondswas undeniablydisastrous. In his commentaryon Schmitt's The Concept of the Political, Strauss the questionwhetherit is possible to speak expressedthe need to "disregard of any conceptionof culture[andnature] except the modernone"(CCP, 87). He obviously felt thatthe modernconceptionof these entities, which led to that a modernsolution.Strausslaterremarked the crsis of the staterequired his writings in the dwindlingdays of Weimarwere "basedon the premise, sanctionedby powerfulprejudice,thata returnto pre-moder philosophyis Thatchanged,however,with the publicationof the full text of impossible."58 The Political Philosophy of Hobbes in 1936, and especially Natural Right and History in 1953. Modernphilosophical-political expressions, particuin a particularly cast later works in these are in reflected as Hobbes, larly unfavorablecomparison with the classical tradition.In light of ensuing events, perhapsStrausswas-to use a word thathas figuredprominentlyin this study-frightened into this stance by the implications of the earlier project he shared with Carl Schmitt.In his "second sailing," he would no longer so explicitly voice modernsolutionsto modernpoliticalproblems.In the United States, Strauss kept his political inclinations hidden behind a religion in which he did not believe, an ostensible venerationof things ancient,and a doctrineof esotericwriting.59 Walter BenJamin,unlike Strauss, did not have sufficient influence to andthe continent,andthusone of Fascism's his exit fromGermany guarantee most brilliantcritics becameone of its millions of victims in 1940.60 After the war, Carl Schmitt attemptedto justify his collaborationwith of"obediencefor NationalSocialism by appealingto the Hobbesianstandard he assumed which new to a offered He regime, allegiance merely protection" It is almostfitting then thatthis Hobbeslanwho would in turnprotecthim.61 soughtto theorizeinto oblivionthe protectioncomponentof the "protectionobedience"formula,came ratherclose several times duringthe ThirdReich Instead to payingwith his life for makingthatunforgivable politicalchoice.62 Schmittlived well into his nineties,claiminguntilthe end thathe was simply misconstrued.63

CONCLUSION In their Weimarworks on Hobbes, Schmitt and Straussattemptto preserve, strengthen,and even redefine the state by reviving the source of its

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development, the fear of violent death. To not recreatethe conditions that broughtaboutthe crisis of the stateto begin with, SchmittandStraussattempt to refoundthe state solely on this "vital,"and inevitably"mythic,"element of fear,divorcingit from the "neutralizing" elements of science and technology. By viewing man as an incomgibly dangerous being, Schmitt, and thejustificationfor a subjectiveautonoespecially Strauss,hopedto eradicate mous realmcultivatedby science and technologyand governed by the right of self-protection, which might grow to rival the power of the state and threatento bringaboutthe chaos of the stateof nature.But therewas a flaw, a fateful flaw, in this project.A revival of the myths necessaryto instill this fearfor the sake of creatingor strengthening authority gives no realguarantee of actually allaying that fear: it does not abolish the state of nature, but it. It may not diminishthe role of technology in modem politics, perpetuates
but rather serves to expand that role many times. This project was, as such

astute and learnedmen should have known, not the elimination,but rather, and manufacture of chaos. potentially,the very institutionalization

NOTES
1. Carl Schmitt, Political Theology: Four Chapterson The Concept of Sovereignty,trans. George Schwab (Cambrdge: MIT Press, 1986), 34. 2. Leo Strauss, "On the Basis of Hobbes's Political Philosophy,"in What Is Political Philosophy?and OtherStudies (Glencoe: Free Press, 1959), 178-9. 3. All referencesto Hobbes are from Leviathan,ed. RichardTuck (Cambridge: Cambrdge UmversityPress, 1991). Book, chapter,and page citationsappearin parentheseswithinthe text. 4. This study differs from that of both Straussdisciple Heinnch Meier, Carl Schmitt,Leo Strauss und "Der Begriffdes Politischen"(Stuttgart: J. B. MetzlerscheBuchhandlung,1988) and Strauss critic John Gunnell, "Straussbefore Straussiamsm: The WeimarConversation," Reviewof Politics (Winter1990), in thatmy interestis primarily with Schmittas participant and with Hobbes as subjectof this "conversation." 5. The Conceptof the Political, trans.GeorgeSchwab (New Brunswick:RutgersUmversity Press, 1976). References are to this edition, cited as CP within the text. Schmitt's thesis was originallyput forthm an article of the same title in 1927. 6. The language of frend and enemy is quite prevalentin Leviathan,for instance: "when either [a groupof people] have no common enemy, or he thatby one partis held for an enemy, is by anotherpartheld for afrend, they must needs by the differenceof theirinterestsdissolve, and fall again into a war among themselves"(II, 17, 119, emphasis added). 7. StephenHolmes objects to attemptsat softemnng Schmitt'spolitical theorythatpresentit as Hobbesianratherthan as reactionary.See "CarlSchmitt:The Debility of Liberalism,"The AnatomyofAntiliberalism(Cambridge,MA. Harvard UmversityPress, 1993), 41. Examplesof such scholarshipare, in German,Helmut Rumpf's Carl Schmittund ThomasHobbes: Ideelle Beziehungen und aktuelle Bedeutung mit einer Abhandlungiber: Die FriihschriftenCarl Schmitts(Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1972), and in English, David J. Levy, "The Relevance

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and I (March1987). Althoughthis strategyis indeedquestionable, of CarlSchmitt,"The World there is little doubtthat Hobbes had a profoundeffect on Schmitt'sthought.Emphasizingthis influence does not make Schmitt'sthoughtany less extremebut, as this essay will show, does objectives.A reliableaccountof the relationship highlightSchmitt'smajortheoretical-political "Carl SchmittundThomasHobbes," Neue PolitischeLiteratur can be foundin HerfnedMiinkler, 29 (1984). 8. See Detlev Peukert,The WeimarRepublic:The Crisis of Classical Modernity,trans. RichardDeveson (New York:Hill and Wang,1992). 9. This theme is developed more fully by Schmitt in "The Age of Neutralizationsand (1929), trans.MatthiasKonzettand John P. McCormick,Telos96 (Summer Depoliticizations" 1993). I do not concernmyself specifically with this essay here,becauseit does not deal directly to pointout thatthis essay has been with the figureof ThomasHobbes. However,it is important as an endorsementof modern technology in many studies of Schmitt. Both mismterpreted underthe influence RichardWolinandJerryZ. Mullermisreadthe essay in this way, apparently of Jeffrey Herf's faulty ReactionaryModernism:Technology, Culture,and Politics in Weimar and the ThirdRetch (Cambrdge: CambridgeUniversityPress, 1984). None of these authors make note of Schmitt'scriticismsof technologyin his early works such as TheodorDdublers des Werkes "Nordlicht" Drei Studieniiber die Elemente,den Geist unddie Akualitdt (Mumch: JakobHegner,1923). Muller,1916), orRomischerKatholizismus undpolitischeForm(Hellerau: to Schmitt's 'The Age of Neutralizationsand For a criticism of Herf, see my "Introduction a criticalstance studydemonstrates, Depoliticizations,'" Telos96 (Summer1993).As thepresent his Weimarwritingsand even beyond. towardtechnologyis maintaned by Schmittthroughout andthe TotalState,"in The Termsof Cultural See Wolin,"CarlSchmitt,PoliticalExistentialism Criticism(New York:ColumbiaUmversityPress, 1992), and "CarlSchmitt,The Conservative Political Theory20, no. 3 (August 1992); HabitusandThe Aestheticsof Horror," Revolutionary: as well as Muller,"CarlSchmitt,Hans Freyerand the RadicalConservativeCritiqueof Liberal Democracyin the WeimarRepublic,"Historyof Political Thought12, no. 4 (Winter1991). A more accurateaccount of Schmitt'sattitudetowardtechnology can be found in G. L. Ulmen, Politische Mehrwert:Eine Studieiiber Max Weberund Carl Schmitt(Weinheim:VCH Acta Humamora,1991). 10. Pasquale Pasquino, "Hobbes: Natural Right, Absolutism, and Political Obligation" de la RechercheScientifique,Pans, no. CognitivesDu Social of the Centre-National (Approches 90158, September1990), 9. 11. Ibid. Life and Working-ClassPolitics: Commumsts, 12. See Eve Rosenhaft, "Working-Class Nazis, and the StateBattle for the Streetsof Berlin 1928-1932,"in Social Changeand Political Developmentin WeimarGermany,eds. RichardBessel and E. J. Feuchtwanger(New York: Barnesand Noble, 1981), 207-40, for a compellingaccountof this state of affairs. Conditionof Mankind" 13. PasqualePasquino,"Hobbeson the Natural (part1 of the English of "ThomasHobbes: la rationalit6de L'obeissancea la loi, La pensde politique," manuscript Spnng 1994), 3. Setting aside the view thatthe state of natureis a mere intellectualenterprise, Pasquinoprefersto employ the termsubtractionto describeit ratherthanabstraction,because thanthe product the stateof natureis for Hobbesa stripping away fromtheempmcalworldrather of imagination. 14. Ibid.Thereis of coursethe famouspassagewhereHobbesassertshow close the "natural condition"really is to contemporary realityby remindinghis readersthatthey arm themselves when traveling,bolt theirdoors at night, and lock theirchests even when at home (I, 13, 89). 15. Ibid.,6.

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16. RichardWolin, The Termsof CulturalCriticism,87; "CarlSchmitt, The Conservative 443. Revolutionary," 17. George Schwab declares, "Nowherein [Schmitt's]writings can one detect a desire on his part to perpetuatecrises as a means of escaping the tediousness of everyday bourgeois existence" (The Challenge of The Exception[New York:GreenwoodRepnnt, 1989], 55). MA: MIT Press, 1985), 125. 18. Political Romanticism,trans.Guy Oakes (Cambridge, and Adorno,Dialectic of Enlightenment 19. See Horkhelmer (1944), trans.JohnCummings (New York:Continuum,1989);Casslrer,TheMythof theState(New Haven,CT:YaleUmversity Press, 1946); Symbol, Myth and Culture:Essays and Lectures, 1935-1945, ed. Donald Philip On Myth,trans. Verene(New Haven, CT:Yale UniversityPress, 1979); and Blumenberg,Work RobertWallace(Cambridge,MA. MIT Press, 1989). See also, "Mythin Contemporary Life," a special issue of Social Research 52, no. 2 (Summer 1985), particularlythe contributionsof Sheldon Wolin, David Apter,GianmVattimo,and UmbertoEco. zu Carl Schmitt,Der Begriff des Politischen"was ongi20. Leo Strauss's"Anmerkungen nally publishedin ArchivfiirSozialwissenschaftundSozialpolitik67, no. 6, 732-49. An English "Commentson CarlSchmitt'sBegriffdes Politischen,"by E. M. Sinclairappearsin translation, the Englisheditionof The Conceptof the Political cited above. I will cite Strauss'sessay as CCP in the body of the text. 21. Strauss, Spinoza's Critique of Religion, trans. E. M. Sinclair (New York:Schocken, 1965), 92. 22. Several years later, in 1939, Walter Benjamin observed that one of the effects of technology-which Schmittand Straussin these works associateexplicitly with liberalism-is to rendera person "no longer capable of telling his provenfnend from his mortalenemy" ("On in Illuminations, ed. HannahArendt[New York:Schocken, 1968], Some Motifs in Baudelaire," 168). WhetherBenjamin,who was quite familiarwith Schmitt'swork,is hereexplicitly alluding to the political is not clear. 23. Strauss,Spinoza'sCritiqueof Religion, 88. 24. Ibid., 89-92. 25. Strauss'sassessment thatSchmitt'sprojectremains"withinthe horizonof liberalism"is sometimes exaggeratedin an attemptto defend Schmitt'sWeimarwork from chargesof latent Nazism. Yet just because Schmitt's work is not latently Nazi, does not mean that it is not or antiliberal. Strauss'scommentscan be seen to emphasizethe pointthatSchmitt's authoritarian theoreticalshortcomingsin his attackon liberalismare not for lack of trying;the intentand the As ChantalMouffemorereasonably attemptarequiteapparent. explains,"itis incorrectto assert, as some do, that Schmitt'sthinkingwas imbuedwith Nazism before his turnabout of 1933 and his espousal of Hitler's movement.There is, however,no doubtthatit was his deep hostility to liberalismwhich made possible, or which did not prevent,his joimng the Nazis" (Mouffe, The Returnof the Political [London:Verso, 1993], 121). Straussis, of course, correctin observing thatSchmittis caughtin the thrallof the liberalismhe is criticizing.As RichardWolinpoints out, Schmitt'semphasis on self-preservationin The Conceptof the Political leaves him susceptible to some of the same charges leveled against liberalismitself: "In Schmitt'spolitical theorywe tradethe 'good life' for 'mere life' " (The Termsof CulturalCriticism,99). 26. See Meier, Carl Schmitt,Leo Strauss und "Der Begriffdes Politischen," 134-5, 137-9. Despite the fact thatSchmittjoined the NationalSocialist Partyin May of 1933, as late as July of thatyear,Strausswas still seeking a correspondence with Schmittaboutthe prospectof aiding in the compilationof a criticaledition of Hobbes's work (Meier,Carl Schmitt,Leo Strauss und "DerBegriffdes Politischen,"17, n. 11). See also PaulEdwardGottfned, CarlSchmitt:Politics and Theory(New York:Greenwood, 1990).

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27. Citations are from the 1952, University of Chicago Press edition, titled in full, The Political Philosophyof Hobbes: Its Basis and Genesis, abbreviated as PPH in the text. is characteristically 28. Strauss's interpretation in opposition to that of the "Cambridge HobbesscholarRichard School"of the historyof politicalthought.Cambridge Tuckassertsthat "Men,on Hobbes'saccount,do not want to harmothermen for the sake of harrmng them;they The common wish forpowerover themit is true,butpoweronly to securetheirown preservation. idea that Hobbes was in some sense 'pessimistic'abouthumannatureis wide of the mark,for were in prnciple stand-offishtowardsone anotherratherthan inherently his naturalmen belligerent"(Hobbes [Oxford:Oxford UniversityPress, 1989], 55). Tuck ignores the fact that Hobbes explicitly states that some persons "takepleasure" in exercising power over others (1, 13, 88). Witnessthe precedentto this conflict between "fartherthantheirsecurityrequires" of apoliticaltheorist: and"Cambridge" the "Straussian" interpretations compareStrauss'soverly of Machiavelli'spoliticsin Thoughts on Machiavelli(Chicago:Umversity slmsterinterpretation of Chicago Press, 1958) with QuentinSkinner'sunnecessarilytepid one in The Foundationsof ModernPolitical Thought(Cambridge: CambridgeUmversityPress, 1978, 2 vols.). Surely the of Western of the greatest figures politicalthoughtcan be said to fall somewhere temperaments between the sadistic nihilism and the genteel detachmentthat these two schools consistently attemptto impose on them in theirrespectiveinterpretations. Koselleckdiscussestherole of fearin Hobbes'spoliticalthought, 29. In 1958, when Reinhart and the Pathogenesis it is Strauss'swork thathe cites. See Critiqueand Crisis: Enlightenment of ModernSociety(Cambridge,MA. MIT Press, 1988), 24. 30. JurgenHabermasobserves with a certaindegree of accuracy that "above all it is the MA. MIT aestheticsof violence thatfascinates[Schmitt]" (TheNew Conservatism [Cambridge, Press, 1988], 137). As we can see, any fascinationon Schmitt'spartwith violence is rathermild in comparisonwith thatof the young Strausson Hobbes. thatWolin 31. Strausshereexemplifies morefully thanSchmittthe "politicalexistentialism" identifies as characteristicof Weimarintellectuals:"the devaluationof all traditionalvalues becamea value in andof itself-the only value meantthathumanexistence,in its brutefacticity, thatremained,as it were. By emphasizingthe bruteprimacyof humanexistence, denuded thereseems to be only one certaintyleft in life: theinevitability value structures, of all supporting of death. [the]existentialculminationof life itself' (The Termsof CulturalCriticism,86-7). extremesentimentsexpressedin his youthfulwritingsby these rather Obviouslyembarrassed in lightof histoncalevents-Strauss latercriticizedthis fascinationwith the "abyss" particularly thatdominatedWeimarintellectualdebates:"Thecontroversycan easily degenerateinto a race It would not be difficult in which he wins who offers the smallestsecurityandthe greatestterror. to guess who would be the winner.Butjust as an assertiondoes not become true because it is shown to be comforting, so it does not become true because it is shown to be terrifying" (quoted in the so-called AutobiographicalPreface, which was added to the English edition however,in admittingthathe of Spinoza's Critiqueof Religion, 11). Straussis not so forthright, himself tookpartin a theoretical projectthatsoughtto offer "thesmallestsecurityandthe greatest terror." 32. It is interestingthatthe two historiansof modem mythwho do deal with Hobbes at all, Cassirerand Blumenberg(cited above), focus solely on the myth of the state of natureand not thatof the Leviathan. in ThomasHobbes,Behemoth(Chicago:Umversityof 33. StephenHolmes, "Introduction," Chlcago Press, 1991), xi. to the issue of myth. In the last chapterof his 34. Of course, Schmittwas alreadyno stranger rational theparagonof Western afterhavingundressed 1923 book on representative government, Schmittspeaksambiguouslyaboutthe politics of "myth" see parliament, politics, the European

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Theoriesof the Direct Use of Force"in The Crisis of ParliamentaryDemocracy, "Irrationalist trans.Ellen Kennedy(Cambrdge, MA: MIT Press, 1988). 35. Der Leviathan in der Staatslehre des Thomas Hobbes: Sinn and Fehlschlag elnes HanseatischeVerlagsaostalt,1938). I will cite the most recent politischen Symbols(Hamburg: edition (Koln: Klett-Cotta,1982) as L. The English renderngs are from the translationof the work by George Schwab forthcomingfrom GreenwoodPress. 36. For more detailed accounts of Schmitt's involvement with National Socialism, see Schwab, TheChallengeof The Exception,andJosephBendersky,Carl Schmitt:Theorstfor the Reich (Pnnceton:Pnnceton Unversity Press, 1983). from the "scientific"Hobbes in 37. Strausstoo gave up the attemptto divorce the "human" his later treatmentof the philosopherin Natural Right and History (Chicago: Umversity of Hobbesas the bearerof thelatterformally ChicagoPress, 1953);in fact, Strausscomes to portray profaneelement, "Theman who was the first to draw the consequences for naturalrightfrom this momentouschange [the emergence of modem science, of nonteleologicalnaturalscience] To Hobbes we must turn if we desire to understandthe specific was Thomas Hobbes. character of modemnatural (Chicago:Universityof ChicagoPress, 1971), 166, also 170-4. right" of Schmitt'sLeviathan,Holmes focuses moreextensively on the vtrulent 38. In his treatment Schmitt'sprofesseddisgustat Hobbes'schoice anti-Semitismexpressedin the book, particularly of mythic symbol: a monsterfrom the Jewish tradition(The Anatomyof Antiliberalism,50-3). WhetherSchmittwas an anti-Semitebeforejoining the party-a claim madeby JohnHerz, and see Herz,"Lookingat CarlSchmittfrom more forcefully,RichardWolin-is morecontroversial: the VantagePoint of the 1990s," Interpretation19, no. 3 (Spnng 1992); Wolin, The Termsof is RaphaelGross,"Carl CulturalCriticism.A recentGermanarticlethatmakessuch an argument Schmitts 'Nomos' und die 'Juden,' " Merkur47, no. 5 (May 1993). In the introductionto his forthcoming translationof Schmitt's Leviathan book, George Schwab argues that the antiSemitism that Schmittexpressed underNationalSocialism was purelyopportumstic. 39. Koselleck, Critiqueand Crisis, 38-9. 40. Again Koselleck sheds light on this relationshipbetween mechanisticcommand and empty law: in which thereis no law but the Reason thuscreatesa neutralzone of State "technology" prnnce'swill. In such a State only the formal legality of the laws is rational,not their content; therefore the formal commandmentof political morality to obey the laws regardlessof theircontentis reasonable.The State is not only a mortalGod; it becomes an automaton,the great machine, and the laws are the levers moved by the sovereign's absolute will, in orderto keep the state machineryrunning.(Ibid., 33) 41. PasqualePasquino,"Hobbeson the Legal Conditionin the Commonwealth" (part2 of of "ThomasHobbes:la rationalit6 de L'obeissancea la loi"), 13. the English manuscript 42. Note Schmitt's distinctionbetween a "totalquantitativestate"and a "total qualitative des totalen Staats in Deutschland" state"in "Weiterentwicklung (January1933), in Positionen und Begriffe im Kampfmit Weimar-Genf-Versailles: 1923-1939 (Hamburg:Hanseatische Verlagsanstalt,1940). This distinctionis overlooked in many new left accounts of Schmitt. In addition to Wolin, The Termsof Cultural Criticism, see John Keane, "Dictatorshipand the CarlSchmitt'sTheoryof PoliticalSovereignty"in Democracyand Civil Decline of Parliament: Society (London: Verso, 1988). A post-Marxist treatmentof Schmitt, which does in fact andqualitativetotalstate demonstrate moresensitivityto the distinctionbetweenthequantitative is Jean Cohen and Andrew Arato, Civil Society and Political Theory(Cambridge,MA: MIT Press, 1992), 204, 237, 239.

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43. Der Hiiterder Verfassung (Tiibmgen: Verlagvon J. C. B. Mohr[PaulSiebeck], 1931),73. 44. "Staatsethik und pluralistisher Staat"(1930), in Positionenund Begriffe,28-9. 45. Hans Kelsen, "Wer soil der Huter der Verfassung seln?" Die Justiz 6 (1930/31), 1917-8. 46. See Hobbes, "A Review, and Conclusion,"in Leviathan,as well as QuentinSkinner, in The Interreg"Conquestand Consent:Thomas Hobbes and the EngagementControversy," num,ed. G. E. Aylmer(London:Macmillan,1972), on the datingof the book. 47. As PerryAndersonnghtly observes regarding both Schmitt'sand Michael Oakeshott's views of Hobbes: "It would be difficult to thunkof a more incongruousauthorityfor any 'non-instrumental' understanding of the state.Thepactof civil associationbetweenindividuals in Leviathanis supremelyan 'instrument' to securecommonends-the aims of securityand prosperity,'mutualpeace' and 'commodiousliving' " ("TheIntransigent Rightat the Endof the LondonReviewof Books, 9/24/92, 7, emphasisadded). Century," 48. TheSecond Treatiseon Government, 2, ? 13, 19-27. 49. On the subjectof Schmitt'sprecarious positionin the Reich afterhis fall fromfavorwith the regime,see Bendersky,Carl Schmitt:Theoristforthe Reich, 263-4; Schwab, TheChallenge of the Exception,142. im Zeitalter seinertechmschenReproduzierbarkeit," 50. "DasKunstwerk orginally published in ZeitschriftfiirSozialforschung 5, no. 1, 1936. Translated by HarryZohn as "TheWorkof 241. Art in the Age of MechamcalReproduction," in Illuminations, "Artwork" 51. In her recentarticleon Benjamnn's essay, Susan Buck-Morssrecountshow in 1932 Hitlerrehearsedhis facial expressions in frontof a mirrorunderthe supervisionof an opera singer. Buck-Morss compares photographsof Hitler's subsequentspeeches with psychopictonalstudiesof faces expressingdifferentemotionalstates. Whatshe finds, surprisingly, of aggression,anger,or rage, but is thatHitler'sexpressionscorrespond,not to representations WalterBenjamin'sArtwork ratherto depictionsof fear andpain ("Aestheticsand Anaesthetics: October62 [Fall 1992], 39-40). Thusthe fearof violentdeaththatSchmitt Essay Reconsidered," and Strausswished to revive, divorced from the influence of technology,was already being communicated newsreels,motionpictures, techmcallyand mechamcallythroughloudspeakers, and radios.Such a divorce was alreadyunlikely. photographs, 52. Ibid.,22-3. 53. Hobbes writes: Nature(the Art wherebyGod hathmade and govemes the World)is by the Art of man, as in many other things, so in this also imitated,that it can make an ArtificialAnimal. For seeing life is but a motionof Limbs,the begimngwhereof is in some pnncipallpart withln;why may we not say, thatall Automata(Enginesthatmove themselvesby springs and wheeles as doth a watch) have an artificiallife? . Art goes yet further,imitating thatRationalland most excellent worke of Nature,Man.Forby Art is createdthatgreat which is or STATE, called a COMMON-WEALTH, LEVIATHAN (in LatineCIVITAS), but an ArtificiallMan. ("TheIntroduction," 9) have "the effect of anaesthetizing the 54. According to Buck-Morss, phantasmagoria organism,not throughnumbing,but throughfloodingthe senses. These simulatedsensona alter thanchemical rather consciousness,muchlike a drug,but they do so through sensorydistraction alteration,and-most significantly-their effects are experiencedcollectively ratherthanindividually"(ibid.). We must not forget that Hobbes intendedhis automaton,his man-monstermachine to be a "visible Power to keep them in awe" (2, 17, 117, emphasis added)-in other words, a sense-induceddistractionof the masses.

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55. See particularlythe first two essays of Dialectic of Enlightenment,'The Concept of and"Odysseusor MythandEnlightenment." AlthoughBlumenberg recogmnzes Enlightenment," in Work on Myth,Cassirer, between mythandenlightenment the intrnslc relationship rationality a renowned Kantian, insists on their distinction. However, Cassirer comes very close to on the "strategic," when he remarks "techncal," acknowledgingthe "dialecticof enlightenment" to modemtechnologyand politics-what he calls and "artificial" qualityof myth in relationship "thetechmqueof political myth"(Symbol,Mythand Culture,235-7). 56. As we have seen, Benjaminclaimedthat,"Alleffortsto renderpoliticsaestheticculminate and Schmitt, In one thing:war."And as MichaelGeyer rermnds us, in termsthatrecall Benjamun war was indeed the essence of NationalSocialism: The direction of the Third Reich was toward war. War was essential to regain the "autonomyof the political" and to recenter the stage by giving politics at least the of purposefulandunifiedactionwhichit otherwiselacks. In the counterrevoappearance lutionaryThirdReich, war,victorous war,was meantto achieve morethanthat.Warnot only happenedto be Hitler's main and ultimategoal in the creationof a new German state."Warpermitsthe "autonomy society, it also made the ThirdReich an "exceptional of the political"to reach its extreme in the age of impenalism.In an "exceptionalstate" war is neithersimply the predatoryinstinctof special interests,nor the manifestationof atavistic sentiments.Rather,war is foughtto createand recreateand society and a state lives on war.""War recentersstateandsociety in combat,dormnation, which "habitually and in Statemaking and directexploitation"('The Statein NationalSocialistGermany," Social Movements: Essays in Historyand Theory,eds. CharlesBrightandSusanHarding [Ann Arbor:Universityof MichiganPress, 1984], 198). I have questionedwhetheror not Schmittintentionally advocatedwarin the mannerthatboth Benjaminand Geyer describe it. I have arguedagainstWolin that, in 1933, Schmitt sought to overcome the state of nature,the friend/enemydistinction,in domestic politics so thatthe state could take partin these in the realmwhere,accordingto Schmitt,they could neverbe overcome, the realm of internationalrelations. Thus, for Schmitt, war had to be suppressedat home to preparefor it abroad.National Socialism defies Schmitt'sown "conceptof the political"by as vigorously making war at home as on foreign soil-by maintaimng,in Geyer's words, "an ("TheStigma of Violence: Nationalescalating system of domestic terrorand violence abroad" ism and War in TwentiethCentury Germany,"German Studies Review [Winter 1992], 97). Nevertheless, the fear that Schmitt sought to inspire throughthe aestheticizationof conflict the political,contributed to the aesthetization of warthatwould not only manifestitself regarding externally, but internally as well. Wolin is right to invoke Benjamin against Schmitt at the conclusionof "CarlSchmitt,theConservativeRevolutionary," but notbecause Schmittendorsed "violence for violence's sake"(443), butrather becauseSchmittdid not understand, as Benjamin did, what Buck-Morss calls "the modem constellationof aesthetics, politics, and war"("Aesthetics and Anaesthetics,"9). What purpose does it serve-except perhaps some aesthetic one-to demomze Schmitt without correctly understanding him? That Schmittdeserves to be takento taskin an informedmannerforbothhis misconceivedundermining of Weimarliberalism and his subsequentpolitical affiliationshould be clear from the exposition of this article. 57. Behemoth:The Structureand Practice of National Socialism, 1933-1944 (New York: Harper& Row, 1944), xii. 58. "Autoblographical Preface,"Spinoza'sCritiqueof Religion, 30. 59. In a review of Heinnch Meier's book on Schmittand Strauss,Paul Gottfrieddescribes how Strauss'sfollowers attemptto artificiallyseparateStrauss'sWeimarviews from those of

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Schmitt(Telos96 [Summer1993]). Yet certainadmirersof Straussreveal more thanothers on this point and even leave open the questionof how much-if at all-Strauss changedhis mind Uhlanerremark:"LeavingEuropebehind, afteremigrating.As VolkerRelnecke and Jonathan his attitudetowardphilosophy.He abandonednone of the positions Straussbegan to rearrange theircoordination" with which he hadworkedfor over a decade,buttransformed ("TheProblem of Leo Strauss:Religion, Philosophyand Politics,"GraduateFaculty PhilosophyJournal 16, no. 1 [1992], 196). Thereis of course the assessmentof young Strauss'spoliticalpredilections see ElisabethYoung-Bruehl, HannahArendt: thatHannahArendtconveyed to her biographer: For Love of the World (New Haven:Yale UniversityPress, 1982). The most thoroughaccount of Strauss'sthoughtas a whole is ShadiaDrury'sThePolitical Ideas of Leo Strauss(New York: St. Martin,1988). 60. On Benjamin'sabortedattemptto escape the Nazis andhis subsequent suicide, see Susan Buck-Morss,The Originof NegativeDialectics: TheodorW.Adoro, Walter Benjamin,and the Institute(New York:Free Press, 1977), 162-3. Frankfurt 61. Bendersky,Carl Schmitt:Theoristfor the Reich, 204. 62. Ibid., 230-42. 63. In his later years, Schmitt would seemingly deny, yet actually affirm, his self-undertheorst, denouncedin his own time,butinfluential standingas a moder Hobbes:a controversial for centures to come. As G. L. Ulmen recounts: Some yearsbeforehis death,Schmittwroteto me that"Iam no Hobbes,but,like Hobbes, of an ancientprudence.'" He was refernngto his charactenzation I am a 'sole retriever as "thereal teacherof a great of Hobbesin his 1938 book where he laudedhis prototype like one whose political political expenence; alone, like every pioneer;misunderstood, like one who opens a door ideas are unrealizedamong his own people; unrewarded, which anothercan go through;and yet, in the undyingcommunityof great men who Over the centurieswe call to know theirtimes, 'a sole retrieverof an ancientprudence.' him:Nonjamfrustradoces, ThomasHobbes!"("Anthropological Theology/Theological Telos93 (Fall 1992), 73, (n. 14) Anthropology,"

John P McCormickrecentlycompleteda doctoraldissertationtitled "AgainstPolitics as Technology:Carl Schmitt'sCritiqueof Liberalism"in the Departmentof Political Science at the Universityof Chicago. He has taughtpolitical theoryin the college and in continuingstudies at the universityand has publishedpieces on Machiavelli in the AmericanPolitical Science Review and on Schmittin Telos. He is spending 1994-95 conductingpostdoctoralresearchin Germanyas a FulbrightFellow at the Universitdt Bremen.