Barrington Moore

Fransız İnkilabı tarihin belirli bir safhasında gelişmiş bir kavga değil, belirli süreçler içinde ilerleyen paradigmadır. Belki de Jakoben kanadın sert muhalefeti, hedefine dolayımlı olarak XIV.Louis devlet izleğini koymuştur. Bu sebeple XIV.Louis devrini açımlamak, İnkilabının mimarisini anlamayı sağlar.

Leninism and the central role that violence played in it is most commonly presented as
a hindrance to democratic development in post-communist Eastern Europe. This paper
reconsiders this proposition in light of the classics of comparative historical analysis.
These classic works maintain that the long-term consequences of revolutionary violence
sometimes counteract its short-term anti-democratic impact. Social change
unleashed by revolution can contribute to the emergence of democracy in subsequent
periods by removing pre-modern barriers to democracy. Two aspects of Leninist violence
are highlighted as having such effects: forced modernization and the civilizing
process. Communist modernization altered pre-modern social structures which had
served as impediments to democracy prior to the Leninist seizure of power. The resulting
social structures and the values reinforced by the communist version of the “civilizing
process,” patterned on those of bourgeois conventions of the early twentieth
century, helped some post-communist countries overcome obstacles to the introduction
of liberal democracy encountered in earlier attempts in the region after World War I.

Nationalism is back with a renewed force. Hungary is a virulent example of the new nationalist ascendancy. As the country was a former liberal star pupil, Hungary's neo-nationalist turn has been puzzling researchers for years. This study goes beyond the entrenched polarisations in the literature by highlighting the dynamic interplay between culture, structure and identity. It proposes to conceptualise Hungary's neo-nationalist turn as a Polanyian countermovement against commodification, globalisation and deindustrialisation. The article presents the results of a thematic analysis of 82 interviews with workers in four towns in Hungary's rustbelt and highlights how the multiscalar lived experience of commodifying reforms violated an implicit social contract and changed workers' narrative identities. In the absence of a class-based shared narrative and lacking a viable political tool to control their fate, working-class neo-nationalism emerged as a new narrative identity to express workers' anger and outrage.

Moore studied how weakening social interests and political structures played a major role in making the new political order. Capitalist transformation in England caused change in class relations and finally led to democratization in the country.

Celem artykułu jest rekonstrukcja kryjącego się za wybranymi koncepcjami i teoriami rewolucji ideału społeczeństwa, wizji polityki i sposobów jej uprawiania. Punktem wyjścia przeprowadzonej analizy będzie Marksowska koncepcja rewolucji. W dalszej części artykułu przedstawię główne linie ideowej recepcji teorii Marksa: konserwatywną, anarchistyczną (Bakunin), socjaldemokratyczną (Kautsky), bolszewicką (Lenin) oraz wizję polityki milcząco zakładaną przez teorie rewolucji budowane w ramach socjologii historyczno-porównawczej (Moore, Skocpol, Goldstone).

On the morning of 30 June, BBC reporter Aleem Maqbool reports from Cairo, “what is today going to be remembered for? What is the 30th June going to be remembered for? Is it going to be the turning point in Egyptian politics or is it going to be remembered for violence?” But what if violence constitutes an integral, even inevitable, component of a democratic struggle? Considering the radical political transformations of the Arab world in the past two years, we cannot help but notice that, from the outset, they were attended by varying degrees of violence. In the case of Egypt, for instance, where non-violence was figuratively symbolic of the 2011 revolution, such a varnished perspective does not go without challenge. Philip Rizk pointed out that “despite the glorification of an eighteen-day revolution as non-violent, violence has been a part of this revolution since the first stone was thrown on 25 January 2011–followed three days later by the torching of police stations on the Friday of Rage–and until today.”

El contexto histórico al que nos hemos referido pone de manifiesto una enorme proximidad –para no decir promiscuidad– entre el campo científico y el campo político, militar y económico. Las principales universidades norteamericanas de la Ivy League, con las universidades de Yale, Harvard y Stanford a la cabeza, participaron desde un comienzo en el esfuerzo de la Guerra de 1939 a 1945.12 Y, en un segundo momento, es decir, durante la Guerra Fría, se transformaron en un poderoso instrumento de la consolidación geopolítica de los Estados Unidos de América. En este sentido, las ciencias sociales sacaron provecho de las circunstancias históricas y políticas, determinadas sobre todo por las guerras y las cuestiones de seguridad, para justificar su expansión dentro de las universidades, la mayor influencia de las propuestas cuantitativas –alimentando la presunción homotética de los diversos paradigmas de raíz positivista– y la creciente valoración pública del conocimiento y de su respectiva utilidad social. Como contrapartida de las críticas al pensamiento radical, marxista y nacionalista, proveniente de los países descolonizados, Moore Jr. también denunció toda una serie de posturas liberales. En primer lugar, había que cuestionar el desarrollo de “una política externa contrarrevolucionaria basada en una enorme máquina militar de aterrorizar, que era vista como algo esencial para mantener el llamado ‘liberalismo corporativo’, según la expresión radical peyorativa”. Después, era necesario dejar de considerar que para mantener los privilegios de una clase de liberales bien educados, era forzoso que otros se ocupasen de los trabajos sucios, entre los cuales estaban los bombardeos con napalm lanzados sobre los niños vietnamitas. Y, por último, ¿era la “explotación colonial y neocolonial la base real de riqueza capaz de proporcionar a los críticos liberales la seguridad económica y la educación que les permitía aprehender el ‘problema’ de forma distanciada, pero solo como ‘problema’, y no como una enfermedad mortal del liberalismo democrático?”.

Siyasal yapıların ortaya çıkışını uzun dönemli çözümleme biçi-mi ile ele alan yaklaşımlar arasında Moore'un katkısı oldukça önemli gözükmektedir. Çözümlemesini karşılaştırmalı tarihsel sosyoloji bağ-lamında gerçekleştiren Moore, farklı siyasal yapılar olan demokrasi, faşizm ve komünizmin modern dünyaya geçilirken ortaya çıkışını ör-nek ülke toplumlarının sınıf yapılarını derinliğine irdeleyerek sınıflar arasındaki belirli ittifaklar ve çatışmalar açısından yapmaya çalışmış-tır. Bu yönüyle karşılaştırmalı tarihsel sosyolojinin önemli isimleri arasına giren Moore, kendisinden sonra gelen pek çok sosyal bilimciyi de etkilemiş gözükmektedir. Moore'un pek çok çalışması arasında öne çıkan ve söz konusu yöntemi kullandığı ana çalışması "Demokrasinin ve Diktatörlüğün Toplumsal Kökenleri" adını taşıyan yapıttır. Bu ça-lışmasında Moore; toprak ağaları gibi bu süreçte rol oynayan pek çok faktörün önemine vurgu yapmış, ticari mantaliteye doğru bir dönüş yaşamış olan toprak ağalarının ve köylülerin devrimlerde oynadığı ro-lü vurgulamıştır. Bu çalışmada Moore'un yöntemi çerçevesinde de-mokrasinin İngiltere, Fransa ve ABD'de, faşizmin Japonya ve Alman-ya'da ve komünizmin ise Rusya ve Çin'de ortaya çıkışına dair çözüm-lemesi irdelenmektedir. Moore'un bu bağlamda yaptığı en önemli kat-kılarından birisinin, siyasal modernleşmenin tarih dışı bir görüşünü savunan modernleşme teorisyenlerine karşı güçlü bir meydan okuma olarak görülmelidir.

This article investigates the governing ideologies of the third and second plan of Development, by using Barrington Moore Jr. (Development program) Theory and also Robert Merton (means and goals) Theory, in order to show the rate of inconsistency between goals and means and ideological conflict in these two plans.
To gain this objectives, first, we explained social, cultural, economic and political principles of socialism and liberalism and then, used the method of content analysis for final goals, policies (middle goals), and provision (means) in these two plans. The results show that in both two plan, mostly the goals were socialistic and the means were often liberalistic. Also the rate of inconsistency between goals and means in the second plan was less than the first plan.


این مقاله با استفاده از نظریه توسعه «برینگتون مور» و نظریه اهداف و وسایل «رابرت مرتون»، به بررسی ایدئولوژی‌های حاکم بر برنامه اول و دوم توسعه، برای نشان دادن میزان ناهمخوانی میان اهداف و وسایل و تناقض ایدئولوژیک در این دو برنامه می‌پردازد. برای این منظور ابتدا اصول سیاسی، اقتصادی، فرهنگی و اجتماعی ایدئولوژی‌های لیبرالیسم و سوسیالیسم بیان شده و پس از آن، تحلیل محتوای هدفهای کلی (اهداف غایی)‌، خط مشی‌ها (اهداف واسط) و تبصره‌ها (وسایل) در دو برنامه، با روش تمام شماری، انجام شده است. نتایچ نشان می‌دهند که در دو برنامه، اهداف بیشتر سوسیالیستی و وسایل بیشتر لیبرالیستی بوده‌اند. همچنین میزان ناهمخوانی بین اهداف و وسایل در برنامه دوم کمتر از برنامه اول بوده است.

جوادي يگانه، محمدرضا (1382) «تناقض‌ ايدئولوژيك‌ در دو برنامه‌ اول‌ و دوم‌ توسعه‌»، رفاه‌ اجتماعي‌ (8)، تابستان‌ 1382: 120-89.