Penultimate Proof of:
1
O
O
FS
Devin Singh, "Class," in Encyclopedia of Religious Ethics, edited by William Schweiker, et al,
Wiley-Blackwell, 2022, 1068-1076.
Class
Devin Singh
PR
Introduction
R
R
EC
TE
D
In this entry, I review attempts to describe and analyze class in relation to common metrics such as
income, wealth, earning potential, and economic mobility. Rather than simply by quantitative indices, I
claim that class should be defined primarily by the forms of economic power and privilege accessible to
a given subset of society. Such power and privilege can be further understood by the relationship to labor
and the means of production, and by the capacity or lack thereof to realize the economic interests of a
given social subset. Such positionality is deeply imbricated in culturally specific markers of status, intellectual and cultural capital, and other forms of symbolic power. It also intersects crucially with categories of race, gender, and sexuality and requires intersectional analysis. I consider matters of class
consciousness and relate this to discussions of the epistemic privilege of the poor and marginalized. I
then explore what class means for religious ethics, asking how religious and ethical concerns (informed
primarily by Christian traditions) interact with the question of class. I offer outlines for a normative
framework for approaching the question of class within religious ethics, informed by liberationist perspectives, womanist traditions of social ethics, and an ethics of care.
O
What is Class?
U
N
C
While any given society is multiform, and social groupings are crisscrossed with a variety of differentiating factors and markers, for heuristic and socio‐analytic purposes, not to mention the needs of demography and policy, class distinctions are typically based on economic factors (Wright 2005; Rieger 2013).
Class is a term used, often vaguely, to capture the level and form of economic power and privilege accessible to particular segments of society. While this is not all that one might mean, this dimension of
economic power is significant and even central to understanding the category of class. Such economic
power is signaled by indicators like wealth and income level, as well as earning potential and economic
mobility. Yet attempts to delineate class neatly with quantitative metrics such as income or education
levels are usually inadequate for providing a meaningful descriptor of class identity. Class also signals
one’s positionality with regard to labor power, and the ability one has to command and enjoy the fruits
of labor. Class location and mobility are often a function of education or forms of cultural and intellectual
0005074735.INDD 1
02/11/2021 6.55.28 PM
2
Class
U
N
C
O
R
R
EC
TE
D
PR
O
O
FS
capital, such as skill, training, and experience, and often run together with other social factors such as
one’s relational network and the opportunities that arise because of one’s affiliations. This is why multidimensional and intersectional analyses are typically necessary when class is under consideration, since
many social and cultural factors are at work in determining class identity and the mobility one might
have within and out of a class.
Demarcating class based on simple quantitative metrics may be useful from a technocratic perspective
of social policy and planning, but it is rarely socially explanatory. It may also lead to interesting tensions
depending upon the metrics used. Consider the option of basing class distinctions on either education
level or income level, both common metrics used in the United States. In an oft‐cited comparison between university professors and tradespeople such as construction workers and electricians, professors
may be in a “higher” class relative to tradespeople when education level is considered, but in a “lower”
class relative to tradespeople when income level is considered. Beyond the potentially contradictory
policy proposals that might originate from such a case, depending upon what measure is used, such metrics consider class identity in a vacuum, evaluating a single variable that on its own yields little insight.
One influential way to delineate class draws upon classical Marxian categories (Marx 1976). Class
figured centrally in Marx’s analysis of capitalist society and indeed was extended to various other periods
and economic formations. Arguably, “[c]lass is the focus of Marx’s work not because he assigns it a
greater explanatory role in human history than other aspects of society, but rather because it has been
repressed from consciousness generally and from the consciousness of capitalism’s critics in particular”
(Wolff 2013, 30). Class thus emerges as a pivotal explanatory lens in part as a corrective to regnant forms
of social analysis blind to its importance. His approach defines class in terms of the mode of production
and one’s location within the particular relations of production within that mode. One can delineate and
assess segments within a society based upon how they operate within the specific mechanisms of power
that sequester labor and use it to generate value through the engines of production.
Within capitalism, the major class distinction is between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat. The former
class owns the means of production and hence retains control over technology, machinery, land, and all
elements used by labor to create value and produce goods. Members of the latter class own only their labor
power and must sell this labor to the bourgeoisie in exchange for a wage. The wage is therefore used as a
demarcator of labor and signature of value. Class belonging here thus defines where one stands in this
broad economic schema. The bourgeoisie or capitalist class retains control over the means of production
and various artifacts of congealed labor power such as machinery and other technology. The proletariat or
working class retains control over its labor power, and is constrained to work for the capitalist class to generate the means of subsistence and social reproduction. Its labor also generates a surplus, however, and yet
the mechanisms of capitalism allocate this surplus to the ownership of the bourgeoisie or capitalist class
despite it stemming from the labor of the proletariat. This approach using classic Marxian categories is thus
useful for understanding the allocation of power and access in a society, prompting questions of justice and
resource distribution, such as whether the needs for survival and flourishing are being broadly met.
The Marxian lens draws attention to two factors that remain central to class analysis: economic power
and privilege and the fact that class is a relational category. As suggested at the outset, class remains
meaningful when attending to economic dimensions primarily, even while intersectional realities must
be kept in view. Beyond economic metrics, however, many of which take class as a static category, the
significance of class analysis emerges when power and privilege are brought into view. Power is the
capacity to realize one’s class interests and those interests are often conflictual and agonistic with respect
0005074735.INDD 2
02/11/2021 6.55.28 PM
Class in Society
3
PR
O
O
FS
to other classes. Therefore, power includes the capacity to influence and direct the will and actions of
other classes. Class thus pertains to the types of economic power that a certain subset of society is able
to exert on other segments of society, with privilege indexing the particular advantages a class has in
exercising said power.
Most complex societies involve divisions of labor, with subsets defined by the types of labor they perform, the differential values placed on that labor, and potentially but not necessarily different allocations
of the fruits of such labor. Group levels of economic power and privilege are modified and conditioned
by the group’s location in a social network. Such levels are dynamic and processual, and best captured
not in isolated or fixed indices but in analysis of the entire network and of the operation of the parts in
relation to the whole (Thompson 1964). Class is thus a relational term, addressing classes in distinction
from one another and in terms of their respective forms of agency and effects on each other
(Aronowitz 2003; Zweig 2004). This is why class is less helpfully demarcated in purely quantitative
terms – such as income level, net worth, or years of education. It requires additional evaluation in
qualitative terms – the forms of economic power a particular social subset is able to exercise as well as
the types of economic power to which it is subjected (Rehmann 2013).
D
Class in Society
U
N
C
O
R
R
EC
TE
Because class is a relational category and involves group location in a social network relative to other
groups, the category of social capital offers important resources for class assessment. Here I draw on the
work of Pierre Bourdieu, who extended Marxian categories to account for cultural and relational aspects
that remain critical for grasping the dynamics of economic power in societies. His analysis of the forms
of capital and the nature of distinction and symbolic power are particularly relevant in this regard
(Bourdieu 1986; Bourdieu 1998). Bourdieu’s approach draws attention to the relational aspect of capital,
which in turn connects with class as a relational category. His theory is also useful in helping to conceptualize the signals and symbols that mark class, the ways symbolic power and cultural methods of distinction figure into class agency and privilege. This also sheds light on how other social categories may
be indexed or cross‐referenced with class and modulated based on class position.
Bourdieu explains that capital can take on various modes in society, outlining three main forms: financial, social, and cultural capital. Financial capital deals with material wealth and typically economic
dimensions. Such a lens pertains most directly to dominant conceptions of class, calibrated as class tends
to be to “properly” economic factors. Social capital indicates the benefits that come from membership
within a group, however we define such benefits and however we demarcate group belonging. Such benefits stem from formal and informal relational networks within a social grouping, and provide a member
access to other benefits enjoyed by group members, many of which are economic. These benefits may
also be symbolic, wherein being marked as a group member alone affords advantages and privileges in a
society that ascribes honor, status, and power to such group identity. Cultural capital speaks to resources
of intellect, education, and artistic and cultural formation afforded certain group members that provide
unseen advantages in negotiating a society’s particular challenges and opportunities. Bourdieu notes
that capital exhibits fluidity and a capacity for conversion: one form of capital may transmute – or transubstantiate, to use his intentionally theological terminology – into another. This is why it is common
that access to one form of capital often affects one’s capital levels in its other forms.
0005074735.INDD 3
02/11/2021 6.55.28 PM
4
Class
U
N
C
O
R
R
EC
TE
D
PR
O
O
FS
Social capital signals that there is a kind of capital that inheres in belonging to particular social
groups. By necessity, social capital thus understood requires differentiation and exclusion. Without
boundary markers, such group membership is meaningless. In other words, if belonging to a certain
group means social status and advancement, such capital would evaporate if the barriers to entry
were eliminated and anyone could become part of the group. By its very nature, then, social capital
requires forms of distinction, exclusion, and boundary maintenance, however arbitrary. Observers
concerned with matters of justice and equality, as well as deleterious effects of segregation and marginalization in society, have thus highlighted the exclusionary dynamics of social capital’s
operations.
Because of the need for distinction and group boundary maintenance, groups develop symbolic
markers and signals of group belonging. Thorstein Veblen’s (1899) classic study of the leisure class offers
a glimpse into the ways classes differentiate themselves from one another. In this case, ruling class
belonging is marked by the forms of conspicuous consumption and leisure exhibited by group members.
He also demonstrates how such practices are at times emulated by those outside the class, in an attempt
to signal belonging or enjoy aspects of the privilege afforded such a class. Yet because groups are highly
effective at policing their boundaries and forms of social distinction, such emulation is typically discernible, meaning it does not lead to seamless inclusion within the dominant group. Indeed, the emulated
group may then modulate its practices, as in the case of the wealthy adopting forms of modesty and
occlusion of affluence, while the less wealthy exhibit types of ostentation in an effort to mimic a now
obsolete set of aristocratic practices. The insight from studies such as Veblen’s is that class belonging,
while centrally a factor of the type of economic power and privilege enjoyed by that group, is also bound
up with sets of practices and symbolic markers that indicate access and can transfer the privileges of
group belonging.
Whether or not symbolic differentiation is intentional, such distinction is often nevertheless at work in
societies, as groups based on class factors of economic power and forms of labor often accrue other cross‐
references such as race, gender, sexuality, and ability. It has long been observed that class is racialized
and gendered, with growing recognition that sexuality, too, factors in. Since labor power figures centrality in class identity, matters of ability are also clearly indexed, as barriers to and constraints around
work influence one’s ability to sell labor power. This means that categorization within particular identity
groups in society has a consistent, observable bearing on one’s class designation. This can be documented
in the statistically significant absence of women and racial/ethnic minorities among the class of owners
of the means of production. The long history of legal barriers to property ownership for such groups is
one of several clear causal factors for such disparity.
Therefore, both because of the group tendency to differentiate and police boundaries, and the
historical legacy of eliding class with other markers such as race, gender, sexuality, and ability, intersectional analyses are called for (Crenshaw 1995; Collins 2000). At the most fundamental level, this means
that when assessing class, that is, when evaluating the factors that forge differences among social subsets based on economic power and privilege, looking for “purely economic” factors is insufficient.
Examining the existence of class also requires attending to the reproduction of classes, and thus matters
of social reproduction and affective labor must also be considered (Bhattacharya 2017). Answers to the
why, how, whence, and whither of class differences will therefore come from analyzing these other
important identity markers and social categories that transcend the economic, narrowly construed.
0005074735.INDD 4
02/11/2021 6.55.28 PM
Class Consciousness and Epistemic Privilege
5
Class Consciousness and Epistemic Privilege
U
N
C
O
R
R
EC
TE
D
PR
O
O
FS
In assessing the presence and persistence of class differences in society, one is led to ask whether a
society and its various classes are aware of and recognize such differentiations, and what such
knowledge means for these allocations of economic power. Marx observed that members of the proletarian class had differing levels of awareness of their social location or of the existence of their class at
all, their class significance, and their capacity to change their class status. This awareness has been
termed “class consciousness.” Such capacity for recognition is historically and economically
conditioned (Marx 1963; Jameson 1981). One of the paradoxical benefits of capitalism is that the
forces of abstraction and reification that form commodities can also contribute to a critical distance
that enables a class to recognize itself, in ways that may be distorted but can be clarified (Lukács 1971).
The Marxist tradition generally seeks to transform the consciousness of the proletarian class from
mere self‐recognition (“class in itself”) to united solidarity and action against capitalism (“class for
itself”). A broader tradition of the sociology of knowledge stops short of advocating a specific political
program while recognizing more generally that class location will affect one’s perspective and view of
reality (Mannheim 1959).
Class consciousness can be related to what has been called the hermeneutical or epistemic privilege
of the poor and marginalized, a principle taken up in liberation theology (Boff 1993; Singh 2017). This
notion builds upon the biblical sense of God’s favor upon and presence among the poor (e.g. Matthew
25:31–46), as well as the Catholic magisterial principle of the “preferential option for the poor.” The
position extends the idea of such prioritization of the poor to a claim about where truth, clarity, and,
in some cases, revelation, are to be found. The claim is that the realities of the world and society are
seen most clearly from the vantage point of the poor. Those who would have eyes to see must adopt a
position alongside the poor and marginalized in order to grasp the truth of the situation. Not only can
the world be glimpsed more clearly, but divine truths apprehended more accurately from this
perspective.
For instance, the establishment of base ecclesial communities in Latin America – centered upon
reading scripture closely with members of impoverished and exploited classes – was fueled by the quest
for a clarity of mind and heart that was enabled by this lens of poverty and exclusion. Reading the Bible
and society “through the eyes of the poor,” then, proclaimed the belief that one’s particular social position in relation to economic power and privilege served or inhibited one’s access to the truth (Sobrino 1984).
Those of wealthy and privileged backgrounds had skewed views of reality. Aligning themselves with the
poor was a way not only to serve and show solidarity, but to seek their own epistemic salvation and interpret the world, themselves, and God correctly.
We can see how this coincides with the idea of proletarian class consciousness. The latter asserts that
a class for itself understands its position in society, the reasons for this location, and the mechanisms that
need to be changed in order to establish more just and equitable socio‐economic relations. Such a class
has achieved a kind of enlightenment, a heightened awareness of social realities, and a sense of the
course that must be plotted for liberation. Such awareness is not idealistic, however, remaining in the
realm of thought alone. Rather, it is manifested in praxis, in concrete action and effort to change class
distinctions. The class sees and acts clearly, and presumably any who join in solidarity with its struggle
and position come to see clearly as well.
0005074735.INDD 5
02/11/2021 6.55.28 PM
6
Class
Class and Religious Ethics
U
N
C
O
R
R
EC
TE
D
PR
O
O
FS
These matters of solidarity and alignment with marginalized classes raise ethical issues around class. While
class analysis may be done for the ostensibly neutral concerns of demography and social investigation, typically, when class is invoked, conversations about the appropriate individual and communal responses to
class tensions and inequities quickly follow. Already implicit in many of the approaches cited above, ethical
concerns abound concerning the nature of power differentials, inequities of privilege and access, and the
relative agency of certain classes with regard to others. Marx set his sights on a classless society, free from
the injustices engendered by class distinctions and differences. Working within a Marxist trajectory,
Bourdieu’s analysis of social capital also explores ways to overcome class power differences, in part through
the reallocation and redistribution of capital, often in its non‐economic forms, such as changes to education systems that prevent the ossification and exacerbation of cultural capital inequities.
What might it mean to think about class from the perspective of religious ethical theory? A number of
ethical theories and frameworks may be relevant to assessing class and responding to moral challenges
raised by the realities of class difference and disparity. At the outset it is important to recognize that class
location itself shapes religious ethical theory, both in the decisions about which approaches to adopt and
in the forms it takes, including which norms and goals to establish. Stemming from the aforementioned
insights about class consciousness, social location, and perspectivalism, we must continually keep in
sight the reality that class location influences how we might view the moral quandaries raised and what
shape responses take.
In an effort to establish a minimal basis for a normative framework, my intervention is informed by
womanist social ethics and feminist ethics of care. Womanist ethical approaches lend themselves to and
interface directly with questions of intersectionality implicated in class analysis. Womanist scholars
were some of the first to point out that the class interests advanced by white feminists, even when
inflected with religious concerns, may be at odds with the needs and concerns of black women
(Grant 1989). This reveals that class analysis is neither neutral nor purely objective, but involves the subject positions of the analysts and activists involved, including embodied matters of race, gender, and
sexuality. The fact that white and black women concerned with class inequity could devise projects that
were not in alignment revealed that race remained a critical modulator. Similarly, black women challenged the gender blindness of black male theologians, whose projects left patriarchy unaddressed,
revealing that challenges to class inequity could not ignore gender. Poor, black and brown women thus
provide a unique paradigmatic position for considering the multiple levels and directions of oppression
and domination within contemporary society. A class analysis that employs a womanist lens and framework will thus ideally remain held accountable by these dimensions and avoid some of the typical and
recurrent blinders that emerge even when liberationist and progressive class interests are advanced.
Womanist ethics attends to the whole person in conscious resistance not only to the forces of abstraction in capitalist society but to the dehumanization of marginalized peoples. Such a wholistic approach
seeks to overcome the fragmentation of existence that is the result in part of the instrumentalization of
certain segments of society for the purposes of labor. Implicit, then, is a resistance to considering people
solely on the basis of class allegiances, even while economic injustice remains a central object of concern. Yet this challenge opens up into a broader and more thoroughgoing critique of at least two dominant ethical theories: utilitarianism and deontology. While theoretical purists may resist the implication,
utilitarian frameworks can result in the use of others for one’s pleasure or utility maximization. The
0005074735.INDD 6
02/11/2021 6.55.28 PM
Class and Religious Ethics
7
U
N
C
O
R
R
EC
TE
D
PR
O
O
FS
abstraction of class further enables this, where an entire social segment of laborers excluded from ownership from the means of production comes to serve the needs and desires of another governing class.
Deontological ethics within a Kantian tradition, which propose a categorical imperative that remains
binding on all agents when certain conditions are met, also run into tensions with womanist priorities.
Such an approach evinces a universalism that imagines abstract human needs and ethical concerns
regardless of history and context, let alone embodiment and materiality. The situated, perspectival approach
of womanist ethics raises concerns about the hidden assumptions of white, male perspectives masquerading as neutral standards for all times, places, and peoples. Therefore, the womanist challenge to abstraction and to disembodied and instrumentalist views of humanity that figure into class inequity also ends up
challenging dominant strands of ethical theory, revealing the mutual implication of ethics and class.
Womanist ethicists and theologians question the centrality of suffering in Christian narratives of salvation, specifically challenging the role of surrogate suffering (Townes 1993). Surrogacy in this case denotes
suffering on behalf of another, and has been elevated based on a particular interpretation of atonement
theology that presents Christ’s suffering as redemptive for humanity. In light of the role that black women
have played in America, often serving as nannies and wet nurses, laboring and toiling on behalf of their
white masters or employers, womanist thinkers critique the supportive role that Christian thought has
played in this problematic arrangement (Williams 1993). From the perspective of a religious ethics of
class, then, womanist thought issues the caution that Christian narratives of redemptive suffering, which
have influenced the development of policy, politics, and economy in the West (Singh 2018), may be at
work supporting a system that makes one class toil, labor, and suffer to support another.
The ethics of care is an ethical approach that centers relational existence and assesses morality in terms
of one’s fulfillment of various relational obligations. It focuses on the needs and concerns of those with
whom one is relationally connected, emphasizing the particularity of the needs of others in their specific
social and historical contexts. Virginia Held (2006) offers the care of a child as a paradigmatic instance to
think through such concerns. Acting morally and ethically in such a scenario stems from vulnerability,
affective bonds, relations of mutual dependence, and other senses of obligation that may precede and
exceed universalized and abstract maxims of moral virtue. Despite utilizing the child as an exemplary case,
an ethics of care is not to be relegated simply to the familial, personal, or private sphere, but has bearing on
broader publics including the national and international level. It also bears on matters of justice, and while
care and justice cannot be collapsed together, they refine and shape one another in significant ways. Care
and concern for specificity of actors and contexts will emphasize restorative and redistributive forms of
justice more than retributive. Beyond models of simple fairness or balance, care will emphasize corrective
and ameliorative measures that may look imbalanced when contextual differences are ignored. In this way,
a care ethic also coincides with the preferential option for the poor introduced above, prioritizing the vulnerable and marginalized as those in need of special attention and protection.
The ethics of care emphasizes relational existence and eschews atomism and individualism. Not only
does ethical formation not happen in isolation, but the ethical as such is relational. Such ethical relationality puts this view into tension with virtue ethics, which at times imply internalized and individually construed paths of moral formation. The ethical individual – and, originally, the virtuous man [sic] – were the
paradigm to attain, as opposed to ethical postures of relatedness and ethical social networks as such. In
attending to the specificity and particularity of ethical others, the ethics of care also pushes back against
the universalism of typical deontological approaches. Maxims such as the categorical imperative commend a universalizable course of action that intentionally denudes the ethical actor of history, society, and
0005074735.INDD 7
02/11/2021 6.55.28 PM
8
Class
U
N
C
O
R
R
EC
TE
D
PR
O
O
FS
culture – not to mention biographical particularities including race, class, gender, and sexuality. Rather,
an ethics of care emphasizes that moral action necessarily varies across time and space, that context and
the specific needs of the other dictate what the ethical looks like in each situation. Furthermore, religiously inflected ethics of care derive injunctions to care for the poor and vulnerable from religious traditions in ways that resonate powerfully with the normative vision of this ethical system.
Given its attunement to relational dynamics and the variability emerging from specific relational
encounters, an ethics of care is particularly suited to class ethics. Because class can be defined by the
forms of economic power exerted and experienced by particular social groupings, agonistic relations between and within classes can benefit from an ethical vision that keeps such relationality central. In this
regard, an ethics of care can provide systemic critique of the relations among classes, and call for care and
concern for the classes rendered vulnerable or precarious. Moves toward restoration and redistribution
will also challenge the differences and disparities in economic power and privilege. At the same time, an
ethics of care recognizes particularity and the unique differences of those within relations. In terms of
class, this means the vision need not entail the erasure of qualitative differences such as the division of
labor, but seek to rectify quantitative differences where some are barred from access to the goods of life.
These approaches offer a variety of moral attunements that remain crucial for constructing a religious
ethic of class. An overall posture informed by liberationist ideals that give priority to the poor and marginalized means that the exploitation and abuse of classes with less economic power and privilege must be kept
in view. Furthermore, a liberationist lens converges with Marxian analyses of class that prioritize the
economic mode of production as a central framework for understanding class structure in a society.
Womanist ethics refines the general liberationist impulse by situating its analysis more self‐reflexively within
the intersecting matrices of domination that impose upon poor black women. Assessing and challenging
class disparity by examining economic power and privilege alone gives way to a richer lens attuned to the
ways racial, gendered, and sexualized differences play into class distinctions and inequities. Womanist
thought also casts a critical eye upon the notion of suffering as labor, as productive, particularly on behalf of
a more powerful and privileged other. It refutes the ways religious thought has valorized such productive
suffering, recognizing how such associations have contributed to the view that enforced labor or labor as
drudgery are somehow purifying and redemptive for the exploited worker. Finally, the ethics of care provides
an ethical vision situated within relational networks, enabling assessments of class that recognize how various social positions and relations inflect what the moral thing to do is in any given situation. Surpassing
individualistically and universally construed moral frameworks that may be blind to the communal and
social realities that bear upon the moral problems raised by class, it offers a way to speak about ethical challenges of class with more faithfulness to the actual realities of the situation. Such views thus provide a set of
baseline attunements to construct ethical frameworks and interventions on the basis of class.
References
Aronowitz, S. (2003). How Class Works: Power and Social Movement. New Haven: Yale University Press.
Bhattacharya, T. (2017). Social Reproduction Theory: Remapping Class, Recentring Oppression. London: Pluto
Press.
Boff, C. (1993). Epistemology and Method of the Theology of Liberation. Mysterium Liberationis:
Fundamental Concepts of Liberation Theology. J. Sobrino and I. Ellacuría: 57–84. Maryknoll, NY: Orbis.
0005074735.INDD 8
02/11/2021 6.55.28 PM
References
9
U
N
C
O
R
R
EC
TE
D
PR
O
O
FS
Bourdieu, P. (1986). The Forms of Capital. Handbook of Theory and Research for the Sociology of Education. J.
Richardson: 241–258. New York: Greenwood.
Bourdieu, P. (1998). Practical Reason: On the Theory of Action. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
Collins, P. H. (2000). Black Feminist Thought: Knowledge, Consciousness, and the Politics of Empowerment.
New York: Routledge.
Crenshaw, K. (1995). Critical Race Theory: The Key Writings that Formed the Movement. New York: New Press.
Grant, J. (1989). White Women’s Christ and Black Women’s Jesus: Feminist Christology and Womanist Response.
Atlanta: Scholars Press.
Held, V. (2006). The Ethics of Care: Personal, Political, and Global. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Jameson, F. (1981). The Political Unconscious: Narrative as a Socially Symbolic Act. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell
University Press.
Lukács, G. (1971). Reification and the Consciousness of the Proletariat. History and Class Consciousness:
Studies in Marxist Dialectics: 83–222. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Mannheim, K. (1959). Ideology and Utopia: An Introduction to the Sociology of Knowledge. New York:
Harcourt.
Marx, K. (1963). The 18th Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte. New York: International Publishers.
Marx, K. (1976). Capital: A Critique of Political Economy. London: Penguin Books.
Rehmann, J. (2013). Poverty and Poor People’s Agency in High‐Tech Capitalism. Religion, Theology, and
Class: Fresh Engagements After Long Silence. J. Rieger: 143–156. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
Rieger, J. (2013). Religion, Theology, and Class: Fresh Engagements After Long Silence. New York: Palgrave
Macmillan.
Singh, D. (2017). Liberation Theology. The Oxford Handbook of the Epistemology of Theology. W. J. Abraham
and F. D. Aquino: 551–563. New York: Oxford University Press.
Singh, D. (2018). Divine Currency: The Theological Power of Money in the West. Stanford: Stanford University
Press.
Sobrino, J. (1984). The True Church and the Poor. Maryknoll, N.Y.: Orbis.
Thompson, E. P. (1964). The Making of the English Working Class. New York: Pantheon.
Townes, E. (1993). A Troubling in My Soul: Womanist Perspectives on Evil and Suffering. Mayknoll, N.Y.,
Orbis: xii, 257 p.
Veblen, T. (1899). The Theory of the Leisure Class: An Economic Study in the Evolution of Institutions. New
York: Macmillan & Co.
Williams, D. S. (1993). Sisters in the Wilderness: The Challenge of Womanist God‐talk. Maryknoll, N.Y.: Orbis
Books.
Wolff, R. D. (2013). Religion and Class. Religion, Theology, and Class: Fresh Engagements After Long Silence.
J. Rieger: 27–42. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
Wright, E. O. (2005). Approaches to Class Analysis. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Zweig, M. (2004). What’s Class got to do with it?: American Society in the Twenty‐first Century. Ithaca, N.Y.:
ILR Press.
0005074735.INDD 9
02/11/2021 6.55.28 PM
FS
O
O
PR
D
TE
EC
R
R
O
C
U
N
0005074735.INDD 10
02/11/2021 6.55.28 PM