NEW ‘MARKET
MECHANISMS’ –
NO NEW FINANCE
FOR FORESTS
Norges Naturvernforbund / Rainforest Foundation Norway
August 2013
Table of contents
Introduction
Purpose and scope of the FVA
Purpose and structure of the NMM
Sectoral trading and crediting
Forests and the NMM
Fungibility
Permanence
‘Beyond offsets’ – net emission reductions
Discounting
Crediting thresholds
Failure of existing carbon markets
Conclusions and recommendations
Recommendations
3
4
5
5
7
7
8
8
9
9
10
11
11
New ‘Market Mechanisms’ – no new finance for forests
August 2013
Author: Kate Dooley
Editor: Ed Fenton
Design: Daan van Beek
Photos: cover, Peru (Flickr Peter King cc)); page 5, Gabon
(Rainforest Foundation UK); page 8, Borneo (Flickr Bill
Barclay–RAN cc); page 10, Sumatra (Flickr Wild Sumatra cc)
Norges Naturvernforbund
Mariboes gate 8, 0183 Oslo
Norway
Tel: (47) 23 10 96 10
Email: naturvern@naturvernforbundet.no
www.naturforbundet.no
Rainforest Foundation Norway
Mariboes gate 8, 0183 Oslo
Norway
Tel: (47) 23 10 95 00
Email: rainforest@rainforest.no
www.rainforest.no
This report has been made possible with funding from
Norad – the Norwegian Agency for Development
Cooperation
New ‘Market Mechanisms’ – no new finance for forests
Acronyms
AOSIS
BAU
CDM
CfRN
CMIA
COP
ETS
EU
FVA
GFC
GHG
IPCC
JI
LDCs
MRV
NAMA
NGO
NMM
QELRO
Alliance of Small Island States
business as usual
Clean Development Mechanism
Coalition for Rainforest Nations
Climate Markets and Investment Association
Conference of the Parties
Emissions Trading Scheme
European Union
Framework for Various Approaches
Global Forest Coalition
greenhouse gas
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
Joint Implementation
Least Developed Countries
measurement, reporting and verification
Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Action
non-governmental organisation
New Market Mechanism
Quantified Emission Limitation or Reduction
Objective
REDD+ Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and
Forest Degradation
SBSTA Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological
Advice
UNEP United Nations Environment Programme
UNFCCC United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change
WGBU German Global Advisory Council
2
Introduction
The establishment of new market mechanisms under the
Convention has grown out of discussions under the Bali
Action Plan (BAP) on various approaches to enhance the
cost-efficiency of mitigation actions. New market mechanisms were ‘considered’ and ‘defined’ in the Cancun and
Durban decisions, and a work programme on non-market
approaches was established in the Doha decision.1 Yet
the establishment of new markets under the Convention,
whether under the Framework for Various Approaches (FVA)
or the New Market Mechanism (NMM) remains contentious.
The Philippines have noted that the Convention is inherently a non-market approach, and the discussions around
markets are about introducing market mechanisms under
the Convention, which represents new responsibilities for
developing country Parties.2 For other Parties, such as the
EU and Norway, progress on the FVA and NMM remains a
key outcome for the Conference of the Parties (COP) 19 in
Warsaw in November 2013.3 At COP 18 in Doha, many Parties
– including China, Brazil, India, South Africa, Ecuador, Bolivia,
Grenada and Venezuela – were reluctant to move forward
on the NMM, expressing concerns about defining the NMM
when there is no agreement on what this is in practice.4
In this context, it is hardly surprising that recent submissions
on the FVA and the NMM have contained a range of views
from Parties and observers, with many questioning the
wisdom of pushing forward new markets in the face of lack
of demand and the failure of existing markets.7 Bolivia has
called for a moratorium on the establishment of any new
markets under the Convention, saying that carbon markets
support the constitution of a new global right – the right
to pollute – and contradict environmental integrity and the
basic science of climate change.8
A broad coalition of NGOs concur with Bolivia, concluding
in their submission that ‘given the urgent need to reduce
emissions, the centrality of the markets discussion under
the UNFCCC is distracting, dangerous and irrelevant at this
critical moment.’9 This report gives an overview of developments around market mechanisms in the climate negotiations, and analyses the potential for effective mitigation
and raising climate finance from these mechanisms, with a
particular focus on forests.
There is much opposition to the use of market mechanisms
under the Convention, and little real-world evidence to
substantiate the oft-repeated claim that carbon markets
are the most cost-effective way to reduce emissions. The
climate crisis has now reached what can be
described as a ‘planetary emergency’, with
GHG emissions increasing globally – recently
crossing the 400ppm threshold – already
well beyond levels considered safe for a
stable climate system.5 Current pledges are
expected to lead us to a world of 4–6˚-C
warming compared to pre-industrial temperatures, with catastrophic outcomes.6
CARBON MARKETS SUPPORT
THE CONSTITUTION OF A
NEW GLOBAL RIGHT – THE
RIGHT TO POLLUTE...
1
2
3
4
5
6
Decision 1/CP.16 para 80 agrees to consider the establishment, at CP.17, of one or more
market-based mechanisms. Decision 2/CP.17 para 83 defines, but does not establish, an
NMM. Decision 1/CP.18 para’s 44, 47 and 50 request SBSTA work programmes on the FVA,
non-market approaches and the NMM respectively.
TWN Bonn News Update (3-14 June 2013) no 27. http://www.twn.my/title2/climate/
bonn.news.11.htm
See Party submissions on FVA and NMM (25 march 2013) at: http://unfccc.int/
documentation/submissions_from_parties/items/5901.php
Personal notes, 4 December 2012, contact group on FVA, COP 18.
See: 400ppm from 350.org http://400.350.org/#1
See: Kevin Anderson, Climate Change, going beyond dangerous – Brutal numbers and
tenuous hope, in Development Dialogue September 2012 | What Next Volume III | Climate,
Development and Equity. http://whatnext.org/resources/Publications/Volume-III/Singlearticles/wnv3_andersson_144.pdf
New ‘Market Mechanisms’ – no new finance for forests
7
8
9
See http://unfccc.int/documentation/submissions_from_parties/items/5901.php and
http://unfccc.int/documentation/submissions_from_observers/items/7482.php for Party
and observer submissions on markets (25 March 2013); and http://climatemarkets.org/
blog/a-wake-for-carbon-offsets-but-will-lessons-be-learned-for-climate-finance.html
for news on carbon markets and climate finance.
TWN Bonn News Update (3-14 June 2013) no 18. http://www.twn.my/title2/climate/
bonn.news.11.htm
See NGO submission at http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2013/smsn/ngo/338.pdf
3
Purpose and scope of the FVA
The work programme on the FVA aims to arrive at a decision
in Warsaw, yet recent discussions at SBSTA 38 failed to
resolve the purpose and scope of the FVA, with wide
divergences. While some Parties see the FVA as a broad
framework to guide market and non-market approaches
under the Convention, others, including the European
Union, Norway, Australia, the US and Japan see the FVA as
a framework to create guidance for international aspects
of domestic emissions trading systems, providing UN
oversight for internationally traded units used for compliance under the Convention.10
The Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS) have cautioned
against the risk of market fragmentation in this context,
saying that the FVA should be limited to a regulation and
coordination mechanism to develop common accounting
frameworks for markets under the Convention and under
the Kyoto Protocol (KP), without providing oversight
of markets developed outside the Convention. AOSIS
says that this will lead to a fragmented and decentralized approach to the use of international offset units11
– with each trading system adopting a different definition of what counts as ‘a ton of carbon’, it would be impossible to ensure the environmental integrity of such a
scheme.12
meaning that the purpose of the FVA should be to enhance
the implementation of the Convention. Malaysia and Bolivia
suggest that the purpose should be to establish the criteria
to assess the eligibility of approaches, not only focusing
only on markets.14
By the end of SBSTA 38, there was still no agreement on
the purpose and scope of the FVA. In the final negotiating
session in Bonn, while the United States, Australia, the EU
and others said they would like to adopt the text “in the spirit
of compromise”, and Norway emphasised the need to move
forward, many countries felt that the questions presented in
the draft conclusions for Warsaw prejudged the outcomes.
Bolivia, Venezuela, the Philippines and Tuvalu felt there
was a lack of balance in the text generally, emphasising
the need to focus on purpose and scope, and not move
ahead with prescriptive questions prematurely, calling for
a more balanced debate between market and non-market
approaches, and a clear understanding of how the purpose
and scope of the FVA relates to raising ambition.15
Several developing countries, including the Philippines,
Brazil, China, Tuvalu and Senegal on behalf of LDCs, have
emphasised that it is important to focus on the purpose
of the framework and the scope of the approaches to be
included, before undertaking detailed work. 13 Saudi Arabia
noted that this agenda item was introduced in the Bali
Action Plan (BAP) to meet the objective of the Convention,
...MANY COUNTRIES FELT THAT THE QUESTIONS
PRESENTED IN THE DRAFT CONCLUSIONS FOR
WARSAW PREJUDGED THE OUTCOMES.
10
11
12
13
TWN Bonn News Update (3-14 June 2013) no 18. http://www.twn.my/title2/climate/
bonn.news.11.htm
TWN Bonn News Update (3-14 June 2013) no 18. http://www.twn.my/title2/climate/
bonn.news.11.htm
See Oscar Reyes (2-13) A wake for carbon offsets. http://climatemarkets.org/blog/awake-for-carbon-offsets-but-will-lessons-be-learned-for-climate-finance.html
TWN Bonn News Update (3-14 June 2013) no 27. http://www.twn.my/title2/climate/
bonn.news.11.htm
New ‘Market Mechanisms’ – no new finance for forests
14
15
TWN Bonn News Update (3-14 June 2013) no 18. http://www.twn.my/title2/climate/
bonn.news.11.htm
TWN Bonn News Update (3-14 June 2013) no 27. http://www.twn.my/title2/climate/
bonn.news.11.htm
4
Purpose and structure of the NMM
The purpose of the NMM, as stated in the Cancun and
Durban decisions, is to promote cost-effectiveness in
emissions reductions and provide comparability in mitigation actions, ensuring a net decrease and/or avoidance
of global greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions and assisting
developed country Parties to meet part of their mitigation targets. The EU and Norway suggest that enhancing
the cost-effectiveness of mitigation actions will lead to an
increase in the overall level of ambition.16
of the COP; voluntary participation; the concept of a net
decrease of greenhouse gas emissions; and avoiding
double-counting. These guiding elements are open to a
range of interpretations, raising new concerns such as the
expansion of carbon markets to include forests and other
land-based emissions (element d), and the concept of net
reductions as a way of moving beyond offsetting (element
c). These concerns are discussed in greater detail below in
the context of forests and the NMM.
In terms of structure of the NMM, Norway and the EU are
closely aligned in their vision of an NMM as a centralised
market operating under the authority of the COP, replacing
the existing project-based mechanisms with a mechanism
that covers broad sectors of developing country economies.
In this context the EU reiterates support for the Least
Developed Countries (LDCs) to participate in the Clean
Development Mechanism (CDM), but states that countries
with the necessary capacity should move towards participation in the NMM and ultimately in cap-and-trade systems.
Sectoral trading and crediting
Other countries, notably those moving ahead with their own
domestic emissions trading schemes, such as Australia, New
Zealand and the US, are supportive of a divergent approach,
outlining a model for the NMM which makes it difficult to
differentiate from the FVA. They envisage an NMM in which
national and other emissions trading schemes can meet
agreed ‘guidelines’, in order for credits from these systems
to be eligible for international trading for compliance
purposes against UNFCCC commitments. Other Parties
wanting to minimise UN oversight and maximise flexibility
include Saudi Arabia, Tunisia and Japan.
The Doha decision contains a list of agreed elements for
the NMM,17 including its operation under the authority
16
17
See Party submissions on FVA and NMM (25 march 2013) at: http://unfccc.int/
documentation/submissions_from_parties/items/5901.php
Decision 1/CP.17 para 51: Elements of the SBSTA work programme on NMM: (a) Its
operation under the guidance and authority of the Conference of the Parties; (b) The
voluntary participation of Parties in the mechanism; (c) Standards that deliver real,
permanent, additional, and verified mitigation outcomes, avoid double counting of
effort and achieve a net decrease and/or avoidance of greenhouse gas emissions; (d)
Requirements for the accurate measurement, reporting and verification of emission
reductions, emission removals and/or avoided emissions; (e) Means to stimulate
mitigation across broad segments of the economy, which are defined by the participating
Parties and may be on a sectoral and/or project‐specific basis; (f) Criteria, including
the application of conservative methods, for the establishment, approval and periodic
adjustment of ambitious reference levels (crediting thresholds and/or trading caps) and
for the periodic issuance of units based on mitigation below a crediting threshold or based
on a trading cap; (g) Criteria for the accurate and consistent recording and tracking of
units.
New ‘Market Mechanisms’ – no new finance for forests
While diverging views mean that the form and structure of
a possible NMM remain undecided, one key distinction in
the approaches under discussion is between sectoral and
project-specific approaches. The NMM is generally understood to go beyond the project-by-project approach used
in the CDM and JI, and to ‘scale up’ to cover economy-wide
sectors. The EU has made several submissions detailing
sectoral crediting and trading systems, and suggests that
for both, ‘New Reduction Units’ would be issued which
Parties could use for compliance with emission reduction
obligations under the Convention.18 China, on the other
hand, supports a project-based crediting mechanism, and
argues that the NMM should not replace the market-based
mechanisms under the KP.19 AOSIS and CfRN advocate an
approach that allows units generated from either sectoral
or project-based mechanisms to be eligible for compliance
purposes under the Convention and the second commitment period of the KP.20
The three main proposals currently on the table are sectoral
crediting, sectoral trading, and project-based (or installation-based) crediting.
t 4
FDUPSBMDSFEJUJOHemissions reductions are generated
and verified before credits are issued, meaning that
credits are issued ex-post. The Norwegian submission
stated that credit units would be issued only if the
sector as a whole reduces emissions beyond the established crediting threshold. This creates problems for the
18
19
20
See EU submission at: http://unfccc.int/files/documentation/submissions_from_parties/
application/pdf/nmm_eu.pdf
See presentation from China at SBSTA workshop on NMM, Bonn, 19 May 2012: http://
unfccc.int/files/bodies/awg-lca/application/pdf/20120518_china_2100.pdf
See submissions at: http://unfccc.int/documentation/submissions_from_parties/
items/5901.php
5
private sector, which prefer to invest in individual installations rather than risk non-performance across an entire
sector. The sectoral approach would reduce operating
costs compared to a project-by-project CDM approach,
but rules out many vulnerable countries and LDCs from
having the capacity to participate in such a mechanism.
A crediting approach also requires countries to invest
in achieving verified emissions reductions before they
can trade these for finance – another barrier to entry for
poorer countries.
AOSIS and LDCs are calling for existing rules and eligibility
criteria under the KP to be applied to any new markets under
the Convention, stating that an international framework for
market mechanisms already exists under the KP.24 The Philippines has said that markets are outside of the Convention, and introducing elements from the KP flexible mechanisms into the Convention represents new responsibilities
for developing countries, with several other Parties raising
concerns during SBSTA 38 that the NMM should not shift the
mitigation burden to developing countries.25
t 4
FDUPSBM USBEJOH allowances are issued ex-ante, to
be traded among installations at completion of the
crediting period (ETS model). An emissions cap is established per sector, with allowances traded between those
who are under or over the cap. A trading scheme based
on allowances, such as the EU ETS, is more efficient than
a crediting mechanism, but it also requires significantly
greater institutional capacity, both to enable effective
enforcement, policing and monitoring of the scheme,
and to distribute allowances via auctioning or other
allocation methods. Developing countries face major
capacity constraints in implementing sectoral trading,
given that the EU has not managed to avoid the pitfalls
of over-allocation, fraud and price collapse in its own
ETS.21 Norway has suggested that governance levels
could vary between the crediting and trading tracks.22
In the face of failing carbon markets and spiraling climate
change, Bolivia has called for a moratorium on market
mechanisms under the Convention. Conservation organisations such as WWF, usually supportive of a market-based
approach to mitigation, have noted that the current low
levels of ambition give little or no justification to establish
an NMM or any other market-based approach, and they
have warned that they will oppose the NMM if it repeats the
failures of the existing carbon markets and broadens the
already huge gap between the low pledges made, and the
steep emissions reductions needed.26 Many other Parties
emphasised the need to establish linkages between the
possibility of a NMM and an increase in Annex 1 mitigation
ambition, and the need to review the collapse of the current
carbon market, including China, India, Tuvalu, Saudi Arabia,
Bolivia and Cuba.27
t 1
SPKFDUCBTFE DSFEJUJOH credits are issued ex-post
to individual projects or installations, which show
emissions reductions relative to a baseline which is
established for defined project boundaries (the CDM
model). This is the preferred approach for the private
sector, with the Carbon Markets Investors Association
(CMIA) stating that individual installations should be rewarded for compliance, to avoid the non-compliance of
some installations affecting others.23
Additionality and leakage have
proved to be obstacles to achieving
genuine emissions reductions under
project-based approaches.
...THE CURRENT LOW LEVELS
OF AMBITION GIVE LITTLE
OR NO JUSTIFICATION TO
ESTABLISH AN NMM...
24
21
22
23
EU ETS myth busting: Why it can’t be reformed and shouldn’t be replicated. April 2013,
http://www.fern.org/EUETSmythbusting
See Norwegian NMM submission: http://unfccc.int/files/documentation/submissions_
from_parties/application/pdf/nmm_norway.pdf
See CMIA NMM submission: http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2013/smsn/ngo/336.pdf
New ‘Market Mechanisms’ – no new finance for forests
25
26
27
TWN Bonn News Update (3-14 June 2013) no 18. http://www.twn.my/title2/climate/
bonn.news.11.htm
TWN Bonn News Update (3-14 June 2013) no 27. http://www.twn.my/title2/climate/
bonn.news.11.htm
See WWF NMM submission: http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2013/smsn/ngo/342.pdf
TWN Bonn News Update (3-14 June 2013) no 18. http://www.twn.my/title2/climate/
bonn.news.11.htm
6
Forests and the NMM
There is some convergence of discussion on forests and
the NMM, with several submissions (CfRN, US, Indonesia)
referring to REDD+ as one possible sector for piloting of
the NMM. The wording of element (d) in the Doha decision
on the NMM (see footnote 17), which refers to the MRV
of emissions removals and avoided emissions as well as
emissions reductions, also opens the NMM up to emissions
from the land-use sector. This raises questions regarding the
appropriateness of different sectors for emissions trading
mechanisms.
The WWF submission states that some sectors are not
appropriate for crediting; the CMIA submission points
out that only developed economic sectors are eligible for
credit issuance/trading, while a submission from the Global
Forest Coalition (GFC) and others argues that sectors with
dispersed emission sources are not appropriate for market
mechanisms. This last point relates to lack of fungibility
between terrestrial and fossil emissions. While some Parties
argue that ‘a ton is a ton’ (CfRN submission), regardless of
the emissions source and location, the idea that reductions
in emissions from the land use sector can compensate for
or ‘offset’ emissions in other sectors is scientifically flawed.28
The Coalition for Rainforest Nations (CfRN) have put forward
an approach suggesting that the REDD+ mechanism should
be defined as part of the NMM, with a pilot phase to be
launched at COP19 in Warsaw. They propose that units
generated from results‐based actions for REDD+ could then
be used by developed countries which are Party to the KP to
meet their emissions reduction obligations (QELROs) under
the second commitment period. The use of NMM units for
compliance in the second period of the KP forms part of the
Durban outcome,29 although there has been long-standing
resistance to forest credits being eligible for meeting
commitments under the KP.
difficult to measure emissions accurately or data is unreliable, such as the forest sector.30
Fungibility
The need for full fungibility in emissions units is expressed
in several submissions, in particular those from the private
sector, but also from the CfRN. This refers to the ability to
trade emissions reduction units from different sources and
locations. Full fungibility does not currently exist in compliance carbon markets, with forest carbon credits in the CDM
subject to strict permanence rules, and excluded from the
EU ETS altogether over concerns relating to permanence,
leakage and verification.31
The enthusiasm of some Parties to include forests in
the NMM therefore raises concerns, given the particular
problems of quantifying and trading carbon from terrestrial
sources. Emissions from land-based sources such as forests
and soil are particularly prone to reversal, with fires, drought
and climate change itself increasing the risk that terrestrial
carbon pools will release CO2 rather than sequester it.32 In
addition, high levels of uncertainty remain in accounting for
terrestrial emissions. For land based carbon sequestration,
estimating and measuring uncertainties of 50% or more are
common, meaning reductions in emissions are often indistinguishable from errors.33
The German Global Advisory Council (WGBU) has stated that,
in the long run, fossil fuel emissions cannot be compensated
for by the terrestrial biosphere, and has called for emissions
from land-use change to be treated separately to emissions
generated from fossil fuel combustion.34 Due to the fundamental difference between carbon pools, if energy-related
30
During negotiations at SBSTA 38 in Bonn, the EU noted
that market approaches are not always the most cost
effective measure, in particular for REDD+, while AOSIS said
approaches which do not rely on offsets can allow countries
to access finance up-front, and should be used where it is
31
32
33
28
29
Mackey et al (2013) Untangling the confusion around land carbon science and climate
mitigation policy. Nature Climate Change 3 552-557
[1) Decision 1/CMP.7, Annex 3 (proposed amendments to the Kyoto Protocol) - Article 3,
paragraph 12 bis allow any units from any mechanism established under the Convention
to be used to meet Annex 1 Parties compliance targets under the Kyoto Protocol
New ‘Market Mechanisms’ – no new finance for forests
34
TWN Bonn News Update (3-14 June 2013) no 18. http://www.twn.my/title2/climate/
bonn.news.11.htm
See DG Climate Action, http://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/forests/lulucf/index_en.htm
See: Cox et al (2000) Acceleration of global warming due to carbon-cycle feedbacks in
a coupled climate model. Nature 408 184-187; Fearnside P (2004) Are climate change
impacts already affecting tropical forest biomass? Global Environmental Change 14
299-302; Choat B, et al. (2012) Global convergence in the vulnerability of forests to
drought. Nature doi:10.1038/nature11688; Friedlingstein P, et al. (2006) Climate–carbon
cycle feedback analysis: Results from the C4MIP model intercomparison. J. Climate 19
3337–3353, among others.
See Pelletier J, et al. (2011) Diagnosing the uncertainty and detectability of emission
reductions for REDD+ under current capabilities: an example for Panama. Environmental
Research Letters 6
Members of the German Advisory Council on Global Change (WBGU), “Solving the
climate dilemma: the budget approach. Special Report” (1 November 2008) http://www.
wbgu.de/fileadmin/templates/dateien/veroeffentlichungen/sondergutachten/sn2009/
wbgu_sn2009_en.pdf
7
emissions are offset against biological sinks
(whether as avoided sources of emissions or
sinks), this justifies the combustion of fossil fuels
from permanent fossil fuel reservoirs, which
have formed over geological periods. Equating
permanent fossil fuel sinks with terrestrial sinks,
and trading one for the other (permitting higher
emissions from the combustion of fossil fuels)
brings the risk that the carbon stored in terrestrial ecosystems is released again after only a few
decades or centuries.35
Permanence
The risk of non-permanence (reversals) is
dealt with in CDM forestry projects by issuing
temporary credits, which must be replaced
on expiration. The temporary nature of these
credits provides a disincentive to buyers,
resulting in insufficient project revenues. Some
Parties (including Australia) are pushing for
new approaches to address non-permanence
which increase market liquidity, such as the
use of buffers and insurance, or reducing the
time-frame to ensure permanence. All of these
‘solutions’ compromise the integrity of emissions
reductions, and are done in order to provide
fungibility while transferring liability and responsibility for permanence to host countries.
Bolivia’s submission on the NMM highlights the scientific
and conceptual incongruity of emissions markets with the
basic science of climate change, in particular the simplified
approach of carbon markets which avoids the reality that
different greenhouse gases have different global warming
potentials.36 Mackey et al point out that for land-based
emissions reductions to compensate for the burning of
fossil fuels, permenance would have to be guaranteed on a
time-scale of 10,000 years and more.37
‘Beyond offsets’ – net emission reductions
Given the criticisms of the CDM, and the general recognition of the inability of offsetting to reduce emissions at the
35
36
37
See also: Mackey et al (2013) Untangling the confusion around land carbon science and
climate mitigation policy. Nature Climate Change 3 552-557
See: http://unfccc.int/files/documentation/submissions_from_parties/application/pdf/
nmm_bolivia.pdf
Mackey et al. (2013) Untangling the confusion around land carbon science and climate
mitigation policy. Nature Climate Change 3 552-557
New ‘Market Mechanisms’ – no new finance for forests
speed or scale required, central to discussions to scale up
carbon markets, is the claim to move ‘beyond offsetting’. The
recent UNEP Emissions Gap report suggested that offsets
contribute around 1.5 Gt CO2e to the emissions gap.38 In
the ‘beyond offsets’ dialogue, the focus is on net emissions
reductions and conservative accounting approaches such
as crediting thresholds and discount factors, with the EU
submission referring to the ‘transition from pure offsetting
to the generation of net mitigation benefits.’39
The concept of a net decrease in emissions has yet to be
defined. A net decrease is assumed to have been achieved
by setting ‘crediting thresholds’ which are below the business-as-usual (BAU) baseline, discounting, or other conservative accounting measures which reward less than the
measured emission reductions. Conservative accounting
alone, however, would likely be insufficient to achieve a
38
39
UNEP (2012) The Emissions Gap report. http://www.unep.org/pdf/2012gapreport.pdf
See EU submission at: http://unfccc.int/files/documentation/submissions_from_parties/
application/pdf/nmm_eu.pdf
8
...CONSERVATIVE ACCOUNTING...ALSO
CARRIES THE DANGER OF TRANSFERRING
THE MITIGATION BURDEN TO DEVELOPING
COUNTRIES, WHILE SIMULTANEOUSLY
REDUCING THE FINANCIAL SUPPORT FOR THESE
COUNTRIES TO REDUCE EMISSIONS.
‘net decrease’ in global emissions,40 given that it would
also require the elimination of double-counting, as well as
cancelling of units – recognised as politically and technically
difficult to achieve.41
The concept of conservative accounting, as well as failing to
achieve a net decrease in emissions and thereby go ‘beyond
offsetting’, also carries the danger of transferring the mitigation burden to developing countries, while simultaneously
reducing the financial support for these countries to reduce
emissions.
Discounting
One of the purposes of conservative accounting is to
increase confidence in the environmental integrity of
carbon credits, by issuing fewer credits than were generated,
thereby compensating for any inaccuracies in measurements, baseline setting, leakage or reversals. For example, if
a project or action generates 100 tonnes of emissions reductions, but is only rewarded for 40 tonnes (a 60% discount
factor), then the risk of overall emissions increasing is
reduced. In this scenario, the burden for environmental
integrity is borne by host countries that wish to participate
in a market mechanism by decreasing income potential.
In order to circumvent this problem, the CfRN submission
proposes that discount factors are applied at the point of
use, rather than the source of emission reductions. Presumably this would mean that countries purchasing emission
reduction units would need to purchase more units than
40
41
UNFCCC NMM Technical Paper, 24 August 2012. http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2012/
tp/04.pdf
Kollmus et al. (2013) New climate mitigation mechanisms: stocktaking after Doha, http://
www.infras.ch/e/news/displaynewsitem.php?id=4947
New ‘Market Mechanisms’ – no new finance for forests
they can actually use for compliance, rather than host
countries being able to sell fewer units than they actually
verified. In reality this would probably result in a lower price
for purchased units, thereby having a similar on the income
potential for host countries.
Crediting thresholds
The EU vision of the NMM, and of REDD+, includes a
‘crediting threshold,’ which is well below a conservatively
defined baseline, as one way to achieve ‘net emissions reductions’. This requires developing country Parties to significantly reduce their emissions compared to a BAU trajectory
before any credits are issued, through a ‘crediting baseline’
or ‘incentive level,’ which is set below the BAU baseline.
This is conceptually the same as unsupported NAMAs, and
puts additional burdens on developing countries (which
are expected to meet the gap between the business-asusual threshold and the crediting baseline with their own
resources). The conservative adjustment introduced with
a crediting threshold does not mitigate against the difficulty of setting credible baselines, and in practice requires
domestically funded developing country mitigation action
(termed ‘own efforts’ by the EU) before credits eligible for
international support are produced.
The EU introduced this concept during REDD+ negotiations
in Doha, by proposing an incentive level below the (historic)
baseline for emissions from deforestation. Many countries
found this concept confusing, and rejected it as contrary
to past agreements taken under the UNFCCC. The submission by GFC and others warns that conservative accounting
standards contravene the principles of the Convention by
shifting the mitigation burden, as well as the costs for this
burden, on to developing countries.
9
Failure of existing carbon markets
A large group of developing countries, including the African
Group, China, the Philippines, India, Tuvalu, Saudi Arabia,
Bolivia and Cuba have emphasised the need to learn from
the current collapse of carbon markets to inform any discussion on new markets, and to understand the relationship
between markets and ambition.42 There is a need for a
fundamental assessment of whether carbon trading can
deliver real, effective and additional emissions reductions.
Lessons from existing carbon markets show a failure in any
significant reduction in emissions or generation of climate
finance.
Since its inception the CDM has been subject to a host of
criticisms, in particular for its failure to reduce emissions, and
its failure to deliver on sustainable development objectives.
The inability of CDM projects to prove additionality43 has
meant that the CDM, as an offsetting mechanism, has likely
contributed to an increase in global GHG emissions – in the
worst-case scenario estimated to be 3.6 Gt-CO2eq cumula-
tively by 2020.44 The move from project-based to sectoral
approaches proposed in NMM discussions does not resolve,
but risks worsening the potential for increased emissions,
due to the greater volumes of emissions reductions involved
when scaling up to entire sectors of an economy.
The WWF submission highlights a range of fundamental
problems with the CDM, including but not limited to the
lack of additionality, lack of sustainable development
benefits, human rights violations, unequal regional distribution, lack of technology transfer, lack of cost effectiveness in
some instances, perverse incentives and double counting.
The submission from GFC et al. reiterates these issues with
the CDM, and exposes further problems with the EU ETS,
such as a vulnerability to fraud and oversupply of credits,
leading to an estimated cost to the taxpayer of €242 billion
by 2020. This sum, if invested directly in clean energy technology, could have achieved emissions reductions of 40% in
the EU over that time.45
...VULNERABILITY TO FRAUD AND
OVERSUPPLY OF CREDITS...
42
43
TWN Bonn News Update (3-14 June 2013) no 18. http://www.twn.my/title2/climate/
bonn.news.11.htm
Additionality refers to the need for emissions reductions that are awarded ‘offset credits’
to be additional to what would have happened in the absence of the project (business as
usual).
New ‘Market Mechanisms’ – no new finance for forests
44
45
Randall Spalding-Fecher et al. (2013) Assessing the Impact of the Clean Development
Mechanism. Report commissioned by the High-Level Panel on the CDM Policy Dialogue.
UBS analysis 2011
10
Conclusions and recommendations
Central to the use of carbon markets to reduce emissions
is the idea that they deliver real, permanent, additional and
verified mitigation outcomes. This briefing highlights the
barriers to this, the most important of which is the attempt
to create a ‘fungible unit’ which can be considered as comparable with emissions reduction units from different sectors,
in particular between fossil and terrestrial emissions. The
false assumption that reductions in emissions from the land
use sector can offset or compensate for emissions from fossil
fuels makes it impossible to achieve permanent and additional emissions reductions.
Introducing standards to ensure environmental integrity is
either not possible in a market mechanism (in the case of
non-fungibility for example), or is achieved at the cost of
shifting the burden for environmental integrity to developing countries. Developments such as weakening permanence rules to improve market liquidity, while discounting
credits to account for uncertainty in emissions reductions
illustrate this point. Host countries will need to invest a great
deal of money to measure and verify carbon to participate in
REDD+ or an NMM, while conservative accounting methods,
such as a discount rate or buffers, will reduce the eventual
amount of carbon credits compensated to a fraction of the
carbon measured. An NMM should not be used to introduce
emissions reduction commitments, nor as a vehicle of
financial and technical support to developing countries.
All countries must work together for effective climate mitigation. This requires ambitious and steep targets from
developed countries, with support for NAMAs and low
carbon development in developing countries.
and delay the structural changes necessary to address
climate change. Instead of examining the fundamentals of
an economic and political system, carbon trading adjusts
the problem of climate change to fit and to benefit the
polluters.”47
Recommendations
” * OUIFGBDFPGDVSSFOUMBDLPGEFNBOEBOEPWFS
supply of credits from existing market mechanisms
until 2020, there should be no new markets under
the Convention.
” 5
IFQSPWJTJPOPGMPOHUFSNDMJNBUFGJOBODFJT
critical for effective mitigation in developing
countries. Relying on carbon markets to provide
climate finance has already proven to be a failed
experiment, risking temperature increases as
emissions continue.
” Effectively addressing climate change will require
a range of approaches – this is reflected in the
EJTDVTTJPOTPOOPONBSLFUNFDIBOJTNT XIFSF
many countries have suggested solutions such as
GPTTJMGVFMTVCTJEZSFGPSN GFFEJOUBSJGGT UFDIOPMPHZ
and energy efficiency standards, the role of
technology transfer and intellectual property rights
*13T BOEBEESFTTJOHVOTVTUBJOBCMFDPOTVNQUJPO
QBUUFSOTBTFMFNFOUTPGBOPONBSLFUCBTFE
approach.48
Recent analysis of the NMM has shown that the challenges
for scaling up to a sectoral approach are formidable.46
The expansion of markets
will require substantial
capacity-building in developing countries, with low
carbon prices providing
no guarantee of income.
“Ultimately, carbon trading
is a means to pre-empt
CARBON TRADING... DELAYS THE
STRUCTURAL CHANGES NECESSARY
TO ADDRESS CLIMATE CHANGE
47
46
See Kollmus et al (2013) ‘New Climate mitigation Mechanisms: Stocktaking after Doha’,
http://www .infras.ch/e/news/displaynewsitem.php?id=4947 and ‘Design options for
sectoral carbon market mechanisms’ (2013) Ecorys report for DG Climate Action, European
Commission, http://ec.europa.eu/clima/news/articles/news_2012111402_en.htm
New ‘Market Mechanisms’ – no new finance for forests
48
Tamra Gilbertson, Carbon Trade Watch, BBC World Service Interview, 17 April 2013,
transcript available: http://www.redd-monitor.org/2013/07/18/australia-to-replacecarbon-tax-with-emissions-trading-scheme/#more-14209
TWN Bonn News Update (3-14 June 2013) no 18. http://www.twn.my/title2/climate/
bonn.news.11.htm
11
Norges Naturvernforbund
Mariboes gate 8, 0183 Oslo
Norway
Tel: (47) 23 10 96 10
Email: naturvern@naturvernforbundet.no
www.naturforbundet.no
Rainforest Foundation Norway
Mariboes gate 8, 0183 Oslo
Norway
Tel: (47) 23 10 95 00
Email: rainforest@rainforest.no
www.rainforest.no