06
The Atlantic as a new security area? Current
engagements
and
prospects
for
security
cooperation between Africa and its Atlantic
counterparts
John Kotsopoulos
University of Pretoria
ABSTRACT
Despite significant socio-economic strides, the question of security – human,
state and regional -- remains a persistent challenge in much of Africa.
Foreign actors from all corners of the globe have had varying degrees of
security presence on the continent, ranging from military interventions to
capacity building, and from project funding to trade in arms and equipment.
Much of this foreign presence, however, has come either from individual
countries or else from already established regional organisations, like the
European Union. Far less has involved cooperation between more disparate
actors, such as those representing either side of the North and South
economic divide.
This paper thus seeks to explore nascent trends in North–South security
cooperation in Africa’s Atlantic region, with a particular focus on the regions
represented by the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and
the Economic Community of West Africa States (ECOWAS). Is an Atlantic
area for cooperation forming? Some progress in domains such as maritime
security is already discernible. This paper also identifies further areas for
cooperation. Atlantic cooperation in Africa is an idea with rich possibilities.
The first draft of this Scientific Paper was presented
at the ATLANTIC FUTURE Workshop, University of Pretoria, June 2014.
.
ATLANTIC FUTURE SCIENTIFIC PAPER
06
Table of contents
1.
Introduction ....................................................................................................... 3
1.1.
Security redefined ......................................................................................... 3
1.2.
Many voices across the Atlantic .................................................................... 4
1.3.
Methodology: case selection and key variables ............................................. 5
2.
African regions: the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and the
Economic Community of West Africa States (ECOWAS) .............................................. 7
2.1.
SADC ............................................................................................................ 7
2.2.
ECOWAS ...................................................................................................... 8
3.
Atlantic Actors’ involvement in Africa: mapping out existing relations ................ 9
3.1.
Brazil ............................................................................................................. 9
3.2.
United States ............................................................................................... 12
3.3.
European Union .......................................................................................... 15
3.4.
EU Member States ...................................................................................... 19
4.
Conclusion: creating an Atlantic community? .................................................. 23
5.
References ...................................................................................................... 27
2
1.
Introduction
There has been a steady rise in Sub-Saharan Africa’s economic and political
prominence in the 21st century. A period of unprecedented growth1 has coincided with
important achievements in many regions of the continent in democracy and
governance. This period has also corresponded with a marked appetite for pan-African
and regional integration as shown by the establishment of the African Union (AU), the
New Economic Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) and the enhancement
of regional groupings such as the Southern African Development Community (SADC),
the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the East African
Community (EAC) to name a few. And while Africa has always been a pole of attraction
-- for better or for worse -- for international actors, this period has witnessed not only
individual countries such as India, Brazil and China making new trade inroads in Africa,
but a burgeoning multilateralisation of engagement. This is exemplified in the regular
summits between, for instance, China and Africa (Forum on China–Africa Cooperation
- FOCAC), Japan-Africa (TICAD), Africa-South America (ASA) and Africa and the
European Union (EU), as well as an unprecedented placement of African issues on the
international multilateral agenda, via structures such as the Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development (OECD), the G8 and of course the United Nations
(UN).2
Yet despite these important and largely welcome changes, Africa still remains a
laggard in a host of crucial areas. From human development, to internally displaced
peoples, to the number of persistent conflicts, to rising terrorism, and only the partial
fulfilment of the Millennium Development Goals, continent-wide indicators suggest
insecurity in the broadest sense persists. Insecurity affects not only states but also the
individuals residing within those states. Understanding the problem in this way has
crucial policy implications, both in terms of the expansion of security cooperation within
Africa and between Africa and its international partners, including many Atlantic
countries.
This paper will adopt a broadened security definition to assess the multifaceted ways in
which Atlantic countries from Europe and North and South America impact regional
African security agendas and initiatives. The purpose is two pronged: a) to ascertain
whether there is a discernible Afro-Atlantic security area and b) to identify target areas
for Atlantic cooperation going forward. Furthermore, the idea of an Atlantic Future
poses important questions about transcending the persistent North-South cooperation
divide and exploring how and where a united approach on ostensibly equal footing is
realistic. In this regard, maritime and food security will be identified as two areas of
particular importance for facilitating North-South Atlantic cooperation.
1.1.
Security redefined
The gradual expansion of the meaning of security, away from the exclusive domain of
states and broadened to address threats to the individual (Krause and Williams 1996),
1
According to the Economist, between 2001 and 2010 half of the world’s ten fastest growing economies
came from Sub-Saharan Africa.
2
For instance, 2005 was declared “The Year of Africa”, that same year the OECD Paris Declaration
strengthened international consensus on aid effectiveness towards Africa, the G8’s Commission for
Africa was introduced at Gleneagles and the UN General Assembly endorsed the decision of the
Secretary-General to establish the Office of the Special Advisor on Africa (OSAA).
3
has created fertile ground for change in the way in which security issues are framed.
By encompassing both the state and the individual, threats to security multiply and
include previously disconnected areas such as economic, environmental, food and
health security (Hough 2008). The immediate physical implication of this redefinition is
that security transcends frontiers and becomes a transnational issue, rather than the
exclusive domain (and responsibility) of the sovereign state. This creates compelling
scenarios which contrast with the long held assumptions of the post-colonial as well as
Cold War periods. Indeed, while the Cold War globalised security in a dichotomous
manner it also provided predictable Soviet and American norms which circumscribed
possible security action. This stands in contrast to the post-Cold War era, which is
actually encumbered with many of the same persistent threats (such as terrorism, arms
proliferation, internal and external population displacement, and drug trafficking) no
longer has as predictable a set of responses
Thus, as the meaning of security has widened and deepened, so too have initiatives to
address it. Of course traditional “hard” security threats still exist and have elicited more
typical military responses, yet new focus is now given to understanding the sources of
insecurity, like conflict and poverty, and long term solutions and prevention are sought.
This invariably necessitates complex, coordinated and costly approaches –
approaches that often cannot be afforded by African countries or regional entities by
themselves.3 Transnational approaches are a compelling way forward, with the timing
increasingly “ripe” as the inviolability of the post-independence sovereign African
nation-state gradually softens.
Moreover, development, which for decades was considered an entity separate from
political considerations, has become increasingly linked with the sustainment of good
governance and security. As former UN Secretary General Kofi Annan said: “we will
not enjoy development without security, or security without development” (Annan
2005). This phrase is often linked to what is labelled the “security-development nexus”,
signifying a belief that the two variables are mutually constitutive/dependent (Hettne
2010). The implications of this assumption have been profound since questions of
development posed as potential security threats – “securitisation” -- often garner
increased interest and consequently funding from the west (Buzan, Wæver and de
Wilde 1998). Controversially however, the nexus has also permitted donor countries to
place traditional security funding under the umbrella of development assistance– often
appropriating development funding originally earmarked for more traditional
development purposes.4
1.2.
Many voices across the Atlantic
To establish the status of, and prospects for, an Afro-Atlantic security area a
breakdown of the Atlantic presence on the continent must first take place. There are a
considerable number of Atlantic actors – North and South America and Europe -- with
bilateral, multilateral, regional and trans-continental levels of cooperation at play.
These connections often stretch back to colonial times but have become more layered
in the post-independence period. Yet, as in the case of development funding which
often is plagued by donor overlap and repetition, most Atlantic countries with security
3
The bulk of the African Union’s budget comes, for example, from non-Africa donors.
4
An example has been the EU’s African Peace Facility. While lauded as a large fund targeted at
supporting the AU’s peace and security operations, it has also been criticised since it uses money taken
directly from the European Development Fund – a fund originally earmarked for aid and trade assistance
within the rubric of the Cotonou Agreement.
4
interests in Africa tend to pursue them alone or through predictable channels (e.g. EU),
not only with respect to hard security matters such as the trade in arms, but even with
soft security initiatives such as police training.5 There are of course some notable
exceptions such as maritime security which will be examined below.
In terms of Europe, the EU is a security actor in Africa with a strong Atlantic heritage. It
is also the most integrated regional organisation in the world, with cooperation taking
place at a multitude of levels and sectors. With respect to security initiatives in Africa
and beyond, a balancing act takes place between member state and EU interests. This
is particularly evident in hard security matters where the modest range of Common
Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) missions so far deployed owe less to systematic
EU-wide evaluations and more to the particular interests of a handful of former colonial
member states (Styan 2012). The EU does promote cooperation between its member
states in other security sectors, such as conflict prevention, but the organisation still
remains hobbled by the challenge of coordination on matters often still considered
within the domain of the sovereign state. An emphatic example is the EU Battlegroups,
operational since 2007 but not once deployed.
It is difficult to identify another regional Atlantic organisation with as comprehensive a
presence in Africa as the EU.6 Attention thus focuses to the numerous key Atlantic
countries with a significant presence at all levels of security (hard and soft) in Africa. In
Europe, these broadly defined “Atlantic” actors are a mix of former colonial powers and
countries with a long-standing presence in the region, including France, the United
Kingdom, Portugal, Belgium, Germany, Denmark, Sweden, Ireland and Spain. Across
the North Atlantic there are of course the USA and Canada. In South America, Brazil
stands out as a major and growing presence on the continent accounting for 70% of
the USD39 billion in trade between South America and Africa in 2011(Glickhouse
2013). Argentina also has a more limited presence.
Given this disparate patchwork of Atlantic interests and voices in Africa, as well as the
still prominent North-South cleavages impeding cooperation, what can be surmised in
terms of an Afro-Atlantic security area? What contribution do the aforementioned actors
make in areas such as capacity building, security operations and funding? Do Atlantic
actors play complementary roles in the region, or is there competition? And what about
the inherent contradictions, given that Atlantic countries are also direct and indirect
contributors to many of Africa’s security challenges, such as the often contested
provision of arms or the demand for drugs? What follows is a breakdown of how this
working paper will “take stock” of the situation.
1.3.
Methodology: case selection and key variables
Clearly the range of actors, security threats, and initiatives to combat them is too broad
for one working paper. However, a targeted and comparative look at cooperation
between a limited number of African inter-regional organisations and their most
prominent member states with their Atlantic partners is a useful exercise in identifying
trends, converging and diverging objectives, and security instruments. Thus for the
5
Cooperation between Atlantic partners has, however, been evident in security finance at African Union
level. The EU and US have provided significant funding for most of the AU’s peace and security missions
(AMIS, AMISOM, AMIB). See (de Coning 2014).
6
The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) for example, does not have a presence in Sub-Saharan
Africa. The relatively recent Africa-South America (ASA) summit process does not function under the
umbrella of a South American regional organisation.
5
sake of analytical management and parsimony, regional organisations in Africa will be
used both as instruments in their own right, but also as agglomerations of countries
with an Atlantic orientation.
The first organisation to be analysed will be ECOWAS. Aside from its geographic
Atlantic orientation, ECOWAS has been chosen because of the breadth and
comprehensiveness of its security-sector initiatives. The second organisation of focus
will be SADC, which is an organisation with an ever-expanding remit in the field of
security. It is also a player in a region with its own share of security concerns,
particularly in with respect to the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) but also
encompassing post conflict states such as Mozambique and Angola. ECOWAS and
SADC also claim membership of sub-Saharan Africa’s two largest and most influential
economics, Nigeria and South Africa respectively.
Of course inter-regional relations tell only part of the story of Atlantic cooperation in
Africa, particularly since only the EU has a significant presence in the region. Therefore
to bring individual countries into the analysis, an “a la carte” approach is proposed.
This means that aside from the EU and its inter-regional security initiatives with
ECOWAS and SADC, separate initiatives of some the key EU member states – namely
France and the UK, and where applicable others – will also be accounted for. On the
Americas side, focus will be placed on the USA and Brazil and their relations with the
aforementioned organisations. Finally, the same logic will also apply on the African
side. Therefore the key units of analysis will be SADC and ECOWAS, but mindful of the
sometimes limited range of security cooperation at the regional level, focus will also be
placed on some of the more prominent members of each organization, with Nigeria and
South Africa being most prominent.
The goal of this paper is to ascertain whether an Atlantic area is indeed discernible.
What is the impact of European, North American and South American actors on the
transformation of security threats in West and Southern Africa? What contributions
have Atlantic actors made in these regions, mindful both of positive and negative
impacts?
The ambition of this paper is to explore Atlantic participation in security initiatives that
span the gamut, from military to human security operations. Yet, In order to keep the
potentially unlimited size of such a research endeavour reasonable, the number of
security related variables examined will be limited to four: : operations, capacity
building, funding and trade. The first, operations, is intended to account for areas in
which Atlantic actors directly participate in security initiatives. This can include
European Security and Defence Policy missions, anti-piracy initiatives in the Gulf of
Guinea, and other direct interventions such as the 2013 French mission in Mali.
Questions to be mindful of include if the missions are unilateral or indicate signs of
Atlantic cooperation. Of course operations can also take on other dimensions, such as
a training capacity, hence the introduction of a second variable, capacity building,
which allows focusing on one of the more popular ways in which non-African actors
contribute to security sector initiatives on the continent. This can take many forms such
as training, planning and management, workshops, funding/budgetary support, and
also industrial cooperation. Topics addressed can include conflict prevention,
management and resolution, Security Sector Reform (SSR) and Disarmament,
Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR). Another form of contribution to security
initiatives is of course helping to fund them – the third variable in the analysis. Funding
accounts well for areas of multilateral cooperation, since it is estimated that 77% of the
UN peacekeeping budget in 2011 was directed towards Africa (de Coning 2014).
Finally, there is security-related trade. This includes arms sales, which is often a
6
murkier area of interaction between North and South than the other variables cited.
The South African arms deal scandal in the late 1990s is a case in point.7 The darker
side of trade also serves as an important counterpoint when assessing the impact of
Atlantic actors in Africa.
Finally, care will be taken to establish where any cooperative ventures between Atlantic
actors in Africa is taking place. Do, for example, Brazilian and American diplomats
coordinate any of their projects on the ground? Do they at least discuss them as would
be expected of donors in the development, agriculture or governance domains?8
Furthermore, are cooperative ventures more evident between Atlantic and non-Atlantic
partners? Does reaction to actors from further afield such as China reinforce SouthSouth axes within and between Atlantic actors? Ultimately then, is cooperation at a
comprehensive or consequential enough level to justify the idea of an Atlantic area?
2.
African regions: the Southern African Development
Community (SADC) and the Economic Community of West
Africa States (ECOWAS)
2.1.
SADC
To understand the presence of an Atlantic community in the Southern African region,
we must first understand the opportunities for cooperation that SADC offers its
partners. SADC took its present form in 1992, succeeding the Southern African
Development Cooperation Conference (which was established in 1980). SADC is
organised around a series of legally-binding protocols -- 26 in total -- touching on a
wide variety of policy areas, including economic development, infrastructure,
agriculture and politics, defence and security.
The latter protocol has benefitted from an institutional framework called the Strategic
Indicative Plan for the Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Co-Operation (SIPO).
Subsequently SIPO helped to establish several security tools such as the SADC
Standby Force (SSD), the Inter-State Defence and Security Committee (ISDSC), the
Early Warning Centre, the Electoral Advisory Council, and the Southern African
Regional Police Chiefs Cooperation Organisation (SARPCCO). This array of tools
belies, however, a lack of implementation. “The production of a business plan for
addressing [SIPO’s] 130-plus objectives never materialised, and no serious effort was
made to develop strategies for operationalising the Organ (sic)” (Nieuwkerk 2012).
There was (and is) also the unresolved question of coordinating these tools with the
African Union’s own security mechanisms. This has been further compounded by the
failure of SADC members to implement the 2012 iteration of SIPO (“SIPO II”).
There has, however, been more tangible progress with respect to the creation of a
Regional Peacekeeping Training Centre, a Standby Force and a SADC Brigade. The
latter, which mixes military, police and civilian components is already operating in one
7
The 1999 arms deal scandal in South Africa involved almost US$5b in contracts, many of which it is
alleged were tainted by enormous bribes paid by a range of European contractors.
8
Many recipient countries now undertake “System Wide Approaches” or SWAPs in order to better
coordinate donor funding.
7
theatre, the DRC, under Tanzanian leadership. Work is also being done in cooperation
with the AU on a Regional Early Warning Centre for Southern Africa.
What then does this mean for security in SADC and what space does it give partners to
cooperate? First, the inconsistent performance of SADC’s security tools does not mean
that they are without purpose, since their overall purpose remains to serve as guides to
collective behaviour by setting out common objectives and agendas. Second, many of
the aforementioned bodies are in the nascent stage of their development, offering
important opportunities for potential international support and the facilitation of
innovative ideas.
2.2.
ECOWAS
Established in 1975, ECOWAS is arguably the best established regional organisations
in Africa. Its fifteen members represent a diverse range of countries, with significant
cleavages in terms of economic development. While the vast majority of members are
considered Least Developed Countries (LDC), Nigeria’s recent GDP recalculation has
made it Sub-Saharan Africa’s largest economy, while Cote d'Ivoire, Ghana and Cape
Verde enjoy middle income status. Originally envisioned as a vehicle for economic
integration (which it remains), the remit of ECOWAS responsibilities expanded with
protocols on non-aggression and mutual assistance in defence by the late 1970s and
most emphatically with the launch of peace support operations in Liberia in 1989 under
the auspices of the ECOWAS Monitoring Group (ECOMOG).
ECOWAS has also developed numerous protocols which address conflict prevention in
a comprehensive manner, including the 1999 Protocol Relating to the Mechanism for
Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peace-Keeping and Security (PRMCR)
which declared human rights and democracy as conditions for peace and stability
(ECOWAS 1999). In 2008 the ECOWAS Conflict Prevention Framework (ECPF) was
introduced. Of note is the Framework’s embracement of the concept of human security
and its multifaceted fourteen-prong approach to conflict prevention. “It represents
probably the most comprehensive example of conflict prevention doctrine produced by
an African regional organization” (Piccolino and Minou 2014).
Today the ECOWAS region remains challenged by conflict and insecurity
stemming from political upheavals (Cote d’Ivoire, Guinea, Sierra Leone,
Liberia, Guinea Bissau, Mali), terrorism (Nigeria, Mali) and piracy (Gulf of
Guinea). It is thus unsurprising that in terms of “hard” security, ECOWAS
boasts the longest standing security instruments in Sub-Saharan Africa,
having established itself as a legitimate security actor long before the
launch of the African Union in 2002.9 Guided by the Mechanism for Conflict
Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security (1999),
ECOWAS has deployed numerous missions in its own backyard. In turn,
this level of commitment to peace and security operations has garnered a
corresponding amount of attention from international partners, including
those within the Atlantic realm.
9
The AU’s predecessor, the Organization of African Unity (OAU) played a historically meek role in peace
and security operations, launching just four security missions in thirty nine years of existence.
8
3.
Atlantic Actors’ involvement in Africa: mapping out
existing relations
3.1.
Brazil
Brazil is in the process of rapidly expanding its presence in Africa, capitalising on the
important historical role of Africans in the development of the country, the cultural
influence of Africa and the Portuguese language which Brazil shares with several
SADC and ECOWAS members. In fact, three of Brazil’s four largest trade partners in
Africa (Nigeria, Angola and South Africa) are from either of those two organisations
(Alves 2013).
Brazil’s turn towards Africa has been premised on a variety of motivations, including
growing trade links, an aspiration to increase its international profile, and the notion of
South-South solidarity (Alves 2013). Trade between Africa and Brazil has also grown
precipitously, from US$4.2 billion to US$27.6 billion in a decade (Stolte 2012), with
90% of Brazil’s imports from the continent coming in the form of natural resources.
Driven by President Lula, Brazil’s diplomatic presence in Africa has similarly expanded
with, for example, an increase of embassies from 18 to 37 -- with an analogous
increase in African representation in Brasilia (Alves 2013).
Brazil’s projects in Africa span a range of activities, with the greatest allocation of
funding made towards the agriculture sector (21% 2003-2010) (ABC 2010). This
allocation has implications for food security, since Brazil provides capacity building and
training for improved farming efficiencies, often using the Ministry of Agrarian
Development and its agribusiness arm EMBRAPA (World Bank 2012). In terms of
explicit security initiatives, “public security” garners 6%.
It is important to underline here just how Brazil styles itself: as a South-South leader,
relating to the challenge of development through its own experience and hence making
a conscious effort at breaking away from the North-South dynamic of donor-client
relationships in its relations abroad.
South–South cooperation ideally emphasizes principles of mutual respect,
sovereignty, and cooperation. This contrasts with the traditional model of
North–South relations, in which developing countries receive aid linked to
economic and political conditions from developed countries that often
include their former colonial rulers. New multilateral South–South tools—
such as the IBSA Fund for Alleviation of Poverty and Hunger—are in effect
sidestepping established mechanisms and organizations, in part because
the traditional institutions are perceived to be dominated by developed
countries’ interests (World Bank (2012).
Brazil-SADC
Brazil’s relationship with SADC is marginal and instead mostly focussed on bilateral
relations with the member states. In fact, Brazil’s presence as a security actor (training,
funding and arms trading) in several major SADC countries is notable. In Angola,
Brazil’s footprint is in the process of rapid expansion with a 2012 partnership
agreement signed between the two countries, including a joint defence committee to
9
facilitate and aid Angola’s wish to develop its own national military industry (SAFPI 20
February 2013).
Brazil and South Africa also share an expanding security relationship, which touches
on all of the four main variables of this analysis: operations, funding, training and trade.
Brazil provides military assistance in the form training and logistics, including expertise
in jungle warfare. In turn, South Africa is playing a consultative role for the 2014
football World Cup. In 2013 the two sides held an inaugural Joint Defence Committee
meeting, pledging exchange lessons learnt in respective UN peace support operations,
and exploring greater collaboration for the future (Department of Defence South Africa
2013).
In terms of arms trade, Brazil and South Africa have a complimentary relationship
which stands in contrast to the usual unidirectional nature of trade of arms to rather
than from Africa. The two partners are currently engaged in the co-development of the
“A-Darter” missile. The South African arms manufacturer Denel Dynamics also
provides components for the Brazilian short range homing MAA-1 “Piranha” missile
(DefenceWeb 2013).
Elsewhere, Brazil has since 1994 made significant investments in Namibia through its
Naval Support Mission in Walvis Bay. Brazil can in fact lay claim to building much of
Namibia’s naval capacity. Furthermore, the programme has been a considered both a
material and political success leading to Brazilian authorities pondering its extension to
other countries as part of a growing presence in Africa (Seabra 2014).
Maritime Security
The vast bulk of Brazil’s foreign trade (95%) passes through South Atlantic ocean
routes (Abdenur and de Souza Neto 2013) making the Atlantic region not simply a
trade zone of great interest to parties on both sides of the American and African
continents, but also an area in need of security – hence the Brazilian impetus to drive
further security cooperation in the region amongst its strategic partners. This
broadening of security focus has also coincided with a notable growth in Brazilian
defence spending. The 2008 National Defence Strategy linked increased spending with
the need to protect natural resources and the 2012 Defence White Paper specified the
importance of an expansion of Brazil’s naval fleet (Abdenur and de Souza Neto 2013).
The South Atlantic and West Africa were also explicitly deemed as the eastern limits of
Brazil’s “area of strategic interest”.
In terms of multilateral cooperation, Brazil’s outward security turn has resulted in
several cooperative initiatives with a variety of countries with some implications for
Africa. One of the more prominent of these is the South Atlantic Peace and Cooperation Zone (Zopacas) which, though established in 1986, lay mostly dormant until
kickstarted again in 2007 through Brazilian encouragement. The aim of the grouping is
to bring African and South American states along the South Atlantic coast together in
order to create a “zone of peace and cooperation” on explicitly South-South lines
(United Nations RES/41/11). Membership to the organisation -- 21 African states and 3
South American – reinforces the Southern orientation. The 2007 Luanda Plan of Action
and the first Africa-South America Summit (ASA) mandated the strengthening of
regional cooperation on peace and security between the two continents with specific
mention of the utility of Zopacas. Since then Ministerial level meetings of Zopacas have
clarified areas of further cooperation and capacity building, such as seabed mapping,
maritime security, environmental security, and joint defence operations (Defesanet
2013). Much of these plans are of course very recent and have yet to come to fruition.
10
Cooperation in terms of a larger Atlantic Community comprising North Atlantic
countries faces some challenges, including the ongoing disagreement between the UK
and Argentina regarding the Falkland Islands. Underlining this point, the Zopacas
Ministerial meeting in Montevideo in 2013 called for “quick and unconditional end to
colonialism in all its forms and manifestations” (Mercopress 2013
South Atlantic naval cooperation also exists in the form of biannual “Atlasur” joint and
combined maritime exercises between the fleets of South Africa, Brazil, Argentina and
Uruguay. Furthermore, there is the UNITAS multinational maritime exercise, which has
been running annually since 1959. It is evidence of North-South cooperation in the
Americas, with participants from all geographic regions, and even beyond with the
inclusion of the UK. UNITAS does not, at this point however, include African navies.
Moreover, the scope of Atlantic cooperation continues to widen; IBSAMAR is another
example of maritime coordination between the IBSA partners, India, Brazil and South
Africa.
Despite Zopacas’ strong rhetoric, the Brazilian government continues to seek
partnerships with North Atlantic partners – particularly in the area of military
technology. For instance, in 2013 Brazil began production on a US$3.95 billion joint
programme with France to build conventional and nuclear submarines (Reuters 2013).
Relations between Brazil and the United Kingdom have also expanded since 2010,
with the establishment of annual foreign policy “Strategic Dialogue” and increased
diplomatic representation in each country. Turning towards human security, in February
2014 the “UK and Brazil in Partnership for African Prosperity” was launched, with the
intention of improving coordinated support of African food security, agricultural
productivity, and improving resource management (Hague 2014).
Brazil-ECOWAS
Brazil and ECOWAS held their first summit in 2010. Unlike the MOU between SADC
and Brazil which was largely limited to infrastructure and technological development,
Brazil and ECOWAS targeted a broader range of areas including political dialogue and
security cooperation (CEDEAO 2010). A subsequent summit was due to take place in
2012 but is still pending, making it difficult to evaluate progress at this stage.
However, Brazil has been supportive of Gulf of Guinea anti-piracy measures, having
made a series of visits with naval vessels in recent years, including a frigate to Nigeria
to conduct anti-piracy training in 2012. Relations with Nigeria in particular have been
growing, bolstered by a state visit of Brazilian President Rousseff in 2013 and including
a commitment to encourage each side’s defence ministers to explore greater
cooperation in the domain of peace and security (Communiqué 2013).
Brazil’s largest presence in the region is in Guinea Bissau in terms not only of
development focused funding and projects, but also democratic institution building. In
fact Brazil was designated to take the lead at the UN Peacebuilding Commission on
the Guinea Bissau file, tasked with assisting in political reconciliation and economic
consolidation (Abdenur and de Souza Neto 2013). But Brazil’s efforts – such as the
Mission for Technical and Military Cooperation -- remain fraught with challenges related
to Guinea-Bissau’s political fragility. More success has been enjoyed in Cape Verde,
where a Naval Support Mission, reflecting the Brazilian initiative in Namibia is bearing
fruit with, for instance, military personnel training in Brazil.
11
A breakdown of the analysis above would look as follows:
Table 1- Brazil security presence in West and Southern Africa
Brazil-SADC
(+member states)
Operations
Capacity
Building
Funding
Trade
No
Naval exercises
(Atlasur,
IBSAMAR,
UNITAS,
Food security
Arms
equipment
Agriculture
technology
Brazil-ECOWAS
(+member states)
Yes – Gulf of
Guinea
interdiction
Naval training
Food security
Atlantic
Cooperation
Yes – limited
participation in
US
backed
exercises
in
Gulf of Guinea
Lusophone
CPLP
(Felino
Exercises)
Zopacas
UK-Brazil
Partnership
African
Prosperity
and
+ development of
missiles
with
South Africa
Arms
No
for
Clearly Brazil has met with notable success in its attempt to position itself as a
champion of South-South relations and offer an alternative path for African actors and
the outside world. Brazil has actively promoted not only regional South-South security
mechanisms like Zopacas but also South-South groupings like BRICS and IBSA, each
of which is armed with some capacity to provide assistance to developing countries.10
This has paid dividends, situating Brazil as a leader in the global south and with
growing trade revenues in Africa.
Yet this global positioning does not necessarily preclude the participation of the North –
something crucial if an Atlantic Community is to truly flourish. However, the traditional
leadership role of the North would have to be contained. As former Brazil President
Lula put “A new global political and economic geography will only be possible if actors
with similar interests chose direct dialogue and join action in international fora” (Alves
2013).
3.2.
United States
The nature of the USA’s security presence in Africa differs profoundly from Brazil’s.
Cold War rivalries ensured that the USA had a strong security presence in many
countries. The demise of the Cold War, combined with the already miserly trade
statistics between the USA and Africa11 gradually weakened American resolve in the
10
IBSA, for example, is armed with a fund to assist developing country with incorporating best
practices for fighting poverty and hunger.
11
According to a 2009 US Congressional report, total trade (imports and exports) between the
USA and Sub-Saharan African quadrupled between 1990 and 2007 from USD17 billion to
12
region. Interest in security and an active presence in the region were further setback in
the 1994 Somalia “Black Hawk Down” debacle, which lead to the deaths of 18
American servicemen and hundreds of Somalis in the streets of Mogadishu. Such was
the gravity of the event that the Rwandan genocide of the same year suffered from
international inertia and fear of engagement in what were seemingly intractable and
impenetrable African security issues. However, in 1998 the twin bombings of US
embassies in Dar Es Salaam and Nairobi and the identification of the then still obscure
Al-Qaeda network as responsible, led to renewed focus on the internationalisation of
African conflicts and then fomentation of terrorism. The increasing linkage of events
previously considered isolated was further solidified by the terror attacks of September
11, 2001. In 2006 General Bantz Craddock underlined American sentiment when he
said that Africa posed “the greatest security stability challenge” to the United States
European Command (EUCOM).
The backlash following the contested decision to go to war in Iraq in 2003, plus a
belated acknowledgement that more than just brute force was required to win the
peace in theatres such as Afghanistan, as well as Iraq, focus began to broaden from
“fighting and winning wars” to embracing conflict prevention (2010). While the former
category naturally limited the extent of active American engagement in Africa, the
latter opened up a myriad of possibilities for operations in areas such as capacity
building (Ploch 2011). The rising tide of “joined up” approaches to security, to include
other levels of government (e.g. development and diplomacy) also opened up new
possibilities and cooperative ventures with African and North Atlantic partners. The
budget for initiatives Africa consequently expanded as well with an average of almost
USD300 million being allocated for each of the years between 2010 and 2012 (Ploch
2011).
The most prominent manifestation of the USA’s new and broadened focus on security
in Africa was United States Africa Command (AFRICOM). Established in 2007,
AFRICOM was a manifestation of the increased strategic importance of Africa to the
United States on several levels: terrorism, energy security, geo-political security. It is
one of six command centres set up by the Department of Defence for its military
relations with various regions of the world. Prior to AFRICOM’s creation, African
command operations were divided between three Unified Commands (EUCOM,
CENTCOM and PACOM). Despite the stated mandate of AFRICOM to cooperate with
African states, the AU and other regional security organisations, the prospect of an
American military presence on the continent led to an almost universally negative
African reaction. Amongst the chief representative countries of SADC and ECOWAS,
South Africa and Nigeria respectively, opposition was explicit (Mail & Guardian 2013).
Negative sentiments about the location of AFRICOM aside, its initiatives on the
continent span the gamut, touching on all of the variables in focus in this study, and
include cooperation with every major region and country.
USA-ECOWAS
Alongside its relationship with the AU, ECOWAS represents an important AFRICOM
security partner – a reflection of the organisation’s comparatively well developed peace
and security instruments but also the historical ties between the US and some parts of
the region. It is also indicative of the strategic importance of a stable West Africa,
USD81 billion. As a share of total US trade, the percentages were a bit less dramatic: 1.9% in
1990 and 2.7% in 2007.
13
where up 15% of US oil supplies are estimated to be imported from (Chatham House
2012) and where maritime security, drug trafficking, terrorism and political instability
provide a range of challenges with potential international ramifications (e.g. export of
terrorism, illegal migration, drugs, disruption of trade routes).
Unsurprisingly, AFRICOM initiatives in West Africa tackle many of these challenges
and touch on all of the four variables under analysis here. In terms of capacity building,
there is the Africa Partnership Station (APS), an initiative which brings American and
international naval forces together to train Africans involved in maritime security.
Training exercises related to the ambition of the APS include the Obangame Express,
which is an operation specifically targeting interdiction in the Gulf of Guinea. Another
naval operation, Saharan Express, occurs on a biennial basis and attracts a
combination of navies from West Africa and the North Atlantic to strengthen
collaborative practices in the region.
Outside of the Gulf, a prominent programme with a human security dimension is
Operation Flintlock, an annual exercise which brings together other North Atlantic
actors (such as Canada, France, UK, Spain) to train African armies in the Sahel region
to protect civilians. Similarly, the Africa Contingency Operations Training and
Assistance (ACOTA) is a capacity building programme, which provides training for
military trainers with the purpose of better equipping African militaries to conduct peace
support and humanitarian relief. The programme boasts 25 African partner countries
and direct or indirect training of 229,000 peacekeepers since 2005 (Kurata 2012).
While the above can be classified as capacity building, in terms of direct security
operations, the United States sent a small contingent of soldiers to help evacuate
American citizens and diplomatic staff from the Liberian capital Monrovia near the end
of the Second Liberian War in 2003 (Operation Shining Express).
USA-SADC
In the early 2000s a SADC-USA Forum was created. Areas of focus included US
funding support for conflict prevention and management and a US contribution to
human security focused refugee protection. However, the process has lost momentum,
with no meetings of the Forum having taken place since.
However, while there may not be a singular dedicated channel of interaction between
the USA and SADC, areas of security cooperation exist, particularly capacity building
programs run by AFRICOM and focused on numerous regions, including Southern
Africa. One of the most prominent is Africa Endeavour, a programme designed to
improve command, control and communication capacities (e.g. “C4”). There is also
Southern Accord, a joint exercise meant to improve responses to humanitarian
disasters.
Beyond SADC, the United States enjoys a comprehensive relationship with South
Africa, bolstered by a doubling in total trade over the last decade to USD16.7 billion in
2011 (Cook 2013). The relationship now includes a framework, a “Strategic Dialogue”,
focussed on, among other things, food security, law enforcement and non-proliferation.
The two countries also have a biennial military training exercise, Shared Accord.
United States arms sales to Africa are guided by the Foreign Military Sales (FMS)
programme. Arms sales are, according to DSCA, “a form of security assistance” and
“fundamental tool of US foreign policy” authorized by the Arms Export Control Act
(Defence Security Cooperation Agency). Obliged by law, each year the Department of
Defence and State Department produce an annual report on arms exports, known as
14
the "Section 655" report (Foreign Assistance Act). The latest figures from 2012 reveal
a range of security related equipment sold to a variety of countries mostly in West and
South Africa -- consistent with an Atlantic focus -- with South Africa being the most
prominent partner for both heavy equipment (SIPRI) and light arms (NISAT). Of note,
little if any of the armaments in the SIPRI database could be considered of an “assault”
type nature, instead supply/transport equipment (e.g. light transport aircraft). Although
not hinting of any sort of broader Atlantic cooperation, the USA also provided parts for
aircraft or vehicles built elsewhere, such as South African Puma (Kenya) and Matador
(Gabon) armoured vehicles (SIPRI).
Breaking down the US contribution to Atlantic security endeavours in Africa would look
as follows:
Table 2- USA security presence in West and Southern Africa
USA-SADC
Operations
Capacity
Building
Funding
Trade
No
Naval training
Food security
Arms (light and
heavy)
Yes – Gulf of
Guinea
interdiction
Naval
and
military training
Food security
Arms (light and
heavy)
Yes (Saharan
Express- North
Atlantic
cooperation)
Yes (Operation
Flintlock – North
Atlantic
cooperation)
No
No
(+member states)
USA-ECOWAS
(+member states)
Atlantic
Cooperation
The role of the United States as unifier of disparate Atlantic actors is somewhat of a
paradoxical one. As the sole superpower and global hegemon it’s actions are often
viewed with either enthusiasm or suspicion. This is certainly the case in Africa. The
controversy surrounding the original wish to establish AFRICOM on African soil can be
juxtaposed with the enthusiasm which African and North Atlantic armies and navies
embrace AFRICOM driven joint exercises.
In terms then of driving an Atlantic security community in Africa, the USA stands with a
unique form of power to attract while arguably missing the moral leverage a Southern
actor such as Brazil retains with its fellow Southern partners in Africa. This will be
explored in the conclusion.
3.3.
European Union
The European Union’s relationship with Africa stems back to the very nascence of the
European Community and its founding Treaty of Rome in 1957. At that time the
relationship was limited to a cadre of francophone countries in West Africa and
focussed on trade and aid. The association gradually expanded to include more
diverse African partners yet remained a a contested arrangement, criticised by many
not least larger African countries like Ghana as a form of neocolonialism (Zartman
1971). Only in 1975, with the establishment of the Lomé Convention and the alignment
of African countries under the Africa, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States (ACP) did
15
the terms of the relationship change in Africa’s favour. However, the relationship
remained steadfastly “apolitical”, steering away from issues of security, democracy and
governance. It was the reversal of development gains suffered by the majority of
African countries in the 1980s, plus the end of the bipolar divisions of the Cold War,
which subsequently emboldened the EU to place political dialogue onto the agenda –
even if African countries feared it was merely a pretext for imposing conditions on the
terms of their aid and trade arrangements.
As a regional organisation, the EU is by definition a cooperative project between
nation-states, including of course many with a geographic or political Atlantic
orientation. The regional and multilateral nature of the EU has also facilitated interregional relations with organisations throughout the world, including of course Africa.
The most comprehensive of these relationships on the continent is with the African
Union, benefitting from regular Africa-EU summits (every three years) and guided by
the Joint Africa-EU Strategy (JAES). One of the eight partnerships – i.e. drivers -- of
the JAES concerns peace and security, building on already existing EU funding
support for African security, in particular the EUR300 million (2008-13) Africa Peace
Facility (APF). The APF has provided funding support to AU peacekeeping missions
such as AMISOM in Somalia and also crucial help for African Peace and Security
Architecture – an ambitious AU rationalisation of its security functions and mechanisms
(Europeaid).
Since 2007 the EU has also had the Instrument for Stability (IfS) at its disposal; a rapid
reaction funding mechanism, designed to finance conflict prevention, crisis
management and peace building initiatives quickly and when other sources of EU
funding are not available. Complimenting the IfS is the 2009 Peace-building
Partnership (PbP) which seeks to build the capacity of partner countries in addressing
crisis and conflict situations. Further strengthening the EU’s capacity in this area is the
Conflict prevention, Peace building and Mediation Instruments Division, housed at the
European External Action Service (EEAS).
Though not an Atlantic actor per se, the AU as the continent’s comprehensive security
actor cannot be overlooked since much of the EU’s support of SADC and ECOWAS is
of a complimentary nature to the greater ambitions of the AU for continent-wide
security integration and regional conflict prevention (Constitutive Act of the African
Union) (11 July 2000). The AU is mandated to encourage regional integration on the
continent. While the main focus is on integration in terms of trade facilitation, attempts
have also been made to better coordinate the security instruments of regional
organisations with those of the AU (Schaefer 2012). This has included cohesion with
respect to rapid response and early warning intelligence – areas in which the EU is
playing a supportive role.
EU-SADC
The EU and SADC’s relationship is largely guided by the 2000 ACP-EU Cotonou
Agreement, with a strong focus on the achievement of the Millennium Development
Goals (Regional Strategy Paper 2008-2013). Much of the EU’s support for SADC is
hence directed at trade and aid, as well as economic integration and institutional
capacity building, most recently highlighted by the announcement of a EUR20 million
Regional Economic Integration Support contribution agreement (Ministerial Meeting
2013). Under the 10th European Development Fund (EDF) EUR116 million was
targeted for the region (Europeaid).
16
Security is an area of focus too. Under the “Berlin Initiative”, a biennial ministerial level
between the EU and SADC, political dialogue is conducted to “contribute to peace,
democracy and sustainable development in the SADC region” (eeas.europa.eu). In fact
the EU-SADC security relationship touches on the funding and capacity building
variables addressed in this paper. For instance, EU’s Regional Political Cooperation
Programme provides EUR18 million to strengthen SADC’s capacity in peace and
security, as well as politics and governance. Another EUR12 million is directed from the
Institutional Capacity Development Programme to the SADC Secretariat in Botswana.
The Technical Cooperation Facility (EUR 6 million) is an additional fund used to
improve coordination, harmonisation and development.
In terms of EU security operations, none are conducted in concert with SADC.
However, despite the still relatively small operational footprint of the EU as a security
actor, the Democratic Republic of the Congo has figured prominently in CSDP
missions. In 2003 “Operation Artemis” oversaw the deployment of French-led EU
troops to prevent further violence in the North East region of Ituri in the Democratic
Republic of Congo (DRC). Another CDSP mission, EUFOR RD Congo, took place in
2006 to support a UN mission during the country’s elections. Ongoing operations are
the Security Sector Reform Mission (EUSEC RD Congo) and the Congo Police Mission
(EUPOL).
Concerning maritime security, which as we have seen has been one of the focal points
for Atlantic community cooperation, both the EU and SADC have committed to sharing
information since both organisations have African maritime initiatives: SADC
established an anti-piracy policy in 2011 with a particular focus on piracy migrating
south from Somalia and into Mozambique (“Operation Copper”; defenceWeb A); the
EU’s current CSDP mission in Africa, “Operation Atalanta” (EU NAVFOR Somalia) has
played an active role in mitigating the risk of piracy in East Africa. The EU even sought
cooperation with SADC in 2012 regarding the flight of pirates from the Somali coast
into Southern African waters (defenceWeb B).
EU and SADC member states
The EU’s funding support of the member states of SADC comes in the form of
development assistance channelled through the EDF. Funding is divided into project,
sector and budget approaches and guided by country strategy reports. Explicitly
security-related activities tend to fall within the human security category, including for
example food security support (Angola) and humanitarian assistance (Mozambique).
South Africa stands as something of an exception, since it also enjoys an enhanced
relationship with the EU, manifested in a partnership agreement concluded in 2007.
Regular summits since then touch on an expansive range of mutually shared issues,
including dialogue on peace and security on the continent (South Africa-EU Summit
Communiqué, 2013).
EU Member States and SADC
Several of the EU’s “Atlantic” members make a contribution to SADC security initiatives
either as funders or capacity builders. Some states also retain lucrative arms deals with
members of SADC, as shall also be explored below. France’s Reinforcement of African
Capacity to Maintain Peace (RECAMP) programme, targeted among other regional
groupings, SADC member states armies to help augment their peacebuilding
capacities (2002). The programme was subsequently brought into the EU fold and
operated between 2008-2010 as a mechanism to assist with the AU’s ambition of
17
better coordinating continent wide brigades. Germany, through its development arm
GIZ, provides multimillion euro support to both the SADC Regional Peacekeeping
Training Centre (which is an extension of SADC’s ambition to create a functioning
Standby Force) as well as broader regional integration in the area of peace, security
and governance (GIZ 2013).
Several Atlantic EU member states account for the sale of both heavy weapons and
small arms to the SADC region, particularly South Africa. The UK, France and
Germany all sold equipment to South Africa at different times in the 2000s, including
missiles and submarines (SIPRI). According to the Norwegian Initiative on Small Arms
Transfers, in 2012 the UK and France racked up multimillion dollar sales of lighter
weapons to South Africa and less to other SADC members such as Tanzania, Zambia
and Botswana (NISAT 2012).
The focus here has been to investigate the degree to which the EU and SADC
cooperate on security issues – and by extension member states with an interest and
geographic orientation towards broader Atlantic cooperation. What can be surmised is
that, despite the array of security initiatives, broader inclusion of non-European Atlantic
actors is limited. This may be a consequence of inter-regional relations themselves,
which tend not to favour the ad hoc since, as in the EU-SADC case, they already
possess a degree of structure which limits the entry of third parties. There is of course
the prospect of triangularisation of regional relations, such as the case of the EU-Africa
and China Dialogue (FT). In the Atlantic case this could include North and/or South
America. Yet this is arguably some distance away, considering breakthrough free trade
agreements with both Mercosur and the USA are still pending after considerable delay.
Another roadblock has been the case of Zimbabwe and its intractable president Robert
Mugabe. Northern (including EU) condemnation of his political actions has led to
criticism of meddling in some Southern African circles.
EU-ECOWAS
The EU-ECOWAS relationship, as in the case of SADC, is largely guided by the
Cotonou Agreement and five year Regional Strategy Papers and a Regional Indicative
Programme. Relative to SADC, the EU has apportioned a greater share of its EDF
funding to ECOWAS, earmarking EUR571 million under the 10th EDF. Approximately
70% of that amount was allocated for strengthening regional integration and
addressing food security (e.g. productivity, upgrading, investment support). Another
20% targeted peace and security, “the systems developed in connection with early
warning, conflict prevention, conflict management, peacekeeping, humanitarian aid and
the Convention on the control of small arms”, all in respect of the African Union’s APSA
(EC-West Africa Regional Strategy Paper 2008-13).
EU support is mostly in the form of technical assistance and funding rather than
operations. Notable is the EU Support to ECOWAS Regional Peace, Security and
Stability Mandate. The two sides also hold regular political dialogue meetings – the 19th
taking place in 2013 – where peace and security issues are placed at the top of the
agenda (EU-ECOWAS 2013). Despite the plethora of security challenges in the region,
in terms of operations, the only CSDP mission in the region took place in Guinea
Bissau in support of Security Sector Reform. An EU Strategy for the Gulf of Guinea
was released in March 2014, but it is too early to assess just what the consequences of
this new strategy will be. The colonial ties of several EU member states may explain
why operations in the region have largely been driven at that level as shall be explored
below.
18
Another current EU capacity building venture garnering member state cooperation is
the Critical Maritime Routes in the Gulf of Guinea Programme (CRIMGO). It is financed
by the IfS and designed to help African countries in the region better coordinate action
by creating a network for sharing information. Training of coastguards is also provided.
France, the UK, Italy, Portugal and Germany, to name a few member states, are
involved.
EU-ECOWAS Member States
Considering the conflict or post-conflict scenarios affecting a wide swath of ECOWAS
countries, it is not surprising that the EU targets individual member states with well
funded programmes and capacity building projects. In the case of Africa’s largest
country by population, Nigeria, the 10th EDF allocated EUR677 million to fund three
focal areas: peace and security; governance and human rights; trade and regional
integration.
The EU has played an instrumental role in rebuilding Malian institutions undermined
after the coup in 2012. In 2013 it brought together 108 delegations representing
governments, the private sector and civil society and garnered EUR 3.285 billion in
pledges – EUR1.35 billion stemmed from the EU and its member states, including
EUR524 million from the European Commission (Europaid). Likewise, Cote d’Ivoire,
another ECOWAS member having suffered conflict in the 21st century, has received
EUR255 million in EU support for peace building, good governance, social cohesion
and economic infrastructure (Ibid).
3.4.
EU Member States
EU Member States and ECOWAS
Unsurprisingly, given the shared history, France is the most prominent of EU member
states in the region, in terms of security operations, funding, capacity building and arms
trade. The most prominent recent operations example is of course the French military
intervention in Mali in January 2013. French forces also intervened twice in Cote
d’Ivoire, in 2004 and 2011, first in retaliation to Ivoirien bombing of a French military
installation and more recently as an intervention in the post-electoral crisis between the
losing incumbent Laurent Ggabgo and the winner-designate Alassane Ouattara.
Food security has also been a focus, with Guinea, Nigeria and Senegal all targeted for
assistance (Agence Française de Développement 2012). A separate 2011 agreement
with ECOWAS and its Water Resources Coordination Centre designated more than
EUR10 million for food security. The spate of piracy in the Gulf of Guinea has also
driven France to action; a Priority Solidarity Fund (FSP) was created in 2011 to
strengthen the maritime capacities of Benin, Ghana and Togo. Training exercises have
also been provided.
France is also the largest Atlantic exporter of small arms to the region, with armaments
sold to almost all of the ECOWAS member states in 2012. It is also a notable seller of
heavier equipment, such as patrol craft (SIPRI – see tables 5 and 6).
The UK’s contribution to ECOWAS and its member states is profoundly different. While
Nigeria represents one of the Department for International Development’s (DFID) top 5
global partners and is slated to receive GBP272,469,574 in 2013-14 (UKAID), the rest
of the region lags well behind target countries in East Africa. The UK Navy, however,
has actively supported international efforts to improve security in the Gulf of Guinea,
19
working with ECOWAS and the Economic Community of Central African States
(ECCAS) to develop an integrated regional maritime strategy. Support has also gone to
individual countries such Sierra Leone, Cameroon and Nigeria to improve piracy
detection and maritime interdiction capacities (Nautilus International 2012). Last but not
least, the UK has conducted a military operation of its own in the region, intervening in
the Sierra Leone civil war in 2000 (Operation Palliser).
Portugal is also a notable security actor with a North and South Atlantic presence
throughout lusophone Africa. Military training has been the most predominant form of
assistance, with more than 6000 African military personnel having received specialised
training in Portuguese military institutions in the last two decades (Seabra 2014).
Looking at trends in peace and security cooperation driven by the EU:
Table 3- EU security presence in West and Southern Africa
EU-SADC
Operations
Capacity Building
Funding
Trade
CSDP DRC
Regional
Political
Cooperation Programme
Diverse EDF
allocation
No
CSDP Guinea Bissau
CRIMGO
prevention
assistance
Diverse EDF
allocation
No
Cooperation limited to
EU member states
Limited to EU members
Limited to EU
members
No
(+member
states)
EU-ECOWAS
(+member
states)
Atlantic
Cooperation
Conflict
technical
And the EU member state trends in the SADC and ECOWAS regions:
Table 4- EU member state security presence in West and Southern Africa
Operations
Capacity Building
EU member
states-SADC
(+member
states)
No
Naval training
(UK, France)
EU member
statesECOWAS
(+member
states)
France
(Mali,
Cote d’Ivoire)
Gulf of Guinea
Atlantic
Yes
exercises
Maritime Strategy (UK)
UK
Leone)
(Sierra
(Saharan
Yes(G8++,
Development
20
ECOWASpartners,
Funding
Trade
Food security
Arms scandal
in South Africa
including
European
partners
Food security
Large
scale
small
and
heavy
arms
sales
to
ECOWAS
member states,
particularly
from France
No
Cooperation
Express USA)
Operation
CRIMGO)
Flintlock,
Due to the scale and variety of challenges facing the ECOWAS region, the range of
sophisticated ECOWAS security instruments, as well as a linguistic and historical
diversity which binds several key European Atlantic countries to the area, many
security initiatives are in play. The EU and France provide the largest and most
comprehensive presence but the USA has also clearly targeted the region because of
the international implications of insecurity there (particularly in the Gulf of Guinea).
Cooperation at the Atlantic level is thus more discernible here, even if still modest, than
in the SADC region.
Table 5 - Small arms exports to Sub-Saharan Africa (2012)
Country
USD
France
23,942,612
United States
17,633,159
United Kingdom
3,934,444
Brazil
1,853,346
Portugal
1,161,230
(source: NISAT)
Table 6 – Armaments exports to West and Southern Africa (2008-2013)
Suppli
er
Recipient
Orders
Designation
Description
Status
Year of
order
Year(s)
of
deliveries
Deliv
ered
Brazil
Angola
6
EMB-314
Trainer/combat ac
New
2011
2013 - 2013
6
Brazil
Burkina
Faso
3
EMB-314
Trainer/combat ac
New
2010
2011 - 2011
3
Brazil
Namibia
1
Grajau
Patrol craft
New
2004
2009 - 2009
1
Canada
Angola
6
PT-6
Turboprop
New
2011
2013 - 2013
6
Canada
Botswana
5
PT-6
Turboprop
New
2011
2013 - 2013
5
Canada
Burkina
Faso
3
PT-6
Turboprop
New
2010
2011 - 2011
3
France
Benin
4
LH-10
Ellipse
Trainer aircraft
New
2010
2011 - 2013
4
France
Benin
3
FPB-98
Patrol craft
New
2011
2012 - 2012
3
France
Burkina
Faso
3
Tetras
Light aircraft
New
2012
2012 - 2012
3
France
Niger
3
Tetras
Light aircraft
New
2009
2010 - 2013
3
21
France
Niger
3
SA-342
Light helicopter
Refurbish
ed
2012
2013 - 2013
3
France
Nigeria
2
FPB-98
Patrol craft
New
2012
2013 - 2013
1
France
Senegal
8
TR-F-1
Towed gun
SecondH
and
2010
2011 - 2011
8
France
Senegal
1
EDIC
Landing craft
SecondH
and
2010
2011 - 2011
1
France
Senegal
1
RPB-33
Patrol craft
New
2012
2013 - 2013
1
France
South
Africa
22
Makila
Turboshaft
New
1996
2011 - 2013
22
France
South
Africa
130
MILAN
Anti-tank missile
New
2006
2008 - 2008
130
France
South
Africa
170
MILAN
Anti-tank missile
New
2008
2009 - 2010
170
France
Togo
6
VAP
APV
New
2008
2010 - 2010
6
Germa
ny
Ghana
2
Type-143
Patrol craft
Refurbish
ed
2010
2012 - 2012
2
Germa
ny
South
Africa
80
SUT
AS/ASW torpedo
New
2000
2006 - 2008
80
Germa
ny
South
Africa
25
IRIS-T
SRAAM
New
2008
2009 - 2009
25
Germa
ny
South
Africa
3
209/1400M
OD
Submarine
New
2000
2005 - 2008
3
Portuga
l
Mozambiq
ue
2
Cessna
Light aircraft
SecondH
and
2010
2011 - 2012
2
UK
Somalia
25
AT-105
Saxon
APC
SecondH
and
2012
2013 - 2013
25
UK
South
Africa
12
Hawk-100
Trainer/combat ac
New
2002
2007 - 2008
12
UK
South
Africa
82
Starstreak
Portable SAM
New
2008
2010 - 2012
82
USA
Angola
6
Cessna
Trainer/light ac
New
2012
2013 - 2013
6
USA
Botswana
4
CT-7
Turboprop
New
2008
2009 - 2010
4
USA
DRC
2
Boeing-727
Transport aircraft
SecondH
and
2009
2009 - 2009
2
USA
Congo Rep
32
Cummins6V
Diesel engine
New
2010
2010 - 2010
32
USA
Ghana
4
PW-100
Turboprop/turbosh
aft
New
2011
2011 - 2012
4
USA
Namibia
2
C-280
Diesel engine
New
2010
2012 - 2012
2
USA
Niger
2
Cessna-208
Light transport ac
New
2013
2013 - 2013
2
USA
Nigeria
1
Hamilton
OPV
SecondH
2011
2011 - 2011
1
22
and
USA
Senegal
2
King Air
Light transport ac
SecondH
and
2011
2011 - 2011
2
USA
South
Africa
9
F404
Turbofan
New
1999
2008 - 2009
9
USA
South
Africa
17
F404
Turbofan
New
2000
2010 - 2012
17
USA
South
Africa
50
Paveway
Guided bomb
New
2010
2011 - 2012
50
(Source SIPRI)
4.
Conclusion: creating an Atlantic community?
The aim of this paper was to test for discernible patterns of an Atlantic ‘community,’
consisting of both North and South partners. Areas of cooperation examined were in
the fields of operations, capacity building, funding and trade. A second goal was to
identify areas for security cooperation going forward, keeping in mind both hard and
soft security challenges. Finally, this paper sought to frame cooperation in light of
altering prevailing South-South or North-driven approaches to cooperation. The results
have been mixed. The following map outlines some of the security initiatives taking
place with several or more Atlantic countries in the ECOWAS and SADC regions.
Figure 1. Atlantic Community cooperation in West and Southern Africa
(source: author)
ECOWAS region
Coordinated security initiatives
Maritime:
EU CRIMGO
USA Saharan Express
G8++ Friends of the Gulf of Guinea
Military
USA Operation Flintlock
SADC region:
Coordinated security initiatives
Maritime:
Zopacas Atlasur
Zopacas UNITAS
IBSAMAR
Food security:
UK/Brazil Partnership for African
23
Prosperity
As indicated, there is no shortage of foreign initiatives targeting the spectrum of
security in Africa, from hard to soft. Amongst Atlantic actors, some discernible trends
are observable. First and most obvious is the sharing of a common ocean. This mutual
resource provides a natural impetus for collaboration. Likewise, evolving
understandings of security, with a heightened awareness of the international
implications of local threats (such as in the Gulf of Guinea) has created a propitious
environment for common action.
Thus, unsurprisingly, the largest number of collaborative Atlantic security projects take
place “on the water” in the Gulf of Guinea. Actors from both sides of the Atlantic and all
sides of the economic divide have been present in some form and at some point. Yet
cleavages between North and South remain evident. Most projects are US and
European driven, and include Northern and African partners. This is essentially a
replication of traditional patterns of North-driven leadership and less about the
formation of a broader, ostensibly more equal, Atlantic Community.
Brazil’s role as the strongest voice of the South Atlantic remains of fundamental
importance here if a recalibration of the way in which business is conducted is to occur.
The signals certainly since the Lula Presidency are that Brazil is indeed willing to play
this role. Long moribund groupings like Zopacas have been bolstered. IBSA and
particularly the BRICS have become prominent. A new Africa-South America summit
process has begun. These all represent a shakeup of the traditional North-driven order,
even if wholesale change has not yet occurred. An enhanced and more internationally
prominent Zopacas willing to embrace North American and European partners, for
example, might be a compelling start.
Ironically considering the antipathy with which AFRICOM was first met, in this study the
United States also appeared strongly poised to bring together disparate actors in the
Gulf of Guinea region – a nod to the attraction of its dominant power and technological
facilities. This is particularly true in the domain of maritime security and equally true
with respect to African governments seeking to bolster their hard security capacities.
Less evident is the USA as a driver of soft security collaboration, even if its own
approach to security has broadened and softened since the end of the Bush
Administration. US success in broadening international cooperation, particularly in
maritime security has, however, meant the perpetuation of the order actors like Brazil
have sought to modify.
The EU Member States tend to have less of a soft power attraction in the region given
their colonial histories and the sensitivity they can still elicit on the continent. Missions
such as France’s recent foray into Mali, while applauded by many including the majority
of locals (Diarra and Valdmanis 2013), were not designed to include even the EU
(which has the collective tools to participate), let alone an Atlantic Community (which
does not yet have a shape, let alone the collective tools).
The EU as a regional organisation, however, in a quiet fashion, has demonstrated its
willingness to change the terms of North-South relations. The unsung JAES has been
somewhat of a prototype for the African Union in the recent proliferation of its
“partnerships” with actors from across the globe, including of course South America but
reaching as far as Korea, Japan, China, and Brazil, to name a few. This EU willingness
to entertain change, coupled with it still delivering the largest single tranche of funding
24
for aid,12 translates into an opportunity to play an enabling role for a nascent Atlantic
Community.
In addition, it should be underlined that EU security focus has tended to be on the
African Union first, rather than on any one regional African organisation. Hence support
of Atlantic oriented organisations such as SADC and ECOWAS is often predicated on
the premise of enhancing coordination with the AU. The AU, after all, boasts its
ambitious African Peace and Security Architecture project and an determined agenda
to unify security initiatives on the continent. Given that the AU’s chief institutional
strength is indeed in the domain of peace and security, this leads to the observation
that an Atlantic Community should be one that engages Africa at the pan-African level.
This brings up the second point, where else can a convergence of Atlantic interests
and values help transcend the North-South divide and contribute to the formulation of
an Atlantic Community? Food security is one area in the broader human security
domain which came up consistently as an important component of each of the major
Atlantic actors’ programming in West and Southern Africa. Food security is a broad
concept, with different manifestations and approaches including humanitarian aid,
agriculture support, governance improvement and agribusiness. It, like most multiple
donor initiatives, suffers from incoherence, aggravated by the fact that funding does not
have a single public channel through which it could be channelled (given that
agriculture is often a private sector area) (Gaus 2012).
Again the Brazilian example in Africa provides a compelling approach to food security
cooperation: that is, to increasingly link it with business rather than aid or charity. This
method addresses the question of public money going to an area in which the private
sphere is at least as important. This way has been touted by former President Lula and
echoed by other key countries of the global South, most obviously China. In the case of
food security, where Brazilian agribusiness, bolstered by state support, can boast
business dealings, including the transfer of technology, with countries such as Angola
rather than traditional aid (ABC 2010).
Another question to consider is whether another entity outside of Brazil, USA and the
EU is better poised to stimulate an Atlantic Community? The United Nations is of
course the obvious choice here. Benefitting from its broad-based membership and
inclusivity, the UN is invariably a forum through which diverse member states
cooperate on geo-political and economic issues. For instance, the UN Office for West
Africa (UNOWA) plays an active role in assisting ECOWAS and the AU to develop
common approaches to peace and security challenges in the region. The UN
Peacebuilding Commission has also targeted several West African states for
assistance and elicited the help of Atlantic partners such as Brazil to carry out the tasks
involved. Importantly, the UN has the legal authority to pass resolutions which serve as
rallying points for concerned members, such as UNSCR (2011) 2018 and (2012) 2039
on Piracy and Armed Robbery in the Gulf of Guinea. Complementing the resolutions is
the work of the International Maritime Organization, which recently brought 22 African
countries together to sign a code of conduct regarding counter-piracy, illegal fishing
and drug smuggling (Yaoundé 25 June, 2013).
Other, looser, entities also exist to foment change. The G8++ Africa Clearing House
(ACH) is a process meant to improve the coordination of donor and partner securityrelated engagements with the AU and African regional organisations to “maximise
coherence and impact” (African Union 2013). G8 members, along with Brazil, a host of
EU member states, the EU itself and the UN are brought together under the ACH
12
The 11th EDF for 2014-20 has yet to be finalised (29/03/2014).
25
umbrella. The same applies for the G8++ Friends of the Gulf of Guinea Maritime
Security Experts Group, organised in 2011 to help avoid duplication of donor activities
in the region. It boasts participation not only from all the major North Atlantic players,
but also Brazil. Other applicable G8 initiatives include the New Alliance for Food
Security and the G8 Peacekeeping and Peacebuilding Experts Groups. Last, but not
least, the annual ECOWAS-Development Partners conference brings together
countries from the EU, ECOWAS, the UN, Canada and the USA to discuss
cooperation, including in one instance important help with the creation of the ECOWAS
Standby Force (Kinzel 2008). These are all examples of the potential for broad-based
North-South cooperation.
Other trends include improvement of dialogue between North and South actors outside
of the African context. The EU-Brazil Summit is an example. The triangulation of EUAfrica-China relations is another. The geo-political world is no longer one dominated by
the global North and this realisation is better accepted now than ever before.
The path towards an Atlantic Future remains a long one, but a broad acceptance about
the transnationalisation of security and the need for greater respect between the North
and an emphatically ascending South mean that further progress towards an Atlantic
Community is in fact likely.
26
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