Pension Fund

This study examines the indirect effect of pension fund on economic growth in Nigeria through the financial system. Using Autoregressive Distributive Lag (ARDL) model, the study found out that pension fund contribution is effective in stimulating growth through investment in portfolios that yield short term returns; this implies that pension fund contribution cannot on its own without a credible financial system impact on economic growth. The policy implication of this study is for Pension Fund Administrators (PFAs) to invest in portfolios with short term returns; thus, a large chunk of funds invested in federal government securities should be unbundled to other portfolios that yield short term returns.

Manuscript Type: EmpiricalResearch Question/Issue: We examine how various types of shareholder activists (such as pension funds and large blockholders) impact the relative use of equity incentives at the middle management level of the firm and compare this with the impact on CEO incentive alignment.Research Findings/Insights: Using a sample of 124 US technology firms over the period 1997–2001, we find evidence indicating voice activist shareholders, using communication pressure, are associated with the greater use of equity incentives, and higher total compensation at middle managerial levels, relative to exit activists, who exert economic pressure. The results for CEO equity incentives are similar. We also find that as the presence of institutional ownership siding with management (banks and insurance companies) increases relative to voice activists, the use of equity incentives at middle managerial levels declines. Results for CEO equity incentives are not the same.Theoretical/Academic Implications: In agreement with contingent agency theory, we predict and find evidence of differing governance mechanisms used by voice activists (e.g., public pension funds) and exit activists (e.g., large shareholders). Voice activists face a higher cost of monitoring managers as compared to exit activists, and thus they will advocate for the heavier use of equity incentive compensation at the middle managerial level. In agreement with a managerial power perspective, however, we also find the use of equity incentives for middle managers decreases as the proportion of institutional ownership siding with the CEO increases.Practitioner/Policy Implications: Shareholder activism plays a key role in aligning managerial interests below the CEO level; however, different types of shareholders have different economic and political interests in how equity compensation is shaped to achieve this. Exit activists use monitoring and voice activists substitute equity compensation for monitoring. Shareholders siding with management may also reduce the use of equity incentives for middle managers. These differing interests should be considered in crafting policy responses.

... Public-Private Partnership - A Study of Nigeria's Pension Administration Sanjo O. Faniran and Kayode M. Olaniyan National Planning Commission, Abuja {depofaniran,ekaynomics}@yahoo. com ... 7. REFERENCES [1] Ahmad, MK The Contributory Pension Scheme. ...

This article examines the impact of stock market performance on the investment policy of pension funds. We find that stock market performance affect the asset allocation of Dutch pension funds in two ways. In the short term, outperformance of equities over bonds and other investment categories automatically results in a higher actual equity allocation (and vice versa), as pension funds do not continuously rebalance their investment portfolios. Each quarter, pension funds rebalance, on average, around 39 percent of excess equity returns, leaving 61 percent for free floating. In the medium term, outperformance of equities induces pension funds to increase their strategic equity allocation (and vice versa). These findings suggest that the investment policies of pension funds are partially driven by the cyclical performance of the stock market.We also find that rebalancing is much stronger after negative equity returns, indicating that pension funds respond asymmetrically to stock marke...

This paper is the first to analyze market impact and execution costs of equity trading by a pension fund. We find that, on average, these costs are nonnegligible. Average market impact costs equal 20 basis points for buys and 30 basis points for sells; average execution costs equal 27 basis points and 38 basis points, respectively. Furthermore, we show that

Resumen: El mercado español de planes de pensiones se caracteriza por establecer límites legales máximos en las comisiones de gestión y depósito, y por estar la comercialización y gestión (en su mayoría) en manos de entidades financieras, lo que a su vez puede generar un ...

About 15% of the fortune of the Swiss pension funds has been invested in real estate from 1994 to 2002. Pension trusts have two possibilities in their investment policy, either owning and being responsible for the buildings directly or buying shares in investment vehicules whose localization is mainly in Zurich. In the first case, pension trusts behave as contractors and

A new economic geography of finance is emerging, and the current "financialization" of contemporary economies has contributed greatly to the reshaping of the economic landscape. How can these changes be understood and interpreted, especially from a territorial point of view? There are two contradictory economic theories regarding the tangible effects of the rise of the finance industry. According to neoclassical