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Bill of Rights

POLITICAL LAW REVIEWER

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY BAR OPERATIONS
there appears a correspondence between the undeniable
existence of an undesirable situation and the legislative
attempt at correction. Moreover, every regulation of
conduct amounts to curtailment of liberty, which cannot be
absolute.

DUE PROCESS
ERMITA-MALATE HOTEL AND MOTEL OPERATORS
ASSOCIATION V. CITY OF MANILA
20 SCRA 849
Facts: The principal question in this appeal from a
judgment of the lower court in an action for prohibition is
whether Ordinance No. Of the City of Manila is violating of
due process clause. It was alleged that Sec. 1 of the
challenged ordinance is unconstitutional and void for being
unreasonable and violate of due process insofar as it
would impose P6T fee per annum for first class motels and
P4,500 for second class motels, that Sec. 2, prohibiting a
person less than 18 years from being accepted in such
hotels, motels, lodging houses, tavern or common inn
unless accompanied by parents or a lawful guardian and
making it unlawful for the owner, manager, keeper or duly
authorized representative of such establishments to lease
any room or portion thereof more than twice every 24
hours runs counter to due process guaranty for lack of
certainty and for its unreasonable, arbitrary and
oppressive character.
Issue: Whether or not the ordinance is violative of the
due process clause?
Held: A Manila ordinance regulating the operation of
hotels, motels and lodging houses is a police measure
specifically aimed to safeguards public morals. As such it
is immune from any imputation of nullity resting purely on
conjecture and unsupported by anything of substance. To
hold otherwise would be to unduly restrict and narrow the
scope of police power which has been properly
characterized as the most essential, insistent and the less
limitable of powers extending as it does to all great public
needs.
Mush discretion is given to municipal
corporations in determining the amount of license fees to
be imposed for revenue. The mere fact that some
individuals in the community may be deprived of their
present business or a particular mode of earning a living
cannot prevent the exercise of police power.
There is no controlling and precise definition of
due process. It furnishes though a standard to which
governmental action should conform in order that
deprivation of life, liberty or property, in each appropriate
case, be valid. The standard of due process which must
exist both as a procedural and as substantive requisite to
free the challenged ordinance, or any governmental action
for that matter, from imputation of legal infirmity is
responsiveness to the supremacy of reason, obedience to
the dictates of justice. It would be an affront to reason to
stigmatize an ordinance enacted precisely to meet what a
municipal lawmaking body considers an evil of rather
serious proportions as an arbitrary and capricious exercise
of authority. What should be deemed unreasonable and
what would amount to an abduction of the power to govern
is inaction in the face of an admitted deterioration of the
state of public morals.
The provision in Ordinance No. 4760 of the City
of Manila, making it unlawful for the owner, manager,
keeper or duly authorized representative of any hotel,
motel, lodging house, tavern or common inn or the like, to
lease or rent any room or portion thereof more than twice
every 24 hours, with a proviso that in all cases full
payment shall be charged, cannot be viewed as a
transgression against the command of due process. The
prohibition is neither unreasonable nor arbitrary, because

PHIL. PHOSPHATE FERETILIZER CORP. VS TORRES

231 SCRA 335
Facts: Philphos Movement for Progress, Inc (PMPI) filed
with the DOLE a petition for certification election among
the supervisory employees of PHILPHOS. The said
petition was not opposed by PHILPHOS. In fact it
submitted a position paper with the Mediator-Arbiter. Later,
PMPI filed an amended petition with the Mediator-Arbiter
wherein it sought to represent not only the supervisory
employees
of
PHILPHOS
but
also
its
professional/technical and confidential employees. The
parties therein agreed to submit their respective position
papers and to consider the amended petition submitted for
decision on the basis thereof and related documents. The
Mediator-Arbiter issued an order granting the petition and
directing the holding of a certification election. PHILPHOS
appealed said order to the Sec. Of Labor, which appeal
was denied.
PHILPHOS alleged that it was denied due
process in the proceedings before the Mediator-Arbiter.
Issue: Whether or not PHILPHOS was denied due
process?
Held: The essence of due process is simply an
opportunity to be heard or, as applied to administrative
proceedings, an opportunity to explain ones side or an
opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling
complained of. Where, as in the instant case, PHILPHOS
agreed to file its position paper with the Mediator-Arbiter
and to consider the case submitted for decision on the
basis of the position papers filed by the parties, there was
sufficient compliance with the requirement of due process,
as PHILPHOS was afforded reasonable opportunity to
present its side. Moreover, PHILPHOS could have, if it so
desired, insisted on a hearing to confront and examine the
witnesses of the other party. But it did not, instead, it opted
to submit its position paper with the Mediator-Arbiter.
Besides, PHILPHOS had all opportunity to ventilate its
arguments in its appeal to the Sec. Of Labor.
JAVIER VS COMELEC
144 SCRA 194
Facts: The petitioner and private were candidates in
Antique for the Batasang Pambamnsa in the May 1984
elections. On the eve of the elections several followers of
the petitioner were ambushed and killed allegedly by the
private respondents men. This heightened the tension in
the province. It was in this atmosphere that the voting was
held.
Petitioner went to the Comelec to question the
canvass of the election returns. His complaint was
dismissed and private respondent was proclaimed winner
by the Second Division of the body. Said decision was
signed by among others. Commissioner Opinion who was
previously asked to inhibit himself on the ground that he
was a former law partner of private respondent
Pacificador. Opinion had refused. The decision of said
division is being contested by petitioner.
Issue: Was there a due process observed by the
COMELEC in proclaiming private respondent?
Held: No. Given the general attitude of the COMELEC
toward the party in power at the time and particular
relationship between Opinion and private respondent, one
could not be at least apprehensive, if not certain, that the

Prepared by the POLITICAL LAW SECTION Chief MARILOU LINDA Assistant Chief CATHY AQUINO Members MAY AQUINO, ERRIZA
BUCU, MARICAR DELA CRUZ, KATHREEN GUNAYON, GRACIELA LEYGO, MARY GRACE MANZANO, RUTCHIE MARANON, and
DINAH MARTINEZ. All Rights Reserved by the SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY COLLEGE OF LAW BAR OPERATIONS 2003.

2
decision of the body would be adverse to petitioner.
Opinions refusal to inhibit himself cannot be justified by
any criterion of propriety.
This court has repeatedly demanded the cold
neutrality of an impartial judge as the indispensable
imperative of due process. To bolster that requirement, we
have held that the judge must not only be impartial but
must also appear to be impartial as an added assurance to
the parties that his decision will be just. They must trust
the judge, otherwise they will not go to him at all.
The relationship of the judge at one of the parties
may color the facts and distort the law to the prejudice of a
just decision. Where this is probable or even possible, due
process demands that the judge inhibit himself, if only out
of a sense of delicadeza. For refusing to do so, he
divested the second division of the necessary vote for the
questioned decision, assuming it could act and rendered
proceeding null and void.
EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE
DUMLAO VS COMELEC
96 SCRA 392
Facts: BP 52 was enacted in connection with January 30,
1980 Local Elections. The petitioners question Sec. 4 of
the said law on the ground that it violates the equal
protection clause and the constitutional presumption of
innocence. The first paragraph of Sec. 4 reads any
retired elective provincial city, municipal official, who has
received payment of the retirement benefits to which he is
entitled under the law and who shall have been 65 yrs. of
age at the commencement of the term of office to which he
seeks to be elected, shall not be qualified to run for the
same elective office to which he seeks to be elected, shall
not be qualified to run for the same elective office from
which he retired. On the other hand, par. 2 of Sec. 4
provides:
Any person who has committed any act of
disloyalty to the State, including acts amounting to
subversion, insureccion, rebellion or other similar crimes,
shall not be qualified to be a candidate for any of the
offices covered by this Act, or to participate in any partisan
political activity therein and the filing of charges for the
commission of such crimes before a civil court of military
tribunal after preliminary investigation shall be prima facie
evidence of such facts.
Issue: Whether or not the aforecited provisions of Sec.
4 of BP 52 are violative of the constitutional principles
of equal protection and presumption of innocence.
Held: Par. 1, Sec 4 of BP 52 does not transgress the
constitutional guarantee mentioned the first par. Of Sec 4
is VALID. As adverted to in many decisions, the equal
protection clauses does not prohibit classification,
provided it complies with the requisites what is prohibited
is a classification which is arbitrary and unreasonable. The
distinction here is substantial. The 2nd par. of Sec 4
however, violates the constitutional guaranty of
presumption of innocence. This is so, since a candidate is
disqualified from running for a public office on the ground
alone that charges have been filed against him. In this
wise, it is as if he is placed in the same category as a
person who has already been convicted of a crime whose
penalty carries with it the accessory penalty of suspension
of the right to hold public office.
ALMONTE VS VASQUEZ
G.R. No. 95367, May 23, 1995
Facts: This is a petition for certiorari, prohibition and
mandamus to annul the subpoena duces tecum and
orders issued by respondent Ombudsman, requiring the
chief accountant and record custodian of the Economic

POLITICAL LAW REVIEWER

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY BAR OPERATIONS
Intelligence and Investigation Bureau (EIIB) to produce all
documents relating to Personal Services Funds for the
year 1988 and all evidence, such as vouchers for the
whole plantilla of EIIN for 1988 and to enjoin him from
enforcing his orders. The subpoena duces tecum was
issued by the Ombudsman in connection with his
investigation of an anonymous letter alleging that funds
representing savings from unfilled positions in the EIIB has
been illegally disbursed, petitioners move to quash the
subpoena duces tecum on the following issues:
1. whether petitioners can be ordered to produce
documents relating to personal services and salary
vouchers of EIIB employees on the plea that such
documents are classified,
2. whether petitioners right to the equal protection of
laws have been violated. Petitioners complain that in
all forum and tribunal the aggrieved parties can only
hale respondents via their verified complaints and
sworn statements with their identities fully disclosed,
while in proceedings before the Office of the
Ombudsman anonymous letters suffice to start an
investigation;
3. that the subpoena duces tecum is violative of the
petitioners right against self-incrimination.
Issue: Were petitioners correct in forwarding the
aforementioned issues?
Held: Where the claim of confidentiality does not vest on
the need to protect military, diplomatic or other national
security secrets but on a general public interest in the
confidentiality of his conversation, courts have declined to
find it in the constitution an absolute privilege of the
President against a subpoena considered essential to the
enforcement of criminal laws.
In the case at bar, there is no claim that the
military or diplomatic secrets will be disclosed by the
production of records pertaining to the personnel of the
EIIB. Indeed, EIIBs function is the gathering and
evaluation of intelligence reports and information regarding
illegal activities affecting the national economy.
Consequently, while in cases which involve state secrets,
it may be sufficient to determine from the circumstances of
the case that there is reasonable danger that compulsion
of the evidence will expose military matters without
compelling production, no similar excuse can be made for
privilege resting on other consideration. Likewise, no law
or regulation was shown which considers personnel
records of EIIB as classified information.
The
Constitution
expressly
enjoins
the
Ombudsman to act on any complaint file in any form or
manner concerning official acts or omissions (Sec. 12, Art.
XI). Rather than referring to the form of complaints, the
phrase in an appropriate case in Art XI Sec 12 means
any case concerning official act or omission which is
alleged to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient. The
phrase subject to such limitations as may be provided by
law refers to such limitations as may be provided by
Congress or in the absence thereof to such limitations as
may be imposed by the courts. There is a violation of
petitioners right to equal protection of laws since in the first
place the procedure for the proceedings before the Office
of the Ombudsman is provided for in the Constitution itself.
Second, it is apparent that in permitting the filing of
complaints in any form and in any manner the framers of
the Constitution took into account the well known reticence
of the people which keep them from complaining against
official wrongdoing. The Office of the Ombudsman is
different from the other investigatory and prosecutory
agencies of the government because those subject to its
jurisdiction are public officials who through official pressure
and influence can quash, delay or dismiss investigations
held against them.
The issuance of the subpoena duces tecum would
not violate petitioners right against self-incrimination. It is

Prepared by the POLITICAL LAW SECTION Chief MARILOU LINDA Assistant Chief CATHY AQUINO Members MAY AQUINO, ERRIZA
BUCU, MARICAR DELA CRUZ, KATHREEN GUNAYON, GRACIELA LEYGO, MARY GRACE MANZANO, RUTCHIE MARANON, and
DINAH MARTINEZ. All Rights Reserved by the SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY COLLEGE OF LAW BAR OPERATIONS 2003.

3
enough to state that
produced in this case
whom the subpoena
government officials in
documents are.

the documents required to be

are public records and those to
duces tecum is directed are
whose possession or custody the

POLITICAL LAW REVIEWER

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY BAR OPERATIONS
fully loaded, printed materials of RAM-SFP and a book
entitled Islamic Revolution Future Path of the Nation. As
a consequence of which, the Veeroy spouses were
charged under PD 1866.
Issue: Is the search valid? Whether or not the
materials taken are admissible in evidence.

ART.III, SEC. 2
SEARCHES AND SEIZURES
TAMBASEN VS PEOPLE
Facts: On August 31, 1988 P Sgt. Natal applied for the
issuance of a search warrant from the MTCC, alleging that
he received information that petitioner had in his
possession at his course M-16 armalite rifle, hand
grenades, .45 pistol, dynamite sticks and subversive
documents, which articles were used or intended to be
used for illegal purposes. On the same day, the application
was granted by the MTCC which allowed the seizure of
the items specified in the application.
At around 6:30pm of September 9, 1988, a police
team searched the house of petitioner and seized the
following articles: a) 2 envelopes containing cash in the
total amount of P14,000; b) 1 hand set c) handset with
antenna Petitioners prays that the search warrant and
the seizure of his personal effects be declared illegal.
Issue: Whether or not the search warrant was legal.
Held: The search warrant violates Section 3, Rule 126 of
the Revised Rules of Court, which prohibits the issuance
of a search warrant for more than one specific offense.
Moreover, by their seizure of articles not described in the
search warrant, the police acted beyond the parameters of
their authority under the search warrant. Section 2, Art. III
requires that a search warrant should particularly describe
the thing to be seized. The evident purpose and intent of
the requirement is to limit the things to be seized to those
and only those, particularly described in the search
warrant to leave the officers of the law no discretion
regarding what articles they should seize to the end that
unreasonable searches and seizures may not be made
and abuses may not be committed. Clearly then, the
money which was not indicated in the search warrant, has
been illegally seized from petitioners. The fact that the
members of the police team were doing their task of
pursuing subversives is not a valid excuse for the illegal
seizure. The same constitutional provision is also aimed at
preventing violations of security in person and property
and unlawful invasions of the sanctity of the home, and
giving remedy against such usurpation when attempted.
VEROY VS LAYAGUE
210 SCRA 97
Facts: Spouses Leopoldo and Ma. Luisa Veroy owned 2
houses, one in Quezon City, where they are presently
residing and another in Davao City. The house in Davao
City was entrusted to caretakers. However, the keys to the
Masters and childrens bedroom were retained by the
Veroy so the caretaker could not enter those rooms.
On April 12, 1990 Capt. Obrero called the
telephone from Davao City, Mrs. Veroy to ask permission
from the latter if he could enter and search the house in
Davao City as there was information that the said house
was being used as a safehouse of rebel soldiers. Mrs.
Veroy gave her permission on the condition that Major
Macasaet, a long time friend of the Veroys, be present
during the search. Thereafter, Capt. Obrero and Major
Macasaet conducted the search. When they were already
inside the house, they opened the padlock of the door
leading to the childrens room. Inside the childrens room,
they recovered a .45 caliber handgun with a magazine

Held: No. The search is not valid. The permission given by

Mrs. Veroy to break open the door of their residence was
merely for the purpose of ascertaining thereat the
presence of the alleged rebel soldiers. The permission did
not include any authority to conduct a room to room
search once inside the house. The items taken, were,
therefore products of an illegal search, violative of their
constitutional rights. As such, they are inadmissible in
evidence.
PEOPLE VS DEL ROSARIO
234 SCRA 246
Facts: Private respondent was charged and convicted of
the Illegal Possession of Firearm and Ammunitions and
illegal sale of regulated Drugs in 2 separate criminal cases
filed against him with the RTC of Cavite.
There appears to be certain irregularities in the
procedure of the buy-bust operations and in the
implementation of the search warrant. As to the buy-bust
operations, the alleged poseur-buyer had to return to the
police station and inform the raiding team that he had
already bought the shabu from the accused to implement
the search warrant. Thereupon, the raiding team
proceeded to the house of the accused to implement the
search warrant. The usual procedure in a buy-bust
operation is for the police officers to arrest the pusher of
drugs at the very moment he hands over the dangerous
drug to the poseur-buyer. As to the implementation of the
search warrant, the search warrant specifically authorized
only the search and seizure of Methamphetamine
Hydrochloride commonly known as shabu and its
paraphernalia but the raiding team also seized certain
firearms.
Issue: Whether or not the firearm seized though not
specifically included in the search warrant is
admissible as evidence against the accused.
Held: No. A search warrant is not a sweeping authority
empowering a raiding party to undertake a fishing
expedition to seize and confiscate any and all kinds of
evidence articles relating to the crime. The Constitution
itself (sec. 2, art.III) and the Rules of Court (Sec. 3, Rule
126) specifically mandate that the search warrant must
particularly describe the things to be seized. Thus, the
search warrant was no authority for the police officers to
seize the firearm which was not mentioned, much less
described with particularity, in the search warrant. Neither,
may it be maintained that the gun was seized in the course
of the arrest, for as earlier observed, accuseds arrest was
far from regular and legal. Said firearm, having been
illegally seized is not admissible in evidence.
PEOPLE VS TANGLIBEN
184 SCRA 220
Facts:
Patrolmen Quenedo and Punzalan were
conducting surveillance mission at the Victory Liner
Terminal aimed not only against persons who may commit
misdemeanor at said place but also on persons who may
be engaging in the traffic of dangerous drugs based on
informations supplied by informers. At 9:30 pm, they
noticed a person carrying a red travelling bag who was
acting suspiciously and they confronted him. The person
was requested to open the bag but he refused only to

Prepared by the POLITICAL LAW SECTION Chief MARILOU LINDA Assistant Chief CATHY AQUINO Members MAY AQUINO, ERRIZA
BUCU, MARICAR DELA CRUZ, KATHREEN GUNAYON, GRACIELA LEYGO, MARY GRACE MANZANO, RUTCHIE MARANON, and
DINAH MARTINEZ. All Rights Reserved by the SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY COLLEGE OF LAW BAR OPERATIONS 2003.

4
accede later on when the petitioner identified themselves.
Found inside the bag were marijuana leaves. The accused
was then taken the police headquarters for further
investigation.
Issue: Was the marijuana inadmissible in evidence on
the ground that it was the product of an unlawful
search without a warrant.
Held: No. One of the exceptions to the general rule
requiring a search warrant is a search incident to a lawful
arrest. (Sec. 12 Rule 126). Accused was caught in
flagrante, since he was carrying a marijuana at the time of
his arrest. This case therefore falls squarely within the
exception. The warantless search was incident to a lawful
arrest and is consequently valid.
This case also presented urgency. The transcript
of stenographic notes reveals that there was an informer
who pointed to the accused aas carrying marijuana. Faced
with such on-the-spot information, the police officer had to
act quickly. There was no enough time to secure a search
warrant.
PEOPLE VS GALVEZ
GR. NO. 136790 MARCH 26, 2001
Facts: The incident happened one evening at a local fair
which was illuminated by fluorescent lights. Playing games
at that time in one of the stalls throwing 25 centavo coins
were Larry, Romy and Al while their companion Danny
was about three meters away playing bingo. After a while
five men arrived. Two of them approached Romy while the
two others served as the lookout. Then the fifth man went
directly to Romy and stabbed him at the back with a knife.
Afterwards the assailant threw the knife away and then
fled with his companions. Larry saw Romy fall to the
ground seriously wounded. Al was around three arms
length away and saw the entire incident. Larry and Danny
brought Romy to the hospital where he was declared dead
on arrival. Then they informed Romys relatives of his
death.
Initial police investigation showed that there were
six suspects but they could not be found in their respective
residences. Inside the bus terminal bystanders informed
SPO1 Lazaro, the police investigator, that Manny stabbed
the victim. So the policeman fetched Manny and told him
to go to the house of the victim. But when they arrived
people just looked at manny and did not point to him as
the assailant. In fact the victims brother Rey told the police
that Manny was not the one who stabbed his brother and
should be released. So the police released Manny.
But as soon as they had left, the people inside the
house particularly Danny, Larry and Al told Rey that it was
Manny who stabbed his brother as they were him and saw
the entire incident. So at the instance of Rey, the
Barangay Tanod apprehended Manny and took the latter
to the police headquarters. The tanod had no warrant of
arrest when he took Manny into custody.
At the police station, the statements of the
witnesses were prepared pointing to Manny as the
assailant. Manny was charged with murder and was
denied bail. At the trial, after pleading not guilty, the
eyewitnesses pointed to Manny as the culprit. So Manny
was found guilty as charged and sentence to reclusion
perpetua despite his alibi and despite the fact that the
knife was not found.
On appeal, among the points raised by Manny was
the legality of his arrest. He alleged that he was arrested
not because of the positive identification of the
eyewitnesses but on the basis of the hearsay testimony of
Rey. Besides, he was arrested without warrant.
Issue: Was Mannys arrest legal?

POLITICAL LAW REVIEWER

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY BAR OPERATIONS
Held: NO. Mannys arrest was illegal. The Barangay
Tanod arrested Manny on the basis solely of what Rey told
him and not because he saw Manny commit the crime
charged against him. Indeed there was no warrant issued
against Manny when the latter was taken into custody by
the tanod. Considering that Manny was not committing a
crime at the time he was arrested nor did the arresting
officer have any personal knowledge of facts indicating
that Manny committed a crime, his arrest without a warrant
cannot be justified.
By entering a plea of not guilty and participating at
the trial however, Manny waived his right to raise the issue
of the illegality of arrest. Objection to a warrant of arrest or
the procedure by which the court acquires jurisdiction
over the person of an accused must be made before he
enters a plea, otherwise the objection is deemed waived.
The fact that the arrest was illegal does not render the
subsequent proceedings void and derive the State of its
right to convict the guilty when all the facts point to
culpability of the accused.
And in the case all the facts point to the culpability
of Manny. He was positively identified as the assailant by
the eyewitnesses who were found by the court to be
credible. The failure to present as evidence of the murder
weapon is not fatal because the positive identification of
the eyewitnesses is sufficient to prove the culpability of
Manny.
ART. III, SEC. 3
PRIVACY OF COMMUNICATION AND
CORRESPONDENCE
GAANAN VS IAC
145 SCRA 112
Facts: Petitioner Edgardo Gaanan was requested by his
client Atty. Leonardo Laconico to secretly listen to the
telephone conversation with Atty. Tito Pintor through a
telephone extension so as to hear personally the proposed
condition without complainants consent, complainant
charged Gaanan and Laconico with violation of the AntiWiretapping Act (RA No. 4200).
After trial on the merits, the lower court found both
Gaanan and Laconico guilty of Violating Sec. 1 of RA No.
4200, which provides:
Sec. 1. It shall be unlawful for any person, not
being authorized by all the parrties to any private
communication or spoken word, to tap any wire or cable or
by using any other device or arraignment to secretly
overhear, intercept or record such communication or
spoken word by using a device commonly known as a
Dictaphone or dictagraph or detecphone or walkie-talkie or
tape recorder, or otherwise decribed.
The petitioner appealed to the appellate court. The
Intermediate Appellate Court now the Court of Appeals
affirmed the decision of the trila court holding that the
communication between the complainant and the accused
Laconico was private in nature and therefore covered by
RA No. 4200; that the petitioner overheard such
communication and that the extension telephone which
was used by the petitioner to overhear the telephone
conversation is covered in the term device as provided in
the RA No. 4200.
Issue: Whether or not an extension telephone is
among the prohibited devices in Sec. 1 of the Act such
that its use to overhear a private conversation would
constitute lawful interception of communications
between the 2 parties using the telephone line.
Held: The unlawful refers to a tap of a wire or cable or
the use of a device or arrangement for the purpose of
secretly overhearing, intercepting or recording the
communication. There must be either a physical

Prepared by the POLITICAL LAW SECTION Chief MARILOU LINDA Assistant Chief CATHY AQUINO Members MAY AQUINO, ERRIZA
BUCU, MARICAR DELA CRUZ, KATHREEN GUNAYON, GRACIELA LEYGO, MARY GRACE MANZANO, RUTCHIE MARANON, and
DINAH MARTINEZ. All Rights Reserved by the SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY COLLEGE OF LAW BAR OPERATIONS 2003.

5
interruption through a wiretap or the deliberate installation
of a device or arrangement in order to overhear, intercept
or recorded the spoken words. An extension telephone
cannot be place in the same category as a Dictaphone,
dictagraph or other devices enumerated in Sec. 1 of RA
No. 4200 as the use thereof cannot be considered as
tapping the wire or cable of a telephone line. The
telephone extension in this case was not installed for that
purpose. It just happened to be there for ordinary office
use. It is a rule in statutory construction that in order to
determine the true intent of the legislative, the statute
should not be taken as detached and isolated expressions,
but the whole and every part thereof must be considered
in fixing the meaning of any of its parts.
Hence, the phrase device or arrangement in Sec
1 of RA No. 4200, although not exclusive to that
enumerated therein, should not b e construed to
comprehend instruments of the same or similar nature,
that is, instrument the use of which would be tantamount
to tapping the main line of telephone. It refers to
instrument whose installation or presence cannot be
presumed by the party or parties being overheard because
by their very nature, they are not of common usage and
their purpose is precisely for tapping intercepting or
recording a telephone conversation.
PEOPLE VS ALBOFERA
152 SCRA 123
Facts: Albofera and Lawi-an were convicted in the RTC of
Davao del Sur for the murder of a forester and were
sentenced to capital punishment. There was no direct
evidence linking both accused to the crime charged, their
alleged participation therein having been found by the trial
court to have proved by circumstantial evidence adduced
by the prosecution. On appeal, the accused assails the
trial courts decision on the ground of among others, a
letter written in the Visayan dialect by accused Albofera,
while under detention, to witness Rodrigo Esma, a friend
of Albofera, asking Esma to testify in favor of Albofera.
Albofera contends that the admissibility thereof was
specifically excluded under Sec. 4, Art. IV of the 1973
Constitution on the Privacy of Communication and
Correspondence.
Issue: Whether or not the admission of such letter as
evidence was valid.
Held:
Yes, Alboferas contention is untenable. The
production of the letter by the prosecution was not the
result of an unlawful search and seizure nor was it through
unwarranted intrusion or invasion into Alboferas privacy.
Albofera admitted having sent the letter to Esma, and
Esma produced such letter in the course of his testimony
before the trial court. Besides, there was nothing really
self-incriminatory in the letter. Albofera mainly pleaded that
Esma change his declaration in his affidavit and testify in
Alboferas favor. Nothing Albofera stated in this letter was
taken against him in assiving at a determination of his
culpability.
(NOTE: The Supreme Court affirmed the judgement of
conviction of the trial court based on circumstantial
evidence of which Esmas testimony was much noted for
its worthiness, even if Alboferas extra-judicial confession
was disregarded as invalid.)
ART. III, SEC. 4
FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION
NATIONAL PRESS CLUB VS COMELEC
207 SCRA 1

POLITICAL LAW REVIEWER

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY BAR OPERATIONS
Facts: Petitioner in these cases are questioning the
validity of Sec. 11 (6) of RA 6646 which prohibits the
selling or donating space and time for political
advertisements except to the COMELEC as provided
under Sec. 90 and 92 of the Omnibus Election Code.
Petitioners argue that the provision violates and invades
the constitutional guarantees comprising Freedom of
Expression; that it amounts to censorship, that the
prohibition is in derogation of medias role and function to
provide adequate channels of public information and
public opinion relevant to election issues.
Held: No infringement of the Freedom of Expression.
1.
The constitution itself, has expressly authorized the
COMELEC to supervise or regulate the enjoyment
or utilization of franchises or permits for the
operation of media of communication and
information. (Art IX-C, 4). The fundamental purpose
of that is to ensure equal opportunity, time and
space and the right to reply, as well as uniform and
reasonable rates of charges for the used of such
media facilities, in connection with public
information campaigns and forums among
candidates.
2.
The technical effect of Art IX-C,4 of the Constitution
may be seen to be that no presumption of invalidity
arise in respect of exercises of supervisory or
regulatory authority on the part of the COMELEC for
the purpose of securing equal opportunity among
candidates for political office, although such
supervision or regulation may result in some
limitation of the rights of free speech and free
press. For supervision or regulation of the
operations of media enterprises is scarcely
inconceivable without accompanying limitation.
Thus, the applicable rule is the general time
honored one- that a statute is presumed to be
constitutional and that the party asserting its
unconstitutionality must discharge the burden of
clearly and convincingly proving that assertion.
3.
The assailed provision is limited in the duration of its
applicability and enforceability in time to election
period.
4.
It is limited in scope of application. It applied only to
sale and purchase, and donation of print space or
airtime for campaign and other report or
commentary or other coverage that, in responsible
media, is not paid for by candidates advertisements
of particular candidates.
5.
It does not limit the right of free speech and of
access to mass media of the candidates
themselves. The limitation however, bears a clear
and reasonable connection with the constitutional
objective. For it is precisely in the unlimited
purchase of print space and radio and television
time that the resources of the financially affluent
candidates are likely to make a crucial difference.
AYER PRODUCTIONS PTY. LTD. VS CAPULONG
160 SCRA 861
Facts: Petitioner Ayer Production Pty. Ltd. For Philippines
and International release, the historic struggle of the
Filipinos at EDSA entitled The Four Day Revolution.
During the filming of said motion picture, private
respondent Juan Ponce Enrile, who played a major role in
the events proposed to be filmed, filed a complaint with
application for Temporary Restraining Order and a writ of
Preliminary Injunction with RTC of Makati seeking to stop
movie production alleging that petitioners production of
said movie is without his consent and over his objections
constitutes a violation of his right of privacy. Petitioner, on
the other hand maintained that the film would not involve
the private life of the Enrile nor that of his family and that a
Preliminary Injunction would amount to a prior restraint on

Prepared by the POLITICAL LAW SECTION Chief MARILOU LINDA Assistant Chief CATHY AQUINO Members MAY AQUINO, ERRIZA
BUCU, MARICAR DELA CRUZ, KATHREEN GUNAYON, GRACIELA LEYGO, MARY GRACE MANZANO, RUTCHIE MARANON, and
DINAH MARTINEZ. All Rights Reserved by the SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY COLLEGE OF LAW BAR OPERATIONS 2003.

 POLITICAL LAW REVIEWER

6
their right of free expression. The lower court then issued
a writ of preliminary injunction against petitioner company.
The latter then filed a petition for certiorari with an urgent
prayer or preliminary injunction. The Court then granted a
limited temporary restraint order partially enjoining the
implementation of respondents judge order and the writ of
preliminary injunction issued therein, and allowing the
petitioners to resume producing and filming those portions
of the movie which do not make any reference to private
respondent Enrile or of his family or to any fictitious
character based on bearing substantial resemblance or
similarity to or identifiable with Enrile.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY BAR OPERATIONS

3.
4.

5.

Issue: Whether the balancing of interest test or the

clear and present danger test be applied.
Held: The court believes that a different conclusion must
be reached. The production and filming by petitioner of the
projected motion picture does not in the circumstances of
this case constitute as unlawful intrusion upon private
respondents right of privacy. The subject matter of the
movie is one of public interest and concern and does not
relate to the individual life. Unlike in the Lagunzad case
which concerned the lifestory of Moises Padilla necessarily
including at least his immediate family. What we have here
is not a film biography, more or less fictionalized, of private
respondent Enrile. The film is not principally about nor is it
focused upon, the man Enrile, but is compelled, if it is to
be historical, to refer to the role played by Enrile in the
precipitating and constituent events of the change of
government in February 1986. The respondent judge
should have his hand, instead of issuing an ex parte TRO,
for the projected motion picture was as yet uncompleted
and hence not exhibited to any audience. Neither Enrile
nor the respondent judge knew what the completed film
would precisely look like. There was in other words, no
clear and present danger or any violation of any right to
privacy that private respondent could lawfully assert.
EASTERN BROADCASTING CORP. (DYRE) VS HON.
DANS, JR
137 SCRA 628
Facts: The petition was filed to compel the respondents to
re-open the radio station DYRE which had been summarily
closed on the ground of national security. The petitioner
contends that it was denied due process when the radio
station was closed based on the mere allegation that it
was used to incite people to sedition. No hearing and
action were taken on the petitioners motion for
reconsideration. The petition also raises the issue of
freedom of speech. Before the court could promulgate a
decision, the petitioner withdraw his petition since the
radio station had already been sold.
Held: Considering that the case has become moot and
academic, the petitioners motion to withdraw or dismiss
the petition is GRANTED. The following guidelines were
issued by the Supreme Court for the guidance of inferior
courts and administrative tribunals exercising quasi-judicial
functions, to wit:
1.

2.

The cardinal primary requirements in administrative

proceedings laid down in Ang Tibay V C.A. should
have followed before a broadcast station may be
closed or its operations curtailed.
All forms of media, whether print or broadcast, are
entitled to the broad protection of the freedom of
speech and expression clause. The test for limitations
on freedom of expression continues to be the clear
and present danger rule- that words are used in such
circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a
clear and present danger that they will bring about the

6.

7.

substantive evils that the lawmaker has a right to

prevent.
The clear and present danger test however, does not
lend itself to a simplistic and all embracing
interpretation applicable to all utterances in all forums.
All forms of communication are entitled to the broad
protection of the freedom of expression clause.
Necessarily, however, the freedom of television and
radio broadcasting is somewhat lesser in scope than
the freedom accorded to newspaper and print media.
The transistor radio is found everywhere, the
television set is also becoming universal. Their
message may be simultaneously received by a
national or regional audience of listeners including the
indifferent or unwilling who happen to be within reach
of a blaring radio or television set.
The impact of the vibrant speech is forceful and
immediate. Unlike readers of the printed work, the
radio audience has lesser opportunity to cogitate,
analyze and reject the utterance.
The clear and present danger test must take the
particular circumstances of broadcast media into
account. Broadcast stations deserve the special
protection given to all forms of media by the due
process and freedom of expression clauses of the
Constitution.

There is a simple, extremely narrow class of

cases in which the First Amendments ban on prior
restraint may be. When the nation is at war, But the
government has failed to even allege an emergency that
could be tantamount to an undeniable and extreme danger
so as to justify the restraint. Mere conclusions are
insufficient.
In the area of national defense and foreign
affairs, the executive is endowed with enormous power
unchecked by the other branches of government. The only
restraint to this power would be an enlightened citizenry.
For this reason, the press must be kept alert, aware and
so as to inform and enlighten the people.
Secrecy is the best maintained through
credibility. An effective internal security is premised on
disclosure.
There is no proof that the publication of the study
would lead to immediate and irreparable damage to our
nation and people.
Should the government fail to proceed with its
grievance, it may do so in other ways but not through
restraint by constitutional entitlement.
ART. III, SEC. 4
ASSEMBLY AND PETITION
Primicias VS Fugoso
80 Phil 71
Facts: The resondent Mayor sought to defend his refusal
to allow the nacionalista party to hold meeting at the
PLAZA MIRANDA by what he called a reasonable ground
to believe basing upon previous and upon the fact that
passions, especially on the part of the losing groups,
remain bitter and high, that similar speeches will be
delivered tending to undermine the faith and confidence of
the people in their government, and in the duly peace
constituted authorities which might threaten breaches of
the peace and a disruption of public order.

Issue: Whether or not the mayor has the discretion to

allow holding of a meeting in a public place.

Prepared by the POLITICAL LAW SECTION Chief MARILOU LINDA Assistant Chief CATHY AQUINO Members MAY AQUINO, ERRIZA
BUCU, MARICAR DELA CRUZ, KATHREEN GUNAYON, GRACIELA LEYGO, MARY GRACE MANZANO, RUTCHIE MARANON, and
DINAH MARTINEZ. All Rights Reserved by the SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY COLLEGE OF LAW BAR OPERATIONS 2003.

POLITICAL LAW REVIEWER

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY BAR OPERATIONS

Held: The Philippine Legislature has delegated the

exercise of police power to the Municipal Board of the City
of Manila, which according to Sec. 2444 of the
Administrative Code has the following powers, among
others, is to regulate the use of streets, avenues, parks,
cemeteries and other public places and to enact
ordinances it may deem necessary.
The Supreme Court rejected the Mayors
argument noting that the condition of Manila at that time
did not justify the mayors fears. The power of local
officials is only one of regulation and not prohibition. The
said provision odes not confer the Mayor the power to
refuse to grant the permit, but only the discretion in issuing
the permit to determine or specify the streets or public
places where the parade or procession may pass or the
meeting may be held. They cannot bar the use of public
places for lawful assemblies.

undeniably related to possible breaches of discipline not

only is a denial of due process but also constitutes a
violation of the basic tenets of fair play.

NON VS DAMES II
185 SCRA 523

ART.III, SEC. 5
FREEDOM OF RELIGION

Facts: Petitioner urge the Court en Banc to review and

reverse the doctrine laid down in Alcuaz V PSBA 161
SCRA 7, to the effect that a college student, once admitted
by the school, is considered enrolled only for one
semester and hence, may be refused readmission after
the semester is over, as the contract between the student
and the school is deemed terminated.
Petitioners, students in private respondent Mabini
Colleges, Inc. in Daet, Camarines Norte, were not allowed
to re-enrol by the school for the academic year 1988-1989
for leading or participating in student mass actions against
the school in the preceding semester. The subject of the
protest is not, however, made clear in the pleadings.
Upholding the primacy of freedom of expression
because the students do not shed their constitutionally
protected right at the schoolgate.

GARCES VS ESTENZO
104 SCRA 510

Held: The Court in Alcuaz, anchored its decision on the

termination of contract theory. But it must be repeatedly
emphasized that the contract between the school and the
student is not ordinary contract. It is imbued with public
interest, considering the high priority given by the
Constitution to educate and the grant to the State of
supervisory and regulatory powers over all educational
institutions (See Art. XIV, Sec. 1-2, 4(1)
Respondent school cannot justify its actions by
relying on Par. 137 of the manual of regulations for private
schools, which provides that when a student registers in a
school, it is understood that he is enrolling for the entire
semester for collegiate courses, which the Court in Alcuaz
construed as authority for schools to refuse enrollment to a
student on the ground that his contract, which has a term
of one semester, has already expired.
The termination of contract theory does not even
find support in the Manual par. 137 merely clarifies that a
college student enrolls for the entire semester. It serves to
protect schools wherein tuition fees are collected and paid
on a installment basis. Thus, even if a student does not
complete the semester for which he was enrolled, but has
stayed on for more than two weeks, he may required to
pay his tuition fees for the whole semester before he is
given his credentials for transfer.
On the other hand, it does not appear that the
petitioners were afforded due process, in the manner
expressed in Guzman, before they were refused re
enrollment. In fact, it would appear from the pleadings that
the decision to refuse them re enrollment because of
failing grades was a mere after thought. It is not denied
that what incurred the fire of the school authorities was the
student mass actions conducted in February 1988 and
which were led and/or participated in by petitioners.
Certainly, excluding students because of failing grades
when the cause for the action taken against them

NOTE: The Supreme Court pointed out that this is not a

simple case of a school refusing readmission or re
enrollment or returning students. Undisputed is the fact
that the refusal to readmit or re-enroll petitioners was
decided upon and implemented by school authorities as a
reaction to student mass actions directed against the
school. Petitioners are students of respondent school who,
after leading and participating in student protests were
denied readmission and re-enrollment for the next
semester. This is a case that focuses on the right to
speech and assembly as exercised by students vis--vis
the right of school officials to discipline pronouncements in
the cases of Malabanan V Ramento and Villar V TIP.

Facts: On March 23, 1976, the Barangay Council of

Valencia, Ormoc City adopted several resolutions
regarding the acquisition of the wooden image of San
Vicente Ferrer to be used in the celebrations of his annual
feats day and the construction of waiting shed. Funds for
the two projects would be obtained through the selling of
tickets and cash donations. With those funds, the waiting
shed was constructed and the wooden image was
acquired.
The image was temporarily places in the altar of
the Catholic Church of Barangay Valencia. A controversy
arose after the mass when the parish priest refused to
return the image to the barangay council.
A replivin case was filed against the priest. In his
answer to the complaint, he assailed the constitutionality
of the said resolutions.
Issue: Whether or not the resolutions violated the
constitutional provision prohibiting the use of public
funds for religious purpose.
Held: No. The questioned resolutions do not directly or
indirectly establish any religion, nor abridge religious
liberty nor appropriate public money or property for the
benefit of any religious sect, priest or clergyman. The
image was purchased with private funds, not with tax
money. The construction of awaiting shed is entirely a
secular matter.
The wooden image was purchased in connection
with the celebration of the barrio first honoring the patron
saint, San Vicente Ferrer, and not for the purpose of
favoring any religion nor interfering with religious matters
or the religious beliefs of the barrio residents. One of the
highlights of the fiesta was the mass, consequently, the
image of the patron saint had to be placed in the church
when the mass celebrated.
The barangay council, as owner of the image has
the right to determine who should have custody thereof.
EBRALINAG VS DIVISION SUPERINTENDENT OF
SCHOOLS OF CEBU
219 SCRA 526
Facts: About 68 students (grade school and highschool)
were expelled by the public school authorities in Cebu for
refusing to salute the flag, sing the National Anthem and
recite the Patriotic Pledge as required by RA 1265 and by
the Department Order No. 8 of the DECS making the flag
ceremony in all educational institutions. These students

Prepared by the POLITICAL LAW SECTION Chief MARILOU LINDA Assistant Chief CATHY AQUINO Members MAY AQUINO, ERRIZA
BUCU, MARICAR DELA CRUZ, KATHREEN GUNAYON, GRACIELA LEYGO, MARY GRACE MANZANO, RUTCHIE MARANON, and
DINAH MARTINEZ. All Rights Reserved by the SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY COLLEGE OF LAW BAR OPERATIONS 2003.

8
were members of the Jehovahs Witnesses which
teaches their children not to salute the flag, sing the
national anthem and recite the patriotic pledge for they
believe that those are acts of worship or religious devotion.
Issue: Whether or not the children may be expelled
from school (public and private) for refusing, on
account of their religious beliefs to take part in the
flag ceremony.
Held: Jehovahs Witnesses are accorded exemption to the
observance of flag ceremony in deference to their religious
beliefs but said right not to participate does not give them
the right to disrupt such patriotic exercises.
Their expulsion will violate their right as Phil.
Citizens under the 1987 Constitution, to receive education,
for it is the duty to protect and promote the right of all
citizens to quality education and to make such education
accessible to all. (Sec. 1, Art. XIV)
Compulsion to observe the flag salute law on pain
of dismissal from ones job or expulsion from school is
alien to the conscience of present generation of Filipinos,
being violative of their constitutional right to free speech
and free exercise of religious profession and worship.
PAMIL VS TELERON
86 SCRA 413
Facts: Private Respondent Father Margarito R. Gonzaga
was elected as municipal mayor of Alburquerque, Bohol in
1971. He was duly proclaimed. Petitioner filed a suit for
quo warranto for responsdents disqualification based on
sec. 2175 of Administrative Code of 1917 which reads: In
no case shall there be elected or appointed to a municipal
office ecclesiatics The court a quo sustained the right of
the private respondent to the office holding that the above
quoted provision was already impiledly repeated by the
Election Code of 1971.
Held: There is no clear cut answer. To render the
challenged provision ineffective, 8 votes are required to be
attained. In this case however, only 7 Justices are of the
view that the lower courts judgment should be affirmed
because the challenged provision is no longer operative
either because it was superseded by the 1935 Constitution
or it was repealed. Five members however believe that no
repeal was made, the provisions of the prohibition being
unequivocal in terms. Procedurally, the required number of
votes not having been attained, the validity of Sec. 2175 is
upheld and Father Gonzaga is ordered to vacate his
position.
NOTE: As to the constitutional dimension of the case,
Justice Fernando, with six other Justices are of the view
that the Constitution (both 1973 and 1935) prohibits
religious test as a requirement for the exercise of Civil or
Political rights. Justice Teehankee notes that the provision
declaring ecclesiastics ineligible for election or
appointment to a municipal office is inconsistent with and
violative of the religious freedom guaranteed by the
Constitution because to do so bar them is to impose a
religious test in violation of the Constitution.
On the other hand, Justice Barredo opines that
there is no repugnancy as between the challenged
provision and the freedom of religion protected by the
Constitution. The no religious test means that no public
office may denuded to any person any reason of his
religious belief. But when he becomes an ecclesiastic, he
becomes the official minister of his church with distinct
duties and responsibilities which may not always be
compatible with the posture of absolute indifference and
impartiality to all religious beliefs which the government
must maintain at all times Justice Makasiar notes that to
allow an ecclesiastic to head the executive department of

POLITICAL LAW REVIEWER

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY BAR OPERATIONS
a municipality is to permit the erosion of the principle of
church and state because there can be no assurance that
the decision of such ecclesiastic in the exercise of his
powers vested in him by reason of his local position will be
clothed with impartiality.
ART.III, SEC. 6
LIBERTY OF ABODE AND TRAVEL
MARCOS VS MANGLAPUS
177 SCRA 568
Facts: Deposed Pres. Marcos exiled in Hawaii wishes to
return to the Philippine, however, Pres. Aquino rendered a
decision to bar their return to the Philippines considering
the dire consequences to the nation of his return at the
time when the stability of the government is threatened.
Mr. Marcos filed a petition for mandamus and prohibition to
compel the Sec. Foreign Affairs to issue travel documents
to him and his family, alleging that his right to return to the
Philippine is guaranteed under the Bill of Rights, and
questions Pres. Aquinos power to impair their right to
travel in the absence of legislation to that effect.
Issue: May the Pres. prohibit the Marcoses from
returning to the Philippines?
Held: YES. The right to return to ones country is not
among the rights specifically guaranteed in the Bill of
Rights, which treats only of the Liberty of Abode and the
right to travel, but it is well considered view that the right to
return may be considered as a generally accepted
principle of international law and, under the Constitution, is
part of the law of the land. However, it is distinct and
separate from the right to travel.
The constitutional guarantees they invoked are
neither absolute nor inflexible. For the exercise of such
freedoms admits of limits and must be adjusted to the
requirements of equally important public interest.
The request or demand of the Marcoses to be
allowed to return to the Philippines cannot be considered
in the light solely of the constitutional provisions
guaranteeing liberty of abode and the right to travel,
subject to certain exemptions, or of case law which clearly
never contemplated situations similar to the present one. It
must be treated as a matter that is appropriately
addressed to those residual unstated powers of the
president which are implicit in and correlative to the
paramount duty residing in that office to safeguard and
protect general welfare.
The president did not act arbitrarily and
capriciously and whimsically in determining that the return
of the Marcoses poses a serious threat to the national
interest and welfare and in prohibiting their return.
SILVERIO VS C.A
195 SCRA 760
Facts: Petitioner Silverio was charged with the violation of
the Revised Securities Act in a criminal case filed with the
RTC. He posted a bail for his provisional liberty. Two years
after the filing of the information, respondent People of the
Philippines filed a Motion to Cancel the passport of and to
issue a hold departure order against accused-petitioner on
the ground that he had gone abroad several times without
the necessary Court approval resulting in the
postponements of the arraignment and schedules
hearings. The RTC granted the Motion. Petitioner
questioned the RTCs Order contending that the right to
travel can be impaired upon lawful order of the Court only
on grounds in the interest of national security, public
safety or public health as was previously stated in the
1973 Constitution.

Prepared by the POLITICAL LAW SECTION Chief MARILOU LINDA Assistant Chief CATHY AQUINO Members MAY AQUINO, ERRIZA
BUCU, MARICAR DELA CRUZ, KATHREEN GUNAYON, GRACIELA LEYGO, MARY GRACE MANZANO, RUTCHIE MARANON, and
DINAH MARTINEZ. All Rights Reserved by the SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY COLLEGE OF LAW BAR OPERATIONS 2003.

 POLITICAL LAW REVIEWER

Issue: May the right to travel be impaired?

Held: YES. Art. III, Sec 6 of the 1987 Constitution should
be interpreted to mean that while the liberty of travel may
be impaired even without Court order the appropriate
executive officers or administrative authorities are not
armed with arbitrary discretion to impose limitations. They
can impose limits only on the basis of national security,
public safety or public health and as may be provided by
law, a limited phrase which did not appear in the 1973
text.
Article III, sec. 6 of the 1987 Constitution should by
no means be construed as delimiting the inherent power of
the courts to use all means necessary to carry their orders
into effect in criminal cases pending before them.
The conditions of bail imposed upon an accused to
make himself available at all times whenever the court
requires his presence operates as a valid restriction of his
right to travel. An accused on bail may be re-arrested
without the necessity of the warrants if he attempts to
depart from the Philippine without prior permission of the
Court where the case is pending.
Holding an accused in a criminal case within the
reach of the Courts by preventing his departure from the
Philippine must be considered as a valid restriction on his
right to travel so that he may dealt with in accordance with
law.
SANTIAGO VS VASQUEZ
217 SCRA 633
Facts: An information docketed as criminal case No.
16698 was filed against petitioner with the Sandiganbayan
for alleged violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices. An order of arrest was issued in said case
against herein petitioner with bail for the release of the
accused fixed at P15000. Petitioner filed an Urgent exparte Motion for Acceptance of Cash Bail Bond for and in
behalf of Dr. Miriam Defensor Santiago. Meanwhile, in a
resolution of Sandiganbayan issued a hold departure order
against petitioner by reason of the announcement made
by petitioner, which was publicized in both print and
broadcast media, that she would be leaving for the United
States to accept a fellowship supposedly offered by the
John F. Kennedy school of government at Harvard
University, hence, this Motion to Restrain the
Sandiganbayan from enforcing its Hold Departure Order
with prayer for the issuance of a TRO and/of Preliminary
Injunction.
Issues:
1. WON the hold departure order violates her right to
due process, right to travel and freedom of speech.
2. WON under the 1987 Constitution, courts can impair
the right to travel only on grounds of national security,
public safety or public health.
HELD:
1. No. It is averred that the hold departure order was
issued without notice and hearing because of the fact
that there was no showing that a motion to issue a
hold departure order was filed by the Sandiganbayan.
Petitioner is in error.
Courts possess certain inherent powers which
may be said to be implied from a general grant of
jurisdiction, in addition to those expressly conferred on
them. A court has the inherent power to make interlocutory
orders necessary to protect its jurisdiction. Such being the
case, with more reason may a party litigant be subjected
to proper coercive measure where he disobeys a proper
order. Petitioner does not deny and even made a public
statement that she in taking judicial notice of such fact of
petitioners polan to go abroad and in issuing sua sponte

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY BAR OPERATIONS

the hold departure order is but an exercise of respondent
courts inherent power to preserve and maintain the
effectiveness of its jurisdiction over the case and the
person of the accused.
2.

No. In the more recent case of Silverio V C.A, it was

held that Art. III, Sec. 6 of the 1987 Constitution
should be interpreted to mean that while the liberty of
travel may be impaired or administrative authorities
are not armed with arbitrary discretion to impose
limitations. They can impose limits only on the basis
of national security. Public safety and public health
and as may be provided by law. Art III, Sec.6 should
by no means be construed as delimiting the inherent
power of the courts to use all means necessary to
carry their power of the effect in criminal cases
pending before them. When by law jurisdiction is
conferred on a Court or Judicial Officer, all auxiliary
writs, processes and other means necessary to carry
it into effect may be employed by such court or officer.
ART. III, SEC 7
RIGHT TO INFORMATION
VALMONTE VS BELMONTE
170 SCRA 256

Facts: Petitioner in this case of special action for

mandamus with preliminary injunction invoked their right to
information and pray that respondent be directed:
a.

b.
c.

to furnish petitioners the list of the names of the

Batasan Pambansa members belonging to the
UNIDO and PDP-LABAN who were able to secure
clean loans immediately before the February 7
election thru the intercession on/marginal note of the
then First Lady Imelda Marcos, and
to furnish petitioners with certified true copy of the
documents evidencing their respective loans, and/or
to allow petitioners access to the public records for
the subjects information

Held: The right to information is an essential premise

meaningful to the right to speech and expression. But this
is not to say that the right to information is merely an
adjunct of and therefore restricted in application by the
exercise of the freedom of speech and of the press. Far
from it, the right to information goes hand-in-hand with the
constitutional policies of full public disclosures and honesty
in the public service. It is meant to enhance the widening
role of the citizenry in governmental decision making as
well in checking abuse in government. Yet like all
constitutional guarantee, the right to information is not
absolute. As stated in the case of Legaspi, the peoples
right to information is limited to matters of public concern,
and is further subject to such limitations as may be
provided by law. Hence, before mandamus may issue, it
may clear that the information sought is of public interest
or public concern, and is not exempted by law from the
operation of the constitutional guarantee. The public
nature of the loanable funds of the GSIS and the public
office held by the alleged borrower make the information
sought clearly a matter of public interest and concern.
On the alleged relationship of confidential nature
between the GSIS and its borrowers, respondent failed to
cite any law granting the GSIS the privilege of
confidentiality as regards the documents subject of this
petition. His position is apparently based merely on
consideration of policy. The judiciary does not settle policy
issue. The court can only declare what the law is, and not
what the law should be. Under our system of government
policy issues are within the domain of the political
branches of the government and of the people themselves

Prepared by the POLITICAL LAW SECTION Chief MARILOU LINDA Assistant Chief CATHY AQUINO Members MAY AQUINO, ERRIZA
BUCU, MARICAR DELA CRUZ, KATHREEN GUNAYON, GRACIELA LEYGO, MARY GRACE MANZANO, RUTCHIE MARANON, and
DINAH MARTINEZ. All Rights Reserved by the SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY COLLEGE OF LAW BAR OPERATIONS 2003.

10
as the repository of all State power. On the issue of
privacy there can be no doubt that the right to privacy
belongs to the individual in his private capacity, and not to
public and governmental agencies like the GSIS. A
corporation has no right of privacy in its name since the
entire basis of the right to privacy is an inquiry to the
feelings and sensibilities of the party and the corporation
would not have such ground on relief.
Neither can the GSIS, through its General
Manager, the respondent invoke the right to privacy of its
borrowers. The right is purely personal in nature, and
hence may be invoked only by the person whose privacy
is claimed to be violated, which cannot, however be
invoked in the instant case considering the public offices
they were holding at the time the loans were alleged to
have been granted. In fine, petitioners are entitled to
access to the documents evidencing loans granted by the
GSIS subjects to reasonable regulations that the latter
may promulgate relating to the manner and hours of
examination, to the end that damage to or loss of the
records may be avoided, that undue interference with the
duties of the custodians of the records may be prevented
and that the right of other persons entitled to inspect the
record may be insured.
ART. III, SEC 8
RIGHT TO FORM ASSOCIATION
CENECO VS SECRETARRY OF DOLE
201 SCRA 584
Facts: Petitioner Central Negros Electric Cooperative
seeks to annul the order issued by then Acting Secretary
Laques declaring the project certification election
unnecessary and declaring petitioner to continue
recognizing private respondent CENECO UNION of
RATIONAL EMPLOYEES (CURE) as the sole and
exclusive bargaining representative of all the rank and file
employees of petitioners electric cooperative for purposes
of collective bargaining. CENECO entered into a CBA with
CURE providing for a term of three years up to March 31,
1990. CURE wrote CENECO proposing that negotiation
be conducted for a new CBA but CENECO denied on the
ground that employees who at the same time are
members of an electric cooperative are not entitled to form
or join a union. Prior to the proposed CBS negotiation,
CURE members in a general assembly approved
Resolution No. 35 whereby it was agreed that all union
members shall withdraw, retract or recall the union
members membership from CENECO to avail of the full
benefit under the existing CBA entered into by and
between CENECO and CURE. However, the withdrawal
from membership was denied by CENECO by reason of
CENECOs refusal to negotiate a new CBA, CURE filed a
petition for direct recognition or for certification election.
CENECO filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that
employees who at the same time are members of an
electric cooperative are not entitled to form or join union
for purposes of CBA for certainly an owner cannot bargain
with himself or his co-owners. Med-arbiter issued an order
granting petition for certification election. CENECO
appealed to the DOLE which issued the questioned order.
Hence, this petition.
Issue: WON employees of CENECO who withdrew
their membership from the cooperative are entitled to
form or join CURE for purposes of CBA.
Held: The articles of Incorporation of CENECO do not
provide any ground for withdrawal from membership which
gives rise to the presumption that the same may be done
anytime and for whatever reason. Moreover, membership
is on a voluntary basis. The right to join an organization
necessarily the equivalent right not to join the same.

POLITICAL LAW REVIEWER

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY BAR OPERATIONS

VICTORIANO VS ELIZALDE ROPE WORKERS UNION

59 SCRA 54
Facts: Benjamin Victoriano, a member of the Iglesia ni
Cristo had been in the employ of the Elizalde Rope
Factory, Inc. since 1958. As such employee, he was a
member of the respondent union, which had with the
company, a closed-shop provision, pursuant to RA 875
(Industrial Peace Act). Later, RA 3350 was enacted
amending RA 875, among others, it provided that the
agreement on closed shop shall not cover members of
any religious sect which prohibit affiliation of their
members in any such labor organization. Victoriano
resigned from the union. Thereupon, the Union
recommended to the company his termination.
Issue: The constitutionality of RA 3350 which allows
members of religious sect to disassociate from the
labor union despite the presence of closed shop
agreement between employer and bargaining union.
Held: The SC upheld the validity of RA 3350, allowing
workers to disassociate from or not to join a labor union
despite a closed shop agreement, if they were members of
any religious sect which prohibits affiliation of their
members in any such labor organization.
The constitutional guarantees the right to form or
join associations. A right comprehends at least two broad
nations, namely: first, liberty or freedom (whereby an
employee may act for himself without being prevented by
law), and second, power (whereby an employee may as
he pleases join or refrain from joining an association). It is,
therefore, the employee who should decide for himself
whether he should join or not to join, he himself make up
his mind as to which association he would join, and even
after he has joined, he still retains the liberty and the
power to leave and cancel his membership with said
organizations at any time. It is clear, therefore, that the
right to join a union includes the right to abstain from
joining any union.
However, the legal protection granted to such right
to refrain from joining is withdrawn by operation of law,
where a labor union and an employer have agreed on a
closed shop, by virtue of which the employer may employ
only the members of the union for the duration of the
contract in order to keep their jobs. Exception: To the all
embracing coverage of the closed shop agreement, RA
3350 introduced an exception but such agreement shall
not covers members of any religious sect which prohibit
affiliation of their members in any such labor organization.
RA 3350 merely excludes ipso jure from the application
and coverage of the closed shop agreement the
employees belonging to any labor organization. What the
exception provides, therefore, is that members of said
religious sects cannot be compelled or coerced to join
labor unions even when said unions have closed shop
agreements with the employers; that inspite of any closed
shop agreement members of said religious sects cannot
be refused employment or dismissed from their jobs on the
sole ground that they are not members of the collective
bargaining union.

ART. III, SEC 10

NON IMPAIRMENT CLAUSE
ORTIGAS & CO., LTD. VS FEATI BANK AND TRUST
CO.
91 SCRA 533

Prepared by the POLITICAL LAW SECTION Chief MARILOU LINDA Assistant Chief CATHY AQUINO Members MAY AQUINO, ERRIZA
BUCU, MARICAR DELA CRUZ, KATHREEN GUNAYON, GRACIELA LEYGO, MARY GRACE MANZANO, RUTCHIE MARANON, and
DINAH MARTINEZ. All Rights Reserved by the SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY COLLEGE OF LAW BAR OPERATIONS 2003.

11
Facts: Ortigas & Co., plaintiff, sold two parcels of land on
installments to Padilla who later on transferred their rights
and interest to Chavez. The agreements of sale contained
stipulation, among others that the parcel of land shall be
used by the buyer exclusively for residential purposes
Such stipulation was annotated in the TCTs. The parcels
of land were eventually sold to FEATI Bank, who began
constructing of the commercial building. The latter refused
to comply with the demand, contending that the building
was being constructed in accordance with the Municipal
Resolution No. 27, zoning regulations which declared the
area a commercial and industrial zone. Plaintiff filed
complaint seeking for the issuance of writ of preliminary
injunction praying, among others, that the defendant
observe and comply with the building restrictions
annotated in the TCT. Trial court dismissed the complaint.
Issue: WON the resolution of the Municipal Council of
Mandaluyong declaring the parcels of land, among others,
as part of the commercial and industrial zone of the
municipality prevailed over the building restrictions
imposed by the plaintiff on the lots in question?
Held: With regard to the contention that the said resolution
cannot nullify the contractual obligation assumed by the
defendant- referring to the restriction incorporated in the
deed of sale and later in the corresponding TCT issued to
defendant it should be stressed that, while non-impairment
of contracts is constitutionally guaranteed, the rule is not
absolute, since it has to be reconciled with the legitimate
exercise of police power. Such power is superior to
contractual stipulations between parties on the use of
lands sold by subdivisions even if said conditions are
annotated in the Torrens Title.
ART. III, SEC 12
CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION
PEOPLE V JUDGE AYSON
175 SCRA 216
Facts: Felipe Ramos, a freight ticket clerk of PAL, was
invited for investigation on February 9, 1986 by the
Management, in accordance with PALs Code of Conduct
and Discipline on allegations of irregularities in the sales of
plane tickets. On Feb. 8, 1986, Ramos gave to his
superiors a handwritten note or admission. At the
investigation before the Branch Manager and in the
presence of the station agent, ticket freight clerk and
PALEAs shop steward was informed of the charge before
him. Thereafter, his answers to the questions by the
Branch Manager were taken down in writing.
After two months, Ramos was charged for estafa.
Trial on the merits ensued. At the close of the peoples
case, the private prosecutors made an offer of evidence to
1) the handwritten note or admission and 2) to the written
question and answer before the Branch Manager. The
defense objected to the offered evidence on the ground
that the admission or confession was taken without the
accused represented by counsel. Judge Ayson ruled in
favor of the defense declared that the written admission or
confession and record of the investigation was
inadmissible because the accused was not informed of his
right to remain silent and to have counsel. Hence this
petition.
Issue: Is the constitutional right of a person suspected
of having committed a crime and subsequently charge
with its commission violated in this case?
Held: No. One of the rights specified exist only in custodial
investigation. And as this court has already stated, a

POLITICAL LAW REVIEWER

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY BAR OPERATIONS
custodial investigation is questioning initiated by law
enforcement officers after a person has been taken into
custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in
any significant way, which is not in the case at bar. It
seems quite evident that a defendant on trial or under
preliminary investigation is not under custodial
investigation. But unquestionably, the accused in court
possesses rights against self-incrimination. Under the
Rules of Court, in all criminal prosecutions the defendant
is entitled 1) to be exempt from being a witness against
himself and 2) to testify as witness in his own behalf, but
3) if he offers himself as a witness he may be crossexamined as any other witness; however 4) his neglect or
refusal to be a witness shall not in any manner prejudiced
or be used against him. In fine a person suspected of
having committed a crime and subsequently charged with
its commission in court, has the following Rights in the
matter of his testifying or producing evidence, to wit: 1)
BEFORE THE CASE IS FILED IN COURT (or with the
public prosecutor, for preliminary investigation), but after
having taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his
liberty in some significant way, and on being interrogated
by the police: the continuing right to remain silent and to
have counsel, and to be informed thereof, not to be
suspected to force, violence, threat, intimidation or any
other means which vitiates free will, and to have evidence
obtained in violation of these rights rejected; and 2)
AFTER THE CASE IS FILED IN COURT a) to refuse to be
a witness; b) to testify in his own behalf, subject to crossexamination by the prosecution; c) not to have any
prejudice whatsoever result to him by such refusal; d)
WHILE TESTIFYING, to refuse to answer a specific
question which tends to incriminate him for some crime
other than that for which he is then prosecuted.

PEOPLE VS MAQUEDA
GR. NO. 112983: MARCH 22,1995
Facts: Hector Maqueda was convicted by the RTC of
Benguet with the crime of robbery with homicide and
various physical injuries. The trial court based its
conviction on the confession and the proof of corpus
delicti. The extra-judicial confession referred to is the
Sinumpaang Salaysay of Maqueda taken by the police
immediately after he was arrested. The trial court admitted
the Sinumpaang Salaysay of the acccused although it
was taken filed in court against him and he was arrested
pursuant to a warrant of arrest issued by the court, the SS
was not therefore taken during custodial investigation and
hence Sec. 12 (1) Art.III of the Constitution is not
applicable, i.e.., the police investigation was no longer
within the ambit of a custodial investigation. The trial court
even stated at the time of the confession that the accused
was already facing charges in court, thus he no longer had
the right to remain silent and to counsel but he had the
right to refuse to be a witness and not to be prejudiced
whatsoever resulting from such refusal.
Issue: Does an accused lose his right to remain silent
and to counsel after a criminal complaint or
information has been filed against him?
Held: No. The exercise of the rights to remain silent and to
counsel and to be informed thereof under Sec. 12(1) Art III
of the Constitution are not confined to that period prior to
the filing of a criminal complaint or information, but are
available at that stage when a person is under the
investigation for the commission of an offense. It was
wrong for the trial court to say that Sec. 12(1) Art.III of the
Constitution is strictly limited to custodial investigation and
that it does not apply to a person against whom a criminal
complaint or information has already been filed because

Prepared by the POLITICAL LAW SECTION Chief MARILOU LINDA Assistant Chief CATHY AQUINO Members MAY AQUINO, ERRIZA
BUCU, MARICAR DELA CRUZ, KATHREEN GUNAYON, GRACIELA LEYGO, MARY GRACE MANZANO, RUTCHIE MARANON, and
DINAH MARTINEZ. All Rights Reserved by the SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY COLLEGE OF LAW BAR OPERATIONS 2003.

 POLITICAL LAW REVIEWER

12
after its filing he loses the right to remain counsel and to
counsel. If we follow the theory of the trial court, then the
police authorities and other law enforcement agencies
would have a heyday in extracting confessions or
admissions from the accused persons after they had been
arrested but before they are arraigned because at such
stage the accused persons are supposedly not entitled to
the enjoyment of the rights to remain silent and to counsel.
The accused in this case was not even told of any of his
constitutional rights. The statement was also taken in the
absence of counsel. Such uncounselled SS is wholly
inadmissible pursuant to Sec. 12 (3) Art III of the
Constitution.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY BAR OPERATIONS

same case. Furthermore, the presence during the
custodial investigation before the fiscal of the military
officer who had earlier threatened the suspect with
death vitiated the latters free will.
2.

No. No arrest without a warrant could have been

legally and validly effected 5 months after the
commission of the crime. A warrantless arrest should
comply with the conditions prescribed in Sec. 5, Rule
113 of the Rules of Court.

PEOPLE VS ALICANDO
DECEMBER 12, 1995
PEOPLE VS AGUSTIN
GR. NO. 110290 JANUARY 25, 1996
Facts: On September 6, 1986, a shooting incident
occurred in Baguio City, which cause the death of two
people and the wounding of three others. On Feb. 10,
1987, appellant was picked up in Pangasinan by military
personnel and brought to Baguio City. In the afternoon of
the same day he was brought to the City Fiscals Office
where he was investigated in connection with the crime.
Appellant alleged that although he was given a lawyer and
that the lawyer who assisted him interviewed him only for
two minutes in Englsh and Tagalog nut not in Ilocano, the
dialect he understands. Appellant also contends that the
lawyer who assisted him was not of his own choice but
was foisted upon him by the City Fiscal and the former is a
law partner of the private prosecutor. Moreover, he alleged
that while he was giving his statements at the Fiscals
office the armed men stayed with him and their presence
deferred him from telling the investigating fiscal that he
was being threatened.
Issues:
1.

Was his extra-judicial admissions taken in violation of

his rights under Art III, sec. 12 of the Constitution?

2.

Was the arrest of the appellant valid?

Held:
1.

Yes. Sec. 12 Art III of the Constitution applies both to

confessions and admissions. Moreover, it was
observed by the court that the appellant was not
explicitly told of his right to have a competent and
independent counsel of his own choice. He was not
categorically informed that he could waive his right to
remain silent and to counsel and that hi waiver must
be in writing and in the presence of his counsel. He
had, in fact waived his right to remain silent by
agreeing to be investigated, yet no written waiver of
such rights appears in the transcript and no other
independent evidence was offered to prove its
existence. It is doubtful for a suspect to have
understood his constitutional rights if he was informed
of the same in English and Tagalog when he could
only understand Ilocano. Also, where the fiscal
immediately suggested the availability of a particular
counsel without first asking the suspect if he had a
counsel of own choice and if he had one, whether he
could hires such counsel or whether he would agree
to have one provided for him then such counsel
provided was foisted upon the suspect ant not one
who was voluntarily and intelligently accepted by the
suspect. A counsel appointed to assist a suspect must
be an independent counsel, and he could not be one
who is an associate of the private prosecutor in the

Facts: In the morning of June 13, 1994, the lifeless body

of Khaye Mae 4 years old, was discovered. The autopsy
report revealed that she was raped and that the proximate
cause of her death was asphyxia by strangulation.
A neighbor pointed appellant as the offender.
Forthwith, he was arrested and interrogated by the police.
He verbally confessed his guilt without the assistance of
counsel. On the basis of this follow up interrogation, the
police recovered from his house the victims slippers, a
pair of gold earrings, a buri mat, a stained pillow and a
stained T-shirt, all of which were later presented as
evidence for the prosecution. The appellant was arraigned
with the assistance of counsel. He pleaded guilty. The trial
court found him guilty of the crime of rape with homicide.
Issue: Is the confession of the accused admissible
against him?
Held: No. it is now familiar learning that the Constitution
has
stigmatized as inadmissible evidence any
uncounselled confession or admission.
In the case at bar, PO3 Tan did not even have the
simple sense to reduce the all important confession of the
appellant in writing. Neither did he present any writing
shown that appellant waived his right to silent and to have
competent and independent counsel. Despite the blatant
violation of appellants constitutional right, the trial court
allowed his uncounselled confession to flow into the
records and illicitly used it in sentencing him to death.
It is not only the uncounselled confession that is
condemned as inadmissible, but also evidence derived
therefrom. The pillow and the T-shirt with the alleged
bloodstains were evidence derived from the uncounselled
confession illegally extracted by the police from the
appellant.
The burden to prove that an accused waived his
right to remain silent and the right to counsel before
making a confession under custodial investigation rests
with the prosecution. The burden has to be discharged by
clear and convincing evidence. Indeed, par. 1 of Sec. 12
Art III of the Constitution provides that the waiver must be
in writing and in the presence of counsel. In the case at
bar, the records show that the prosecution utterly failed to
discharge this burden. It matters not that in the course of
the hearing, the appellant failed to make a timely objection
to the introduction of these constitutionally prescribed
evidence. The lack of objection did not satisfy the heavy
burden of proof that rested on the prosecution.

REPUNLIC ACT NO. 7438

Prepared by the POLITICAL LAW SECTION Chief MARILOU LINDA Assistant Chief CATHY AQUINO Members MAY AQUINO, ERRIZA
BUCU, MARICAR DELA CRUZ, KATHREEN GUNAYON, GRACIELA LEYGO, MARY GRACE MANZANO, RUTCHIE MARANON, and
DINAH MARTINEZ. All Rights Reserved by the SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY COLLEGE OF LAW BAR OPERATIONS 2003.

 POLITICAL LAW REVIEWER

13

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY BAR OPERATIONS

AN ACT DEFINING CERTAIN RIGHTS OF PERSON

ARRESTED, DETAINED OR UNDER CUSTODIAL
INVESTIGATION AS WELL AS THE DUTIES OF THE
ARRESTING, DETAINING AND INVESTIGATING
OFFICERS AND PROVIDING OPENALTIES FOR
VIOLATIONS THEREOF
Be it enacted by the Senate and house of Representatives
of the Philippines in Congress assembled.

Section 1. Statement of Policy It is the policy of the state

to value the dignity of every human being and guarantee
full respect for human rights.
Section 2. Rights of persons arrested, detained or under
custodial investigation; Duties of public Officers
a.

b.

c.

Any person arrested, detained or under custodial

investigation shall be at all times be assisted by
counsel.
Any public officer or employee, or anyone acting
under his order or his place, who arrests, detains
investigates any person for the commission of an
offense shall inform the latter, in a language known to
and understood by him, of his rights to remain silent
and to have competent and independent counsel,
preferably of his own choice, who shall at all times be
allowed to confer private with the person arrested,
detained or under custodial investigation. If such
person cannot afford the services of his own counsel,
he must be provided with a competent and
independent counsel by the investigating officer.
The custodial investigation report shall be reduced to
writing by the investigating officer, provided that
before such report is signed, or thumbmarked if the
person arrested or detained does not know to read
and write, it shall be read and adequately explained to
him by his counsel or by the assisting counsel
provided by the investigating officer in the language or
dialect know to such arrested or detained person or
otherwise, such investigation report shall be null and
void and of no effect whatsoever.

Human Rights or by any international nongovernmental organization duly accredited by the

Office of the President. The persons immediate
family shall include his or her spouse, parent or child,
brother or sister, grandparent or grandchild, uncle or
aunt, nephew or niece and guardian or ward.
As used in this ACT, custodial investigation
shall include the practice of issuing an invitation to a
person who is investigated in connection with an offense
he is suspected to have committed, without prejudice to
the liability of the inviting officer for any violation of law.
Section 3. Assisting Counsel Assisting counsel is any
lawyer, except those directly affected by the case, those
charged with conducting preliminary investigation or those
charged with the prosecution of crimes.
The assisting counsel other than the government
lawyers shall be entitled to the following fees:
a.

The amount of One Hundred fifty pesos (P150.00) if

the suspected person is chargeable with light felonies;

b.

The amount of Two Hundred fifty pesos (P250.00) if

the suspected person is chargeable with less grave or
grave felonies;

c.

The amount of Three Hundred fifty pesos (P350.00) if

the suspect is chargeable with a capital offense.

The fee for the assisting counsel shall be paid by

the city or municipality where the custodial investigation is
conducted, provided if the municipality or city cannot pay
such fee, the province comprising such municipality or city
shall pay the fee: Provided, that the Municipal or City
Treasure must certify that no funds are available to pay
the fees of assisting counsel before the province pay said
fees.
In the absence of any lawyer, no custodial
investigation shall be conducted and the suspected person
can only be detained by the investigating officer in
accordance with the provision of Article 125 of the Revised
Penal Code.
Section 4. Penalty Clause a) Any arresting public officer
or employee, or any investigating officer, who fails to
inform any person arrested, detained or under custodial
investigation of his right to remain silent and to have
competent and independent counsel preferably of his own
choice, shall suffer a fine of Six Thousand pesos
(P6,000.00) or a penalty or imprisonment of not less than
eight (8) years but not more than ten (10) years, or both.
The penalty of perpetual absolute disqualification shall
also be imposed upon the investigating officer who has
been previously convicted of a similar offense.

d.

Any extra-judicial confession made by a person

arrested, detained or under custodial investigation
shall be in writing and signed by such person in the
presence of his counsel or in the latters absence,
upon a valid waiver, and in the presence of any of the
parents, elder brothers and sisters, his spouse, the
municipal mayor, the municipal judge, district school
supervisor, or priest or minister of the gospel as
chosen by him, otherwise, such extra-judicial
confession shall be inadmissible as evidence in any
proceeding.

e.

Any waiver by a person arrested or detained under

the provisions of Art. 125 of the Revised Penal Code
or under custodial investigation shall be in writing and
signed by such person in the presence of his counsel,
otherwise such waiver shall be null and void and of no
effect.

The same penalties shall be imposed upon a

public officer or employee, or anyone acting upon orders
of such investigating officer or in his place, who fails to
provide a competent and independent counsel to a person
arrested, detained or under custodial investigation for the
commission of an offense if the latter cannot afford the
services of his own counsel.

f.

Any person arrested or detained under custodial

investigation shall be allowed visits by or conferences
with any member of his immediate family, or any
medical doctor or priest or religious minister chosen
by him or by any member of his immediate family or
by his counsel, or by any national non-governmental
organization duly accredited by the Commission on

b) Any person who obstructs, prevents or prohibits any

lawyer, any member of the immediate family of a person
arrested, detained or under custodial investigation, or any
medical doctor or priest or religious minister or by his
counsel, from visiting and conferring privately chosen by
him or by any member of his immediate family with him, or
from examining and treating him, or from ministering to his

Prepared by the POLITICAL LAW SECTION Chief MARILOU LINDA Assistant Chief CATHY AQUINO Members MAY AQUINO, ERRIZA
BUCU, MARICAR DELA CRUZ, KATHREEN GUNAYON, GRACIELA LEYGO, MARY GRACE MANZANO, RUTCHIE MARANON, and
DINAH MARTINEZ. All Rights Reserved by the SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY COLLEGE OF LAW BAR OPERATIONS 2003.

14
spiritual needs, at any hour of the day or, in urgent cases,
of the right shall suffer the penalty of imprisonment of not
less than four (4) years nor more than six (6) years and a
fine of Four Thousand pesos (P4,000.00)
The provisions of the above section
notwithstanding, any security officer with custodial
responsibility over any detainee or prisoner may undertake
such reasonable measures as may be necessary to
secure his safety and prevent his escape.
Section 5. Repealing Clause Republic Act No. 857, as
amended, is hereby repealed. Other laws, presidential
decrees, executive orders or rules and regulations, or
parts thereof inconsistent with the provision of this Act are
repealed or modified accordingly.
Section 6. Effectivity This Act shall take effect (15) fifteen
days following its publication in the Official Gazette or in
any daily newspaper of general circulation in the
Philippines.
Approved. April 27,1992.

ART. III, SEC 13

RIGHT TO BAIL
PEOPLE VS JUDGE DONATO
198 SCRA 130
Facts: Rodolfo Salas (Commander Bilog) and his coaccused were charged for the crime of rebellion. Sales
filed a petition for bail which was opposed by herein
petitioner on the ground that since rebellion became a
capital offense under PD 1996, 943 and 1834 which
amended Article 135 of the RPC, by imposing the penalty
of reclusion perpetua to death on those who promote,
maintain or head a rebellion, the accused is no longer
entitled to bail as evidence of guilt is strong. Subsequently
however, the President issue EO 187 restoring to fulll force
and effect Article 135 RPC. Accordingly Salas was granted
bail.
Petitioner contends that it would be dangerous to
grant bail to Salas considering the nature in the CPP-NPA
hierarchy, whose ultimate overriding goals is to wipe out all
vestiges of democracy and to replace it with their ideology,
and that his release would allow his return to this
organization to direct its armed struggle to topple the
government before whose courts he invokes the
constitutional right to bail. Petitioner argues that while he is
entitled to bail as a matter of right, yet when the interest of
the State conflicts with that of an individual, that of the
former shall prevail for the the right of the State to selfpreservation is paramount to any of the rights of an
individual enshrined in the Bill of Rights.
Issue: Whether or not rebellion is a bailable offense.
Held: YES. Bail is a matter of right when the offense
charged is punishable by any penalty lower than reclusion
perpetua.
Accordingly, the prosecution does have the right to
present evidence for the denial of bail in the instances
where bail is a matter of right. However, in the cases
where the grant of bail is discretionary, due process
requires that the prosecution must be given an opportunity
to present within reasonable time all the evidence that it
may desire to introduce before the court should resolve
the motion for bail.

POLITICAL LAW REVIEWER

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY BAR OPERATIONS

CALLANTA VS VILLANUEVA
77 SCRA 377
Facts: The validity of the issuance of the warrants of
arrest by respondent City Judge Felipe Villanueva based
on the two complaints for grave oral defamation against
petitioner is being contested on the ground that it should
have been the City Fiscal who should have conducted the
preliminary examination. There was then, in the opinion of
petitioners counsel a jurisdictional infirmity. From the very
petition itself, however, it was shown that after such
issuance of the warrants of arrest with the bail fixed in the
amount of P600.00, petitioner posted such required bail
bonds, thus obtaining her provisional liberty.
Issue: Whether or not the petitioner can still
questioned the defect, if any, in the issuance of the
warrants of arrest.
Held: No. With the express admission by petitioner that
she had posted the required bail to obtain her provisional
liberty, it becomes futile to assail the validity of the
issuance of the warrants of arrest. In the case of Zacarias
Vs Cruz, it was held that posting of a bail of a person,
stops him from discussing the validity of his arrest. In the
case of Luna Vs Plaza, it was held that where petitioner
has filed an application for bail and waived the preliminary
investigation proper, he waived his objection to whatever
defect, if any, in the preliminary investigation conducted
prior to thr issuance of the warrant of arrest.
At any rate, it cannot be denied that the City fiscal
of Dagupan City had been quite active in the investigation
and thereafter in the prosecution of petitioner. The matter
was referred to his office. It was he who appeared at the
hearing and manifested his readiness to proceed with the
trial. It would be then to pay an undue premium to
technicalities to assert that under such circumstances the
procedural requisite, assuming that the contention of
petitioner is correct, of such official conducting the
preliminary examination was not in fact complied with.

ART. III, SEC 14

CRIMINAL DUE PROCESS
GALMAN VS SANDIGANBAYAN
144 SCRA 43
Facts: Petitioners filed an action alleging that the
Tanodbayan did not represent the interest of the people
when he failed to exert genuine and earnest efforts to
present vital and important testimonial and documentary
evidence for the prosecution and that the Sandiganbayan
Justices were biased, prejudiced and partial in favor of the
accused. The court resolved to dismiss the petition and lift
the TRO issued earlier enjoining the Sandiganbayan from
rendering its decision. Petitioners filed a motion for
reconsideration. The court required the respondents to
comment on the the MR but issued no restraining order.
On Dec. 2, 1985, Sandiganbayan acquitted all the
accused of the crime charged and absolved them of civil
liability. The petitioners filed their second motion for
reconsideration on the ground that the President ordered
the respondents Sandiganbayan and Tanodbayan and the
prosecution panel to whitewash the criminal cases against
the 26 respondents. The SC thus created a fact finding
commission to determine the allegations of the petitioners.

Prepared by the POLITICAL LAW SECTION Chief MARILOU LINDA Assistant Chief CATHY AQUINO Members MAY AQUINO, ERRIZA
BUCU, MARICAR DELA CRUZ, KATHREEN GUNAYON, GRACIELA LEYGO, MARY GRACE MANZANO, RUTCHIE MARANON, and
DINAH MARTINEZ. All Rights Reserved by the SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY COLLEGE OF LAW BAR OPERATIONS 2003.

15

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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY BAR OPERATIONS

Issue: WON the interference and pressure of the

President violative of due process and prevented a
fair and impartial trial.
Held: The fact of the secrete Malacanang conference of
Jan. 10, 1985 at which the authoritarian President
discussed with the Presiding Justice of the Sandiganbayan
and the entire prosecution panel the matter of the
imminent filing of the criminal charges against all 26
accuses (as admitted by respondent Justice Fernandez to
have been confirmed by him to the then Presidents
Coordinator Manuel Lazaro on the proceeding day) is not
denied. This illegality vitiated from the very beginning all
proceedings in the Sandiganbayan court healed by the
very Presiding Justice who attended. As the commission
noted: The very acts of being summoned to Malacanang
and their ready acquiescence thereto under the
circumstances then obtaining, are in themselves pressure
dramatized and exemplified. Verily, it can be said that any
avowal of independent action or resistance to presidential
pressure became illusory from the very moment they
stepped inside Malacanang Palace on Jan. 10, 1985.
No court whose presiding justice has received
orders or suggestions from the President who by an
amendatory decree made it possible to refer the cases to
the Sandiganbayan can be an impartial court, which is the
very essence of due process of law. Jurisdiction over
cases should be determined by law, and not by
preselection of the executive, which could be much too
easily transformed into a means of predetermining the
outcome of individual cases. This criminal collusion as to
the handling and treatment of the cases by public
respoindents at the secret Malacanang conference (and
revealed only after 15 months by Justice Herrera)
completely disqualified respondent Sandiganbayan and
voided ab initio its verdict.

Prepared by the POLITICAL LAW SECTION Chief MARILOU LINDA Assistant Chief CATHY AQUINO Members MAY AQUINO, ERRIZA
BUCU, MARICAR DELA CRUZ, KATHREEN GUNAYON, GRACIELA LEYGO, MARY GRACE MANZANO, RUTCHIE MARANON, and
DINAH MARTINEZ. All Rights Reserved by the SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY COLLEGE OF LAW BAR OPERATIONS 2003.

16

PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE
PEOPLE VS DRAMAYO
42 SCRA 59
Facts: The accused-appellants, Dramayo and
Carbin were charged and convicted by the crime
of murder. In their appeal, accused appellants
claim that there is an absence of evidence
sufficient to convict and that there is a reasonable
doubt to be implied from the fact that while
conspiracy was alleged, only two of the seven
accused were held culpable.
Issue: WON proof beyond reasonable doubt is
needed to overcome presumption of
innocence.
Held: Accusation is not, according to the
fundamental law, synonymous with guilt. It is
incumbent on the prosecution to demonstrate the
culpability lies. Appellants were not even called
upon then to offer evidence on their behalf. Their
freedom is forfeit only if the requisite quantum of
proof necessary for conviction be in existence.
Their guilt must be shown beyond reasonable
doubt. To such a standard this court has always
been committed. There is need, therefore, for the
most careful scrutiny of the testimony of the state,
both oral and documentary independently of
whatever defense is offered by the accused. Only
if the judge below and the appellate tribunal could
arrive at a conclusion that the crime had been
committed precisely by the person on trial under
such an exacting test should be sentence be one
of conviction. The conscience must be satisfied
that on the defendant could be laid the
responsibility for the offense charged, that not
only did he perpetrate the act but that it mounted
to a crime. What is required then is moral
certainly. In the case at bar, the presumption of
innocence could not come to their rescue as it
was more than sufficiently overcome by the proof
that was by the prosecution.

RIGHT TO BE HEARD BY HIMSELF AND

COUNSEL
PEOPLE VS ELOY MAGSI
124 SCRA 64
Facts: Magsi, del Rosario and other co-accused
were charged with the murder of Jesus Gallardo

POLITICAL LAW REVIEWER

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY BAR OPERATIONS
with several aggravating circumstances attendant
to the crime. They were convicted but Del
Rosario appealed the said decision on the
ground, among others, that the trial court erred in
appointing as attorney de officio, a lawyer who is
the compadre of the person killed by the
accused, and who, because of special
relationship with the deceased, reluctantly
discharged his duties as attorney de officio, after
the court had denied his repeated petition to be
relieved of his appointment as such.
Issue: Whether or not the conviction was
valid.
Held: No. It is established the de officio counsel
Atty. Rivera and del Rosario were hardly afforded
by the trial court any opportunity to discuss the
case together, and the qualified plea of guilty
resulted from the courts prodding rather than
from the accuseds spontaneous violation. Where
defendants are charged with capital offenses,
mere pro forma appointment of de officio counsel,
who fails to genuinely protect the interest of the
accused, resulting of hearing by the court for
alleged reception of evidence when such fact was
not conducted, perfunctory queries to the
accused, whether he understands the charges
and the gravity of the penalty, are not sufficient
with the Supreme Courts injunction.

RIGHT TO BE INFORMED OF THE

NATURE AND CAUSE OF ACCUSATION
SORIANO VS SANDIGANBAYAN
131 SCRA 187
Facts: In the course of an investigation for
qualified theft alleged to have been committed by
Thomas Tan, herein petitioner demanded from
the latter an amount of P4,000.00 as
consideration for dismissing the case. The same
was reported to the NBI thus an entrapment was
made. A complaint for violation of the Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act was filed against
petitioner with the public respondent. Petitioner
contends that an investigation cannot be
regarded as a contract of transaction within the
purview of the said Act hence cannot be
convicted of violation thereof. Public respondent
then convicted him for Direct Bribery. Petitioner
now raises the defense of violation of his right to
be informed of the nature and cause of
accusation against him considering that he was
charged of violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act.

Prepared by the POLITICAL LAW SECTION Chief MARILOU LINDA Assistant Chief CATHY AQUINO Members MAY
AQUINO, ERRIZA BUCU, MARICAR DELA CRUZ, KATHREEN GUNAYON, GRACIELA LEYGO, MARY GRACE
MANZANO, RUTCHIE MARANON, and DINAH MARTINEZ. All Rights Reserved by the SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY
COLLEGE OF LAW BAR OPERATIONS 2003.

17

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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY BAR OPERATIONS

Issue: Was there a violation of petitioners

above mentioned right?

Held: Petition is granted. The restraining order

issued is made permanent.

Held: It is obvious that the investigation

conducted by the petitioner was not a contract.
Neither was if a transaction because this term is
analogous to the former term. A transaction, like a
contract, is one which involves some
consideration, like a credit transaction, and this
element is absent in the investigation conducted
by the petitioner, thus he cannot be liable for
violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act. He however could be liable for Direct Bribery.
A reading of the information filed against him
clearly shows that the same is a case of Direct
Bribery, thus he cannot claim that he was
deprived of his right to be informed. It is not the
title of the information that counts but the
contents thereof.

It is beyond that due process cannot be

satisfied in the absence of that degree of
objectivity on the part of a judge sufficient to
reassure litigants of his being fair and being just.
Thereby there is the legitimate expectation that
the decision arrived at would be the application of
the law to the facts as found by a hearing before
an impartial and disinterested tribunal, and that
every litigant is entitled to nothing less than the
cold neutrality of an impartial judge. Petitioners
can assert then that this court has the power to
set aside the order denying the motion for
disqualification. While the discretion in the first
instance belongs to the respondent Judge, its
exercise is subject to this courts corrective
authority. There can be no question as to its
being considered abused if it can be shown that
to refuse disqualification is to cast valid doubts as
to courts impartiality. In this case, the respondent
Judge could not be totally immune to what
apparently was asserted before him in such
extra-judicial statement. It is unlikely that he was
not in the slightest bit offended by the affiants
turn about which his later declaration that there
was intimidation by considering that the
respondent Judge would have to pass judgement
on a question that by implication had already
been answered by him (having already given his
opinion on the matter).

RIGHT TO SPEEDY, IMPARTIAL

AND PUBLIC TRIAL
MANUEL MATEO JR. VS HON. VILLALUZ
50 SCRA 18
Facts: Petitioners were charged with robbery in
band with homicide. They filed motions to dismiss
the criminal cases which were not immediately
resolved by the respondent Judge. In the
meantime, another suspect, one Rolando Reyes
was arrested. He executed an extra-judicial
statement and signed and swore to its truth
before the respondent Judge wherein he
implicated the petitioners. On this basis, the
respondent Judge deferred action on the
petitioners motion to dismiss until after the
prosecution had presented and rested its case
against Reyes. Reyes was tried separately and in
the absence of petitioners. During the petitioners
trial, Reyes was called as an additional witness
where he repudiated his extra-judicial statement
contending that the same was procured through
threats by a government agent. As a
consequence, he petitioners filed a motion to
disqualify the respondent Judge on the ground
that Reyes had repudiated the extra-judicial
statement which the latter sworn to before the
former and that the latter would have to pass
upon the repudiation. The motion to disqualify
was denied by the respondent Judge.
Issue: Whether the respondent Judge should
disqualify was denied by the respondent
Judge.

TRIAL IN ABSENTIA
PEOPLE VS SALAS
143 SCRA 163
Facts: Marie Abong was originally charged with
homicide in the Court of First Instance of Cebu
but before he could be arraigned the case was
reinvestigated on motion of the prosecution. As a
result of the reinvestigation, an amended
information was filed, with no bail recommended,
to which he pleaded not guilty. Trial commenced
but while it was in progress, the prisoner, taking
advantage of the first information for homicide,
succeeded in deceiving the city court of Cebu
into granting him bail and ordering his release
and so he escaped. The respondent Judge,
learning later of the trickery, cancelled the illegal
bail bond and ordered Abongs re-arrest. But he
was gone, nonetheless, the prosecution moved
that the hearing continue in accordance with the
constitutional provision authorizing trial in
absentia under certain circumstances. The
respondent Judge denied the motion, however,

Prepared by the POLITICAL LAW SECTION Chief MARILOU LINDA Assistant Chief CATHY AQUINO Members MAY
AQUINO, ERRIZA BUCU, MARICAR DELA CRUZ, KATHREEN GUNAYON, GRACIELA LEYGO, MARY GRACE
MANZANO, RUTCHIE MARANON, and DINAH MARTINEZ. All Rights Reserved by the SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY
COLLEGE OF LAW BAR OPERATIONS 2003.

18

POLITICAL LAW REVIEWER

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY BAR OPERATIONS

and suspended all proceedings until the return of

the accused.
Issue: Was the order of the Judge proper?
Held: No. The old case of People V Avancena
has been modified by Sec. 19 of Art. IV of the
1973 Constitution which now allows trial in
absentia. Now, the prisoner cannot by simply
escaping thwart his continued prosecution and
possibly eventual provided only that: a) he has
been arraigned b) he has been duly modified of
the trial, and c) his failure to appear is unjustified.
The purpose of this rule is to speed up the
disposition of criminal cases, trial of which in the
past be indefinitely deferred, and many times
completely abandoned, because of defendants
escape. The old case of People V Avancena has
been modified. The right to present at ones trial
may now be waived except only at that stage
where the prosecution intends to present
witnesses who will identify the accused. The
defendants escape will be considered as a
waiver of his right about the inability of the court
to notify him of the subsequent hearings will not
prevent it from continuing with his trial he will be
deemed to have received due notice. The same
fact of his escape will make his failure to appear
unjustified.

Prepared by the POLITICAL LAW SECTION Chief MARILOU LINDA Assistant Chief CATHY AQUINO Members MAY
AQUINO, ERRIZA BUCU, MARICAR DELA CRUZ, KATHREEN GUNAYON, GRACIELA LEYGO, MARY GRACE
MANZANO, RUTCHIE MARANON, and DINAH MARTINEZ. All Rights Reserved by the SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY
COLLEGE OF LAW BAR OPERATIONS 2003.