1 paradiplomacy adam Grydehøj linda Fabiani jordi Solé i Ferrando lorena lopez de lacalle ariSti maria ackrén Centre Maurits Coppieters 2014 2 3 contents This publication is inanced with the support of the European Parliament (EP). The EP is not responsible for any use made of the content of this publication. The editor of the publication is the sole person liable. introduction 1 GoalS, capabilitieS, and inStrumentS oF paradiplomacy by Subnational juriSdictionS adam Grydehøj abstract 1.1. introduction 1.2. Deining paradiplomacy 1.3. Jurisdiction as a zero-sum system 1.4. Competing national and subnational interests 1.5. paradiplomacy in practice 1.6. toward a stronger system of european paradiplomacy 2 paradiplomacy – Scotland in the World Linda Fabiani abstract 2.1. introduction 2.2. scontland’s story 2.3. scotland re-emerges 2.4. scotland’s experience with paradiplomacy 2.5. Dealing with the Hard stuf 2.6. resources 2.7. Conclusion 3 From paradiplomacy to protodipomacy: the emerGence oF neW WeStern european StateS and the caSe oF catalonia Jordi solé i Ferrando abstract 4 baSque paradiplomacy and european union internal enlarGement Lorena Lopez de Lacalle aristi aknowlegment abstract 4.1. introduction 4.2. Foreign afairs of the Basque Government 4.3. Limitations of the activities carried out by the Basque Government 6 10 10 11 11 12 13 14 17 20 22 22 23 23 24 28 28 34 35 37 38 38 39 50 50 51 51 52 54 60 5 5 paradiplomacy in Greenland Maria ackrén abstract 5.1. introduction 5.2. a short History of Greenland’s international role 5.3. General Development regarding paradiplomacy 5.4. the Greenlandic Case 5.5. paradiplomacy within the economic sphere 5.6. paradiplomacy within other policy areas 5.7. political Considerations regarding Greenland 5.8. a new Greenlandic strategy? 5.9. Conclusion or Way ahead bibliography centre maurits coppieters members of the cmc colophon 6 64 64 65 66 66 68 68 69 70 72 74 75 79 88 91 93 7 introduction We live in historic times. across europe ancient nations, regions, and peoples, currently under the jurisdiction of various states, are increasingly calling for either enhanced autonomy or outright independence, and all the beneits that go with bringing decision-making power back home. scotland and Catalonia now have the opportunity to decide on their future and whether they want to become free, independent states. this is thanks to their pro-independence parties’ electoral success and, most importantly, the overwhelming support of their constituents. You are reading the main policy papers presented during the conference Local actions in a Global Context: ”paradiplomacy by subnational Jurisdictions” organised last 15-17 January 2013, in Longyearbyen, svalbard. it considered how subnational jurisdictions (towns, cities, counties, and regions) and other non-state actors use paradiplomacy to seek inluence beyond their borders. as globalisation reduces the ability of national governments to independently implement efective policies, subnational jurisdictions are inding that sovereignty is no longer essential for entrance to the global stage. Local governments are using paradiplomacy and informal diplomacy to promote their interests internationally in areas like trade, culture, tourism, politics, and environment. 8 their european umbrella, the european Free alliance (eFa) is best described as a broad alliance Gathering a diverse range of parties from all across europe. each with their own unique approach on how to improve the prospects for their people. eFa has always advocated for (1) minorities in their struggle for recognition, (2) parties with an autonomy / devolution agenda and (3) and also independence parties. these 3 diferent approaches to self-determination have always been equally important for us. now is also the time to show we are an eu party that represents emerging new states and that we hence facilitate emerging new states in their preparatory process towards full statehood. one important element towards statehood is recognition as a state and in this sense para-diplomacy and pluto- diplomacy are important. it’s time eFa focuses more on emerging new states as a new phase, important for some of our parties. Günther Dauwen secretary-General CMC paradiplomacy 9 abstract 1 GoalS, capabilitieS, and inStrumentS oF paradiplomacy by Subnational juriSdictionS this paper deines paradiplomacy as “a political entity’s extra-jurisdictional activating targeting foreign political entities”. Because paradiplomacy is speciically an example of political interaction between unequal partners, taking place outside of the internationally accepted political sphere, it is by nature a contested practice. this paper argues that subnational jurisdictions and sovereign states have inherently difering policy objectives and that paradiplomacy is best capable of achieving policy objectives when it manages to either slip beneath the political radar of sovereign states or acquire the de facto concession of sovereign states. For this reason, the more sophisticated paradiplomatic tools (such as pseudo-embassies) are not necessarily more efective in achieving policy objectives than are less sophisticated tools (such as participation in international networks). successful paradiplomatic practice requires a balance of developing political structures and of pursuing concrete policy objectives. the aims of subnational jurisdictions seeking greater autonomy or independence could be furthered through the construction of stronger networks of like-minded subnational jurisdictions in europe and internationally. 1.1. introduction paradiplomacy can be a diicult subject to discuss, not least because there is sometimes an understandable reluctance to admit that one is engaging in it. this chapter will address what paradiplomacy is, how it is undertaken, and why it might be important. it will also consider why national governments might be opposed to the practice of paradiplomacy by their subnational jurisdictions. it is only by facing up to what paradiplomacy actually entails that we can understand what it can and cannot ofer to localities and regions that are pursuing greater self-determination. adam Grydehøj adam Grydehøj (phD in ethnology, university of aberdeen) is Director of island Dynamics and research associate at the institute of island studies, university of prince edward island. He works to encourage knowledge exchange between academic, government, and the business world, with a focus on culture, economy, and policy in small island communities. 10 as the structure of governance in europe and the world as a whole grows more complex, new opportunities are arising for enterprising subnational jurisdictions to increase their powers of self-determination (Bartmann, 2000; Keating, 1999). For some, full independence might be the ultimate ideal, while for others, increased power might be an end in itself. either way, paradiplomacy represents a path toward gaining greater standing and inluence adam Grydehøj | paradiplomacy 11 in the international community. it is not a path, however, that is guaranteed to lead to success, and in some cases, paradiplomacy can actually hinder a jurisdiction’s quest for greater international recognition. in addition, as is always the case, a policy instrument is only as good as the policies it advances, and efective paradiplomacy holds out the ability to efectively produce bad results, which is a particular risk in the case of subnational jurisdictions that lack substantial prior experience on the world stage. 1.2. deining paradiplomacy We will begin with a brief deinition of the concept of paradiplomacy and argue for an understanding of paradiplomacy as a set of instruments for achieving certain symbolic and policy-oriented objectives. in this chapter’s broad deinition, paradiplomacy is a political entity’s extra-jurisdictional activity targeting foreign political entities. in this context, an ‘entity’ is a unit of government: thus, Catalonia is a subnational entity, spain is a national entity, and the european union (eu) is a supranational entity. spain is also a higher-level entity relative to Catalonia, yet spain is simultaneously a lower-level entity relative to the eu. the above deinition rests on an understanding that diferent levels of government possess diferent levels of ‘jurisdictional capacity’, i.e. diferent degrees of competence “to pass laws, build efective administrative processes, facilitate inward capital lows, encourage education and support the development of a climate conducive to economic growth” (Baldacchino, 2002, 349). ‘extra-jurisdictional’ activity is thus activity exceeding a political entity’s de jure jurisdictional capacity, representing a de facto expansion of the entity’s powers. this deinition furthermore speciies that paradiplomacy must target foreign political entities, i.e. must aim to inluence subnational entities in other countries, foreign sovereign states, etc. When, for instance, a subnational entity exercises de facto powers to encourage economic development by participating in an international policy network or entering into a twinning agreement, this can generally be regarded as paradiplomatic activity in as much as it targets foreign entities. When, in contrast, a subnational entity exercises de facto powers to encourage economic development by providing inancial support to key business actors within its own territory, 12 this cannot be regarded as paradiplomacy inasmuch as the target of the activity is within the entity’s jurisdiction (even if the methods being used are beyond the entity’s de jure jurisdictional capacity). it can furthermore be useful to distinguish between ‘paradiplomacy’ and ‘public diplomacy’. the former targets foreign political entities per se whereas the latter target foreign publics in a more general sense. an important reason for this distinction is that, unlike paradiplomacy, public diplomacy is not usually extra-jurisdictional, i.e. does not exceed a political entity’s de jure jurisdictional capacity: sovereign states tend not to place legal limits on the ability of their subnational entities to address foreign publics through tourism campaigns, overarching place branding initiatives, etc. of course, the distinction between paradiplomacy and public diplomacy can be more theoretical than actual, for not only are members of formal governments also themselves members of foreign publics, but the opinions of members of the general public can inluence the stances of their own governments. Depending on how public diplomacy is undertaken, it could even implicitly seek to inluence the policy of foreign entities (rather than just the ideas of their publics). We should note that although the present paper focuses on paradiplomacy undertaken by subnational entities that are either moving toward full independence or are seeking to expand their jurisdictional capacity, many of these same activities are also undertaken by national entities (sovereign states). there are cases in which national entities strive for goals that are diicult to achieve through formal diplomacy, causing engagement in informal diplomacy, which can often take the same forms as the types of paradiplomacy discussed here (Grydehøj, 2014). 1.3. jurisdiction as a zero-sum system there is a certain unwillingness within the scholarship to use the term ‘paradiplomacy’ itself. it is thus that Criekmans (2010a, 1-2) seeks to avoid contention by referring to “the academic study of what was once called ‘paradiplomacy’,” pointing out that “some scholars are not fond of the term paradiplomacy because it suggests an element of conlict between the national and sub-national policy levels, and implicitly assumes ‘incompatible interests’.” it is understandable that one would wish to avoid the suggestion of conlict in paradiplomacy, especially because such a suggestion could prompt attempts by higher-level entities to reign in the adam Grydehøj | paradiplomacy 13 activities of lower-level entities. nevertheless, subnational entities that are moving toward independence or seeking to enhance their existing powers should be wary of arguments to the efect that paradiplomacy does not necessarily involve the pursuit of objectives that are incompatible with the interests of higher-level entities. although jurisdictional capacity has always been negotiated and contested within and between sovereign states, the rise of supranational and international entities and authorities has further complicated the delineation of powers. Both paradiplomacy and internally oriented expansions of jurisdictional capacity could prove worthwhile for a subnational entity seeking outright independence or greater self-determination, and both types of activities necessarily challenge higher-level entities’ notions of the powers that the subnational entity possesses. the very existence of a relevant higher-level entity results in at least a qualitative weakening and at most a quantitative decrease in the jurisdictional capacity of its constituent entities. Jurisdiction is a zero-sum system in the sense that one political entity’s accrual of de facto or de jure jurisdictional capacity can only result from another entity’s absolute or relative loss of this same capacity. For instance, just as the increasing power of the sovereign state historically weakened the capacity of local communities to manage their own isheries, the creation of the eu’s Common Fisheries policy weakened the capacity of the eu’s constituent sovereign states to manage their own isheries. the existence of eu policies on ishing, agriculture, manufacturing, labour, etc. does not mean that sovereign states no longer have any power over these areas, but it does mean that sovereign states no longer have exclusive or superior de jure power over these areas. such losses or gains of jurisdictional capacity are neither inherently ‘good’ or ‘bad’ nor are even necessarily resisted by the entities that lose out: For instance, the eu’s constituent national entities might ideally wish that they could independently determine all aspects of isheries policy for themselves, but given that this would involve exerting extra-jurisdictional control over other sovereign states that make use of european waters (which would be either impossible or unpleasant in practice), an eu Common Fisheries policy represents a palatable alternative. since they involve the exercise of powers that are legally the reserve of these higher-level entities. thus, while the results of paradiplomacy by a subnational entity may not necessarily be contrary to the interests of the sovereign state, the exercise of the paradiplomacy is itself a transgression of the sovereign state’s authority. From the perspective of the sovereign state, there is good reason for the sovereign state – and not its constituent entities – to wield diplomatic authority because it is only the sovereign state that is responsible for advancing the objectives of the state as whole. Let us consider an example from the archipelago of shetland, a subnational entity of scotland, which is itself a subnational entity of the united Kingdom (uK). in the 1990s and early 2000s, shetland’s local government used both internally oriented and paradiplomatic de facto expansions of jurisdictional capacity to strengthen its commercial ishing industry in the face of rising supranational legal restrictions on ishing, increased competition, and declining ish stocks. the uK quite concretely beneited from the relative success of these local ishing-promotion activities because a portion of the economic advantage that shetland gained presumably came vis-á-vis foreign actors as shetland’s share of the ish catch increased relative to what it might have otherwise been. in other words, there was a direct relationship between shetland ishermen in particular making more money and uK ishermen in general making more money (since shetland ishermen are also uK ishermen). the situation was, however, problematic, for not all of the value added due to these industrial promotion activities in shetland was subtracted from foreign actors. With regards to a particular local government programme, in fact, ishermen from elsewhere in scotland complained that shetland ishermen possessed an unfair advantage (Grydehøj, 2013a) – in other words, that the increased competitiveness of the shetland ishing industry undermined the competitiveness of the scottish ishing industry as a whole. it is unlikely that either the devolved scottish government or the uK government would ever have been inclined to undertake the same kinds of activities in shetland alone as did the local authorities in shetland. this is because the accrual of value by one subnational entity vis-á-vis other subnational entities that are constituents of the same national entity is not in itself a relevant goal for a sovereign state. 1.4. competing national and subnational interests all types of de facto expansions of jurisdictional capacity by subnational entities represent a challenge to the authority of higher-level entities 14 it is not in itself a relevant goal, but it could be a relevant goal from the sovereign state’s perspective in certain circumstances. For instance, the sovereign state might seek to redistribute wealth within its territory in order adam Grydehøj | paradiplomacy 15 to increase national economic equality: it might be deemed better to have numerous small ishing industries scattered around the country than one very strong industrial centre. or in contrast, a sovereign state might seek to reinforce a locality’s national dominance in a particular industry in order to enhance its – and thus the country’s – international competitiveness, even if this meant weakening actors in the industry in other localities within the country: it might be deemed that numerous small industrial centres were unsustainable and that more value would be produced by nurturing specialisation and economies of scale in one very strong industrial centre (Grydehøj, 2013b). there is thus a tension between the interests of the sovereign state as a whole and the interests of its constituent entities. it could be argued that the more responsible and responsive a sovereign state is, the greater the likelihood that it will act against the interests of some of its subnational entities relative to others. thus, whereas any local government activity could either intentionally or unintentionally strengthen the national welfare, determinations as to what is in the best interests of the sovereign state as a whole can only really be made at the national level. in most cases, paradiplomacy by subnational jurisdictions is not remarked upon at the national level. For instance, when the local government of the city of Copenhagen undertakes paradiplomatic activity regarding climate change even though climate diplomacy is a national responsibility, there is no complaint, for Denmark’s national government deems Copenhagen’s activities to be in the national interest despite the Copenhagen government’s focus on its own interests. By the same token, when the local government in shetland engages with a foreign head of state in order to latter local cultural nationalist sentiments, neither the scottish nor the uK governments deem this to be a threat–in part, we may assume, because they are aware that the foreign state in question does not regard the engagement in the same light as does shetland. Conlict only arises when higher-level entities feel that their own authority is threatened by the actions of lower-level entities. in the case of paradiplomacy, the situation can be particularly acute if a strong nationalist sentiment exists in the subnational entity and if this entity is regarded as using paradiplomacy as a tool for gaining support for independence or for eventually rendering independence a fait accomplis. From the perspective of this volume, such paradiplomacy is morally justiied since the subnational 16 entity in question is acting like a sovereign state because it feels it ought to be regarded as a nation. the argument that the paradiplomatic activities of an emerging nation are harmful to the sovereign state in which this nation is currently encompassed is thus missing the point: paradiplomacy is being used to de facto enact nationality and secure national interest in the de jure absence of a relevant nation-state. 1.5. paradiplomacy in practice there has been a tendency to view paradiplomacy progressively, as taking place in waves of increasingly sophisticated political activity. Criekmans (2010b, 45-46), indeed, breaks down “the full spectrum of diplomatic instruments” into the following: a) ius legationis or political representation abroad; b) ius tractandi or treaty-making power; c) other agreements of a certain formalized nature: (political) declarations of intent and/or cooperation agreements, transnational contracts and cultural agreements or partnerships; d) the development of own programmes of assistance and sharing of know-how: bilateral programmes, programmes on cross-boundary cooperation, programmes that want to bring the civil societies of the region and other regions/countries together, or multilateral programmes; e) other forms of participation in multilateral frameworks and organizations: observing and participating in (technical) committees, the creation of or participation in funds within multilateral organizations, becoming an associate member of multilateral organizations; f) participation in other formal or informal networks; g) Developing a public diplomacy, both domestic and international. Criekmans’ list suggests descent (with the items at the top being more politically sophisticated than those at the bottom) and feeds into the idea that the more complex or sophisticated the form of paradiplomacy, the more advanced the paradiplomatic project in question. this assumption might be an instance of confusing cause with efect. We will consider this by discussing the most formally sophisticated adam Grydehøj | paradiplomacy 17 paradiplomatic instrument, namely political representations (hereafter, pseudo-embassies), both within the sovereign state (such as the Greenlandic and Faroese representations in Copenhagen) and outside it (such as scotland House in Brussels and the Québec representations around the world). in many cases, such pseudo-embassies are relections of the prior success of a nationalist movement, not of its ability to achieve paradiplomatic success on its actual policy objectives. these pseudoembassies are striking precisely because they are often accepted as at least semi-legitimate by the sovereign states to which they are subordinate and, as a result, by other sovereign states. this, however, is not always the case: an interesting counter-example is ofered by a de facto but unrecognised state, the turkish republic of northern Cyprus (trnC), which operates pseudo-embassies in a range of countries. With the exception of the trnC embassy in ankara, however, these pseudo-embassies are completely unrecognised by their host states since the Greek Cypriot-dominated government that controls the south of Cyprus (the republic of Cyprus) is regarded by all countries except for turkey as the only legitimate authority on the island. it is precisely because the trnC’s pseudo-embassies have no formal legitimacy that they are capable of undertaking extremely sophisticated paradiplomatic activity. trnC pseudo-embassies can ofer passport services, birth certiicates, and other services that have the trappings of true ambassadorial work-services that are closed to many pseudo-embassies that are set up with the concession of the sovereign state. this is not to say that having the concession of one’s sovereign state is a bad thing, but having this concession does mean that one is obliged to play by the sovereign state’s rules. such a situation may be more palatable for subnational entities like scotland, Greenland, and Faroe that have won from their sovereign states legitimate pathways to future independence (should they choose to follow them) than it is for a subnational entity like Catalonia, which possesses a delegation to the eu but no legal trajectory toward independence. of course, in discussing pseudo-embassies, one must consider that instrumental sophistication is in itself no guarantee of political efectiveness. the trnC’s unrecognised pseudo-embassies undertake high-level activities yet are of little value to the trnC in terms of achieving policy objectives that involve engagement with foreign states since the very fact that the pseudo-embassies are pretending to be embassies without the concession of the international community means that national entities must avoid 18 engaging with them. it is instead through its public diplomacy eforts that the trnC makes much of its paradiplomatic impact: although activities aimed at convincing people that north Cyprus is an ideal place to go on holiday or attend university are targeted primarily at foreign publics (rather than foreign political actors), they can indirectly afect the opinions – and ultimately, policies – of foreign political actors as well (Grydehøj, 2012, 190). How then can subnational entities seeking outright independence or greater self-determination accomplish the most in practical terms? What is most important: building the structures of independence or achieving policy goals? there is no clear-cut correct answer because diferent kinds of paradiplomatic activity can achieve diferent kinds of results. For instance, even the most successful of pseudo-embassies by subnational entities are at some level symbolic acts: they can be bases from which highly efective paradiplomatic activity (for instance, trade promotion or meetings with foreign politicians) can take place, but such activity could theoretically have been undertaken elsewhere, for such pseudo-embassies lack the privileges that the international community grants to fully ledged, recognised embassies. this does not, however, mean that pseudo-embassies of this sort fail to add value to the paradiplomatic activities that they host, for their very use as sites of paradiplomatic activity demonstrates a subnational entity’s de facto capacity to undertake diplomacy. in other words, by imitating embassies, such pseudo-embassies could not only potentially directly enhance the eicacy of the paradiplomatic activities they host but also indirectly enhance the willingness of foreign actors to regard these activities as legitimate. this, however, is just a potential, not a given, for if a pseudo-embassy is viewed not simply as less than fully ledged (such as with the pseudoembassies of subnational Québec and unrecognised taiwan) but as instead wholly illegitimate (such as with unrecognised trnC), then the paradiplomatic activities it carries out could be further delegitimised as a result. the pseudo-embassy’s host country (and typically the sovereign state of which the subnational or unrecognised entity is arguably a constituent) must irst concede to at least a degree a legitimacy before the pseudo-embassy can have any kind of positive efect. in the absence of such a concession, these ‘guerrilla embassies’ are possibly counterproductive: their symbolic force draws attention to the paradiplomatic nature of paradiplomatic activities, which is a good thing if other entities wish to engage in paradiplomacy with you but is a bad thing if they wish adam Grydehøj | paradiplomacy 19 to avoid giving the impression of engaging in diplomatic activity with a non-existent or illegitimate state. Fortune can thus be said to favour the fortunate: the highly respected pseudo-embassies of Greenland and Faroe in Copenhagen share a building with the altogether oicial icelandic embassy and are recognised as undertaking (limited) ambassadorial functions via Denmark’s and iceland’s concession of their legitimacy. this in turn enhances the power of the activities that Greenland and Faroe undertake from these premises. 1.6. toward a stronger system of european paradiplomacy subnational entities and unrecognised states are not necessarily barred from efectively engaging in paradiplomacy if they lack prior international support. as noted above, the fact that certain paradiplomatic instruments are less sophisticated than others does not necessarily make them any less efective. Despite the international community not regarding it as a legitimate candidate for future independence, shetland has had considerable paradiplomatic success in practical terms, perhaps precisely because its paradiplomatic activities on foreign soil have been largely shorn of symbolic force. Because shetland lacks a signiicant independence movement and because its government largely leaves its cultural nationalism at home when it undertakes activity abroad, this subnational entity’s involvement in international ishing disputes, trade shows, tourism and culture networks, etc. have not raised complaint. none of the uK’s three crown dependencies (the isle of Man, Guernsey, and Jersey) are part of the eu, and none have trajectories toward full independence, yet all have shown themselves capable of engaging with the international community at a high paradiplomatic level in terms of inancial negotiations as well as competently engaging in public diplomacy to advance positive place brand images of themselves. the lack of outright nationalism in these paradiplomatic eforts – that is, the lack of a challenge to the de jure jurisdictional status quo – make them palatable to the higher-level entities involved. preference for remaining outside of the eu presents a challenge for subnational entities within the eu that are seeking substantially increased self-determination rather than outright independence. the problem is more than a relative inability to appeal to precedent; it also limits a subnational entity’s ability to seek support from and engage diplomatically with peers. those who aim to strengthen the ability of european ethnic and cultural groups to pursue self-determination should consider ways of strengthening the platform for facilitating subnational paradiplomacy on a european level. the emergence of a stronger network of highly autonomous subnational entities within europe (not necessarily limited to the eu) could help legitimise such paradiplomacy as well as grant it additional efectiveness through economies of scale. Greater international cooperation between subnational entities at all levels could be of wide beneit: it could serve as a halfway house for subnational entities seeking full independence, as a useful sphere of activity for those highly autonomous subnational entities that are content with their present de jure jurisdiction, and as a launching pad for aspirational subnational entities that presently lack but are striving for enhanced jurisdictional capacity. in all cases, it could give subnational entities the opportunity to simultaneously develop governmental structures that are conducive to independence and greater self-determination as well as pursue the practical policy objectives that presumably play a signiicant role in the desire for independence or greater self-determination itself. it is interesting to consider in this context that many of the most autonomous european subnational entities (crown dependencies, special or overseas territories, outermost regions, etc.) remain outside of the eu. exceptions include Åland, Gibraltar, and (from a certain perspective) scotland. this 20 adam Grydehøj | paradiplomacy 21 afairs, Culture and the Gaelic Language, and was Convener of the parliament’s scotland Bill Committee. she is currently a member of the scottish parliament Corporate Body and sits on the referendum Bill and Welfare reform Committees. Longyearbyen. norway, 17 January 2013 abstract 2 paradiplomacy– Scotland in the World linda Fabiani Linda Fabiani Msp for east Kilbride was educated at Hyndland secondary school in Glasgow and graduated with a Diploma in Housing from Glasgow university. Before she was an elected representative, Linda had a successful career within the housing associations sector. Linda was irst elected to the scottish parliament in May 1999 where she was an Msp for Central scotland until 2011 when elected as Msp for the east Kilbride constituency. she is a Fellow the Chartered institute of Housing and an Honorary Fellow the royal incorporation of architects in scotland. in 2007 the italian Government awarded Linda the Cavaliere dell’ordine della stella della solidarieta’ italia (Knight of the order of the star of italian solidarity) for working to promote scots/italian links. Linda is a former Minister for europe, external 22 since the union of the scottish and english crowns in 1603, scotland’s state diplomacy has been conducted largely through London-based institutions. in 1707, scotland and england established the united Kingdom, within which aspects of scottish identity were protected – law, church and education. From the late 19th century, developments in government saw the emergence of a scottish component of the British Civil service, covering scottish domestic afairs. Because of this history, despite four centuries of union with england, in one form or another, scotland’s identity as a nation is not in dispute. its unique identity is recognised in many ields, not least in culture and sport. since the formation of the scottish parliament in 1999, non-state diplomacy has been a unifying priority, even when the governing parties favoured the constitutional status quo. With the coming to power of the snp, as a minority administration in 2007, and as a majority government in 2011, the process intensiied. the independence referendum in 2014 represents our biggest challenge. Have we laid the groundwork for scotland to make the transition from stateless nation back to nation state? What diplomatic challenges do we face in making that transition? Can non-state diplomacy really help? 2.1. introduction as a member of the scottish parliament since 1999, and a minister in scotland’s irst pro-independence government, from 2007 to 2009, i had the opportunity to see at irst hand growing links between scotland and government institutions across the globe operating above, at, and below the level of the nation-state. Linda Fabiani | paradiplomacy 23 such links are not entirely new. scotland’s local authorities have developed international links over many years, whether through town, city and region twinning arrangements, or as scotland’s cities have used international representation to boost economic development. these forms of international operation do not represent a challenge to the integrity - territorial or symbolic - of the united Kingdom (Cornago 2010). those of us on either side of the debate over scottish independence may not see scotland’s recent participation in para-diplomacy in the same way. indeed, the impact of independence on scotland’s international engagement, especially with the eu, is an important factor in the current debate over scotland’s relationship with the uK. scotland’s future relationship with the uK will come to a head over the next 18 months. on 18 september 2014, the scottish Government will hold a referendum that will allow the scottish people to determine whether scotland remains in the united Kingdom, or takes back the responsibilities of an independent nation-state. Whatever the outcome of that referendum, which i hope will be to re-establish scottish independence; it is unlikely that scotland will accept a downgrading of its international proile. therefore, one way or another, scotland’s enhanced engagement with the international community will continue, and, most likely, grow. 2.2. Scotland’s story on 1 July 1999, my former Holyrood1 colleague, Dr Winnie ewing, had the privilege of opening the irst session of the modern scottish parliament. after a break in the life of scotland’s parliament of almost 300 years, she picked a resounding phrase to mark the occasion: “The Scottish Parliament, adjourned on the 25th day of March, 1707, is hereby reconvened.” (the scottish parliament 1999). 1 The modern Scottish Parliament is situated beside Holyrood Park and Holyrood Palace in Edinburgh, and takes its name from this location. 24 in 2014, ifteen years after that irst meeting of the modern scottish parliament, the people of scotland - for the irst time ever - will have the opportunity to decide democratically the country’s constitutional future2. Westminster’s legislation for the re-establishment of the scottish parliament sought to prevent Holyrood from challenging the continuation of the united Kingdom. indeed, this year, in a publication on its view of the nature of the 1707 union between scotland and england, the uK Government published legal advice (Great Britain and parliament 2013), which stated: “Whether or not England was also extinguished by the union, Scotland certainly was extinguished as a matter of international law, by merger either into an enlarged and renamed England or into an entirely new state” (Great Britain and scottish parliament 2013, 74). appearing in a legal opinion published by the uK Government, this sentence demonstrates the signiicance of the issues raised by the debate over scotland’s constitutional future. not since the 18th century has a uK Government so publicly endorsed the view that scotland has no continuing right to exist as a separate entity, and continues to do so only by the tolerance of the Westminster parliament. the suggestion that scotland was extinguished 300 years ago would come as a shock to the many peoples and nations who have witnessed its re-emergence on the international stage over recent years. these groups are as diverse as • many parliaments and governments, national and regional, with whom scottish representatives have worked over issues ranging from climate change to education, from development to culture; • audiences at the many internationally toured cultural events based on scotland’s unique languages, cultures, and experience; and • judges of the european Court of Justice, whose president from 1984-88 was Lord MacKenzie-stuart, whose background was in scotland’s separate legal system, which is founded on signiicantly diferent principles from that in efect in the rest of the united Kingdom. 2 The establishment of the Scottish Parliament in 1999 followed a referendum in which the UK Parliament determined the terms of the settlement. Linda Fabiani | paradiplomacy 25 so, why is there such a gap between the rhetoric of the uK Government and the reality of scottish nationhood, as experienced by scots and our many international contacts, and what role might para-diplomacy be playing in scotland’s ight for international recognition. scotland is one of europe’s oldest nations. it emerged as a single political entity over the 9th and 10th centuries. its sole land border - with england was largely resolved by the early 13th century (education scotland 2013a). However, relations between the two countries remained strained and scots courted england’s european competitors; most notably France, in what scots refer to as the ‘auld alliance’3 (education scotland, 2013). the scottish and english crowns were uniied in 1603, with the accession of King James Vi of scotland to the position of James i of england. since then, despite the existence of a scottish parliament until 1707, and again from 1999, London-based institutions have conducted scotland’s state diplomacy. in 1707, the parliaments of scotland and england agreed by separate acts of union, to form the united kingdom of Great Britain. Despite negotiations proceeding in haste, the agreed treaty of union protected many scottish institutions and traditions, including our education system, which was already providing universal free primary education, and major elements of scots Law and the legal system. the treaty also protected scotland’s distinct religious tradition, a signiicant factor, even in today’s more secular society, given that the monarch is also head of the Church of england4 (BBC 2011). as government activity grew in scotland over the 19th century, much of it driven forward by scotland’s local authorities, a distinct scottish public administration developed5 (education scotland 2013b). a national 3 The alliance dates from the treaty signed by John Balliol, King of Scots, and Philip IV of France in 1295 against Edward I of England. The terms of the treaty stipulated that if either country were attacked by England, the other would invade English territory. 4 The Church of England was established in the 16th century, when the English monarch Henry VII was refused a divorce by the Pope and assumed the role of the head of the church in England. The Church of England has a limited presence in Scotland and no links to the dominant Church of Scotland, of which the monarch is not the head. 5 This would be in ields such as por Relief, Education, Roads, Housing, Urban Development, Public Health etc. 26 education Department was formed in 1872; in 1885, the uK Government appointed a dedicated minister with responsibility for scotland. in 1926, the minister in charge of the scottish oice joined the uK Cabinet. this arrangement continued until 1999, when the parliament took over most of the responsibilities of what was, by then, a scottish oice ministerial team. over the 300 years of union, a wide range of scottish non-governmental organisations has grown, especially in areas protected by the union, with their own links to european and international networks. scotland has direct membership of international sporting bodies, including FiFa, a position that even anti-independence commentators strongly defend6 (scottish Cup 2011). in 2014, scotland will host the Commonwealth Games7 (the CDF 2013) and Golf’s ryder Cup8 (r&a 2013), both with the active support of the scottish Government. scotland retains a distinct cultural identity and a diaspora of up to 45 million people worldwide consider themselves of scots ancestry. scots travelled afar, some by choice some not9 (education scotland 2013c), and as a result, we have strong links with many parts of the world (the scottish Government 2013a). in 2009, at the instigation of a pro-union First Minister, scotland staged a Homecoming for the diaspora, to mark the 250th anniversary of the birth of our national poet, robert Burns (Queen Margaret university 2009). this will be repeated in 2014, to coincide with the Commonwealth Games and the ryder Cup (Visit scotland 2013). in a useful coincidence, 2014 is also the 700th anniversary of the Battle of Bannockburn, the decisive battle in scotland’s war of independence. incredibly, unlike ireland, which has been actively engaging with its diaspora since the earliest days independence (Diaspora Matters 2011), these are among the most signiicant steps taken to tap into scotland’s global network. 6 The Scottish Football Association rejected a “Team GB” for the football at the 2012 London Olympics, concerned this might jeopardise Scottish participation in the Worls Cup. 7 Scotland has participated as separate team in every Commonwealth Games since 1930, as have Wales and England. 8 Scotland is widely recognized as the home of Golf, with the Royal and Ancient Club of St Andrews responsible for creating the rules of the modern game. 9 The Clearances – in which a large part of Scotland’s Gaelic speaking population were forced from their homes, with many travelling overseas, is one of the deining elements in Scottish history. Linda Fabiani | paradiplomacy 27 2.3. Scotland re-emerges in a move directly aimed at preventing the snp from gaining control of Holyrood, the parliament’s voting system10 was structured to prevent the election of a single-party government (Wintrobe 2001). scots quickly came to see Holyrood as their parliament, with survey results regularly indicating over 70% of scots believe Holyrood11 (economic & social research Council 2011; the scottish Government 2010) should matter to scotland more than Westminster. Following two four-year terms of pro-union government, in 2007, the snp became the largest party in the parliament and formed a minority government. in 2011, a high level of support for the snp right across scotland overwhelmed the carefully designed voting system and elected a majority snp government. Westminster had a choice; it could stand on its view that scotland had been ‘extinguished’ and attempt to block an independence referendum, or it could recognise Holyrood’s democratic mandate and pass legislation permitting an independence referendum. Westminster adopted the path of letting the referendum proceed and the two governments signed an agreement to that efect (the scottish Government 2012). scotland’s growing conidence in recent years, assisted by our experience of para-diplomacy, has undoubtedly played its part in gaining this referendum. 2.4. Scotland’s experience with paradiplomacy the parliament reconvening in 1999 prompted a high level of international interest in events in scotland. the parliament and the scottish Government work with a network of 57 consuls and honorary consuls based in edinburgh, and have developed close links with many ambassadors to the uK. in the last full calendar year representatives of 13 national parliaments and 12 regional parliaments oicially visited the parliament. 10 The voting system provides for the election of 72 ‘First past the post’ or Constituency members, and 56 ‘Additional’ or regional members elected by proportional representation. 11 Findings are drawn from the British and Scottish election survey of 1997, the Referendum survey of 1999, the Scottish parliamentary election survey of 1999, and the Scottish Social Attitudes surveys of 2000 to 2001. 28 in 1999, scotland House was opened in Brussels, with Catalan representation to europe cited as a model for what the pro-union scottish executive12 was hoping to achieve. through the irst two terms of parliament, governed by a coalition of unionist parties, Labour and Liberal Democrats, the primary focus of our work on external afairs was our relationship with the eu and the impact of european Law on devolved issues. scotland became an active participant in reGLeG, the network for regions with Legislative Competency of the eu. since 1999, para-diplomacy has been a priority, even for governing parties that favour the constitutional status quo. at eu level, the scottish Government opted for engagement through the regions with Legislative powers (regLeg) Group in preference to the Committee of the regions; indeed, Jack McConnell, a pro-union First Minister, served as president of regLeg. the approach adopted to european engagement during this period has been described as ‘co-operative’, exercising inluence ‘behind the scenes’ and ‘insider’(Keating 2010, 158). in March 2002, the pro-union coalition published its irst statement of priorities for work on external engagement. although european issues were dominant, the statement signalled the government’s intention to work further aield to support its functional responsibilities, and to promote scotland. then Deputy First Minister, Jim Wallace summarised the priorities as13 (the scottish parliament 2002): • promotion of scottish devolved policy interests in the european union and internationally; • building of mutually beneicial links with regions and countries of the european union and beyond; • the promotion of a positive image of scotland overseas. Following approval of this document, the Government entered into a range of bilateral agreements with other sub-state Governments: Catalonia (May 2002), covering agriculture and rural afairs; architecture; education; 12 The Scotland Act 1998, which established the parliament used the term ‘Scottish Executive’ for the ministerial team. When the SNP took oice in 2007, usage changed to ‘Scottish Government’. The 1998 Act has now been amended to relect this. 13 Presentation of the statement to the Scottish Parliament. Ironically, Jim Wallace is now the senior Scottish Law Oicer for the UK Government, and supervised production of the ‘Scotland extinguished’ legal advice. Linda Fabiani | paradiplomacy 29 Led by their increasing contact with the diaspora, scotland’s politicians embraced the growing tartan Day movement in Canada and america, aimed at celebrating these countries’ strong scottish heritage. With the us as our largest international trading partner, both the Government and parliament welcomed this initiative. By the end of its irst session, in 2003, the whole parliament had moved in the direction initially supported only by the snp, with the european Committee assuming a wider external relations remit. the returned, pro-union, coalition Government published its irst international strategy in 2004 (scotland and scottish executive 2004). although this was a signiicant advance, the administration seemed reluctant to stake scotland’s international claim too strongly. this hesitancy can be detected in the 2004 document’s strategic goals, one of which was: “to position Scotland internationally as a leading small nation” (scotland and scottish executive 2004, 6). one of the early drivers in the Government looking beyond scotland’s borders was a drop in the country’s population. even after the discovery of oil of scotland’s shores in the 1960s, scotland’s population was in decline. as can be seen from Diagram 1, this was quite dramatic when compared to the population growth taking place in other nearby countries. Between 1970 and 2000, the population of scotland dropped by 2%, by contrast, northern ireland’s population increased by over 50%. Population change 1970/71 to 2010/11 Scotland and adjacent countries 60% 50% 40% 30% 20% 10% 0% 20 / 10 1 30 /1 1 1 England & Wales 14 The Scottish Executive International Development Policy states that “The International Strategy is primarily concerned with the beneits that can accrue to Scotland - politically, culturally or economically - from establishing strong international relationships” (The Scottish Government 2005, 2). 00 0/ 0/ 1 Census years Ireland in the international Development policy, published the following year, the Government recognised that the strategy had been inward facing (the scottish Government 2005), emphasising the beneits that would accrue to scotland from international relations14. However, it did lay the groundwork for later developments. 20 9 19 8 19 0/ -10% 7 19 this is not a bold ambition for a nation that has contributed signiicantly to so many ields of human endeavour. the parliament’s european and external relations Committee welcomed the strategy, but stated “to develop the strategy further, we believe that the devolved government will need to show greater vision and conidence” (scottish parliament 2005). to underpin the international Development policy, the Government established an international Development Fund of £3m per annum. the policy prioritised the use of this fund to support development in Malawi, one of the countries with which scotland has long-standing ties; although we now support work in many other countries a high priority for Malawi continues to underpin our work to this day. Cumulative % increase on 1970/71 pop’n research to support innovation; health; housing; urban regeneration and transport; tuscany (november 2002), covering economic development; arts & culture; cultural education & creativity; and eu and international policy; north rhine-Westphalia (February 2003), covering eu policy; science and technology; and the stimulation of entrepreneurship; Bavaria (June 2003), covering land use planning and design; justice; education; tourism; environment and administration (scotland and scottish executive 2004). Northem Ireland Denmark Scotland in a development that was unimaginable pre-devolution, the scottish Government persuaded the Home oice to approve the Fresh talent initiative, a uniquely scottish component to uK immigration policy. initiated in 2004, Fresh talent ofered overseas students who studied in scotland the right to remain and work, in scotland, for two years beyond graduation. this was put in place against signiicant opposition from elsewhere in the uK and despite control over immigration being “closely associated with ideas of national sovereignty and national identity” (skilling 2007, 102). Linda Fabiani | paradiplomacy 31 When the snp took oice in 2007, we began to expand scotland’s role internationally. For example, we expanded the work around tartan Day to build an annual ‘scotland Week’. this focusses on economic development and engages with contacts across the usa and Canada. For example, in scotland Week 2008, the First Minister launched the scottish Government’s £10 million saltire prize for marine renewables. the launch took place in the Washington headquarters of national Geographic, which gave the announcement an otherwise unattainable international proile (the scottish Government 2008). although the parliament had begun to embrace external relations from its early days, this did not feature in a ministerial title before my appointment, in 2007, as Minister for europe, external afairs, and Culture in the irst snp Government. With the beneit of a ministerial post within the First Minister’s team, we were able to bring this area of activity together under a government-wide international engagement Framework. the principal diference between the snp Government and its predecessors was that we very deliberately presented scotland as a nation in its own right, rejecting the notion that scotland is simply a region of the united Kingdom. the idea that scotland had been ‘extinguished’ in 1707 hadn’t even made an appearance at that time. since 2007, the scottish Government has produced a range of country plans, for the usa, Canada, india, pakistan, and China, to direct and focus scotland’s external engagement. the framework is clear about the need to link external engagement to the Government’s overriding goal of creating sustainable economic growth. it is also clear about the need to build scotland’s global identity – and not in a small way. We also of course have very clear plans for our engagement with europe. For example, scotland has europe’s largest isheries zone and still accounts for over 60% of uK ishery landings; yet, scotland has been routinely excluded from top table discussions on the Common Fisheries policy. the snp has consistently challenged the uK Government on this exclusion. in 2010, for the irst time, a Minister in the scottish Government spoke on behalf of the uK; this took place in negotiations over mackerel quotas between the eu and Faroes and iceland. this is just one of many issues 32 afecting countries around the north sea and north atlantic that are of more concern to scotland than to the uK. For many years, alcohol has been a powerful feature of scottish life, socially, and through the iconic scotch Whisky industry, which exports over £4 billion worth of product per annum. the snp Government identiies scotland’s growing consumption of alcohol as a problem, and accepts that price can be used as a factor in regulating consumption. it brought forward legislation to set a minimum price per unit of alcohol, which has implications for eu competition policy and is in dialogue with the eu over implementation of this proposal as a public health measure. the scottish Government recognises the need to protect and grow exports of scotch Whisky. the opening of the parliament in 1999 has increased focus on the importance of the industry to scotland. With the support of the scottish Government, scotch Whisky is securing Geographic indication of origin status15 across the world, including in the crucial Chinese market (the scottish Government 2009). in recent years, scotland has performed strongly in attracting foreign direct investment and research and development. in 2011, we attracted over 5,900 jobs; that was 2,000 more than any other part of the uK, including London. We have attracted investment from companies based in China, Japan, norway, the Middle east, the usa, and elsewhere16 (the scottish parliament 2012). it seems the possibility of an independent scotland doesn’t hold many fears for companies that already operate in a multitude of diferent countries; this appears to come as a surprise, possibly even a disappointment, to our political opponents. the re-emergence of scotland on the world stage ofers a platform and a support for scotland’s creative industries, whether these are based on our 15 EU policy was introduced by Council Regulation 2081/92 of July 14th 1992 - protection of geographical indications and designations of origin for agricultural products and foodstufs. Geographic Indication of Origin Status means that Scotch Whisky must be made in Scotland. 16 Taqa (Abu Dhabi), Avaloq (Switzerland), FMC Technologies (USA), Aker (Norway), Ineos (England), PetroChina (China), Dell (USA) , Gamesa (Spain), BNY Mellon (USA), State Street (USA), Amazon (USA), Doosan Power Systems (England), Hewlett-Packard (USA) and Mitsubishi Powers Systems (Japan/USA) Linda Fabiani | paradiplomacy 33 traditional cultures, or on scotland’s signiicant contribution to the digital age. the parliament’s irst national Cultural strategy, agreed the year after the re-establishment of the parliament and by all political parties, called for the promotion of international Cultural exchange and Dialogue, and for the establishment of a long-awaited national theatre of scotland. the national theatre unveiled its irst major production in 2006 – the play, Black Watch. apart from being an excellent piece of theatre, the play’s vivid portrayal of soldiers at war gave a strong scottish perspective on the iraq war and provoked huge interest. it played to packed houses at home, and with the support of the scottish Government had highly successful tours in america, China, india, and elsewhere, visiting over 40 cities. as i write this, it is playing to packed houses in Glasgow, before taking to the road again to seattle and san Francisco. the nts has continued to relect scottish identity and values (the scotsman 2012), including in the most recent production, Glasgow Girls, which tells the story of asylum seekers in scotland and a community campaign to challenge uK Government asylum policy. the scottish Government values the part played by nts, and helps to promote their work overseas, as it does for scotland’s other creative groups – our traditional musicians, classical national companies, visual-arts collections, and a broad spectrum of creative talents who are interpreting, and in many cases leading, scotland’s re-engagement with the world. However, we should bear in mind the warning from one reviewer of Black Watch: “cultural diplomacy is best kept ire-walled from regular diplomacy... its efectiveness declines the nearer it comes to the oicial foreign policy apparatus” (Cull 2007, 12). suspects took place under scots Criminal Law, one of the parts of scotland’s separate legal system protected by the treaty of union. in 2001, the sole convicted bomber, abdelbaset al-Megrahi, was sentenced to life imprisonment in a scottish jail. in 2009, with the snp in power in Holyrood, Megrahi applied for release in compassionate grounds following a diagnosis of terminal cancer. arguably, because of the international aspect of his case, the uK Government could have directed scottish Ministers not to release Megrahi17. the uK Government chose not to invoke its powers, yet stayed silent as us senators threatened reprisals against scotland after the Justice secretary granted Megrahi’s request. in the face of such duplicity, is it any wonder that only a small minority of scots trust the uK to act in scotland’s interests18? scotland’s diplomacy is not all far aield, however. the snp recognises the need to maintain a social union within the British isles post-independence, and we can see the beginning of this in the British irish Council (BiC). the BiC was initiated as part of the northern irish peace process, through the ‘Good Friday’ agreement between the uK and irish governments, and the political parties in northern ireland. it brings together the irish and uK governments, the devolved institutions in northern ireland, scotland, and Wales, together with representatives of the isle of Man, Guernsey and Jersey. We see the BiC developing into a Council of the isles, perhaps learning from the nordic Council, as one of the forces that can help maintain positive relationships between the nations and regions on the British isles in the years ahead. 2.6. resources this is every bit as true at the sub-state level as it is at state level; cultural endeavour can of course be political, but it must never become mere propaganda. 2.5. dealing with the hard Stuf in terms of major diplomatic issues, few come bigger than that of the 1988 Lockerbie bombing, in which 270 people died, most of them usa citizens. By agreement between Libya, the uK, and the usa, the trial of two Libyan 34 Diplomacy, even paradiplomacy, costs money! prior to devolution, scotland’s external links strongly focussed on the usa. in 2001, of 60 17 Clause 58(1) of the Scotland Act 1998 states “Power to prevent or require action. If the Secretary of State has reasonable grounds to believe that any action proposed to be taken by a member of the Scottish Executive would be incompatible with any international obligations, he may by order direct that the proposed action shall not be taken.” 18 In the same study that found 70% support for Holyrood as more important to Scotland than Westminster, only 13% of Scots trusted Westminster to always or mostly act in Scotland’s interest, whereas a majority thought Holyrood would do so. Linda Fabiani | paradiplomacy 35 representatives of the scottish Government or its agencies posted abroad, 31 were in the usa, 15 in Brussels, and another 15 covered asia and the rest of the World. the world. our environment Minister attended the Copenhagen climate conference in 2009 as a representative of one of the irst governments to agree carbon targets to 2050 (the scottish Government 2013b). in 2009-10, spending outside scotland’s borders by the Government and its agencies (Hudson and nicol 2010), was just under £30m, approximately 0.1% of the Government’s budget. Just four organisations incurred over 90% of international spending. the Government itself incurs expenditure across its diverse responsibilities; scottish Development international promotes international trade and inward investment; Visitscotland promotes tourism in scotland, and; the scottish Qualiications authority (sQa) markets scottish educational qualiications and consultancy internationally (ibid). our Ministers have headed numerous business delegations, including to the Middle east, China, and india. our presence at cultural and sporting events is important in the promotion of both business and tourism. recently, the First Minister attended the ryder Cup in the us to take handover as the next host nation, and previously had attended the premiere of the Disneypixar animated ilm, Brave, set in scotland. 2.7. conclusion the budget in 2009/10 represents an increase of over £10m, 54% in real terms, from inancial year 2004-05.there are two main factors in this increase. scottish Development international now has over 80 staf working in 15 countries, and, over its irst term, the snp doubled the international Development Fund to £9 million. the pattern of spend has shifted: the proportion spent in both europe and the usa is down; spend in asia has increased signiicantly and spend in the rest of the world increased from 1% of our international spend in 2004/05, to almost 25% in 2009/10, due largely, but not solely, to the international Development Fund’s focus on Malawi. one of the critical resources in scottish diplomacy is international trips by Government Ministers. the number of trips made outwith the uK has been relatively stable since the parliament was established in 1999, at approximately 50 visits a year, many of them relatively routine visits to Brussels (many more are made to London, but these don’t count as foreign trips). as a sign of how quickly matters change in world afairs, when the parliament opened in 1999, Climate Change was not seen as suiciently important to be ‘reserved’ as a responsibility of the uK parliament19. Consequently, this issue of global signiicance automatically devolved to scotland, which put in place one of the most ambitious pieces of climate change legislation in 19 The Scotland Act 1998 adopted the principle of devolving all matters to the Scottish Parliament, unless speciied, in Schedule 5 of the Act, as a Reserved Matter. 36 as we move towards the 2014 referendum, the groundwork we have laid since 1999, and indeed in the years before that, must come to fruition. While our opponents talk of a scotland ‘extinguished’ in 1707, those of us promoting scottish independence look to scotland’s future. Diplomatic issues already dominate the referendum debate, with disputes over scotland’s place in the eu, and our relationship with nato in the context of our ambition to free scotland of nuclear weapons. at a recent seminar in Brussels, Deputy First Minister, nicola sturgeon, spelled out the scottish Government’s views on an independent scotland’s place in the eu (european policy Centre 2013). Winnie ewing, who opened the modern scottish parliament with such aplomb also served as a Member of the european parliament, from 1979 to 1999. During that time, she earned the title Madame ecosse, and earned scotland many friends across the union. However, Winnie’s irst parliamentary election was to the uK parliament in 1967. Following her victory, which marks the start of the snp as a political force, she welcomed her election with the words: “Stop the world, Scotland wants to get on.” i hope the overview i have given you provides some sense that scotland is now moving towards ‘getting on’, and that our heightened engagement with the world in recent years has played some part in moving our campaign forward. Linda Fabiani | paradiplomacy 37 Member of the Catalan republican Left (erC) since 2003, in June 2007 he was elected as mayor of his home city Caldes, and re-elected in June 2011. since october 2011, he is erC’s deputy secretary-general for institutional and international relations. From March 2012 he is the secretary General of the european Free alliance (eFa). in December 2012 he was elected as Member of the Catalan parliament. abstract 3 From paradiplomacy to protodipomacy: the emerGence oF neW WeStern european StateS and the caSe oF catalonia since the 80’s, sub-state governments with legislative powers have developed a range of para-diplomacy strategies that over time have become more open and complex. these strategies have been more efective the more they have been conducted in cooperation and with the agreement of the respective central governments. some sub-state governments have included in their para-diplomacy strategies the promotion of an own cultural identity. For governments such as Quebec, Catalonia, Flanders, scotland or the Basque Country, external policies have become not only an opportunity to directly promote their economic and cultural interests, but also to publicize and promote their national speciicity and aspirations. recently, some of these governments, especially in the case of scotland and Catalonia, have been committed with the achievement in the short term and in a strictly democratic way of an independent state for their own countries. this means that para-diplomacy activities are complemented by proto-diplomacy, ie strategies to seek international alliances and support for the achievement of independence. proto-diplomacy, to these stateless nations, is a discrete activity that often conlicts with state diplomacy. nevertheless, it constitutes a key ield of action in order to optimize the chances for these self-determination processes to become a success. jordi Solé i Ferrando Born in Caldes de Montbui, Catalonia, in 1976, in 1998 he graduated in political science and public administration at the autonomous university of Barcelona and continued his studies in Germany with a Master program in european studies. From 2002 to 2007 he worked as political advisor in the european parliament in the eFa group. 38 eFa as european political party, drawing together civic nationalists, supports the self-determination processes and sees this as a democratization and normalization towards a diferent and better europe. Jordi solé i Ferrando | paradiplomacy 39 the european Free alliance (eFa) is a european political party with three decades of experience and presence in 17 european countries, which includes parties that from progressive values and a clear democratic stance, advocate the collective rights of national minorities, self-government and self-determination. eFa wants a better and stronger europe, a people’s europe that really implements the subsidiarity principle, a europe opened to emerging new states. although the oicial slogan of the european union is ‘unity in Diversity’, the eu needs to act upon the blatant linguistic and cultural inequality in europe. eFa claims for linguistic equality giving oicial status to all european languages and protecting endangered and minority languages. Many of our parties are active in self-governing regions with legislative competences across europe. some advocate full statehood for their countries, while others advocate (more) devolution or self-government. seven Meps from eFa parties are present in the european parliament, within the Greens/eFa parliamentary group. We in eFa are glad to see that some stateless nations in europe are involved in self-determination processes that for several reasons have sped up in the last years and that could end up with the emergence of new Western european states. these nations are mainly scotland and Catalonia, with Flemish and Basque pro-independence forces making clear progresses towards this goal as well. More speciically, both the scottish and the Catalan government have taken compromises to call for a referendum on the independence of their countries. scotland will hold its referendum in autumn of this same year, after the signature of the edinburgh agreement with the British government in 2012. Meanwhile, in Catalonia, a clear majority of the autonomous parliament has reached an agreement to call for a referendum in november, but in this case the spanish government has clearly stated its rejection of any dialogue or negotiation directed to reach an agreement similar to the edinburgh one. eFa supports these self-determination processes and regards them as democratization and normalization paths towards a diferent, diverse and better europe. all these processes stem from democratic values and rights, such as the right to decide, that for us is a key collective right. thus, from a purely democratic point of view, we believe that no democratic political force should never reject the exercise of democracy. However, it is clear that the actual success of these democratic processes is not only a matter of democratic principles, but also a matter of politics; and, indeed, of international politics. scotland’s referendum is being fought over issues 40 such as scotland’s future eu membership; and in Catalonia, the very same possibility that the Catalans could be free at last to vote on its own future, critically depends on the role of other countries and international organizations: the less sensible they will be to spanish pressures, the more likely the Catalans will be able to exercise their right to decide. in this chapter, i want to make a brief discussion of the diplomatic activity of Western stateless nations seeking independence by peaceful and democratic means, using the case of Catalonia as an example. in order to reach a better understanding of how this diplomatic activity looks like, i will irst review the two key concepts of sub-state entities’ diplomacy: paradiplomacy and protodiplomacy; then i will make a brief review of the reasons that have led a majority of Catalans to support independence, also leading an even larger majority of them to support the demand of a democratic referendum on the issue; and then thirdly, and inally, i will make an even briefer description of how Catalan institutions are bringing those reasons to international organizations, foreign governments, civil societies and public opinions in order to pave the way for international support and recognition. How could we describe paradiplomacy? to begin with, we must mention that, in europe, there are several federal or decentralized states that have sub-state entities with legislative powers (in the eu there are in total 74, most notably in the federal austria, Germany and Belgium or in the regionalised italy, spain or the united Kingdom). some of these political entities have developed, especially from the 80’s, foreign policy strategies to defend and promote, parallel to central state diplomacy, their interests in the international arena. this is what we understand by paradiplomacy. some sub-state entities have created a constitutionally based, complex and structured set of instruments and policies for their own external activities with functional and geopolitical priorities. according to (Keating 2010), the main ields of this external action are: economic development, technology, education, environment, culture, institution-building, migration, human rights, environment and security. as a matter of fact, then, in europe a considerable number of states do not enjoy a monopoly of competences in the area of foreign afairs. Globalization, internal democratization and federalization, and the european decision-making process have facilitated the rise of paradiplomatic activities for sub-states entities. a globalized world with multiple Jordi solé i Ferrando | paradiplomacy 41 levels of governance and the concurrence of many public and private actors opens the scope for action for sub-state entities in the international ield. and in the speciic framework of the european union, where many of the competences of sub-state governments are indeed shared with european bodies, regions have practical incentives to try to inluence the complex decision-making process and beneit from eu resources. at regional level, as well as at state level, european afairs are increasingly seen as a matter of domestic as much as foreign policy given the deep implication of the eu for all tiers of government. representation oices, have or desire to have some type of formal treatymaking power linked to their domestic competences, and seek presence in international organizations, be it formal or through informal links. they also tend to be very active in terms of public diplomacy, that is, in their eforts to promote through publicity, cultural events and marketing communication a positive image and reputation for their countries, in order to to present them as good locations for investment, living and tourism and also to promote the idea that they are a self-governing entities that want to play a role in world afairs. a thriving activity in paradiplomacy is a by-product of constitutional provisions that allow them as much as a result of political initiatives (constitutional arrangements vary considerably between diferent states, the most generous being Belgium). in some speciic cases, like the Catalan one, the process has been the other way round. the Catalan government started in the 80’s an active pro-european policy, which included a representation oice in Brussels and other ad-hoc initiatives, a policy that was seen with suspicion and was even politically and legally fought by the spanish government, until in 1994 a Constitutional Court rule recognized the right for autonomous communities to pursue their internal competences beyond the borders of the state (‘in foro interno, in foro externo’ doctrine). although the spanish constitution stipulates that foreign policy is an exclusive prerogative of the state, 2006 Catalan autonomous constitution (the estatut) stipulates that the international competences of Catalonia derive from the internal competences, mainly in the ields of culture, education, trade, tourism and sports. However, paradiplomacy is at the end of the day the diplomatic activity of a sub-state government, with very limited aspirations and means, almost always focused on gaining cultural and economic advantages for the population that this government represents, whether a stateless nation or not. thus, when the government of a stateless nation engages in a democratic process of self-determination, a new approach is required. For those governments actively seeking independence, paradiplomacy activities are therefore complemented by protodiplomacy, i.e. strategies to seek international alliances and support for the achievement of independence. it should be taken into account that sub-state entities with legislative powers have a national identity distinguished from the rest. this identity is usually based on a speciic culture, a particular history with government institutions in the past, a distinct party system and a collective project for the future (a willingness to exist as a particular group) largely shared by citizens. these entities tend to be especially active in the ield of paradiplomacy, since they ind in it not only an opportunity to promote their economic and cultural interests, but also to publicize and promote their national speciicity and aspirations among the peoples of the world. in this sense, paradiplomacy can be seen as a nation building policy. thus, stateless nations such as Flanders, Catalonia or the Basque Country (and Québec outside europe) have a particularly dense network of 42 protodiplomacy, to these stateless nations, is a discrete activity that often conlicts with state diplomacy, since two diferent/divergent national projects compete in the international arena. nevertheless, it constitutes a key ield of action in order to optimize the chances for these self-determination processes to become a success. the oicial recognition by the international community of these new states is a crucial step for them in order to be fully active in this community, but all this demands a prior, careful action on the international stage. established states may be reluctant to protodiplomacy activities from stateless nations because they would not like to antagonize the home nation state by openly supporting their national aspirations. the world of diplomacy is a conservative world, and all nation-states have a self-interest in maintaining their sovereignty and territorial integrity and, thus, in resisting diplomatic developments that appear to promote centrifugal tendencies within nation-states (Kincaid 2010). that’s why protodiplomacy is by no means an easy business. protodiplomacy activities usually target governments that are seen to play a key role in the hypothetical recognition of the new state. in that sense, Jordi solé i Ferrando | paradiplomacy 43 alliances and inluences among other devolved and federated territories play a secondary role, because the ultimate goal is the recognition by the international community, that is, by the community of states. inluential transnational lobbies can also be a target by stateless nations wishing to become new states. the relationship with their diaspora is also important: communities of nationals who emigrated abroad can be valuable partners in promoting the independence project in the countries where they live. in the case of potential new western european states, the eu is also a target, since these states might well secure eu membership right after the independence. Flemish, Basque, scottish or Catalan citizens are indeed european citizens as well, since their states long belong to the eu. internal enlargement is here a key concept. all new Member states of the union had to undergo a long process of institutional and political integration into the eu. in order to become members of the union they had to accept legal standards of the Member states of the union, and their accession requires the consent of all member states. But “internal enlargement” refers to the accession of states not from outside but within eu boundaries, states that would arise from democratic secession or succession processes within states already members of the european union. therefore they would automatically fulill the criterion for being admitted into the eu. However, the acceptance of “internal enlargement” as the result of a secession from a member state is far from being the oicial doctrine of the eu; nor it is, by the way, to reject it. the main reasons for this ambiguity are two. in the irst place, the eu treaties determine how a state can enter the union and how should it leave it, but they don’t say a word on what happens after the secession of a territory from one already-member state. in the second place, the eu has never been faced with the need to handle such a scenario, so there are no precedents. thus, neither its written law nor any precedent would tell the eu what to do in case that scotland or Catalonia happen to eventually secede. there’s a legal void. and where there’s a legal void, politics, and therefore diplomacy, play the lion’s share in determining the inal outcome. Here the key role of protodiplomacy in paving the way for an automatic, or at least quick and easy, admission of nations like scotland or (even more) Catalonia if they inally decide to became independent states. now let me briely focus on the Catalan case. Catalonia is a european country located in the north-east corner of the iberian peninsula. Formally it is one 44 of the seventeen spanish autonomous communities, and it is one of the most dynamic, populated and opened to the world. the country’s oicial language is Catalan, alongside spanish, which is the oicial language for the whole state. the Catalan linguistic and national community extends to the rest of the Catalan Countries: Valencia, the Balearic islands and some counties in southern France. all these territories have been historically linked to the principality of Catalonia, which for many centuries and until the beginning of the 18th century had its own laws and institutions of government. over the centuries, Catalonia was gradually integrated into a personal monarchic union irst with aragon and then, in the dawn of the Modern age, with Castile, the cultural and political core of modern spanish nationalism. Within this common crown, Catalonia retained a great degree of self-government through a mixed government between the crown and the parliament, not very far away from the english and scottish systems. However, Catalan freedoms and constitutions were eventually abolished in 1714 after a military defeat against the troops of philip V, at the end of the War of the spanish succession. there began the attempts of building a strongly uniied, culturally and linguistically homogeneous, and politically sometimes authoritarian, sometimes dictatorial, spanish nation state. in a short republican period in the 1930’s, right before the civil war, Catalonia regained its own institutions of government, but they were again brutally abolished, this time by Franco. With the coming of democracy in the end of the 70´s, Catalan self-government was re-established. During these three decades of self-government, Catalan institutions have been consolidated, and they could even broaden their powers after a new estatut came into force after much dispute in 2006. But these three decades have also shown that spain is unwilling to recognize its true multinational reality and the political implications that this recognition should bring. the central government formally treats the autonomous communities in equal terms, whereas in fact some of the communities (most notably Catalonia, the Basque Country and Galicia) have a distinguished national feeling that deserves, for the sake of their smooth accommodation into the spanish project, a diferential treatment. Far from this, the parties that have ruled spain (both center-right and center-left), backed by a public opinion reluctant to the recognition of the national diversity within spain, have chosen the strategy known as “café Jordi solé i Ferrando | paradiplomacy 45 para todos” – cofee for all; the same for all, even though some regions do not want –and probably do not need- as much. another important fact should be added to this lack of national recognition for Catalonia: the huge iscal deicit that our country sufers year by year vis a vis the central government. this iscal imbalance amounts to 16 billion euros every year. this tax drain has tremendously harmed Catalan economy. Despite its traditional strength our economy has in recent years lost dynamism to the advantage of other spanish regions, most notably Madrid. Despite generating the resources that are necessary to maintain and even improve our welfare state and our economic infrastructure, the deicit imposed by our inancial relationship with spain, in addition to our current economic crisis, have brought our government and our country to a point close to collapse. a recent episode, the last reformation of our autonomous constitution (the estatut), is also important to understand the Catalan fatigue. in 2005 the Catalan parliament approved by a large majority (with the support of 120 MCp’s to 15) a proposal for a new estatut that, according to spanish constitutional provisions, was to be sent to the spanish parliament for review, discussion and approval. there the proposal was severely cut. nevertheless, this revised proposal was voted by a majority of Catalans in a referendum. But despite of this, the estatut was taken to the spanish Constitutional Court by some other spanish autonomous communities as well as by the people’s party (at the time the main opposition party at the spanish parliament). they all alleged that many parts of the new estatut were unconstitutional, specially those concerning iscal autonomy, justice, the equalization between Catalan and spanish as oicial and compulsory languages, and Catalonia’s recognition as a nation. after 4 years of deliberations, the court stated that the estatut had indeed gone too far in several aspects and cut it once again, re-writing or re-interpreting many of the most important articles concerning language, national recognition, economic autonomy, self-government and justice. all this process was experienced as a humiliation by a large majority of the Catalan society. the toughness of the economic crisis, the injustice of the iscal system, and the general feeling of mistreatment to our own culture, national personality and self-government have ended up forming a civic and political majority supporting a call for a referendum on independence. this huge popular 46 support was particularly visible during the last two september 11ths (2012 and 2013), the national Day of Catalonia. in 2012, a civic and even festive demonstration on the streets of Barcelona became one of the largest in all european history, with a clear motto: “Catalonia, New State in Europe”. Just one year after, a 480 km massive human chain, called the Catalan Way towards independence, was formed following the ancient Via augusta, from Le perthus (French republic, Vallespir) up to alcanar (Kingdom of spain, Montsià). 2012 demonstration, an unprecedented historical event, led the Catalan president, artur Mas from the center-right party Convergència i unió, to end the parliamentary term and call for early elections, which took place on november 25. these elections formed a fragmented parliament, but with a clear majority of members advocating the need for a referendum to be called for next year. the minority government of Convergencia i unió is now backed by my party, the Catalan republican Left (erC in Catalan), under the condition, amongst others, to move decisively towards the referendum, which both spanish conservatives and socialists assure they will never let to happen. therefore, within spain, Catalonia lacks from recognition as a stateless nation, a just economic treatment and reasonable iscal self-government as an autonomous government. a majority of Catalans have been backing Catalan nationalist parties with the aim not to break with spain, but to accommodate Catalonia within a new, federal and multinational spain; however, the absolute failure of this project during the reformation of the estatut in the past decade has led this majority to now back the idea of secession, with an even more massive majority supporting the call for a referendum on the issue. unlike the British government, Madrid is determined to not allow this democratic referendum; thus, Catalonia’s independence will be more than likely the result of unilateral action due to the unilateral decision of Madrid to not negotiate nor dialogue with the Catalan government, despite the repeated ofers in this sense. these are our reasons, and we are convinced that they show very few laws. We’re not in front of a reasonable central government, but in front of one that is determined to ignore the democratic demands of a huge and stable majority of the Catalan society. But, in order to overcome Madrid’s frontal opposition to the exercise of democracy in Catalonia, we the Catalans have an obvious need to explain our case to the whole world. on the one hand, Jordi solé i Ferrando | paradiplomacy 47 there are diferent international campaigns and initiatives driven by Catalan civil society and the pro-referendum parties in Catalonia. and on the other hand, there are Catalan protodiplomatic eforts. listen. our people have started to speak out loud, and very soon will speak out louder; and our institutions are working hard to assure that the world is going to listen. thus, the Catalan government has recently created the public Diplomacy Council of Catalonia, popularly known as Diplocat. in its website, this agency is self-described as “a public-private partnership designed to foster dialogue and build relationships between the citizens of Catalonia and the rest of the world”. However this broad statement, from its very beginning the Diplocat has been deeply committed to explain the reasons why a majority of Catalans want independence, and (especially) why an even larger majority want a referendum on the issue. Diplocat is particularly oriented to public diplomacy, therefore being more focused on the relationship with foreign public opinions and civil societies, rather than with governments. But Catalonia also sees a target, of course, in foreign governments; in the end, they will be the ones from which Catalonia will need recognition. in this sense, the Catalan institutions have been also actively, while quietly, making its own eforts to promote the Catalan referendum’s cause to many diferent governments and international organizations. this protodiplomatic efort has generally been built upon the blocks of Catalan paradiplomacy, presenting the Catalans as reasonable people enraged by the old-fashioned nationalism of the spanish governments whether center-left or center-right, as well as for their rejection of the idea of a democratic referendum on independence like the one that, with absolute normality, will take place in scotland after an agreement between the British and the scottish governments. thus, Catalonia is presenting its case to the world not only with convincing reasons, but with means to bring these reasons to that world. the economic situation of the Catalan government, harmed for the crisis but specially by the deliberate iscal asphyxia imposed by a hostile spanish government, forces Catalan institutions to use austere means in its protodiplomatic eforts. My impression, however, is that these means are slowly having an efect. in the quiet eforts that my own party is doing on its own to internationalize our cause, we have noticed an evident change of attitude in many actors of the international scene: from largely ignore Catalan independentism, during the last year they have started to ask and, most importantly, to listen. and what we, those who stand up for Catalan freedom, need to win this battle, are just two things: our people to speak, and the world to 48 Jordi solé i Ferrando | paradiplomacy 49 aknowlegment 4 baSque paradiplomacy and european union internal enlarGement My warmest thanks to adam Grydehoj from “island Dynamics” as organiser of the seminar in svalbard on “Local actions in a Global Context, paradiplomacy by subnational Jurisdictions”. My deep appreciation to the Deputy Governor Mr. Lars erik alfheim and the Mayor Christin Kristogfersen for their most enlightening explanations on the political, social and cultural situation of the island of svalbard in the north pole. it was and will ever be one of the most extraordinary trips i have ever done, an unforgettable experience. thank you also to eFa for making it possible to meet with other colleagues from all around the world. it was an intense seminar where we all learnt a lot from each other, both from the academic point of view and from the human point of view. and inally thank you to svalbard itself for its unrivaled natural beauty even in extreme conditions of coldness and darkness. abstract We live in a globalized world in which paradiplomacy is necessary if we, as subnational entities, are to establish direct relations to deal with the issues that are crucial to us, depending on the will and level of self-government enjoyed. For those stateless nations wishing to initiate a process of self-determination, paradiplomacy is an efective instrument to help further our cause. it is an essential step in the right direction. Yet it is also true that there comes a time when the diplomacy of states on which we depend – in our case the French and spanish states – closes the door on us. therefore, it is our view that the future of our people lies in the establishment of a free, sovereign state within the european union so that we can forge diplomatic ties like any other state. lorena lopez de lacalle aristi eFa Vice-president, international relations secretary at the national executive of eusko alkartasuna, Member of the araba provincial parliament (Basque Country), secretary General of the think tank alkartasuna Foundation and secretary General of eurobask (Basque Council of the european Movement). paradiplomacy and diplomacy should co-exist peacefully, in mutual respect for the diferent levels of self-government because they thus facilitate, speed up and take better advantage of the relations among the various levels of representation. they should not, however, work against each other because diplomatic relations should be understood as those that are built from the bottom up, not the other way around. Longyearbyen. norway, 17 January 2013 50 Lorena Lopez de Lacalle aristi | paradiplomacy 51 4.1. introduction paradiplomacy and diplomacy should co-exist peacefully, in mutual respect for the diferent levels of self-government because they thus facilitate, speed up and take better advantage of the relations among the various levels of representation. they should not, however, work against each other because diplomatic relations should be understood as those that are built from the bottom up, not the other way around. in our case, however, we ind ourselves with two states characterized by the strongest Jacobin and centralist tendencies: France and spain. to facilitate our understanding of the issue, let’s bring a brief explanation of the current situation in euskal Herria. after 25 years of nationalist governments, in 2009 the Basque Country experienced the interregnum of a constitutional government, or what it is the same: a non-nationalist government. this allowed to clearly identifying the type of diplomatic relations to be established depending on the will to implement a nation-building policy. today, the new government, led by the Basque national party (eaJ-pnV), is a nationalist government, which was set up on 19 December 2012. therefore as to date it’s not easy to know what kind of foreign afairs policy they will be implementing. However, there is no doubt that the previous transition to a constitutional government did away with the political facet of the Basque paradiplomacy in order to, on the one hand, focus nearly exclusively on economic and trade relations, and on the other, to become open to cooperation with other spanish autonomous communities in issues dealing with foreign afairs, all this with the aim of reducing the importance of euskal Herria and to diminish its own identity. nonetheless, euskal Herria is experiencing an unprecedented period in its history as a result of the decision of e.t.a to cease all acts of armed violence in october 2011; therefore, this is the time to reactivate diplomatic channels to initiate a genuine peace process that will pave the way for a true and peaceful co-existence in euskal Herria. the Basque Country or euskal Herria is the land of the people that speak the Basque language (pérez-agote 2006; trask 1997), and refers to the area located in the borderland between northern spain and south-west France. the total area of its seven provinces at both sides of the pyrenees (4 in spanish territory or Hegoaldea: araba, Bizkaia, Gipuzkoa and nafarroa 52 [navarre], and 3 in French territory or iparralde: Lapurdi [Labord], Behe nafarroa [Basse navarre] and Zuberoa [soule]) has about 8.218 km2 and around 3.150.000 inhabitants, to this amount it should be added the diaspora, which Basques consider eighth province. indeed, it is estimated that there are more than 10 million people of Basque descent in the world, being argentina a clear example of that, as the 10% of the population is of Basque origin. it must be pointed out that administratively iparralde is not legally recognized, in fact, the Basque territory in France is separated into two French departments that spill over into the geographical area of the French Basque Country. Good thing that Basques like daunting challenges. since 2009 Basques have witnessed the reuniication of left-leaning nationalist forces in the Basque autonomous Community as well as in nafarroa and iparralde. although they are three diferent administrations, these forces are committed to respecting the pace of each administration, while they share a common goal – that of holding a referendum for self-determination. the Basques have always been a people open to the outside world – its seafaring history and its expertise in transforming minerals to metal made it a people that were naturally inclined to establish relations on an equal footing with peoples of other lands. During the twentieth century and the republican era under Lehandakari20 agirre, the irst president of the Basque Government, Basques had their own currency and foreign representation abroad. But let’s focus on the spanish transition so that you can learn how Basques went about acquiring the competences we now enjoy and why we now consider them to be insuicient, even if at the moment the Basque Country does have the highest level of self-governance in comparison with any other sub-national entity in europe (Cronin 2008). after 40 years of dictatorship under Franco, the spanish transition – which by some politicians such as the author, is been called the “incomplete spanish transition”– gave spain another geographical distribution to make 20 Lehendakari is the Word used to call the President of the Basque Government in any language; however, following the dictionary of the Basque Academy: Euskaltzaindia; “the Basque noun lehendakari means "president" and can refer to the president of any country, club, association, etc” (Mitxelena 2013) Lorena Lopez de Lacalle aristi | paradiplomacy 53 it appear to be a decentralized state (Bew, Frampton, and Gurruchaga 2009, 183–184). However it did so, by giving all the autonomous regions practically the same competences, thereby dashing the hopes of Catalans, Basques and Galicians and giving autonomous powers to those that sought none, such as Murcia, extremadura or Madrid, for whom decentralization only meant higher costs and heavier administrative burdens desired by none. Madrid is the most eloquent case of this: in addition to having all the institutions inherent in the spanish Government, it has a regional government and a regional parliament in Madrid, it is not surprising thus that the partido popular – the spanish popular party – speaks of overlapping and recentralization with regard to the spanish state. therefore, sooner or later the spanish state will have to seek a diferent system. some, have no doubt that the Catalans and Basques will embark upon the road to self-determination (pérez-agote 2006). independentists shall do this in full respect for spain, while demanding that the spanish Government respect peoples in return. as sovereign nations they shall not ask permission, nor shall they wait any longer because they’ve already been down that road and the only response gotten from the spanish Government is a systematic “no”. in spite of it all, the transition enabled Basques to lay the groundwork for what is now the Basque foreign policy. the irst Basque government of the post-Franco era (1980 to 1985) – under the leadership of Carlos Garaikoetxea, who founded eusko alkartasuna, the political party to which the author belongs – set up the institutions that successively developed the four Basque governments that followed (Garaikoetxea 2002). and this was important because he was convinced that institutions matter, that is, that institutions shape political outcomes. as peter Burens and Jana Deforche appoint, “major decisions taken at one point in time shape the scope and direction of future decisions”(Bursens and Deforche 2010, 168). that was the case in 1985 and also today, we are again at this same critical juncture. spain is at this critical juncture: Catalonia and the Basque Country want to become new states of the european union. 4.2. Foreign afairs of the basque Government since the Basque administrative setup is quite complex. in the following lines, the situation of the Basque autonomous Community will be described, 54 that is, of three of the four southern provinces that compose the Basque Country. the Basque regional government has acquired international relations competences, what shapes the foreign policy and international relations. But it must be insisted, foreign policy action encompasses much, much more because it also includes the activities carried out by the Basque Government through its parliamentary Committee on Foreign afairs. it also includes the activities of the three provincial governments, with their respective Directorates for european afairs, the important contributions to international solidarity and cooperation for development made by the Basque municipalities, the political organizations and labour syndicates, chambers of commerce, non-governmental organizations (nGos), cultural associations and many others (ugalde Zubiri 2005). the irst Basque Government set the stage for what in 1991 would become the General secretariat for Foreign afairs for a fundamentally political reason (Castro ruano and instituto Vasco de administración pública 2004). it endeavoured to project some semblance of country, with its own sociopolitical reality, cultural identity and history (ibid).actually, it was a matter of acquiring an essential tool to build a nation; it was also, of course, done for economic reasons, such as seeking investments abroad and markets for its own industries and technology so as to modernize it, as well as promoting tourism in the country (ibid). and lastly – also very important for cultural reasons – was to spread the Basque language and culture, targeting in particular the diaspora. With regard to this point, i would like to thank professors José Luis de Castro ruano and alexander ugalde Zubiri, whose reports have been used in the creation of this article. i would also like to say that they prefer to speak of the “foreign relations of non-central governments” rather than “paradiplomacy” to avoid any reference to hierarchy or subordination (Castro ruano and instituto Vasco de administración pública 2004, 21) the General secretariat for Foreign afairs is the body that assists the Lehendakari, the president of our Government, in deining and setting the political and institutional strategy of the autonomous Community’s foreign policy (ugalde Zubiri 2005, 8). the General secretariat has two directors, the Director of international relations and the Director for Basque Citizens and Basque Communities abroad. its main policy areas are relations with Lorena Lopez de Lacalle aristi | paradiplomacy 55 the european union, cross-border cooperation, international relations and relations with Basque groups abroad. represents all the autonomous Communities on issues that afect their competences. as you can understand, that is not at all suicient. to date the Basque Government has opened 8 delegations: Brussels, new York, Mexico, Buenos aires, santiago de Chile, Bogotá, the Delegation for Cross-border Cooperation, headquartered in Gasteiz, the capital of the Basque Country, and the Delegation of the Basque Country in Madrid, which was opened on 7 February 2003 and closed in 2009, when the constitutional government was formed and re-instated with diminished competences by that same government two years later. the Basque Government’s “european policy” covers both participation in deining the position of the spanish state in Brussels by means of the very deicient and unsatisfactory internal channels existing today, such as direct participation in the european union’s institutions via those bodies and structures that allow it; and interregional cooperation in numerous organizations and bodies with diferent objectives. the Delegation of the Basque Country to the european union in Brussels defends Basque socioeconomic, sectoral and business interests in the european union. it guarantees the participation of Basque Government representatives in the decision-making bodies of the european union, for example in the working groups of the Councils of Ministers that are open to the autonomous Communities (eusko Jaurlaritza 2013). However, participation in those bodies continues to be inadequate and unsatisfactory. Further, the Delegation of the Basque Country in Brussels is the gathering point for the Basque community in Belgium and of public and private Basque entities wishing to act at the eu level. it organizes activities aimed at spreading information and promoting the economic, business and cultural interests of the Basque Country to european institutions and partners. the Basque Country is also a member of the Committee of the regions. it goes without saying that a top priority–and rightfully so–is that of the Basque Country’s place in the european union. the process of integration in the european union covers areas of competence proper to the Basque autonomous Community. participation in this process is inevitable and the enhancement of mechanisms of participation both within the spanish state and directly with the institutions of the european union, such as participation in the Council of Ministers, is a major aspiration of the executive branch of the Basque Government. true, on 9 December 2004, the spanish Conference for european Community afairs did adopt the agreement that opened a few Council groups to the participation of the autonomous Communities (secretaría de estado de administraciones públicas 2004). But it is also true that still today, autonomous community representation is carried out by the inclusion in the spanish Delegation of a member of an autonomous Government who 56 the Basque Government has engaged in a strategy that takes full advantage of the meagre possibilities of participation existing today, such as attending multilateral meetings and serving on committees of the european Commission open to representatives of the autonomous Communities. it also advocates in all possible forums, and with other autonomous governments, the need for greater participation and the improvement of existing channels, as their limitations and inefectiveness have been largely proven (Castro ruano 2004). Direct participation in institutions of the european union has also been a priority of the Basque autonomous executive, like its participation in the Committee of the regions and the activity developed in various organizations engaged in interregional cooperation, both of a sectoral and political nature. While maintaining its presence in bodies such as the assembly of european regions, the Basque Government works closely with other like-minded governments, for example, in the Conference of european regions with Legislative power. But the diferent external and european vocations of many other non-central governments, both with regard to the european union and to internal afairs, have proven a hindrance that restricts or impedes possibilities for Basque action abroad and in the european union. some organizations are involved in interregional cooperation structures of extremely broad-based multilateral participation, thus composed of highly heterogeneous entities, within and outside the spanish state and such organizations hamper the Basque autonomous Community’s foreign afair aspirations. the Basque autonomous Community engages also in sectorial cooperation with other non-central governments under various frameworks: the network of regional Governments for sustainable Development, it4aLL – network Lorena Lopez de Lacalle aristi | paradiplomacy 57 of Local authorities for the information society, the oice of the High Commissioner for Human rights, or the Forum of Global associations of regions, established in 2007 as a joint initiative of the Conference of peripheral Maritime regions of europe, and the united nations Development programme (ugalde Zubiri 2005, 9). the potential of these networks is huge since it would produce a de facto recognition of the non-central governments within the united nations (paradoxically, the united nations recognizes local governments and nGos as actors with a consultative role, but not regions, because some states are opposed to it) (Castro ruano 2004). another distinguishing feature of those networks is that they are not limited geographically to the european continent, as was commonplace until recently: today non-central governments of other continents have also joined assertively. these networks relect the sectorial multidimensionality of foreign policy action, in this case, of the Basque Country. Basque communities on both sides of the border, since it gives priority to relations with Bordeaux. Concerning cross-border cooperation, the Basque Country belongs to the Working Community of the pyrenees and the atlantic arc Commission (ugalde Zubiri 2005, 9). Cross-border cooperation is nothing more than keeping up to date relations we have traditionally had with our neighbours. it is one of the dimensions of interregional cooperation with very speciic features derived from being a neighbouring country and from the existence of a state border. the Working Community of the pyrenees was established in 1983 and deals with four main areas: Communication infrastructures, research and training, Culture, youth and sport and sustainable development (ibid). its members are three French regions: aquitaine, Midi-pyrenées and Languedoc-rousillon and four spanish autonomous communities: Catalonia, aragon, navarre, the Basque Country and the principality of andorra. the atlantic arc Commission is one of the six geographical commissions in the Conference of peripheral Maritime regions of europe. it was established in 1989 and covers ive states: ireland, united Kingdom, France, spain and portugal. With regard to development and cooperation, the Basque development and cooperation agency was set up in 2010 and it relects the increasingly broadening model of decentralized cooperation implemented by non-central governments and local administrations. it falls under the president’s oice but i will not elaborate much on this due to lack of time except to say that Basque oicial development cooperation began in 1988 with 0.7% of the Basque autonomous Community’s operating budget. in reality, it is an expression not only of institutional cooperation, but it also relects–at least in part–the Basque people’s solidarity and outreach with other peoples of the world. speaking of bilateral cross-border cooperation, allow me to mention the establishment of the aquitaine-euskadi euroregion on 12 December 2011 under the innovative approach of community law of the european Grouping of territorial Cooperation (eusko Jaurlaritza and region aquitaine 2011). However, from a political point of view and seen from a nation-building perspective, this agreement is not fully satisfactory because aquitaine is larger than the Basque Country and often hinders cooperation with the 58 nonetheless, one of the most interesting features of interregional cooperation is the systematic practice of concluding agreements relating to international relations with foreign entities – the Basque administration has been doing that since the 1980s. such instruments come in many forms – conventions, memorandums of understanding, cooperation protocols or joints declarations, to list a few. the Basque Government has undertaken various means of cooperation with non-central governments; territorial bodies such as federated states, regions and cantons; central governments of states and state bodies (ministries and public institutions); and international organizations and other entities such as private foundations, universities, inancial institutions, nGos and cultural organizations, in particular those in europe and the americas (ugalde Zubiri 2005, 9). another action area is that of the Basque groups abroad, in other words, relations with the Basque diaspora. since the 1990s, the Basque Government has maintained a speciic policy line for relations with Basque citizens who live temporarily in other countries, basically for study or work reasons, and those Basque groups or communities living in other countries (among others, emigrants of Basque descent) and associations, mainly the euskal etxeak or Basque social centres. activities and programmes in this area derive from Law no. 8/1994 on relations with Basque Groups and Centres abroad of the Basque autonomous Community, adopted by the Basque parliament in 1994, and other laws stemming therefrom (eusko Jaurlaritza 1994). the number of oicially recognized Basque social centres and their federations throughout the world is currently 175. they are located in 24 countries, mainly in argentina and the united states. You may ind it curious Lorena Lopez de Lacalle aristi | paradiplomacy 59 that there are 10 of these Basque social centres and federations in spain, not including the Basque autonomous Community, and 3 in France. Law no. 8/1994 aims to strengthen these entities on behalf of its members, its internal cohesion and efectiveness of its associative actions (eusko Jaurlaritza 1994). therefore, it seeks to protect and enhance the links that these groups maintain with the Basque Country, to heighten awareness of the Basque reality by promoting its culture and economy and to nurture relations with diferent host countries (ibid). it sets out also a series of rights and services to which the centres and its members alike are entitled. thus, those who return to the Basque Country will be able to claim health care and other types of assistance, submit calls for the allocation of social housing or beneit from means of support aimed at facilitating their return trip, provided that certain conditions are met. Furthermore, the diaspora exercises its voting rights in Basque elections. according to the electoral Census of residents abroad concerning the Basque parliamentary elections on 21 october 2012–out of a total of 1,718,696 voters– 56,740 voters residing abroad registered with a municipality in the Basque autonomous Community cast their ballots (ine, 2012. therefore, the vote of the diaspora represents 3.29% of the Basque autonomous Community electorate. the majority of countries with Basque voters are in the americas, representing 51.3% of the Basque electorate overseas, compared with those in europe, which accounts for 30.3% (ibid). Last but not least, the Basque Government strives to promote the spread of the Basque language and culture throughout the world through the Basque institute, which was founded on 13 May 2008 as a public entity governed by private law with its own legal status. it is part of the Basque Department of Culture (eusko Jaurlaritza 2008, vol. 3629, sec. 88). Let us recall that Beñat etxepare was the author of the irst book printed in Basque, Linguae Vaconum primitiae. Dating back to the irst half of the 16th century, the publication was aimed at introducing the Basque language and culture to the world (Lasagabaster 2001, 403). 4.3. limitations of the activities carried out by the basque Government the legal framework for Basque international relations is provided in the spanish Constitution, the statute of autonomy of the Basque Country and 60 in the jurisprudence of the Constitutional Court. the question regarding the possibilities for action relating to international relations ofered by this framework has led to a lively political and academic debate. the lack of precision of the constitutional text concerning the meaning of international relations in article 149.1.3 resulted in some initial restrictive interpretations of the possibilities open to the autonomous communities for developing their activities abroad (Constitución española, 1978). over time, the Constitutional Court recognized to a certain extent the international dealings of the autonomous Communities, albeit with certain limitations and restrictions. according to most of the doctrines, the inlection point between the closed–and often ridiculous–obstructionist positions lies in judgment 165/1994 of 26 May concerning the establishment of the Basque Delegation in Brussels, which opened oicially in 1996, in which the Constitutional Court rules in favour of the position of the Basque authorities (tribunal Constitucional 1994). since then, the international relations of the autonomous community will be considered legitimate, within certain boundaries. these boundaries continue to be as narrow as the political will of the spanish central Government so deems. From the start, this political will tends to short-circuit the foreign activities of the autonomous Community in such a way that recourse to the Constitutional Court ends up being the customary way of elucidating the legitimacy or illegitimacy of many initiatives relating to international relations. as soon as resolute steps are taken towards nation-building, Basques ind ourselves blocked by the spanish Constitution, which was in fact rejected by an overwhelming majority of Basque citizens when consulted in a referendum about it (Blas Guerrero 1978, 205; Muro 2011, 167–168). Currently, recourse to the Constitutional Court focuses on economic issues such as the drug co-payment, pension cuts or measures restricting the access of undocumented persons to health care services. of course, there are other issues of recourse to the Court: political matters like the legality or not of Basque political parties, the parot doctrine (which deals with the non-remission of sentences), democratic participation in institutional structures and so forth. the absolute majority of the spanish popular party does its utmost to ensure that what should be dealt with by the Government ends up in the Constitutional Court. Lorena Lopez de Lacalle aristi | paradiplomacy 61 therefore, as it was said at the beginning of the article, in the Basque case, Basques have decided to seek a place in the european union as a member state. For that reason, we are proponents of eu internal enlargement. it is our view that europe should march resolutely towards becoming a europe of peoples, where each community if so desired can become a member state. Whatever the case, we must build a europe that respects the pace and wishes of each community and the levels of participation and representation they seek in the european institutions. a europe of peoples will be more decentralized and more european in virtue of its increased respect for european cultural identity. indeed, various stateless nations throughout europe continue to demand their full emancipation and the chance to associate with other peoples of the continent, and the world on an equal footing (Keating 2010). and they wish to do so without giving up the common project of european construction. this new year–2013–will see the admission of a new state to the european union: Croatia. it has been a long and tortuous road, but it will be recognized as a new member of the union. 2013 is also the year declared to be the european Year of Citizens by the european union. and in the words of the european Commission itself, it was so declared because “the better the men and women of europe understand their rights as eu citizens, the more informed the decisions they can take in their personal lives, and the more vibrant democratic life in europe can be at all levels” (european Commission 2013). that is our wish as Basques and european citizens. indeed, as professor Mario Zubiaga, put it recently: “it’s time for the institutions to become sub-versive, to put at the fore front what laid behind, the will of the majority of its citizens. Institutions apart from granting security and predictability they ought to pave the way for the changes their societies demand” (Zubiaga 2012). professors Matas, Gonzalez, Jaria and román argue that the european union law cannot be an obstacle hindering the legitimate democratic will of european citizens who, in a particular region of europe, decide to found a new state for themselves through a democratic and peaceful process (Matas i Dalmases et al. 2011). in accordance with the precedents of Greenland and above all those of German uniication, the union should be capable of responding to the democratic aspirations of part of its citizens by constituting a new state, which would rule out ex novo admission. the treaties cannot be used to frustrate the will of a legitimate majority as it would be the same as sanctioning someone for exercising a legitimate right. the treaties must be interpreted in such a way as to allow for the integration of a declaration of will supported by union’s fundamental legal and political principles, as a democratic community of law. Certainly it would not be understood that a european union based on states which, in many cases had originated through processes hardly or not at all democratic should fail to respond satisfactorily to new states appearing within the union. if democracy requires an agreement on the territorial legitimacy of political power, the possibility of an internal union enlargement made through transparent, open and participative means has to be well accepted both by the other union member states, guided by democratic principles, and by the union itself. 62 Lorena Lopez de Lacalle aristi | paradiplomacy 63 abstract paradiplomacy has become a concept for regional governments acting within international relations, i.e. sub-national jurisdictions developing their own international agenda. regions open oices and conduct “trade missions” abroad; become involved in regional/international organizations and participate in regional/international conferences and networks. the most common evidences of paradiplomacy are found in Western europe. 5 paradiplomacy in Greenland this paper will focus on the case of Greenland as an arctic player in the new era of geopolitics in the north. How does Greenland operate in international relations in the diferent policy ields? What is the current political strategy for Greenland, while the focus is on the hydrocarbon and mineral assets that are supposed to be located both of-shore and on-shore in Greenland? What role does the Greenlandic government play in these afairs? 5.1. introduction maria ackrén Maria ackrén is associate professor in political science since 2011 at ilisimatusarik/university of Greenland. she is also Head of Department of social sciences since 2012 at the same institution. Her ield of research is within comparative politics focusing on autonomous regions in the world, island studies, methodology and recently arctic relations with a special focus on Greenland. associate professor in political science Department of social sciences ilisimatusarik/university of Greenland pB: 1061 3900 nuuK phone: +299-36 23 47 e-mail: maac@samf.uni.gl 64 this article will elucidate how the paradiplomacy is functioning in a more peripheral sub-national jurisdiction focusing on Greenland. Greenland can be seen as a scandinavian welfare model but at the same time it also qualiies as a developing region, since the economy is dependent on the block grant from Denmark ixed at the 2009 level. the home-rule system derives from 1979, but since Greenland has been a former colony and recently become more involved in international relations it is interesting to see how Greenland has managed the new role of becoming more and more self-regulating in areas such as international relations. However, Denmark as the metropolitan state has the exclusive rights of foreign afairs. With the new self-Government act from 2009, Greenland has some room for manoeuvre in international relations, which will be further elucidated. the Danish strategy in the arctic is very much focused around the relationship between Copenhagen and nuuk. this has both been stressed in the DanishGreenlandic joint strategy from 2008 and in the Kingdom of Denmark’s arctic strategy from 2011 (Bailes et al. 2012). the aim of the latest strategy can be seen as a reaction and respond to the major ongoing environmental Maria ackrén | paradiplomacy 65 and geopolitical challenges in a growing global interest towards the arctic and at the same time Denmark tries to redeine its role and strengthen its position as a key player in the arctic in terms of referring to the whole Kingdom including Greenland and the Faroe islands. this essay will following the introduction be divided into four main parts. the irst part will give a short historical overview of Greenland’s international role from the second World War until today. this is to give the reader a notion of Greenland’s strategic geopolitical role throughout diferent periods in time. the second part will elucidate the aspect of paradiplomacy within the economic sphere and the third part will continue to look at other policy areas where Greenland is playing an international role. the conclusion or last part will take the current political considerations into account. 5.2. a Short history of Greenland’s international role as other regions in the arctic, Greenland has come under pressure from outside powers using the area to pursue their larger interests. the arctic as such is a sparsely populated, resource-rich region whose location makes it increasingly important in geopolitical terms (Young 2011). Looking at history, we can say that military planners have always seen the arctic as a theatre of operations for weapons systems and as a potential arena for actual combat, while others have perceived the region as giving opportunities for collaboration in scientiic research and presenting a growing need for co-operation to protect the shared ecosystems of the region (Young and Cherkasov 1992). During the second World War when Denmark lost contact with Greenland due to German occupation, the us showed interest in placing military bases around the island. the us opened a consulate in Godthaab (now nuuk) and us coastguard vessels patrolled Greenlandic waters (Boel and thuesen 1993). in 1941 the us signed a defence agreement with Greenland. this was made possible by the Danish ambassador in Washington D.C. at the time, Henrik Kaufmann. the treaty gave the us the right “to construct, maintain and operate such landing ields, seaplane facilities and radio and meteorological installations as necessary” (archer 2003). By the end of the war the us had established 13 army bases and 4 navy bases in Greenland. Greenland was considered important for four main reasons: irst, it was important to prevent access to north america by any potential hostile power; second, Greenland was a key transit point to europe; thirdly, Greenland provided 66 crucial meteorological information; and fourthly, Greenland’s mineral wealth was of value for the aircraft industry in the usa and Canada (archer 2003). in 1951, a new defence agreement was struck between Denmark and the usa concerning Greenland. the americans established the thule air Base in the northern part of Greenland and the base was considered of high military value (Boel and thuesen 1993). the motives for the 1951 agreement were to stress the shared framework of nato, which Denmark by this time had entered as a member; to underline the mutuality of interest between Denmark and the united states regarding the defence of Greenland; to allow the united states a wide range of defence-related activities in Greenland; and at the same time to protect the local people (archer 2003). From 1958 to 1990 the us operated four radar stations over the inland ice as part of the Distant early Warning system (DeW). another development was two Long-range navigation (Loran) stations, which were established on Greenland’s east coast and these were connected to nato’s wider navigation system in the arctic. During the Cold War the Ballistic Missiles early Warning system (BMeWs) at thule provided the us with a notice of a soviet surprise attack. other connections were placed in alaska and england (archer 2003). During the Cold War the arctic was divided into two armed camps with the soviet union on the one hand and the united states on the other, together with four of its nato allies – Canada, Denmark, iceland and norway (Young 2011). With the end of the Cold War, strategic interest in Greenland declined and most of the military bases closed, but thule air Base is still running and it has even been upgraded to an advanced missile-defence standard. permission for this development was laid down in 2004 with the igaliku agreement. this agreement was a supplement to the 1951 Defence agreement and was signed also by the home-rule authorities of Greenland (petersen 2011). since the late 1980s, the so-called arctic eight (Canada, russia, the united states, and the ive nordic states) have taken a lead in co-operative measures and international diplomacy regarding the arctic region. the most prominent results of the international co-operation in the arctic can be seen in the form of the arctic environmental protection strategy, adopted in 1991 and the establishment of the arctic Council in 1996 (Young 2011). Greenland plays an active role in the arctic Council and paradiplomatic matters have been in the forefront since the advent of Home rule back in 1979. Greenland is now in a hot spot regarding the new arctic geopolitical game that is now taking place between major powers in the arctic. this is somewhat discussed in the end of the paper. Maria ackrén | paradiplomacy 67 5.3. General development regarding paradiplomacy Criekemans (2008) has traced three waves of paradiplomacy made by sub-states. the irst wave derives from the 1980s and onwards. During this period a growing number of non-central governments are attracting foreign direct investments through own initiatives (e.g. Catalonia’s early eforts in Japan) or using their culture and identity as a trade mark for placing oneself on the international map. these initiatives were of a more ad hoc nature with a minor form of integration. the second wave illustrates the 1990s, where the sub-state entities of certain european countries are taken a more formal step into diplomatic relationships, because of legal reforms (e.g. the Belgian state reform in 1993, which awarded formal ius tractacti and ius legationis to the regions and Communities). the current third wave is characterized by steps in the direction of a ‘verticalization’ of the organizational structure of the administration or department of external/foreign afairs. this process is an ongoing process, where the sub-states are forming their own foreign policy within their metropolitan states. one recent example of this is the portuguese autonomous region of the azores in the atlantic. the amendment of the 2004 Constitution in portugal changed the framework of the regional system of self-government, and as a consequence a new amendment of the political and administrative statute of the autonomous region of the azores from 2009, now states that the islands can pursue their own international policy with its own agenda and objectives. this will be done in co-operation with foreign regional bodies. the azores can also take part in organisations created by international conventions (Lanceiro 2009). 5.4. the Greenlandic case Following Criekemans’ three waves of paradiplomacy we can say that Greenland before the advent of Home rule in 1979 was under the power of Denmark, since Greenland was considered as a county amongst other counties in Denmark from 1953. Before that Greenland was a Danish colony through the years of 1721-1953. With the introduction of Home rule, Greenland had no real say within international relations, since this was considered as a Danish overall matter. the call for more autonomy came during the 1980s with the withdrawal from the european economic Community (eeC) and the option of a status as an oCt (overseas Countries and territories). this was the irst international decision Greenland made by its own. there were, however, some problems in the 1990s regarding the cod 68 isheries, because of changing sea temperatures. the eu continued to buy the right to catch cod, but there were some concerns that this was not very sustainable (Gad 2013). in 2006, a joint declaration concerning eu/Greenland partnership was issued as an umbrella covering the isheries agreement and a new special partnership agreement foreseeing increased cooperation in a number of areas presumably of interest to the eu, such as minerals, transportation, and climate research (Gad 2013). With the new self-Government act from 2009, the Government of Greenland can negotiate at an international level in agreement with the Danish state especially in areas of Greenlandic interests. the Greenlandic Government can also sign international agreements and become a member within such international organisations that are of Greenlandic interests without any intervention from the Danish state (udigivet af Bureau for inatsisartut 2009). Greenland is following quite the same system as the azores in this case. 5.5. paradiplomacy within the economic Sphere Greenland is economically dependent on Denmark through the annual block grant, which is now lying at DKK 3.4 billion according to 2009 level. the main industries in Greenland consist of the ishing industry, mining and some small private businesses. other characteristics of the Greenlandic economy are a very low level of production of goods and services for the domestic market and therefore the import exceeds the export (Jónsson 1999). However, there is a lot of optimism regarding future endeavours since oil, gas and mineral exploration is taking place both of-shore and on-shore in Greenland. the possible new extractive industries will attract a lot of international investors. according to the new self-Government act from 2009, there is a statement that the block grant will be reduced to half the amount if the incomes from natural resources exceed DKK 75 million (udigivet af Bureau for inatsisartut 2009). the Government of Greenland has taken a clear step towards exploration and exploitation of natural resources in two strategy plans from 2009. in the irst strategy, there is a discussion around the issue of exploration and exploitation of oil and gas with the policy of licenses. in the second strategy, there is an outline of the policy regarding minerals (råstofdirektoratet: Maria ackrén | paradiplomacy 69 Grønlands selvstyre 2011). there is a political ambition that all activities within the area of extractive industries are made in such a way that it takes all aspects of security, safety, health and environmental issues into account. the Government has a goal to develop the mineral industry as a central economy sector in Greenland. the estimation is that Greenland will during the next ive to ten years have at least ive active mines with over 1000 citizens working within this business (råstofdirektoratet: Grønlands selvstyre 2011). Within the economic sphere Greenland has been active to negotiate favourable agreements with the eu. Greenland was a member in the european economic Community (eeC) until 1985 together with Denmark. in 1985, Greenland seceded from the eeC as the irst territory to ever leave the eeC, but established agreements through the so called oCt-order (overseas Countries and territories) (Gad 2013) .a ishery agreement was struck and has been renewed in several occasions. the agreements with the eu is not just focused on the ishery sector, they also include co-operation within areas such as research (especially climate research), education, energy, tourism and food security (Gønlandsk-dansk selvstyrekommissions 2008). since 1992, a Greenlandic representative has worked in the Danish diplomatic mission in Brussels and held diplomatic status. today, four persons work full-time in Brussels for Greenland. First, Greenland was part of the Danish delegation, but now both Greenland and the Faroe islands have their own oices with own entrances (Gad 2013). Greenland can be compared to other european regions in this sense, since Bavaria and scotland for instance, have also been co-operated in similar areas as Greenland. in the case of Bavaria, international trade, international cultural or educational policies, and even tourism are seen as separate areas, which are even managed by separate institutions. in scotland, public diplomacy has been in focus in the cultural and economical areas (Criekemans 2008). 70 and supporting inuit initiatives within national jurisdictions. its governing body is the iCC General assembly comprised of delegations from Greenland, Canada, alaska and russia. Between General assemblies, held every third year, the iCC is led by a president and an executive council (innuksuk 1994). the iCC is recognizing that inuit rights extend across the circumpolar regions, including marine areas and transcend the national boundaries of arctic states (innuksuk 1994). With respect of other regions, such as, Québec, Wallonia and Catalonia their paradiplomatic activities are very much centred on the issue of exporting identity and culture similar to Greenland in this matter (Criekemans 2008). it only difers what kind of identity and culture we are referring to. in the Greenlandic case it is about the inuit traditional life, in Québec and Wallonia it is the French identity and culture and in Catalonia it is the Catalonian identity and culture that the regions are exporting to other areas. another important organization is the arctic Council, where Greenland has been one of the “founding fathers”, signing the document on behalf of Denmark, when the arctic Council was established in 1996. the organization functions as a forum for the arctic states and nations in the arctic rim (Motzfeldt 2006). the arctic Council is a high-level intergovernmental forum promoting co-operation, co-ordination and interaction between the arctic states. the member states are: Canada, Denmark (including Greenland and the Faroe islands), Finland, iceland, norway, russia, sweden and the usa. added to this there are six international organizations representing arctic indigenous peoples, which have permanent participant status (arctic Council). the most important issues within the arctic Council have been related to climate change, environment and biodiversity (Motzfeldt 2006). 5.6. paradiplomacy within other policy areas the Kingdom of Denmark’s chairmanship of the arctic Council in 2009-2011 has highlighted peoples of the arctic, the international polar Year (ipY) legacy, climate change, biodiversity, megatrends (in the arctic), integrated resource management, operational cooperation and the arctic Council in a “new geopolitical framework” (Bailes et al. 2012). Greenland takes part in various international organizations as an own nation. one of the most important ones is inuit Circumpolar Council (iCC). the iCC founded in 1977 has become a trademark of inuit co-operation between Greenland, alaska, Canada and russia. the iCC is an international non-governmental organization, which works for inuit rights internationally Greenland takes also part in the nordic co-operation through the membership in the nordic Council and the nordic Council of Ministers since 1984. the most important issues in a Greenlandic context have been the issues around environment, indigenous peoples’ status and some security matters (especially regarding the thule air Base) (sændergaard 2006). Greenland Maria ackrén | paradiplomacy 71 has established a nordic institute (n.a.p.a.) since 1987 (sændergaard 2006). in 1985 another nordic co-operation was established through the West-nordic initiative with iceland, the Faroe islands and Greenland as partners. this co-operation has further been developed into what is called nora (north atlantic Cooperation) with north- and West-norway as members as well (Lytthans 2006). the Greenlandic Government has a foreign oice, which handles the co-ordination, contact and functions as an advisory board in international relations between nuuk and the Greenlandic representation in Copenhagen and the Greenlandic representation in Brussels. the foreign oice has diferent matters on its agenda, such as, the arctic co-operation, the eu, the un, nordic co-operation, indigenous peoples, the Joint Committee between the usa and Greenland, foreign- and security policy and foreign commercial matters (udenrigsdirektoratet). in the parliament (inatsisartut) there is a foreign- and security committee, which has been established since 1988. the committee is discussing important international afairs, which relates to Greenland. the matters are the same as for the foreign oice at the governmental level. 5.7. political considerations regarding Greenland the election of 12th March 2013 has been decisive also for which way Greenland is going to go regarding international afairs. the results showed a majority for siumut, the social Democratic party at 42.8% of the total votes with aleqa Hammond as the leader, who was the total winner of the election with as much as 6818 personal votes. Before the election each party proiled itself regarding international afairs. inuit ataqatigiit (ia) has been in the forefront regarding the international ield. ia’s policy is to develop Greenland into a fully sovereign state both politically and economically. Foreign afairs are important matters for the party in question. Greenland should become an equal player on the international arena. ia is engaging in international agreements between other nations and also establishing agreements with international companies, especially in the area of extractive industries. the goal is to develop the foreign oice into a Department of Foreign afairs (inuit ataqatigiit 2013). Demokraatit (D) has another policy regarding international relations. their policy is more limited to keep status quo in the sense, that Denmark will continue to take care of the overall foreign- and security policy. Demokraatit 72 would though like to have embassies in those cities, which are important for Greenland. they suggest to open embassies in the usa and Canada and to keep Greenland within nato, even if Greenland would become an independent state (Demokraatit). siumut (s) is also in favour of independence and the party would like to take over the foreign labour legislation from Denmark. the party is also working for preparation of what the un Convention of the Law of the sea (unCLos) will bring regarding the claims of the extended continental shelf that Denmark/Greenland has put forward to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental shelf (CLCs). the application is still in process and will be delivered in 2014. siumut is also in favour of better marketing management of Greenlandic products to the world markets and would like to see more trade agreements with other countries. the party would also work for more international representation in other countries than exist today. another point in the party’s programme is to establish some form of military in Greenland, e.g. having an own navy or military service (“siumut” 2013). atassut (a) is more conservative than the other parties. the party respects Denmark to have the overall control over foreign- and security matters. atassut wants that Greenland is heard in matters related to Greenland within eu, iCC and the nordic co-operation. the most important areas that Greenland should have a voice within are the ishing sector and culture according to the party’s programme (atassut). the other two parties: Kattusseqatigiit partiiat (Kp) and the new party partii inuit (pi) do not have a special international agenda, since these parties are more in favour of domestic Greenlandic issues. partii inuit is a new nationalistic party with independence on its agenda, but it is not clear what kind of foreign policy this party wants. according to the coalition agreement of the new Government 2013-2017 between siumut, atassut and partii inuit the international agenda is to enhance the Greenlandic competence regarding international relations. the possibilities within the oCt-order within the eu should be better utilized and the trade with neighbouring countries should be developed. new markets for Greenlandic products are also mentioned, but there are no details about what kind of markets the Government are thinking of. Within the security dimension it is mentioned that there will be more control over the shipping traic within Greenlandic waters, since this will probably increase due to Maria ackrén | paradiplomacy 73 climate change. Cooperation regarding sar-operations will take place with neighbouring countries (Government of Greenland 2012). 5.8. a new Greenlandic Strategy? Lately, there has been some turbulence within the arctic policy strategy regarding Greenland. prime Minister, aleqa Hammond, siumut decided to boycott the arctic Council meeting in Kiruna, sweden. this was made in protest against the swedish chairmanship and as a notiication to the member states within the Council to consider if Greenland and the Faroe islands might be sitting as equal partners at the negotiating table on separate chairs with Denmark with voting rights in the future. another way of tactic was to give attention towards the Canadians to be aware of the situation, since Canada is now taking over the chairmanship. there have been a lot of discussions whether this was a good strategy or not (sermitsiaq). Demokraatit (D) has also recently been having requests of changing the ottawa Declaration from 1996 between the arctic states. the Declaration is the agreement between the eight arctic states sitting in the arctic Council, which gives every state a vote in the Council. as a result of the boycott Demokraatit has no showed support of revising the ottawa Declaration so that also the self-government areas, such as, Greenland and the Faroe islands would be able to have a vote themselves at the table (Knr 2013). an interesting feature regarding the arctic Council is that the Kiruna meeting on 15 May 2013 brought new permanent observers into the Council. amongst these China, india, italy, Japan, republic of Korea and singapore became new observer states (arctic Council secretariat 2013). the Chinese observer status has been a little bit controversial, since foreign ministers in Denmark (incl. Greenland), sweden, Finland, norway and iceland have been supporting China’s application. the other arctic states (Canada, russia and the usa) have been more silent on this issue. Denmark has huge interests in China, since the country has been investing a lot of money into the asian market in recent years and there is some geopolitical tactics behind the Danish support for the observer status in the arctic Council. the Chinese interest in the arctic has been a little bit exaggerated by Danish media. the main interest for the Chinese is the new possible shipping route due to climate change. the investment in Greenland is minor so far. in 2009, a private mining company from Jiangxi province acquired prospecting rights to explore metals and 74 minerals in southern Greenland. another private company from the same province invested in a joint prospecting project in Greenland with the united Kingdom’s nordic Mining Corporation. in 2011, a company owned by the sichuan provincial government, Xinye Mining, was reported to have plans to purchase an iron ore mine in Greenland’s isua region from the British company London Mining (Jakobson and peng 2012). this process is still an ongoing process, but there has been some contradictory development since the Chinese director working with the project now has been withdrawn from Greenland. the whole project has been a little bit put on hold for the moment. 5.9. conclusion or Way ahead after the election the whole world has been focusing on Greenland and what will happen, especially within the extractive industries. Greenland has been in focus in the world news and newspapers. the direction towards trying to build up a totally new industry has been in focus, but with siumut now in the role as leading the negotiations, some international investors have already reacted more negative and we have seen shares on the stock market declining within the possible new sector of income in Greenland. However, the projects in place will still go on and a possible iron ore mine will be placed in the Godthåbsjord 120 km’s northeast of nuuk with London Mining as the company in charge of this particular project. siumut has a more restrictive policy within this sector. the party would like to enforce royalties from day one for all multinational companies working within extractive industries, while the former leading party ia had enforced a taxation policy which has already been giving Greenland some income. ia has been attracting a lot of international investors from countries, such as, the us, Canada, australia, China, south Korea, the eu and of course Denmark. now, there seems to be an uncertain situation of what will happen within this area. siumut has also been in favour of extracting uranium as a bi-product, while extracting rare earth elements (ree) from the grounds at a certain level with environmental, health and nature in mind. For the time being, there is an expert group investigating this issue. We can say that Greenland in its current form is focusing on the paradiplomacy within the economical sphere rather than in other areas. there is, of course, still a focus on environmental and cultural concerns, but the main focus is clearly within the economical sphere. Maria ackrén | paradiplomacy 75 Greenland has also becoming aware of the geopolitical game, which is now going on in the arctic, so we might experience a process towards a “Greenlandic arctic strategy” in the future. the Faroe islands are already on their way to have an own arctic strategy, so Greenland will possibly follow suit. there are a lot of diplomatic interests directed towards Greenland at the moment. During the recent weeks (during time of writing), Greenland has had some high-level visits from the German ambassador, the norwegian ambassador and the French ambassador. iceland has decided to establish a more permanent form of diplomatic oice in nuuk in the near future and there might be more to come. 76 Maria ackrén | paradiplomacy 77 bibliography 1 GoalS, capabilitieS, and inStrumentS oF paradiplomacy by Subnational juriSdictionS — Godfrey Baldacchino (2002) “Jurisdictional Self-Reliance for Small Island Territories: Considering the Partition of Cyprus”, the round table, 356(1), 349-360 — Barry Bartmann (2000) “Patterns of Localism in a Changing Global System”, Lessons from the political economy of small islands: the resourcefulness of Jurisdiction. ed. by Godfrey Baldacchino and David Milne (Houndmills et al. and new York et al.: Macmillan and st. 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Cambridge; new York: Cambridge university press — Young, oran r., and arkady i. Cherkasov. 1992. “International Co-operation in the Arctic: Opportunities and Constraints.” in arctic alternatives: Civility or Militarism in the Circumpolar north, edited by Franklyn Griffiths, 9–25. Canadian papers in peace studies 1992 no. 3. toronto, ont., Canada : Downsview, ont., Canada: science for peace; s. stevens 87 on behalf of the Centre Maurits Coppieters and our partners i sincerely wish to thank the authors of the report for their groundbreaking approach to the subject and their passionate, conceptually robust and well structured factual presentations. Finally i also wish to thank you (the reader) for your interest in our organization and for reviewing our modest contribution to a much wider european political debate in this area. Günther Dauwen secretary of Centre Maurits Coppieters www.ideasforeurope.eu centre maurits coppieters GoalS oF the european political Foundation centre mauritS coppieterS (cmc) according to its general regulations, the Centre Maurits Coppieters asbl-vzw persues the following objectives and references: the european parliament recognized the Centre Maurits Coppieters (CMC) as a political Foundation at a european Level in 2007. since then the CMC has developed political research focusing on european issues, also in the ields of multilevel governance, management of cultural and linguistic diversity in complex (multi-national) societies, decentralization, state and constitutional reform, succession of states, conlict resolution and protection of human rights. so far, every little step has been important to the steady consolidation and growth of the Centre, that’s why i’m especially proud of this publication. indeed, it undoubtedly represents a crucial contribution to the current state of afairs and will certainly have a notorious impact both in the academia and among european decision makers in a broad sense, including european institutions (like the european commission, european parliament, Council and Committee of the regions), other political actors, think tanks, research centers and contributors to the european integration process. 88  observing, analysing and contributing to the debate on european public policy issues with a special focus on the role of nationalist and regionalist movements and the process of european integration;  serving as framework for national or regional think tanks, political foundations and academics to work together at european level;  Gather and manage information for scientiic purposes on all nationalist and regionalist movements, organisations, structures,… in all its appearances situated in a european context;  Making available information to the public on the implementation of the principle of subsidiarity in a context of a europe of the regions;  promoting scientiic research on the functioning and the history of all national and regional movements in the eu and making the results public to as many people as possible;  Developing actions to open information sources and historical information sources in a structured and controlled way with the aim to build a common data network on issues of nationalism and regionalism in europe;  Maintaining contacts with all organisations who are active in national movements and with the institutions of the eu; 89 the Centre Maurits Coppieters asbl-vzw takes all the necessary actions to promote and achieve the higher stated goals always observing the principles on which the european union is founded, namely the principles of liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law. among other things, Coppieters was the author of: ‘Het jaar van de Klaproos’; ‘Ik was een Europees Parlementslid’; ‘De Schone en het Beest’. He is Honorary member of the eFa. memberS oF the centre mauritS coppieterS mauritS coppieterS (Sint-niklaaS, 1920 – deinze, 2005) arritti, Corsica the Fleming Maurits Coppieters studied history and later became a Doctor of Laws and obtained a master’s degree in east european studies. During the second World War, he refused to work for the German occupier. after many years as a teacher, he worked as a lawyer for a while. He was one of the people who re-established the Vlaamse Volksbeweging (Flemish people’s Movement), of which he was the president from 1957-1963. Fundació emili Darder, Balearic islands, www.fundacioemilidarder.cat alkartasuna Fundazioa, Baque Country, www.alkartasunafundazioa.org Fundació Josep irla, Catalonia, www.irla.cat Fundacion aragonesista 29dejunio, aragon, www.chunta.org/29j.php Fundación Galiza sempre, Galicia, www.galizasempre.org Home of the Macedonian Culture, Macedonia, Greece Coppieters’ political career began when he became a member of the Flemish-nationalist party Volksunie (Vu) which was formed in 1954. With the exception of two years, Coppieters was a town councillor between 1964 and 1983. He was also elected as a member of the Belgian Chamber (1965-1971) and senate (1971-1979). at the same time, Coppieters became president of the newly formed ‘Cultuurraad voor de Nederlandstalige Cultuurgemeenschap’ (Cultural Council for the Dutch-speaking Community, from which later the Flemish parliament emanated), when the Vu formed part of the government. in 1979, Coppieters was moreover elected during the irst direct elections for the european parliament. as a regionalist, he became a member of the Group for technical Coordination and Defence of independent Groupings and Members in the european parliament (tCDi). among other things, he made a name for himself when he championed the cause of the Corsicans. in the meantime, Coppieters also played a pioneering role in the formation of the european Free alliance, of which he became the Honorary president and in whose expansion he continued to play a role, even after he said farewell to active politics in 1981. in 1996, Coppieters joined forces with the president of the Flemish parliament, norbert De Batselier, to promote ‘Het Sienjaal’, a project with a view to achieve political revival beyond the party boundaries. Coppieters died on november 11, 2005. 90 Welsh nationalism Foundation, Wales, www.welshnationalismfoundation.eu Le peuple Breton, Brittany, www.peuplebreton.net aSSociated memberS Kurdish institute of Brussels, Belgium, www.kurdishinstitute.be transylvanian Monitor, transilvania, www.emnt.org Centre international escarré per les Minories Ètniques i nacions, Catalonia, www.ciemen.org istituto Camillo Bellieni, sardinia, www.istituto-bellieni.it Free state of rijeka association, rijeka 91 colophon cmc publications, 9 editorial CMC asbl, Centre Maurits Coppieters, Boomkwekerijstraat 1, 1000 Brussels www.ideasforeurope.eu publication date 2014 publication series and number CMC stuDies | 2014 | 1 authors adam Grydehøj, Linda Fabiani, Jordi solé i Ferrando, Lorena Lopez de Lacalle aristi, Maria ackrén editorial board Xabier Macias, alan sandry, Josep Vall, antonia Luciani, Miguel Martinez tomey, Günther Dauwen translation Dobra forma coordination Günther Dauwen, aitziber salazar and ignasi Centelles Scientiic board alan sandry. advisor on the ield of political science Luc Boeva. advisor on the ield of History of nationalism ruben Lois. advisor on the ield of Geography Carmen Gallego. advisor in the ield of anthropology Josep Huguet. advisor in the ields of Contemporary history and public governance Jaume Garau. advisor in the ields of economic development and promotion Daniel turp, advisor in the ield of international Law Graphics and layout Wils&peeters - Lier printing Drukkerij De Bie - Dufel © CMC, Centre Maurits Coppieters- asbl, Brussels, July 2014 no items of this publication can in any way be copied or used without the explicit permission of the author or editor. 92 93 previous centre maurits coppieters studies previous centre maurits coppieters policy papers cmc 2013 — An Alternative Economic Governance for the European Union by Xavier Vence, alberto turnes, alba nogueira With the collaboration by ICEDE members Oscar Rodil, Brais Yáñez and Jorge Fernández cmc 2014 | 1 — The Fiscal Balance of Stateless Nations with the EU by Jaume Garau and Félix pablo cmc 2012 — The Future of Europe an integrated youth approach cmc 2013 | 2 — Internationalism vs Globalism by isidor Marí, santiago Castellà surribas and Josep Bargalló In a joint efort with Fundació Josep Irla cmc 2012 — The Ascent of Autonomous Nations 2nd edition the institutional advantages of being an eu member state, by Matthew Bumford In a joint efort with the Welsh Nationalism Foundation cmc 2013 | 1 — Law and Legitimacy: The denial of the Catalan voice by Huw evans In a joint efort with the Welsh Nationalism Foundation cmc 2012 — Variations autour du concept d’empreinte culturelle Déinition du concept et metodes de Mesure, by elna roig Madorran et Jordi Baltà potolés cmc 2012 | 3 — Making ideas spread new Media, social networks, political Communication, advocacy and campaigns, by Jorge Luis salzedo Maldonado cmc 2011 — Approaches to a cultural footprint proposal for the concept and ways to measure it, by elna roig Madorran and Jordi Baltà potolés cmc 2012 | 2 — The size of states and Economic Performance in the European Union, by albert Castellanos i Maduell, elisenda paluzie i Hernàndez and Daniel tirado i Fabregat. In a joint efort with Fundació Josep Irla cmc 2010 — The Internal Enlargement of the European Union 3rd edition analysis of the legal and political consequences in the event of secession or dissolution of a Member state, by Jordi Matas, alfonso Gonzalez, Jordi Jaria and Laura roman. In a joint efort with Fundació Josep Irla cmc 2012 | 1 — 2014-2020 Un autre cadre inancier pluriannuel pour une nouvelle Europe pour une europe des peuples, by roccu Garoby In a joint efort with Arritti cmc 2009 — Electoral contestability and the representation of regionalist and nationalist parties in Europe, by simon toubeau cmc 2008 — A diferent kind of kinetics establishing a network of heritage and research institutions for the (historical) study of national and regional movements in europe, by Luc Boeva cmc 2011 | 3 — From Nations to Member States by Lieven tack, alan sandry and alfonso González cmc 2011 | 2 — Diversité linguistique un déi pour l’europe cmc 2011 | 1 — Tourism and identity, by Marien andré In a joint efort with Fundació Josep Irla cmc 2010 | 1 — Language Diversity a challenge for europe 94 95 96