ISSN 0219-3213
2014 #08
Trends in
Southeast Asia
JOHOR SURVEY: ATTITUDES TOWARDS
GOVERNANCE AND ECONOMY,
ISKANDAR MALAYSIA, AND SINGAPORE
TERENCE CHONG
ISEAS Publishing
INSTITUTE OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN STUDIES
Trends in Southeast Asia
The Institute of Southeast Asian Studies (ISEAS) was established
in 1968. It is an autonomous regional research centre for scholars
and specialists concerned with modern Southeast Asia. The Institute’s
research is structured under Regional Economic Studies (RES), Regional
Social and Cultural Studies (RSCS) and Regional Strategic and Political
Studies (RSPS), and through country-based programmes. It also houses
the ASEAN Studies Centre (ASC), Singapore’s APEC Study Centre, as
well as the Nalanda-Sriwijaya Centre (NSC) and its Archaeology Unit.
2014
#08
Trends in
Southeast Asia
JOHOR SURVEY: ATTITUDES TOWARDS
GOVERNANCE AND ECONOMY,
ISKANDAR MALAYSIA, AND SINGAPORE
TERENCE CHONG
ISEAS Publishing
INSTITUTE OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN STUDIES
Published by:
ISEAS Publishing
Institute of Southeast Asian Studies
30 Heng Mui Keng Terrace
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ISEAS Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data
Chong, Terence.
Johor Survey : Attitudes towards Governance and Economy, Iskandar
Malaysia, and Singapore.
(Trends in Southeast Asia, 0219-3213 ; TRS 8/14)
1. Public opinion—Malaysia—Johor.
2. Ethnicity—Malaysia—Johor.
3. Johor—Politics and government.
4. Johor—Economic policy.
5. Iskandar Malaysia—Public opinion.
6. Investments, Singaporean—Malaysia—Johor—Public opinion.
I. Title.
II. Attitudes towards Governance and Economy, Iskandar Malaysia,
and Singapore
III. Series: Trends in Southeast Asia ; TRS 8/14.
DS501 I59T no. 8(2014)
2014
ISBN 978-981-4620-18-5 (soft cover)
ISBN 978-981-4620-19-2 (e-book, PDF)
Typeset by Superskill Graphics Pte Ltd
Printed in Singapore by Mainland Press Pte Ltd
FOREWORD
The economic, political, strategic and cultural dynamism in Southeast
Asia has gained added relevance in recent years with the spectacular
rise of giant economies in East and South Asia. This has drawn greater
attention to the region and to the enhanced role it now plays in international
relations and global economics.
The sustained effort made by Southeast Asian nations since 1967
towards a peaceful and gradual integration of their economies has
had indubitable success, and perhaps as a consequence of this, most
of these countries are undergoing deep political and social changes
domestically and are constructing innovative solutions to meet new
international challenges. Big Power tensions continue to be played out
in the neighbourhood despite the tradition of neutrality exercised by the
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).
The Trends in Southeast Asia series acts as a platform for serious
analyses by selected authors who are experts in their fields. It is aimed at
encouraging policy makers and scholars to contemplate the diversity and
dynamism of this exciting region.
THE EDITORS
Series Chairman:
Tan Chin Tiong
Series Editors:
Ooi Kee Beng
Terence Chong
Editorial Committee:
Francis E. Hutchinson
Daljit Singh
Johor Survey: Attitudes towards
Governance and Economy,
Iskandar Malaysia, and Singapore
By Terence Chong
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
•
•
•
•
These are selected findings from a survey on Johor residents
commissioned by the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies (ISEAS).
The survey was conducted with 2,009 respondents between October
and November 2013.
The big picture painted by the findings is one of interethnic
dissonance,1 especially between ethnic Malays and Chinese in the
state of Johor. More than income or education, ethnicity seemed to
be the key determinant of how certain questions were answered in
this survey.
With regard to satisfaction with the performance of state and federal
government, ethnic Chinese respondents were more likely to be
dissatisfied with the government’s performance to date compared
with their Malay and Indian counterparts.
Interethnic dissonance is also evident in the political and economic
outlook of respondents. Indian and Malay respondents were more
optimistic over the state’s political, economic and social conditions
while Chinese respondents, the higher educated, and those from
higher income households were more likely to be pessimistic.
Interethnic dissonance is defined here as the differences in opinions, attitudes
and experiences of social reality between ethnic groups or communities. These
differences may have been determined by the varying lifeworlds of different
ethnic communities that have been shaped by historical circumstances or
contemporary politics.
1
•
•
•
•
With regard to Iskandar Malaysia, although the majority of all
respondents said they were satisfied with its developments, Chinese
respondents were the least likely to say so. The majority of Chinese
and Indian respondents were satisfied with the influx of Singaporean
investors into Iskandar Malaysia, while Malay respondents tended
to be less receptive.
Chinese and Indian respondents were more likely to have a
favourable opinion of Singapore and were more open to visiting and
working in the city-state. Chinese respondents were most likely to
have visited Singapore; followed by Indian respondents; and lastly
Malay respondents.
In terms of ethnic affinity across the Causeway, Malay, Chinese,
and Indian respondents in Johor did not see similarities between
themselves and their ethnic counterparts in Singapore. This suggests
that despite geographical proximity, nationality and national
development have resulted in divergent self-perceptions and an
exclusive sense of identity on the part of Johor respondents.
However, while the majority of Chinese and Indian respondents did
not believe that Malaysians and Singaporeans of the same ethnic
group were similar, Malay respondents reportedly believe that
Chinese Malaysians and Chinese Singaporeans were similar to each
other; and also Indian Malaysians and Indian Singaporeans were
similar to each other. This may hint at a lack of trust or familiarity
on the part of Malay respondents with regard to their fellow Chinese
and Indian citizens.
Johor Survey: Attitudes towards
Governance and Economy,
Iskandar Malaysia, and Singapore
By Terence Chong2
INTRODUCTION
These are selected findings from a survey on Johor residents commissioned by the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies (ISEAS). Johor is
made up of 10 districts and is one of Malaysia’s most developed states. It
has a population of 3.2 million residents with ethnic Malays comprising
1.7 million of these, ethnic Chinese 1 million, and ethnic Indians about
210,000 residents.3 Johor also has a relatively young population with
601,000 residents between 10 and 19 years of age; 630,000 between 20
and 29 years of age; and 478,000 between 30 and 39 years of age.4
The survey had three objectives, namely, to gain a better understanding
of the attitudes of Johor residents towards:
a.
b.
c.
Government and Economy;
Iskandar Malaysia and its Importance; and
Singapore and Singaporeans.
GOVERNMENT AND ECONOMY
One of the striking trends of Malaysia’s 2013 General Elections was that
over 81 per cent of the Chinese vote went to the opposition. This loss of
2
Terence Chong is Senior Fellow and Coordinator of the Regional Social and
Cultural Studies Programme at the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies (ISEAS),
Singapore. Special thanks to Research Assistant, Callista Hang.
3
Source: Malaysian Census 2010.
4
Ibid.
1
Chinese votes was quickly dubbed the ‘Chinese tsunami’ by the ruling
coalition, the Barisan Nasional (BN). This label proved erroneous as the
BN actually received a lower share of the vote from Malay and Indian
voters as well.5 According to studies elsewhere, the Chinese vote in the
state of Johor dipped from 52.7 per cent in 2008 for the BN to 21.3 per
cent in 2013 while the Malay vote for the BN in the state saw a slight
increase from 81.1 per cent in 2008 to 81.9 per cent in 2013.6
Among the host of electoral issues were rising property prices,7
corruption and transparency in government,8 as well as a cleanup of the
electoral roll.9 Meanwhile the BN’s loss of support from urban voters
was attributed to the three ‘C’s, namely, “corruption, cost of living, and
crime”.10
These issues form the background for this objective. Selected findings
on the attitudes of Johor residents towards state and federal government,
towards a variety of issues ranging from municipal matters like water
Malaysian Insider. 8 July 2013. “It wasn’t a Chinese tsunami, study shows”.
By Md Izwan. http://www.themalaysianinsider.com/malaysia/article/it-wasnt-achinese-tsunami (accessed 19 April 2014).
5
6
Merdeka Centre. 4 September 2013. “13th Malaysian General Election Results
Parliamentary Level Analysis along Regional, Ethnic and Age Cohort Voting
Patterns”. Presentation at ISEAS. http://www.iseas.edu.sg/ISEAS/upload/files/
analysis_of_general_election13results.pdf (accessed 19 April 2014).
The Straits Times. 12 December 2012. “Penang’s soaring property prices a hot
election issue”. By Carolyn Hong. http://www.straitstimes.com/the-big-story/
asia-report/malaysia-elections/features/story/penangs-soaring-property-priceshot-elec (accessed 19 April 2014).
7
Low, Olivia and Green, Russell A. 23 May 2013. “Malaysia: At election time,
corruption remains a central issue”. http://blog.chron.com/bakerblog/2013/05/
malaysia-at-election-time-corruption-remains-a-central-issue/ (accessed 19 April
2014)
8
Merdeka Centre. 25 May 2012. “92% of voters want electoral roll to be cleaned
up before GE-13 is held”. http://merdeka.org/media/245-250512.html (accessed
19 April 2014).
9
10
The Straits Times. 23 December 2013. “Playing Islam card won’t help UMNO”.
S. Jayasankaran. http://news.asiaone.com/news/asian-opinions/playing-islamcard-wont-help-umno (accessed 19 April 2014).
2
management and socio-political concerns such as fighting corruption will
be presented. Similarly, levels of optimism reported by Johor residents
with regard to economic outlook, as well as the sources from which
respondents glean news and information, will be explored.
ISKANDAR MALAYSIA AND ITS
IMPORTANCE
Iskandar Malaysia was established on 30 July 2006 as an economic
development zone in the state of Johor. The plan is for it to be a hub for
finance and business, medicine and education, as well as a site for luxury
private housing, and electronic and industrial facilities. In total, Iskandar
Malaysia covers an area of over 2,000 square kilometers. Some eight
years after its establishment, Iskandar Malaysia has attracted a total of
S$51 billion in investments.11 According to official Malaysian statistics,
Singapore is by far the lead investor to date with RM9.1 billion, followed
by Spain at RM4.1 billion, and in third place Japan at RM3.7 billion.12
It has, however, not always been smooth sailing. The Iskandar
Regional Development Authority (IRDA) has admitted that it needs
to win over the “hearts and minds” of Johor residents, not to mention
“be more attuned to the needs of local residents” and to “counter the
perception that Iskandar Malaysia only served the interests of foreign
investors”.13 More recently, IRDA has had to refute claims that the inflow
11
Channel News Asia. 9 April 2014. “Singapore manufacturing firms see good
performance in Iskandar”. http://www.channelnewsasia.com/news/business/spore-manufacturing/1064692.html (accessed 13 April 2014).
The rest of the top ten investors are U.S (RM3.2 billion); Netherlands (RM2.8
billion); UAE (RM1.8 billion); Australia (RM1.8 billion); Lebanon (RM1.7
billion); France (RM1.6 billion); and China (RM1.5 billion). http://www.
mycorridor.malaysia.gov.my/Documents/IRDA%20-%20ISKANDAR%20
MALAYSIA%20%E2%80%93%20INVESTMENT%20CHALLENGES%20
STRATEGIES.pdf (accessed 14 April 2014).
12
13
New Straits Times. 23 April 2009. “Iskandar Projects ‘for the people’s benefit’ ”.
http://news.asiaone.com/News/AsiaOne+News/Malaysia/Story/A1Story
20090423-136939.html (accessed 13 April 2014).
3
of foreign investments into Iskandar Malaysia has “marginalised Malays
in Johor”.14 Furthermore, on-the-ground observers have suggested that
rising property prices and costs of living are key concerns among locals,
made more acute by the presence of Iskandar, the benefits of which have
not been perceived by the locals.15
Iskandar Malaysia is also a site for political contention. The opposition
has warned that only UMNO (United Malay National Organisation)
“cronies and companies” will benefit.16 The Islamic political party PAS
also distributed 100,000 booklets entitled IDR, Antara Impian and Realiti
(IDR, Between Dreams and Reality) warning of how the project would
not benefit Malays.17 Not to be outdone, former Malaysian Prime Minister
Dr Mahathir Mohamad has also raised the spectre of race by suggesting
that if the Malaysian “government allows Singapore Chinese to occupy
the IDR (through business, employment and property purchase) to a
larger extent than the Malays, the IDR would be dominated by Singapore
Chinese because the Malays cannot afford to buy homes there”.18
Meanwhile in Singapore, elder statesman and former Prime Minister
Lee Kuan Yew cautioned against over-enthusiastic investment and called
for a ‘wait and see approach’.19 Lee also opined “It is one thing for the
Opposition Party PAS to knock the prime minister down, but when
14
Straits Times. 17 January 2013. “Iskandar benefits locals too, says chief exec”.
By Teo Cheng Wee.
15
http://www.getitright-iskandar.com/?q=node/112 (accessed 13 April 2014).
Free Malaysia Today. 18 January 2013. “Peanuts for landowners, millions
for cronies”. By Chua Jui Meng. http://www.freemalaysiatoday.com/category/
opinion/2013/01/18/peanuts-for-landowners-millions-for-cronies/
(accessed
17 April 2014).
16
The Star. 20 November 2007. “A political ploy by PAS, says Johor MB”. http://
www.thestar.com.my/story.aspx/?file=%2f2007%2f11%2f20%2fnation%2f1950
8836&sec=nation (accessed 17 April 2014).
17
The Straits Times. 5 September 2007. “Beware the IDR falling into S’pore
hands”. http://news.asiaone.com/print/News/The%2BStraits%2BTimes/Story/%
2527Beware%2Bthe%2BIDR%2Bfalling%2Binto%2BS%2527pore%2527s%2
Bhands%2527.html (accessed: 17 April 2014).
18
19
Lee, Kuan Yew. 2013. One Man’s View of the World. Singapore: Straits Times
Press.
4
UMNO leaders, especially from Johor, hit out in the same vein, potential
investors from Singapore must seriously ask themselves when these
attitudes will change, and how welcome their investments will be”.20
In light of these concerns, this survey seeks to understand the attitudes
of Johor residents towards Iskandar Malaysia. Most recently, it was
reported that Iskandar Malaysia’s intended shift from low-cost centre to
high value-added manufacturing, as well as rising land and labour cost,
is reducing the comparative advantage it has to offer Singapore-based
companies.21
SINGAPORE AND SINGAPOREANS
The geographical proximity of Johor residents to Singapore endows
them with a unique insight into Singapore and Singaporeans. There are
approximately 205,000 Malaysians working in Singapore,22 while the
number of Malaysians commuting to Singapore daily is estimated to
be between 80,00023 and 120,000.24 Many of these are Malaysians from
other parts of the country who have domiciled themselves in Johor to
make daily trips to work or study in Singapore.
Business Times. 2 July 2007. “Malaysia’s IDR a ‘win-win’ arrangement for
S’pore: MM Lee”. By Pauline Ng.
20
ODAY. 23 April 2014. “Iskandar to move from being low-cost centre”. By
Wong Wei Han.
21
The Business Times. 29 August 2007. “Rafidah highlights opportunities
for Singapore business”. By Nande Khin. http://news.asiaone.com/News/
The+Business+Times/Story/Rafidah+highlights+opportunities+for+Singapore+
business.html (accessed 14 April 2014).
22
Ye, Junjia. 2011. “Reproducing Class in a Global Labour Force: The Case
of Singapore’s Division of Labour”. Unpublished PhD thesis. Faculty of
Graduate Studies (Geography). University of British Columbia. https://circle.
ubc.ca/bitstream/handle/2429/37743/ubc_2011_fall_ye_junjia.pdf?sequence=1
(accessed 30 March 2014); see also Abdullah, Kamarulnizan. 2009. Johor in
Malaysia-Singapore Relations. Across the Causeway: A Multi-dimensional Study
of Malaysia-Singapore Relations, ed. Takashi Shirashi. Singapore: Institute of
Southeast Asian Studies.
23
24
The Business Times. 29 August 2007.
5
Conversely, an estimated 130,000 Singaporeans travel to Malaysia on
a daily basis.25 According to 2006 figures, Johor received about 23,500
Singaporean visitors per day.26 Over 85 per cent of visitors passing
through Johor checkpoints are Singaporeans.27 Meanwhile, some 100
students from Singapore travel to Johor’s Iskandar Educity for school.
They include Singaporeans as well as children of expatriates based in
Singapore.28 Clearly, as a cross-border region, the state of Johor is unique
to the rest of the country.
Methodology
The survey was conducted between October and November 2013.
The 2,009 respondents interviewed via fixed-line and mobile phones
consisted of Malaysian citizens aged 18 and above who resided in Johor.
They were selected on the basis of random stratified sampling across
district of residence, controlled by quota for ethnicity, age and gender. A
‘Johor resident’ is defined as one who is registered as a voter in the state.
There were 1,248 ethnic Malay respondents, 624 ethnic Chinese
respondents, and 137 ethnic Indian respondents. The survey sample was
segregated along four principal segments or geographic areas as follows:
25
Ibid.
Reuters. 20 March 2007. Singapore and Malaysia’s Johor -- so near, yet so
far”. By Clarence Fernandez. http://www.reuters.com/article/2007/03/20/usmalaysia-johor-idUSKLR29136120070320 (accessed 14 April 2014).
26
27
http://www.iskandarmalaysia.com.my/pdf/im-sme/IM-Corridor-City-Laboverview-SME.pdf (accessed 14 April 2014).
28
The Sunday Times. 16 September 2012. “These students need passports to go
to school”. http://www.straitstimes.com/breaking-news/singapore/story/thesestudents-need-passports-go-school-20120916. (accessed 14 April 2014).
6
Table 1: Distribution of Respondents
Location
Composition
Entire State of
Johor
Iskandar
Region
All ten districts of the
state
Comprising areas such
as Johor Baharu, Pulai,
Gelang Patah, Tebrau,
Pasir Gudang and Kulai
Comprising Districts
of Segamat, Batu Pahat
and Muar
Comprising districts
of Mersing and Kota
Tinggi
North West
Johor
Eastern Johor
No. of
Estimated
Respondents Margin of
Error
1,002
± 3.10
1,403
± 4.88
1, 302
± 5.64
1, 302
± 5.64
7
SELECTED FINDINGS
A. GOVERNANCE AND ECONOMY
Performance of State Government and
Leadership
Interethnic dissonance — differences in opinions, attitudes and
experiences of social reality between ethnic groups or communities —
can be seen in the strong correlation between ethnicity and satisfaction
with government which runs through the survey. When asked about state
government and leadership, ethnic Chinese respondents were more likely
to be dissatisfied with the government’s performance to date compared
with their Malay and Indian counterparts. For example, while the Johor
state government’s handling of water management and municipal issues
saw high levels of satisfaction, Chinese respondents were less likely to
be satisfied with its handling of land acquisition, housing development,
and religious harmony. Furthermore, the higher the household income,
the higher the level of dissatisfaction with the state government’s
performance, suggesting possible middle and upper-middle class
discontent.
Performance of Johor State Government
For example, when asked if they were satisfied with the performance
of the Johor state government in managing the state, Malay and Indian
respondents were more likely to be positive with 31.0 per cent and 37.2
per cent, respectively, indicating satisfaction (Figure 1.1A). However,
it must be noted that more Malays (49.9 per cent) and Indians (43.4 per
cent) answered ‘neutral’. This suggests that they had no opinion or did
not want to venture an opinion. The Chinese respondents, on the other
hand, were more unambiguous with 49.1 per cent stating that they were
‘very dissatisfied’ or ‘somewhat dissatisfied’ with the state government’s
performance to date.
Interestingly, when cross-tabulated by household income, levels
of dissatisfaction rose in tandem with income (Figure 1.1B). 19.2 per
8
cent of respondents with monthly household incomes of RM1,500 and
below were either ‘very dissatisfied’ or ‘somewhat dissatisfied’ with
the state government. This figure rose to 37.4 per cent with respondents
with household incomes of RM5,000 and above. This finding is largely
in keeping with broader national trends. For example, BN also saw an
erosion of support from urban voters who were more likely to be from
higher income groups.29
Religious Harmony and Interests: Ethnic Divide
Malay and Indian respondents were overwhelmingly positive about
the state government’s handling of religious harmony and interests
(Figure 1.6A). 83.9 per cent and 82.7 per cent of Malay and Indian
respondents, respectively, were either ‘very satisfied’ or ‘somewhat
satisfied’. However, 36.8 per cent of Chinese respondents were either
‘very dissatisfied’ or ‘somewhat dissatisfied’.
Performance of Federal Government and
Leadership
Ethnicity and incomes were correlated with satisfaction with the federal
government. Over a variety of issues from the handling of public
safety and crime prevention, the creation of employment opportunities,
to efforts in fighting corruption, Chinese respondents and higher
income households were more likely to be dissatisfied with the federal
government’s response. These findings are in keeping with the thrust of
the 2013 General Election results where the BN saw a loss of Chinese
and urban votes.30
MSN. 6 May 2013. “GE13: Triumphant BN seen losing popular vote”. By
Clara Chooi. http://news.malaysia.msn.com/elections/ge13-triumphant-bn-seenlosing-popular-vote (accessed 19 April 2014).
29
30
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-05-07/najib-s-win-may-mask-biggesttest-after-malaysian-chinese-exodus.html (accessed 2 April 2014).
9
Public Safety and Crime Prevention
When asked about public safety and crime prevention there was a sharp
disparity in response according to ethnicity (Figure 2.1A). Malay and
Indian respondents were most likely to be either ‘very satisfied’ or
‘somewhat satisfied’ with the federal government’s handling of public
safety and crime prevention at 66.7 per cent and 63.4 per cent, respectively.
Meanwhile, Chinese respondents were most likely to be either ‘very
dissatisfied’ or ‘somewhat dissatisfied’ with an overwhelming 82.2 per
cent expressing this sentiment.
When cross-tabulated according to household income, it became
clear that higher household income groups were less satisfied (Figure
2.1B). 29.1 per cent of households earning RM1,500 and below were
either ‘very dissatisfied’ or ‘somewhat dissatisfied’. This figure grew
to 65.0 per cent for households earning more than RM5,000. In other
words, the higher the income group, the less satisfied the respondent is
with the federal government’s handling of crime and safety.
Government Job Creation
With regard to job creation, Malay and Indian respondents were more
likely to be satisfied with the federal government’s efforts in creating
employment opportunities at 63.7 per cent and 63.1 per cent, respectively
(Figures 2.2A). Conversely, the majority of Chinese respondents, at 52.7
per cent, were ‘very dissatisfied’ or ‘somewhat dissatisfied’ with the
federal government’s efforts to create employment opportunities. It was
also found that the higher the household income, the more likely the
respondent would be dissatisfied with the federal government’s efforts to
create employment opportunities (Figure 2.2B).
Fighting Corruption
Levels of dissatisfaction with the federal government’s efforts in fighting
corruption were generally high. Chinese respondents were most likely
to be ‘very dissatisfied’ or ‘somewhat dissatisfied’ with the federal
government’s fight against corruption with 88.8 per cent indicating
dissatisfaction (Figure 2.3A). They were followed by Malay respondents
10
at 50.3 per cent, and Indian respondents at 40.0 per cent. Again there was
a correlation between higher income households and dissatisfaction with
the government’s efforts (Figure 2.3B).
Economic Situation and Outlook
As in the previous section, there was interethnic dissonance in optimism
over economic outlook. Indian and Malay respondents were more
optimistic over the state’s political, economic and social conditions.
Chinese respondents, the higher educated, and those from higher income
households were more likely to be pessimistic. This trend is broadly
repeated with questions concerning the state of the national economy.
Has the Malaysian Economy Improved or Declined in the Last
Five Years?
When asked if the Malaysian economy had improved or declined in the
last five years, most respondents feel that the Malaysian economy has
improved in the last five years, except for Chinese and higher income
groups. In keeping with patterns above, Malay and Indian respondents
seem to be more positive with their replies. Malay and Indian respondents
reported seeing improvement in the national economy in the last five
years (65.6 per cent and 61.7 per cent, respectively), with Chinese
respondents the least likely to perceive an improvement with only 16.0
per cent saying so (Figure 3.2A). Meanwhile, 33.7 per cent of households
earning RM1,500 and below saw a decline in the national economy, with
the figure rising to 47.6 per cent for households earning RM5,000 and
above (Figure 3.2B).
Will the Malaysian Economy Improve or Decline in the Next Five
Years?
When asked if the Malaysian economy will improve or decline in the
next five years, most Malay and Indian respondents believe that the
national economy would improve in the next five years, with 71.7 per
cent and 66.8 per cent, respectively, expressing this optimism (Figure
11
3.3A). Indian and Malay respondents were, again, most positive with
71.7 per cent and 66.8 per cent, respectively, believing that the national
economy would improve. Chinese respondents were the least likely to
believe so, at 20.3 per cent. Higher household income respondents were
also least likely to believe there would be improvements in the near
future (Figure 3.3B).
Personal Household Economic Situation
Moving from state and national economy, the survey turned to the
respondent’s own household situation (Figure 3.4A). While Malay and
Indian respondents were more likely to have seen improvements in their
own household economic situation (56.5 per cent and 47.4 per cent,
respectively), relatively large numbers reported to have seen a decline
(34.8 per cent for Indian respondents and 31.1 per cent for Malay
respondents).
Meanwhile, 40.8 per cent of Chinese respondents saw a decline in
their household’s finances from a year ago. This may explain why they
are least likely to anticipate improvement a year from now.
For a change, the higher the household income, the more likely the
respondent was to see improvements (Figure 3.4B). 47.9 per cent of
respondents from households earning RM1,500 and less reported to have
seen improvements to their household financial situation, compared to
53.5 per cent of those from households with RM5,000 and above.
Sources of Information and News
More research should be conducted on consumption of information
and news in Johor. While newspapers appear to remain the top source
of information and news, it is important to understand if accessibility
equates to influence. The use of the internet among the younger,
better educated and higher income households also needs to be further
investigated. Does the internet serve as a complement to newspapers or
an alternative news source? Does the internet suggest a more politically
critical readership or merely indicative of greater entertainment and
leisure consumption?
12
Newspapers Top News Source
Respondents were asked to name their top sources of information and
news from a list which included ‘newspapers’, ‘TV’, ‘internet’, ‘radio’,
and ‘others’. 65.2 per cent of respondents across the board reported that
they received their information and news from newspapers, followed by
TV (19.9 per cent) and, in third place, the internet (11.9 per cent) (Figure
4.1A).
When broken down according to ethnicity, it was found that the
top three sources of information and news for Malay respondents
were newspapers (59.1 per cent), followed by TV (26.1 per cent), and
the internet (11.8 per cent). For Chinese respondents there was some
variation with newspapers first (79.1 per cent), followed by the internet
(11.9 per cent), and then TV (6.4 per cent). For Indian respondents, it was
newspapers (59.8 per cent), followed by TV (23.5 per cent), and finally
the internet (13.6 per cent) (Figure 4.1B).
Internet: Younger and Higher Income Respondents
Unsurprisingly, the internet was more frequently used by respondents
in younger age groups (Figure 4.1C). Those between 18 and 30 years of
age were most likely to use the internet (22.2 per cent), followed by those
between 31 and 50 years of age (12.3 per cent). Respondents 51 years
old and above were least likely to go online. Likewise, higher educated
respondents were more likely to go online (21.3 per cent) and less likely
to rely on TV for news (15.8 per cent), while less educated respondents
were more likely to use TV for news (22 per cent) and less likely to rely
on the internet (7.2 per cent) (Figure 4.1D).
13
B. ISKANDAR MALAYSIA AND ITS
IMPORTANCE
Familiarity with Iskandar Malaysia
Interethnic dissonance is also evident where familiarity with Iskandar
Malaysia is concerned. Whereas the majority of Malay and Indian
respondents claimed familiarity with the project, Chinese respondents
were more likely to say they were unfamiliar than familiar. Although
the majority of all respondents said they were satisfied with the
developments in Iskandar Malaysia, the Chinese were the least likely
to say so. However, they were not more likely to be dissatisfied than
Malay respondents, with a notable proportion expressing neutrality on
the issue.
Weakening of Transethnic Solidarities?
Respondents were asked about their familiarity with developments in
Iskandar Malaysia. Malay and Indian respondents were most likely to say
they were ‘somewhat familiar’ or ‘very familiar’ with the developments
in the economic zone at 66.8 per cent and 65.6 per cent, respectively
(Figure 5.1A). Conversely, Chinese respondents were most likely to say
they were unfamiliar, with 57.9 per cent indicating being ‘somewhat
unfamiliar’ or ‘very unfamiliar’. The contrast between the Malay and
Indian respondents’ response to that of the Chinese respondents is striking.
While it is prudent not to over-interpret the data, the interethnic
dissonance found throughout this survey supports scholarly observations
that ‘race’ and ‘ethnicity’ have been key factors in the way national
politics and state-sponsored mega-projects are perceived in Malaysia. As
such, because official history and development are tied to the interest of
the Malay-based ruling UMNO, while non-Malay political participation
may only take place via an alliance (Barisan Nasional) with UMNO,
historical ‘transethnic solidarities’ have been eliminated or weakened
over time.31 Such forms of ‘unfamiliarity’ with state projects may be
31
Mandal, Sumit K. 2004. Transethnic solidarities, racialisation and social
equality. The State of Malaysia: Ethnicity, Equity and Reform, ed. Terence
Gomez. London: Routledge
14
the long term result of these weakened inter-ethnic ties, and perhaps of
alienation of the Chinese community from state matters.
Perceived Beneficiaries of Iskandar Malaysia
In general, the majority of respondents believed that Iskandar Malaysia
benefited them, albeit less so compared to other perceived beneficiaries
such as corporations and property developers. This observation was most
pronounced among Chinese respondents, who were least likely to see
benefits for themselves.
Respondents were also more likely to agree that Singaporean investors
benefited from Iskandar Malaysia, compared to non-Singaporean foreign
companies. This is consistent with the observation in the subsequent
section that respondents across the board believed Singapore to be the
largest investor in Iskandar Malaysia.
Malaysian Corporations and Property Developers Biggest
Beneficiaries
When asked about the beneficiaries of Iskandar Malaysia (Figure 6.1A),
respondents believed that ‘big Malaysian corporations’ and ‘property
developers’ benefited most. 82.3 per cent ‘strongly agreed’ or ‘somewhat
agreed’ that ‘big Malaysian corporations’ benefited from the project
while 82.1 per cent ‘strongly agreed’ or ‘somewhat agreed’ that ‘property
developers’ were a beneficiary.
The perception of corporations and property developers as beneficiaries
may stem from the prominence and visibility of residential and commercial
developments associated with Iskandar Malaysia. 79.1 per cent agreed
that the economic zone benefited government servants and 74.3 per cent
perceived politicians to be benefiting from the project as well.
Ordinary Citizens Benefit but Fear Little Employment
Trickledown to Local Residents
The majority also agreed that ordinary citizens would gain from Iskandar
Malaysia, although at 65.2 per cent, this was only larger than the
proportion of respondents who agreed that ‘non-Johorean Malaysians’
(52.9 per cent) and ‘foreign property buyers’ (61.4 per cent) benefited
15
from Iskandar Malaysia. Meanwhile, 69.4 per cent of respondents agreed
that Singaporean investors benefited from the economic zone.
In other words, these findings support existing reports which opine
that many Johor residents fear that the fruits of Iskandar Malaysia will
flow out of the state, with very little economic or employment trickledown
to local residents.
Majority Believe Government Servants and Politicians are
Beneficiaries
The vast majority of respondents across ethnic groups viewed government
servants as beneficiaries of Iskandar Malaysia, with 83.5 per cent of
Indian respondents, 80.9 per cent of Chinese respondents, and 77.9 per
cent of Malay respondents agreeing (Figure 6.1H).
The majority of respondents across ethnic groups also viewed
politicians as a group benefiting from Iskandar. Indian respondents were
most likely to believe so with 80.2 per cent agreeing, followed closely by
Chinese respondents of whom 79.7 per cent agreed. Malay respondents
were the least likely to agree (71.1 per cent) and also the most likely to
disagree (23.4 per cent) (Figure 6.1J).
Majority Believe Singaporean Investors are Beneficiaries
The majority of all ethnic groups believed that Singaporean investors
benefited from Iskandar Malaysia, with Chinese respondents being most
likely to agree with this (86.2 per cent), followed by Indian respondents
(76.4 per cent) (Figure 6.1O). Malay respondents were the least likely to
agree that investors from Singapore benefited from Iskandar Malaysia
(60.5 per cent), and were also most likely to disagree with this (35.1 per
cent).
Chinese Residents: More Relaxed Entry Requirements for
Singaporeans into Iskandar Malaysia
Respondents were asked if Malaysia should relax entry requirements for
Singaporeans into Iskandar Malaysia (Figure 6.3A). This question was
posed in response to the IRDA’s announcement that “the Governments
16
of Malaysia and Singapore are currently working on a simplified
immigration procedure”.32
Malay respondents were most likely to disagree at 65.7 per cent,
while Chinese respondents were most likely to agree at 74.8 per cent.
The sharp contrast in the response of Malay and Chinese respondents
bears explanation. As will be explained below, Malay respondents are
more likely to be unfamiliar with Singapore, more likely to see the
city-state as arrogant, as well as an economic threat and competitor
than Chinese or Indian respondents. In light of these findings, it is little
surprise that Malay respondents are the least enthusiastic about relaxing
entry requirements for Singaporeans into Iskandar Malaysia.
Investment in Iskandar Malaysia
Singapore featured prominently in the minds of Johor respondents
as the top investor in Iskandar Malaysia, with the majority across all
groups believing the republic to be the largest investor. Ethnicity was
correlated with receptiveness of Singaporean investors in Iskandar
Malaysia. Although the majority of respondents appeared favourable
towards the influx of investors from Singapore, Malays reported being
the least satisfied and were the most likely to express dissatisfaction. This
suggests some ambivalence towards the issue, and may reflect a desire
for investment to boost the local economy on the one hand, and concerns
relating to competition and impact of foreign investment on cost of living
on the other.
Singapore Believed to be Largest Investor
Respondents were asked which country they thought was the largest
investor in Iskandar Malaysia (Figure 7.1A). The majority of respondents
(54.8 per cent) ranked Singapore as the largest investor in Iskandar
Malaysia, and this was true for all groups when cross-tabulated by
ethnicity, age, education, income and region.
32
http://www.iskandarmalaysia.com.my/faqs (accessed 15 April 2014).
17
Interestingly, while official figures say that China is only the tenth
biggest investor in Iskandar Malaysia with RM1.5 billion, it is perceived
by respondents as the second largest investor. One possible explanation
for this (mis)perception is that China is actually the top real estate
investor in the whole of Malaysia, pouring in US$1.9 billion in 2013,
superseding the US$1.8 billion and US$867 million from Singapore and
Hong Kong, respectively.33
China’s foray into Iskandar Malaysia has also received publicity in the
Malaysian media.34 Chinese developers have reportedly been organising
subsidised tours to Malaysia for potential buyers from Guangzhou,
Hong Kong, and Macau.35 It has also been reported that an increasing
number of Chinese nationals are seeking a second home in Malaysia,
with Chinese nationals constituting the largest number of participants in
Malaysia’s foreign residency scheme.36
Majority Satisfied with Influx of Singaporean Investors
A large majority of Chinese and Indian respondents — 66.9 per cent and
68.4 per cent respectively — reported being ‘very satisfied’ or ‘somewhat
satisfied’ with the influx of Singaporean investors into Iskandar Malaysia
(Figure 7.2A). Malay respondents were the least receptive (47.9 per
cent), and concomitantly most likely to be dissatisfied with the influx of
Singaporean investors into Iskandar Malaysia (44.4 per cent).
Reuters. 11 March 2014. “Chinese developers bet on Malaysia as investors
turn cold on Hong Kong, Singapore”. By Clare Jim. http://www.reuters.com/
article/2014/03/11/us-china-property-malaysia-idUSBREA2A1UX20140311?_
ga=1.141260018.175109580.1397646617 (accessed 17 April 2014).
33
Business Times. 10 March 2014. “Chinese investors filling Arab void in
Iskandar”.
http://www.nst.com.my/business/nation/chinese-investors-fillingarab-void-in-iskandar-1.504866 (accessed 17 April 2014).
34
Reuters. 11 March 2014. “Chinese developers bet on Malaysia as investors turn
cold on Hong Kong, Singapore”.
35
Quartz. 15 April 2014. “Why Chinese families will keep moving to Malaysia
despite their anger over MH370”. By Lily Kuo and Wang Yuan. http://
qz.com/196492/why-chinese-families-will-keep-moving-to-malaysia-despitetheir-anger-over-mh370/ (accessed 17 April 2014).
36
18
C. SINGAPORE AND SINGAPOREANS
Visiting and Working in Singapore
Chinese and Indian respondents are more likely to have a favourable
opinion of Singapore and are more open to visiting and working in the
city-state. Nevertheless, it would be premature to assume that the desire to
work in Singapore equates with fondness for the city-state. Other sources
have suggested that the majority of Malaysians working in Singapore
do so because of favourable economic conditions, and have no desire to
settle permanently in the city-state.37 Furthermore, it would be wrong to
suppose that ethnic affinity with Singaporeans alone is the cause of their
favourable responses as later findings suggest that there are differences
in self-perception.
Singapore ‘Second Most Favourable’ Country Overall
Singapore was rated overall second most ‘favourable’ country behind
Japan and just before China and Australia (Figure 8.1A). The top six
countries for Johor residents are outside ASEAN, with the exception
of Singapore where close proximity and historical ties have enhanced
familiarity and favourableness. The high overall rank for Japan and China
may be because of the perceived roles they have played in investment in
Johor.38 Australia remains a popular destination for work and play for
many Malaysians.
Conversely, the overall ‘least favourable’ countries are all from
ASEAN, namely the Philippines, Myanmar, and Thailand. This suggests
that ASEAN’s rhetoric of regional unity and identity remains firmly
insulated within small elite circles, enjoying little, if any, currency with
ordinary people.
37
Yahoo Finance. 2 January 2014. “Chinese Press: Malaysians prefer to work
in Singapore rather than migrate”. https://sg.finance.yahoo.com/news/chinesepress-malaysians-prefer-singapore-091004258.html (accessed 12 April 2014).
38
The order of countries may differ if the survey was conducted again. China may
not be ranked so highly in the aftermath of the disappearance of flight MH370.
19
Favourable Countries According to Ethnicity
However, when cross-tabulated by ethnicity, different countries
emerged at the top (Figure 8.1B). For Malay respondents, the top three
most favourable countries were Japan; the Gulf countries; and China.
The affinity for Gulf countries may be due to religious ties between
Malays and the Middle East, as well as the increasing number of Malay
professionals seeking employment there. For Chinese respondents, the
top three countries were Singapore; Australia; and Japan. Finally, for
Indian respondents the top three countries were Japan; Singapore; and
Australia.39
Singapore may have been ranked most favourable among Chinese
and Indian respondents because of a variety of factors such as the
consumption of Singaporean Chinese-language and Tamil-language
television programmes, employment opportunities and constant visits to
the city-state.
How Many Times Have You Visited Singapore in the Last Five
Years?
Chinese respondents were most likely to have visited Singapore more
than 10 times in the last five years at 50.3 per cent; followed by Indian
respondents at 33.6 per cent; and lastly Malay respondents at only 8.5
per cent (Figure 8.2A). Conversely, Malay respondents were most likely
not to have visited Singapore in the last five years at 65.2 per cent. This
shows a strong correlation between ethnicity and frequency of visits to
Singapore.
The high frequency of visits by Chinese respondents is in keeping
with broader tourism trends. Malaysian tourists form the third largest
group of visitors to Singapore, after those from Indonesia and China.
There were slightly over 1 million and 1.2 million Malaysian tourists in
Singapore in 2011 and 2012, respectively.40
There was no significant difference when cross-tabulated by income, age or
education.
39
40
Annual Report on Tourism Statistics 2012. https://www.stbtrc.com.sg/images/
links/X1AnnualReportTourismStatistics_2012.pdf (accessed 28 March 2014).
20
Do You Have an Immediate Family Member Working in
Singapore?
Chinese respondents were most likely to have an immediate family
member working in Singapore at 63.8 per cent; followed by Indian
respondents at 57.7 per cent; and finally Malay respondents at 37.8
per cent (Figure 8.3A).41 This finding is in keeping with the fact that
Malaysia is a traditional source of immigrant labour for Singapore,
with Malaysians facing fewer work permit restrictions than other ‘nontraditional source countries’.42
Have You Ever Considered Finding Employment in Singapore?
The majority of respondents purportedly never considered finding
employment in Singapore (Figure 8.4A). Nevertheless, there is a
correlation between ethnicity and response, with a significant percentage
of respondents having considered a move to the city-state. The ethnic
group most likely to have considered doing so is Chinese respondents
at 45.0 per cent; followed by Indian respondents at 42.3 per cent; and
finally Malay respondents at 24.7 per cent.43
Again this is in keeping with Malaysia as a traditional source country
for immigrant labour in Singapore, as well as anecdotal evidence that
Malaysia workers in Singapore are largely of Chinese descent.
Have You Ever Tried to Find Employment or Business
Opportunities in Singapore?
Likewise the majority of respondents have never tried to find employment
or business opportunities in Singapore (Figure 8.5A). However, as
above, there is a significant percentage of respondents who have tried to
There was no significant difference when cross-tabulated by income, age or
education.
41
42
http://elibrary.worldbank.org/doi/pdf/10.1596/1813-9450-2053
27 March 2014).
(accessed
There was no significant difference when cross-tabulated by income, age or
education.
43
21
do so. The ethnic group most likely to have tried doing so is the Chinese
respondents at 45.2 per cent; followed by Indian respondents at 37.2 per
cent; and finally Malay respondents at 16.1 per cent.44
Impressions of Singapore and Singaporeans
Singapore was most associated with positive traits such as ‘anticorruption and transparency’ across all ethnic groups.
However, when Johor Malays, Chinese and Indian respondents were
asked if they were similar to their ethnic counterparts in Singapore, the
answers were largely negative. The perceived lack of similarity between
ethnic groups across the Causeway suggests that despite geographical
proximity, nationality and national development have resulted in
divergent self-perceptions and an exclusive sense of identity on the part
of Johor respondents. Despite the cultural and linguistic similarities
shared by ethnic groups, as well as cultural consumption of Singaporean
TV drama serials and news, the national and economic divide seems to
hold sway between perceptions of the self and of Singaporeans.
Standing out is the finding that Malay respondents in Johor are more
likely to perceive their fellow Chinese and Indian citizens as being
similar to their ethnic counterparts in Singapore. This suggests a trust
and/or familiarity deficit between Malay respondents and their nonMalay respondents. This is in keeping with broader observations of the
lack of trust between Malaysian Malays and non-Malays.45
Which Traits or Characteristics Do You Most Associate with
Singapore?
The top three characteristics most associated with Singapore were ‘anticorruption and transparency’ (15.3 per cent of respondents); ‘arrogance’
There was no significant difference when cross-tabulated by income, age or
education.
44
45
http://asia.nikkei.com/Politics-Economy/Policy-Politics/Malaysias-ethnictensions-rise-as-its-economy-declines (accessed 28 March 2014).
22
(11.3 per cent); and ‘efficiency’ (11.1 per cent) (Figure 9.1A).46
Interestingly, when cross-tabulated according to ethnicity, different traits
emerged at the top.
For Malay respondents, the top three traits most associated with
Singapore were ‘arrogance’ (15.8 per cent of all Malay respondents);
‘anti-corruption and transparency’ (14.4 per cent), followed by ‘business
and employment opportunities’ (11.5 per cent).
For Chinese respondents, the top three traits were ‘efficiency’ (16.9
per cent of all Chinese respondents), ‘anti-corruption and transparency’
(16.5 per cent), followed by ‘low crime rates’ (14.8 per cent).
For Indian respondents, ‘anti-corruption and transparency’ and
‘business and employment opportunities’ were most associated with
Singapore (18.2 per cent of all Indian respondents); followed by ‘low
crime rates’, ‘legalism’, and ‘good public transport’ (11.8 per cent). More
qualitative research may be needed to understand the relationship, if any,
between ethnicity, domestic politics and perceptions of Singapore.
Interestingly, Singapore is ranked low for leisure and entertainment
(4.7 per cent). However, this is in contradiction to the fact that Malaysian
tourists form the third largest group of visitors to Singapore, after
Indonesia and China.47 There are two possible explanations for this. First,
Malaysians begrudgingly choose to come to Singapore only because it
is cheaper to travel to than to other far-off exotic destinations. Secondly,
there is cognitive dissonance where the popular perception of Singapore
as strait-laced, sterile and boring is in contradiction to the action and
behaviour patterns of Malaysian tourists.
Are Malay, Chinese and Indian Malaysians Similar to Malay,
Chinese, and Indian Singaporeans?
Respondents were asked if they saw any similarities between themselves
and Singaporeans of the same ethnic group. All three ethnic groups did not
There was no significant difference when cross-tabulated by income, age or
education.
46
47
Annual Report on Tourism Statistics 2012.
23
see similarities between themselves and their counterparts in Singapore
(Figures 9.2A; 9.3A; 9.4A). This suggests that self-perception across the
three ethnic groups was consistently differentiated from counterparts in
Singapore.
However, when asked about perceptions of other ethnic groups, an
interesting finding was revealed. While the majority of Chinese and
Indian respondents did not believe that Malaysians and Singaporeans of
the same ethnic group were similar (Figures 9.2A; 9.3A; 9.4A), Malay
respondents showed a different pattern.
Half of Malay respondents (49.4 per cent) believed that Chinese
Malaysians and Chinese Singaporeans were similar to each other (Figure
9.3A). When asked about Indian Malaysians and Indian Singaporeans,
almost 60 per cent of Malay respondents believed they were similar to
each other (Figure 9.4A). This is typical of interethnic dissonance and
hints at a lack of trust or familiarity on the part of Malay respondents
with regard to their fellow Chinese and Indian citizens.
Furthermore, the survey found that the main reason for perceptions
of dissimilarities stemmed from impressions arising from the different
socio-economic developments of the two countries. For example when
asked what the differences were:
1. 75 per cent of Malay respondents saw Malay Singaporeans as
different because of “different attitudes towards life”, the latter being
“more matured” and “leading more modern lives”.
2. 69 per cent of Chinese respondents saw Chinese Singaporeans as
different because of “different attitudes”, the latter’s “modern living”,
“better education system” in Singapore; and Singapore’s “strong
economy”.
3. 66 per cent of Indian respondents saw Indian Singaporeans as
different because the latter are “better educated”; have “different
attitudes/more matured”; and enjoy “modern facilities”.
Perceptions of Singaporean Impact on Cost of
Living and Development in Johor
Given Singapore’s status as a global city it is not surprising that the
majority of respondents feel that the city-state has had a large impact
24
on the local economy. 80 per cent of all respondents feel that Singapore
has had a large economic impact on Johor. Naturally, the majority of
respondents felt that Singaporeans who travelled to Johor have had an
impact on the cost of living there with 74 per cent of all respondents
believing so. This figure fell slightly, to 71 per cent, among respondents
who lived in the Iskandar region.
Such findings are not uncommon in the cross-border regions
literature. Singapore’s economic impact on Johor may be characterised
as the “metropolitan spill-over” effect.48 Here, the metropolis’s good
infrastructure, high skills, strong industry sectors, not to mention tourists,
spill over into the adjacent hinterland, thus raising the cost of living in the
border region of the hinterland.
As part of the Singapore-Johor-Riau Islands (SIJORI) growth
triangle, the relationship between Singapore and Johor may be typical of
a core-periphery one. This core-periphery relationship has been argued
elsewhere to be one where Johor becomes dependent on Singapore, with
consequences such as the uneven concentration of foreign investment and
uneven distribution of national resources from the federal government.49
How Much Impact Do Singapore and Singaporeans Have on the
Cost of Living in Johor
The majority of respondents across ethnic groups believed that
Singaporeans had either a ‘fair amount’ or ‘great deal’ of impact on
the cost of living in Johor (Figure 10.1A). The views among Malay
respondents were the most unequivocal as can be seen from the sharp
contrast between the first two and latter two bars. This suggests that
Malay Johor respondents are more unambiguous than any other ethnic
group in their belief that Singaporeans have an impact on the cost of
living. For the Chinese Johor respondents, the bars have a steadier
48
Chia, Siow Yue and Lee Tsao Yuan. 1993. Subregional Economic Zones: A
New. Motive Force in Asia-Pacific Development. In Pacific Dynamism and
the International Economic System, ed. C. Fred Bergsten and Marcus Noland.
Institute for International Economics: Washington DC.
49
Yeung, Yue-man. 2000. Globalisation and Networked Societies: UrbanRegional Change in Pacific Asia. Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press.
25
incline. This suggests that their views are more graduated and mixed,
although the majority agree with their Malay counterparts.50
How Much Impact Does Singapore Have on Economic
Development in Johor?
When asked about the impact Singapore has on economic development
in Johor the views across the three ethnic groups are unequivocal (Figure
10.2A). The vast majority of Johor respondents believe strongly that
Singapore has a fair or large impact on the Johor economy.51
Who Benefits More from Economic Investments in Johor —
Malaysians or Singaporeans?
Respondents were asked, when it came to economic investment in Johor,
if ‘Singaporeans benefited more than Malaysians’; ‘Both benefited
equally’; or if ‘Malaysians benefitted more than Singaporeans’ (Figure
10.3A).
Chinese Johor respondents are more likely to believe that
‘Singaporeans benefit more than Malaysians’ (51. 1 per cent), followed
by Malay respondents (42.3 per cent); and finally Indian respondents
(36.7 per cent). One possible explanation for the high negativity of
Chinese respondents could be that they believe that Malaysian Chinese
vis-à-vis Malaysian Malays, in general, are less likely to benefit from any
economic investment in the country.
And while the perceptions of mutual benefit vary across the ethnic
groups, all three ethnic groups are equally unlikely to believe that
‘Malaysians benefit more than Singaporeans’.
There was no significant difference when cross-tabulated by income, age or
education.
50
There was no significant difference when cross-tabulated by income, age or
education.
51
26
Interestingly, when cross-tabulated by monthly household income,
a different pattern emerges (Figure 10.3B). The higher the respondent’s
monthly household income, the more likely the respondent believes
that ‘Singaporeans benefit more than Malaysians’. Similarly, the higher
the monthly household income, the less likely the respondent believes
that ‘both benefit equally’ and that ‘Malaysians benefit more than
Singaporeans’. Further qualitative research may be needed to understand
this pattern.
Perceptions of Bilateral Relations
As above, on this issue, there are signs of correlation between responses
and ethnicity. Chinese respondents were more likely to hold positive
attitudes towards the economic relationship between Johor and
Singapore. However, the survey did not reveal any significant hostility
among Malay respondents.
Nevertheless, the positive attitudes come with a few caveats. These
caveats include concerns over the inflationary impact of Singaporean in
the local economy and Singaporean access to the local housing market.
There is also clear indication that when it came to purchasing property
over RM500,000, the current water agreement, and relaxed entry
into Iskandar, Malay respondents were more likely to give a negative
response.
Singaporean Interests Promoted over Malaysian’s
In terms of business and politics, respondents were asked if they thought
Singapore and Singaporeans prefer a situation where (a) both countries
prosper and benefit together; (b) Singaporean interests are promoted
over Malaysian interests; (c) Malaysian interests are promoted over
Singaporean interests (Figure 11.1A).
The majority of respondents across all ethnic groups believed that
Singaporeans preferred a situation where Singaporean business and
political interests were promoted over Malaysian interests. 64.8 per cent
of Chinese respondents believed so, followed by 57.7 per cent of Malay
respondents, and finally 55.8 per cent of Indian respondents.
27
Desired Strengthening of Bilateral Relations
Respondents were asked if political and diplomatic relations between
Singapore and Malaysia should be (a) reduced or weakened; (b) kept
the same; (c) further strengthened (Figure 11.2A). The majority of
respondents opted for a further strengthening with Chinese respondents
at 79.1 per cent, followed by Indian respondents at 57.9 per cent, and
finally, Malay respondents at 57.4 per cent.52
Singapore is an Economic Threat to Malaysia
When asked if they believed that Singapore was an economic threat to
Malaysia (Figure 11.3A), Malay respondents were most likely to believe
so (52.5 per cent), followed by Indian respondents (44.3 per cent), and
finally, Chinese respondents (42.1 per cent).53
This pattern is consistent with the rest of the survey which
demonstrates correlation between Malay respondents and less positive
perceptions and familiarity with Singapore. A possible explanation for
this is the history of racial politics between the two countries, especially
during the 1963-65 merger, which gave rise to ethnic-based suspicions
between Malaysia and Singapore.
Singapore is a Competitor to Malaysia
Respondents were asked if they believed Singapore was a competitor to
Malaysia (Figure 11.4A). The majority agreed, with Indian respondents
most likely to do so (77.3 per cent), followed by Malay respondents (76.1
per cent), and finally Chinese respondents (54.4 per cent).54
There was no significant difference when cross-tabulated by income, age or
education.
52
There was no significant difference when cross-tabulated by income, age or
education.
53
There was no significant difference when cross-tabulated by income, age or
education.
54
28
Singapore Tourists and Visitors Welcomed
The overwhelming majority of respondents said that Singaporean tourists
and visitors are welcomed to Johor (Figure 11.5A). Indian respondents
were most likely to say this (95.6 per cent), followed by Chinese
respondents (93.7 per cent); and finally, Malay respondents (80.3 per
cent).
Nevertheless, a relatively high percentage of Malay respondents —
at 16.5 per cent — disagreed that Singaporeans were welcomed. This
is consistent with the metropolitan spill-over” effect where there is
acknowledgement of the benefits and advantages that capital and visitors
from the metropolitan bring, despite the obvious drawbacks.
Not Acceptable for Singaporeans to Purchase Property over
RM500,000
When asked if it was acceptable for Singaporeans to purchase properties
worth more than RM500,000 in Johor, there was a split between Malay
and Chinese respondents in opinions (Figure 11.6A). Malay respondents
were by far the most likely to disagree (83.3 per cent), followed by Indian
respondents (58.9 per cent); and finally, Chinese respondents (28.3 per
cent).55
Conversely Chinese respondents were most in favour of
Singaporeans purchasing properties over RM500,000 at 64.2 per cent.
The overwhelmingly negative Malay response to the question is not
surprising in light of the bumiputera (sons of the soil) status of Malays
in Malaysia and their perceived connection to the land. This suggests an
underlying protectionist sentiment linked to issues of sovereignty among
the Malay community and should be further researched.
There was no significant difference when cross-tabulated by income, age or
education.
55
29
Singaporeans Inflate Price of Consumer Goods and Services
When asked if visitors from Singapore inflated the price of consumer
goods and services in Johor the vast majority across ethnic groups agreed
(Figure 11.7A). Malay respondents were most likely to agree at 78.6
per cent, followed by Chinese respondents at 77.2 per cent, and finally,
Indian respondents at 74.2 per cent. Again, this is consistent with the
metropolitan ‘spill-over’ effect.
Singaporeans Making Private Property Unaffordable for Locals
The vast majority of respondents across ethnic groups agreed that
Singaporean buyers were making private property unaffordable for locals
(Figure 11.8A). 85.9 per cent of Malay respondents agreed, followed by
81.2 per cent of Indian respondents, and finally, 80.4 per cent of Chinese
respondents.
Johor Government Should Limit Sale of Property and Land to
Singaporeans
When asked if it was necessary for the Johor government to limit the
sale of property and land to Singaporeans, the vast majority across
ethnic groups agreed (Figure 11.9A). As with the patterns above, Malay
respondents were most likely to agree at 90.2 per cent, followed by
Indian respondents at 84.6 per cent, and finally Chinese respondents at
76.1 per cent.
The Chinese response here is inconsistent with that in Figure 4.6A
where 64.2 per cent of Chinese agreed that Singaporeans should be
allowed to buy property worth above RM500,000. Why did 64.2 per cent
agree to allow Singaporeans to buy property worth more than RM500,000
when 76.1 per cent agree that the government should limit the sale of
land and property to Singaporeans? There are two possible explanations
for this. Firstly, Chinese respondents may agree, on the principle of
market supply and demand, that Singaporeans should be allowed to
buy Malaysian property but, in reality, feel that the government should
control such sales. In other words they display a dilemma between
market rationale and national sentiments. Secondly, perhaps Chinese
30
respondents feel that property worth above RM500,000 is generally out
of their reach and thus feel that they have less of a stake in expensive
real estate. Malay respondents were, however, more consistent in their
negative response.
High Speed Rail Should Be Built
The majority of respondents were in agreement that a high speed rail
between Singapore and Kuala Lumpur should be built (Figure 11.10A).
Chinese respondents were most in favour of it at 90.5 per cent, followed
by Indian respondents at 87.0 per cent, and finally, Malay respondents at
69.4 per cent.
Conversely, over a quarter of Malay respondents were most likely to
disagree with the high speed rail at 27.6 per cent.
Current Water Agreement Unfair to Malaysia
When asked if the current Johor-Singapore water agreement was fair
to Malaysia (Figure 11.11A), Malay respondents were mostly likely
to disagree at 75.7 per cent, followed by Chinese respondents at 52.6
per cent, and finally, Indian respondents at 41.7 per cent. This is one
of the few instances when Chinese respondents unveiled some negative
sentiments towards Singapore.
Like land, water is a natural resource which arouses notions of
sovereignty and birth right. Johor respondents may perceive the water
agreement to be unfair because, under the federal constitution, natural
resources such as land and water still come under the purview of the state
government. This suggests a view that the federal government needs to
consult the state government over the price mechanism when supplying
water to Singapore.56
56
Abdullah, Kamarulnizan. 2009. Johor in Malaysia-Singapore Relations. Across
the Causeway: A Multi-dimensional Study of Malaysia-Singapore Relations, ed.
Takashi Shirashi. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies.
31
A SMRT Line Should Be Built Between Singapore and Johor
Respondents were asked if they supported the building of a SMRT
(Singapore Mass Rapid Transit) service between Johor and Singapore
(Figure 11.12A). Not surprisingly the overwhelming majority of
respondents were supportive. Indian and Chinese respondents were most
likely to be supportive at 94.7 per cent and 93.8 per cent, respectively.
Nevertheless, over a quarter of Malay respondents, at 26.8 per cent, were
not supportive.
32
FIGURES
Performance of State Government and
Leadership
Question 1.1: How satisfied/dissatisfied are you with the performance
of the Johor state government in managing Johor today?
Figure 1.1A: Performance of Johor state government according to
ethnicity (percentage)
Figure 1.1B: Performance of Johor state government according to income
(percentage)
33
Question 1.2: How satisfied/dissatisfied are you with the Johor state
government’s handling of various issues?
Figure 1.2A: Satisfaction with Johor state government according to
various issues (percentage)
Figure 1.2B: Johor state government’s handling of water supply and
management according to ethnicity (percentage)
34
Question 1.3: How satisfied/dissatisfied are you with the Johor state
government’s handling of the acquisition of land for development?
Figure 1.3A: Johor state government’s handling of the acquisition of land
for development according to ethnicity (percentage)
Figure 1.3B: Johor state government’s handling of the acquisition of land
for development according to education (percentage)
35
Figure 1.3C: Johor state government’s handling of acquisition of land for
development according to region (percentage)
Question 1.4: How satisfied/dissatisfied are you with the Johor state
government’s handling of municipal issues?
Figure 1.4A: Johor state government’s handling of municipal issues
according to ethnicity (percentage)
36
Question 1.5: How satisfied/dissatisfied are you with the Johor state
government’s handling of housing development?
Figure 1.5A: Johor state government’s handling of housing development
according to ethnicity (percentage)
Question 1.6: How satisfied/dissatisfied are you with the Johor state
government’s management of religious harmony and interests?
Figure 1.6A: Johor state government’s management of religious harmony
and interests according to ethnicity (percentage)
37
Performance of Federal Government and
Leadership
Question 2.1: How satisfied/dissatisfied are you with the Federal
Government’s management of public safety and crime prevention?
Figure 2.1A: Federal Government’s management of public safety and
crime prevention according to ethnicity (percentage)
Figure 2.1B: Federal Government’s management of public safety and
crime prevention according to household income (percentage)
38
Question 2.2: How satisfied/dissatisfied are you with the Federal
Government’s efforts in creating employment opportunities?
Figure 2.2A: Federal Government’s efforts in creating employment
opportunities according to ethnicity (percentage)
Figure 2.2B: Federal Government’s efforts in creating employment
opportunities according to household income (percentage)
39
Question 2.3: How satisfied/dissatisfied are you with the Federal
Government’s efforts in fighting corruption?
Figure 2.3A: Federal Government’s efforts in fighting corruption
according to ethnicity (percentage)
Figure 2.3B: Federal Government’s efforts in fighting corruption
according to household income (percentage)
40
Question 2.4: How satisfied/dissatisfied are you with the Federal
Government’s management of housing development and prices in
Johor?
Figure 2.4A: Federal Government’s management of housing development
and prices in Johor according to ethnicity (percentage)
Figure 2.4B: Federal Government’s management of housing development
and prices in Johor according to age group (percentage)
41
Economic Situation and Outlook
Question 3.1: How optimistic are you with general political, economic
and social conditions in Johor today?
Figure 3.1A: Optimism over political, economic and social conditions in
Johor according to ethnicity (percentage)
Figure 3.1B: Optimism over political, economic and social conditions in
Johor according to education (percentage)
42
Figure 3.1C: Optimism over political, economic and social conditions in
Johor according to household income (percentage)
Question 3.2: Do you think the Malaysian economy has declined/
improved in the LAST five years?
Figure 3.2A: Malaysian economy in the last five years according to
ethnicity (percentage)
43
Figure 3.2B: Malaysian economy in the last five years according to
household income (percentage)
Question 3.3: Do you think the Malaysian economy will decline/
improve in the NEXT five years?
Figure 3.3A: Malaysian economy in the next five years according to
ethnicity (percentage)
44
Figure 3.3B: Malaysian economy in the next five years according to
household income (percentage)
Question 3.4: Has the financial situation of your household improved/
declined compared to what it was ONE year ago?
Figure 3.4A: Financial situation of household compared to ONE year ago
according to ethnicity (percentage)
45
Figure 3.4B: Financial situation of household compared to ONE year ago
according to household income (percentage)
Question 3.5: Will the financial situation of your household improve/
decline ONE year from now?
Figure 3.5A: Financial situation of household ONE year from now
according to ethnicity (percentage)
46
Figure 3.5B: Financial situation of household ONE year from now
according to household income (percentage)
Sources of Information and News
Question 4.1: What are the main sources of your information and
news?
Figure 4.1A: Main sources of information and news (percentage)
47
Figure 4.1B: Main sources of information and news according to ethnicity
(percentage)
Figure 4.1C: Main sources of information and news according to age
group (percentage)
48
Figure 4.1D: Main sources of information and news according to
education (percentage)
Figure 4.1E: Main sources of information and news according to
household income (percentage)
49
Familiarity with Iskandar Malaysia
Question 5.1: How familiar are you with the developments in
Iskandar Malaysia?
Figure 5.1A: Familiarity with developments in Iskandar Malaysia
according to ethnicity (percentage)
Figure 5.1B: Familiarity with developments in Iskandar Malaysia
according to region (percentage)
50
Question 5.2: How satisfied are you with the developments taking
place in the Iskandar region?
Figure 5.2A: Satisfaction with developments in Iskandar according
ethnicity (percentage)
Figure 5.2B: Satisfaction with developments in Iskandar according
region (percentage)
51
Beneficiaries of Iskandar Malaysia
Question 6.1: Do you agree that the following groups benefit from
Iskandar Malaysia?
Figure 6.1A: Perceived beneficiaries of the Iskandar Malaysia
(percentage)
Figure 6.1B: Ordinary citizens as beneficiary of Iskandar Malaysia
according to ethnicity (percentage)
52
Figure 6.1D: Non-Johor Malaysians as beneficiary of Iskandar according
to ethnicity (percentage)
Figure 6.1F: Perception of big Malaysian corporations as beneficiary of
Iskandar according to ethnicity (percentage)
53
Figure 6.1H: Perception of government servants as beneficiary of
Iskandar according to ethnicity (percentage)
Figure 6.1J: Perception of politicians as beneficiary of Iskandar according
to ethnicity (percentage)
54
Figure 6.1L: Perception of property developers as beneficiary of Iskandar
Malaysia according to ethnicity (percentage)
Figure 6.1M: Perception of property developers as beneficiary of
Iskandar Malaysia according to ethnicity (percentage)
55
Figure 6.1N: Perception of foreign property buyers as beneficiary of
Iskandar Malaysia according to ethnicity (percentage)
Figure 6.1O: Perception of Singaporean investors as beneficiary of
Iskandar Malaysia according to ethnicity (percentage)
56
Figure 6.1Q: Perception of foreign companies as beneficiary of Iskandar
Malaysia according to ethnicity (percentage)
Question 6.2: Do you agree that ordinary Malaysians like yourself
benefit economically from Iskandar Malaysia?
Figure 6.2A: Perception of ordinary Malaysians benefiting economically
from Iskandar Malaysia by ethnicity (percentage)
57
Question 6.3: Malaysia should relax entry requirements for
Singaporeans into Iskandar Malaysia
Figure 6.3A: Malaysia should relax entry requirements for Singaporeans
into Iskandar Malaysia according to ethnicity (percentage)
Investment in Iskandar Malaysia
Question 7.1: Which country do you think is the largest investor in
Iskandar Malaysia?
Figure 7.1A: Perception of largest investor in Iskandar Malaysia
(percentage)
58
Figure 7.1B: Perception of largest investor in Iskandar Malaysia by
ethnicity (percentage)
Question 7.2: How satisfied or dissatisfied are you with the influx of
Singapore investors into Iskandar Malaysia?
Figure 7.2A: Satisfaction with influx of Singaporean investors into
Iskandar Malaysia by ethnicity (percentage)
59
Visiting and Working in Singapore
Question 8.1: Which countries are the most and least favourable to
you?
Figure 8.1A: Overall country ratings (mean score)
Figure 8.1B: Selected country ratings according to ethnicity (mean score)
60
Question 8.2: How many times have you visited Singapore in the last
five (5) years?
Figure 8.2A: Frequency of visits to Singapore in last 5 years according
to ethnicity (percentage)
Question 8.3: Do you currently have an immediate family member
who is working in Singapore?
Figure 8.3A: Immediate family member working in Singapore according
to ethnic group (percentage)
61
Question 8.4: Have you ever CONSIDERED finding employment in
Singapore?
Figure 8.4A: Considered finding employment in Singapore according to
ethnicity (percentage)
Question 8.5: Have you ever TRIED to find employment or business
opportunities in Singapore?
Figure 8.5A: Tried to find employment or business opportunities in
Singapore according to ethnicity (percentage)
62
Impressions of Singapore and Singaporeans
Question 9.1: Which traits or characteristics do you most associate
with Singapore?
Figure 9.1A: Characteristics most associated with Singapore (percentage)
Question 9.2: In your view, are Malay Malaysians SIMILAR to
Malay Singaporeans?
Figure 9.2A: Similarity of Malay Malaysians to Malay Singaporeans
according to ethnicity (percentage)
63
Question 9.3: In your view, are Chinese Malaysians SIMILAR to
Chinese Singaporeans?
Figure 9.3A: Similarity of Chinese Malaysians to Chinese Singaporeans
according to ethnicity (percentage)
Question 9.4: In your view, are Indian Malaysians SIMILAR to
Indian Singaporeans?
Figure 9.4A: Similarity of Indian Malaysians to Indian Singaporeans
according to ethnicity (percentage)
64
Perceptions of Singaporean Impact on Cost of
Living and Development
Question 10.1: How much impact does Singapore and Singaporeans
have on the cost of living in Johor
Figure: 10.1A: Impact of Singapore and Singaporeans on cost of living
in Johor according to ethnicity (percentage)
Question 10.2: How much impact does Singapore have on economic
development in Johor?
Figure 10.2A: Impact of Singapore on economic development in Johor
according to ethnicity (percentage)
65
Question 10.3: In recent years there has been increased Singaporean
economic investment in Johor. Which of the following statements is
closest to your view?
Figure 10.3A: Attitudes towards Singaporean economic investment
according to ethnicity (percentage)
Figure 10.3B: Statements on Singaporean economic investment
according to monthly household income (percentage)
66
Perceptions of Bilateral Relations
Question 11.1: In terms of business and politics, do you think
Singapore and Singaporeans prefer a situation where (a) both
countries prosper and benefit together; (b) Singaporean interests
promoted over Malaysian interests; (c) Malaysian interests promoted
over Singaporean interests.
Figure 11.1A: Perceptions of Singapore’s and Singaporeans’ preference
in business and politics according to ethnicity (percentage)
Question 11.2: Do you think political and diplomatic relations
between Singapore and Malaysia should be (a) reduced or weakened;
(b) kept the same; or (c) further strengthened?
Figure 11.2A: Perceptions over political and diplomatic relations between
Singapore and Malaysia according to ethnicity (percentage)
67
Question 11.3: Is Singapore an economic threat to Malaysia?
Figure 11.3A: Singapore an economic threat to Malaysia according to
ethnicity (percentage)
Question 11.4: Do you agree that Singapore is a competitor of
Malaysia
Figure 11.4A: Singapore is a competitor to Malaysia according to
ethnicity (percentage)
68
Question 11.5: I welcome the influx of Singaporean tourists and
visitors into Johor
Figure 11.5A: Influx of Singaporean tourists and visitors into Johor
according to ethnicity (percentage)
Question 11.6: It is acceptable for Singaporeans to be permitted to
purchase properties worth more than RM500,000 in Johor
Figure 11.6A: Singaporeans to be permitted to purchase properties worth
more than RM500,000 in Johor according to ethnicity (percentage)
69
Question 11.7: Visitors from Singapore inflate the price of consumer
goods and services in Johor
Figure 11.7A: Visitors from Singapore inflate the price of consumer
goods and services in Johor according to ethnicity (percentage)
Question 11.8: Singaporean investors are making private property
unaffordable for locals
Figure 11.8A: Singapore investors are making private property
unaffordable for locals according to ethnicity (percentage)
70
Question 11.9: The Johor government should limit the sale of
property and land to Singaporeans
Figure 11.9A: The Johor government should limit the sale of property
and land to Singaporeans according to ethnicity (percentage)
Question 11.10: A high speed rail between Singapore and Kuala
Lumpur should be built
Figure 11.10A: high speed rail between Singapore and Kuala Lumpur
should be built according to ethnicity (percentage)
71
Question 11.11: The current Johor-Singapore water agreement is
fair to Malaysia
Figure 11.11A: The current Johor-Singapore water agreement according
to ethnicity (percentage)
Question 11.12: Johor and Singapore should be linked by an MRT
service
Figure 11.12A: Johor-Singapore MRT service according to ethnicity
(percentage)
72
TRS8/14
ISBN 978-981-4620-18-5
9
789814 620185