Policy Report June 2007

Engaging Political Islam to

Promote Democracy
by Shadi Hamid

S ince the attacks of September 11, 2001, Americans have struggled to

articulate an overarching, long-term strategy for fighting religious extremism
and terror in the Middle East. Most experts on both the left and right agree that
promoting democracy will help address the root causes of terrorism in the
region, though they differ on to what degree. The reasoning is simple: If Arabs
and Muslims lack legitimate, peaceful outlets with which to express their
grievances, they are more likely to resort to violence. In one important 2003
study, Princeton University’s Alan Krueger and Czech scholar Jitka Maleckova
analyzed extensive data on terrorist attacks and concluded that “the only
variable that was consistently associated with the number of terrorists was the
Freedom House index of political rights and civil liberties. Countries with more
freedom were less likely to be the birthplace of international terrorists.” 1

This is not to say that democracy is a produced the Jihadist movement and gave
magical solution for the Middle East’s long us 9/11. In short, the status quo is untenable
list of problems and pathologies. It is, and threatens America’s security.2
however, a first step, and a necessary one. Anger and frustration are the prevailing
Without substantive political reform, the sentiments in today’s Middle East, and they
region will continue to suffer under the same must be channeled constructively. Arab
poisonous political environment that autocracies, however, lack the willingness

Shadi Hamid is director of research at the Project on Middle East Democracy. He has written widely
on political Islam and democratization in the Middle East, and has served as a program specialist on
public diplomacy at the State Department as well as a legislative fellow at the Office of Senator Dianne
Feinstein. Hamid is an associate of the Truman National Security Project. He can be reached at
shadi.hamid@pomed.org.
“One person with a belief is a social power equal to ninety-nine who have only interests.”
—John Stuart Mill
The Pr og
ogrressiv
Prog essivee Policy Ins
Policy titut
titutee
Institut
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and institutional capacity to absorb the outcomes—has prevented the Bush

growing participatory demands of their administration from adopting a more effective,
citizens. Related to this, Islamic extremism coherent approach to supporting democracy
is also fueled by humiliation, or what Tom abroad. Where only two years ago the
Friedman has called “the poverty of ambitious “forward strategy for freedom”
dignity.” Arabs have lost their ability to chart formed the centerpiece of the administration’s
their own course, to ask their own Mid-east agenda, it has now been almost
questions, to form their own governments. entirely abandoned.
As I have noted elsewhere, Arabs can This report calls for a new U.S. policy
reclaim their dignity only through a for the Middle East that unequivocally gives
democratic process which treats them as democratic reform priority over so-called
citizens with rights, rather than subjects “stability.” To be credible, however, such
whose sole obligation is to obey.3 a policy must recognize and engage
But if democracy is part of the solution, mainstream Islamist parties, which often
many today see it as part of the problem. offer the most effective and organized
With the electoral rise of Islamist parties opposition to the region’s autocratic
throughout the region, Americans are regimes. Whether we like it or not, such
questioning the wisdom of a democracy parties are often seen as more legitimate
promotion policy that elevates our adversaries champions of popular aspirations than
to power. Rightly or wrongly, fear of political more secular and liberal groups. The United
Islam remains the stumbling block for U.S. States, of course, should not engage
policymakers. The unexpected victory of Islamist groups that refuse to foreswear
Hamas in last year’s Palestinian elections only terrorism or whose commitment to
served to highlight this reality. The embedded democracy expires the moment they
contradiction in American policy—between actually win power. But our government
wanting democracy and fearing its must become much more sophisticated in

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its ability to distinguish mainstream and ground, where it matters most, as the
extremist varieties of political Islam, and in ideological gulf between radical and
dealing with groups that have a genuine mainstream Islamism has grown
interest in democratic reform. To isolate precipitously in recent years.
extremists and cultivate democracy in the For instance, the Muslim Brotherhood’s
region, America must enter into dialogue unequivocal renunciation of violence
with political Islam. prompted Ayman al-Zawahiri, Osama Bin
Laden’s deputy, to write a book entitled The
Muslim Brotherhood’s Bitter Harvest in Sixty
Understanding Political Islam Years in which he charged the group with
betraying the integrity of the Islamic
Much of the difficulty in formulating a movement. Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi,
coherent approach to Islamism stems from one the world’s most influential Jihadist
the inability of policymakers to make sense thinkers, has declared that “democracy is
of what is an extremely complex and diverse obvious polytheism and thus just the kind
movement. Political Islam is a unique of infidelity that Allah warns against.”4 In
phenomenon and one that appears to defy accepting democracy, the Brotherhood’s
conventional political analysis. This crime is that it has, in effect if not in intent,
mystification of Islamically-oriented parties is reconciled itself with the underlying premise
due, in part, to a natural suspicion of actors of secular politics, that sovereignty comes
who defy the Western divide between not from God but from an elected
religion and politics. More problematic, parliament. Extremists consider this to be a
however, is the tendency to conflate Islamists form of kufr, or disbelief.
who use violence with those who do not. Indeed, mainstream political Islam has
Al Qaeda, a clearly apocalyptic shown little interest in the grand gestures of
organization whose primary objective revolution. Adopting gradualism, Islamist
seems to be the slaughter of innocents, groups are already an integral part of the
cannot in any serious sense be compared political systems in their respective
to political groupings like the Egyptian countries. The IAF controls a plurality of
Muslim Brotherhood (the region’s oldest and seats in the Jordanian parliament. In the
most influential Islamist group), the 2005 Egyptian parliamentary elections, the
Jordanian Islamic Action Front (IAF), Muslim Brotherhood, despite running fewer
Tunisia’s Al-Nahda, and Morocco’s Justice than 140 candidates, won 20 percent of
and Development Party (PJD), all of whom the vote and ended up with 88 seats. And
have explicitly renounced violence and in Morocco, the PJD is expected to win
committed themselves to peaceful this year’s upcoming legislative elections.
participation in the democratic process. Such participation cannot be dismissed
The divide, then, is between the extremists as some cynical ploy. In their published
and terrorists who operate outside the electoral programs, these groups have
political process, and the mainstream affirmed their commitment to many of the
Islamists who operate within it. This is not fundamental aspects of democratic life,
an arbitrary divide fashioned by liberal including alternation of power, popular
academics or Islamic apologists; it is a sovereignty, equal rights for women and
divide that has gained currency on the minorities, and an independent judiciary.5

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There has been an evident shift in priorities. Fighting Terror

Writing on Egypt, Samer Shehata and
Joshua Stacher note that in the current In order to gather intelligence on
parliamentary session, the 88-member extremist groups, the United States needs
Brotherhood bloc “has not pursued an the cooperation of indigenous populations.
agenda focused on banning books and With anti-American sentiment at an all-time
legislating the length of skirts. It has pursued high, such cooperation has been
an agenda of political reform” and has increasingly hard to come by. Our
demonstrated “professionalism and action unwillingness to develop contacts with non-
on issues of substance.”6 violent Islamists has further limited our
In light of the growing schism between ability to monitor the internal situation in
mainstream Islamists and their radical Middle Eastern countries.
counterparts, the United States has an Beyond these more immediate
unprecedented opportunity to redefine the intelligence concerns, mass-based Islamist
war on terror and articulate a bold, new groups represent the most effective
policy—one that brings together the lessons counterweight to radical Islamists. As Robert
of the past and the urgent needs of the Leiken and Steven Brooke note, “Critics
present. As Kevin Croke points out in a speculate that the Brotherhood helps
recent PPI brief, “The first and most important radicalize Muslims in both the Middle East
rule is that the struggle for hearts and and Europe. But in fact, it appears that the
minds—or ‘legitimacy’—is paramount. [Brotherhood] works to dissuade Muslims
Insurgents must be separated from the base from violence, instead channeling them into
of support among the population.”7 In other politics and charitable activities.”8 In closed
words, to effectively fight the radicals, the societies where forming political parties is
United States must align itself with the nearly impossible and political
aspirations of the broader population. participation generally dangerous, Islamist
Engaging with and, in some cases, groups, with their vast organizational
supporting moderate Islamists is one way network of mosques, clinics, foundations,
to do this, and social clubs, provide an outlet for
and the one disaffected youth—who would otherwise
“In rejecting contacts with most likely to be susceptible to the lure of terrorists—to
Islamist parties, we lose an produce channel their frustrations peacefully. In this
opportunity to tap into the results. So respect, political Islam, rather than being
long as the a source of conflict, may in fact represent
Middle East’s largest and most
groups in an effective bulwark against political
mobilized constituencies.” question violence.
meet certain In Jordan, for instance, the IAF, which
preconditions— enjoys a working, if tense, relationship with
a renunciation of violence and a publicly the Hashemite monarchy, has regularly
stated commitment to the rules of the cooperated with security forces to ensure
democratic game—then we should be open that protests and rallies remain peaceful.
to dialogue with them (this would not Where protests have led to the destruction
include Hamas and Hezbollah as they have of property and devolved into riots, IAF
yet to disavow violence). leaders have been quick to intervene and

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calm the situation. Because of the street Where they were on the defensive as
credibility, grassroots support, and religious recently as late 2005, the region’s autocrats
legitimacy that groups like the IAF enjoy, have regrouped and reasserted themselves.
they are able to persuade more militant With the Bush administration’s diminishing
members of society to respect the rule of interest in Arab reform, they have sensed
law. On the other hand, Arab regimes— an opportunity.
unelected, unaccountable, and sustained More than anywhere else, Egypt is a
largely through the use of fear and force— flashpoint for the deterioration of relations
have little sway with their own people. between regime and opposition. In a
Accordingly, as long as we ally dangerous escalation, President Hosni
ourselves with the small ruling cliques of Mubarak has unleashed an unprecedented
the region, then we will have little influence wave of repression against the Muslim
with Arab masses, and even less insight Brotherhood. Since January, hundreds have
into their anger and aspirations. In rejecting been arrested, while government charges
contacts with Islamist parties, we lose an against 40 Brotherhood leaders have been
opportunity to tap into the Middle East’s transferred to
largest and most mobilized constituencies. militar y courts. “Thus, reversing course on
Where liberal-secular groups are weak The Egyptian
democracy promotion
and often have membership rolls in the mere attorney general,
betrays not only our ideals
thousands, Islamist parties can command meanwhile, has
millions of members and supporters. frozen the assets but also our strategic
Engaging with Islamists would thus give of 29 of the interests.”
the United States a much-needed window group’s leading
into Arab public opinion. That window, financiers. As a more long-term measure,
however, is now closed. the regime is changing the constitution to
ban any group with a “religious reference
point” ( marja’iya ) from participating in
The Threat of Violence political life. For now, the Brotherhood still
has its perch in the parliament, but even
In recent years, Islamist parties, despite here there is speculation that Mubarak will
efforts to restrict their participation, have dissolve parliament and call for new
done remarkably well in elections. They elections.
have come to power in Iraq, Turkey, and In the face of this crackdown, the United
the Palestinian territories and, later this year, States has largely stayed silent, offering only
Morocco may become the newest addition the most tepid criticism. Bogged down in
to the list. In Egypt and Jordan, the Muslim Iraq, the Bush administration has thought
Brotherhood and the IAF represent the little about the long-term implications of its
largest opposition blocs in their respective continued and increasingly unabashed
parliaments and look poised to make more support for dictators. Consumed by a
gains. Fearing this growing threat to their Middle East beyond its control, the
power, Arab governments have suspended administration has given up even the
political reform, closed democratic pretense of caring about Arab
openings, and begun to systematically democracy—a striking reversal from the
clamp down on the Islamist opposition. aggressive stance it took in 2003-2005,

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when it had put increasing pressure on also our strategic interests. As repression
close allies like Saudi Arabia and Egypt. increases, the opposition will be driven
Arab regimes have essentially been given underground, making an explosion of
the green light to do as they please political violence almost inevitable. In
domestically as long as they defer to the countries plagued by high levels of
United States on its strategic priorities in unemployment, low levels of growth, and
Iraq, Iran, and the Palestinian territories. swelling populations, such an outcome
The Faustian bargains of the pre-9/11 era may be more likely than observers imagine.
have returned and, just as before, the risks In Egypt, there have been reports of
of realist realignment are many. protestors chanting, “He, who bans
Islamist parties have made a strategic demonstrations, will join Sadat soon,”9 a
choice to participate in the democratic not-so-implicit threat and one that should
process. While some of this comes from a be taken seriously.
principled commitment, some of it is also
no doubt a product of self-interested
calculation— Toward a U.S.-Islamist Dialogue
they stand
“A priority of any U.S.-Islamist to gain Mainstream Islamist parties, while
dialogue would be a discussion of more from paragons of moderation relative to their
how Islamist leaders can use their operating more extreme counterparts, are far from
extensive social and educational within the ideal. They are socially and morally
programming to instill and system than conservative in a way that most Americans
promote democratic values outside of would find uncomfortable. At the end of
throughout all levels of their it. Up until the day, they are Islamists, and this means
organizational network.” now, this that they have a distinct religious identity
has been which guides their thinking. While they may
the case: be committed to democracy, Islamists are
the existing political systems, while far from not—and have no intention of becoming—
democratic, have afforded just enough liberals. Their burnishing of simplistic
openings to Islamists to justify their slogans like “Islam is the solution” belies a
participation. But as regimes shut down willingness to use religion as a political
opposition activity and strengthen their grip cudgel. If they come to power, they likely
on power, the rational calculus is altered. would, among other things, encourage sex
The younger, more militant members of these segregation in public schools, limit alcohol
groups may begin to question the utility of consumption, and restrict “blasphemous”
participation if the end result is simply more speech.
repression and a denial of their very That said, the leaders of Islamist groups,
existence as political actors. As grassroots having gotten used to the compromise and
activists lose faith in the democratic cross-ideological cooperation inherent in
process, they are more likely to leave the political competition, tend to be more
fold of mainstream political Islam and moderate in both rhetoric and practice than
explore violent alternatives. their activist base. Jillian Schwedler recounts
Thus, reversing course on democracy a revealing conversation with former IAF
promotion betrays not only our ideals but Secretary-General Hamzeh Mansour:

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“[Mansour] acknowledged to me in supporters and sympathizers. Through

June 2003 that the party’s support base engagement and dialogue, the United States
is largely disinterested in, if not and other Western powers can encourage
opposed to, the party’s commitment pro-democracy trends within Islamist parties
to democratic processes. Its and provide clear incentives for further
constituency is more moved, he moderation.
argued, by its advocacy for Islamists are aware of the constructive role
conservative social programs, Islamic that American involvement can play. As Abdel
education reforms, and criticism of Menem Abul Futouh, a leading Muslim
official foreign-policy positions.”10 Brotherhood moderate, told me last year,
referring to the Bush administration’s past
This leadership-base gap presents an pressure on the Egyptian regime: “We
opportunity for American policymakers. A benefited, everyone benefited, the Egyptian
priority of any U.S.-Islamist dialogue would people benefited.” 12 The Brotherhood
be a discussion of how Islamist leaders can understands that democratization in Egypt
use their extensive social and educational can be aided by a more credible, consistent
programming to instill and promote democratic American approach. In February, after the
values throughout all levels of their arrest of deputy general guide Khairat al-
organizational network. Although they are Shater, the group appealed to the United
not yet, Islamist groups have the potential to States on its official English-language
become incubators of democratic learning. website:
At the level of decision-making, some Islamist
parties are already moving in this direction. “It is time now for President Bush to
As Nathan Brown notes in a recent Carnegie decide either to go with freedom
Endowment policy brief: and democracy as a principle
claimed by his administration and
“The IAF may be the most democratic lectured to the Egyptians by Mrs.
party in the region in terms of is internal Rice, his Secretary of State, or to
operations … [It] has built an continue supporting despotic
impressive set of democratic structures regimes by turning a blind eye to
internally. Party leaders are elected by their oppressive actions. In either
the membership, and there is a regular case the consequences are
turnover in top positions. At key points expected to go beyond Egypt
it has polled its members for guidance leaving ample room for all extremists
on important decisions.”11 to reinforce their claims against
democratic reformers who renounce
Western observers have long wondered violence like the Muslim
why the Arab world appears to lack strong, Brotherhood.”13
pro-democracy movements that enjoy mass
support. Instead of putting all our hopes in Any U.S.-Islamist dialogue would
weak, nearly nonexistent liberal parties, it necessarily include an implicit (and
would be more realistic to tap into what is sometimes explicit) give-and-take. In
already the Arab world’s largest political exchange for putting increased pressure on
constituency—the millions of Islamist Arab regimes to respect the rights of Islamist

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parties, the United States would expect dialogue. Instead of simply giving lip-service
certain things in return, such as guarantees to “winning hearts and minds,” the United
regarding cooperation on anti-terrorist States must go further, and realize that mass-
activities and, in the case of Egypt and based Islamist groups can provide an
Jordan, honoring peace agreements with important window into a significant
Israel. The latter subsection of the Arab populations that we
consideration is have thus far ignored. This requires a
“Instead of simply giving important, paradigm shift of looking at Islamist
lip-service to “winning particularly in a movements not as obstacles to democracy
hearts and minds,” the climate where but rather, as movements that are—and will
United States must go Israel’s enemies, continue to be—a vital feature of the region’s
further, and realize that including Iran ongoing political evolution.
mass-based Islamist and Hezbollah, In framing this new strategic vision, there
groups can provide an have grown are parallels to the Cold War, although
important window into a i n c r e a s ingly not the ones people normally think of. To
significant subsection of influential. The compare radical Islamism to Communism
the Arab populations that more we engage makes little sense, as it bears no coherent
we have thus far with and, if political philosophy, nor does it present a
circumstances conventional military threat to Western
ignored.”
require it, assist democracies. Its strength is not in its
Islamist groups, ideological appeal, but rather in its ruthless
the more leverage we will have with them ability to use violence to terrorize target
if and when they come to power. populations.
Considering the likelihood of Islamists This is not to say that Islamic extremism
winning if there actually were free and fair is not a grave threat. It most certainly is,
elections, this would be a prudent strategic which is precisely why we must seek allies
calculation. This leverage can then be used with which to fight and defeat it. It is here
to push Islamist parties to respect vital U.S. that mainstream political Islam, with its
interests, among them a stable Iraq, a secure strong grassroots following and widespread
Israel, and a non-nuclear Iran. legitimacy, can do what no amount of
American military strength or cynical public
Framing the Current Struggle diplomacy posturing can. Groups like the
Muslim Brotherhood are essentially states-
A new strategy of Islamist engagement within-states with hundreds of affiliated and
would constitute a crucial component of the interlocking organizations and institutions.
war on terror. By overemphasizing the military Millions of Arabs depend on these
aspects of fighting terrorism, neo-conservatives extensive networks for access to welfare,
misunderstood profoundly the nature of the jobs, and health care. And, just as
threat at hand. The current struggle demands importantly, this parallel sociopolitical
an approach which emphasizes the structure provides an outlet for those who
importance of engaging with indigenous would other wise be driven to self-
populations, understanding their needs and destruction and violence. It is no surprise,
circumstances, and exploring areas of then, that organizations like Al Qaeda have
potential cooperation through sustained directed so much of their vitriol toward the

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Muslim Brotherhood. As long as the latter eventually rise to power through the ballot
can attract young, Islamically-oriented box. As such, articulating a policy of
members, it will mean that the pool of engagement before they come to
prospective terrorists remains small. power—and not afterward when it is too
Along these lines, Kevin Croke argues late to exert any influence—makes a
that “it should be U.S. policy to seek out good deal of sense.
groups and clerics who can play the buffer It is true that Arab regimes will react
role that Wester n European social angrily to any American attempt to reach
democratic parties played in channeling out to Islamists. But beyond this, it is
the aspirations of the democratic left during unlikely that there would be any serious
the Cold War.”14 The comparison is apt. If consequences to U.S. strategic interests
we are to win the coming struggle, we will in the region.
need allies—allies who, while supporting Let us take as
democracy and opposing terrorism, have an example Reconciling American
influence and credibility with the large and Egypt, a interests and ideals in the
growing portion of the Arab world which, purportedly Middle East—up until
now, after six years of the Bush useful ally. It now placed in opposition
administration, sees us not as friends but is true that to each other—requires a
as enemies. The comparison is also the Mubarak bold, new approach that
appropriate in that, like European socialists regime has takes into account the
before them, Islamists initially entered the helped the diverse nature of Islamist
political process skeptical of multi-party United States organizations.
democracy. They would, however, evolve in Gaza (in
and adapt over time, eventually embracing policing the
the democratic process on its own terms. Rafah border and mediating between
Palestinian factions), provided logistical
Conclusion support for American troops in Iraq, and
supported the U.N. peacekeeping
Fear of political Islam—much of it based mission in Darfur. There is no reason,
on mistaken assumptions—has paralyzed however, to think that it would stop doing
not only our democracy-promotion policy, these things if we were to establish a
but also the broader effort to combat Muslim dialogue with the Muslim Brotherhood.
extremism and terrorism. At such a critical After all, there is the simple fact that
phase, this strategic miscalculation is the Egyptian regime, as unpopular as
something the United States can no longer ever, is dependent on U.S. financial and
afford. political support for its very survival
The United States gains nothing by (Egypt is the second-largest recipient of
ignoring mainstream Islamist groups. On American foreign aid in the world). They
the other hand, there is much to gain by need us much more than we need them.
speaking to them, by listening to their It is also worth noting that dialogue with
concerns, and sharing our own. Unless Islamists is not without precedent. For a
American policymakers are under the brief period in the early 1990s, the
impression that autocracy can be made Clinton administration had established
permanent, the reality is that Islamists will official contacts with the Brotherhood,

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the IAF, and Algeria’s Islamic Salvation Front inclusion of the region’s largest democratic
(FIS).15 groups. Reconciling American interests and
In any case, a choice must be made. If ideals in the Middle East—up until now
we are not willing to take the preliminary placed in opposition to each other—requires
step of talking to the largest opposition groups a bold, new approach that takes into
in the Middle East, then we should say so account the diverse nature of Islamist
clearly and, for the sake of consistency, give organizations. Once we do this, we may
up the crumbling façade of caring about realize to our surprise that political Islam, too
Arab democracy. It is a contradiction in terms long seen as something to be resisted, may
to support Arab democracy but to, actually provide the key to a more productive
simultaneously somehow, be against the U.S. relationship with the Middle East.

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Endnotes
1
Krueger, Alan B. and Jitka Maleckova, “Seeking the Roots of Terrorism,” The Chronicle of Higher Education, June 2003,
http://chronicle.com/free/v49/i39/39b01001.htm.
2
Early on, the Bush administration appeared to grasp the causal link between lack of democracy and terrorism. On
November 6, 2003, in a landmark address at the National Endowment for Democracy, President George W. Bush
broke with decades of U.S. policy, saying: “Sixty years of Western nations excusing and accommodating the lack of
freedom in the Middle East did nothing to make us safe, because in the long run, stability cannot be purchased at the
expense of liberty.” The logic behind this policy shift was articulated by Richard Haas, then Director of Policy
Planning at the State Department: “Countries plagued by economic stagnation and lack of opportunity, closed
political systems, and burgeoning populations fuel the alienation of their citizens. As we have learned the hard way,
such societies can breed the kind of extremists and terrorists who target the United States for supporting the regimes
under which they live.” (Haas, Richard,“Toward Greater Democracy in the Muslim World,” The Washington Quarterly,
Summer 2003, p. 143).
3
Hamid, Shadi, “Vision Gap, Part II,” The American Prospect Online, August 24, 2006, http://www.prospect.org/web/
page.ww?section=root&name=ViewWeb&articleId=11919.
4
Brooke, Steven and Robert S. Leiken, “The Moderate Muslim Brotherhood,” Foreign Affairs, March/April 2007, p. 11.
5
See for example Na’am wa ila al-abad al-Islam hoa al-hal: Al-Barnamaj al-Intakhabi li-Murashi Hizb al-Jabha al-
‘Amal al-Islami, 2003-2007 (Yes and Forever, Islam is the Solution:The Election Program of the Islamic Action Front Candidates),
p. 5-7; and Mubadira al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun houl Mabadi’ al-Islah fi Misr (The Initiative of the Muslim Brotherhood
regarding Principles of Reform in Egypt), March 2004.
6
Shehata, Samer and Joshua Stacher, “The Brotherhood Goes to Parliament,” Middle East Report, Fall 2006,
http://www.merip.org/mer/mer240/shehata_stacher.html.
7
Croke, Kevin, “Rethinking the War on Terrorism: The Lessons of Counterinsurgency Doctrine,” Progressive Policy
Institute Policy Institute, November 2006, p. 2, http://www.ppionline.org.
8
Brooke and Leiken, op.cit. p. 112.
9
El-Hamalawy, Hossam, “Police crack down on Kefaya demo; at least 35 detained,” The Arabist, http://arabist.net/
arabawy/2007/03/16/police-crack-down-on-kefaya-demo-35-detained/.
10
Schwedler, Jillian, Faith in Moderation: Islamist Parties in Jordan and Yemen, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK,
2006, p. 92.
11
Brown, Nathan J., “Jordan and Its Islamic Movement,” Carnegie Endowment Paper, no. 74, November 2006, p. 3, 6.
12
Interview by author with Abdel Menem Abul Futouh, July 2006.
13
Issandr el-Amrani, “Do what is necessary,” The Arabist, http://arabist.net/archives/2007/02/07/do-what-is-necessary.
14
Croke, op.cit., p. 7.
15
For more on the Clinton administration’s policy toward political Islam, see Fawaz Gerges, America and Political Islam:
Clash of Cultures or Clash of Interests? (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1999).

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