70 léon buskens RECENT DEBATES ON FAMILY LAW REFORM IN MOROCCO: ISLAMIC LAW AS POLITICS IN AN EMERGING PUBLIC SPHERE* LƒON BUSKENS (Leiden University and Utrecht University) Abstract In 1957-1958 Moroccan family law was codified in the Mudawwana, a text known for its close adherence to the classical Maliki tradition. Since the early 1980s the debate about reform has become more intense and widespread. The relatively limited reform of the Mudawwana in 1993 was closely linked to the beginnings of a process of cautious democratization. Since then the discussions have become more vehement, especially since the coming to power of a new government in 1998 consisting of former opposition parties. A year later this government presented a plan for extensive family law reforms. The plan has provoked considerable public debate over key concepts such as democracy, development, human rights, civil society, and ijtih¨d. Upon closer inspection, larger issues are at stake: Who may speak out in public and participate in politics? This new turn in the discussions is related to the emergence of a public sphere. 1. Introduction Ever since the codification of family law in the Mudawwana in Morocco in 1957-1958 there have been debates about its possible reform. Only in 1993 did these discussions lead to a slight revision * A first draft of this essay was presented at the ISIM/AKMI workshop, ÒFamily, State, and Civil Society in Islamic Communities: Legal and Sociological ApproachesÓ, Second Mediterranean Social and Political Research Meeting, European University Institute, Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, Mediterranean Programme, Florence, 21-25 March 2001. I thank the organizers for their invitation and the participants for their comments. Special thanks to Annelies Moors, David Powers, and Amalia Zome–o for their stimulating criticism and help. I also received valuable comments from Aharon Layish and two anonymous readers. Ann Mayer sent me copies of her publications and allowed me to read forthcoming articles. Many thanks also to Robert Rutten for his unfaltering help in gathering source material, as well as to numerous friends in Morocco who were willing to talk with me about my research. An earlier, shorter version was published in Dutch in: Justiti‘le verkenningen 27,5(2001):18-31. © Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, 2003 Also available online – www.brill.nl Islamic Law and Society 10, 1 recent debates on family law reform in morocco 71 of family law. With the coming to power of former opposition parties in 1998 and the presentation of their proposal for radical family law reform, the debate has been rekindled, especially since King HassanÕs death in 1999. In this article I analyze recent discussions about the reform of the Mudawwana. The Moroccan debate shows that in order to understand Islamic family law, we should analyze it as a political phenomenon. I treat the current debates in Morocco as an example of how family law and gender serve as powerful political symbols in the modern Muslim world. In many Muslim societies it is impossible to speak about family law except in terms of Islam. Many people understand the legal status of women as a sign of the direction that society at-large should take. Every codification of family law entails a selection, interpretation and re-creation of classical fiqh norms. The content of the law is a social construction, shaped by political considerations.1 Hence, public discussion about family law raises larger questions, e.g., who may participate in politics and what views about Islam may be expressed in the public sphere? I will address these larger issues by looking at specific questions relating to the reform of Moroccan family law. What is the content of the codified or proposed norms for family law? Who decides what the norms should be? Who is allowed to participate in discussions about norms? What are the idioms, key concepts, and language in which Moroccans speak about these norms? By analyzing the public debate about family law in Morocco, I also intend to contribute to the study of Islam and politics in Morocco, as undertaken by Hegasy (1997), Munson (1993), and Tozy (1999). This article is structured as a chronicle of developments in Morocco. I start with a description of the coming-into-being and contents of the Mudawwana, followed by a summary of calls for reform and the resulting plans from the 1960s until 1992. Then, I discuss the family law reform authorized by the late King Hassan II in 1993. These materials serve as the background for my primary concern here, the 1999 proposal for a radical reform of the Mudawwana and the debates instigated by this plan. 1 I borrow the term Òsocial construction of Shar®aÒ from Khalid Masud, whose work performs an important critical function within the Islamic tradition itself. Masud pays attention to the intellectual dimensions of the question, e.g., by analyzing the methods of legal reasoning used by Muslim jurists to deal with social issues (cf. Masud 2001). 72 léon buskens I conclude by attempting to situate recent events within the larger process of the emergence of a public sphere in Morocco. Nongovernmental organizations (NGOÕs) for womenÕs and human rights, Islamist movements, and political parties are all engaged in a national debate in which every faction fiercely defends its right to speak in public about its proper understanding of Islamic law. As such, the debate is also about citizenship and the position of the monarchy. Almost all of these groups appeal to the king for support and mediation, thus confirming, at least for the present, the hegemonic institution of Commander of the Faithful. 2. Codification of Family Law in the Mudawwana (1957-1958)2 In the struggle for Moroccan independence Islamic law played an important role as a symbol of national identity. Nationalists, Islamic reformists, and traditionalists adhered to the unity of the Shar®a to oppose the legal pluralism promoted by the French. The French protectorate divided the country into areas in which Islamic law prevailed as opposed to areas dominated by Berber customary law. Although the French contemplated preparing a digest of Islamic family law, they did not dare to implement it for fear of stirring up unrest among the population (cf. Lapanne-Joinville 1959: 97). After independence in 1956 one of the first actions of the new government was to abolish Berber customary law. ®Allal al-Fasi, ®¨lim and one of the leaders of the independence movement, strove for an overall islamization of the legal system. For him the codification of Islamic family law in the Mudawwanat al-a½w¨l al-shakh×iyya in 1957-1958 was only a first step towards this end. To date, however, the Mudawwana has remained the only extensive code based on Islamic law in Morocco. The family law codification commission consisted of ten men, ®ulam¨¾ and judges. ®Allal al-Fasi acted as rapporteur. The commission worked in close cooperation with the Ministry of Justice. King Mohammed V, who had led the country to independence, was ulti2 For further details on the Moroccan code of personal status and its relation to social practice, see Buskens (1999). Lapanne-Joinvil le 1959 is a concise but excellent analysis of the code in French. Borrmans 1977, and Charrad 2001 offer a comparative analysis of the genesis of the laws of personal status of Tunisia, Algeria and Morocco. Combe (2001) gives an overview of Moroccan family law and current debates. recent debates on family law reform in morocco 73 mately responsible for the proceedings. No parliamentary discussion took place. The Tunisian family law code, created shortly after TunisiaÕs independence from the French in 1956, served as a model for the structure, wording, and contents of some of the articles of the Moroccan code. However, the Tunisian Majalla was liberal on a number of points: the Tunisian government abolished guardianship in marriage, polygamy, and repudiation; and divorce could take place only through the intermediary of a judge, at the request of either the husband or the wife. The Mudawwana, by comparison, was more conservative and followed the prescriptions of classical Maliki jurisprudence on most points.3 Most of the separate books of the code end with an article stipulating that in those cases in which the code does not offer a solution, one must take recourse to the doctrine of the Maliki school (e.g. article 82: Kullu m¨ lam yashmaluhu h¨dh¨ l-q¨nân yurja®u fÂhi il¨ l-r¨ji½ aw al-mashhâr aw m¨ jar¨ bihi l-®amal min madhhab al-im¨m M¨lik). These provisions, as well as a similar statement in article 4 of the úahÂr promulgating the first two books of the law, led Lapanne-Joinville to characterize the Mudawwana as Òune sorte de loi-cadre ˆ reboursÓ (Lapanne-Joinville 1959: 100-1). The name of the new law already announced its faithfulness to the classical tradition. The word ÒMudawwanaÒ, literally ÒcollectionÓ or Òcode of lawsÓ, is the title of one of the most famous Maliki law books, Al-Mudawwana al-kubr¨ of Sa½nân (d. 240/854). At the same time the Moroccan legislator intended the new family law to serve as an instrument for social reform. In the selection of different opinions from the fiqh books, as well as in the wording of the stipulations, the legislator tried to protect the weak, women and children, against abuse of the privileges given by God to men. This intention resulted in limited reforms of family law as compared to classical doctrine. 3 There is considerable internal variation within the Maliki school. By Òclassical Maliki jurisprudenceÓ, I refer to the dominant views of the school, as embodied in KhalÂl b. Is½¨q al-JundÂÕs Mukhta×ar and its commentaries. For Morocco, the classical views current in the later periods, until the twentieth century, may be found in the commentaries of al-Bann¨nÂ, al-DardÂr, and alDasâq on KhalÂl; in Ibn Far½ân, Tab×irat al-½ukk¨m and its commentaries; in Ibn ®¤×im, Tu½fat al-½ukk¨m and its commentaries; and in ®amal treatises. For overviews in French, see: Borrmans 1977; Linant de Bellefonds 1965. For further references, see also: Buskens 1993; and Buskens 1999: 36-41. 74 léon buskens The code retained most of the characteristic elements of the classical Maliki school. The strict rules of wil¨yat al-nik¨½, guardianship in marriage, and the related institution of jabr, the right to compel a daughter to marry, were incorporated in a slightly modified form. Hence, unlike the rules of the Hanafi school followed in Tunisia, in Morocco a woman could never conclude a marriage by herself, but always needed the intercession of a male marriage guardian (walÂ). This might require a mother to ask her son to conclude a second marriage on her behalf. The legislator showed his reformist intentions by explicitly presenting the institution of guardianship in marriage as serving the interests of the bride (art. 12 par. 1 Mud 1958). The right to compel a daughter to marry henceforth might be exercised only after authorization by a judge (art. 12 par. 4 Mud 1958). The code stressed a womanÕs right to her nuptial gift (×ad¨q or mahr) (arts. 18-19 Mud) and fixed the minimum age of marriage at fifteen years for girls and eighteen for boys (art. 8 Mud). The husbandÕs right to repudiate his wife and to take up to four wives was constrained by means of procedural measures. Repudiation during menstruation, in case of extreme anger, threefold repudiation, and repudiation linked to an oath or a condition were declared forbidden or invalid (arts. 47, 49-52 Mud). The legislator clearly wanted to suppress these innovative (bid®a) forms of repudiation, referring to the classical scholars who classified such repudiations as morally forbidden, although legally valid. The Mudawwana only recognized as legally valid the sunna form of repudiation, i.e. a single repudiation not pronounced during menstruation, nor in extreme anger, nor linked to an oath or condition.4 Polygamy was considered lawful, but might be a source of ´arar, harm, for the wife, and thus a ground for judicial divorce (art. 30 Mud). In all cases in which a husband initiates a repudiation, he is required to compensate the divorcŽe (mut®a) (art. 60 Mud). This stipulation was later developed in the regulations of q¨nân al-misßara al-madaniyya (QMM), the 1974 Code of Civil Procedure. The Moroccan legislator also retained another distinctive feature 4 Linant de Bellefonds (1965: 321-5) discusses the differences between bid®a and sunna repudiations. The Moroccan legislator did not include the classical rule that a man should pronounce the repudiation only after the termination of his wifeÕs menses and before having had intercourse with her again. According to the legal scholars, the husbandÕs desire for his wife would be the strongest at this moment, and he thus would be least likely to repudiate her. recent debates on family law reform in morocco 75 of Maliki family law, judicial divorce at the wifeÕs request in special cases, such as prolonged absence of the husband, his failure to provide maintenance (nafaqa) for his wife, severe physical defects and illnesses, grave discord between the spouses (shiq¨q), and serious harm (´arar) caused to the wife by the marriage. In the Mudawwana we find these rules in a slightly modernized version. The Maliki teachings on judicial divorce are more liberal than the views of the other schools, and have thus served as a source of inspiration for the modernization of Islamic family law in many other countries (cf. Layish forth.; Linant de Bellefonds 1965: 449-80). Apart from these limited reforms, the legislator firmly maintained the patriarchal family model of classical Islamic jurisprudence.5 The code begins with a declaration of male supremacy. The opening article offers a modernist definition of marriage as an institution whose purpose is to found a family and promote harmony and mutual affection. However, this union takes shape ta½ta ri®¨yat al-zawj, Òunder 5 I use the term ÒpatriarchalÓ to signfify a model of family life in which senior men are entitled to a dominant position over subordinate women and children. This male dominance, grounded in their position as husbands and fathers, is expressed in norms about gender, descent, obedience, sexuality, the use of space and freedom of movement, as well as about the economy of the household. An example of such a model is the family in classical Roman law and the institution of the pater familias. I am aware of the problems with this term. For example, it obscures certain womenÕs rights in Islamic law, such as their right to dispose of their property, and the absence of a community of property between spouses. The term may mask the considerable differences that exist between several legal systems that commonly are characterized as patriarchal, such as the Roman, Jewish, classical Chinese and Islamic. I use the term ÒpatriarchalÓ to refer to a normative model embodied in the legal rules of classical Islamic jurisprudence. These norms do not necessarily correspond with actual practices in Morocco, past or present. In fact, the gap between this legal model and current practices among the urban middle-class is one of the arguments used by Moroccan modernists in their call for family law reform. The term may also deter researchers from paying sufficient attention to womenÕs agency and domestic power. In a forthcoming article Aharon Layish suggests that the term Òpatriarchal familyÓ should be replaced by Òthe Muslim patrilineal familyÓ, although he does find some use for expressions like Òpatriarchal authorityÓ . His proposed alternative does emphasize the dimension of filiation in family life, but it also has shortcomings. Again, actual practice may differ from the patrilineal ideology. I have decided to use the term ÒpatriarchalÓ, because it draws attention to the features of exchange and authority in the model of family life that the fuqah¨¾ construct in their learned writings and that also underlies the Moroccan code of personal status. For further discussion of the concept and references, see Ahmed 1992; Buskens (1999: 37, 69). 76 léon buskens the care of the husbandÓ (art. 1 Mud). Articles 34-36 establish the mutual rights and obligations of spouses. The wife has the right to be maintained, to visit her family and to receive them (art. 35, pars. 1 and 3 Mud); the husband has the right to his wifeÕs chastity and obedience, and to her respect for his parents and relatives (art. 36, pars. 1, 2 and 5 Mud). Article 123 expressly links the concept of female obedience to the wifeÕs right to maintenance. Only a judge may decide that a womanÕs ÒdisobedienceÓ or ÒrecalcitranceÓ (nushâz), such as leaving the house without her husbandÕs permission, will lead to her losing her right to maintenance. Other classical institutions of patriarchy, such as marriage guardianship, repudiation, and polygamy, have already been discussed above. Nasab, ÒdescentÓ or ÒfiliationÓ, is understood, first and foremost as descent from the father (art. 83 Mud). The father gives his name and religion to the child and provides maintenance. Thus, the provisions of the Mudawwana reflect a patriarchal model of family life in which a husband provides a nuptial gift (×ad¨q or mahr), maintenance and protection, in exchange for his wifeÕs obedience, sexual availability, and reproductive capacities. If a man is no longer satisfied with this relationship, for whatever reason, he can end the contract by unilaterally repudiating his wife. A judge may intervene only if a husband or father clearly abuses these divinely sanctioned privileges. The Mudawwana served as a symbol of national and Islamic identity. The government of newly independent Morocco replaced the diversity of norms that prevailed during the French and Spanish protectorates, when, in addition to Islamic rules, Berber customs were also considered a source of law, with one uniform code for all Muslims. 6 In this way the government emphasized the unity of the nation under the guidance of orthodox Islam. Codification was a product of the Salafiyya ideology that dominated the independence movement. The legislator engaged in social engineering, seeking to create a just society by a return to Islamic roots that were equated with Malikism. The result was a traditional and orthodox law, with some limited attempts at reform. Its textual form was modeled on 6 The Jewish community in Morocco retains its own family law and Rabbinical courts. There are few Christians of Moroccan nationality. According to the Moroccan Code of Nationality if it becomes necessary to apply Moroccan family law to Christian couples, the judge should apply the Mudawwana, with the exception of the rules concerning repudiation and polygamy. recent debates on family law reform in morocco 77 the French legal tradition, in accordance with the aim of creating a modern nation-state. The millenial tradition of fiqh, with its glosses and commentaries, was replaced by Cartesian style texts arranged in books, chapters, articles, and paragraphs (cf. Buskens 1993). 3. Calls and Plans for Reforms until 19927 Already in 1965, within a decade after the codification of the Mudawwana, an official commission was set up to find solutions for shortcomings in the family law, such as in the rules concerning marriage guardianship and maintenance. After its first meeting, however, nothing was heard from this commission again. The government took up family law reform again in 1970, 1974, and in 1979 (cf. Moulay RÕchid 1989: 244). In 1981 a royal commission for codification prepared a draft composed of 336 articles (cf. Khamlichi 1985; Moulay Rchid 1985b), but this proposal never reached Parliament. In 1986 the Council of Arab Ministers of Justice, based in Rabat, presented a draft for a Pan-Arab code of personal status, comprising 291 articles (cf. Moulay Rchid 1987: 28). Again, this draft did not lead to any change in Moroccan family law. Meanwhile, public discussion of family law became more intense (cf. Borrmans 1977; Daoud 1996). In 1982 the French-language magazine Lamalif published a landmark article entitled ÒLa femme mineureÓ (Daoud 1982). The article presented the reaction to the 1981 draft of four leading intellectuals, the jurists Ahmed Khamlichi and Abderrazak Moulay Rchid, and the sociologists Fatima Mernissi and Malika Belghiti. They protested against the secrecy that surrounded these proposals for reform. The article triggered a wave of publications by liberal thinkers on the necessity of reforming the Mudawwana. A large number of these publications were written in French, the language in which many progressive intellectuals prefer to express themselves. An important topic was the widening gap between the stipulations of law and daily life. Some writers referred to the growing importance of female wage labor for the economic viability of households, especially in urban areas. The patriarchal family model, in which the husband provides maintenance and guidance while the wife obeys and procreates, had become obsolete. 7 This section is based on: Buskens 1999. See also: Borrmans 1973. Mouaqit 2002a offers a useful collection of sources on the debate. 78 léon buskens The legal dominance of males, enshrined in the Mudawwana, was to be thoroughly reformed. Many of these liberal critics considered social science research on family life to be an important tool in their struggle for reform.8 At the end of the 1980s, the struggle for womenÕs rights was overtly linked to the struggle for human rights. The Moroccan government considered the subject of human rights to be a sensitive one. Human rights organizations were tightly controlled, and the government created its own institutions to promote the issue. However, foreign criticism and pressure contributed to a liberalization of the intellectual and political climate. Intellectuals and politicians could speak out more freely, among other things, about the necessity to reform the Mudawwana. It became the new intellectual fashion to discuss claims for family law reform as a struggle for human rights, which could be explained by referring to international conventions. ÒHuman rightsÓ became one of the key notions in the modernist discourse that seeks to criticize the current social and political situation in Morocco.9 8 One of the most prominent advocates of reform is the jurist Moulay Rchid, whose magnum opus is La condition de la femme au Maroc (1985a). A likeminded moderate critical view may be found in the commentary on the Mudawwana by the ®¨lim and jurist Khamlichi (1987), with whom Moulay Rchid regularly collaborates. Khamlichi tries to find favorable interpretations for women and children, while remaining within the Islamic tradition. His commentary serves as a counterbalance to the numerous more traditionally oriented commentaries on the Mudawwana by other ®ulam¨¾. An important startingpoint for this critical tradition of Moroccan studies on women and womenÕs rights is Fatima MernissiÕs Beyond the Veil, first published in English in the United States in 1975. Mernissi has played a pivotal role in the debate on womenÕs rights in Morocco as a writer, teacher, and activist. During the last twenty years an impressive amount of work has been done on the position of women in Morocco. For bio-bibliographical overviews, see: Tauzin and VirolleSouibs 1990 and Hadraoui and Monkachi 1991. Since the late 1980s a number of books have been published in which legal and social studies are linked to normative approaches, such as the series Approches (directed first by Fatima Mernissi and later by A•cha Belarbi), Marocaines citoyennes de demain (directed by Fatima Mernissi and Omar Azziman, a leading intellectual and prominent professor at the faculty of Law in Rabat, who was appointed minister of justice in 1998, after having been minister of human rights in a previous government), and Femmes Maghreb (directed by Fatima Mernissi). Foreign foundations, notably from Germany, have played an important role in the funding of these publications. Hegasy (1997: esp. 131-9) places MernissiÕs work in its political and social context. She also gives an overview of womenÕs associations in Morocco. Daoud 1996 offers an insiderÕs account of the womenÕs rights movements in Morocco in the context of developments in the Maghreb. 9 This connection between human rights and womenÕs rights is poignantly recent debates on family law reform in morocco 79 4. The 1993 Reforms10 King Hassan IIÕs 1993 decision to reform the family law fit in with the general climate of carefully controlled political reform and democratization, which characterized the last decade of his almost forty year reign. On 29 September 1992 the king received representatives of womenÕs organizations at the royal palace. In his speech he declared that he would not allow Islamic family law to be the subject of a political struggle. This would divide the nation and lead to a situation like that in neighboring Algeria. He emphasized that in his capacity as amÂr al-mu¾minÂn, ÒCommander of the FaithfulÓ, it was his task and responsibility to determine the authoritative interpretation of Islam by means of ijtih¨d.11 On 13 October 1992 King Hassan II created a commission of twenty learned men and one woman, a representative of the royal court, in order to prepare a draft for the revision of the Mudawwana. In March the minister of religious foundations and Islamic affairs, Alaoui MÕDaghri, announced that the commission had finished its task. On 1 May 1993, a public holiday, the king presented the draft of the reform to representatives of womenÕs rights expressed in the title of Moulay RchidÕs evaluation of the 1993 reforms of the Mudawwana: ÒLa rŽforme du code de statut personnel marocain. Une avancŽe dans la consolidation des droits de lÕhomme.Ó For an overview of the human rights movements in North Africa, see: Faath and Mattes 1992; for the Maghreb in general: Waltz 1995; for Morocco: Rollinde 2002. Combe 2001 pays attention to the influence of human rights issues on the debate on family law in Morocco. Changes in Moroccan political culture in the early 1990s are analyzed from a legal point of view by Mayer 1993, and from a socio-political perspective by Eickelman 1994, Hegasy 1997, Munson 1999 and Waltz 1999. These changes form the background to the 1993 reform of the Mudawwana, as well as to the present debates. 10 For further discussion of the reforms of 1993 and references, see: Buskens 1999: 70-82. Al-Ahnaf 1994 offers a detailed chronicle of the political events leading to the reform. Hegasy (1997: 190-4) also analyzes the debate on family law reform in Morocco as an example of the emergence of a public sphere. Moulay RÕchid 1997, one of the most prominent participants in the discussions, evaluates the reforms. Mayer 1995 places the reforms within the broader perspective of legal change in the Maghreb. 11 There is an extensive literature on the Commander of the Faithful, divine kingship, and the interplay between religion and politics in Morocco. Recent studies include: Bourqia and Miller 1999; Hammoudi 1997; Munson 1993; Tozy 1999. The analyses of the institution undertaken by Moroccan scholars are not only important scholarly achievements but also contributions to the political debate in the public sphere. 80 léon buskens organizations. The king ordered the womenÕs rights organizations and the commission to reach a consensus. If they failed to do so, he would intervene personally. The Islamic scholars and the women rapidly reached a consensus. Finally, the king promulgated the law reforms by úahÂr, royal decree, on 10 September 1993. The reforms concerned not only the Mudawwana but also parts of the Code of Civil Procedure (QMM) and the Civil Code (DOC). The reform process had taken place while the Parliament was dissolved, as required by the constitution, because of upcoming elections. In this situation, according to article 101 of the Constitution of 1992, the Kng held all legislative power. Thus the reform of the Mudawwana took place entirely under the supervision of the king, without any discussion in the chamber of representatives, just as in 1957-1958. The substance of the reforms was limited. From 1993 onwards a marriage could be contracted only if a woman indicated her express consent by placing her signature in the notebook of the professional witnesses (®udâl) appointed by the minister of justice, whose presence is required for the conclusion of a marriage (art. 5, par. 1 Mud 1993). The possibility of a fatherÕs compelling his daughter to marry (jabr or ijb¨r) was abolished (art. 5, par. 1 and art. 12 Mud 1993; cf. art. 12, pars. 1 and 4 Mud 1958). If a woman has attained the age of legal majority (defined as twenty years in art. 137 Mud, changed in 1992) and her father is deceased, she is entitled to conclude a marriage herself, without the intercession of a marriage guardian (art. 12, par. 4 Mud 1993). The legislator required additional documents for the establishment of a marriage contract by the ®udâl (art. 41 Mud 1993). By the creation of new procedures, polygamy as well as repudiation were rendered more difficult and made dependent upon permission of the judge (arts. 30 and 48 Mud 1993; art. 179 QMM 1993). Paragraph 2 of article 48 renders mandatory a wifeÕs presence at her husbandÕs repudiation of her in the presence of two professional witnesses. The rules for the financial settlement of a repudiation were also made more rigid and elaborate, especially with regard to compensation, mut®a, by the husband to the repudiated wife (art. 52 bis Mud 1993; cf. art. 60 Mud 1958; art. 179 QMM 1993; art. 1248, par. 2 DOC). The reform also allowed a mother to be the legal guardian (walÂ) of her child (art. 148 Mud 1993). The new Mudawwana elaborated on the wifeÕs right to maintenance from her husband, and the procedure to follow in case the husband does not provide for her (art. 119 Mud recent debates on family law reform in morocco 81 1993; art. 494 QMM 1993; art. 1248, par. 2 DOC 1993). It also clarified the rules concerning care of the child (½a´¨na). The father acquires the right to exercise ½a´¨na if the mother is not qualified or is unable to take care of her children (art. 99 Mud 1993). The duration of the care is clearly defined in terms of age of the child, instead of the traditional limits set by the fiqh (art. 102 Mud 1993). Article 156 bis of the Mudawwana established a family council to assist the judge in taking care of family affairs. These reforms of the Mudawwana, which offered some improvements in the condition of women and children, were not meant to bring about a substantial rupture with the classical tradition of Maliki fiqh. The large issues in family law reform, such as the abolition of marriage guardianship, polygamy, and repudiation, were not really dealt with. These institutions continued to exist, with only minor amendments. The 1993 reforms were entirely in line with the reformist tendencies discernable in the Mudawwana of 1958. Most male prerogatives were preserved, out of respect for the venerable Maliki tradition and for traditional values and customs, in order to avoid social upheaval. Instead, the government tried to protect weaker parties, women and children, against abuses of these privileges by men. These protections were accomplished in three ways: 1. stressing the rights of women and children as laid down in the fiqh by explicitly mentioning these rights in the wording of the law code; 2. creating obstacles against careless use of male privileges by instituting cumbersome procedures and financial obligations; 3. assigning the tasks of control and mediation to judges and, to a lesser degree, to professional witnesses. These techniques are an expression of the Salafiyya ideology, which strives at social reform by returning to the true and pure Islam of the forefathers. In this view Islamic law means social justice. In the law of 1993 these three techniques were prominent. The reactions to the reforms in the Moroccan press and in books and articles showed that most modernist factions were not satisfied with the amendments to the Mudawwana. 12 They did not think that 12 See Moulay Rchid et al. 1997 for articles on the reforms, written by Moroccan jurists, law professors, and legal practicioners, who discuss the changes from the point of view of legal practice. Some articles deal with the implications of the reforms for migrant communities in Europe. 82 léon buskens the law had really been brought into conformity with social life. The authorities had avoided the most important subjects. Thus the modernists continued their struggle for reform. The poorer parts of the population considered the new procedures to be awkward and expensive. According to some members of the urban lower-middleclass with whom I spoke, the new requirements created new obstacles to the conclusion of a marriage, thereby increasing the age at which people first marry. The number of men who abandon their families and disappear, instead of ÒproperlyÓ repudiating their wives according to the new rules, has also grown considerably. The new law and the discussion related to it also met with fierce criticism among the Islamist factions in Morocco. In his authoritative study of the Islamist movements in Morocco, Tozy notes the violent nature of the reactions of the Jam¨®at al-i×l¨½ waÕl-tajdÂd to the actions of the feminist movements (1999: 251). In general this Islamist association, which seeks to gain official acceptance as a player in the political field has tried to create an image of being peaceful and moderate. However, its leaders considered the campaign initiated by the Union de lÕAction FŽminine on 7 March 1992 to gather a million signatures in favor of a reform of the Mudawwana as a serious threat to the survival of Islam in Morocco. In April 1992 they called on the people for a form of jih¨d to counter this menace, and asked the ®ulam¨¾ to assume their responsibilities as the authoritative interpreters of the sacred law. Mu½ammad al-¼abÂb al-Tujk¨nÂ, a professor of Islamic jurisprudence in Tetouan and a regular contributor to I×l¨½Ôs weekly Al-R¨ya, reacted in a timely manner by issuing a fatw¨. He condemned the feminist campaign, which sought to change GodÕs Word and the Sunna of the Prophet, as an act of apostasy. According to al-Tujk¨nÂ, anyone who signs the petition was effectively participating in this act apostasy and thus was liable to the appropriate punishment (cf. Tozy 1999: 251). In 1994 al-Tujk¨n again expressed his views on the reform of the Mudawwana in a book entitled Qa´iyyat mudawwanat al-a½w¨l al-shakh×iyya bi-l-maghrib (ÒThe Question of the Personal Status Code in MoroccoÓ). The Organisation Marocaine des Droits de lÕHomme reacted to this condemnation of the feminists by claiming for all citizens the right freely to express their opinions, within the bounds of the law. The human rightsÕ organization denounced I×l¨½Ôs strategy of using a fatw¨ as Òune forme de terrorisme intellectuel rŽprouvŽ et inad- recent debates on family law reform in morocco 83 missible, ... une transgression de la loi et une usurpation du pouvoir judiciaireÓ (quoted in Hegasy 1997: 191). The clashes between modernists and Islamists about family law reform in 1992 and 1993 foreshadowed the debate on the same subject beginning in 1999. With the 1993 reform of the Mudawwana, King Hassan II made a largely symbolic gesture, showing his willingness to modernize the law, while at the same time trying not to antagonize the conservative and Islamist segments of the population. On the one hand, the new rules stayed close to the classical Maliki tradition. On the other hand, the reforms reflected a measure of openness to modern ideas. Family law played an important role in the kingÕs attempt to legitimize his rule in Islamic terms. Given the conflicting views on family law within Moroccan society, he had little room to maneuver. He had the delicate task of striking a balance between tradition and modernity, and between Islamic fundamentalism and Western-style liberalism. His favorite approach seemed to be the (re)invention of traditions, such as the institution of amÂr al-mu¾minÂn, and stressing adherence to the Maliki school. There seemingly was no way to satisfy all the parties; any real change would endanger the status quo. The manner in which the reforms were brought about conveyed a strong political message. By unambiguously taking the lead in the process, King Hassan II affirmed once again his position as an absolutist ruler. In ceremonies and speeches, he assumed his traditional role as national patriarch, addressing the representatives of the womenÕs organizations as Òmy daughtersÓ. He re-affirmed that as amÂr al-mu¾minÂn, he alone had the final say in all questions concerning Islam. As the self-proclaimed holder of the right to exercise ijtih¨d, it was the king who determined the content of family law. Modernists, womenÕs associations, Islamists, and ®ulam¨¾ all had to listen to the king. His attention to their requests and opinions was an expression of royal favor. However, the mass campaigns, petitions, discussions, and confrontations between different factions were also a sign that certain groups within Moroccan society were willing to contest this authoritarian model. Even if the call for a radical reform of family law had failed, some activists, and also some foreign analysts, interpreted the process itself as an important step towards the creation of a civil society (cf. Hegasy 1997: 193-4). 84 léon buskens 5. The 1999 Proposal for Family Law Reform In March 1998 a new government took office in Morocco, headed by the socialist Abderrahman Youssoufi of the Union Socialiste des Forces Populaires (USFP). After years of opposition, socialist and center-right parties came to power. It was also the first time that an Islamist political party, the Mouvement Populaire DŽmocratique Constitutionnel (which would later change its name to Parti de la Justice et du DŽveloppement), was represented in the Parliament. This change in the political climate, known as lÕalternance, took place at the express orders of the king. After King Hassan IIÕs death, the former dissident and exile Youssoufi revealed that during a private interview with Hassan II he had sworn on the Qur¾an to collaborate faithfully with the king to govern the country. The new leaders were full of promises and projects, and the people had great expectations. In August 1998 Sa•d Sa‰di, a member of the Parti du Progrs et du Socialisme (PPS; the former communist party) and state secretary for social, family and youth affairs, declared in an interview that he wanted to improve the position of women in Moroccan society (LÕEconomiste, 13 August 1998). His plans also included the reform of family law, for example in the field of polygamy and repudiation. According to Sa‰di, the 1993 amendments had been much too limited. He declared himself to be an advocate of a progressive view of Islam, founded on ijtih¨d. He referred to the family codes of Tunisia and Syria as examples worthy of imitation. 13 Nine months later, on 19 March 1999, the government presented a proposal for the improvement of the position of women in Moroccan society: Projet plan dÕaction national pour lÕintŽgration de la femme au dŽveloppement. The aim was to integrate women more fully in society, and to make them contribute to, as well as share in, development. The authors of the plan expressly linked their projects to United Nations declarations, especially to resolutions adopted at the 1995 WomenÕs Conference in Beijing. 13 In an interview published in La Vie Žconomique 26 November 1999 (p. 8), RabŽa Naciri gives some background information on the genesis of the proposal, which was initiated by Zoulikha Nasri, a state secretary in the preceding government, after the 1995 WomenÕs Conference in Beijing. In an interview published in LÕOpinion (12 April 2000, 10), Sa‰di discusses the preparatory meetings under his direction, whose participants included Ahmed Khamlichi and a representative of the Ministry of Religious Foundations and Islamic Affairs. recent debates on family law reform in morocco 85 The plan presented four domains of priorities: 1. Literacy, informal education, schooling and education for equality; 2. Reproductive health; 3. Integration of women in economic development; 4. Reinforcement of female power. This last domain was directly linked to law. The authors sought the reform of penal law (to fight violence against women), the code of nationality (in order to grant Moroccan nationality to children born of Moroccan mothers and foreign fathers), and, especially, family law. In the field of family law the changes proposed were as follows (Projet plan 1999: 75-6): – Minimum age of marriage for girls: Raising the minimum age of marriage for girls from fifteen to eighteen years, in conformity with the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC), ratified by Morocco in 1993. Article 8 of the present Mudawwana fixes the minimum age of marriage for girls at fifteen, and for boys at eighteen years. – Guardianship in marriage: The intercession of a marriage guardian becomes optional for all women who have attained legal majority (fixed at twenty years in art. 137 Mud, since 1992). – Repudiation: Abolition of repudiation, to be replaced by judicial divorce, to which men and women have equal access. – Polygamy: Almost complete abolition of polygamy. A man can marry another spouse only on the condition that the first wife agrees and after permission by the judge. – ¼a´¨na: After dissolution of marriage the mother will have the care (½a´¨na) of both girls and boys until the age of fifteen years. According to art. 102 Mud 1993, boys can choose at the age of twelve either to stay with their mother or go to live with their father or another relative, while girls may exercise this choice at the age of fifteen. – Possibility of remarriage for a mother who has the ½a´¨na over her children: The mother who remarries no longer loses the right to care for her 86 léon buskens children, contrary to what is stipulated in art. 105 Mud. The same holds for the mother who wants to move to a place remote from the place where the father lives, such that he will have difficulty in exercising his right to visit his children (cf. art. 107 Mud). – Marital home as part of maintenance for children after divorce: Residence in the marital home is understood as essential for the wellbeing of children after divorce. This means that the mother normally will be allowed to stay in the former marital home when she takes care of the children after divorce. Art. 127 Mud mentions accommodation (sukn¨) only in general terms as one of the constituents of the maintenance due to children. The father must provide maintenance for his children before as well as after divorce, even if the mother cares for these children (arts. 124, 126 Mud). – Legal guardianship of minors: The mother should be appointed legal guardian of her children not only in cases of death or incapacity, as stipulated in article 148 of the Mudawwana of 1993, but also in cases in which the father is absent. The condition stipulated in article 148, namely that the judge should authorize any alienation of the childÕs property in cases in which the mother is the legal guardian, should be made general, so that the rule also will apply if the father is the guardian. – Division of property after divorce: The judge who dissolves the marriage should also give a judgment concerning the division of property acquired during marriage. He should grant half of the property acquired to the wife, because she has contributed to the marriage, whether she was working at home or outside for a salary. This proposal is a clear break with the classical view that there is no community of property within marriage, although the Mudawwana does not make explicit this fundamental rule. It is implied in paragraph 4 of article 35, which states that the husband has no right whatsoever to limit his wifeÕs disposal of her property. – To provide sanctions in case of failure to respect, or violation of, the stipulations of the family law: The Mudawwana contains a number of injunctions and prohibitions that have not been provided with sanctions. The present plan seeks to remedy these lacunae, without however giving any example. – Creation of family courts: Cases should be settled in summary proceedings, by a plurality of judges, and with recourse to experts in family affairs, such as psychologists and social workers. recent debates on family law reform in morocco 87 – Granting women the right to serve as judges in matters of personal status: The only further information that the plan offers on this point is that this concerns the right to be q¨´Â al-tawthÂq, the judge charged with controlling the professional witnesses and homologating their documents. The homologation of a document (khiߨb) by a judge means ascertaining that the professional witnesses have formulated the document according to the legal rules, and confirming that it is a valid means of legal proof, which the judge expresses by affixing his counter-signature. Related to this homologation is the task of issuing decisions concerning the effects of a repudiation, such as mut®a, maintenance and the care of, and guardianship over, the children (cf. Buskens 1999: chapter 7, esp. 249-77). At present, women may not hold this office, which entails supervising male professional witnesses. – Training judges who are specialists in family matters and in international rules concerning womenÕs rights. – Training auxiliary legal personnel who are specialists in family matters, such as social workers and psychologists. – Dissemination of important judgments issued by the Supreme Court: Publication, in newspapers, on radio and on television, of judgments that contain important changes in personal status law to the advantage of women. The plan also proposed some reforms related to the registration of births. Thus the mother should be able to obtain a duplicate of the kunn¨sh al-ta®rÂf waÕl-½¨la al-madaniyya or Livret dÕidentitŽ et dՎtat civil. This is a booklet that the husband can procure at the Registry of Births and Deaths, in which children born from his marriage can be registered. His wifeÕs name is mentioned in this booklet only as the mother of his children. The father is the owner of this booklet, which he can take from one marriage to the next (cf. Buskens 1999: 286). These administrative rules clearly underline the legal importance of patrilineal descent. In order to avoid possible abuse of power by the husband with respect to his former wife in case of divorce, and to facilitate numerous administrative procedures, the government intends to give the woman the right to ask for a duplicate of this booklet in case of divorce (Projet plan 1999: 77). Another reform assigns a fictive name to children born out of wedlock; 88 léon buskens thus some social and psychological problems for the child as well as for the unmarried mother may perhaps be avoided (Projet plan 1999: 77).14 According to the plan, the Ministry of Finance should create a fund to guarantee the payment of maintenance to children of divorced parents. This measure should remedy some of the problems stemming from delays in the legal processing of maintenance claims, as well as from the weak financial position of the Òclasses dŽfavorisŽesÓ. All legal claims related to the family code would be exempt from taxes (Projet plan 1999: 77). The proposed reforms differ considerably from the classical prescriptions of Maliki fiqh, from the moderate modernist interpretations of these prescriptions laid down in the Mudawwana (see section 2) and also from the 1993 reforms (see section 4). Raising the minimum age of marriage for women to eighteen years, abolishing the obligation of marriage guardianship for all women who have attained legal majority, abolishing repudiation and replacing it by judicial divorce to which both sexes have equal access, the almost complete abolition of polygamy, allowing a mother who has the ½a´¨na of her children to remarry without losing this right, and the equal division of property acquired during marriage upon divorce—these changes clearly go beyond the teachings of the classical Maliki school. The main justification of the plan in terms of Islamic legal methodology is the notion of ijtih¨d, already mentioned by Sa•d Sa‰di in August 1998.15 Sa‰diÕs statements indicate that the proposed reforms have been inspired by similar reforms enacted in other Muslim countries, as well as by 14 The Moroccan press has recently paid extensive attention to unmarried mothers and illegitimate children. For anthropological studies of this subject, see: Bargach 2002; and Reysoo 1998. On the legal status of children in Morocco, see the texts compiled by Benyahya 2001b, intended to advance the position of children in Morocco, which is an important concern of the family law reform movement. 15 In a speech on 19 November 1999 Ahmed Khamlichi, a prominent ®¨lim who supports the plan (and who, according to Sa‰di, was involved in the preparatory discussions), defended the raising of the minimum age of marriage for girls by referring to the Maliki position that a girl reaches puberty at the age of eighteen (La Vie Žconomique 26 November 1999, 8). Mostafa Zaoui justified the raising of the minimum age by mentioning the Maliki principle of al-ma×la½a. He makes numerous references to this principle, as well as to the Maliki tradition in general, in an attempt to defend the plan against Minister Alaoui MÕDaghriÕs criticisms (Al Bayane 24 January 2000, 1-2). recent debates on family law reform in morocco 89 general ideas about social justice, and by United Nations conventions and conferences. However, the terms and ideas used in the plan show that the reformists have attempted to situate their work within an Islamic discourse about the family. The reforms also should be understood in a wider historical and geographical context. They form part of a general process of family law reform in the Muslim world. In a forthcoming article Aharon Layish surveys these processes of legal reform. Behind these legal and social changes, Layish discerns a general pattern, which he characterizes as Òthe collapse of the Muslim patrilineal familyÓ. Until now, Morocco has adopted a conservative position within the range of possibilities, by adhering faithfully to the classical Maliki teachings. The governmentÕs proposal would catapault the country to the forefront of international developments in Islamic family law reform. Some segments of society perceive such a move as a grave threat to Islam and to the existing social order. For others, the new legislation only confirms social changes that are already taking place. They regard the plan as a step towards ÒdevelopmentÓ and the creation of a Òcivil societyÓ. These differing views of society, law, and religion are currently being expressed in fierce debates about the intended reforms. 6. Debates About the Proposed Reforms of Family Law16 The two left-wing parties in the government, the Union Socialiste des Forces Populaires (USFP) and the Parti du Progrs et du Socialisme (PPS), have supported the reform proposal from the beginning. The attitude of the Parti de lÕIstiqlal, the third important partner in the government, has been more cautious and ambiguous. In matters of religion the party is much more conservative, adhering to the Salafiyya approach of their former leader ®Allal al-Fasi, one of the authors of the Mudawwana of 1958. 16 This section is based on reports in the Moroccan press, newspapers and periodicals, such as Le Matin du Sahara et du Maghreb, Al Bayane, LÕOpinion, LÕEconomiste, LibŽration, Le Journal, Demain Magazine, La Vie Žconomique, Maroc Hebdo International , Le Reporter, and La Nouvelle Tribune. For recent studies on the debate, published after the completion of the first draft of this article, see: Alami MÕChichi 2002; Combe 2001; and Feliu and Ram’rez 2002. 90 léon buskens 6.1. The Minister of Religious Affairs, Docile, and Defiant ®Ulam¨¾ One of the prominent critics of the proposal is AbdelkŽbir Alaoui MÕDaghri, minister of religious foundations and Islamic affairs. With the formation of the new government in 1998, King Hassan II insisted that this ministry, which he regarded as essential for the supervision of religious life and hence for internal stability, remain under his control. Thus Alaoui MÕDaghri has stayed on, as a representative of the old order, next to Driss Basri, the minister of the interior. Together these two loyal servants of the king have assumed the task of counteracting and tightly controlling the rise of Islamist movements that might criticize the religious legitimacy of the monarchy. Almost immediately after the presentation of the plan, Alaoui MÕDaghri stated that he considered it to be contrary to Islamic law. He charged a commission of ®ulam¨¾ to write a report about the intended family law reforms. These scholars stated that only ®ulam¨¾ are entitled to interpret Islamic law. Other experts, such as judges, lawyers, physicians and psychologists, may at the most offer material for discussion by the Islamic scholars. According to the report, the plan was a product of secularization, and its aim is to emulate Western values, which would mean importing the problems of these decadent societies. The actual family law problems in Morocco are a product of ignorance and lack of morality among its population. These problems can be remedied by some simple measures, in accordance with the Shar®a. The learned reporters, who did not agree with any of the proposed reforms, based their arguments on classical Islamic views of gender relations. Women are too emotional to make decisions themselves and should be guided by men. The reporters also opposed the proposed reforms of the judiciary and they objected to women holding the office of q¨´Â al-tawthÂq.17 The report was fiercely contested by the reformists, who claimed that it represented the ministerÕs view. Alaoui MÕDaghri promptly denied this claim. He had done nothing more than charge the scholars to prepare the report and he later transmitted their findings to the prime minister, but he had in no way participated in their meetings. The report was meant as a contribution to the debate. However, according to Alaoui MÕDaghri, the government had made a major For a text of the report, see: Al-TajdÂd, no. 51 (12 January 2000): 20-5. For critical discussions of the report, see: LibŽration 25 June 1999, 1 and 3; La Vie Žconomique 23 July 1999, 10. 17 recent debates on family law reform in morocco 91 mistake by not consulting the ®ulam¨¾ at an earlier stage. The ®ulam¨¾ were competent in matters of ijtih¨d and Shar®a. The minister had serious objections to all the proposed reforms. The plan required serious revisions in order to safeguard womenÕs rights according to Islam. He invited the womenÕs associations to return to their true identity, which was Islam, and to relinquish corrupting Western ideas. They should start a dialogue with the ®ulam¨¾, instead of demonizing them (Maroc Hebdo International no. 379 (2-8 July 1999): 12-13; cf. LibŽration 26 July 1999). On 7 July 1999 Alaoui MÕDaghri appeared on television to explain his ideas. He again criticized the proposed reforms and defended the religious scholars. At the same time he presented his own view, which called for a contractual approach to marriage. When a marriage is contracted, the spouses may include conditions in the contract concerning for example divorce, polygamy, and the mutual rights to property. He also discussed his recently published book, Al-Mar¾a bayna a½k¨m al-fiqh waÕl-da®wa il¨ l-taghyÂr (ÒWoman between the prescriptions of Islamic jurisprudence and the call for changeÓ), dedicated to his two daughters (Alaoui MÕDaghri 1999). In this book he advanced his ÒpoeticÓ view of woman, who, however, requires male guidance. His views on the veil are liberal, but he is against women working in places such as nightclubs. In the book he also pays attention to the writings of the feminist Moroccan authors Hinde Taarji and Fatima Mernissi. He is especially harsh about Mernissi, who, in his view, despises Islam. According to the minister, it is merely a coincidence that the book was published at this moment in time. He considers it to be another contribution to the public debate, which, he emphasizes, should be decided by the king as amÂr almu¾minÂn. The king is the ultimate arbiter for all parties. 18 On 27 May 1999, the R¨bißat ®ulam¨¾ al-maghrib (ÒThe League of the ®ulam¨¾ of MoroccoÓ) issued a statement (bay¨n) criticizing the proposed family law reforms. According to them, the plan is in total contradiction to the Shar®a, the Qur¾an, and the Sunna. The statement implies that the modernists are heretics. The reform proposals are a threat to the family and to social order and may lead to vices such as prostitution. The ®ulam¨¾ were furious that the government had not consulted them about the proposal. Family law reform 18 On Minister Alaoui MÕDaghriÕs television appearance, see: Le Journal 10-16 July 1999, 9; and Le Matin du Sahara et du Maghreb 10 July 1999, 6. 92 léon buskens was possible only if initiated by the amÂr al-mu¾minÂn, on the basis of the sacred texts and the ijtih¨d of the ®ulam¨¾. Their statement, which was directed against the reformists, seemed to be part of a long power struggle with the minister of religious affairs, who has attempted to control them.19 Mohamed El Gahs, the editor-in-chief of LibŽration, understood Alaoui MÕDaghriÕs reaction to the plan as an attempt to outdo and control conservative groups (LibŽration 25 June 1999, 1). Several groups of traditionalist scholars, such as ÒThe Association of the Alumni of D¨r al-½adÂth al-½asaniyyaÒ (®ulam¨¾ who studied at the national institute for religious studies), began to express their views more openly.20 Some pleaded for the creation of a council of ®ulam¨¾ that would examine the Islamic character of all new legislation. Liberal politicians and journalists have reacted strongly to the statements of Minister Alaoui MÕDaghri and the conservative ®ulam¨¾. They stress that Islam does not have a clergy and that no group possesses the exclusive right to interpret the sacred texts. On the contrary, ijtih¨d is a right possessed by every believer. There are no intermediaries between God and man. The Moroccan tradition of Malikism is characterized by tolerance, open-mindedness, and moderation. The scholarsÕ declarations are a menace to Moroccan society and may lead to a situation of fitna or civil war, as in Algeria. Modernist journalists also refer to universal values, such as freedom of speech, human rights, and civil society. The proposed reforms are based in the Qur¾an and the Sunna, which support the idea of equality between men and women. The Mudawwana was a manmade text, open to interpretation and revision. The modernist ®¨lim Ahmed Khamlichi publicly endorsed these modernist views.21 WomenÕs and human rights groups reacted in a similar manner, denying the scholarsÕ claims to the exclusive right to the interpret Islam. Alaoui MÕDaghriÕs views were against the constitution. Only On the R¨bißa and its relations with the government, see: Tozy 1999: 111. The text of the statement can be found in: Al-TajdÂd, no. 51 (12 January 2000): 27. Their statement is critically discussed in Le Journal 19-25 June 1999, 12; and by Bachir Znagui in LibŽration 25 June 1999, 1. 20 Many of these statements are collected in the PJD-linked periodical AlTajdÂd no. 51 (12 January 2000), an issue devoted to the struggle against the reform plans. The statement of the alumni is found on page 26. 21 See: Al Bayane 25 June 1999; a commentary of Khalid Jama•, a leading journalist and prominent member of the Parti de lÕIstiqlal in Le Journal 10 July 1999; interview with Khamlichi in LibŽration 8 July 1999. 19 recent debates on family law reform in morocco 93 the government, the king as amÂr al-mu¾minÂn, and civil society together can make decisions about legislation. They also expressed their solidarity with Hinde Taarji and Fatima Mernissi, who the minister threatened with censorship. On 20 July 1999 forty-one associations together with many private persons founded a network to support the proposal for family law reform: RŽseau pour le soutien et la mise en œuvre du plan dÕaction pour lÕintŽgration de la femme au dŽveloppement. In their manifesto they declared their opposition to Alaoui MÕDaghriÕs contractual approach to family law, which does not offer sufficient protection to women and leaves them at the mercy of patriarchal institutions. It also excludes the millions of women who are already married. Members of the network claimed the right to exercise ijtih¨d and referred to the constitution, as well as to international conventions and universal human rights. They enjoyed the support of two prominent modernist ®ulam¨¾, Abdelhadi Boutaleb, a former diplomat and chair of the commission that prepared the 1993 family law reforms, and Ahmed Khamlichi. The modernists presented their wish to discuss new interpretations of the sacred texts as a sign that civil society in Morocco was becoming more mature.22 Minister Alaoui MÕDaghri remains a scapegoat of the modernists. The liberal press continuously scrutinizes and attacks his conservative views.23 At the same time, the minister has to deal with defiant ®ulam¨¾, subversive preachers, and all kinds of Islamists, who are attempting to test the limits of freedom of speech in the emerging civil society. In public, the minister maintains that Morocco does not have a problem with Islamists, because Morocco is one of the few real Islamic states in the world. The king, as Commander of the Faithful, insures the application of the Shar®a, and the constitution protects Islam. In the foreign press, Alaoui MÕDaghri characterizes the Islamic movements as a positive phenomenon for Moroccan society, so long as they act within the limits of the constitution (an article in Al-Sharq al-awsaß, reported in Le Matin du Sahara et du Maghreb 6 July 2001). On the RŽseau see: Le Journal 17-23 July 1999, 9; Al Bayane 22 July 1999; La Vie Žconomique 23 July 1999, 10; Le Journal 20 November 1999, 12 (which mentions 200-300 NGO supporters. Later reports even mention up to 400 NGOÕs.); La Vie Žconomique 26 November 1999. 23 See for example: Mostafa Zaoui in Al Bayane 24 January 2000, 1-2; and Mohamed MÕRabet in LibŽration Le Magazine 29 September-5 October 2001, 3. 22 94 léon buskens 6.2. The Death of a King and the Rise of his Islamists After the death of King Hassan II on 23 July 1999, the debate about family law reform gained further momentum. The succession to the throne of the youthful Mohammed VI raised expectations of social, political, and economic changes among large parts of the population. He was regarded as Òthe king of the poorÓ, who would see to improvement of the living conditions of ordinary Moroccans. In one of his first public speeches after his accession to the throne, on 20 August 1999, he announced that he supports the notion of equal rights for men and women, as well as the full integration of women into Moroccan society. The participation of two female ministers in the bay®a, or pledge of allegiance to the ruler, was a novelty. Although the new king attaches great importance to creating an image of openness and renewal in political life, he also showed respect for tradition, for example, by going to Fez to visit the shrine of one of the founders of the Islamic sultanate in Morocco, Mawl¨y IdrÂs.24 At the end of 1999 and the beginning of 2000 Islamist groups increasingly took action against the plan for the integration of women. Most of these groups were linked to the officially recognized Islamist party ¼izb al-®ad¨la waÕl-tanmiya (or: Parti de la Justice et du DŽveloppement, PJD), which held nine seats in Parliament. Because of their support for the monarchy, as manifested by their participation in the bay®a ritual, they are known as Òles islamistes du RoiÓ. Their criticism was directed against the proposed family law reform. Periodicals linked to the PJD, such as Al-TajdÂd and Al-®A×r, published articles full of condemnation and outrage. Islamists began to appear in large numbers at reformist meetings. Their conspicuous presence in the audience, unremitting critical questions, distribution of pamphlets, and plain shouting disturbed these public debates.25 The kingÕs speech is quoted in Benyahya 2001a: 33, see also 34-6. Much has been written about real and possible changes in the political climate because of the ascension to the throne of Mohammed VI. A detailed overview and analysis of recent developments can be found in: Cubertafond 2001; L—pez Garc’a 2000; L—pez Garc’a 2001 (placing Morocco in the wider context of the Maghreb); Tuquoi 2001; Vermeren 2001; and the epilogue in Tozy 1999. Mayer (forthcoming a) analyzes these political developments in connection with Moroccan constitutional law. 25 For further information about the different factions, with extensive references, see: ¯arÂf 1992; ¯arÂf 1995; ¯arÂf 1999; Munson 1993; Tozy 1999. 24 recent debates on family law reform in morocco 95 Members of the PJD and the allied ¼arakat al-taw½Âd waÕl-i×l¨½, guided by the secretary general of the PJD, Dr. Abdelkrim Al Khatib, took the initiative to create Al-Hay¾a al-waßaniyya li-½im¨yat al-usra al-maghribiyya (ÒThe national committee for the protection of the Moroccan familyÓ).26 The committee was officially created on 7 November 1999. Its manifesto contains a radical condemnation of the proposed family law reforms, and calls on the people to join the committee in its struggle against this unholy scheme. The governmentÕs plan is not only against the Shar®a, but also un-Moroccan. It is a product of Western influences. Dr. Al Khatib managed to enlist the support of some well-known members of the former resistance movement against the French colonialists, thus stressing the patriotic and anti-imperialist character of the committee. A prominent member of the Parti de lÕIstiqlal accepted the chair of the committee, and an ®¨lim belonging to the USFP was also one of its officers. 27 During the last ten days of Rama´¨n, one of the most sacred times of the year, the PJD stepped up its offensive against the plan. On the 23 Rama´¨n 1420/1 January 2000, Dr. Ahmed Raissouni made an appeal Òto the Muslim people of MoroccoÓ on behalf of the ¼arakat al-taw½Âd waÕl-i×l¨½, of which he was the chair. He condemned the plan as a product of Western influences, which will destroy the Moroccan family and the entire society. Like the previous critics of the plan, he refutes the main proposals for family law reform. He ends the statement with an appeal to the people to protest against the proposal and to ask for an alternative plan that will serve the real needs of Moroccan society and Islam. In order to express their protest, all true believers should sign the accompanying petition. The appeal and the petition were published in a special issue AlTajdÂd, the periodical of ¼arakat al-taw½Âd waÕl-i×l¨½, of which Ahmed Raissouni was the editor-in-chief. This issue of 27 Rama´¨n 1420 was devoted to the struggle against the family reform plan. Side-by-side with detailed information about the proposal and the On Dr. Al Khatib and the aforementioned movements, see Tozy 1999, esp. chap. 8. On p. 228 he mentions the emergence of the ¼arakat al-taw½Âd waÕl-i×l¨½ (which he calls ÒAl-Islah wa-t-TawhidÓ). The PJD formerly was called Mouvement Populaire DŽmocratique Constitutionnel (MPDC). 27 The text of the manifesto was published in Al-TajdÂd, no. 51 (5 January 2000): 28. For reports on the creation of the committee and its views, see: Le Reporter 18-24 November 1999, 7; Le Journal 20-26 November 1999, 9; Le Matin du Sahara et du Maghreb 9 December 1999. 26 96 léon buskens feministsÕ claims for reforms, it contained many of the declarations of ®ulam¨¾ and Islamic movements that had been issued during the past year. The petition was printed on the back of the issue, leaving space for seven names and signatures. Readers were invited to circulate the petition and to send completed forms to the prime minister, as well as to Al-TajdÂd itself. 28 The ¼arakat al-taw½Âd waÕl-i×l¨½ also published a more comprehensive brochure, 56 pages in length, entitled Mawqifuna mimm¨ summiya ÒMashrâ® khußßat al-®amal al-waßaniyya li-idm¨j al-mar¾a f l-tanmiyaÓ (ÒOur Position concerning the so-called ÔNational Draft Plan of Action for the Integration of Women in DevelopmentÕÓ). The text was published in installments in Al-TajdÂd from 19 January 2000 onwards. The back cover of the brochure contains the same petition form. The brochure offers an overview of the criticisms of the proposal for family law reform. It refers repeatedly to verses of the Qur¾an and to the Sunna of the Prophet, as well as to writings of ®ulam¨¾ and other scholars. It discusses the international sources of the plan, considered to be contrary to the Shar®a; the conflicts between the aims of the plan and the aims of the Shar®a; the exclusivist nature of the plan, which does not benefit from consensus; the five principal issues in family law reform; and Western financial support for the plan. The brochure ends with a call on true believers to oppose the plan, as well as on the modernists to repent and to return to Islam. Verses from the Qur¾an mention the punishment that awaits unbelievers.29 28 See: Al-TajdÂd, no. 51 (12 January 2000). A French translation of the appeal, without the petition form, was published on the last page of Al-TajdÂd, no. 53 (19 January 2000). Al-TajdÂd is normally published entirely in Arabic. For a portrait of Ahmed Raissouni (A½mad al-RaysânÂ), see: Al-TajdÂd no. 132 (30 December 2000): 21. Dr. Raissouni is a professor of Islamic legal methodology at the UniversitŽ Mohammed V in Rabat, and the author of a book on Al-Sh¨ßibÂÕs legal theory. 29 For the brochure, see ¼arakat al-taw½Âd waÕl-i×l¨½ 2000. In June 2000 a French translation of the brochure, without the petition on the cover, was published (Mouvement de lÕUnification et de la RŽforme 2000). For the first installment in the periodical of the movement, see: Al-TajdÂd, no. 53 (19 January 2000): 3. In the months to follow many pamphlets and books critical of the plan were published, such as: Bâ Bakr 2000; ¼¨dâsh 2001; Hakkaoui et al (2000); Kharâb¨t 2001; Kharâb¨t 2002; N¨jÂ-Makk¨w 2002. The critiques of the reform plan articulated by these authors merit a separate study. The PJD summarized its views on the family law question in a document prepared for the elections of September 2002: ¼izb al-®ad¨la waÕl-tanmiya. Al-FarÂq alniy¨b (2002: 100-21, esp. 101-5). recent debates on family law reform in morocco 97 Representatives of the PJD and allied groups, such as Dr. Al Khatib, have repeatedly stated that they are in favor of family law reform and development, but that they are opposed to the plan because it is inspired by Western sources and in flagrant contradiction to the Shar®a, as well as to other Moroccan values and customs. The proposals are atheist and a product of cultural neo-colonialism; they seek to destroy one of the last strongholds of Islam: the family. Qur¾anic verses and other statements suggest that the Islamists consider defenders of the plan to be westernized unbelievers, estranged from their Islamic identity. The governmentÕs plans are a grave menace to Moroccan society and social order, and they will lead to discord, moral depravity, and vices such as prostitution and fornication. According to these Islamists, the proposals address false problems that rarely occur in real life, such as polygamy and early marriage. It would be unwise to prohibit these divinely sanctioned institutions, which offer valuable solutions to many social problems. The division of property upon divorce may be unjust and may lead to serious social disruption. The promotion of judicial divorce may have grave consequences for the children of these marriages. The abolition of marriage guardianship is completely contrary to Moroccan values. The plan does not offer any solution for the real problems in family life. It is not representative of the concerns of the Moroccan people, but represents only the concerns of a small elite, of rich spoiled women. Dr. Al Khatib stresses that sound reforms can be reached only on the basis of the Shar®a, as interpreted by the ®ulam¨¾, and under guidance of the amÂr al-mu¾minÂn. He protests against the manner in which the views of the ®ulam¨¾ are misrepresented and demonized in the liberal media. The PJD and allied groups claim the right to express their opinions in Moroccan civil society. The Islamist appeal to the Muslim nation has received considerable attention. Liberal journalists complain that in their Friday sermons preachers are inciting believers to sign the petition. According to the liberals, Minister Alaoui MÕDaghri should act by disciplining preachers who use the mosques for political purposes. In his official replies, the minister tried to downplay the seriousness of the events. A young man, working as a poorly paid civil servant in Rabat, and living in one of the popular quarters of SalŽ, told me about the petition. He was in his early thirties, married, and father of a young son, pious and well-read in the classical texts. He made it clear to me that does not consider himself to be an Islamist, and that he has 98 léon buskens no political affiliation. He admits that he has not taken the trouble to read the governmentÕs proposal in its entirety, but from what he has heard and seen, it is clear to him that the proposal is completely foreign, translated from French, and contrary to Islam. He does not understand why the government wants to forbid institutions ordained by God, such as polygamy or early marriage, which are useful in certain circumstances. So when a friend gave him the petition, he did not hesitate to sign it and then pass it on to his wife and to another friend. 6.3. Al-®Adl waÕl-i½s¨n: Dialogue and Total Islamic Reform At the end of January 2000 a fourth anti-reform faction entered the debate: the until then clandestine Islamist movement Jam¨®at al-®adl waÕl-i½s¨n. Perhaps encouraged by the new-found freedom of speech exercised by Minister Alaoui MÕDaghri, the traditionalist ®ulam¨¾, and the officially recognized Islamists of the PJD, their leader Abdessalam Yassine began to assess how much liberty the authorities would grant him in this apparently new era. In 1974 Shaykh Yassine had published an open letter to Òhis brotherÓ King Hassan II, in which he admonished him to relinquish his unjustly acquired wealth and to renounce his irreligious way of life. He implied that the king had accumulated the royal estate by stealing from the people. As a result of this brotherly admonishment, Yassine spent three and a half years in an insane asylum and has been under various forms of police surveillance ever since. On the occasion of the tenth anniversary of his house arrest in SalŽ, Yassine published a memorandum on the internet in French, entitled ÒA qui de droitÓ, with translations in Arabic and English, in which he exhorted King Mohammed VI to use his private estate to alleviate the national debt. By returning to the nation the money that his late father had stolen, the son might atone for his fatherÕs sins and show himself to be a good Muslim. He should also take the opportunity to dismiss his fatherÕs henchmen, who were doing so much harm to the country.30 30 See YassineÕs internet site,ÓYassine OnlineÓ, with texts in Arabic, French, English, Spanish and German, as well as links to other sites, such as that of Al-®Adl waÕl-i½s¨n; cf. http://www.yassine.net/. For studies of Yassine and his movement and further references, see: ¯arÂf 1992; ¯arÂf 1995; ¯arÂf 1999; Munson 1993 (who presents an extensive analysis of the open letter of 1974); Tozy 1999. recent debates on family law reform in morocco 99 The meeting to commemorate YassineÕs plight was the first occasion on which the association publicly expressed its views on the family reform plan. Its secretary general and spokesman, Fathallah Arslane, said that the association does not understand why anyone would want to trouble the Moroccan people with this issue when there are much more important and urgent problems. Polygamy is not a problem; indeed, most men can hardly afford one wife. Arslane opined that the people who are waging the debate want to distract the Moroccans from the real problems. The real concerns of the association are the liberation of their political prisoners, the lifting of their shaykhÕs house arrest, and the acquisition of the same civil liberties as other political movements have. Arslane stressed the associationÕs desire for a true dialogue in Morocco. ÒDialogueÓ, or ½iw¨r, is one of the key-notions in YassineÕs œuvre, and it fits well the discourse of human rights and civil society. But Yassine does not leave much doubt that under his leadership many people would not be entitled to participate in the dialogue.31 Whereas the spiritual aims of Al-®Adl waÕl-i½s¨n are close to sufism, the main points of its political program are social justice and a radical critique of the existing political order. The association prefers an Islamic republic, based on the principle of shâr¨, or consultation. YassineÕs movement, which seems to have considerably more supporters than the PJD and allied groups, is remarkably well organized. As the largest Islamist movement in Morocco, the association is potentially much more dangerous to the monarchy and to the existing political parties than is the PJD, which acknowledges the institution of amÂr al-mu¾minÂn. Ahmed Raissouni of Al-Taw½id waÕl-i×l¨½ quickly condemned YassineÕs attack on the young king, although he did not disagree entirely with the shaykhÕs analysis of the actual state of the country (Maroc Hebdo International no. 405 [11-17 February 2000]: 8-9). King MohammedÕs reaction to YassineÕs advice differed from that of his father, as befits the democratic image he is trying to project. On 16 May 2000, a month and a half after the publication of the memorandum, YassineÕs house arrest was lifted. The association For reports on the meeting in SalŽ, and reactions to it, see: Al Bayane 31 January 2000; Le Monde 1 February 2000; LÕOpinion 1 February 2000, 13; Al Bayane 1 February 2000, 1; Maroc Hebdo International no. 405 (11-17 February 2000): 7-9; Le Journal 12-18 February 2000, 18; Le Journal 4 March 2000, 10-11. 31 100 léon buskens announced that it would henceforth celebrate Òa national day of dialogueÓ annually. On 10 July 2000 the establishment of a political branch of Al-®Adl waÕl-i½s¨n was announced (cf. Le Reporter 1-14 March 2001, 10-11). And in February 2001 Yassine presented his next book, a 700 page tome entitled Al-®Adl. Al-isl¨miyyân waÕl-½ukm (ÒJustice. The Islamists and PowerÓ). Although the question of family law reform is not of prime importance for the shaykh, his daughter, Nadia Yassine, who acts as his spokeswoman, criticized the government proposal in the interviews she gave. She seems to have realized that the topic is useful for attracting attention and mobilizing supporters. She supported the PJD ÒbrothersÕÓ protests against the plan, which is a product of cultural imperialism imposed by the North on the South, and intended to harm Moroccan society and culture. The elite who proposed the plan are completely cut off from the rest of Moroccan society. However, the Mudawwana is not a sacred text. As a product of a despotic past, it requires thorough revision. Millions of women suffer injustice because of it. Islam, as embodied in the Qur¾an and the Sunna, is a religion of justice. By means of ijtih¨d, family law can be adapted to the requirements of contemporary society. Polygamy is an institution sanctioned by God. But a woman may qualify her husbandÕs rights by inserting a condition in the marriage contract. Repudiation is severely limited by the Qur¾anic revelations. The minimum age of marriage for girls can be determined by the government. According to Nadia Yassine, the reform of the Mudawwana should form part of a much larger project to reform society and politics. Her protests against the government proposal and against the Mudawwana are clearly part of a revolutionary endeavor. She makes no reference whatsoever to a possible role of the king in these reforms, and in a later interview even dared to qualify the appeal to the king to intervene as aberrant (cf. interviews in: LÕOpinion 3 April 2000, 5-6; La Vie Žconomique 28 July 2000, 8-10; Le Journal Hebdomadaire no. 76 (27 July-2 August 2002): 12-18). 6.4. Modernist Defenses and the Question of Cultural Authenticity The actions of the ®ulam¨¾ and the Islamists provoked the modernists to defend the plan even more strongly. In its weekend edition of 22/ 23 January 2000, the socialist newspaper LibŽration, linked to the USFP of Prime Minister Youssoufi, published a one-page summary recent debates on family law reform in morocco 101 of the plan, introduced by a front page article written by journalist Bachir Znagui, entitled, ÒQui peut tre contre a?Ó. This article may serve as an example of how ferocious the debate has become. Znagui vehemently attacks the opponents of the plan, dubbed Òan obscurantist minorityÓ. He refers to the same emotionally charged subjects as the Islamists do. The governmentÕs proposal is the product of a thorough analysis of the real problems of Moroccan women, and it is based on Islam as well as on universal principles. Znagui wonders why these people are opposed to development, progress, and improvement of the living conditions of the poor. In his view, they are defending their economic privileges, established through corruption and repression. To defend themselves, they employ the same tactics as the former colonialists did, using religion to attack the forces of progress and to keep the country in a state of backwardness. Opponents of the reforms are linked to mafia-like groups and the corrupt privileged class. They also maintain relations with hostile foreign groups. All democrats should unite against this Òobscurantist horde of Moroccan TalibanÓ, who threaten to create a situation similar to that in Algeria. Their false accusations and lies about religion put Òthe national dialogueÓ in danger. In order properly to inform the general public of this danger, the newspaper decided to publish a summary of the plan, to which no right-minded person could object.32 One day later the other important left-wing French language newspaper, Al Bayane, an organ of the former communist party PPS, published on its front page a long article refuting the ideas of Minister Alaoui MÕDaghri and the protesting ®ulam¨¾. The author, Mostafa Zaoui, used his knowledge of the Islamic learned tradition to argue against a political use of religion and to show the un-Moroccanness of the opponentsÕ views. He quotes al-Ghaz¨l (d. 1111 CE) to show that the ®ulam¨¾ should subordinate their intellectual powers to the legislative authority, lest fitna ensue. The scholarsÕ ambition to establish the law themselves is entirely foreign to the Moroccan Maliki Published in LibŽration 22/23 January 2000, 1 and 3. On p. 4 of the same issue, in an article entitled, ÒUn aprs-midi chez les anti-femmesÓ, Mohamed Boudarham reports on an Islamist meeting called to oppose the plan. He uses the terms ÒfascistÓ and ÒbrainlessÓ and refers to the IslamistsÕ enthusiasm for the Iranian model. According to Boudarham, the Islamists misrepresented the plan, directing their propaganda at young people and women in particular. He reports that one of the activists threatened to Òslit throatsÓ in order to prevent the plan from being implemented. This is clearly a reference to the violent confrontations currently taking place in Algeria. 32 102 léon buskens tradition of amÂr al-mu¾minÂn. The minister and the PJD advocate the Shi®ite institution of wil¨yat al-faqÂh. According to Zaoui, in Morocco this debate was decided centuries ago, when Maliki scholars refuted the views of the Almohads in favor of the principle of wil¨yat al-umma. The ministerÕs contractual approach to family law does not offer sufficient protection to the weak. The governmentÕs proposals, on the other hand, fit nicely with the Maliki view that the interpretation of the sacred law should serve al-ma×la½a, the public interest. Zaoui ends his article by accusing the minister and the scholars of using their knowledge to gain wealth and power, which fits with certain political practices current in Morocco (Al Bayane 24 January 2000, 1-2). There have also been more detached defenses of the reform proposal. In May 2000 the Ligue DŽmocratique pour les Droits de la Femme (LDDF; cf. Hegasy 1997: 164-5) published a study in which it supported the proposed family law reforms. The Mudawwana should be revised, because of its incompleteness, to suppress its contradictions, and also because of profound changes in the structure of the Moroccan family. Islam has been a religion of justice and equality from the beginning. On the basis of ijtih¨d, it is possible to change the interpretations laid down in the Mudawwana, which date from a period of decadence in Islamic scholarship and are closely linked to customary law. Equality is not a foreign idea; indeed, it was put forward by Islam long before it became fashionable in the West (Ligue DŽmocratique pour les Droits de la Femme 2000). The prominent intellectual Abdou Filali-Ansary brought his scholarship to the defense of the reforms in a brief and elegant contribution, entitled ÒLa Mudawwana: coutume ou droit?Ó He opposes a literal interpretation of the sacred texts. Family law reform means doing justice to the message of Islam, as argued by scholars such as Mohamed Talbi. The Mudawwana is only a local interpretation of Islamic sources, developed by the early ®ulam¨, which no longer fits with current circumstances. Application of this code leads to injustice. Contemporary scholars should understand the revolutionary message of Islam and hence oppose gender inequality (Filali-Ansary 2001: 69-73). The question of cultural authenticity is one of the important themes in the debate. The traditionalist ®ulam¨¾ and the Islamists accuse the reformists of being unbelievers who have been led astray by Western ideologies. The liberals in turn characterize the Islamists as representa- recent debates on family law reform in morocco 103 tives of foreign influences. Their clothes and scarves follow Saudi fashion. Their ideas are foreign. And Wahhabism is has been imported from Saudi Arabia. The claim that the ®ulam¨¾ should control the legislative process echoes the revolutionary Shi®ite doctrine of wil¨yat al-faqÂh, as practiced in Iran. The Islamist movements and their publications are financed with Òpetro-DollarsÓ. By contrast, the reformist approach of the liberals is truly Islamic and Moroccan. It relies on the tradition of Malikism, which defends tolerance, and the institution of amÂr al-mu¾minÂn. True Islam means equality, human rights, and ijtih¨d.33 6.5. The Culmination of the Conflict: Two Marches The confrontation between the reformist and traditionalist/ Islamist factions culminated on Sunday 12 March 2000. Since the period of the French protectorate, Sunday has been the official public holiday in Morocco— despite persistent protests by Islamic groups— and, hence, the appropriate day for public meetings and demonstrations. Well in advance, reformists called upon the populace to come to Rabat on the occasion of International WomenÕs Day in order to express public support for the family law reform plan. Most estimates of the number of people who turned up in the capital vary between 40, 000 and 100,000 (figures mentioned in Le Monde 14 March 2000). But the PPS newspaper Al Bayane reported that almost a million people protested Òagainst poverty and violenceÓ in Rabat (Al Bayane 13 March 2000). The march was organized by liberal womenÕs associations, the PPS and the USFP. Three days before the march, the Parti de lÕIstiqlal decided to support the event and its leaders were prominent on Sunday. As a countermove, the officially recognized Islamists of the PJD and Al-Taw½Âd waÕl-i×l¨½, joined by Al-®Adl waÕl-i½s¨n, called on their supporters to come to Casablanca that very day in order to protest against foreign and anti-Islamic influences. This demonstration was remarkably well-organized. Protestors from all over Morocco were transported by buses to Casablanca. Men and women arranged themselves in separate lines in an orderly manner. The men were led by Mostafa Ramid, the PJD leader in the Parliament, and Fathallah Arslane, secretary general of Al-®Adl waÕl-i½s¨n; the women were For modernist views on ijtih¨d, related to family law reform, see: Mouaqit 2002b. 33 104 léon buskens led by Nadia Yassine. Demonstrators carried banners containing texts of ½adÂth and slogans such as Na®am li-idm¨j al-mar¾a f l-tanmiya. L¨ li-l-taghrÂb waÕl-taba®iyya (ÒYes to the integration of women in development. No to westernization and submissionÓ). According to the police, approximately 60,000 people participated; the organizers estimated their number at half a million. The French newspaper Le Monde of 14 March 2000 mentions 100-200,000 participants. The participation of Al-®Adl waÕl-i½s¨n was a further step in the politicization of the association. 34 In an interview published in LÕOpinion, the French language newspaper of the Parti de lÕIstiqlal, Ms. Bassima Hakkaoui, president of the Munaúúama tajdÂd al-wa®y al-nis¨¾Â (or: ÒOrganisation du Renouveau de la Prise de Conscience FŽminineÓ) of the PJD, explained that the march was a protest against the threat to the identity of the people. The participants were good Muslims and loyal patriots who were resisting the encroachment of secular Western culture. Islam was their point of departure. They were striving for the prosperity of the nation. Their preferred system of government is im¨rat almu¾minÂn, Òthe commandership of the believersÓ, which implies acknowledgment of the monarchy. In their opinion, the reform plan does not offer any real improvement of the living conditions of the poor and mainly addresses false problems. Ms. Hakkaoui reiterated the official opinion of the PJD (see above). She is not against reform of the Mudawwana, but this should carried out on the basis of the Qur¾an and the Sunna. She considers polygamy to be a womanÕs right [sic]. By legitimizing a womanÕs position as a second, third, or fourth wife, polygamy protects her from prostitution and concubinage. However, Ms. Hakkaoui does find some merit in a few of the governmentÕs proposals. She stresses the importance of a wifeÕs right to remain in the marital home after divorce, as well as her keeping the ½a´¨na after remarrying. The state should give a pension to every divorcŽe or widow, irrespective of the economic situation of her former spouse. Ms. Hakkaoui does not oppose the West in general; rather It is difficult to obtain reliable data on the number of people that participated in the marches in Rabat and Casablanca. Figures mentioned in the Moroccan press vary widely for both marches and are obviously part of the political struggle. Feliu and Ram’rez (2002: 74-5) discuss the question, also raised in the Moroccan press, of the extent to which the participation of large numbers of people in Casablanca was the result of ignorance about the plan, manipulation, and clientelism. 34 recent debates on family law reform in morocco 105 she is seeking to preserve her own identity, based on Islam as well as on Moroccan history. She states that the PJD position differs from that of Abdessalam YassineÕs Islamist movement, Al-®Adl waÕl-i½s¨n, but she does not clearly explain the nature of these differences (LÕOpinion 17 April 2000, 3; cf. Hakkaoui et al. 2000). The debate has also spread to Moroccan communities in Europe. In mosques in the Netherlands, preachers declared that Islam is in danger in Morocco because of the imminent reform of family law, and they asked their audiences to sign a petition protesting these plans. The copy of the petition that I obtained from one of my Moroccan students was identical to the form circulated by the ¼arakat al-taw½Âd waÕl-i×l¨½ in Morocco. On the other hand, the Marokkaanse Vrouwen Vereniging Nederland (ÒAssociation of Moroccan Women in the NetherlandsÓ) and leftwing groups strongly support the reform plan and they have attempted to mobilize support as well. They collected signatures for a petition in favor of the reform, which they presented to the Dutch Parliament on the occasion of International WomenÕs Day on 8 March 2000. They asked the Dutch government to put pressure on the Moroccan government to continue with the intended reforms. Khadija Arib, a member of Parliament for the Dutch Labour Party with a Moroccan background, has played an important role in the discussions. She links the question of family law reform to the legal problems of Moroccans in the Netherlands. Morocco wants to conclude a bilateral treaty with the Netherlands in order to settle these problems. This would mean a strengthening of the influence of Moroccan family law in the Netherlands. According to Ms. Arib, the Dutch government should make the conclusion of such a treaty conditional on a modernist reform of the Mudawwana. To date, the Dutch government has not been eager to conclude such a bilateral treaty, arguing that Morocco should become a party to the already existing multilateral conventions on family law.35 Khadija Arib expressed her opinions in a Òletter to the editorÓ in the Dutch newspaper Trouw of 4 March 2000, 25 (see also p. 23), entitled ÒGeef vrouw in Marokko alle steunÓ (ÒGive full support to women in MoroccoÓ). On the legal problems of Moroccans in the Netherlands and the question of a bilateral treaty, see two articles by Van der Velden, professor of law at the Free University in Amsterdam and a civil servant in the Dutch Ministry of Justice; these articles provide insight on official Dutch policy on this issue (Van der Velden 2001a and 2001b). On the discussions in the Netherlands, see also: NRC Handelsblad 29 November 1999; Trouw 4 March 2000, 1; De Volkskrant 6 March 35 106 léon buskens 6.6. Summertime: Islamists on the Beach and Governmental Prudence In the months following the march in Casablanca, the Islamists of Al-®Adl waÕl-i½s¨n began to manifest themselves more prominently in the public sphere. Members of the association tried to play an important role in the literacy campaigns. This was an initiative of the young king, launched as part of his struggle against poverty, and in which he wanted to involve the mosques. YassineÕs followers were disseminating their views while teaching people to read and write. Of course, the government strove to regain control of this campaign. It also prohibited the holiday camps which the Islamists organized during the summer (Demain Magazine 20 January 2001 [no. 1]). In these camps men and women might relax and enjoy themselves, in separate quarters and properly dressed. During the summer of 2000 large numbers of the shaykhÕs disciples showed up on the beaches. Dressed in ÒIslamicÓ attire they positioned themselves in front of the half-naked sunbathers in order to perform the ritual prayers. They also tried to prevent the general public from going into the sea, playing and sunbathing. After some hesitation the government decided to take action and to forbid these actions as well.36 With the arrival of summer, the general publicÕs interest in the debate seems to have declined. The liberals tried to support their claims by citing opinion polls. The newspaper LÕEconomiste and the Association DŽmocratique des Femmes du Maroc had both conducted surveys, although the reliability of the results is questionable. In the first survey 571 people were interviewed by telephone, which meant that the rural population was not well represented. According to this survey a slight majority was in favor of the reforms. The ADFM survey concluded that more than 80 percent of the population supports the reforms. However, nearly everyone opposes the proposed abolition of guardianship in marriage for women who have attained legal majority. This reform seems to be too much in opposition to Moroccan 2000, 1; Utrechts Nieuwsblad 6 March 2000, 5; De Volkskrant 9 March 2000, and 15 March 2000, 9. On the debateÕs impact on Moroccan communities in France, see: Gazette du Maroc 19 April 2000, 38; in Spain: Feliu and Ram’rez 2002: 76-7. 36 On Islamists on the beaches, see: La Nouvelle Tribune 6-12 July 2000, 8; Demain 8-14 July 2000, 14-15; Al Bayane 12 July 2000; LibŽration 25 July 2000, 1, and 4 August 2000, 1. On a similar attempt of Al-®Adl waÕl-i½s¨n during the summer of 2001, see: Demain magazine 14-20 July 2001, 9. recent debates on family law reform in morocco 107 values and customs (LÕEconomiste 16 March 2000, 17-21; LÕEconomiste 22 June 2000, 11). The government also seemed to give less priority to the family law reform plan. In official statements politicians often emphasize that it is not yet a plan, but only a proposal for a reform plan. WomenÕs associations, concerned about this retreat, tried to prod the politicians to action. In October 2000 the Islamist PJD, which had supported the government until then in most matters, decided to join the opposition. By distancing themselves from the plan, they began to prepare themselves for the ferocious political confrontation with the socialists for the elections of 27 September 2002. 6.7. Appeals to the King The events that took place between the presentation of the plan in March 1999 and the Islamists praying on the beaches in the summer of 2000 point to certain patterns in actions, ideas, and relations. At first glance, there seems to be a binary opposition between advocates and opponents of the plan. But there are great internal differences within each party. Although all claim to adhere to a true understanding of Islam, and all claim the right to speak in civil society. The next years, similar clashes would take place again and again, and the same views would be reiterated. But in these confrontations and debates the appeal to the king to intervene as amÂr al-mu¾minÂn would become increasingly insistent. Both advocates and opponents, except for YassineÕs followers, hope that Mohammed VI will defend their views. According to the traditionalists and the moderate Islamists, only the king, in consultation with the ®ulam¨¾, is entitled to change family law in accordance with the Shar®a. Modernists regard this emphasis on the decisive role of the ®ulam¨¾ as un-Moroccan. They consider this to be a manifestation of the Shi®i doctrine of wil¨yat al-faqÂh, current in Iran since the Islamic revolution of 1979. According to this view, Muslim scholars should not only be the guardians of the faith, but also bearers of political power in order to implement the divine law (cf. Akhavi 1996). Moroccan reformists consider this ÒShi®iÓ view to be in sharp contradiction with the centuries-old tradition of Malikism and the monarchy, in which the king, as amÂr al-mu¾minÂn, has the right to exercise ijtih¨d. In the end it is the king who should decide the contents of Islamic law in Morocco. 108 léon buskens The reformistsÕ request to the king for protection clearly shows how threatened they feel. Their appeal is in sharp contrast to views they had held until recently. At the first presentation of the plans, Sa•d Sa‰di seemed intent on reforming family law entirely on his own. In the recent past, the opposition parties regarded the king as someone who, as Commander of the Faithful, was trying to curtail them.37 King Hassan II effectively pursued this strategy of serving as both the political and religious leader of the nation in his 1993 reforms of the Mudawwana (see above). King Mohammed VI has for a long time tried to avoid reacting to either the proposals of the Islamists and traditionalists or to the appeals of the government and modernists. In the question of family law reform, he has reached the same impasse as his father. Traditionalists, Islamists, and modernists all expect him to defend their particular interpretation of Islam. These three groups represent important segments of the population. For the time being, the only solution for the king seems to be to wait and not to do anything. 6.8. Violence Against Women and International Conventions Until the end of 2000, public debate over family law was limited to meetings of different womenÕs rights groups in Rabat and Casablanca, such as Jossour, RŽseau pour le soutien et la mise en œuvre du plan dÕaction pour lÕintŽgration de la femme au dŽveloppement, and La Ligue DŽmocratique des Droits de la Femme, all of which called for continuation of the plan. They urged the government to take action again and requested that it not limit the reforms to social and economic issues, but continue to work towards reform of the Mudawwana (cf. LibŽration 17 and 22 November 2000). The suppression of violence against women was high on their agenda.38 Several womenÕs rights groups and womenÕs centers sent a memorandum to the government on the occasion of the international campaign for the struggle against violence directed at women. The Tozy (1999: 295) describes the recent support of the USFP for the monarchy and its rituals; and internal party criticisms of the institution, which were quickly silenced. However, Le Journal of 12-18 January 2002 again published articles critical of the monarchy, including a historical study of the genesis of the institution of Commander of the Faithful. 38 Numerous articles and books on violence against women have been published recently in Morocco, for example: Razi 1999; and: Centre dÕEcoute et dÕOrientation Juridique et Psychologique pour Femmes AgressŽes 2001, which offers a comparative study of three countries in the Maghreb. 37 recent debates on family law reform in morocco 109 memorandum began by invoking several human rights declarations, the Moroccan constitution, as well as the United Nations ÒConvention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against WomenÓ (CEDAW; New York, 18 December 1979). They asked the government to give greater attention to the struggle against violence directed at women, especially domestic violence and sexual harassment; and to instruct the police to take domestic violence seriously, instead of considering it as a private affair (Al Bayane 12 December 2000). One of the signatories of the memorandum, the ÒAssociation DŽmocratique des Femmes du MarocÓ (ADFM), published a study on Moroccan penal law exposing its patriarchal and ÒmachoÓ nature. ADFM concluded that fifteen provisions in the Penal Code and the Code of Criminal Procedure discriminated against women. The womenÕs association asked for the abolition of article 418 of the Penal Code, which allows for the possibility of mitigating the punishment of a husband who has assaults, batters, or even murders his wife after catching her in an act of adultery. They also characterized article 494 of the Penal Code as disparaging towards women: This article makes it possible to prosecute a person who helps to escape or kidnaps a married woman who has been confined to a certain place by another person (such as her husband) who holds authority over her. According to the ADFM, this article treats a woman as someone who has no will of her own (LÕEconomiste 14 December 2000, 8). In the memorandum, the womenÕs rights groups also asked for publication of the United Nations ÒConvention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women.Ó Morocco had ratified this convention in June 1993, but never published the text in the Al-JarÂda al-rasmiyya, the official law gazette. Moreover, the Morrocan government, like that of many other Muslim countries, had stipulated certain reservations to the convention. These reservations mainly concerned the Mudawwana. The Moroccan government announced that it was willing to apply the rules of CEDAW in so far as they are not against the Shar®a. It specifically mentioned that the personal status code contains rules that were not in compliance with the convention. Thus, it declared that article 15 section 4 of CEDAW would not apply in Morocco because it undermines a womanÕs obligation to obey her husband and to live with him, as stipulated in articles 34 and 36 of the Mudawwana. In its reservations to article 16, the government defended the male prerogative of 110 léon buskens repudiation by pointing to the husbandÕs financial obligations towards his wife which he assumes at the time of marriage. Because of these financial obligations, the Shar®a gives a woman the right to divorce only by applying to a judge. Thus, the Moroccan government once again underscored the patriarchal nature of its family law by invoking the divine precepts of the Shar®a. In 1997 experts on the CEDAW monitoring committee questioned Ahmed Snoussi, the Moroccan representative, about these reservations, which they considered to be against the essence of the convention. In defense of his government, the representative referred to Islam, morality, and culture, and to fear of Islamist reactions. The committee called on the government of Morocco to set a standard in developing a more liberal interpretation of Islamic law, mentioning the prestige that the king of Morocco enjoys in the Muslim world. At the end of 2000, Moroccan womenÕs rights groups were trying to make the government lift the reservations by referring to human rights and to the Moroccan Constitution. They pointed out that Mohammed VI, in a speech of 10 December 1999, clearly indicated that there is no contradiction between Islam and the universal conception of human rights. On 26 December 2000, the king promulgated the convention by royal decree (úahÂr). Despite of the protests, the reservations have been maintained.39 6.9. The Coming of Spring: The King Intervenes Meanwhile, during the summer of 2000, the Cabinet was reshuffled and Sa•d Saâdi of the Parti du Progrs et du Socialisme had to give up his position. In the eyes of many, he had been too radical in his proposals and public pronouncements. Nouzha Chekrouni, a new minister for womenÕs and youth affairs and for the integration of handicapped people, and a member of the 39 These ideas about the giving up the reservations and the publication of the convention are discussed by Nouzha Skalli in her article, ÒLes femmes ont-elles droit au chapitre?Ó in Al Bayane 14 December 2000. The text of the úahÂr containing the reservations, as well as the text of the convention of 1979, together with a UN declaration on the elimination of discrimination against women of 7 November 1967, is reproduced in Benyahya 2001a: 97-117. Ann Mayer has written extensively about the attitudes of Muslim countries towards CEDAW, analyzing in detail their reservations which they have entered. In Mayer (forthcoming b) she describes how some Arab countries, such as Algeria and Morocco, have responded to criticism of their policies by the CEDAW monitoring committee, and she analyzes the criticism faced by the Moroccan representative Ahmed Snoussi in 1997. The article contains references to MayerÕs work on this topic. See also Combe 2001. recent debates on family law reform in morocco 111 more moderate Union Socialiste des Forces Populaires, replaced Sa‰di. Attempting to maneuver in a more tactful manner, she repeatedly stressed that the Mudawwana can only be revised on the basis of the Shar®a. She proposed that a special procedure should be followed, since the reforms are to be undertaken by the king in his capacity as amÂr al-mu¾minÂn (Le Matin du Sahara et du Maghreb, 23 December 2000). Some of the modernists grumbled. In a comment of 4 January 2001 published in Al Bayane, a newspaper linked to Sa‰diÕs party, Nouzha Skalli wrote that Minister ChekrouniÕs opinions were contrary to an earlier statement of Prime Minister Youssoufi, in which he declared that reform of the Mudawwana lay within the competence of the government. According to Ms. Skalli the government should accept this responsibility and give women their rights as citizens. However, she concluded the article by conceding that the king might nevertheless take the lead in the reform process. Article 19 of the Moroccan constitution grants him the authority to carry out family law reform, not only in his capacity as amÂr al-mu¾minÂn and the defender of Islam and the constitution, but also as Òthe protector of the rights and liberties of citizens, social groups and organizations.Ó As such, the king Òest le mieux placŽ pour rŽtablir les femmes marocaines dans leurs droits.Ó40 Prime Minister Youssoufi confirmed the transfer of authority to the king at the beginning of February 2001, when he asked Mohammed VI to set up a commission for the reform of the Mudawwana (Le Matin du Sahara et du Maghreb 6 February 2001). In the meantime dissension developed between the parties in office. Minister Abbas al-Fasi of the conservative Parti de lÕIstiqlal attempted to seize control of the reform process at the expense of Minister Chekrouni. The Istiqlal party opposed family law reforms that were too radical. However, Prime Minister Youssoufi and the progressive USFP continued to back their Minister, Chekrouni. Chekrouni repeated her wish that the king establish a commission consisting of ®ulam¨¾ who would formulate a draft law (LÕEconomiste, 14 February 2001). For a portrait of Nouzha Skalli, one of the prominent actors in the debate and a member of the PPS and of the related Association DŽmocratique des Femmes du Maroc (ADFM), see an interview in Citadine no. 72 (March 2002): 36-8. On the ADFM, see: Hegasy 1997: 155-8. Ms. Skalli was one of the womenÕs representatives who were received by King Mohammed VI on 5 March 2001 to discuss family law reforms (Le Matin du Sahara et du Maghreb 6 March 2001, 2). 40 112 léon buskens On 5 March 2001 King Mohammed VI finally intervened. He received several womenÕs rights groups at the royal palace in Rabat. Moroccan observers noticed the difference in the new kingÕs manner of proceeding, compared to his fatherÕs handling of the reforms of 1993. Hassan II had received representatives of only a few political parties and associated trade unions, and he had made a fatherly speech. His son Mohammed VI invited a much larger range of womenÕs representatives, who were allowed to speak first. After listening to the speech made by Sa‰dia Belmir, a Supreme Court judge and member of the Constitutional Council, the king himself reacted briefly. He clearly expressed his desire for reforms and promised to establish a commission for this purpose, which should consult with representatives of civil society.41 The reformists applauded the kingÕs gesture. It was a present on the occasion of International WomenÕs Day, as well as al-®Âd al-kabÂr. His ÒarbitrationÓ as amÂr al-mu¾minÂn was founded in the tradition and the constitution. The royal intervention might prevent further politicization of the debate by the Islamists, against the express warning of the late King Hassan II. The PJD also thanked the king warmly for his gesture. The Islamists emphasized in public that Mohammed VI supported their views. On 11 March 2001 they celebrated the first anniversary of the establishment of their national committee for the protection of the family. One of the speakers, an im¨m from Casablanca who the minister of religious affairs had recently forbidden to preach, used the occasion to characterize the authors of the plan as non-Muslims. The government tried to calm things down. Minister Chekrouni stated in an interview that one should not refer to the royal intervention as ÒarbitrationÓ because there was no conflict. The government had only presented a proposal and collected opinions from the different segments of society. From the beginning it had been clear that in the end the king would decide the matter, according to the provisions of the constitution. In another interview the minister stated that the complexity of the issues meant that the reform of the Mudawwana could not be carried out in just one day. She also explained that For two texts concerning this meeting, see: Benyahya 2001a: 355-62. For reports on the meeting, see: Al Bayane 6 March 2001; Le Matin du Sahara et du Maghreb 6 March 2001, 1-2 (with a list of people present). A French translation of Ms. BelmirÕs speech was published in: Le Matin du Sahara et du Maghreb 7 March 2001. 41 recent debates on family law reform in morocco 113 reservations of the Moroccan government regarding certain international conventions for womenÕs rights stemmed from its attachment to certain religious and cultural values and were not in contradiction to the principle of gender equality.42 Approximately one month later, on Friday 27 April 2001, the king established the long awaited ÒConsultative Commission Entrusted with the Reform of the MudawwanaÓ. Representatives of womenÕs associations were invited to attend the ceremony. The commission consisted of sixteen members, three of whom were female: Zhor ElHorr, a judge at the Supreme Court in Rabat; Rahma Bourqia, a prominent sociologist and dean of the Faculty of Arts at the University of Mohammedia; and Nezha Guessous, a professor of medicine at the University of Rabat. The majority of the thirteen men were ®ulam¨¾, and some were attached to a modern faculty of law. Five men were members of the judiciary. Driss Dahhak, first president of the Supreme Court as well as president of the Conseil consultatif des droits de lÕHomme, the official body for human rights, was appointed chair. Ahmed Khamlichi, the progressive ®¨lim and legal scholar, and director of the state institute for higher Islamic education in Rabat, D¨r al½adÂth al-½asaniyya, was also made a member of the commission. In the speech in which King Mohammed VI announced the establishment of the commission, he referred to himself as amÂr al-mu¾minÂn. He stated that the reforms should be anchored in the Shar®a and he stressed the importance of continuity with the already existing text of the Mudawwana. The new commission should try to make the reforms of 1993 really effective. In addition to respect for tradition and for the Òsacred values of the familyÓ, the king also referred to human rights. He entrusted the members of the commission with the task of ijtih¨d. He encouraged them to consider the public interest and to strive after consensus and moderation (Le Matin du Sahara et du Maghreb 28 April 2001, 1-2). The first reactions were positive. Official commentators stressed the balanced selection of experts: a felicitous mixture of ®ulam¨¾, 42 For reformist reactions: LÕEconomiste 8 March 2001, 23; Le Journal Hebdomadaire 10-16 March 2001, 14. For Islamist reactions: LÕEconomiste 13 March 2001, 2; Le Matin du Sahara et du Maghreb 15 March 2001, 2. See also the ÒdossierÓ in La Nouvelle Tribune 15 March 2001, 6-12; an interview with Minister Chekrouni is published on p. 8. For a summary of an interview with Al-Sharq al-awsaß, see: Le Matin du Sahara et du Maghreb 30 March 2001. 114 léon buskens modern legal scholars, and scientists. The modernists praised the energy of the king. They regarded as good portents the absence of Minister Alaoui MÕDaghri from the commission and the inclusion of ®¨lim Khamlichi, who had been working for family law reform for a long time. 43 6.10. The Long Waiting: Mounting Concern After the establishment of the commission, the confrontations between modernists, conservatives, and Islamists continued. For months Islamists harassed and menaced the poetess Hakima Chaoui, who, on the occasion of the celebration of 8 March 2001, read a poem on the radio that they considered offensive to the prophet Muhammad. When she was accused of being an apostate, members of the Ligue DŽmocratique pour les Droits de la Femme came to her defense by referring to the Qur¾an and to a study published in the official journal of the Ministry of Religious Affairs, Da®wat al½aqq. In September 2001 sixteen conservative ®ulam¨¾ clashed again with Minister Alaoui MÕDaghri. They issued a fatw¨ condemning the alliance of Morocco with the United States in a war against Muslims; the participation of Muslims in a ceremony in the cathedral in Rabat to commemorate the victims of September 11; and the ministerÕs requiring the im¨ms to use a prescribed text about these events in their Friday sermons. In October 2001 ®Abd al-Sal¨m ¼¨dâsh, a former judge at the Supreme Court, alumnus of the famous QarawiyyÂn university for Islamic studies in Fez, and a member of the ÒLeague of the ®ulam¨¾ of MoroccoÓ, published a book of almost 500 pages in which he criticized the proposed family law reforms. At the end of the year copies of an audio cassette became available in which an im¨m from Marrakech discussed the implications of the scientific discovery that women had lighter brains than men. Another im¨m called for the stoning of members of the Ligue DŽmocratique pour les Droits de la Femme who had toured his region to distribute information.44 43 For comments, see: Le Matin du Sahara et du Maghreb 30 April 2001, 1 (entitled ÒLa mission de lÕijtihadÓ); La VŽritŽ 4-10 May 2001, 18 (entitled: ÒLe printemps, enfin?Ó). 44 On the case of the poetess Hakima Chaoui, see: LibŽration 7 May 2001, 9 July 2001, 21 September 2001. On the fatw¨ against the alliance: Le Matin du Sahara et du Maghreb 18 September 2001, 5, 10 October 2001; LibŽration 10 October 2001, 5; Le Journal 20 October 2001; Demain 6-12 October 2001, recent debates on family law reform in morocco 115 WomenÕs rights groups, such as the ADFM, went on with their meetings, publications, and information campaigns on topics such as violence against women, female participation in politics, women as decision-makers, unmarried mothers, and the protection of children.45 They also created new centers that offered shelter to abused women, single mothers, and orphans, as well as continuing to dispense legal aid to women. The NGOs for womenÕs rights continued to receive support from abroad. In March 2000 the ÒInternational Human Rights Law GroupÓ (IHRLG), based in Washington, opened an office in Rabat to support efforts by womenÕs organizations in Morocco to provide legal aid to women. IHRLG developed a Moroccan legal literacy program, in partnership with fifteen Moroccan womenÕs advocacy groups. An important event was the publication in spring 2001 of a manual, in Arabic, for legal literacy for women. The group is also collaborating with Berber NGOs to produce a Berber language version of the manual.46 Since June 2001, the commission for the reform of the Mudawwana has been busy meeting representatives of civil society and gathering material. They have held numerous hearings with representatives of political parties and womenÕs associations. However, womenÕs rights activists have complained about the slow pace of the commissionÕs proceedings, the lack of information and the absence of communication. Journalists and womenÕs rights groups openly ask whether the commission was created to change the law or merely to keep things quiet. The stress on promoting the effectiveness of the 1993 reforms in the kingÕs speech at the establishment of the commission also contributed to these worries. In October 2001 womenÕs organizations founded a group called Printemps de lՎgalitŽ in order to express their wish to be more involved and informed.47 4-5 (with a French translation of the fatw¨), 13-19 October 2001, 4 (with a reproduction of the original signatures of the scholars at the end of the fatw¨). On the treatise against the plan: ¼¨dâsh 2001. On the speeches of the im¨ms: LibŽration 26 January 2002. 45 Examples of recent publications by engaged female scholars are: Alami MÕChichi 2002, who uses the concept of gender to analyse the debate about family law in Morocco; Belarbi 2001, a collection of articles on women and democracy. The volumes edited by the legal scholars Benyahya 2001a and 2001b, and Mouaqit 2002a and 2002b, are important collections of legal sources and studies, intended to contribute to the struggle for family law reform. 46 See: Al Bayane 27 May 2002; and the IHRLG website: http://www. hrlawgroup.org/ country_programs /morocco/. 47 On the growing concern and the foundation of the ÒcollectifÓ, see: LibŽra- 116 léon buskens King Mohammed VI intervened on 23 November 2001. He held a working session with Driss Dahhak, president of the commission for family law reform, to inquire about their progress. In this meeting the two objectives of the commission were further clarified: (1) judicial reform and the allocation of additional resources in order to make the application of the present family law more effective; and (2) reform of the Mudawwana. To this end the commission had already established six sub-commissions, whose domains roughly coincided with the subjects of the six books composing the present code. The king encouraged the commission to work hard in order to reach the objectives. 48 Meanwhile, the government and the political parties started to prepare for the elections of September 2002. The government decided to create a national list for women, for which thirty seats in Parliament (out of 325) would be reserved. To date, only two women have held a seat in Parliament. The official measure would ensure that at least 10 percent of the representatives would be female. WomenÕs rights activists objected that women constitute about 70 percent of the Moroccan electorate. 49 At the beginning of 2002 the king announced that he was going to marry Lalla Salma, a woman Òfrom an ordinary Moroccan family.Ó The kingÕs presentation of his prospective bride to the Moroccan people was an exceptional gesture that was highly appreciated. The conclusion of the marriage contract and the wedding celebration itself received extensive media coverage. Photographs of the new princess appeared all over Morocco. Previously, it had been customary for Moroccan monarchs to have many spouses, although they never appeared officially in public. For King Hassan II, the maintenance of a mysterious royal harem was part of the complex of rituals and tion 11 October 2001, 1 November 2001, 3; Al Bayane 12 October 2001, 30 October 2001, 1 November 2001; La Vie Economique 26 October 2001; LibŽration 1 November 2001, 3; Maroc Hebdo International no. 484 (2-8 November 2001): 30; Le Journal Hebdomadair e 1-7 December 2001, 13. Feliu and Ram’rez 2002 share this concern about possible stagnation of the reforms. 48 See: LÕOpinion 25 November 2001, 1-2; LibŽration 26 November 2001, 3, and 12 December 2001 (reaction of Printemps de lÕEgalitŽ). 49 On the national list for women and reactions to it, see: LÕEconomiste 26 February 2002, 21; Le Matin du Sahara et du Maghreb 26 February 2002; La Gazette du Maroc 4 March 2002. For the comment that women constitute the great majority of the electorate: LÕEconomiste 23 August 2002, 28-9. recent debates on family law reform in morocco 117 symbols that served as an expression of royal power. The new kingÕs break with this tradition may be understood as another statement that he wants to improve the living conditions of women in Morocco. On 8 March 2002 womenÕs associations again drew public attention to their cause. They held a sit-in in front of the House of Parliament in Rabat, a favorite site for public demonstrations. They wanted to show that they remain concerned about the progress of the family law reform commission (cf. LÕOpinion 10 March 2002). The king intervened again by organizing a second working session with Driss Dahhak, the chair of the commission, and the ministers of justice and of religious affairs on 13 March 2002. First, they announced the creation of special sections for family affairs in the courts. Second, the king ordered that a draft of the family law reform be submitted to him before the end of 2002. The family law reform should be comprehensive and substantial. Some commentators regarded the kingÕs decision to set a date for the presentation of the draft law as a felicitous maneuver to remove the issue of family law reform from the election campaigns. However, the document prepared for the elections by the PJD pays considerable attention to the question of family life and law reform.50 Apparently, King Mohammed VI does not want to follow the same approach as his father did in 1993, i.e. to use his legislative power to determine the contents of the new family law while the Parliament is dissolved. This time the peopleÕs representatives apparently will be allowed to discuss the draft law, although the Commander of the Faithful keeps a decisive role in the process of family law reform. 50 On the second working session, see: Le Matin du Sahara et du Maghreb 14 March 2002, 1; LibŽration 15 March 2002; Maroc Hebdo International 15 March 2002, 8 (with the remark concerning the election campaigns). Le Matin du Sahara et du Maghreb of 25 September 2002, 6 reports about experiments with the new tribunals for family affairs in two places. On the document prepared by the PJD for the election campaign, see: ¼izb al-®ad¨la waÕltanmiya. Al-FarÂq al-niy¨b 2002: 100-21. In the months preceding the elections, Le Journal Hebdomadaire published a debate between progressive defenders of the family law reform plan, including Sa•d Sa‰di and two female representatives of Al-®Adl waÕl-i½s¨n. Thus the weekly devoted attention to an Islamist group that holds views different from those of the PJD, but which was not allowed to participate in the elections. In this debate Nadia Yassine pronounced herself in favor of reforms. She emphasized that these should be implemented by going back to the pure Islam of the Prophet, using ijtih¨d. She expressed opposition to Western influences on family law reform, but at the same time distanced herself from the tradition of Malikism and from the appeal to the king (Le Journal Hebdomadaire no. 76 (27 July-2 August 2002): 12-18). 118 léon buskens 7. Conclusions: The Emergence of a Public Sphere The Moroccan governmentÕs proposal for family law reform implies a clear rupture with tradition as constructed in the Mudawwana of 1958 and in its revised version of 1993. In this article, I have focused on the debates and legislation that produced these texts. From this perspective, the current debate is a continuation of the 1992-3 discussions, which the late King Hassan II brought to a halt by declaring that he would not allow the reform of the Mudawwana to become politicized. As in 1957-8, so in 1992-3, the king determined the contents of the family law together with a select group of loyal ®ulam¨¾. At present, such a curtailment of the legislative process is no longer acceptable to many Moroccans. The most recent debate shows the great diversity of opinions about Islam and family law in Morocco. Supporters and opponents of the reforms do not constitute coherent blocs; there are many internal differences of opinion, and coalitions are temporary in nature. The opponents include traditionalists , docile and defiant ®ulam¨¾, and Islamists. Among the Islamists several currents can be discerned, such as the revolutionary movement Al-®Adl waÕl-i½s¨n, led by Abdessalam Yassine, and the relatively law-abiding Islamists of the PJD. Although it is difficult to discern the attitude of the largely illiterate rural population toward the plan, they likely do not support modernist views. The minister of religious affairs has the difficult task of controlling and containing the Islamic opposition to the government. He has tried to do this by voicing severe criticisms of the plan. Supporters of the plan include the two main left-wing political parties, the more moderate USFP and the more radical PPS. The Parti de lÕIstiqlal, which has a more ambiguous and cautious attitude, supports the plan to a certain degree. NGOÕs for womenÕs and human rights are its most fervent defenders (cf. Feliu and Ram’rez 2002; Hegasy 1997; Sater 2002). The various reformist groups speak, often in French, in terms of human rights, civil society, citizenship, progress and development, and adaptation of the law to changing social conditions. United Nations conventions serve as an important source of references.51 In the eyes See, for example, Royaume du Maroc 1997, an official publication of the Moroccan government with an overview of international conventions and declarations that may serve as references in the campaign to improve womenÕs 51 recent debates on family law reform in morocco 119 of reformists, modernizing the law will contribute to the creation of a just and democratic society in which women will be able to participate fully. It will also promote economic development. True to the critical teachings of Habermas, the reformists use the concept of Òcivil societyÓ not only as a scholarly tool for understanding Moroccan society, but also as an activist instrument for change.52 In the name of civil society the reformists claim the right to participate in discussions about the contents of family law and to voice their rights. Benyahya 2001a is a reformist collection of texts concerning the legal status of women in Morocco. The volume, which is a valuable source for the study of recent discussions, has been published in both French and Arabic. The book contains Moroccan legislation as well as internationa l conventions and declarations. It also includes verses from the Qur¾an, excerpts from speeches of King Mohammed VI, statements issued by political parties, and statistical data. The text of the Manifeste du rŽseau dÕappui au Plan dÕaction national pour lÕintŽgration de la femme au dŽveloppement is supplemented by a long list of NGOÕs that have signed this manifesto. Since the late 1980s, NGOÕs and foreign foundations have played an important role in the debate on family law reform, among other things by funding and organizing conferences and supporting the publication of books. Later in 2001 Benyahya published a similar collection devoted to the legal position of children in Morocco (Benyahya 2001b). Feliu and Ram’rez 2002 analyze the concept of human rights in the debate on family law reform and offer valuable references to other Spanish studies on this subject. 52 On Òcivil societyÓ as a tool to analyze contemporary developments in the Muslim world, and for further references, see: Eickelman and Anderson 1999; Hegasy 1997. For an analysis of political and social developments in Morocco during the last years of the reign of Hassan II, with a critical discussion of Òcivil societyÓ, see: Layachi 1998. Hegasy 1997 offers a comprehensive analysis of the role played by liberal opposition groups in the emergence of a Òcivil societyÓ and a Òpublic sphereÓ in Morocco since the 1980s. Roque 2002 discusses the use of the concept of Òcivil societyÓ in order to understand current developments in Morocco. She pays special attention to the establishment of NGOÕs active in rural areas in the South and to Berber cultural associations. Sater 2002 is a critical analysis of recent developments in relations between state, political parties, and NGOÕs in Morocco. He pays attention to the important role of womenÕs rights groups in the creation of a civil society, which the state and political parties try to dominate and control in order to protect their power bases. In 1992 El Aoufi edited a volume on the notion of civil society, with contributions of Moroccan intellectuals, entitled La sociŽtŽ civile au Maroc. The authors use the concept of Òcivil societyÓ as a tool for social and political criticism. A•cha Belarbi and Abderrazak Moulay Rchid contributed essays on womenÕs rights. The bilingual volume Femmes and sociŽtŽ civile au Maghreb links the concept of Òcivil societyÓ with the struggle for womenÕs rights in the three countries of the Maghreb, with an essay by Khadija Amti (also spelled ÒAmitiÓ) on discussions on the Mudawwana in Morocco (Mernissi n.d.). 120 léon buskens own opinions about ijtih¨d. In their view ijtih¨d is not the prerogative of the ®ulam¨¾, but a right of every Muslim. They also defend their right to ijtih¨d by referring to the national tradition of Malikism. The Maliki heritage also serves to justify the modernistsÕ appeal to the king as amÂr al-mu¾minÂn who should protect them from the hegemonic aspirations of the ®ulam¨¾. Only recently have the reformists begun to refer to Malikism and to the institution of amÂr al-mu¾minÂn in order to defend themselves against accusations of apostasy and westernization voiced by the traditional ®ulam¨¾ and Islamists. Opponents of the plan present the reformists as enemies of the Shar®a who are cooperating with malicious foreign powers such as the World Bank. They consider the reform plans as a major threat to the integrity of Moroccan society that will result in chaos and debauchery. Acceptance of so-called ÒuniversalÓ values will lead to westernization and hence to doom and gloom. Legal reform may be reached only by ijtih¨d as practiced by the ®ulam¨¾ under the protection of the king. Islamists present the era of the Prophet Muhammad as the ideal to be followed. The Shar®a offers women sufficient protection of their rights. Thus, according to Nadia Yassine, a woman adequately can protect herself from polygamy by including an appropriate stipulation in her marriage contract. Like their liberal opponents, Islamists have adopted the idiom of human rights and civil society to defend their right to express their opinions in public. Despite the wide differences in opinion, most parties share certain key concepts. All refer to Islam and the Shar®a as the source for their ideas and ideals. No debate about family law seems to be possible outside the limits of an Islamic discourse. In 1990 representatives of womenÕs organizations explained to me unambiguously that the demands for secular family law were unacceptable and therefore impossible in Morocco, and this situation has not changed in the intervening years. However, there are wide variations in the way in which the different groups understand the shared concepts of Islam, Shar®a, ijtih¨d, human rights, civil society, democracy, development, and the role of the king as amÂr al-mu¾minÂn. Each groupÕs understanding of the terms serves its particular goals. A sociological analysis of the social background of the members of these movements and factions is a necessary further step in the analysis of the debate. Within the framework of this article, I can do no more than formulate some impressions and raise some questions. recent debates on family law reform in morocco 121 Modernist supporters of the plan seem to belong to the educated urban middle-class. They include academics, members of the liberal professions, civil servants, business people, and students. Some of them are wealthy, but most are not, contrary to what their opponents suggest. The PJD and allied groups find some of their supporters among the same urban middle-class. Tozy notes that the majority of candidates for the 1997 elections were academics and representatives of liberal professions, such as lawyers and physicians (Tozy 1999: 254). Allied groups also enjoy considerable support among students. We may provisionally identify the PJD faction with the pious urban (lower) middle-classes. According to Tozy, Al-®Adl waÕl-i½s¨n recruits its supporters mainly among teachers and students (Tozy 1999: 201). Moroccan university campuses have a tradition of violent clashes between left-wing and Islamist student groups that have sometimes resulted in severe casualties or even death. Supporters of the traditionalist ®ulam¨¾ include part of the rural population, rural migrants to the cities, and the lower urban strata. It would be simplistic to explain the debate as as an attempt by a westernized elite to impose its views on traditionalist masses. Islamists and modernists both attract supporters among the educated urban middle-class. The emergence of Islamist movements is related to social changes, such as large-scale rural migration to the cities, and the growing role of women who perform wage labor in the urban economy. Women have become much more visible in public space, not only as civil servants and laborers, but also as activists, politicians and entrepreneurs. Some of these women join modernist associations; others, such as Nadia Yassine and Bassima Hakkaoui, play a prominent role in Islamist organizations. The monarchy has reacted to these social and economic changes by partly shifting its social base from rural notables to the urban bourgeoisie (cf. Sater 2002: 112). This shift offers a partial explanation for the increasing importance of concepts like Òcivil societyÓ and Òhuman rightsÓ in official discourse. The intensity of the debate, the strong language used, and the accusations of apostasy, heresy, obscurantism, barbarism, and treason, show that powerful symbols and fundamental values are at stake. The debate is about conflicting visions of society, family and Islam. It is a confrontation between different world views and identities. The debate may also be a clash of interests between different social classes, although I do not have sufficient material to discuss the question. 122 léon buskens These debates are not only about the contents of Moroccan family law but also about fundamental political issues. The family law debate should be understood as part of larger political developments taking place in Moroccan society.53 Family law has become a symbol of the place of Islam in society and of the right to participate in politics. Who has the right to interpret Islam in an authoritative manner? Upon taking office, the new government parties claimed this right. However, in response to fierce resistance from traditionalists and Islamists, they were forced to take refuge with King Mohammed VI and to confirm his status as amÂr al-mu¾minÂn, the supreme political and religious leader of the Moroccan nation, or umma. This appeal implies a consolidation of the all-powerful position of the king that his father Hassan II had created during his almost forty year reign. During the reign of Hassan II, the Islamists were scarely able to make themselves heard in public debates. They were closely monitored by the Ministry of the Interior and even persecuted. Meanwhile, the Ministry of Religious Foundations and Islamic Affairs provided an officially sanctioned interpretation of Islam that legitimized the monarchy. The more radical factions have seized upon the debate over the Mudawwana to explore how much latitude Mohammed VI will allow them. By defending their interpretations of Islam in public, they assert their right to participate fully in the political arena. The prominent participation of the PJD in the family law debate has contributed to their further integration into the political arena, which had been in preparation for several decades. It was also an important step in their highly successful campaign for the elections of September 2002. Al-®Adl waÕl-i½s¨n has used the debate to further politicize the movement by creating a political branch. They have not yet been allowed to establish a real political party because of their revolutionary and republican program. Traditionally, the ®ulam¨¾ have been faithful partisans of the king (cf. Munson 1993). They consider the actions of the modernist government to be not only an onslaught on Islamic values, but also a menace to their privileged position. As a reaction to this perceived threat, they have renewed their claim to be the sole possessors of the authoritative interpretation of Islam, and, thereby, their right to 53 Hegasy 1997, L—pez Garc’a 2000, Sater 2002, and Tozy 1999 pay attention to debates about family law as part of a larger analysis of political developments in Morocco, from a sociological and political science perspective. recent debates on family law reform in morocco 123 engage in politics. Like the modernists, they back this claim by appealing to the king as Commander of the Faithful. Some of the ®ulam¨¾ have seized upon the debate to defy the control of the minister of religious affairs, and thus develop a critique of the regime in religious terms. This critical minority may fit with the Moroccan tradition of individual Islamic scholars who confront the government in Islamic terms, as described by Munson (1993). According to Minister Nouzha Chekrouni, there has never been a debate in Morocco that involved as many people as does the present debate about family law (Le Matin du Sahara et du Maghreb, 23 December 2000, 4). The controversy over the reforms is an indicator of important political changes in Morocco. It shows the development of a new public sphere in which a substantial amount of diversity in political sentiments may be expressed.54 However, the vehemence of the debate and the mutual condemnations point to the fragility of this public sphere. To what extent do parties agree to disagree? The king is implored to act as the protector and arbitrator of this emerging civil society, and to thus give a new interpretation to the institution of Commander of the Faithful. For most of his reign, King Hassan II feared such openness and ÒunbridledÓ pluralism. Assisted by his minister of the interior Driss Basri he kept a tight grip on both Islamists and leftist liberals. But his son Mohammed VI is apparently willing to allow greater liberty, in accordance with the image of openness and social justice that he seeks to project. His personal family life, so different from his fatherÕs, is part of this new approach. This is reflected in the publicity surrounding his wedding. At the same time, the monarchyÕs appropriation of civil society may also be understood as an attempt to control and neutralize it, as Sater (2002) argues. It is still unclear to what degree Mohammed VI will allow Moroccans to transform themselves from subjects into citizens. In order to keep his position of dominance, which he gained with the current family law debate, Mohammed VI will have to act appropriately. Will the different factions continue to respect the authority of the amÂr al-mu¾minÂn if he takes decisions 54 The writings of, and my conversations with, John Bowen and Armando Salvatore have helped me to understand the Òpublic sphereÓ dimension of the debate. See for example: Bowen 1996; Bowen 1999a; Bowen 1999b; Salvatore 2002a and 2002b. See also Eickelman and Anderson 1999; and Hegasy 1997. 124 léon buskens that do not please them? To what extent is their submission only apparent or temporary, just another strategic move in their game plan? In the family law debate modernists, traditionalists, and Islamists, bien ŽtonnŽs de se trouver ensemble, appeal to the king as Commander of the Faithful. Only the revolutionary followers of Shaykh Yassine think that they can do without the kingÕs grace, but they are not allowed to express this opinion too loudly. By establishing a commission for the reform of the Mudawwana, Mohammed VI has accepted this appeal to his leadership. He will have to make the commission propose a draft law that will satisfy modernists, traditionalists and Islamists. The enormous differences of opinion will render such a solution extremely difficult. For several decades, his father followed a strategy of postponing. The cosmetic reforms of 1993 satisfied few, as the present discussions demonstrate. The new draft will play an important role in keeping society together and in confirming the religious authority of Mohammed VI. His subjects expect the young king to perform a miracle, in the tradition of his forefathers, who, endowed with baraka, or Divine grace, have been ruling Morocco for more than three centuries as descendants of the Prophet. Abbreviations DOC Mud Mud 1958 Mud 1993 Dahir formant code des obligations et contrats or Q¨nân aliltiz¨m¨t waÕl-®uqâd. Moroccan Civil Code of 1913. See Blanc and Zeidguy n.d. for a bilingual edition. The changes of 1993 were published in Al-JarÂda al-rasmiyya no. 4222 (29 September 1993), p. 1832. Mudawwana, in full: Mudawwanat al-a½w¨l al-shakh×iyya. Moroccan Code of Personal Status of 1958. See Blanc and Zeidguy 1986 for the text in Arabic as well as the official French translation of the version of 1958. See Blanc and Zeidguy 1994 for the Arabic text and French translation of the version of 1993. The abbreviation ÒMudÓ without further specification refers to articles which formed part of the 1958 version and have remained valid until now. Version of the Mudawwana of 1958. Abbreviation used to refer to articles which were changed in the reform of 1993. See Blanc and Zeidguy 1986 for the Arabic text and official French translation of the ÒoldÓ version of 1958. El Alami and Hinchcliffe 1996 offer an English translation of the first two books. Articles of the Mudawwana changed in 1993. Published in AlJarÂda al-rasmiyya no. 4222 (29 September 1993): 1833-1834. 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