Electronic copy available at:
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=4055411
Decline of Public Sector Vaccine Manufacturing in India
Sudip ChaudhuriΩ
March, 2022
Abstract:
For Covid 19 vaccination, India has primarily relied on two private firms. During the second
wave of the pandemic, when shortages were reported in some parts of the country, when
desperate attempts were made to scale up production, when exports were suspended, the
absence of the public sector was strongly felt. An obvious question that came up was why
India with a long traditional of public sector vaccine manufacturing had to rely on only two
private firms. While private vaccine manufacturers in India have made commendable progress
in the last few decades, the public sector has lost its dominance and has now become a marginal
player. This is not because of any inherent deficiencies of the public sector vaccine sector or
lack of capabilities to deliver. The basic problem has been underinvestment and neglect by
government. Particularly in situations where mass vaccination is required, it is critically
important to ensure uninterrupted supplies of vaccines at affordable prices. To minimize the
uncertainty associated with private sector investments, production and pricing, presence of a
strong public sector is crucial. The government has aided the growth of the private sector in
India. Similarly with proper investments and support and a re-orientation of official policies
and attitudes, it is possible to revive and make the public sector a significant player.
Key words: Vaccines, Covid-19, public sector, private sector, India, GMP, universal
immunization, R&D, technology.
Ω
Professor (Retd), Indian Institute of Management Calcutta. Email: sudip1953@gmail.com.
Page 1 of 16
Introduction
For Covid 19 vaccination, India has primarily relied on two vaccines - Covishield and Covaxin
manufactured by two private firms, Serum Institute of India and Bharat Biotech respectively.
During the second wave of the pandemic, when shortages were reported in some parts of the
country, when desperate attempts were made to scale up production, when exports were
suspended, the absence of the public sector was strongly felt. An obvious question that came
up was why India with a long traditional of public sector vaccine manufacturing had to rely on
only two private firms.
The situation has improved since then. Production capacities of Covishield and Covaxin have
expanded, production has increased, exports have resumed and permission has been granted
for manufacturing and importing of other Covid-19 vaccines.
But it is not yet clear how long the Covid-19 pandemic will continue and this may not be the
last pandemic. In situations where mass vaccination is required, it is critically important to
ensure uninterrupted supplies of vaccines at affordable prices. The private sector has
contributed significantly to Covid-19 vaccination. And it should be encouraged and supported
to do so. But ultimately what the private firms do is influenced by profit considerations. To
minimize the uncertainty associated with private sector investments, production and pricing,
presence of a strong public sector is crucial.
While private vaccine manufacturers in India have made commendable progress in the last few
decades, the public sector has lost its dominance and has now become a marginal player. The
focus of the paper is not as such on COVID-19 vaccines. The basic objective of this paper is to
understand the reasons for the rise of the private sector and the decline of the public sector in
vaccine manufacturing in general. We will see that the decline is not because of any inherent
deficiencies of the public sector vaccine sector or lack of capabilities to deliver. The basic
problem has been underinvestment and neglect by government. The latter has aided the growth
of the private sector. Similarly with proper investments and support and a re-orientation of
official policies and attitudes, it is possible to revive and make the public sector a significant
player.
Structure of vaccine industry in India
In India, 21 firms – 14 in the private sector and 7 in the public sector have got licences from
the drug regulatory authority to manufacture human vaccines.1 Out of the 7 units in the public
sector, 4 were set up as departmental government units and the remaining 3 as corporate entities
owned by the government. The former includes the Central Research Institute, Kasauli
1
“List of Licensed Human Vaccine Manufacturing Facilities in India,” Central Drugs Standard Control
Organisation
(https://cdsco.gov.in/opencms/export/sites/CDSCO_WEB/Pdfdocuments/biologicals/facilitiesLIST.pdf).
Page 2 of 16
(established in 1905), Pasteur Institute of Southern India, Coonoor (1907) (later renamed as
Pasteur Institute of India), BCG Vaccine Laboratory, Guindy, (1948), and the Haffkine
Institute set up by the provincial government in Bombay in 1899. Haffkine Institute was
originally known as the Plague Institute where Dr Haffkine developed the plague vaccine
(Lahariya 2014).
The three public sector undertakings were set up much later. Bharat Immunologicals and
Biologicals Corporation Limited (BIBCOL) was established in 1989, Human Biological
Institute, as a division of Indian Immunologicals Ltd in 1998 and HLL Biotech Limited as a
wholly owned subsidiary company of HLL Lifecare Ltd in 2012.
The private sector comprises mainly of Indian firms and a few MNCs - GSK Asia, Sanofi
Pasteur and Shantha Biotechnics (set up in 1993 as an Indian company but acquired by Sanofi
in 2009). The MNCs - GSK and Sanofi primarily import vaccines and repackage these for sales
in India (Ghosh 2019, pp 7-8). The major private firms are Biological E, Serum Institute of
India (SSI), Bharat Biotech and Panacea Biotec. Biological E was the first private firm to start
vaccine manufacturing in India. It was established in 1953 and started vaccine manufacturing
in 1962. SSI was set up in 1966, Panacea Biotec in 1984 and Bharat Biotech in 1996.
Universal immunization market
The domestic market is classified between the vaccines procured for the Universal
Immunization Programme (80% of the market) and the retail market (20%) (Confederation of
Indian Industry n.d., p. 14). India launched the Expanded Programme of Immunization in 1978
with four vaccines – BCG (tuberculosis), Oral polio vaccine (OPV), Diphtheria, Pertussis and
Tetanus (DPT) and Typhoid-paratyphoid vaccines. Tetanus toxoid replaced Typhoidparatyphoid vaccine in the early 1980s. Measles vaccine was added and the programme was
expanded and renamed as the Universal Immunization Programme (UIP) in 1985 (Lahariya
2014). Currently UIP provides free vaccination for twelve vaccine preventable diseases Diphtheria, Pertussis, Tetanus, Polio, Measles, Rubella, childhood Tuberculosis, Rotavirus
diarrhoea, Hepatitis-B and Meningitis & Pneumonia caused by H. Influenza Type-B,
Pneumococcal Pneumonia and Japanese Encephalitis (the last two only in endemic districts).
These vaccines were added to the UIP in stages. Among the new vaccines added in the recent
past are: Rotavirus vaccine (2016), Measles Rubella vaccine (2017) and Pneumococcal
Conjugate Vaccine (PCV) (2017) (Ministry of Health and Family Welfare 2021, pp. 60-61).
Unlike the retail market where several products are patent protected, the UIP market is
essentially a generic market with hardly any patent barrier to entry.
When UIP was introduced in the mid-1980s, India was self- sufficient in the basic vaccines of
BCG, DPT and Tetanus toxoid and depended on the public sector for supplies (Madhavi 2005;
Lahariya 2014). But there has been a progressive decline in the role played by the public sector
and today it is a marginal player. The public sector did not manufacture in 2018-19, 13 out of
the 17 vaccines listed in Table 1. Out of the remaining 4 vaccines, its share is negligible in two
Page 3 of 16
vaccines. It is dominant in only anti-rabies vaccine (78.3% market share) and has some
presence in DPT (29.2%).
Retail market
The structure of the retail market is radically different. It is a smaller but higher priced segment
dominated by the MNCs (Ghosh 2019, p. 16). According to the AIOCD-AWACS data base
(based on sales to stockists), MNCs accounted for 64% of total vaccine sales of Rs 21880
million in 2019. GSK is the largest (33.2% market share) followed by Sanofi India (18.5%),
Pfizer (7.1%), MSD (3.9%) and Abbott India (1.5%). Vaccine products with single doses
costing more than Rs 2000 (in March, 2019) accounted for 37% of the sales and those costing
between Rs 1000 and Rs 2000, 38% of the sales in 2018-19. The share of products costing less
than Rs 500 was only 20%. Among the high-priced products sold widely are Meningococcal
vaccine sold by Sanofi India (Rs 4950 per single dose), Pneumonia vaccine sold by Pfizer (Rs
3801) and Human Papillomavirus Bivalent vaccine sold by MSD (Rs 3250).
As mentioned above, the high priced MNC products are primarily imported. While India is a
major exporter of vaccines, India has also emerged as a big market for imported vaccines. In
the late 1990s and early 2000s, annual average imports of human vaccines in India were about
USD 25 million. Since then, imports have increased to USD 110 million in 2010, USD 304
million in 2015 and USD 340 million in 2020 (UNCOMTRADE database). Where domestic
supply is inadequate, India imports UIP vaccines from developing countries, for example polio
vaccines and Japanese encephalitis. Indonesia is a major source of Polio vaccines imports and
China that of Japanese encephalitis. In 2020, Indonesia accounted for 15% of India’s total
imports and China (including Hong Kong) about 7%. But almost 80% of imports in 2020 were
from developed countries such as Belgium, France, the Netherlands. These are mainly for
newer vaccines the production and sales of which are dominated by few MNCs world-wide.
They use patent and other barriers to prevent entry of generic firms and inhibit competition to
charge high prices. India re-introduced product patent protection in medical products in 2005
and hence patented vaccines cannot be manufactured by local firms unless specifically
permitted to do so. Not surprisingly, there has been a sharp rise in imports since then.
Market for private sector
The government procurement of vaccines under UIP provided the main market initially for the
private sector. Subsequently the international market became much more significant. The
efforts of international organizations such as UNICEF and GAVI to immunize children around
the world led to a huge increase in demand for vaccines. These vaccines are procured through
a competitive bidding process restricted to manufacturers with vaccines pre-qualified by the
World Health Organization. To be prequalified by WHO, manufacturers need to set up plants
and follow manufacturing processes to satisfy the standards of safety and efficacy prescribed
by WHO. The Indian firms realized the demand and profit prospects and undertook the
necessary investments to satisfy the prequalification process. Till 2021, 111 products - different
Page 4 of 16
doses of 28 types of vaccines manufactured in India - have been prequalified. The WHO Prequalification (WHOPQ) vaccines manufactured in India cover both older types such as DPT,
Measles, Rabies, Tetanus Toxoid and newer ones such as Hepatitis B, Haemophilus influenzae
type b, Influenza, Pandemic (H1N1) and Meningococcal A Conjugate. SSI was the first Indian
company to get WHOPQ for Measles vaccine in 1993. By 2006, when other companies started
getting WHOPQ, SII already had WHOPQ for 9 more vaccines including for Diphtheria
Tetanus (DT), Tetanus Toxoid (TT), Measles, Mumps and Rubella, Hepatitis B. By 2021 SSI
had the largest number of WHOPQ vaccines (22) followed by other Indian private firms Biological E (8), Bharat Biotech (4), Panacea Biotec (2) and Cadila Health Care (1). Haffkine
Bio Pharmaceutical Corporation is the only public sector firm with WHOPQ for 3 types of
polio vaccines. The MNC, Sanofi Healthcare has WHOPQ for 4 vaccines.2
As the largest supplier to international procurement agencies, India has emerged as a leading
manufacturer of vaccines in the world. It exports vaccines to about 170 countries and exports
account for more than two thirds of the total volume of vaccines manufactured in the country.
India’s share in global vaccine market is currently about one-third.3
So far as the domestic market is concerned, the private sector started with the basic vaccines
where the public sector dominated. The suspension of manufacturing licences of the three
government vaccine units in 2008 provided a huge opportunity and market for the private
sector. But even prior to that the private sector has been investing in creating capacities not
only in the older vaccines but also in the newer ones where the public sector did not enter.
Currently even in the older vaccines – BCG, DPT and TT - where the public sector once
dominated, the installed capacities in the private sector are much more than that in the public
sector. For example, BCG vaccine used to be solely supplied by the public sector till the mid2000s. But by 2019, more than two-thirds of the installed capacity is in the private sector (Table
1).
Sourcing of technology by private sector
The government in India and the international agencies provided the market. But from where
did they get the technology? Here too, through formal and informal channels, the government
helped the growth of the private sector. Consider SSI, which is the largest vaccine manufacturer
in the world alone accounting for 28% of the global volume (the next largest being GSK with
2
Computed
from
“Prequalified
(https://extranet.who.int/pqweb/vaccines/prequalified-vaccines).
Vaccines”,
WHO
3
“Indian Vaccine Industry: A Brief Overview”, November, 11, 2020 (http://ivma.in/the-indian-vaccineindustry-a-brief-overview/).
Page 5 of 16
11% share). Even in value terms SSI is the fourth largest manufacturer with 4% share.4 The
Poonawalla family, the founder of SSI used to be in the business of horse breeding and racing
and owned the largest stud farm in the country. They had no background in vaccine
manufacturing and naturally lacked technological knowledge to set up and run a vaccine plant.
But they used to donate retired horses to Haffkine Institute which required blood of horses to
manufacture serum and vaccines. And that provided the link. As narrated by the Executive
Director of SSI, it was the delay in getting anti-venom serum from the Haffkine Institute to
save the life of a horse bitten by a snake that gave Poonawallas the idea why not start serum
manufacturing themselves. They also realized the business opportunity. With the help of
technical staff recruited from Haffkine Institute, they started manufacturing of serums against
tetanus and snake bites and then diversified to vaccines.5 Three of the people recruited from
Haffkine Institute are currently board members of the company.6 It is to the credit of SSI that
it has been able to develop in house capability over the years to emerge as such a major player
in this technology intensive sector.
Not only at SSI. The government contributed to the development of the other private firms as
well. An important technical functionary of Bharat Biotech, for example was an employee of
Pasteur Institute of India with years of experience there in development and production of
vaccines.7 In fact, as the Javid Chowdhury Committee (2010) observed: “The private sector
manufacturers of vaccines/sera in the country are relatively recent entrants and the experience
they draw upon is largely through the technical staff of public sector units who are either
retirees, or have been poached from public sector units” (p. 23).
The private sector also benefitted from the government through more formal channels.
Technologies for manufacturing a number of vaccines marketed by private firms were provided
by or jointly developed by government laboratories. Notable examples include the country’s
first r-DNA Hepatitis B vaccine and the Covid-19 vaccine, Covaxin. To develop the former,
Shantha Biotechnics worked closely with the government laboratory, the Centre for Cellular
and Molecular Biology (CCMB) and other Indian research institutes. Covaxin has been
4
Global
Vaccine
Market
Report,
2020
source/immunization/mi4a/2020_global-vaccine-marketreport.pdf?sfvrsn=48a58ada_1&download=true).
(https://cdn.who.int/media/docs/default-
5
Lauren Frayer, “The World's Largest Vaccine Maker Took a Multimillion Dollar Pandemic Gamble”,
March 18, 2021 (https://www.npr.org/sections/goatsandsoda/2021/03/18/978065736/indias-role-incovid-19-vaccine-production-is-getting-even-bigger).
6
Yash Bharati, “How Adar Poonawalla's Family Started Serum Institute of India & Turned it Into a
$12.8 Billion Business: The secret lies in the horses”, 18 January, 2021 (https://www.gqindia.com/getsmart/content/how-adar-poonawallas-family-started-serum-institute-of-india-and-turned-it-into-adollar128-billion-business).
7
“Managing Committee”, Indian Vaccine Manufacturers Association (http://ivma.in/managingcommittee/).
Page 6 of 16
developed by Bharat Biotech in collaboration with the Indian Council of Medical Research
(ICMR) and the National Institute of Virology, Pune (NIV).
Among the other vaccine technologies developed at government laboratories and transferred
to private firms are: Leprosy vaccine (National Institute of Immunology, New Delhi and Cadila
Pharmaceuticals); Hepatitis A candidates (NIV and Bharat Biotech); Rotavirus (ICMR and
Bharat Biotech); Cholera vaccine (Institute of Microbial Technology, Chandigarh/
National Institute of Cholera and Enteric Diseases, Kolkata/ Indian Institute of chemical
Biology, Kolkata and Shantha Biotech (Madhavi 2008a, Table 2).
Underutilization of potential of public sector
Two of the government vaccines units - Central Research Institute, Kasauli (CRI) and Pasteur
Institute of India, Coonoor (PII) are more than a century old and the third one, BCG Vaccine
Laboratory, Guindy (BCGVL) about 70 years old. The technical knowledge built up over the
years in these units is quite unique among developing countries. These units not only laid the
foundations of the industry and met the vaccine needs of the country over the years. They have
also demonstrated their ability to innovate new processes and products despite the constraints
under which they worked (Madhavi 2008b). CRI established in 1905 started with snake bite
and Typhoid vaccines. But over the years it developed and produced different types of antirabies vaccines, Japanese encephalitis and yellow fever vaccines apart from DPT group of
vaccines.8 BCGVL has continued to focus on BCG vaccines since its inception in 1948 but has
introduced several innovations including switchover of production from liquid to freeze dried
form and commencement of BCG vaccine for cancer therapy.9 Similarly, PII has maintained
its emphasis on Anti-rabies vaccine but has developed several improved products to make
treatment more affordable and convenient in addition to diversifying to DPT group of vaccines.
It was also the first one to develop and produce Trivalent (Sabin) Oral Polio Vaccine (Pasteur
Institute of India 2020, p. 17).
It is not only that the government vaccine units had in house manufacturing and innovation
capabilities. India also has huge expertise in government R&D laboratories and academic
institutes. There are 25 research-based Institutes and laboratories involved in vaccine
development in the country10 and the private sector has used the services of some of these
institutions as we have mentioned above.
8
“Milestones of CRI, Kasauli,” website of CRI Kasauli (https://crikasauli.nic.in/Milestones).
9
“Achievements,” website of BCG Vaccine Laboratory (https://dirbcglab.gov.in/achievements.html).
10
“Institutes/Labs involved in Vaccine Development”, website of India Science, Technology &
Innovation (https://www.indiascienceandtechnology.gov.in/covid-19-vaccine/institutes-labs-involvedvaccine-development).
Page 7 of 16
The tremendous technological resources of the public sector could have been used for
expanding capacities and upgrading technology not only in the existing lines of manufacturing.
but also, for diversifying to newer vaccines. The public sector could have continued to be
dominant in vaccine manufacturing. But this did not happen. While the government started
some projects, it was the private sector which took the main initiative to grow not only in the
older vaccines but also in the new vaccines often taking help from government laboratories.
While the private sector upgraded technology not only to satisfy local regulatory requirements
but also WHOPQ requirements, the public sector units failed to do so.
Suspension of manufacturing licences
Manufacturing licences of the three government units - CRI, PII and BCGVL were suspended
in January, 2008 on the ground that these units are not GMP compliant. Good Manufacturing
Practice (GMP) comprises of a set of safeguards and procedures at each stage of the production
process to ensure that the product manufactured is effective and safe. Based on the GMP
prescribed by WHO, different countries have formulated their own GMP standards. India
revised Schedule M of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940 to implement GMP on 11
December, 2001. Existing units were given time till 1 July, 2005 to implement these GMP
standards. GMP covers all aspects of the production process including starting materials,
premises, equipment and training of workers.
Even in the mid-2000s, these units were the predominant sources of vaccine supplies for the
UIP. For the 4 vaccines produced by these units for UIP, the share these government units were
100% in BCG, 78% in DT, 64.3% in TT and 59.1% in DPT during 2004-05 to 2007-08 (Javid
Chowdhury Committee 2010, Annexure G). But with the suspension of the licences, as these
units stopped production, the entire market for the public sector was eliminated. The immediate
effect was that shortages were faced in some states (Javid Chowdhury Committee 2010, para
5.3). While the shortages were taken care of by relying on the private sector, the cost went up
significantly. The prices were stable during 2004-05 to 2007-08 when the government units
were major suppliers. But the prices more than doubled in 2008-09 and 2009-10 when the
private sector were the sole suppliers (Parliamentary Standing Committee 2009b, pp. 9-10).
At the time of ordering the closure of the government units in 2008, the government announced
that a new integrated vaccine complex will be set up at Chengalpattu, Tamil Nadu. Under
public pressure, the government also revoked in 2010 the suspension of the licences and
decided to revive the units. But as we will discuss below, the Chengalpattu complex is not yet
operational with an uncertain future and the process of making the government units GMP
complaint has taken a long time.
If we go into the reasons why technology was not upgraded and the government units were
forced to stop production in the first place and why it has taken a long time to revive these
units, we will find that the basic problem has been underinvestment and neglect of the units by
the government.
Page 8 of 16
Ultimately the growth of an enterprise depends on the objectives of the people who own and
control it. CRI and BCGVL function as “subordinate offices” under the Directorate General
of Health Services of the Ministry of Health and Family Welfare. They are required to seek
approval of DGHS even for minor matters. PII was also set up as a departmental unit but its
status was changed to a registered society in 1977 and since then is managed by a governing
body under the Ministry of Health and Family Welfare. But PII too does not enjoy financial
autonomy.
The scientists and technical persons in these units did not have the necessary freedom to take
major decisions and did not have access to funds. The growth of the units depended on what
those in the Ministry did or did not do. It is here that the main difference between the private
and public sectors lies. The promoters of the private firms wanted the firms to grow and
implemented projects and programmes with necessary funding. The strategic intent to expand
and diversify which is so evident in the private sector has been absent in the public sector. The
government units were left to themselves to survive without support, funding and decision
autonomy.
Underinvestment and neglect of public sector
CRI and BCGVL and the Central Drugs Standard Control Organization (CDSCO) which is the
National Regulatory Authority in India, function under DGHS. It is obvious that century old
buildings and traditional ways of manufacturing would not conform to GMP. GMP was not
suddenly implemented. It was known to DGHS even before 2001 when GMP was being
deliberated upon and after 2001 when it was implemented, that these units do not conform to
GMP. Compliance with Schedule M/GMP involves additional costs including fixed costs for
constructing and re-designing factory building and premises. In view of the lack of financial
and decision-making autonomy in the government units, it was the responsibility of DGHS to
initiate the process.
But as the two Parliamentary Standing Committees (2009a and 2009b) pointed out, hardly any
funds were allocated to these two government units for the purpose and practically no
initiatives were taken to change the century old building structures and introduce other changes
to make these units conform to GMP. And even at CRI where an attempt was made, the
commitment was missing. A private firm was appointed by the Ministry to implement a plan
to upgrade the facilities. The project was dropped after spending Rs 118.60 million after nine
years in December 2006 after the private firm informed the Ministry that it lacks the technical
competence to complete it. Awarding the contract to a technically incompetent firm and then
realizing it after nine years reveals the cavalier attitude of the Ministry (Parliamentary Standing
Committee 2009a, pp. 3, 9).
When the manufacturing licences were suspended in 2008, it appears that the initial plan was
not to revive manufacturing but to convert these units to testing laboratories or training units
Page 9 of 16
(Parliamentary Standing Committee 2009a, p. 11). However, in the light of a public interest
litigation filed in the Supreme Court and critical observations by the two Parliamentary
Standing Committees and a committed appointed by the Ministry of Health chaired by the
former Health Secretary (Javid Chowdhury Committee 2010), the suspension was revoked in
February, 2010 and a decision was taken to revive these units and make these GMP compliant.
But the progress has been extremely slow. The construction of the new GMP facilities at
BCGVL was approved in November 2011. But it was in 2020-21 that supplies of vaccines
manufactured in the new plant started.11 Immediately after the revocation of suspension of
manufacturing, renovation of GMP compliant facilities was approved in 2010 at CRI. The
construction was completed in 2012-13 but it was only in 2019-20 that commercial
manufacturing and supply of DPT vaccines for UIP began.12 Similarly, even trial runs at the
new DPT facility at PII began as late as in in 2020-21 (Ministry of Health and Family Welfare
2020, p. 287).
The decision makers in the Ministry of Health were more concerned about the perceived impact
on the private sector than on vaccine security in the country. The Secretary of the Ministry of
Health informed the Parliamentary Standing Committee 2009b: “If the National Regulatory
Authority, who is Drug Controller General of India, adopts dual standard of imposing certain
GMP norms on private sector but having completely non-compliant public sector, he would
stand being derecognized by the World Health Organisation (WHO) which is the main agency
for getting the country’s exports to the other countries” (p. 11). While interacting with
Parliamentary Standing Committees 2009a and 2009b and the Javid Chowdhury Committee
2010, ministry officials repeatedly emphasized this aspect that if the NRA is derecognized, the
private manufacturers will not be eligible for WHO pre-qualification. But as the Javid
Chowdhury Committee pointed out, there were no basis for such apprehensions. WHO can of
course determine the criteria for WHOPQ. So far as national regulatory authorities are
concerned, WHO can and does provide guidelines for GMP. But de-recognizing NRAs is
beyond the jurisdiction of WHO.
In any case, the team including WHO nominated experts which inspected the government units
for GMP compliance in 2007-08 did not recommend suspension of production. It only pointed
out some deficiencies for corrective action (Javid Chowdhury Committee 2010). The
promptness with which the government suspended the manufacturing licences, the initial
reluctance to revive the units and the lack of urgency to make these GMP compliant suggest
that the government did not consider public sector to be of critical importance. It is a shortsighted policy to solely rely on the private sector. To reduce the uncertainty of supplies and to
11
“From
Director’s
Desk”,
website
(https://dirbcglab.gov.in/director_disk.html).
12
of
BCG
vaccine
Laboratory
“Milestones of CRI, Kasauli,” website of CRI Kasauli (https://crikasauli.nic.in/Milestones).
Page 10 of 16
control the prices of vaccines, a strong public sector is crucial. The government needs to be
actively involved in running public sector units and facilitating their growth.
Chengalpattu vaccine complex
The work for the integrated vaccine complex at Chengalpattu was supposed to start in January,
2010 and to be completed by December, 2012 (Parliamentary Standing Committee 2009b, p.
3). It was meant to compensate for the loss of production in the government units. But it was
not before April 2012 that the government actually approved the project at a cost of Rs 5940
million to produce 585 million doses of pentavalent combination (DPT plus Hep B plus Hib),
BCG, Measles, Hep. B, Human Rabies, Hib. and Japanese Encephalitis vaccine.13 The
construction of the plant was completed in 2016 and marginal investments need to be made to
make the plant operational. But the government has not spent the additional amount. The
government has decided in 2017 to hive off the project as a separate SPV and sell the 100%
government equity through the auction process (Ministry of Health and Family Welfare 2020,
p. 313). Tenders have been floated seeking expression of interest from vaccine manufacturers
to use the plant. No bids have been received despite extension of the due date. The government
has also not yet responded to the proposal of the chief minister of Tamil Nādu to hand over the
complex on lease to manufacture vaccines.14
The government has provided financial aid to private firms - SII and Bharat Biotech – in
different ways (Mani 2021, Annexure 3). But the government is not willing to incur some
additional amount and make the huge complex operational. This reflects the attitude of the
current government towards its own public sector. This must change. It is important for the
government to take the responsibility to ensure that the project is completed and is run properly.
With this the government will have a sizable presence in the vaccine sector and can directly
influence supplies to satisfy public health needs.
Other public sector vaccine units
The focus of our discussion in this paper has been on the three government units under the
Ministry of Health. There are four other public sector vaccine units in the country. Haffkine
Institute has a long history but currently the only vaccine manufactured by Haffkine
13
Answer to Unstarred Question No 3104, Lok Sabha, 15 March,
(http://164.100.47.194/Loksabha/Questions/QResult15.aspx?qref=138002&lsno=15).
2013
14
Akshaya Nath, “DMK Mounts Pressure on Centre to Make Chengalpet Integrated Vaccine Complex Operational,” July
21, 2021 (https://www.indiatoday.in/india/story/dmk-mounts-pressure-on-centre-to-make-chengalpetintegrated-vaccine-complex-operational-1830906-2021-07-21).
Page 11 of 16
Biopharmaceutical Corporation, a government of Maharashtra undertaking is Oral polio
vaccine (OPV).15 This is the only public sector unit with WHOPQ for the product.
Similarly, Bharat Immunologicals and Biologicals Corporation Limited (BIBCOL), set up by
the Department of Biotechnology of the government of India in 1989 is involved in
manufacturing OPV. It was set up to manufacture OPV on the basis of technology imported
from erstwhile USSR. Commercial production was started in 1996 and the company has been
supplying OPV for the UIP. But it has not been able to make a major impact. Unlike as planned,
OPV could not be manufactured from basic stages and manufacturing is based on bulk imports.
It has been under financial stress for a long time (Madhavi 2005; Ghosh 2019). Perpetual
dependence on imports and on a single product have been major concerns (BIBCOL, Thirty
Second Annual Report, 2020-21). While some recent attempts have been made to diversify
production to Cholera vaccine and the Covid-19 vaccine, Covaxin,16 any major plan of action
to initiate production from basic stages and make the unit viable in OPV is conspicuous by its
absence.
Another unit set up by DBT was Indian Vaccine Corporation Ltd. (IVCOL). It was set in 1989
at Gurgaon for the production of Measles vaccine with technology transferred from a French
public sector company. But with a private firm taking over the former, the technical
collaboration never materialised and the project did not take off (Madhavi 2005). Serum
Institute of India was able to manufacture and supply Measles vaccine. But the government
closed down IVCOL. No effective steps were taken to develop the technology through
collaboration with government laboratories or other means.
Thus, the record of the Department of Biotechnology in managing the vaccine units under its
administrative control has been no better than that of the Ministry of Health. These units were
also victims of under-investments and neglect by the government.
HLL Biotech was set up to implement the Chengalpattu project. With the project not yet in
operation, it markets some vaccines manufactured by the private company, Biological E on the
basis of a (loan) licence received by it from drug control administration.17
Currently the only public sector unit with some presence in the vaccine sector is Human
Biological Institute (HBI). It is part of Indian Immunologicals which was set up by the National
Dairy Development Board (NDDB) in 1982 to manufacture veterinary vaccines. It is a very
15
Haffkine Institute was bifurcated in 1975 into Haffkine Institute for Training, Research and Testing
and the manufacturing unit, Haffkine Bio-Pharmaceutical Corporation Ltd.
16
“Upcoming Products”, website of BIBCOL (https://www.bibcol.com/upcooming_products.php).
17
“Products”, website of HLL Biotech Ltd (http://www.hllbiotech.com/business/products).
Page 12 of 16
successful veterinary vaccine manufacturer having one of the largest plants in the world for vet
vaccines.18 HBI started manufacturing human vaccines in 1998 and currently it manufactures
DPT, TT and Hep B vaccines for UIP apart from anti-rabies vaccine. It is the largest
manufacturer of anti-rabies vaccine and also has a substantial market share in DPT (Table 1).
Being a part of a successful public enterprise has contributed to the superior performance of
HBI. Similarly with proper strategic intervention, support and funding there is no reason why
the units under the Departments of Health and Biotechnology cannot be viable and why these
cannot be major players in the vaccine sector.
Lately, in the light of the criticism as to why technology for manufacturing Covaxin was
transferred to only one private firm, viz, Bharat Biotech, the government has decided to include
Haffkine Biopharmaceutical, BIBCOL and HBI in the plan to expand manufacturing of
Covaxin.
Concluding remarks
Two disquieting aspects of the vaccine sector in India which the discussion above reveals are
the crowding out of the public sector by the private sector in generic manufacturing and the
dependence on high priced patent protected imported vaccines in the retail market.
The indifference displayed by the government towards the public sector units leading to its
decline coincided with the rise of the private sector. The commendable progress of the private
sector may have prompted the government not to take an active interest in the growth of the
public sector. This needs to change. For public health considerations, particularly in pandemic
situations a strong public sector is crucial. The growth of the private sector need not be and
should not be at the cost of the public sector.
The government also needs to intervene to reduce the dependence on high priced imported
vaccines. In line with the TRIPS agreement of WTO, India has re-introduced product patent
protection in 2005. But the TRIPS agreement also provides some flexibilities for the countries
to take appropriate action to make products more affordable. Through creative use of these
flexibilities together with necessary innovation and industrial policies, both the local private
and public sectors need to be supported to enable them to play a more significant role in the
patent protected markets.
18
“Overview, website of Indian Immunologicals Ltd (https://www.indimmune.com/aboutus/overview).
Page 13 of 16
Table 1: Share of Public Sector in Installed Capacity and Production of Vaccines in India, 2019
Total installed
capacity,
as on 31
March, 2019
(Million
doses)
Total
Production,
2018-19
(Million
doses)
Share of public
sector in total
installed
capacity (%)
Share of
public sector
in total
Production
(%)
Vaccine
Tissue culture based anti-rabies
vaccine (TCARV)
49.40
15.94
36.4
Diphtheria, Tetanus, Pertussis
(DTP)
555.80
63.45
33.2
Tetanus Toxoid (TT)
1329.70
395.39
33.9
Hepatitis-B
531.00
86.09
11.3
BCG
280.00
183.62
28.6
Measles
430.00
155.00
7.0
Tetanus and Diphtheria (Td)
200.00
120.00
0.0
Japanese Encephalitis vaccine
(JEV)
17.40
0.50
0.0
Typhoid (Vi-Poly)
43.30
2.30
0.0
Typhoid (AKD)
94.00
1.90
0.0
Quadrivalent Meningococcal
Meningitis Vaccine (QMMV)
4.00
1.80
0.0
Haemophilis (Hib) Influenzae
Vaccine
128.75
5.28
0.0
Quadruple Vaccine
200.00
4.26
0.0
Tetravalent Vaccine
201.50
0.44
0.0
Pentavalent Vaccine
687.57
253.35
0.0
Measles, Mumps and Rubella
(MMR)
500.00
51.35
0.0
Measles and Rubella (MR)
65.00
40.00
0.0
Source: Computed from Central Bureau of Health Intelligence 2020, Table 6.2.12 (pp. 44145).
Page 14 of 16
78.3
29.2
1.4
0.2
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
References
Central Bureau of Health Intelligence. 2020. National Health Profile 2020, New Delhi:
Directorate General of Health Services. (https://www.cbhidghs.nic.in/showfile.php?lid=1155).
Confederation of Indian Industry. n.d. The Make in India Imperative –Position Paper on
Regulatory and Policy Changes required for Sustained Competitiveness of the Indian Vaccine
Industry
(https://www.sathguru.com/Publication/download/Version-VaccinesWhitepaper.pdf).
Ghosh, P. K. 2019. ‘Indian Vaccines Industry Addressing Human Health Challenges’,
Science Diplomacy Case Studies No 4, Forum for Indian Science Diplomacy, New Delhi:
Research
and
Information
System
for
Developing
Countries
(http://fisd.in/sites/default/files/FISD%20Case%20Study_P%20K%20Ghosh.pdf).
Javid Chowdhury Committee. 2010. ‘Final Report of the Committee Set up to determine the
reasons for the suspension of the manufacturing licenses of CRI, Kasauli, PII, Conoor and
BCGVL, Guindy and to draw the road-map for the revival of the three Units’
(http://www.mfcindia.org/main/bgpapers/bgpapers2011/am/bgpap2011s.pdf).
Lahariya, C, 2014, ‘A Brief History of Vaccines & Vaccination in India’, Indian J Med Res
139, April, pp 491-511 (https://vaccine.icmr.org.in/images/pdf/ijmr_reference.pdf).
Madhavi, Y. 2005. ‘Vaccine Policy in India’, PLoS Medicine, Vol 2, Issue 5
(https://journals.plos.org/plosmedicine/article?id=10.1371/journal.pmed.0020127).
Madhavi, Y. 2008a. ‘Human Vaccine Science and Technology Status in India’, in India Science
and Technology 2008 (http://www.indiaenvironmentportal.org.in/files/India-S&T-2008Full.pdf).
Madhavi, Y. 2008b. ‘Vaccine PSUs: Chronicle of an Attenuation Willfully Caused’, in Medico
Friend
Circle
Bulletin,
June-July
(https://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.467.532&rep=rep1&type=pdf).
Mani, S. 2021. ‘The Role of Industrial Policy in Market-Friendly Economies: Case of COVID19 Vaccine R&D and its Manufacturing in India And The USA’, Commentary on India’s
Economy and Society Series - 21, Centre for Development Studies, Trivandrum
(https://cds.edu/wp-content/uploads/21CommentarySeriesProfMani.pdf).
Ministry of Health and Family Welfare. 2021. Annual Report 2020-21, Government of India
(https://main.mohfw.gov.in/sites/default/files/Annual%20Report%20202021%20English.pdf).
Parliamentary Standing Committee. 2009a. Thirty-Fourth Report on the Functioning of the
three Vaccine Producing PSUs, Namely, the Central Research Institute (CRI) Kasauli, the
Pasteur Institute of India (PII), Coonoor, and the BCG Vaccine Laboratory (BCGVL),
Chennai., Department-Related Parliamentary Standing Committee on Health and Family
Welfare
Page 15 of 16
(https://rajyasabha.nic.in/rsnew/Committee_site/Committee_File/ReportFile/14/14/34_2016_
6_14.pdf).
Parliamentary Standing Committee. 2009b. Thirty-Eighth Report on Major Issues Concerning
the three Vaccine Producing PSUs, Namely, the Central Research Institute (CRI) Kasauli, The
Pasteur Institute Of India (PII), Coonoor, and the BCG Vaccine Laboratory (BCGVL),
Chennai, Department-Related Parliamentary Standing Committee on Health and Family
Welfare
(https://rajyasabha.nic.in/rsnew/Committee_site/Committee_File/ReportFile/14/14/38_2016_
6_14.pdf).
Pasteur
Institute
of
India.
2020.
Annual
(https://pasteurinstituteindia.com/pdf/Annual%20Report%2020192020%20Final%20Proof.pdf).
Report
2019-20
Page 16 of 16