Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy
Vol. 21, No. 2 · February 2022
https://doi.org/10.26556/jesp.v21i2.1581
© 2022 Author
IS EPISTOCRACY IRRATIONAL?
Adam F. Gibbons
t is commonly thought that widespread voter ignorance is a problem for
democracies.1 Ignorant voters can inadvertently vote against their interests.
More generally, political leaders can supply harmful laws and policies by catering to the ill-informed preferences of such voters. If the electorate wants bad
policies, accommodating politicians will often satisfy their demands. Epistocrats
think that we should mitigate the harm caused by voter ignorance by allocating
comparatively greater amounts of political power to citizens who possess more
politically relevant knowledge.2
One important challenge to epistocracy attacks the underlying assumption
that better-informed citizens possess superior political judgment.3 According
to this challenge, while better-informed citizens may possess more knowledge
of politically relevant facts, much research in political psychology indicates that
better-informed citizens are less rational than their ill-informed counterparts,
being more susceptible to various biases, more partisan, less open minded, and
more prone to engaging in motivated reasoning. Correlatively, their ill-informed
counterparts are less biased, less partisan, more open minded, and engage in
motivated reasoning with less frequency.4 Epistocratic institutions, then, might
I
1
Caplan, The Myth of the Rational Voter; Somin, Democracy and Political Ignorance; and Brennan, Against Democracy.
2 Brennan, Against Democracy; and Jones, 10% Less Democracy.
3 Friedman, “Democratic Competence in Normative and Positive Theory”; Gunn, “Against
Epistocracy”; Hannon, “Are Knowledgeable Voters Better Voters?”
4 Box-Steffensmeier and De Boef, “Macropartisanship and Macroideology in the Sophisticated Electorate”; Zaller, “Floating Voters in U.S. Presidential Elections, 1948–2000”; Achen
and Bartels, “Blind Retrospection”; Taber and Lodge, “Motivated Skepticism in the Evaluation of Political Beliefs”; Abramowitz and Saunders, “Is Polarization a Myth?”; Taber, Cann,
and Kucsova, “The Motivated Processing of Political Arguments”; Hartman and Newmark,
“Motivated Reasoning, Political Sophistication, and Associations between President Obama
and Islam”; Joslyn and Haider-Markel, “Who Knows Best?”; Lodge and Taber, The Rationalizing Voter; Kahan, Peters, Dawson, and Slovic, “Motivated Numeracy and Enlightened
Self-Government”; and Guay and Johnston, “Ideological Asymmetries and the Determinants of Politically Motivated Reasoning.”
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Gibbons
just end up placing more political power in the hands of less rational citizens.
There is no guarantee that such institutions would constitute an improvement
over existing democratic institutions, and they may even lead to worse governance and worse outcomes.5 Call this the problem of epistocratic irrationality.
In this paper I argue that the problem of epistocratic irrationality can be overcome. A closer look at the psychological data adverted to by critics of epistocracy shows that it is unclear whether it has the implications such critics claim it has.
But even if the critics are right about these implications, it still would not follow
that democratic institutions will outperform epistocratic institutions. Much depends on the precise form that the envisaged epistocratic institutions take. A
more considered approach to epistocratic institutional design might allow us to
reap the benefits of placing more power in the hands of the more knowledgeable,
while avoiding some of the costs associated with increasing the power of purportedly more dogmatic citizens.
I begin in section 1 by outlining the problem that voter ignorance presents
to democracy, before then discussing the problem of epistocratic irrationality at
greater length. In section 2, I argue that critics of epistocracy have downplayed
and overlooked several problems with their arguments for epistocratic irrationality. First, the citizens counted as knowledgeable by the standards of the experiments that critics advert to are not always such that they would be knowledgeable according to epistocratic standards. Second, the relationship between levels
of political knowledge and political irrationality revealed by such experiments is
often more complex than critics of epistocracy suppose. Third, the value of traits
such as open mindedness is easy to exaggerate. Even if less politically knowledgeable people were more open minded (and more knowledgeable people less open
minded), it is unclear whether this would have the upshots attributed to it by
critics of epistocracy. In section 3, I argue that even if the relevant data has the implications that critics claim it has, suitably amended forms of epistocracy could
overcome the problem of epistocratic irrationality. I consider two potential strategies: (1) using refined selection mechanisms that avoid placing too much power
in the hands of irrational citizens, and (2) increasing epistocratic influence only
in those areas where such influence has a reliable track record of improving outcomes. I turn to consider some objections to my claims in section 4. Section 5
concludes by summarizing the main claims of the paper.
5
What it is to govern well is naturally a controversial question. In this paper, I focus solely on
the relative epistemic merits of democratic institutions as against epistocratic institutions—
that is, I focus on the degree to which such institutions (attempt to) create legislation
grounded in objective facts, the degree to which such institutions use reliable decision-making methods, and the like.
Is Epistocracy Irrational?
253
1. Democratic Ignorance and Epistocratic Irrationality
The claim that a well-informed population is central to the health of a democracy
is widely endorsed.6 An uninformed population may not know which policies
are in their best interests. An uninformed population cannot hold their representatives meaningfully accountable.7 Even epistemic democrats, sanguine as
they are about individually ignorant voters, accept that a minimum level of voter competence is a necessary precondition of an epistemically well-functioning
democracy.8
However, many decades of empirical studies indicate that most voters are
ignorant of even basic political facts.9 Not only are voters unfamiliar with simple,
relatively uncontroversial findings in economics, political science, and other social sciences, they often do not know basic facts such as which politicians were
responsible for enacting certain pieces of legislation, what sorts of policies are
favored by candidates for office, the various roles played by different political
agents and organizations, the identities of their representatives, and so on. If a
well-informed population is central to the health of democracies, and if most
voters are politically ignorant, then democracies face a serious problem. A necessary condition of a flourishing democracy is seemingly unsatisfied.
What, if anything, should be done to mitigate the harm caused by voter ignorance? Epistocrats think that we should allocate more formal political power
to those citizens who possess more knowledge of politically relevant facts.10 In
effect, the harm caused by voter ignorance cannot be mitigated without transitioning away from democratic institutions to some extent. Epistocratic reforms
variously try to ensure that only politically knowledgeable people possess political power, or that the political power of politically knowledgeable people is
6 Mill, Considerations on Representative Government, ch. 2; Dewey, Democracy and Education;
and Gutmann, Democratic Education.
7 Gutmann and Thomson, Why Deliberative Democracy? 35; and Guerrero, “Against Elections.”
8 Landemore, Democratic Reason; and Goodin and Spiekermann, An Epistemic Theory of Democracy.
9 For helpful overviews of the relevant literature, see Caplan, The Myth of the Rational Voter;
Oppenheimer and Edwards, Democracy Despite Itself; Somin, Democracy and Political Ignorance; and Brennan, Against Democracy.
10 Brennan, Against Democracy; Mulligan, “Plural Voting for the 21st Century”; Jones, 10% Less
Democracy; Malcolm, “Epistocracy and Public Interests.” By “formal” I mean the sort of
political power allocated to one by virtue of some law or institution. The political power
granted to one by virtue of a legal right to vote is a paradigmatic example of such power, as
are the sort of powers one gains upon occupying certain political offices (such as the various
powers associated with being a member of the upper and lower houses of parliaments, the
executive branch, and so forth).
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amplified relative to less knowledgeable people. Ideally, such reforms would increase the degree to which political decision-making is based upon objective,
politically relevant facts.
A seemingly unquestioned assumption underlying arguments for epistocracy is the claim that greater levels of political knowledge confer superior political
judgment. But this might be mistaken. Suitable levels of political knowledge are
not the only thing central to the health of a well-functioning polity. In addition
to well-informed citizens, we also need citizens who are rational.11 We need citizens who are willing to appropriately update their beliefs in response to new
evidence. We need citizens who can set aside partisan loyalties when it becomes
clear that these loyalties lead them astray. We need citizens who are open minded and undogmatic. Knowing what the available evidence indicates on politically relevant issues is, of course, deeply important. But a stubborn resistance to following new evidence can be quite damaging in its own right. Broadly speaking,
such resistance might cause us to stick with the status quo even if the available
evidence indicates that it is harmful. This has important upshots for the viability
of epistocracy. If more knowledgeable citizens are less rational, then it becomes
unclear whether epistocratic institutions will yield the benefits ascribed to them
by proponents of epistocracy. Epistocratic institutions might solve one problem
at the cost of another.12
Several critics of epistocracy contend that this is precisely what the available
evidence from political psychology shows.13 They claim that since more knowledgeable citizens are more partisan and less rational than their less knowledgeable peers, epistocratic reforms may produce even worse outcomes than the
existing democratic institutions they are intended to supplant. This is a power11 By “rational” here I have in mind epistemic rationality. We need citizens who are both well-informed and who behave in paradigmatically epistemically rational ways when reasoning
about political matters. Epistemically irrational conduct may or may not be instrumentally
rational for some citizens.
12 An independent problem facing epistocracy stems from the recognition that, in principle, the individually ignorant citizens empowered by democratic institutions might make
collectively wise decisions, while the well-informed citizens empowered by epistocratic
institutions might make collectively unwise decisions. In short, individual and collective
intelligence sometimes pull apart. Since this issue has been extensively discussed elsewhere,
I set it aside in this paper, though I note the complications it raises for discussions of the
comparative epistemic merits of democracies and epistocracies (Surowiecki, The Wisdom
of Crowds; Landemore, Democratic Reason; Goodin and Spiekermann, An Epistemic Theory
of Democracy). I consider a variant of this problem, one involving individual and collective
rationality, in section 4.
13 Friedman, “Democratic Competence in Normative and Positive Theory”; Gunn, “Against
Epistocracy”; and Hannon, “Are Knowledgeable Voters Better Voters?”
Is Epistocracy Irrational?
255
ful challenge that proponents of epistocracy ought to take seriously, for if these
critics are correct then the prospects for epistocracy are dim.
There is much evidence indicating that more knowledgeable citizens are
also more partisan than their ill-informed peers.14 The more one knows about
politics, the more likely one is to be strongly allied to certain views or politicians while strongly opposed to others. Indeed, the causal direction is often the
reverse—people more interested in politics and more allied to certain views will
generally tend to acquire more political information. But high levels of partisanship create problems. Michael Hannon puts it well when he writes:
The problem . . . is that the most politically partisan individuals (who are
also the most knowledgeable, remember) are also the most likely to have
their thinking corrupted by politics.15
In a similar vein, Paul Gunn, drawing on the seminal work of Philip Converse,
notes that “the more political knowledge people possess, the more ‘constrained’
by ideology they tend to be.”16
It is worth understanding why more partisan individuals tend to have their
thinking corrupted by politics more often (and more severely) than less partisan
individuals. In general, heavily partisan individuals are more likely to possess a
self-conception defined in part by their adherence to certain political beliefs.17
If one were to ask such partisan individuals to describe themselves, they might
reply by saying that they are, for instance, a supporter of the second amendment,
a fiscal conservative, or something to that effect. These beliefs are a core part
of their identity (as they see it). Importantly, however, a body of research in
political and cognitive psychology shows that such individuals are more prone
to engaging in motivated reasoning.18 Partisans engaged in motivated reasoning
are more likely to actively seek out evidence that confirms their preferred views,
more likely to unquestioningly accept evidence that supports their views, more
14 Judd and Brauer, “Repetition and Evaluative Extremity”; Box-Steffensmeier and De Boef,
“Macropartisanship and Macroideology in the Sophisticated Electorate”; Zaller, “Floating
Voters in U.S. Presidential Elections, 1948–2000”; Abramowitz and Saunders, “Is Polarization a Myth?”; Feldman and Price, “Confusion or Enlightenment?”; Hetherington, “Putting
Polarization in Perspective”; Joslyn and Haider-Markel, “Who Knows Best?”; and Kalmoe,
“Uses and Abuses of Ideology in Political Psychology.”
15 Hannon, “Are Knowledgeable Voters Better Voters?” 3.
16 Gunn, “Against Epistocracy,” 35. Gunn here cites Converse, “The Nature of Belief Systems in
Mass Publics,” 213. See also Friedman, Power without Knowledge.
17 Haidt, The Righteous Mind. Hannon calls such beliefs identity-constitutive beliefs (“Are
Knowledgeable Voters Better Voters?” 3).
18 Kunda, “The Case for Motivated Reasoning.”
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likely to avoid evidence that conflicts with their views, more likely to be disproportionately critical of opposing evidence, and so on.19 In short, partisans are
biased toward conclusions they like and biased against conclusions they dislike.
Rather than dispassionately assessing the relevant evidence, partisans press their
cognitive abilities into the service of protecting their core political beliefs.
Partisans, then, engage in motivated reasoning more frequently than nonpartisans because political beliefs form a central part of their self-conception,
which they are strongly motivated to defend.20 The problem for epistocracy becomes clear. Epistocratic institutions would enhance the political power of more
knowledgeable citizens relative to their less knowledgeable peers. But these
more knowledgeable citizens also happen to be much more partisan than others.
Since they are partisan, they will engage in the sort of corrupted thinking outlined above—they will dismiss ideologically inconvenient data, they will rush to
conclusions that fit their preconceptions, they will selectively focus their critical
attention onto views they dislike, and so on.21 By attempting to empower the
more knowledgeable among us, epistocracy will also empower those of us who
most deeply exemplify a host of problematic epistemic vices. Political ignorance
may indeed be a problem worth fixing, but the proposed epistocratic cure may
end up worse than the illness, for it is not obvious that amplifying the political
power of more partisan, less rational citizens is a reliable way to secure better
policies and better outcomes.
2. How Serious Is the Problem of Epistocratic Irrationality?
The problem of epistocratic irrationality highlights a weakness in extant epistocratic proposals. By focusing too much on what voters know and not enough on
how voters update their beliefs in light of new evidence, epistocratic reforms risk
19 Taber and Lodge, “Motivated Skepticism in the Evaluation of Political Beliefs”; Taber, Cann,
and Kucsova, “The Motivated Processing of Political Arguments”; Hartman and Newmark,
“Motivated Reasoning, Political Sophistication, and Associations between President Obama
and Islam”; Lodge and Taber, The Rationalizing Voter; Bolsen, Druckman, and Cook, “The
Influence of Partisan Motivated Reasoning on Public Opinion”; Kuru, Pasek, and Traugott,
“Motivated Reasoning in the Perceived Credibility of Public Opinion Polls”; Guay and Johnston, “Ideological Asymmetries and the Determinants of Politically Motivated Reasoning”;
and Vegetti and Mancosu, “The Impact of Political Sophistication and Motivated Reasoning
on Misinformation.”
20 Kahan, “Misconceptions, Misinformation, and the Logic of Identity-Protective Cognition”;
Kahan, Peters, Dawson, and Slovic, “Motivated Numeracy and Enlightened Self-Government”; and Mason, Uncivil Agreement.
21 Shani, “Knowing Your Colors”; and Bartels, Unequal Democracy.
Is Epistocracy Irrational?
257
placing too much power in the hands of citizens who, through their epistemic
vices, would often make bad decisions. It is therefore unclear whether such reforms would constitute an improvement over existing democratic institutions.
However, it is important to bear in mind the following caveat regarding the
problem of epistocratic irrationality: even if critics of epistocracy are right to
claim that the data from political psychology shows that more knowledgeable
citizens are typically less rational than their less knowledgeable peers, such data
cannot by itself establish that democratic institutions will outperform epistocratic institutions along various dimensions. To establish the superiority of existing democratic institutions would require a serious empirical analysis of the
performance of both sorts of institutions. This in turn would require investigating, inter alia, the impacts of ignorant voters on policy outcomes compared to
the impacts of more knowledgeable but less rational voters. Then this would require an analysis of the importance of the issues that less knowledgeable voters
are typically ignorant of, the sorts of issues more dogmatic voters are typically
reluctant to change their minds about, the degree to which legislators and policymakers are responsive to both groups of voters, and more. In short, psychological data of the sort appealed to by critics of epistocracy cannot furnish us
with evidence regarding the overall costs and benefits of both sets of institutions.
Instead, we would need to measure the actual performance of democratic institutions against epistocratic ones.
In response, one might think that critics of epistocracy do not intend to show
that the overall costs of epistocracy will outweigh its benefits, or that democratic
institutions are superior to epistocratic ones. Instead, one might think that they
intend only to undercut the claim that epistocratic institutions would be superior
to democratic ones, and that they do so successfully.22 Perhaps it is true that
critics of epistocracy intend to offer only undercutting evidence. Nonetheless,
this is consistent with thinking that the ultimate test of epistocracy consists in
implementing different epistocratic institutions and measuring their subsequent
performance along various parameters, comparing such performance to the performance of democratic alternatives. For those willing to experiment with novel institutional arrangements, this is important. Additionally, in what follows I
show that the critics have failed to successfully undercut the case for epistocracy.
In this section I discuss some complications with the interpretation of the relevant psychological data critics defend, arguing that these complications should
undermine our confidence in such an interpretation. In the following section I
discuss certain classes of epistocratic institutions that can overcome the prob22 I thank an anonymous referee for highlighting this point.
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lem of epistocratic irrationality even if critics of epistocracy have correctly interpreted the relevant psychological data.
Regarding the former, what sort of complications do I have in mind?
2.1. Who Counts as Knowledgeable?
First, critics of epistocracy frame the relevant studies as showing that more
knowledgeable citizens are typically less rational than their ill-informed counterparts. But this description of the data is underspecified. With this information
alone we do not know, for example, in what way the subjects of the experiments
are knowledgeable, or whether such subjects would count as knowledgeable according to the standards of different epistocratic proposals. Without knowing
whether the subjects of the experiments are the sort of people who would be
disproportionately empowered by epistocratic mechanisms, we cannot know
whether these studies in fact present a problem for epistocracy. In effect, we cannot know whether there really is a problem of epistocratic irrationality—at least,
that is, for certain forms of epistocracy.
Consider, for example, the work of Lodge and Taber on motivated political reasoning.23 Critics of epistocracy point to this work as evidence of the
claim that more knowledgeable citizens are more prone to motivated political
reasoning than less knowledgeable citizens.24 Lodge and Taber do indeed find
evidence of what they call a sophistication effect, wherein more knowledgeable
citizens—sophisticates—are more prone to engaging in motivated reasoning.25
More specifically, more knowledgeable citizens more frequently exhibit both
confirmation bias (by willingly seeking out confirming arguments rather than
disconfirming arguments) and disconfirmation bias (by spending more time and
energy challenging attitudinally incongruent arguments than they do on attitudinally congruent arguments).26 Additionally, sophisticates polarize in their
beliefs to a greater degree than non-sophisticates.27 However, it is worth noting
that the subjects of their experiments were classed as sophisticates depending
on how well they scored on a general political knowledge scale consisting of sev23 Taber and Lodge, “Motivated Skepticism in the Evaluation of Political Beliefs”; and Lodge
and Taber, The Rationalizing Voter.
24 Gunn, “Against Epistocracy”; and Hannon, “Are Knowledgeable Voters Better Voters?”
25 They also find evidence for what they call an attitude strength effect, where those citizens
with the strongest policy attitudes are most prone to politically motivated reasoning (Lodge
and Taber, The Rationalizing Voter, 153).
26 For an overview of the evidence they adduce in support of these claims, see Lodge and
Taber, The Rationalizing Voter, 158–67.
27 Lodge and Taber, The Rationalizing Voter, 168.
Is Epistocracy Irrational?
259
enteen items, including questions like “What proportion of Congress is needed
to override a presidential veto?”28 Notably, Lodge and Taber use a median split
to differentiate sophisticates from non-sophisticates.
Similar measures of political knowledge are used in other studies purporting to show that more knowledgeable citizens engage in politically motivated
reasoning more often than their less knowledgeable peers. Consider the work of
Kuru, Pasek, and Traugott showing that more knowledgeable citizens are more
prone to politically motivated reasoning about the results of public opinion polls,
or the work of Vegetti and Mancosu showing that more knowledgeable citizens
are prone to politically motivated reasoning about various news items.29 The former measures political knowledge using five multiple-choice questions regarding recent news events.30 The latter, using a sample of Italian citizens, measures
political knowledge using three questions regarding the identity of the president
of the Republic, the president of the Low Chamber, and the number of deputies
in the Low Chamber.31
Are these sophisticates the sort of people who would possess more political
power under epistocratic institutions? Naturally, the answer varies when different forms of epistocracy are considered. On some forms of epistocracy, the
28 Taber and Lodge, “Motivated Skepticism in the Evaluation of Political Beliefs,” 760; Lodge
and Taber, The Rationalizing Voter, 84.
29 Kuru, Pasek, and Traugott, “Motivated Reasoning in the Perceived Credibility of Public
Opinion Polls”; Vegetti and Mancosu, “The Impact of Political Sophistication and Motivated Reasoning on Misinformation.”
30 Kuru, Pasek, and Traugott, “Motivated Reasoning in the Perceived Credibility of Public
Opinion Polls,” 431.
31 Vegetti and Mancosu, “The Impact of Political Sophistication and Motivated Reasoning on
Misinformation,” 7–8. Indeed, such measures are pervasive in the literature on the relationship between levels of political knowledge, partisanship, and politically motivated reasoning. Virtually every study either uses their own general knowledge scale ( Judd and Brauer,
“Repetition and Evaluative Extremity”; Box-Steffensmeier and De Boef, “Macropartisanship and Macroideology in the Sophisticated Electorate”; Federico, “Predicting Attitude
Extremity”; Feldman and Price, “Confusion or Enlightenment?”; Hetherington, “Putting
Polarization in Perspective”; Taber, Cann, and Kucsova, “The Motivated Processing of Political Arguments”; Hartman and Newmark, “Motivated Reasoning, Political Sophistication, and Associations between President Obama and Islam”; Joslyn and Haider-Markel,
“Who Knows Best?”; Bolsen, Druckman, and Cook, “The Influence of Partisan Motivated
Reasoning on Public Opinion”; Guay and Johnston, “Ideological Asymmetries and the Determinants of Politically Motivated Reasoning”) or relies upon data from sources such as
reports from American National Election Studies (Zaller, “Floating Voters in U.S. Presidential Elections, 1948–2000”; Abramowitz and Saunders, “Is Polarization a Myth?”; Bartels,
Unequal Democracy; Kalmoe, “Uses and Abuses of Ideology in Political Psychology”). In
either case, levels of political knowledge are gauged using relatively low numbers of general
knowledge items.
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class of sophisticates plausibly more or less aligns with the class of those citizens whose political power would be amplified. A scheme of restricted suffrage
deploying minimally demanding voter-qualification exams that test for general
political knowledge might be adversely impacted by the findings adduced by
critics of epistocracy.32 The same applies to any form of epistocracy allocating
more political power to those who possess more knowledge of these basic and
general political facts alone.33 But other forms of epistocracy with more demanding standards might escape the challenge of epistocratic irrationality altogether. For instance, under veto council epistocracy, a select group of extremely
knowledgeable citizens would constitute an epistocratic council tasked with
vetoing potentially harmful laws and policies.34 Acquaintance with only basic
questions of general political knowledge would not grant one access to such an
institution. Instead, one must possess considerable levels of knowledge of—and
perhaps even expertise in—one of several fields, such as economics, sociology,
or political science. The experiments pointed to by critics of epistocracy do not
establish that such citizens are more prone to engaging in motivated reasoning.
Accordingly, forms of epistocracy using similarly demanding qualifications are
not obviously subject to the problem of epistocratic irrationality.35
One might grant this point while denying its significance. In the absence of
evidence that the sort of citizens who would satisfy extremely demanding qualification requirements behave more rationally than either the citizens identified
as sophisticates in the psychological literature or non-sophisticates, why grant
such an assumption? Until such evidence is supplied, the importance of the relevant mismatch in standards of knowledge is unclear at best.
This point should be conceded. Still, it is important to recognize that the
available data does not say much about citizens that we might call extreme sophisticates—that is, citizens who cannot only answer several basic general knowledge items, but who additionally possess considerable knowledge of the structure and function of existing political institutions, economics, political science,
sociology, and more. It is at least possible that such citizens, outliers as they al-
32 On restricted suffrage, see Brennan, Against Democracy, 211–14.
33 For a discussion of minimal epistocracy—a form of epistocracy restricting itself only to
uncontroversial, basic political facts— see Gibbons, “Political Disagreement and Minimal
Epistocracy.”
34 Brennan, Against Democracy, 215–18.
35 This is not to deny that such epistocracies might be harmed by epistocratic irrationality.
Whether they are or not is clearly an empirical question. I only claim that the studies adverted to by critics of epistocracy do not establish that they are in fact so harmed.
Is Epistocracy Irrational?
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ready are in the degree to which they are well-informed about politically relevant
matters, may differ in how they reason about politics compared to other citizens.
Moreover, there is some suggestive evidence that the most well-informed
citizens (as measured by the typical scales deployed by political psychologists)
can resist partisan influences better than their less knowledgeable peers.36 Consequently, the fact that different forms of epistocracy deploy different measures
of knowledge may indeed be important as far as the problem of epistocratic irrationality is concerned.
2.2. What Is the Relationship between Political Knowledge and Political Rationality?
Second, critics of epistocracy sometimes characterize the relevant data as showing that higher levels of knowledge positively correlate with a greater propensity to engage in motivated reasoning, adoption of more extreme views, more
closemindedness, and so on. In contrast to more knowledgeable citizens, less
knowledgeable citizens are more open minded, less prone to engaging in motivated reasoning, and the like. For instance, in describing the relevant psychological findings, Gunn writes that “these effects tend to occur more frequently
and stubbornly among citizens who are relatively well informed than among
those citizens who are not.”37 This description of the data is not inaccurate, but it
omits crucial details, oversimplifying the relationship between levels of political
knowledge, political irrationality, and other independent traits. Indeed, the relevant data is oversimplified in at least two important ways.
On the one hand, such a presentation of the psychological findings overlooks the possibility that other factors might be driving both the acquisition of
political knowledge and motivated reasoning. Indeed, for many individuals, the
key point is that they are motivated (perhaps because they are independently
partisan) and not that they know more.38 As Taber and Lodge write:
[Our] theory predicts less bias for unsophisticated and uncommitted respondents not because they possess a greater sense of evenhandedness,
but rather because they lack the motivation and ability to engage in attitude defense.39
36 Achen and Bartels, “It Feels Like We’re Thinking,” 16, 21. Interestingly, Hannon also acknowledges the fact that the most well-informed citizens may be more rational than merely
moderately well-informed citizens (“Are Knowledgeable Voters Better Voters?” 14).
37 Gunn, “Against Epistocracy,” 42.
38 To his credit, Hannon acknowledges this point, writing that “it may be that increasing political knowledge is counterproductive only when it occurs in partisan individuals” (“Are
Knowledgeable Voters Better Voters?” 5).
39 Taber and Lodge, “Motivated Skepticism in the Evaluation of Political Beliefs,” 767.
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In short, ill-informed citizens are less epistemically virtuous than they are unmotivated, and it is the motivation of knowledgeable citizens that drives politically
motivated reasoning, not the acquisition of facts per se. Similarly, some studies
find that other traits that sometimes (though not always) correlate with high levels of knowledge are what drive attitude extremity. For instance, Federico argues
that a high need to evaluate—a felt need to assess things for positive and negative qualities—is what drives attitude extremity, not high levels of knowledge.40
Of course, this by itself does not show that critics of epistocracy are mistaken
to highlight the importance of the correlation between high levels of political
knowledge and political irrationality. If a tendency to engage in politically motivated reasoning correlates with levels of political knowledge, then epistocratic
institutions may encounter a problem of irrationality even if the relevant relationship is not causal. For the problem of epistocratic irrationality to emerge, it
is enough that epistocratic institutions disproportionately empower epistemically vicious citizens. Still, as we will see in section 3, the absence of a causal
relationship paves the way for more refined epistocratic selection mechanisms
that can identify (and subsequently empower) well-informed individuals without thereby empowering irrational individuals.
On the other hand, it should be noted that such a presentation of the data
masks the considerable variety one can find among both well-informed and
ill-informed citizens. To be sure, the data does indeed indicate that moderately
knowledgeable citizens are in general less rational than less knowledgeable citizens. However, the gap between these two groups vanishes regarding certain
issues.41 Further, Vegetti and Mancosu argue that more knowledgeable citizens
are less susceptible to character-related misinformation than knowledgeable citizens.42 Again, Taber and Lodge put it best when they explicitly caution against
taking their findings to show that less knowledgeable citizens are free from epistemic vice:
Provocative though it may be, this interpretation does not stand up to
normative, theoretical, or empirical scrutiny. . . . We find no empirical evidence of principled moderation among the bottom or middle thirds of
our sample, whose extremity scores were statistically indistinguishable
from those of the most sophisticated participants.43
40 Federico, “Predicting Attitude Extremity,” 1287. On the need to evaluate, see Jarvis and Petty,
“The Need to Evaluate.”
41 Taber and Lodge, “Motivated Skepticism in the Evaluation of Political Beliefs,” 765.
42 Vegetti and Mancosu, “The Impact of Political Sophistication and Motivated Reasoning on
Misinformation.”
43 Taber and Lodge, “Motivated Skepticism in the Evaluation of Political Beliefs,” 767.
Is Epistocracy Irrational?
263
Ill-informed citizens may be less prone to engaging in motivated reasoning on
some (though not all) issues, but they are somewhat prone, and they frequently
adopt extreme political positions at similar rates to their allegedly less rational,
high-information peers. Critics of epistocracy, while not outright denying such
facts, fail to recognize their importance. As suggested at the beginning of this
section, establishing the superiority of either democratic or epistocratic institutions will involve measuring the differential harmful impact of generally ignorant, moderately rational citizens as against the impact of more highly informed
but less rational citizens. Bearing in mind that both sets of citizens display a lot
of variety in how they process political information should caution us against
too quickly assuming that the psychological data clearly favors one set of institutions over the other.
2.3. Open Minds Are Overstated
Last, we should not assume that it is always good when citizens are open minded,
nor always bad when they are closed minded.44 Ideally, we want citizens to update their beliefs appropriately in light of new evidence. We do not want citizens
to constantly modify their views in a haphazard fashion. More obviously, we do
not want citizens to change their beliefs when their beliefs track the truth, or
when the countervailing evidence they encounter is sufficiently weak or misleading. In such cases, we want citizens whose minds are closed to evidence that
would only lead them astray. This is not to deny that open mindedness is never
an attitude that we should wish to cultivate among the electorate, but it does suggest that our evaluation of the behavior of purportedly irrational, closed-minded,
high-information citizens should be more sensitive to the specifics of the beliefs
in question. For some beliefs in some settings, open mindedness and a willingness to change one’s mind are virtues; for others, they are vices.
For example, drawing upon Zaller, Hannon notes that less knowledgeable
citizens are more responsive to the content of individual elections.45 Among
other things, less informed voters are more likely to reward incumbent candidates presiding over a strong national economy, more responsive to ideological
shifts on the part of candidates, and at least as likely as their better-informed
peers to respond positively to presidential success in managing foreign affairs.
He further concludes, drawing upon Achen and Bartels, that “the more knowl44 Kruglanski and Boyatzi, “The Psychology of Closed and Open Mindedness, Rationality,
and Democracy.”
45 Zaller, “Floating Voters in U.S. Presidential Elections, 1948–2000,” 166; Hannon, “Are
Knowledgeable Voters Better Voters?” 4.
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edgeable voters tended to ignore or downplay the very considerations that are
typically viewed as an appropriate basis for electoral choice.”46
However, a closer look at the manner in which such voters respond to changes in the economy reveals that their behavior may not be rational. Notably, Achen
and Bartels are themselves critical of the claim that voters can “reliably form and
act upon sensible retrospective judgements at election time.”47 On their account,
voters who reward presidents presiding over strong economies often exemplify
a myopic perspective, neglecting to take into consideration their economic welfare over sufficiently long periods of time. Accordingly, the degree to which less
informed voters reward (or punish) presidents for the state of the economy is
frequently inappropriate. It does not follow from this, of course, that knowledgeable citizens behave appropriately in not responding to economic conditions
during election cycles. Still, this merely reinforces the fact that how we evaluate
the behavior of citizens who update their beliefs in response to evidence should
be more sensitive to the specific details of any given case. Moreover, it highlights
once more the occasionally substantial variation in how citizens with different
levels of knowledge process political information.
Summing up, then, the significance of the psychological data adverted to by
critics of epistocracy is unclear. The standards by which the psychologists judge
that citizens are knowledgeable do not always match epistocratic standards.
Rather than a simple relationship between the possession of political knowledge
and political irrationality, the data in fact reveals a complex interrelationship between levels of political knowledge, attitude extremity, and political irrationality.
Lastly, the virtues of a willingness to change one’s mind on political issues vary
with the subject matter, the evidence prompting the update of beliefs, and more.
Consequently, our confidence in the interpretation of the psychological data offered by critics of epistocracy should be undermined. If so, the severity of the
problem of epistocratic irrationality is uncertain.
Before moving ahead, it is worth considering the following possible response
to the claims advanced in this section. One might think that, given the controversial nature of many epistocratic proposals, the burden of justification lies
squarely with epistocrats defending the epistemic superiority of their preferred
institutions. Rebutting critical discussions of epistocracy by issuing purely negative critiques in return is not enough to discharge this burden. Instead, a positive defense of epistocratic institutions (as against democratic alternatives) is
46 Achen and Bartels, Democracy for Realists, 294; Hannon, “Are Knowledgeable Voters Better
Voters?” 4.
47 Achen and Bartels, Democracy for Realists, 175; see also Achen and Bartels, “Blind Retrospection.”
Is Epistocracy Irrational?
265
required. Applied to the case at hand, while it may be true that the data from
political psychology lacks the implications critics of epistocracy claim it has, establishing this does not constitute a positive argument for epistocracy.
However, even if this claim about the burden of justification is correct, this
sort of response suffers from two problems. First, it effectively leaves worries
grounded in the putative irrationality of politically knowledgeable citizens behind, conceding that current claims of epistocratic irrationality are unsuccessful.
In short, one cannot make this concession while at the same time claiming that
the critics have successfully undercut the case for epistocracy. To be sure, this
too does not constitute a positive argument in favor of epistocracy. However,
such a concession is indicative of the fact that, as far as the comparative epistemic performance of both democratic and epistocratic institutions is concerned,
it is an open question as to which is superior. As alluded to earlier, for those
willing to experiment with novel institutional arrangements, this is important.
Such individuals, noting the failure of current arguments to demonstrate the
irrationality of epistocracy, ought to consider epistocratic institutions a live option—at least, that is, certain sorts of epistocratic institutions with the ability to
overcome any potential problem with epistocratic irrationality.
Second, as we shall see in the next section, the burden of justification has
been met for a certain class of epistocratic institutions. Indeed, since there exists much evidence in favor of the superior epistemic performance of certain
epistocratic institutions (relative to more democratic alternatives), the burden
of justification plausibly lies with critics of these institutions rather than their
supporters.
3. Overcoming Epistocratic Irrationality
The previous section provided some reasons to doubt the interpretation of the
psychological data appealed to by critics of epistocracy. Suppose, though, that
this interpretation is accurate. What follows from this? In this section, I argue
that even if their interpretation is accurate it still does not follow that we should
reject epistocratic institutions in favor of democratic institutions.
The problem of epistocratic irrationality is more severe when the costs of
epistocratic irrationality outweigh the benefits of amplifying the political power
of more knowledgeable citizens.48 However, some epistocratic institutions will
plausibly be able to mitigate the harmful effects of epistocratic irrationality bet48 To be clear, such a distribution of costs and benefits would still not establish the superiority
of democratic institutions. Even if the problem of epistocratic irrationality is severe, it might
be that the problem of political ignorance in democracies is even more severe.
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ter than others. If they can mitigate these effects such that the costs of irrationality are outweighed by the benefits of empowering more knowledgeable citizens,
such institutions will still be viable.
I focus on two strategies for epistocrats. First, I explore whether refined selection mechanisms that avoid placing too much power in the hands of irrational
citizens could help to ameliorate epistocratic irrationality. I then discuss implementing only those epistocratic institutions that have a reliable track record of
outperforming their more democratic counterparts.
3.1. Refined Selection Mechanisms
A presupposition that seemingly underlies the problem of epistocratic irrationality is that epistocracies are committed to uncritically using mechanisms that empower more knowledgeable citizens. Since, let us suppose, more knowledgeable
citizens are less rational, the virtues of such mechanisms are questionable at best.
This presupposition is not unreasonable since proponents of epistocracy often
place heavy emphasis on knowledge of politically important factual matters. Still,
there is no reason why epistocrats cannot expand their focus to include the sort
of epistemic virtues rightly stressed by critics of epistocracy.49
How might epistocrats appropriately expand their focus? Recall that the psychological data adduced by critics of epistocracy does not show that all well-informed citizens are irrational, even setting aside the problems discussed in the
previous section. It is perhaps true that, on average, better-informed citizens are
less rational than ill-informed citizens, but there are exceptions to this general
trend. Most notably, some well-informed citizens are also politically rational.
Such citizens can form the target for suitably refined epistocratic selection mechanisms. If we could devise ways to identify citizens who are both well-informed
and less prone to various forms of political irrationality, we could amplify their
political power rather than the political power of well-informed citizens tout court.
The use of such refined selection mechanisms faces two important obstacles.
First, one must devise sufficiently precise tests to distinguish between appropriately rational, knowledgeable citizens and their equally knowledgeable but less
rational peers. Second, use of the relevant tests must be feasible given the overall
49 Indeed, the importance of such virtues is already recognized by epistocrats, even if they are
discussed less often than knowledge of important factual matters. For example, Brennan
defends veto council epistocracy at least partly due to the prospect of such a council providing a forum for its members to engage in careful deliberation (Against Democracy, 215–18).
Presumably, such careful deliberation is not desirable for its own sake, but for its ability to
allow council members to learn from one another, change their minds on certain issues (if
necessary), and the like. The veto council, then, provides institutional settings within which
attitudes and behaviors associated with political rationality can flourish.
Is Epistocracy Irrational?
267
epistocratic arrangement in question. Questions of feasibility here primarily revolve around the degree to which the tests can be used cheaply and effectively,
especially given large numbers of citizens. These two obstacles are not independent. For instance, the most precise tests may be prohibitively costly to use when
large numbers of people are involved, and this might count against certain forms
of epistocracy. Correlatively, cost-effective tests may not reliably distinguish between the relevant groups of citizens. Epistocrats thus face potential trade-offs
between accuracy and cost-effectiveness, with such trade-offs needing to be factored into any overall cost-benefit assessment of epistocratic proposals.
Let us consider an example that helps to highlight the difficulties that epistocrats may face in using refined selection mechanisms. A natural strategy for
epistocrats looking to overcome the problem of epistocratic irrationality is
to implement a plural voting scheme wherein the most epistemically virtuous
citizens receive comparatively more votes than either their ignorant and ill-informed peers or their well-informed but irrational peers.50 A nice feature of this
form of epistocracy is that, in principle, it could accommodate the claim that
the latter group of citizens more harmfully impact political outcomes than the
former group. Roughly speaking, we have four groups of citizens to consider:
(i) ignorant and irrational citizens, (ii) ignorant but more rational citizens, (iii)
well-informed but irrational citizens, and (iv) well-informed and rational citizens. Depending on the magnitude of harm ascribed to empowering each group
(or the magnitude of expected benefits in the case of the last group), we could
allocate numbers of votes accordingly. If well-informed but irrational citizens
make worse decisions than ignorant but more rational citizens, we could modify
the numbers to diminish the influence of the former. However, the central aim
of such a scheme of plural voting would be to amplify the power of the most
epistemically virtuous citizens.
However, empowering the right citizens is easier said than done. We must
first identify the relevant people. One option to consider is the use of indirect
tests of political rationality such as standard measures of cognitive reflection and
rationality quotients.51 If scoring well on such measures reliably correlates with
a propensity to engage with politically contentious issues in a suitably rational
manner, such tests may work well as proxies for political rationality. However, if
no correlation exists (or if there is an inverse correlation between the relevant
traits), use of these indirect tests risks bringing about the very distribution of
50 For more on plural voting, see Brennan, Against Democracy, 211–14; and Mulligan, “Plural
Voting for the 21st Century.”
51 Frederick, “Cognitive Reflection and Decision Making”; and Stanovich, “The Comprehensive Assessment of Rational Thinking.”
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power that critics of epistocracy worry about—namely, one where politically
irrational citizens find their political power unduly increased.52
Forgoing indirect measures, one might rely upon measures that directly test
for political rationality. For instance, we can measure levels of political rationality in the same way that the political psychologists cited by critics of epistocracy
measure it. In other words, in addition to examining the degree to which citizens possess knowledge of politically relevant facts, we can assess, among other
things, the degree to which they are capable of mitigating confirmation and disconfirmation biases (as well as other cognitive biases), the degree to which they
are willing and able to update their beliefs in response to evidence in ways that
are incongruent with their prior positions, the degree to which they can fairly
and accurately state the strongest case for views they are ideologically opposed
to, and so on. Discussing the precise details of such measures will involve empirical concerns that are beyond the scope of this paper. The important point
for our purposes is that while such direct measures are far more accurate than
indirect measures, their use is likely not feasible for an arrangement such as plural voting, for subjecting large numbers of citizens to these measures is likely too
expensive and too time consuming.
Generalizing the preceding discussion, it becomes clear that some forms of
epistocracy are more affected by the problem of epistocratic irrationality than
others. To a first approximation, forms of epistocracy that involve very large
numbers of citizens—up to and including the entire electorate—are most negatively impacted. For example, schemes of restricted suffrage and, as noted, plural
voting, are likely not feasible given the problem of epistocratic irrationality and
a lack of accurate, cost-effective indirect measures for refined selection mechanisms. At the same time, though, since the cost of utilizing more precise, direct measures of political rationality varies with institutional background, some
forms of epistocracy will be able to feasibly make use of them. Roughly put, as
we reduce the number of people to which we seek to apply individually costly
measures of political rationality, the aggregate cost of using such measures decreases to such an extent that certain epistocratic institutions become correspondingly more feasible.
What forms of epistocracy can avail of these direct measures? To take an example, consider again veto council epistocracy. Recall that under this form of
epistocracy a select group of highly competent individuals would constitute an
epistocratic council tasked with overseeing the legislative activities of other in52 Kahan suggests that there is indeed an inverse correlation between the relevant traits (“Misconceptions, Misinformation, and the Logic of Identity-Protective Cognition”). If this is
correct, the use of indirect measures of political rationality may not be feasible whatsoever.
Is Epistocracy Irrational?
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stitutions. Extremely demanding qualification requirements would be in place
to ensure that only the most competent and knowledgeable individuals are
admitted. Adding further tests with the aim of preventing politically irrational
agents from joining the council would yield higher feasibility costs compared to
a veto council without these tests. Importantly, though, the relatively low numbers involved ensures that veto council epistocracy has much lower aggregate
feasibility costs than arrangements like plural voting or restricted suffrage epistocracy. While the latter arrangements employ significantly simpler qualification
requirements, the massive number of tests required drives the feasibility costs
up. In contrast, the veto council has lower total feasibility costs even though it
uses relatively sophisticated qualification requirements. For veto council epistocracy, then, further tests to distinguish between prospective council members
of varying levels of rationality are not the drawback they were for epistocracies
with higher feasibility costs. Accordingly, the use of refined selection mechanisms provides the veto council with a plausible tool to mitigate the problem of
epistocratic irrationality.
Something similar is true of other epistocratic institutions aiming to increase
the political influence of relatively low numbers of individuals. For instance, the
enfranchisement lottery, wherein a descriptively representative random sample of
the population is selected in order to engage in competence-building exercises so
that they become better-informed about ballot options, could easily be tweaked
to accommodate concerns regarding epistocratic irrationality.53 Rather than competence-building exercises alone, descriptively random samples of the population
could be subjected to additional screening to ensure that only appropriately rational citizens are furnished with voting rights. For another, consider rule by simulated oracle.54 Under this arrangement, we simulate what the electorate would
prefer if they were fully informed about important politically relevant facts. Oversimplifying somewhat, we achieve this by surveying citizens’ political preferences together with their demographic information, as well as testing their political
knowledge. We can then simulate what their preferences would be if we simulated
full knowledge while holding the rest of their demographics fixed. A natural modification to such an institution, then, is to use the same method to simulate political
preferences given full information and high levels of political rationality.
Summing up, then, while the problem of epistocratic irrationality threatens some epistocratic institutions, others are much less threatened. Restricted
suffrage and plural voting may not be feasible, but institutions such as the veto
53 For more on the enfranchisement lottery, see López-Guerra, Democracy and Disenfranchisement, 4; and Brennan, Against Democracy, 214–15.
54 Brennan, Against Democracy, 220–22; Ahlstrom-Vij, “The Case for Modelled Democracy.”
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council, enfranchisement lottery, and even rule by simulated oracle can be readily modified to better avoid increasing the power of knowledgeable but irrational
citizens.55
3.2. Conservative Epistocratic Institutions
Refined selection mechanisms provide a potentially useful tool for epistocrats
seeking to safeguard more radical epistocratic proposals against the harms of
widespread epistocratic irrationality. But there are easier ways to increase the
likelihood that the costs of epistocratic irrationality are outweighed by the benefits of empowering more knowledgeable people. Instead of opting for controversial institutional reforms, we could adjust existing institutions in ways that
have a good track record of improving performance. In the same vein, we could
protect currently successful institutions where disproportionate levels of political power are already placed in the hands of more knowledgeable people. These
sorts of conservative epistocratic proposals either modify existing institutions in an
epistocratic direction or prevent the modification of existing institutions in less
epistocratic directions.
By “conservative,” I mean to stress the sense in which these proposals are
either manifestations of institutions we already have experience with or are
significantly influenced by such institutions. Specifically, these are institutions
that have a track record of good performance (relative to some non-epistocratic
alternative). Consider the difference between a plural voting scheme utilizing
refined selection mechanisms and, say, requiring that civil servants possess certain qualifications. Transitioning from democratic institutions with universal
and equal suffrage to plural voting is risky, at least in part owing to uncertainty
surrounding the efficacy of such an institution. We may have suggestive indirect
evidence bearing on the prospective performance of plural voting, but we can
point to very few concrete exemplars with an actual track record we can examine.56 In contrast, requiring that civil servants possess certain qualifications relevant to the role they occupy is conservative in the sense that we have concrete
evidence bearing on the importance of qualifications. If one were to measure the
performance of civil engineers with legitimate engineering credentials against
55 Additionally, forms of limited epistocracy empowering a relatively low number of experts in
narrowly circumscribed roles could feasibly avail of precise and costly measures of political
rationality. On limited epistocracy, see Jeffrey, “Limited Epistocracy and Political Inclusion.”
56 Plural voting schemes of different sorts have historically been adopted by several countries,
including the United Kingdom, New Zealand, and the Republic of Ireland. But it is important to note that these forms of plural voting were not identical to the sorts of plural voting
defended by contemporary epistocrats, let alone epistocracy with refined selection mechanisms. Their evidential import is thus unclear.
Is Epistocracy Irrational?
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the performance of civil engineers without such credentials, one would quickly
see the virtues of qualification requirements that are, strictly speaking, epistocratic constraints on access to civil service positions.
Conservative epistocratic institutions of this sort have recently been defended
by Garret Jones.57 For example, drawing on a wide range of data from political
science, he argues that independent central banks typically outperform central
banks more tightly constrained by democratic politics. Independent central
banks are more reliably correlated with low rates of inflation, low and stable rates
of unemployment, steady economic growth, fewer financial crises, and more.58
Maintaining the independence of central banks is epistocratic to the extent that
insulation from democratic politics allows members of the central bank to draw
upon their expertise in a more consistent fashion than would be possible if they
were subject to pressure from the electorate, representatives of the electorate, and
so on. Epistocrats, then, may wish to protect currently independent central banks
from modification in less epistocratic directions. Alternatively, they may urge
states without independent central banks to move in an epistocratic direction.59
Jones defends other institutions on similar grounds. For example, he argues
that appointed, epistocratic city treasurers typically outperform elected treasurers, doing a better job of managing their city’s finances.60 Moreover, he suggests
that the virtues of such institutions provide us with a blueprint for creating novel
epistocratic institutions. Drawing on work from Maskin and Tirole, he writes
that “when it is crucial to get the technical details right and when the policy debate is less about values and more about facts and competent execution, that is a
likely a good opportunity to delegate power to unelected bureaucrats.61 For instance, extending the rationale behind maintaining an independent central bank,
we could implement a Federal Tax Board.62 A broad division of labor could exist
between Congress (which would decide the broad contours of policy) and the
Federal Tax Board (which would focus on the precise details). Implementation
of such a novel epistocratic institution is certainly less conservative than main57 Jones, 10% Less Democracy.
58 Jones, 10% Less Democracy, 41–62.
59 One may think that having no central bank whatsoever is better than having either an independent central bank or a central bank constrained by democratic politics (Rothbard, The
Case Against the Fed). But this is consistent with thinking that if we are to have a central bank,
then we should have an independent central bank. In such a case, the epistocratic institution
is still preferable to the democratic institution on instrumental grounds, even if there is an
instrumental justification for abolishing the institution entirely.
60 Jones, 10% Less Democracy, 76–80.
61 Maskin and Tirole, “The Politician and the Judge”; and Jones, 10% Less Democracy, 91–92.
62 Jones, 10% Less Democracy, 93–94. See also Blinder, Advice and Dissent.
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taining the independence of an already independent central bank. But it is much
less radical than, say, transitioning to a political arrangement characterized by
use of the enfranchisement lottery since there is already much evidence that institutions of the former sort can outperform democratic alternatives.
For the purposes of this paper, we can remain silent on whether Jones correctly assesses the relevant data. The important point is that opting only for conservative epistocratic institutions offers a simple way for epistocrats to overcome
the problem of political irrationality. This claim immediately raises two separate
questions. First, what sorts of conservative institutions count as epistocratic?
Second, and more important, in what way do these institutions help overcome
the problem of epistocratic irrationality?
Regarding the first question, let us count as epistocratic any institution that
makes the possession of knowledge or expertise an official requirement of occupying certain roles. According to this account, many existing institutions
are epistocratic even if not widely recognized as such. For instance, limits to
universal suffrage withholding the right to vote from children are epistocratic
to the extent that they are defended on the grounds that children (especially
young children) lack sufficient knowledge or judgment to vote competently.63
Similarly, members of the judiciary are subject to epistocratic constraints given that jurisprudential expertise is a legal requirement for attaining the relevant
positions. Conservative epistocratic reforms, then, might often take the form of
implementing these sorts of relatively uncontroversial institutions (or, alternatively, safeguarding them against those who would wish to remove epistocratic
constraints).
Regarding the second question, conservative epistocratic institutions undermine the problem of epistocratic irrationality because there is much evidence
suggesting that the relevant institutions outweigh the costs associated with epistocratic irrationality. In a sense, reliance upon conservative institutions builds in
a response to the problem of epistocratic irrationality from the outset, since this
problem trades on the prospect of the costs outweighing the benefits. This is not
to say that conservative institutions will always be superior to more radical ones
such as plural voting, the veto council, and so on. But conservative institutions
can be defended in a less speculative fashion. In addition to epistocracies using
refined selection mechanisms with low feasibility costs, then, conservative epistocratic institutions provide a relatively clear way for epistocrats to rebut worries
revolving around epistocratic irrationality—they simply outperform their democratic counterparts, even if more knowledgeable citizens tend to be less rational
than less knowledgeable citizens.
63 Brennan, “The Right to a Competent Electorate,” 701.
Is Epistocracy Irrational?
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Before moving on, two further clarifications are in order. First, the class
of conservative epistocratic institutions can shift over time as more evidence
is gathered regarding the efficacy of different institutions. If epistocratic councils were to be formed in many different countries, and if such councils were to
perform well, they could eventually be classified as conservative in the relevant
sense. As evidence of their solid performance mounts, it would become correspondingly less risky to consider implementing them.
Second, conservative proposals are not necessarily proposals to modify institutions incrementally (or proposals to prevent the incremental modification
of existing institutions in less epistocratic directions). In general, institutional
reform might take place in increments—that is, by slight adjustments along the
margins of existing institutions. Whether a given adjustment counts as incremental is vague, but one can point to clear instances of incremental adjustments
as against non-incremental adjustments. Intensifying the qualification requirements for access to certain civil service positions is an incremental adjustment,
while the abolition of universal suffrage is not. In practice, conservative epistocratic reform will often be incremental. Incremental adjustments may be easier to attempt, and it may subsequently be easier to develop a body of evidence
about their performance. But in principle we could have solid evidence about
wide-ranging epistocratic reforms. If so, these non-incremental reforms would
properly be described as conservative in the sense outlined earlier. If conservative epistocratic reforms tend to be incremental, this at most reflects a contingent fact about what sorts of reforms people are typically willing to attempt.
4. Objections and Replies
In this section, I address some objections to the claims defended in previous
sections. First, one might worry that empowering collections of individually
rational agents may not translate to collectively rational group decision-making. If groups constituted by individually rational agents can behave irrationally,
then even epistocracy with refined selection mechanisms might not solve the
problem of epistocratic irrationality. Second, one might worry that the problem
of epistocratic irrationality can only be solved by epistocratic institutions that
would create or exacerbate other more serious problems. If so, epistocratic institutions should not be implemented.
4.1. Epistocracy and the Independence Thesis
Individual and group rationality can pull apart. Individually irrational agents can
form rational groups, and individually rational agents can form irrational groups.
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Call this the Independence Thesis.64 For example, individual scientists who dogmatically defend certain theories can help ensure that good theories remain
within the wider scientific community.65 This, in turn, might help the scientific
community ultimately converge on the truth. By analogy, perhaps a political decision-making body constituted by individually irrational agents can somehow
outperform one constituted by individually rational agents.
The Independence Thesis complicates the process of creating epistemically
well-functioning groups, in politics and elsewhere. One cannot simply gather a
collection of individually rational agents and subsequently guarantee collectively rational decision-making. One must also pay attention to the group’s internal structure, its dynamics, and more. Consequently, the case for using refined
epistocratic selection mechanisms becomes considerably more complex since
we cannot be sure that the eventual group of individually rational (and well-informed) agents will behave in collectively rational ways. If that is right, then we
should be less confident in the ability of refined selection mechanisms to overcome the problem of epistocratic irrationality.
Though programmatic, this sort of objection is undeniably important. If epistocrats are serious about designing epistemically well-functioning institutions,
they must consider the internal structure and group dynamics of the relevant
decision-making bodies they seek to implement. With that said, there are at least
three important qualifications one must bear in mind regarding such an appeal
to the Independence Thesis.
First, the Independence Thesis does not say that no decision-making body
constituted by individually rational agents can behave in collectively rational
ways. Nor does it say that no epistocratic institution can outperform any democratic institution. Instead, it tells us that individual and group rationality pull
apart. It cautions us against thinking that when we have a collection of individually rational agents, we thereby have a group of agents that will together behave rationally. But whether any given group is in fact organized in epistemically
optimal ways is an empirical question. We should not assume that refined selection mechanisms will automatically yield rational groups, to be sure, but we
also should not assume that we cannot successfully use refined selection mechanisms to mitigate the problem of epistocratic irrationality.
64 Mayo-Wilson, Zollman, and Danks, “The Independence Thesis.” There are in fact several
different formulations of the underlying insight that individual and group rationality can
diverge. Strictly speaking, then, there is no single independence thesis (Mayo-Wilson, Zollman, and Danks, “The Independence Thesis,” 655). I set aside this complication moving
forward, writing of the independence thesis for convenience.
65 Zollman, “The Epistemic Benefit of Transient Diversity.”
Is Epistocracy Irrational?
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Second, an epistocratic tu quoque—much as the independence thesis complicates the case for epistocracy with refined selection mechanisms, it complicates
the case against epistocracy grounded in the problem of epistocratic irrationality.
The force of the problem of epistocratic irrationality lies in the fact that much
psychological research seemingly indicates that the sort of well-informed citizens
who would be empowered by epistocratic institutions are also typically less rational than their ill-informed peers. However, per the Independence Thesis, groups
of individually irrational agents can constitute collectively rational groups. Individually irrational and knowledgeable citizens might constitute epistemically
well-functioning groups despite their individual epistemic vices. Critics of epistocracy appealing to the Independence Thesis, then, undermine the case for
refined selection mechanisms at the cost of undermining their initial critique.
Third, and more positively, conservative epistocratic institutions are not subject to this worry. At the very least, this sort of worry is much less serious for conservative epistocratic institutions. By stipulation, we can already be reasonably
confident that the relevant institutions strike an appropriate balance between
individual and group rationality. At the very least, we can be reasonably confident that conservative epistocratic institutions do a better job of striking such a
balance than their democratic counterparts. If no such institutions existed, then
the Independence Thesis would be much more troublesome for epistocrats. But
since we can find examples of conservative epistocratic institutions, then at least
some epistocratic institutions remain viable.
Ultimately, then, the appeal to the Independence Thesis fails. For use of refined selection mechanisms, it is inconclusive, at most suggesting that we ought
to be cautious in assuming that group rationality will emerge from the interaction of individually rational agents. For conservative epistocratic institutions,
we can already be confident that group rationality does indeed emerge from the
interactions of the agents constituting the relevant group, at least to a certain
extent.
4.2. The Problem of Unintended Consequences
To be fully successful, political institutions designed to solve certain problems
need to avoid creating or exacerbating comparably severe (or even worse) problems. An anti-corruption agency with exorbitantly high operational costs, even if
it functions as intended, might be a net cost if the funds allocated to its operation
could have been better used elsewhere.66 Along the same lines, epistocratic institutions with the means to overcome the problem of epistocratic irrationality
66 In general, the optimal level of corruption in any given society might be nonzero. Cf. Klitgaard, Controlling Corruption.
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might solve that problem only while creating or exacerbating others. If the costs
of these other problems exceed the benefits of the relevant epistocratic institutions, we should deem these institutions failures, even if they successfully tackle
the problem they were designed to tackle.
For instance, suppose that a veto council can successfully overcome the problem of epistocratic irrationality, with its low feasibility costs allowing it to deploy
highly multifaceted selection mechanisms. But suppose further that this council would increase risks of abuse and corruption that, in expectation, outweigh
the expected gains.67 If so, we ought not implement the veto council. Taken in
isolation, the institution is a success, performing its function as intended. But
when its overall impact on the larger political arrangement of which it is a part
is considered, it is a failure. It worsens other problems, even if unintentionally.
Like the previous appeal to the Independence Thesis, this objection is at best
inconclusive. Whether potential complications would arise, even with epistocratic institutions well-equipped to overcome the problem of epistocratic irrationality, is an empirical question. At most, it again counsels us to adopt a cautious approach to the implementation of novel political institutions. However,
this is—or ought to be—a perfectly general point. The expected complications
of novel institutions need to be factored into their overall assessment of whether they are epistocratic or democratic, and we should proceed with caution if
uncertain about the downstream negative consequences of implementing them.
Moreover, and again like the previous objection, this worry is most serious
for nonconservative epistocratic proposals for which there is uncertainty regarding their efficacy. But conservative epistocratic institutions are precisely those
institutions for which we have some evidence of their merits. Since we have evidence of the expected performance of these institutions, in some cases we can
be confident that they will not create or exacerbate problems to such an extent
that the gains from mitigating epistocratic irrationality are outweighed by the
costs. There may indeed be costs associated with civil service qualification requirements, independent central banks, and the like, but the evidence suggests
that these costs are outweighed by various gains.
The problem of unintended consequences does not show that epistocratic
67 Vandamme, “What’s Wrong with an Epistocratic Council?” Two complications are omitted
here as they are beyond the scope of this paper. First, that the veto council might increase
the risk of various political abuses is simply taken for granted to illustrate a wider point,
namely, that institutions may have unintended consequences that militate against their implementation. Second, I ignore the possibility that epistocratic institutions could be modified to avoid political abuse. Though I cannot defend the claim here, I think that worries
about the potential abuse of epistocratic institutions are often overstated, especially given
the possibility of modifications that could be made to such institutions to prevent abuse.
Is Epistocracy Irrational?
277
institutions are infeasible. For nonconservative proposals, it shows at most that
we should be cautious about implementing them. Conservative epistocratic institutions, as before, bypass this problem. We can already be confident that they
do not create negative unintended consequences that outweigh their expected
benefits.
5. Conclusion
Epistocrats perhaps reasonably worry about high levels of political ignorance
among voters. But their critics reasonably observe in turn that increasing the
political power of those citizens who possess more knowledge is not guaranteed
to constitute an improvement over the status quo. If these citizens also happen
to be much less rational than their ignorant peers, epistocratic reforms might
just make things worse.
It is important in that regard to get clear on what the data from political psychology shows. As argued in section 2, critics of epistocracy overstate the degree
to which the relevant findings establish that different epistocratic institutions
would empower irrational citizens in harmful ways. More crucially, though, critics of epistocracy have overlooked the possibility that certain incarnations of
epistocracy could overcome the problem of epistocratic irrationality entirely,
even if the relevant psychological data has the implications that critics claim it
has. Perhaps more refined epistocratic selection mechanisms could allow us to
screen for irrational citizens, provided the feasibility costs of using such mechanisms are sufficiently low. Perhaps we could play it safe, opting to implement
or preserve conservative institutions with a track record of solid performance.
Perhaps both could be pursued in tandem. Whatever the case, epistocrats have
viable strategies for mitigating the problem of epistocratic irrationality.
On balance, then, while critics of epistocracy have alerted us to potential
complications that could arise upon transitioning to some form of epistocracy,
they have not shown that all forms of epistocracy are equally suspect. The problem of epistocratic irrationality, if it is indeed a problem, can be overcome.68
Rutgers University
adam.gibbons@rutgers.edu
68 Many thanks to Alex Guerrero, Michael Hannon, Oliver Traldi, audiences at Rutgers University and the Forethought Foundation, and two anonymous referees for their feedback on
this paper.
278
Gibbons
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