The Monstrous Multitude: Edmund Burke's Political Teratology

Contemporary Political Theory, 2004, 3, (70–88) r 2004 Palgrave Macmillan Ltd 1470-8914/04 $25.00 www.palgrave-journals.com/cpt Feature Article: Political Theory Revisited The Monstrous Multitude: Edmund Burke’s Political Teratology Mark Neocleous Department of Politics, Brunel University, Uxbridge UB8 3PH, UK. E-mail: mark.neocleous@brunel.ac.uk This article explores the political meanings of a relatively unexplored dimension of Edmund Burke’s thought: the monster. After first showing the extent to which the figure of the monster appears throughout Burke’s work, the article speculates on some of the political reasons for Burke’s use of the metaphor of the monstrous. These reasons are rooted in the categories of the aesthetic developed in the Philosophical Enquiry into the Origin of our Ideas of the Sublime and Beautiful, and also in his political fear of a new collective entity only beginning to emerge on the historical stage: the proletariat. The article therefore has three aims: first, to contribute to the developing body of literature on Burke’s aesthetic ideology; second, to deepen our knowledge of the Gothic tropes in Burke’s writings; and third, to broaden our conception of the way conservative ideology conceptualizes order and the threats to that order. Contemporary Political Theory (2004) 3, 70–88. doi:10.1057/palgrave.cpt.9300110 Keywords: Burke; aesthetic ideology; political teratology; mob; monster; monstrosity Introduction The writings of Edmund Burke are taken by many to represent one of the first and clearest statements of conservative politics. Whether in their attack on revolutionary action and reason or in their defence of a certain conception of private property and traditional authority, his writings are widely considered to be unsurpassed in the history of conservatism. As a confirmed part of the ‘canon’ of political thinkers, Burke’s work has also been pored over for its explicit and implicit claims concerning revolution, rights, gender, sexuality, language, theatrical politics and a whole host of other issues. In this article, I aim to unpick a relatively unexplored dimension to Burke’s thought: the monster. The possible significance of the monster in Burke’s work was first hinted at by one of Burke’s contemporaries, Richard Payne Knight. Noting the connection drawn by Burke between terror and the sublime, he suggested the works of those who follow Burke ‘teem with all sorts of terrific and horrific Mark Neocleous The Monstrous Multitude 71 monsters and hobgoblins’ (Payne Knight, 1808, 384). It was an astute comment for, as I shall show, it is not just the work of Burke’s followers that teem with monsters, but Burke’s works as well. In a letter to his son from 1789 Burke comments on ‘the portentous State of France F where the Elements that compose Human Society seem all to be dissolved, and a world of Monsters to be produced in the place of it’ (Burke, 1967, 30). This seemingly throwaway comment, in fact, picks up on a theme that resonates throughout Burke’s Reflections on the Revolution in France (1790). Burke refers to the new ‘monster of a constitution’ composed from ‘a monstrous medley of all conditions, tongues, and nations’. There is also a new ‘spirit of money-jobbing and speculation’ that creates a ‘volatilized’ form of property and ‘assumes an unnatural and monstrous activity’. Similarly, the emerging ‘military democracy’ or ‘municipal army’ is described as ‘a species of political monster’. All in all then, the new society is a ‘monstrous tragi-comic scene’, a ‘monstrous fiction’ in which ‘publick measures are deformed into monsters’ (1968, 92, 124, 160, 308, 313, 333, 350). On a superficial level such claims may appear fairly innocuous. After all, it is generally accepted that much of Burke’s attack on the French revolutionaries plays on issues concerning the imagination. He comments, for example, on the importance of the ‘moral imagination’ that covers ‘the defects of our naked shivering nature’, and the way ‘acts of rapacious despotism present themselves to [our] imagination’ (Burke, 1968, 171, 218).1 As early in his intellectual career as May 1747, he opposed a particular motion at a debating club by commenting that ‘were it to pass [it] would take away our Spirit by reducing our speeches to dry logical reasoning’ (cited in O’Brien, 1992, 33).2 And as a host of respondents and commentators thereafter have noted, the attempt to avoid dry logical reasoning permeates virtually all his writings and speeches. This attempt to avoid dry logical reasoning means that Burke’s work is a rich source of metaphors and rhetorical flourishes. ‘Chock full of feverish metaphors and gorgeous wording [the Reflections] is a deeply literary text, no more amenable to logic chopping than an epic poem or a first-rate novel’ (Herzog, 1998, 13). Maybe, then, his references to the monstrous are nothing other than one of the many rhetorical flourishes, stylistic turns and metaphorical innovations for which Burke is rightly known F one of what Thomas Paine (1969, 81) describes as the ‘poetical liberties’ in the ‘dramatic performance’ of the Reflections.3 So if, as Burke (1999a, 123, emphasis added) suggests in his Letters on a Regicide Peace, ‘a Government of the nature of that set up at our very door has never been seen, or even imagined’, then it may perhaps make perfect sense to allow his description of this hitherto unimaginable thing as ‘monstrous’ and leave it at that. But if, on the other hand, the metaphors writers use offer clues to some of the more substantive arguments in their work (see Neocleous, Contemporary Political Theory 2004 3 Mark Neocleous The Monstrous Multitude 72 2003a), then it might just be worth following through the trope of the monster in Burke’s arguments. On this basis, this article has three inter-related aims. First, I aim to show that the figure of the monster in Burke’s arguments provides a further link between his work on the Revolution and his much earlier essay on the sublime and the beautiful; in this way I aim to contribute to the developing body of literature on Burke’s aesthetic ideology. Second, the argument here is meant to deepen our knowledge of the Gothic tropes in Burke’s writings. And third, the argument will hopefully broaden our conception of the way conservative ideology conceptualizes order and the threats to that order. An Astonishing and Sublime Revolution? Early in his Reflections, Burke (1968, 92) describes the French revolution as ‘the most astonishing thing that has hitherto happened in the world’. His recognition of such astonishment picks up on comments he had made earlier in 1789 regarding the revolution. In a letter of 9 August 1789, for example, he had noted ‘our astonishment at the wonderful Spectacle which is exhibited in a Neighbouring and rival Countryy England gazing with astonishment at a French struggle for Liberty’ (1967, 10). In a letter of November 1789 to Charles-Jean-François Depont, generally taken to be a first and sketchy outline of what would become the Reflections, he is found commenting on ‘the astonishing scene now displayed in France’ (1967, 41). And he repeats the point in his later Letters on a Regicide Peace of 1795–7: the revolution ‘has astonished, terrified, and almost overpowered Europe’, and one can only be doubly astonished by the fact that there are those who do not feel resentment at the ‘monstrous compound’ before them (1999a, 138, 314). Burke’s account of the monstrosity that is emerging in France is thus clearly connected to the astonishment at the spectacle. To make sense of this, we need to backtrack slightly into Burke’s Philosophical Enquiry into the Origin of our Ideas of the Sublime and Beautiful (1757), where he first utilizes the notion of astonishment. ‘The passion caused by the great and sublime in nature, when those causes operate most powerfully, is Astonishment; and astonishment is that state of the soul, in which all its motions are suspended, with some degree of horrory Hence arises the great power of the sublime, that far from being produced by them, it anticipates our reasonings, and hurries us on by an irresistible force’ (Burke, 1987, 57). Astonishment is the highest degree of the ‘delightful horror’ which is the foundation of the sublime (1987, 136). It is clear from this that Burke’s notion of astonishment is intimately connected to the question of fear, horror and terror. The sublime is ‘that state of the soul, in which all its motions are Contemporary Political Theory 2004 3 Mark Neocleous The Monstrous Multitude 73 suspended, with some degree of horror’ while ‘delightful horror’ is ‘the most genuine effect, and truest test of the sublime’. The sublime is on the side of novelty in the sense that it generates feelings of dread, and in particular the greatest dread F the fear of death. Elsewhere, the ‘delightful horror’ of the sublime is described as ‘a sort of tranquility tinged with terror’ (1987, 57, 73, 136).4 Burke makes a point of spelling out the idea that ‘terror is in all casesythe ruling principle of the sublime’ by pointing to the affinity between these ideas in a number of languages: Terror is in all cases whatsoever, either more openly or latently the ruling principle of the sublime. Several languages bear a strong testimony to the affinity of these ideas. They frequently use the same word, to signify indifferently the modes of astonishment or admiration and those of terror. Y
′ mboB is in greek, either fear or wonder; deinóB is terrible or respectable; aı´d′o, to reverence or to fear. Vereor in latin, is what aı´d′o is in greek. The Romans used the verb stupeo, a term which strongly marks the state of an astonished mind, to express the effect either of simple fear, or of astonishment; the word attonitus, (thunderstruck) is equally expressive of the alliance of these ideas; and do not the french etonnement, and the english astonishment and amazement, point out as clearly the kindred emotions which attend fear and wonder? (1987, 58). Part of the difference between the sublime and the beautiful is thus that despite having a variety of causes, such as vastness, silence, obscurity, solitude and power, the sublime has the capacity to astonish us, a capacity rooted in its connection with horror and fear. In contrast, beauty is a quality fundamentally different to the sublime. Where sublime objects and actions impress with their power, loftiness and nobility, instilling astonishment, reverence and respect, beautiful objects ‘induce in us a sense of affection and tenderness’, or love; where sublime objects are solid, massive and rugged, beautiful objects are small, light, delicate and polished; where sublime virtues are strong and great, beautiful virtues are soft and subordinate. Thus, the great virtues such as fortitude, justice and wisdom tend to be ‘political and military’, while the subordinate virtues, such as compassion and kindness, are ‘domestic’ (1987, 51, 91). This plays on Burke’s attempt (criticized by Kant as empiricism and physiologism) to distinguish the sublime from the beautiful in terms of the way in which the characteristics of a thing or activity give rise to feelings of pleasure or pain by impinging on the mind by way of the senses. ‘Whatever is fitted in any sort to excite the ideas of pain, and danger, that is to say, whatever is in any sort terrible, or is conversant about terrible objects, or operates in a manner analogous to terror, is a source of the sublime’ (1987, 39; also 131). The idea of Contemporary Political Theory 2004 3 Mark Neocleous The Monstrous Multitude 74 pain is thus the strongest and delightful emotion that the mind is capable of feeling, and the grounds of the sublime. Now, although this argument is at one level pitched as a general account of fear and pain, at another level it is distinctively political, as Neal Wood (1964) and others have shown. ‘I know of nothing sublime which is not some modification of power. And this branch rises as naturally as the other two branches, from terror, the common stock of every thing that is sublime’ (Burke, 1987, 64). However, if it is distinctively political, if the sublime is always some modification of power connected in some way to terror or horror, then an important question emerges: can the horror or terror of a revolution be sublime? Tom Furniss has pointed out that although in the Enquiry the sublime is deeply implicated in politics, it is not reducible to any single political position. Rather, the political project of the Enquiry is said to reside in its contribution to a debate that acted as a means of authenticating the political and economic project of the rising middle class (Furniss, 1993, 17–40). When it comes to the form of political power, it also seems to be the case that the sublime is not reducible to any single political position. On the one hand, it is potentially a source of tyranny in the guise of ‘despotic governments that are founded on the passions of men, and principally upon the passion of fear’. Yet on the other, Burke makes far more general claims about the sublime nature of power: ‘the power which arises from institution in kings and commanders, has the same connection with terror’. Thus ‘sovereigns are frequently addressed with the title of dread majesty’ (1987, 59, 67). From this it is clear that, as Furniss (1993, 119–120) points out, the sublime cannot be unproblematically resorted to as a way of distinguishing legitimate or illegitimate forms of power. Moreover, there are moments, such as when Burke (1987, 61–62) quotes from Milton’s analysis of Satan (‘here is a very noble picturey’) when the Enquiry could be read as celebrating a revolutionary sublime. Similarly, the language of terror and horror Burke uses in discussing the sublime reappears throughout his account of the Revolution, in which we are constantly confronted by terrors and horrors: the new government ‘fills us with horror’, we ‘turn away with horror’ our minds ‘are purified by terror’, and so on (1968, 117, 159, 161, 171, 174, 175, 205, 216, 226, 231, 240, 301). Since terror is either openly or latently the ruling principle of the sublime, it does not seem unreasonable to presume that the revolutionary terror unleashed in France could be thought of as sublime. His description of central ancien regime figures such as Marie Antoinette as beautiful and his accusation (1968, 171) that the Revolutionaries have stripped away all the sentiments, pleasing illusions and decent drapery that serve to ‘beautify and soften private society’, might also suggest that the revolution might in some way be sublime. Contemporary Political Theory 2004 3 Mark Neocleous The Monstrous Multitude 75 Thus, it might be argued that Burke comes to figure the French Revolution as potentially producing ‘the effect of the sublime in the highest degree’ (Furniss, 1993, 3, 116), or that ‘for Burke revolutionary terror is itself a kind of sublimity’ (Eagleton, 1995, 50). In other words, ‘one solution to the confrontation with this unthinkable phenomenon, the French Revolution, was (for Burke) to fit it into the framework of aesthetic categoriesy Burke’s imagery of revolution in fact came fromythe terrible of the sublime’ (Paulson, 1980, 250). Since Burke’s work is saturated with images of fear (Corlett, 1993, 124), and since the monster appears to incarnate fear as such, it would seem that it is here that the monster needs to be situated: the revolutionary horror is both monstrous and sublime. This would also tally with Burke’s suggestion in the Enquiry that ghosts, goblins and harpies affect minds with fear and terror (1987, 59, 64, 144). Yet the general consensus among commentators is that for obvious ideological reasons, Burke has to hold back from interpreting the Revolution as an instance of the sublime. The astonishment, which in the Enquiry is celebrated as the source of the sublime, has in the Reflections become an astonishment at another sort of horror, one that is no longer sublime. Burke therefore aims to refute implicitly any claim that the Revolution might be either sublime or beautiful by attempting to show instead that it is merely barbaric terror, especially compared to the way the ancien regime and the British constitution are thought to be endowed with ‘sublime principles’. The British constitution, for example, ‘is tempered with an awful gravity’, while the state should be consecrated and treated with ‘pious awe and trembling solicitude’ (1968, 121, 189, 194). Similarly, it is ‘settled and recognized authority’ that is expected to be treated with ‘awe and reverence’ (121, 194, 277, 372).5 At the same time, his references in the Reflections to horror are no longer associated with the sublime but with disgust (117, 161, 174, 249), abominations (249), shame (159, 205), scorn (231), and to institutions such as the Bastille under Louis XVI (237); the Revolutionaries are attacked for seeing the nobility as ‘objects of horror’ (240). Terror is likewise associated not with the sublime but with barbarism, evil and the bayonet (160, 171, 216, 301). In general, commentators have therefore concluded that in the Reflections, Burke seems concerned that the sublime is moving in an unanticipated direction, from those awesome and revered forms of traditional power to the revolutionary movement. He therefore has to rethink the sublime such that it would appear that the terror and horror of the Revolution constitute a kind of false sublime. Burke now appears to be saying that the true sublime in government is a mixture of fear and awe or admiration, whereas the false sublime is a perversion of this and generates only a barbaric and grotesque energy (Ferguson, 1985, 136; Paulson, 1983, 66, 71; Furniss, 1993, p. 119; also see Ferguson, 1981, 62–78). It is here, I believe, that we can begin to identify and explain the roots of Burke’s use of the metaphor of monstrosity. Contemporary Political Theory 2004 3 Mark Neocleous The Monstrous Multitude 76 While the monstrous society may initially appear to possess the kind of terror or horror that Burke associates with the sublime in his Enquiry, it fails to satisfy an important criterion in Burke’s account of the sublime. In the Enquiry, Burke asks himself an obvious question: how can terror or horror be delightful? ‘If the sublime is built on terror, or some passion like it, which has pain for its object; it is previously proper to enquire how any species of delight can be derived from a cause so apparently contrary to it’. On this score, he highlights what to him is a fundamental dimension of the relationship between terror and the sublime: ‘when danger or pain press too nearly, they are incapable of giving any delight, and are simply terrible; but at certain distances, and with certain modifications, they may be, and they are delightful’. Thus while on the one hand Burke connects the sublime with the terror and fear of death, on the other he insists that only in the safety enjoyed when the danger and pain do not ‘press too nearly’ is the sublime truly experienced. It is ‘the removal of pain or danger’ that becomes crucial to distinguishing the sublime from the ‘simply terrible’ (1987, 37, 40, 134, emphases added). Sublime delight occurs only when one enjoys the terror or fear from a position of safety. Terror can produce delight only when it does not press too nearly; the false sublime would thus equate with pure unmediated terror. In the case of Revolutionary France, the terror clearly ‘pressed too nearly’ and lacked a ‘certain distance’. The Reflections, it must be recalled, were intended as a response to those Englishmen who might see Revolutionary France as a ‘model held up to ourselves’ (1968, 185) F to those who might move, that is, from being spectators to being active participants in a Revolutionary politics. In this case, the necessary distancing required for the sublime to be operative disappears, and the terror can no longer be enjoyed from a position of safety. On these initial grounds, we can say that Burke invokes the monster as a way of disengaging the sublime from the horror and terror emerging in France. The kind of order emerging was less a form of delightful dread and more a form of barbarous horror, breaking with the necessary distancing and pressing far too nearly. The terror emerging across the Channel was thus less sublime than monstrous. If this argument has any substance, then we should expect to find in Burke’s texts an increased use of the monster as a means of ideologically interpellating the French Revolution throughout the 1790s F as ‘the Terror’ becomes clearer. And this is indeed what we find. In his writings of 1791, for example, we find comments on ‘the monster of a commonwealth’ and ‘the monsteryhaving torn the womb it came from’ (1992, 43, 230). This becomes a key theme in his Letters on a Regicide Peace, which repeat some of the comments of the Reflections concerning, for example, France as a ‘monstrous Tragicomedy’, but also contain references to the ‘monstrous shapes’ of ‘this monster Contemporary Political Theory 2004 3 Mark Neocleous The Monstrous Multitude 77 of a State’, Regicide France as ‘the mother of monsters, more prolifick than the country of old called ferax monstrorum’, and the Revolutionaries themselves as monsters desecrating and degrading the State (1999a, 72, 104, 128, 345, 355). In the French regicide Republic, Burke argues, we have, formed, a new, unlooked-for, monstrous, heterogeneous alliance; a double-natured Monster; Republic above and Monarchy below. There is no Centaur of fiction, no poetic Satyr of the Woods; nothing short of the Hieroglyphick Monsters of Aegypt. Dog in Head and Man in Body, that can give an idea of it. None of these things can subsist in nature; so at least it is thought. But the moral world admits Monsters, which the physical rejects (1999a, 367–368). Likewise, ‘the grim Moloch of Regicide’ brought about by the ‘revolution harpies’ and ‘nefarious monsters’ of France’ is nothing less than a ‘monstrous compound’ culminating in monstrous acts of cannibalism (Burke, 1992, 291; 1999a, 130, 138, 166, 216, 385; 1999b, 91). In ‘A Letter to a Noble Lord’ from 1796 (1992, 291) he quotes Milton’s comment on the generation of ‘monstrous, prodigious things’ out of ‘chaotick anarchy’, and then cites several lines from Virgil: Tristius haud illis monstrum, nec saevior ulla. Pestis, & ira Deûm Stygiis sese extulit undis. Virginei volucrum vultus; faedissima ventris Proluvies; uncaeque manus; & pallida semper Ora fame [Monsters more fierce offended Heav’n ne’er sent From hell’s abyss, for human punishment: With virgin faces, but with wombs obscene Foul paunches, and with ordure unclean; With claws for hands, and looks forever lean] Burke comments: Here the Poet breaks the line, because he (and that He is Virgil) had not verse or language to describe that monster even as he had conceived her. Had he lived to our time, he would have been more overpowered with the reality than he was with the imagination. Virgil only knew the horror of the times before him. Had he lived to see the Revolutionists and Constitutionalists of France, he would have had more horrid and disgusting features of his harpies to describe, and more frequent failures in the attempt to describe them.6 Stricken by such fear, Burke castigates both the French population and English admirers of the Revolution for being ‘not in the least disgusted or discouraged by the monstrous evils’ carried out by ‘this monster of a Directory’, and Contemporary Political Theory 2004 3 Mark Neocleous The Monstrous Multitude 78 dismisses those who place our hopes ‘in the moderation and virtue of the most atrocious monsters that have ever disgraced and plagued mankind’. He even on occasion describes particular individuals of this ‘union of characters, monstrous as it seems’, as individual monsters (1992, 312; 1999a, 207, 253, 254). It is clear then that the monster features heavily in Burke’s writings on France, that it plays an increasing role in Burke’s arguments as the French Revolution progresses, and that part of the reason for Burke’s use of the metaphor of the monster lies in his work on the sublime and the need to protect the sublime from being associated with the Revolution. Burke’s aesthetic ideology, in other words, pushes him to configure the Revolution as monstrous. However, an obvious question to ask at this point is: why? And: is there a more political reason beyond the ‘false sublime’ that pushes Burke into engaging the monster metaphor? Any answers to these questions must of necessity be speculative. In what follows, I suggest that one source of Burke’s use of the idea of monstrosity is a generalized fear of what we would now call mass action, and that implicit in this fear was a sense of a new collective force emerging on the historical landscape: the proletariat. It is precisely this fear of both the mass (‘mob’) in general and the working class in particular that come to play a key role in conservative ideology thereafter. Mobs and Monsters Cultural historians have shown that Burke’s theory of the sublime helped launch the Gothic novel, which itself became part of the tradition of the sublime. Gothic novelists and scholars of the Gothic novel consult Burke’s Philosophical Enquiry as if it were a storehouse of approved terrors; it has even been suggested that Burke’s portrayal of the French revolutionaries is startling in its Gothic conventionality (Paulson, 1980, 253; Morris, 1985, 299–319; De Bruyn, 1987, 415–438). It is worth unpicking that ‘Gothic conventionality’ a little in order to make a more political point. If, as the Marquis de Sade (1996, 109) once commented, Gothic literature was ‘the inevitable result of the revolutionary shocks which all of Europe has suffered’, then perhaps there is some political insight to be had from exploring the monster. As De Bruyn (1987, 417) puts it: In an age when unprecedented historical events were rapidly overtaking the strangest of gothic fancies, to say nothing of previous historical and political orthodoxy, journalists and political commentators such as Edmund Burke increasingly recognized in the gothic mode a means of apprehending or conceptualizing the bewildering sequence of public events unfolding before Contemporary Political Theory 2004 3 Mark Neocleous The Monstrous Multitude 79 their eyes. The gothic served for them as a metaphor or narrative thread to enable the writing of new kinds of political and journalistic discourse. The reason why the Gothic could perform this function lies in the fact that, as José Monleón has shown, ‘one of the main features of Gothic literature is precisely its defense of order and its negation of arbitrary rule’. Consequently, one of the sources of the anxiety and foreboding in Gothic fiction is a deepseated fear of radical social upheaval. The long intellectual history of reflection on the monster, traceable at least to Democritus and Aristotle, centres very much on physical ‘defects’, relative ages of reproduction, the extent to which individual humans and animals resemble their parents, and so on F ‘natural’ monstrosities in other words (for example, Aristotle, 1912, 767b–770b). This interest intensifies during the early modern period, for example in Francis Bacon’s call for a study to categorize ‘deviant instances, that is errors of nature, freaks and monsters’, and culminates in the 18th century focus on (or perhaps obsession with) identifying and delineating the boundaries of the human. An offshoot of the attempt at classifying the different ‘races’ of mankind and to consider which of them were suitable for the status of citizen was an attempt to differentiate the human from the nonhuman F or monstrous. Hence, Linnaeus’ final double-column scheme separating homo sapiens from homo monstruosus. In one sense, then, the monster eventually became the ‘object’ through which the citizen-subject of the Enlightenment acquired its positive dynamic (Žižek, 2001, 134). However, analyses of the monster also tend to suggest that, culturally speaking, monsters are defined by their categorical ambiguity and troubling mobility. The difficulty in categorizing the monster in the ‘order of things’ makes it a harbinger of category crisis. The monster disrupts the usual rules of interaction, occupying an essentially fluid site where despite its otherness it cannot be entirely separated from nature and man. As simultaneously inside and outside the monster disrupts the politics of identity and the security of borders (see, for example, Braidotti, 1996; Cohen, 1996; Haraway, 1997, 214– 215; Shildrick, 2002). To put it another way: the monster is in essence a threat to order. ‘The existence of monsters throws doubt on life’s ability to teach us order’, George Canguilhem (1962, 27) tells us. However, ‘order’ is a deeply ideological concept. Riding on the back of an implied connection between natural and political order, little intellectual effort was required for the interest in ‘natural’ monstrosity to be transformed into an interest in socio-political monstrosity. That is, it took little for natural and political science to overlap around the figure of the monster, generating what I am suggesting we think of as a political teratology (Neocleous, 2004). Since, for Burke, ‘good order is the foundation of all good things’ (1968, 372), it should not surprise us that he presents threats to order in terms of their monstrosity. Contemporary Political Theory 2004 3 Mark Neocleous The Monstrous Multitude 80 This connects with the organic tropes in Burke’s writings. As is well known, Burke’s conservative politics plays heavily on the ideas of an organic order and the ‘body politic’, which together generate a range of rhetorical devices in his work F heads, bodies and limbs; plagues, purges and panaceas; cancers, contagions and quarantines (Neocleous, 2003b). The qualification ‘monster’ also plays heavily on these rhetorical devices because, as Canguilhem (1962, 36) argues, the qualification must by definition be reserved for organic beings F the definition of monster must include its nature as a living being (there is no such thing as a mineral monster or mechanical monster). Burke’s use of the metaphor therefore performs a useful ideological function in terms of his organic analogy, reaffirming the illusion of organic order; the unease produced by the monster is a form of dis-ease. Revolutionary France is monstrous because it is ‘out of nature’ F nothing less than ‘a contrivance of nature’ (1968, 92, 228). Just as a creature which is ‘Dog in Head and Man in Body’ cannot subsist in nature, so any such political ‘double-natured Monster’, such as one which is ‘Republic above and Monarchy below’ also should not be allowed to exist in the moral universe. ‘But’, Burke (1999a, 367–368) laments, ‘the moral world admits Monsters, which the physical rejects’. And as Chris Baldick (1987, 18) has pointed out, it is symptomatic of Burke’s argument concerning the monstrous compound that France was becoming that he stresses the interest in scientific experiment among the radicals of the time. For Burke, the monstrosity was a result partly of the excessive and obsessive interest in experiment, computing, sorcery and chemistry on the part of the revolutionaries (1968, 124, 152, 194; 1992, 314–318). If teratology was born of the meeting between comparative anatomy and embryology (Canguilhem, 1962, 36), then it might be said that political teratology has a remarkable presence in the organic and biological tropes used in political thinking. The general point is that just as the natural order is supposedly threatened by the various monsters it sometimes spawns, so the moral order appears to be threatened by the various political monsters it spawns. Of course, for Burke the moral order he is defending is (in some sense) a natural order, and on these grounds the monster metaphor makes perfect sense. His monster is thus called upon to legitimize an intuitive vision of life in which natural order appears to be threatened by artificial monstrosities. Now, contemporary popular culture and political discourse teem with ‘monsters’, all of which are understood in terms of their supposed threats to order (the paedophile or juvenile killer are perfect examples, but many more could be given). However, to finish the argument here I will suggest that the monster Burke so feared at this stage possessed such categorical ambiguity and troubling mobility, and was a harbinger of such a category crisis, that it had not yet been properly named and rendered an integral part of the social order. It had not yet been named: as the proletariat. Why the proletariat? Contemporary Political Theory 2004 3 Mark Neocleous The Monstrous Multitude 81 In the third of his Letters on a Regicide Peace (from 1797), Burke suddenly shifts his focus on to the question of whether ‘the present war’ is the cause of the high price of provisions during 1796. This allows him to introduce the question of the labouring class and the level of wages. On the whole, I am satisfied, that the humblest class, and that class which touches the most nearly on the lowest, out of which it is continually emerging, and to which it is continuously falling, receives far more from publick impositions than it pays. That class receives two million sterling annually from the classes above it. It pays to no such amount towards any publick contribution (1999a, 266). No doubt part of Burke’s concern here follows from his lengthy memorandum to William Pitt from 2 years previously (his essay ‘Thoughts and Details on Scarcity’ of 1795), in which he had rallied against state subsidies for the labouring class during a period of poor harvests and even famine. However, his digression into the pricing of provisions and public finance is also symptomatic of an interest in the question of class that runs through Burke’s work. It might be said that Burke’s concern in both the Letters on a Regicide Peace and ‘Thoughts and Details on Scarcity’ is with the necessity for the labouring class to continue to labour. However, Burke’s essentially bourgeois political economy in these texts (Macpherson, 1980, 51–70) is not uncommon for the time. What is distinctive about Burke’s argument is that it also builds on the class dynamic immanent in the Enquiry. For Burke, the experience of the sublime is confined to a cultivated few. The closest the labouring mass get to the experience of the sublime is in nothing less than their labour. ‘As common labour, which is a mode of pain, is the exercise of the grosser, a mode of terror is the exercise of the finer parts of the system’ (1987, 136). Thus, apart from being the foundation of both the wealth of nations and the order and discipline of the working class, labour also figures as a poor person’s version of the sublime (Eagleton, 1990, 56). Burke’s concern is that the labouring class will wish to give up the pain of labour and thus lose its fear or, in Burke’s aesthetic terms, its reverence and awe. In so doing, it becomes nothing but a mob. Thus, the reason Burke is left implicitly bemoaning a false sublime in the Reflections lies in Burke’s perception of the political mobilization of the labouring class as a ‘mob’ during the revolutionary fervour. He had already commented on the ‘horrors of mob-government’ in his Thoughts on the Cause of the Present Discontents, but the point there was that an unruly multitude can be used by political factions. ‘Unable to rule the multitude, they endeavour to raise divisions among them. One mob is hired to destroy another; a procedure which at once encourages the boldness of the populace, and justly increases their discontent’ (Burke, 1999c, 90, 111). The Reflections are concerned more with this ‘boldness’ and the targets to which it might be directed. One problem Contemporary Political Theory 2004 3 Mark Neocleous The Monstrous Multitude 82 with revolutionary fervour identified by Burke is that it undermines ‘the principles of natural subordination’, which are the grounds of discipline for the mob. They [the mob] must respect that property of which they cannot partake. They must labour to obtain what by labour can be obtained; and when they find, as they commonly do, the success disproportioned to the endeavour, they must be taught their consolation in the final proportions of eternal justice (1968, 372). What Burke fears most is the loss of reverence and fear on the part of the labouring mass of the population, a loss which would result not just in a threat to the established order F ‘Is it in destroying and pulling down that skill is displayed? Your mob can do this as well at least as your assemblies’ (1968, 279)7 F but to the continuation of settled property ownership as well; a key difference between 1688 and 1789 is precisely that in the former no mobs marched through the streets with the heads of gentlemen ‘stuck upon spears’ (1968, 164–165). Tom Furniss and Frances Ferguson have suggested that whereas the mob is immanent within Burke’s theory of the sublime, in the Reflections it has become properly mobile, and it is this mobility that undermines any possibility of it being the ‘true’ sublime (Ferguson, 1985, 136; Furniss, 1993, 129). I would argue that the ‘mobility’ and thus ungovernability of the mob turns out to represent for Burke rather too much sublimity, to the extent that it becomes merely terrible. ‘Mob’, it should be recalled, is an abbreviation of the Latin mobile vulgus, developed by the ruling class in the 18th-century as a coda for the poor and thus the emergent working class. (Burke half-apologizes for using it: ‘excuse the term, it is still in use here’ [1968, 179]). In particular, it became coda for disorderliness and mobility (that is: mobility as disorderliness) on the part of the labouring class F as, for example, in Adam Smith’s Wealth of Nations (Smith, 1979, 460, 779). Much has been made of Burke’s description of the mob or lower orders as a ‘swinish multitude’ F should the revolutionaries succeed, he suggests, learning and its natural protectors and guardians ‘will be cast into the mire, and trodden down under the hoofs of a swinish multitude’ (1968, 173). However, we need to read Burke as suggesting that the mob is not only mobile, ungovernable, swinish and all in all terrible F it is also monstrous. Indeed, the monstrosity of the mob lies in its mobility and disorderliness; its terrible ‘mobishness’ is the crux of its monstrosity. Burke’s use of the idiom of monstrosity can be traced to the new processes of industrial society then emerging and, concomitantly, the new forms of mobility F in both the individual and collective sense F exercised by workers. In employing the figure of the monster in this way, Burke was building on an established tradition in the ideological strategies of the ruling class. Historians Contemporary Political Theory 2004 3 Mark Neocleous The Monstrous Multitude 83 such as Christopher Hill, Peter Linebaugh and Marcus Rediker have shown at length the extent to which one particular monster, the many-headed hydra, figures as an ideological ploy in ruling class discourse. In text after text, the working class appears as a ‘hydra of misrule’, a monster that grows new heads when one of its existing heads is lopped off. The myth of the many-headed hydra was thus intended to capture the difficulty of imposing order on increasingly global and mobile systems of labour (Hill, 1974; Linebaugh and Rediker, 2000). Despite focusing on one particular monstrous form, Hill, Linebaugh and Rediker identify a key aspect of political teratology more generally: it is centrally concerned with the question of class. As such, one might extend the kind of political teratology explored by these writers well beyond the hydra to many other forms of monster. One might, for example, trace the connection between Thomas Hobbes’s figure of rebellion in the form of the monstrous Behemoth and his concern over the emergence from feudal order of a ‘dissolute condition of masterlesse men, without subjection to Lawes, and a coercive Power to tye their hands’. Burke’s adoption of the idiom of monstrosity was thus, on the one hand, hardly new. Yet, on the other hand, Burke is writing during the period in which the Gothic literary form had become predominant. The Gothic, it should be recalled, ‘occupies the first stage of the creation of the modern bourgeois society, that is, roughly the period between 1760 and 1815’ (Monleón, 1990, 48). In other words, the emergence and rise of the Gothic coincides with the beginning of the industrial revolution and, concomitantly, the gradual emergence of an industrial working class. I suggest that it is in the context of this emerging class formation F a confused, complex, heavily overdetermined process, but a process of class formation nonetheless F that Burke’s use of the monster trope and, concomitantly, the class politics of Burke’s aesthetic ideology and political teratology needs to be understood. Now, this argument cannot be made without a couple of important qualifying comments. Macpherson (1980, 64, 66) is entirely right to point out that ‘Burke was not a 19th-century historian’ and thus ‘did not see modern history in terms of class conquests of power’. As Burke simultaneously favoured both a ‘free market’ economy and yet wished to defend substantial settled property, he did not see the Revolution as a transfer of power to a substantial bourgeoisie or as removing feudal obstacles to the development of a fully fledged bourgeois order in France and thus Europe as a whole. As such, it would be unreasonable to read Burke as having a clear and coherent class conception of the Revolution. Moreover, one has to recognize that ‘the proletariat’ as such was hardly fully formed at this time F it would be another 50 or so years before it would emerge as a historical actor of any substantive political power. Even Marx’s announcement in1844 that what is needed for communism is ‘a class with radical chains’ is immediately followed by the Contemporary Political Theory 2004 3 Mark Neocleous The Monstrous Multitude 84 observation that ‘the proletariat is only beginning to appear’ (Marx, 1975, 256). In other words, it would have to be said that the ‘class’ nature of the monster was hardly clear to Burke, nor could it have been. However, it is in part precisely this lack of clarity that encourages Burke to use the notion of the monstrous F he simply has no other way of thinking through such an as yet unidentifiable and yet threatening political force. The posters that advertised theatrical adaptations of Frankenstein during Mary Shelley’s lifetime usually left a blank space opposite the name of the actor who played the monster. Shelley rather liked this, as she thought it a creative way of ‘naming the unameable’ (cited Flahault, 2003, 44). We might think of Burke’s ‘monster’ as precisely a way of ‘naming’ what was then politically unameable.8 Burke’s joint preoccupation with the mob class and his invocation of the metaphor of the monster are two of the complex of terms including ‘swinish multitude’ developed in ruling class ideology through the 18th century as a way of identifying and politically labelling the nascent and thus far unameable proletariat. Or, to put it in the aesthetic terms of the Philosophical Enquiry, it was a way for Burke to identify the multitude as no longer awe-ful, but as now merely awful. This is in part the reason for the emotional force and political intensity of Burke’s descriptions of the revolutionary events in France. Although commentators have often queried this force and intensity given the fact that Burke did not experience the events in France at first hand, the point is that Burke’s response to them is heavily dependent on his experience of the Wilkite disturbances and the Gordon Riots, not only because in the case of the latter his own life had been threatened but also because of his conviction, attested to by his Parliamentary speeches of the early 1790s, that these events were all connected. Richard Price, whose sermon to The Revolution Society was the immediate cause of Burke’s Reflections, was a protegé of Lord Shelburne, whom Burke suspected of having fomented the Gordon Riots. As O’Brien (1992, 395) puts it, ‘Burke’s feelings about what he read of the excesses of the Paris revolutionary mob in 1789 blended, in his imagination, with his still vivid memories of that London Protestant mob of nine years before’. Hence his exaggerated characterization of the rioters/revolutionaries as a frenzied mob or fanatical monster. This is in no way to imply that the French Revolution was some kind of proletarian uprising, for that would clearly be absurd; nor is it to downplay the enormous political, social, and historical differences between the Gordon Riots, the French Revolution, and the later political actions of the organized proletariat. And as I have suggested, it is also not to imply that the proletariat was clearly identifiable to Burke (or anyone else) in this period. Rather, it is to suggest that Burke’s fear lay in any large-scale movement of the ‘multitude’ F Contemporary Political Theory 2004 3 Mark Neocleous The Monstrous Multitude 85 ‘the people’ of/from the lower orders appearing as an active historical subject on the world stage F and that implicit in this conception of the multitude was the emergent modern proletariat. In utilizing the monster this way, Burke therefore seeks to score a political as well as an aesthetic point. What was at stake in the Revolution was nothing less than a monstrous movement creating a monstrous society. Conclusion In his ‘Introduction’ to the Penguin edition of the Reflections, Conor Cruise O’Brien (1968, 9) suggests that the specter haunting Europe in The Manifesto of the Communist Party walks for the first time in the pages of Burke: ‘out of the tomb of the murdered Monarchy in France, has arisen a vast, tremendous, unformed spectre’ (Burke, 1968, 65; compare Marx and Engels, 1973, 67). In fact, we might say that the Gothic connection between Burke and Marx resonates more fully in the figure of the ‘monster’. When Marx and Engels comment (1973, 72) that modern bourgeois society is like the sorcerer who has conjured up something from the nether world whose powers he can no longer control, they trail in the wake of Burke’s thoughts about the emergent proletariat. For the monster often expresses an anxiety about the future: that it will be monstrous (Moretti, 1983, 84). It is impossible to believe that Burke did not know that ‘monster’ is derived from a complex of related terms: monstrare meaning ‘to show forth’, monstra and monestrum meaning to warn or show, monstrum meaning ‘that which reveals’, or ‘that which warns’, and monere meaning ‘to warn’. Similarly, the word Aristotle and the Greeks use for abnormal forms is teras, meaning a warning or portent, giving rise in the early modern period to the possibility of a teratology. Burke’s use of the monster trope in part plays on the idea that the monstrous mob currently dominating the historic stage is a sign: a warning of things to come. Like many political tropes, ‘monster’ in Burke’s political teratology oscillates wildly between movements, forces, institutions and processes. However, despite such oscillation, the trope centred on a historic moment and movement in which ‘the people’ were beginning to appear on the historic stage having shaken off its reverence and awe. In grappling ideologically with such a moment and movement, Burke eased himself into a form of political rhetoric in which the disorderly mob could be seen as inherently monstrous, a rhetoric that became a standard ideological device on the political right. Somewhere within Burke’s use of the metaphor was a sense that there was a material force emerging that would eventually shake and shape European history; the ‘monstrous’ thereafter became a crucial feature of the strategy of ideological terror employed by the political right in an effort to undermine this force. In Contemporary Political Theory 2004 3 Mark Neocleous The Monstrous Multitude 86 setting up the ‘monstrous’ in this way, Burke thereby inaugurated what became one of the core features of the conservative nightmare: the monster of mob rule. Date submitted: 23 January 2003 Date accepted: 14 April 2003 Notes 1 Burke also comments on how the revolutionaries may imagine his own argument (1968, 85, 181). Responses to Burke play on this theme of the imagination. Structuring her response to Burke around his ‘lively imagination’ and the extent to which his ‘reason may have often been the dupe of [his] imagination’, Mary Wollstonecraft comments that had Burke been French he would have been a ‘violent revolutionist’: ‘your imagination would have taken fire’. To Burke’s defence of property she comments that the ‘imagination revolts’ against the distress of poverty, and to his attack on the remodelling of the French constitution she claims that if the constitution had been modelled by the ‘lovers of elegance and beauty’ it ‘is natural to suppose that the imagination would have erected a fragile temporary building’ (Wollstonecraft, 1994, 5, 14, 44, 48, 56, 57, 58, 61). 2 In the Introduction to his book, O’Brien comments that central to a proper understanding of Burke’s work is what Vico called Fantasia, translated by Isaiah Berlin as ‘imaginative insight’. 3 Yet Paine also plays on the theme of imagination, describing hereditary monarchy as ‘a thing in imagination’, a ‘thing as various as imagination can paint’; likewise, ‘monarchy, aristocracy, and democracy, are but creatures of the imagination’. 4 The first person to point out how odd this argument is was Richard Payne Knight: ‘If [Burke] had walked up St. James’s Street without his breeches, it would have occasioned great and universal astonishment; and if he had, at the same time, carried a loaded blunderbuss in his hands, the astonishment would have been mixed with no small portion of terror: but I do not believe that the united effects of these two powerful passions would have produced any sentiment or sensation approaching to sublime’(1808, 383–384). 5 In ‘A Letter to a Member of the National Assembly’, May 1791, Burke compares despots governing by terror with the dominion of awe (1992, 55). 6 For an alternative translation of the passage, and an alternative reading based on the question of disgust, see Zerilli (1994, 92). 7 In a letter to William Wyndham of 27 September 1789 (1967, 25) Burke comments on ‘the Mob ofyconstituents ready to Hang’ the National Assembly should it ‘deviate into moderation’. 8 This also in part explains the references to ‘hair-dressers’, ‘working tallow-chandlers’ and ‘innumerable servile, degrading, unseemly, unmanly and often most unwholesome and pestiferous occupations’ (Burke, 1968, 138, 271) F references to members of the working class without having to use this term. 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