Provided by the author(s) and University College Dublin Library in accordance with publisher
policies. Please cite the published version when available.
Title
Lexical decomposition meets conceptual atomism
Authors(s)
Acquaviva, Paolo; Panagiotidis, Phoevos
Publication date
2012-07
Publication information
Lingue E Linguaggio, XI (2): 165-180
Publisher
Società Editrice il Mulino
Item record/more information http://hdl.handle.net/10197/4198
Publisher's version (DOI)
10.1418/38784
Downloaded 2022-03-30T12:55:54Z
The UCD community has made this article openly available. Please share how this access
benefits you. Your story matters! (@ucd_oa)
© Some rights reserved. For more information, please see the item record link above.
LEXICAL DECOMPOSITION
MEETS CONCEPTUAL
ATOMISM
PAOLO ACQUAVIVA
PHOEVOS PANAGIOTIDIS
ABSTRACT: Asking what can be a substantive word in natural language is closely
related to asking what can be a lexical concept. However, studies on lexical concepts
in cognitive psychology and philosophy and studies on the constitution of lexical
items in linguistics have little contact with each other. We argue that linguistic
analyses of lexical items as grammatical structures do not map naturally to plausible
models of the corresponding concepts. In particular, roots cannot encapsulate the
conceptual content of a lexical item. Instead, we delineate a notion of syntactic root,
distinct from that of morphological root; syntactic roots are name-tags establishing
lexical identity for grammatical structures. This makes it possible to view basic
lexical items as mappings between syntactically complex structures, identified by
their root, with simplex concepts, where the constructional meaning of the former
constrains the content of the latter. This can lead to predictive hypotheses about the
possible content of lexical items in natural language.
KEYWORDS: concepts, roots, lexical decomposition
1. CONCEPTS AND WORD STRUCTURE*
Taking DOG to represent the concept associated with the word dog seems a
straightforward choice, but it presupposes a clear notion of what is a word.
To see that there is an issue, and that the issue is linguistic in nature, it
suffices to ask whether the two word forms present in put up map to one or
to two concepts; or whether break corresponds to a single concept BREAK
*
We wish to thank the audience and organizers of the first NetWordS workshop. P.
Acquaviva’s research was supported by an Alexander von Humboldt fellowhip, which is
gratefully acknowledged. Faults and omissions are the authors’ responsibility.
Published as: Acquaviva, P. and Panagiotidis, P. 2012. Lexical decomposition meets
conceptual atomism. Lingue e linguaggio XI.2, 165-180.
in all its uses, including idiomaticized ones like break wind (contrast windbreaker, in the sense of a garment). Far from being a terminological quibble,
this is a substantive issue about the discrimination between simple and
complex concepts. If the notion of wordhood relevant for conceptualization
is morphological, break up is not only a complex expression but also a
complex concept, assembled out of two simple concepts like BROWN
COW. If instead a simple concept corresponds to a ‘semantically simple’
word, then we must decide what counts as semantically simple—a task that
seems identical to the task of deciding what counts as a concept, resulting in
circularity: a b jointly form a simple concept because they are a concept.
Researchers in linguistics and in cognitive psychology are not
generally overly worried about the linguistic bases of concept individuation.
Βeginning their overview of the extensive literature on concepts, Laurence
and Margolis (1999:4) note that ‘For a variety of reasons, most discussions
of concepts have centered around lexical concepts. Lexical concepts are
concepts like BACHELOR, BIRD, and BITE—roughly, ones that correspond to
lexical items in natural languages.’ Correspondingly, Fodor (1998:122)
makes it clear that consisting of a single word is indeed crucial in defining
lexical concepts: ‘actually, of course, DOORKNOB isn’t a very good
example, since it’s plausibly a compound composed of the constituent
concepts DOOR and KNOB.’ Expressions like ‘concepts (/lexical
meanings)’ (Fodor 2008:26) are symptomatic of this perspective. Laurence
and Margolis (1999:4) acknowledge that defining simple concepts as those
associated to lexical words is not straightforward, and add that ‘the concepts
in question are ones that are usually encoded by single morphemes. In
particular, we don’t worry about the possibility the one language may use a
phrase where another uses a word, and we won’t worry about what exactly a
word is’. Still, being monomorphemic is not the same as being semantically
basic; consider morphologically but not semantically complex lexemes like
con-ceive, or lexicalized compounds like home run, or indeed cranberry.
On the linguistic side, research into the primitives and the constituent
structure of lexical meaning represents a long and richly diverse tradition of
studies, but typically without much dialogue with psychological research
into the representation of concepts. Most analyses decompose the content of
lexical words into representations differing in the primitives and in the type
of structure envisaged (cf. Pinker 1989, Jackendoff 1990, Pustejovsky 1995,
among many others). Some approaches distinguish separate structural
representations in the meaning of a lexical item, like Jackendoff’s
(2002:334-339) Conceptual Structure and Spatial Structure, or Lieber’s
(2004) encyclopaedic ‘Body’ and semantically regimented ‘Skeleton’ (with
function-argument structure). In contrast, Levin and Rappaport Hovav
2
(1995, 2005) envisage a single representation, expressing the argument- and
event structure of a verb by means of primitive predicates (like BECOME) and
constants/roots (like BREAK), forming a lexical semantic template:
(1)
noncausative break:
[ y BECOME BROKEN ]
Finally, among the approaches that decompose lexical meaning into a
grammatical structure, a family of analyses explicitly take this structure to be
generated accorded to the same principles that underlie sentence construction
(Hale and Keyser 1993, 2002, Arad 2005, Halle and Marantz 1993, Embick
and Marantz 2008, Borer 2005a,b, Ramchand 2008). We will focus on
analyses of this type, questioning the way they deal with non-structural,
idiosyncratic aspects of lexical meaning that are essential to a word’s
conceptual content but apparently lack any grammatical relevance.
As Laurence and Margolis (1999) note, representing the content of a
lexical item as a structured arrangement of primitives results problematic for
the view it presupposes of lexical concepts. In particular, the idea that
linguistic word-internal structure may explain the content of lexical concepts
and their mutual relations inherits the problems associated with ‘classical’
theories of concepts as structures articulated into smaller components:
• decomposition into semantic primitives faces a regress problem: what do
primitives like CAUSE or THING mean, if they are not the same as the
corresponding lexical words?
• if lexical meaning was analyzable into constituent parts and their
relations, we would expect definitions reflecting the structural
decomposition of a concept to accurately describe its content: but this
typically fails, since word meaning systematically cannot be give a
unique and precise definition or paraphrase;
• if lexical concepts were constituted of linguistic constructs, possession of
these concepts would require being aware of their content; yet competent
speakers often don’t seem to know certain aspects of the meaning of the
words they use, even supposedly constitutive ones;
• prototype effects, like the fact that a certain representation of
grandmother exemplifies the concept better than others, are unexpected if
the content of GRANDMOTHER consists in a hierarchical arrangement
of semantic primitives, defining in this case a biological relation.
Such empirical issues do not seem to have had an impact on linguistic
analyses of the structure of lexical items. In part this is due to a widespread
perception that such matters do not concern what speakers know about
3
lexical items as linguistic representations; the content of lexical concepts
certainly includes a fair deal of non-linguistic knowledge, but, it may be
argued, this is irrelevant for an account of what speakers know when they
know a word as a product of the language faculty. Grimshaw 1993 (cited in
Laurence and Margolis 1999: 55, Jackendoff 2002: 338) has articulated this
position in a particularly strong form: ‘Linguistically speaking, pairs like
[break and shatter] are synonyms, because they have the same structure. The
differences between them are not visible to the language.’
Most syntactic decompositional analyses to lexical structure share this
view, in practice if not in principle. This is a problem, however. If the
semantic relations between concepts like DOG and CAT lie outside the
purview of linguistic theory, as a theory of the computational capacity of the
mind to represent linguistic knowledge in a way that explains the
productivity and compositionality of linguistic expressions, then it is hard to
see why the relation between DOG and ANIMAL should not be likewise
‘not visible to the language.’ And if such a canonical example of hyponymy
falls outside the scope of linguistics, much of what speakers know about the
relations between word meanings becomes inaccessible to linguistic
explanation. Thus, the semantic deviance of comparisons like # a dog is
smaller than an animal, involving two nouns in hyponymy relation, can only
receive a non-linguistic explanation, or none at all. However, these facts are
part and parcel of what speakers know about words and their combinatorial
possibilities in sentences. Current syntactic approaches to lexical semantics
are forced to ignore this empirical domain, which was an important part of
earlier work in generative grammar (the example comes from Bever and
Rosenbaum 1970). The result has been a near-exclusive attention to
argument- and event structure in verbs, which is a significant limitation and
blocks the way towards a linguistically informed theory of a possible word.
By contrast, we hold that a theory of UG should have something to
say about the way lexical items relate to their conceptual content. We will
take as our point of departure a specific syntactic approach which most
clearly dissociates the grammatical components of a word from a nongrammatical core, and focus on the properties which can and cannot be
attributed to this root element as a key locus for the relation between
syntactic representation and conceptual content.
2. ROOTS IN LEXICAL DECOMPOSITION
Work in Distributed Morphology and Borer’s (2005a,b) Exoskeletal
approach both envisage maximally underspecified root terminals embedded
inside a number of syntactic shells, which collectively define syntactic
4
constructions that define lexical categories; a noun, adjective, or verb is for a
construct, in whose innermost core lies a category-neutral root. There are
many important differences between the two approaches, and indeed
between the two conceptions of roots, the most apparent being that
Distributed Morphology, but not Borer, mandates the presence of
categorizing heads, [n], [v], or [a], immediately governing the root and
categorizing it (with possible complications for complex roots). For present
purposes, however, what counts is the role of the root in determining lexical
semantic properties, understood as lexeme-related properties which remain
constant across grammatical contexts. Both models assume that all roots are
non-categorized, so even the unique categorial determination of
monomorphemic words like fun, tall, or idiot is inferred from the context;
categorial underspecification, however, does not directly imply that roots
lack the kind of semantic information which makes a difference between a
noun and a verb. Analyses within Distributed Morphology, when they
address the topic, typically treat the root as a meaningful element, whose
content selects a suitable syntactic context. Importantly, however, work in
this framework stresses that a root’s meaning is emergent in a context. In the
most comprehensive treatment of the issue in this framework, Arad (2005)
defends a view of roots as radically underspecified but still meaningful
elements which give rise to distinct interpretations depending on their
immediate context. More precisely, Arad distinguishes roots with a relatively
stable and well-defined meaning, from a more theoretically interesting type
of roots whose semantic content cannot be stated in isolation, but emerges as
a cluster of conceptually related words, giving rise to what Arad calls
Multiple Contextual Meaning. Roots of the first type tend to form one or
very few words only (as Hebrew nouns for animal, plants, food, or kinship
terms, like kelev ‘dog’, sukar ‘sugar’, ax ‘brother’, axot ‘sister’ ); roots
of the second type give rise to larger word families, with a more or less
recognizable semantic relatedness which can be very faint indeed; for
example, XŠB in xašav ‘think’, xišev ‘calculate’, hexšiv ‘consider’, (Arad
2005:82), or QLT in miqlat ‘shelter’, maqlet ‘receiver’, qaletet ‘cassette’,
qalat ‘absorb, receive’ (Arad 2005:97). While roots of this second type do
not define a lexical sense without a context, they are unambiguously
qualified as semantically contentful signs.
In contrast, the category-free heads which correspond to roots in
Borer’s (2005a,b) framework lack any kind of grammatically legible
information (with the exception of idioms; cf. Borer 2005b:354). In a
framework that consigns to syntax all grammatically relevant information of
lexical words, these elements are the non-grammatical residue, which appear
as listed phonological forms, or ‘listemes’: ‘By listemes we refer to a pairing
5
of a conceptual feature bundle with a phonological index’ (Borer 2005b:25).
Borer’s listemes thus encapsulate the non-syntactic information which
defines a lexical item. In different ways, then, Distributed Morphology and
Borer’s Exoskeletal model posit contentful root elements at the core of their
syntactic decompositions of substantive lexical items, which determine
lexeme-specific and encyclopaedic aspects of lexical semantics either by
themselves or as a function of their context. Our claim, now, is that roots in a
syntactic decomposition sense cannot have this sort of content.
3. ROOTS ARE NOT MEANINGFUL SIGNS
In this section we will review some empirical evidence that roots do not
carry any meaning and/or semantic content that could be identifiable outside
of a grammatical structure, not just because they need a local context to
determine a specific interpretation, but more radically because they are not
signs. In fact, the evidence suggests that any sort of lexical meaning is a
property of roots embedded in a grammatical structure, which can be of a
rich and complex nature. The conclusion that will emerge is that there is no
such thing as non-structural meaning, even at the level of ‘word’.
Let us begin with some remarkable cases. It is received wisdom within
the Distributed Morphology research on the systematic idiomaticity of the
structure below the first categorizing shell (e.g. nP or vP) that the categorizer
projection acts as a sort of limit, below which interpretation is / can be / must
be non-compositional (Marantz 2000; see also Marantz 2006, where inner
versus outer morphology phenomena are explained in this way). In this
perspective, the opposition between event nominalization and result nominal
of collection in (2) must be due to different grammatical structures
corresponding to the two readings (see Borer 2003). But since the root is the
same, neither the difference in syntactic structure nor that in ontological
typing (event vs. object) can be even indirectly a function of the root:
(2)
collection1
‘the frequent collection of mushrooms by Eric’
collection2
‘let me show you my collection of stamps’ (result nominal)
Still, it can be argued that the two structures, while different, share a
semantic core because they only differ in terms of outer morphology, above
the first categorizing shell. However, as discussed in Panagiotidis (2011), we
can have radically different meanings across the first categorizing shell. A
telling example is the one below from Greek:
(3)
a. [VoiceP nom-iz-]
‘think’
6
b. [nP [VoiceP nom-iz-] ma]
‘coin, currency’
c. [aP ne- [VoiceP nom-iz-] men-]
‘legally prescribed’
A large number of words relating to law, regulations and the like is derived
from the root nom-. However, when the root is verbalized, yielding the
verbal stem nom-iz- in (i) above, the meaning assigned is ‘think, believe’. So
far, this is just what Marantz (2000; 2006) and Arad (2005) predict, namely
that roots are not assigned meaning until they are categorised.
See however what happens when we take the verbal stem, a vP by
hypothesis, and nominalize it, using the run-of-the-mill nominalizer –ma in
(3b). Unlike the explicit predictions in Arad (2005), and as Borer (2009)
points out with similar examples, the already categorized element nomizdoes not keep its meaning. What happens instead is that the whole [ nP n vP]
structure is (re-)assigned a new, unrelated and completely arbitrary meaning,
that of ‘coin, currency’. Perhaps equally interestingly, the participle derived
in (3c) from the selfsame verbal stem carries a meaning as if nomiz- meant
‘legislate, prescribe by law’. In other words, in (3c), the vP embedded within
an adjectival shell also fails to keep its “fixed” meaning of ‘think, believe’
and the whole aP participle means ‘legally prescribed’.
The question raised by such and similar examples concerns the
semantic malleability of roots. Assuming that they are very underspecified
semantically, one might ask how underspecified they can be before they
become semantically vacuous. The most obvious example is provided by
Latinate roots like -ceive, -mit, or -verse, which in English underlie a variety
of semantically unrelated lexemes like con-ceive and re-ceive, ad-mit and
per-mit, con-verse and per-verse. Their likes can be found in a number of
languages, like the Greek esth-:
(4)
esth-an-o-me ‘feel’
esth-is-i ‘sense’
esth-i-ma ‘feeling’, ‘love affair’, ‘boyfriend / girlfriend’
esth-an-tik-os ‘sensitive, emotional’
esth-it-os ‘perceptible’, ‘tangible’,
an-esth-it-os ‘unconscious’, ‘insensitive’
esth-it-ir-ios ‘sensory’
esth-it-ik-os ‘esthetic’, ‘beautician’
7
Despite the illusory affinities suggested by the Latinate English glosses (G.
Longobardi, p.c.), the concepts of words derived from esth- is so broad that
it is impossible associate the root itself with any cognitively coherent
concept, no matter how underspecified, even to the exclusion of ‘beautician’.
The problem is not just that all too often a single root lacks a single
identifiable content. In some cases there is evidence that the different
interpretations are visible for grammatical processes. This happens when the
same root yields interpretations of different ontological types (like (2)
above), which differ for the purposes of further morphological derivations,
after the root has been categorized, as in the following Greek example:
(5)
paradosi1
‘tradition’
(result / *process nominal)
paradosi2
‘delivery’, ‘surrender’
(result / process nominal)
(i.e. ‘traditional’), # paradosi2
paradosiakos relative to paradosi1
Even clearer examples where the same root under-determines lexical
properties are the ones studied in Basilico (2008), where the same (atomic)
root is compatible with different selectional restrictions, according to the
grammatical environment in which it is embedded:
(6)
the criminals cooked a meal / #an evil scheme
the criminals cooked up an evil scheme
(Basilico 2008)
v
√cook up
v
√cook
up
This type of examples is particularly instructive, as it brings out an
ambiguity in the notion of root: atomic element individuated
morphologically (here, cook), or innermost category-free element, defined
syntactically and possibly complex (here, cook up). This will play an
important part on our discussion.
Finally, we can push further the empirical point that lexical meaning is
not fixed within the first categorizing shell; in fact, we also find cases where
the basic lexical predicate is determined only by the choice of inflectional
morphemes, after a significant amount of structure has been built. Consider
Russian, where the root tsvet in different noun declensions derives both the
word for ‘colour’ and the word for ‘flower’:
8
(7)
SINGULAR
PLURAL
tsvet
‘colour’
tsvet-á ‘colours’
tsvet-ók
‘flower’
tsvet-´y ‘flowers’
Even though FLOWER is a basic-level concept, the noun lexicalizing this
concept is derived in the singular by the addition of the diminutive suffix -ok
with individualizing function. There are, to be sure, an archaic form tsvet
with the meaning ‘flower, blossom’, and a regular plural tsvet-kí from tsvetók; but in so far as the paradigm in (7) reflects a stable synchronic pattern, it
shows that what individuates the concept FLOWER is neither the root by
itself (also appearing in tsvestí ‘to blossom’) nor, crucially, the root with a
nominal suffix, which is absent in the plural, but the choice of one among
two alternative inflectional classes, which emerge in the nominative /
accusative plural. Further evidence that lexical meaning can be fully
established at the inflectional level comes from the numerous idiosyncratic
(specialized) interpretations for morphologically regular inflectional plurals
(cf. Acquaviva 2008), like the English brain (count) - brains (count / mass),
or the Cypriot Greek nero (‘water’), plural nera (‘heavy rain’).
4. TWO TYPES OF ROOTS
For Distributed Morphology, roots are syntactically active elements (but see
De Belder 2011 for an interesting alternative). Moreover, they are:
(8) i. category-neutral and categorized in the course of the derivation;
ii. meaningful, although there is no consensus on how much content they have;
iii. phonologically identified as forms.
We have a number of objections on these (see also Acquaviva 2009b, Borer
2009; Harley 2012). The first is of a conceptual nature: if roots are indeed
meaningful, then they are equivalent to verbs, nouns and adjectives except
for a categorial label. This in turn raises serious concerns on the nature,
purpose and necessity of categorization in natural language (see Panagiotidis
2011 for discussion). The second objection concerns two interlinked facts:
on the one hand, there exists unconstrained variation between roots that
appear to be very specified (e.g. sugar), extremely impoverished (e.g. mettin Italian or mit- in English) and all the in-between shades. Moreover, even if
we argue for impoverished and semantically underspecified roots, we are
9
still with left with the empirical problems adumbrated in the previous
section, namely that roots too often do not capture a coherent meaning (what
connects, for instance, the noun book to the verb to book? what logical or
ontological type should the root book have?). This renders unlearnable the
purported ‘common semantic denominator’ roots are supposed to express.
It seems, then, that roots in the technical sense this term has in
Distributed Morphology cannot have all the three properties attributed to
them. Taking into account also the recent contributions by Borer (2009) and
Harley (2012), we propose an alternative which abandons (8ii) and crucially
qualifies (8iii) (see also Acquaviva, forthcoming, Panagiotidis 2011,
Acquaviva and Panagiotidis, in prep.).
First, we think that it is necessary to distinguish between roots as
morphological objects and roots as elements of syntactic computation. In
doing so, we embrace generalized Late Insertion, not just for non-root
syntactic material, as in Galani (2005: Ch. 5-6); Siddiqi (2006: Ch. 3);
Haugen (2009). Thus, syntactic roots will be associated with different
morphological roots (Vocabulary Items, essentially: forms) in particular
syntactic contexts, as sketched below:
(9)
√CAT <—> cat
√GO <—> go
√GO, [Tense: Past] <—> went
Given this dissociation, we can use the notion of morphological roots to
account for the multiple ‘radicals’ or ‘stems’ that occur, for instance, in
Latin inflection and derivation (Aronoff 1994). Thus conceived,
morphological roots may display specifications like being exclusively
nominal or verbal, and we expect there to exist constraints on their form
(like the Semitic three-consonant skeleton). Moreover, the same Vocabulary
Item (form) that spells out a root may also spell out functional terminals, as
is the case of will (future marker or noun); see also De Belder (2011). So, a
notion of morphological root distinct from that of syntactic root correctly
predicts the existence of such ‘semilexical’ categories.
The consequence of the above dissociation is that we can now
conceive syntactic roots, as distinct from morphological ones, as abstract
indices (cf. Acquaviva 2009b, Harley 2009; 2012). By this we mean purely
formal objects internal to the faculty of language in the narrow sense; that is
to say, elements that are defined only as constituents of a formal syntactic
representation, but have no grammar-external status—in particular, not
definable, independently of a syntactic structure, as sound-meaning
10
mappings, or even as abstract instructions to ‘fetch’ or ‘activate’ concepts
(contrast Pietroski 2008:319, 9 Boeckx 2010:28-29). What we are essentially
claiming is that a syntactic root is a syntax-internal criterion of lexical
identity, so that two otherwise identical syntactic constructions count as
different formal objects if they differ in the root, and as identical (that is,
tokens of the same type) if the root is the same. Given this characterization,
there is no semantic variation to explain between root types, nor learnability
problems raised by some elusive conceptual content independent of any one
lexical item; because roots have no semantic content. Instead, we argue, they
act as labels to identify (UG-internally) the structures which correspond to
lexical words, and it is these which support conceptual content. The
following section will make explicit the implications of our proposal for the
relation between conceptual content and syntactic structure.
5. MAPPING CONCEPTS WITH WORD STRUCTURE
It seems a truism that if lexical items are grammatically complex, then the
corresponding lexical concepts are also complex. If the hypothesis we put
forward can be substantiated, however, the structural complexity of a word
as a linguistic object does not necessarily correspond to complexity in its
conceptual content. Recall that syntactic decompositional approaches aim at
representing in syntactic terms the grammatically relevant information
encapsulated in a lexical word, by means of a structure generated by the
same principles underlying the productive construction of sentences. Now,
lexical words also have a non-grammatical content, idiosyncratic and
encyclopaedic, which cannot be associated to a grammatical shell. It seems
natural to associate this irreducibly lexical residue to a root element. But if
independent empirical and conceptual arguments make it problematic to
associate with roots even this type of content, the question where
idiosyncratic lexical meaning is represented must receive a different answer.
The answer we suggest is that a word’s conceptual content does not
correspond to one piece of the syntactic construction, but corresponds to a
construction as a whole. Syntactic heads express content regimented into
grammatical features, and collectively determine a grammatical
interpretation; say, count noun, or unaccusative change-of-state verb. A root
at the core of such a construction merely labels it; for that purpose, it does
not matter whether it is a single node, realized as an invariant phonological
form, or a complex node like cook up in (6). Assuming that pairs like break
and shatter or dog and cat have identical structural representations, what we
claim is that they are differentiated, in the abstract syntactic representation
before morphological spellout, by distinct syntactic roots. These do not
11
differ by virtue of semantic content, but by a differential marking, like
subscripts. It is by virtue of having different subscripts that the structures
corresponding to dog and cat count as different syntactic objects,
independently of semantic interpretation. Conversely, when two distinct
structures have the same root, they can correspond to different concepts, as
in (4) and in the corradical ‘colour’ and ‘flower’ in (7); or, less frequently,
they can map to the same concept, as in the singular and plural of ‘flower’ in
(7). Syntactic roots, then, mark lexical across syntactic representations.
Lexical concepts map to these representations, not directly to roots; what the
latter do is provide a UG-internal signature for lexical concepts.
Consider Borer’s (2005b:9) statement that a lexical item consists of
‘its syntactic structure and the interpretation returned for that structure by the
formal semantic component, and [...] whatever value is assigned by the
conceptual system and world knowledge to the particular listemes embedded
within that structure.’ Instead of claiming that the conceptual component is
associated to grammatically inert listemes (which has no independent
motivation, although it may appear natural as a null hypothesis), we claim
that an empirically more satisfactory solution consists in taking the
structural-grammatical meaning as a semantic template which constrains the
conceptual content associated with the structure. If the syntax of a verb
involves a causative v head, the lexical concept associated with it should be a
causative verb (like kill); but a semantically causative verb does not have to
decompose into a non-causative part and a CAUSE predicate definable
independently of this concept. In essence, then, we argue that there exist
morphological and syntactic roots, but that there are no semantic roots as
distinct from basic lexical concepts; in particular, not as the semantic content
of syntactic or morphological roots.
Of course, it is at best insufficient, and at worst circular, to say that a
concept may map to ‘whatever’ grammatical construct defines a lexical word
(N. Hornstein, p.c.); but the claim that concepts do not map to fixed-size
syntactic pieces is coherent and compatible with the data. As cases like the
Russian tsvet-ók show, a single concept can be expressed by a noun with
different structures in the singular and plural; and especially a category like
number may easily be an intrinsic component of the lexical concept. This
appears clearly in ‘collective’ plurals like the Spanish padres, which shifts
the meaning of padre / padres ‘father / fathers’) to that of ‘parents’, but only
denoting mother-father pairs (so, a mother and her mother are both parents
but are not padres). In addition, not just any structure can map to a lexical
concept, for principled language-internal reasons., It seems plausible that the
domain of conceptual lexicalization cannot extend beyond a nominal or
verbal extended projection, probably definable as a syntactic Phase
12
corresponding to a DP or a vP; in fact, this is expected if we take seriously
the notion of Phase as derivational cycle whose output is consigned to
interpretation (Acquaviva and Panagiotodis, in prep.).
6. CONCLUSION: COMPLEX WORDS, SIMPLE CONCEPTS
Lexical decomposition, as a hypothesis on the constituency of words as
linguistic representations, captures fundamental aspects of lexical
competence. On the other hand, it is problematic as a hypothesis on the
internal constituency of lexical concepts. Our main point is that
decomposition becomes problematic even from a linguistic perspective, as
soon as we ask where a lexical grammatical structure hosts non-grammatical
conceptual content; resorting to roots, in particular, proves empirically
inadequate. Our alternative hypothesis, linguistically motivated, is that a
word can be linguistically complex but conceptually simplex.
Conceptual atomism, as defined by Fodor (1998:121), holds that
‘most lexical concepts have no internal structure’. Since we still claim that
the grammatical structure of words comprehends meaningful elements, we
do not take this thesis to mean that lexical words are semantically
unanalyzable as linguistic objects (in particular, they are not semantic atoms
in a Mentalese; contrast Fodor 2008). What we claim is rather that a word’s
conceptual content is not on a par with grammatically encoded meaning, as
the content of one syntactic piece, but belongs outside UG-generated
representations and is mapped to them in such a way as to respect the
semantic templates defined by grammar. Unstructured concepts, then, can
map to complex syntactic structures.
The difference we envisage between lexical concepts (UG-external)
and the content of syntactic representations (UG-internal) does not mean that
the relation between them is arbitrary and unconstrained. On the contrary, a
principled relation between the two can lead to predictive hypotheses on
what can be a possible lexical word in a natural language. For instance,
Fodor (1998:164-165) argues that while REDSQUARE is conceivable as a
primitive concept, without having RED and SQUARE, there can be no
primitive, atomic concept ROUNDSQUARE, as opposed to the complex
ROUND SQUARE (as the conceptual content of the phrase round square).
Such a basic concept could never identify anything at all; while
contradictory properties can be entertained, it could not exist as a basic
concept (‘there can be no primitive concept without a corresponding
property for it to lock to’). But this is a prediction about language: a noun
with that content is impossible in natural language. Further hypotheses about
the conceptual bases of lexical nouns can rule out words meaning ‘number
13
of planets’ or ‘undetached rabbit part’ as simplex lexical concepts
(Acquaviva, forthcoming).
It bears emphasizing that the thesis of conceptual atomism, and our
contention that syntactic lexical decomposition is compatible with it, does
not deny the cognitive complexity of concepts. The content of a word enters
in a complex network of relations with the content of other words, as CAT
and ANIMAL. But inferences can be necessary though not constitutive:
taking water contains hydrogen to be necessarily true, it is still possible to
have the concept WATER without having the concept HYDROGEN.
Word meaning, in conclusion, is indeed cognitively complex, but not
as a reflex of grammatical complexity. We take it to be a strength of our
analysis that it makes linguistically motivated decompositions of lexical
items (more) compatible not only with conceptual atomism, but also with
views that, without embracing conceptual atomism, emphasize the lack of
one fixed structure for lexical concepts; cf. Murphy (2002:441): ‘Thus, it can
be very difficult to know where to draw the line between what is part of the
word meaning “per se” and what is background knowledge. It is not clear to
me that drawing this line will be theoretically useful.’ A linguistic analysis
of lexical content which could be related to a psychologically and
philosophically plausible view of lexical concepts is certainly a desirable
goal. Our proposal is a contribution towards that goal.
REFERENCES
Acquaviva, P. (2008). Lexical Plurals. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Acquaviva, P. (2009a). Roots, categories, and nominal concepts. Lingue e
linguaggio 8, 25–51.
Acquaviva, P. (2009b). Roots and Lexicality in Distributed Morphology . In A.
Galani, D. Redinger & N. Yeo (Eds.) York-Essex Morphology Meeting 5, 1–21.
Acquaviva, P. Forthcoming. The roots of nominality, the nominality of roots. In A.
Alexiadou et al. (Eds.), The Syntax of Roots and the Roots of Syntax. Oxford
University Press.
Acquaviva, P. & P. Panagiotidis. In preparation. Roots and lexical semantics.
University College Dublin - University of Cyprus.
Arad, M. (2005). Roots and Patterns: Hebrew Morpho-Syntax. Berlin: Springer.
Aronoff, M. (1994). Morphology by Itself. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Basilico, D. (2008). Particle verbs and benefactive double objects in English: High
and low attachments. Natural Language and Linguistic Theory 26, 731–729.
14
Bever, T. & P. Rosenbaum. (1970). Some lexical structures and their empirical
validity. In R. A. Jacobs and P. S. Rosenbaum (Eds), Readings in English
Transformational Grammar (pp. 3–19). Waltham, MA: Ginn and Company.
Boeckx, Cedric (2010b). Defeating Lexicocentrism. Ms., CLT/UAB. Available from
http://ling.auf.net/lingBuzz/001130
Borer, H. (2005a). In Name Only. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Borer, H. (2005b). The Normal Course of Events. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Borer, H. (2009). Roots and Categories. Paper presented at the 19th Colloquium on
Generative Grammar. University of the Basque Country, Vitoria-Gasteiz.
DeBelder, M. (2011). Roots and affixes: eliminating lexical categories from syntax.
LOT: Utrecht.
Embick, D. & A. Marantz. (2008). Architecture and Blocking. Linguistic Inquiry
39(1), 1–53.
Fodor, J.A. (1998). Concepts: Where Cognitive Science Went Wrong. Oxford:
Oxford University Press.
Fodor, J.A. (2008). LOT 2: The Language of Thought Revisited. Oxford: Oxford
University Press.
Galani, A. (2005) The morphosyntax of verbs in Modern Greek. Unpublished PhD
thesis, University of York
Grimshaw, J. (1993). Semantic structure and semantic content in lexical
representation. Ms, Rutgers University. Published in Grimshaw, J. (2005). Words
and Structure (pp. 101–119). Chicago: CSLI.
Hale, K. & S. J. Keyser. (1993). On argument structure and the lexical expresson of
syntactic relations. In K. Hale & S. J. Keyser (Eds.), The View from Building 20
(pp. 11–41). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Hale, K. & S. J. Keyser. (2002). Prolegomenon to a Theory of Argument Structure.
Cambridge: MA: MIT Press.
Halle, M. & Alec Marantz. (1993). Distributed Morphology and the pieces of
inflection. In K. Hale & S. J. Keyser (Eds.), The View from Building 20 (pp.
111–176). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Harley, H. (2009). Roots: Identity, Insertion, Idiosyncracies. Paper presented at the
Root Bound workshop, USC, February 21, 2009
Harley, H. (2012). On the Identity of Roots. Ms., University of Arizona.
Haugen, J. (2009). Hyponymous objects and Late Insertion. Lingua 119, 242-262
Jackendoff, R. (1990). Semantic Structures. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Jackendoff, R. (2002). Foundations of Language. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Laurence, S. & E. Margolis. (1999). Concepts and cognitive science. In S. Laurence
& E. Margolis (Eds.), Concepts: Core readings. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Levin, B. & M. Rappaport Hovav. (1995). Unaccusativity. Cambridge, MA: MIT
Press.
Levin, B. & M. Rappaport Hovav. (2005). Argument Realization. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
Lieber, R. (2004). Morphology and Lexical Semantics. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
Marantz, A. (2000). Words. Unpublished ms. MIT.
15
Marantz, A. (2006). Phases and words. Unpublished ms. NYU.
Murphy, G. (2002). The Big Book of Concepts. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Pietroski, P. (2008). Minimalist meaning, internalist interpretation. Biolinguistics 2,
317–340.
Pinker, S. (1989). Learnability and Cognition. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Pustejovsky, J. (1995). The Generative Lexicon. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Ramchand, G. (2008). Verb Meaning and the Lexicon. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
Siddiqi, D. (2006). Minimize exponence: economy effects on a model of the
morphosyntactic component of the grammar. PhD thesis, University of Arizona.
_________________________
Paolo Acquaviva
University College Dublin
Newman Building, Belfield, Dublin 4
Ireland
e-mail: paolo.acquaviva@ucd.ie
Phoevos Panagiotidis
University of Cyprus
Dept. of English Studies
Kallipoleos 75, 1678 Nicosia
Cyprus
e-mail: phoevos@ucy.ac.cy
16