Unequal Use of Social Insurance Benefits:
The Role of Employers*
Sarah Banaa
Maya Rossin-Slaterc
Kelly Bedardb
Jenna Stearnsd
April 19, 2019
Abstract
California’s Disability Insurance (DI) and Paid Family Leave (PFL) programs have become important sources of social insurance, with benefit payments now exceeding those of the state’s Unemployment Insurance program. However, there is considerable inequality in program take-up.
While existing research shows that firm-specific factors explain a significant part of the growing
earnings inequality in the U.S., little is known about the role of firms in determining the use of
public leave-taking benefits. Using administrative data from California, we find strong evidence
that DI and PFL program take-up is substantially higher in firms with high earnings premiums. A
one standard deviation increase in the firm premium is associated with a 57 percent higher claim
rate incidence. Our results suggest that changes in firm behavior have the potential to impact
social insurance use and thus reduce an important dimension of inequality in America.
Keywords: Disability Insurance, Paid Family Leave, Social insurance, Firm premium
JEL: J31, J32, J38
*
We thank Kent Strauss for valuable research assistance. We thank Isaac Sorkin, as well as seminar participants at the University of Toronto, the All-California Labor Economics conference and the AEA meetings for helpful
comments. Rossin-Slater is grateful for support from the National Science Foundation (NSF) CAREER Award No.
1752203. Any opinions, findings, and conclusions or recommendations expressed in this paper are those of the authors
and do not necessarily reflect the views of the National Science Foundation. All errors are our own. The California
Employment Development Department (EDD) had the right to comment on the results of the paper, per the data use
agreement between the authors and the EDD.
a
University of California, Santa Barbara. E-mail: sarah.bana@gmail.com.
b
University of California, Santa Barbara; IZA. E-mail: kelly.bedard@ucsb.edu.
c
Stanford University; NBER; IZA. E-mail: mrossin@stanford.edu.
d
University of California, Davis. E-mail: jestearns@ucdavis.edu.
1 Introduction
The dramatic rise in U.S. inequality in recent decades has motivated a burgeoning literature on its
causes and consequences along a number of dimensions, including wages (Acemoglu and Autor, 2011),
income (Chetty et al., 2014), wealth (Saez and Zucman, 2016), health (Currie, 2011; Chetty et al., 2016),
and family structure (Lundberg, 2015). When it comes to the growth in earnings inequality, recent research
emphasizes the role of employers, finding that most of the increase is due to widening earnings dispersion
between, rather than within, firms (Song et al., 2018). But less is known about the influence of employers
on other aspects of inequality among Americans, or about non-wage differences between high-paying and
low-paying firms. In this paper, we aim to understand how firms contribute to inequality in the use of
public short-term leave-taking social insurance programs, which allow individuals to take partially paid
leave for their own medical issues or to care for new children or ill family members.
A growing body of evidence demonstrates that access to temporary social insurance has beneficial labor market and health effects on workers and their families (e.g., Rossin-Slater, 2018; Olivetti and Petrongolo, 2017; Stearns, 2015; Carneiro et al., 2015), and can even generate positive externalities for the
broader population (Stearns and White, 2018). However, the availability of short-term disability insurance
(DI) and paid family leave (PFL) is highly limited in the United States. There is no federal legislation, and
only five states have implemented public programs.1 Most firms do not provide their own private benefits
either, or if they do, they do not necessarily offer them to all of their employees. According to 2017 data,
only about one third of all firms offer any paid maternity leave to workers, and only 17 percent offer paid
paternity leave (Kurani et al., 2017). Overall, just 15 percent of workers have access to PFL and 39 percent
have access to short-term DI.2
In addition to being limited, access to and the use of short-term social insurance in the U.S. is highly
unequal. Only 6 and 19 percent of workers in the bottom quartile of the wage distribution have access to
employer-provided PFL and short-term DI, respectively, compared to 25 and 54 percent of workers in the
top quartile. Even in states with government programs, not all workers are equally able to take advantage
1
California, New York, New Jersey, and Rhode Island have both short-term DI and PFL programs. Hawaii has a short-term
DI program but no PFL. Washington state, Washington, D.C., and Massachusetts have enacted paid family and medical leave
legislation set to go into effect in the coming years.
2
Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics, National Compensation Survey, March 2017, https://www.bls.gov/ncs/
ebs/benefits/2017/benefits_tab.htm.
1
of public benefits. For instance, despite the almost universal eligibility of workers in California, DI and
PFL take-up rates are still substantially different across industries, firm sizes, and earnings quartiles for
both men and women (Bana et al., 2018a). As most workers learn about public social insurance benefits
through their employers, and polls document that lack of awareness about these programs is a major
barrier to take-up (DiCamillo and Field, 2015), insights into the relationship between firm characteristics
and program use are critical for understanding the drivers of these disparities.
This paper uses ten years of administrative data from California to provide the first evidence on the role
of firms in explaining differences in short-term social insurance take-up. Drawing on a well-established
literature that demonstrates that observably similar firms pay observably similar workers different wages
(i.e., employer-specific wage premiums, or “firm fixed effects”) (see, e.g.: Abowd et al., 1999; Card et al.,
2013, 2016; Barth et al., 2016; Card et al., 2018; Sorkin, 2018; Song et al., 2018), we analyze the relationship between the employer earnings premium and the share of employees within a firm who take DI or
PFL in any given year. Whether firms with higher earnings premiums are more or less conducive to benefit
take-up is theoretically ambiguous. Workers at higher premium firms might face a higher opportunity cost
of taking leave, or be more likely to have access to private DI or PFL benefits that could crowd-out the use
of public programs. But employers that offer private benefits may have a particularly strong incentive to
encourage public benefit take-up, as it can lower the cost to the firm. Higher earnings premium firms—
which are likely to be more innovative and productive than their lower-premium counterparts (Van Reenen,
1996; Faggio et al., 2010; Barth et al., 2016)—may also view their wage setting policies as complements
to creating a workplace culture conducive to leave-taking.
To answer this question, we combine two data sets from the California Employment Development
Department (CA EDD): the universe of DI and PFL claims over fiscal years 2004-2013, and quarterly
earnings data for nearly all California employees from 2000 to 2014. Our empirical strategy involves
two main steps. First, we estimate employer earnings premiums using the seminal Abowd, Kramarz and
Margolis (1999) (AKM) methodology that includes both worker and firm fixed effects to account for nonrandom sorting of workers across firms. Second, we aggregate the data to an employer level panel and
estimate Poisson regressions of the number of social insurance claims within a firm in a given year on the
firm earnings premium, controlling for firm size, industry and year fixed effects, and the percentage of
female employees in each industry-year.
2
We find strong evidence that public temporary social insurance program take-up is higher in firms with
relatively higher earnings premiums. A one standard deviation increase in the firm earnings premium is
associated with a 57 percent increase in the incidence rate of claims. The effect of the firm premium is
similar for claims made by men and women, and exists for both DI and PFL. We also show that the effect
is largest for workers in the lower half of the employer-specific earnings distribution, suggesting that a
firm’s premium is particularly important in determining the non-wage benefit use of its lowest-earning
employees. Although high-premium firms have higher claim rates relative to low-premium firms, they
also have lower average leave durations and higher employee retention rates following periods of leave.
The results indicate that characteristics of firm culture that are reflected in the firm earnings premium
may be key to increasing take-up rates of public social insurance in California. If all firms behaved as those
in the top third of the firm premium distribution, a back-of-the-envelope calculation suggests that takeup rates for DI and PFL would increase by 25 and 29 percent, respectively.3 By contrast, prior research
demonstrates that specific policy levers—such as the wage replacement rate—have limited effects on takeup. Ziebarth (2013) shows that changes in wage replacement rates do not significantly affect take-up rates
of a DI program that covers work absences longer than six weeks, while Ziebarth and Karlsson (2010) find
that a large cut in the sick pay replacement rate in Germany had a relatively small impact on leave use, and
only for a sub-group of workers with a limited history of work absences. In Japan, Asai (2015) finds that
an increase in the maternity leave wage replacement rate has no effect on job continuity or leave duration
among new mothers. Finally, in California, Bana et al. (2018b) show that a higher replacement rate does
not increase PFL duration among high-earning mothers.
Our paper contributes to a growing literature on the determinants of public short-term leave takeup, which in the U.S. has mostly focused on the implementation of California’s first-in-the-nation PFL
program in 2004 (Rossin-Slater et al., 2013; Das and Polachek, 2015; Baum and Ruhm, 2016; Bartel
et al., 2018).4 Outside the U.S., many studies examine the effects of extensions in PFL policies (or,
3
These calculations assume that claim rates are specific to three firms sizes (5-24, 25-99, and 100+ average employees),
seventeen industries, and three terciles. The thought experiment reported here increases the claim rate in the first two terciles to
the third tercile within specific firm size and industry categories. In other words, differential claim rates by firm size and industry
are held constant.
4
The small literature on state DI programs is largely focused on pregnacy-related coverage. Stearns (2015) exploits a law that
required state DI programs to start covering pregnancy as a disability to look at the impact of benefits on infant health. Campbell
et al. (2018) estimate the impact of pregnancy coverage under DI in Rhode Island on maternal labor supply and other outcomes.
There is also a substantial literature on the effects of long-term disability (which covers permanent withdrawal from the labor
market) on labor supply in the U.S. (e.g., Gruber, 2000; Autor and Duggan, 2003; Chen and van der Klaauw, 2008).
3
less frequently, introductions of new programs) on parental leave-taking and labor market outcomes (see
Rossin-Slater, 2018; Olivetti and Petrongolo, 2017 for recent overviews), but less is known about the use
of temporary DI programs. In general, the existing studies find that very short-term sick leave use is
positively correlated with the generosity of the benefits, while the relationship with longer periods of leave
is less clear (Pettersson-Lidbom and Thoursie, 2013; Henrekson and Persson, 2004; Johansson and Palme,
2005; Dale-Olsen, 2014; Ziebarth and Karlsson, 2010; Ziebarth, 2013).
Moreover, we know little about other non-policy-driven determinants of temporary social insurance
take-up.5 Research on the importance of workplace culture in promoting work-family balance often relies
on case studies and small samples, and cannot shed light on the characteristics of firms that support benefit
take-up on a broader scale (Clark, 2001; Kelly et al., 2011; Moen et al., 2016). More relevant to our work,
Dahl et al. (2014) find large peer effects in the take-up of publicly provided paternity leave in Norway,
arguing that increased knowledge about employer reactions to leave is a primary mechanism. A separate
literature on firm-specific premiums has quantified their importance in driving wage inequality (Card et al.,
2013, 2016; Song et al., 2018), but less is known about non-wage differences between high-premium and
low-premium firms.6 This paper bridges this gap by documenting a strong and robust association between
employer earnings premiums and the use of temporary paid leave. Our findings suggest that firm-specific
factors not only explain a substantial part of earnings dispersion, but also drive disparities in the use of
public social insurance benefits.
2 Temporary Social Insurance in California
California’s State Disability Insurance (SDI) is a partial wage-replacement insurance plan for workers
in the state. Participation in the SDI program is mandatory for most private sector employees, and over
18 million workers are currently covered. The SDI program is funded entirely through employee payroll
5
There is a small literature on the correlates with absenteeism, but these papers focus on very short-term absences (e.g.,
individual days) and are not necessarily relevant for studying PFL or DI. In these settings, absenteeism is often used as a proxy
for effort. Dionne and Dostie (2007) find workplace conditions, including standard schedules, work at home options, and reduced
workweeks are correlated with reduced absenteeism. Employment protection increases absenteeism as well (Riphahn, 2004;
Ichino and Riphahn, 2005).
6
Several recent papers examine the role of between- and within- firm factors on the gender wage gap. Hotz et al. (2017)
show that exogenously moving mothers to more family-friendly firms would shrink the gender gap in wages and income. Coudin
et al. (2018) show that sorting of workers inter firms explains more of the gender wage gap than bargaining in France, and Bruns
(2018) shows high-wage firms disproportionately employ men in Germany.
4
tax deductions and currently consists of two types of benefits: Disability Insurance (DI) and Paid Family
Leave (PFL). Work requirements for coverage are quite low. Eligible individuals must have earned at least
$300 in taxable wages in a base period 5 to 18 months before the start of the claim, and eligibility is not
employer-specific. The 2018 SDI tax rate is 1 percent on the first $114,967 earned, and is not experience
rated. During a claim, workers receive 55 percent of their base period earnings, up to a maximum weekly
benefit amount.7
The DI program was established in 1946 to provide short-term benefits to California workers who
experience a loss of wages when they are unable to work due to a non-work-related illness or injury.8
In 1978, the federal Pregnancy Discrimination Act required that states with DI programs start covering
pregnancy as a disability. Birth mothers in California are eligible for four weeks of DI benefits in the
period prior to their expected due date, and six weeks of benefits to recover from a vaginal, uncomplicated
childbirth (benefits can be extended by two weeks if the delivery is by Cesarean section, or longer if
there are other complications). The maximum length of a DI claim for any reason is 52 weeks, though the
average claim duration is around 16 weeks. Pregnancy/childbirth-related claims account for approximately
one quarter of all DI claims. There is a seven-day non-payable waiting period that must be served for all
claims, which reduces the moral hazard problem associated with many sick leave programs. Claimants
must also have a physician certify the disability. Workers are only eligible for benefits if they are losing
income during their absence, but firms can “top off” DI benefits through employer-provided paid sick
leave or other forms of paid time off up to the equivalent of the worker’s full salary.
In July 2004, California introduced its PFL program for new parents and caregivers. Eligible workers
can take up to six weeks of partially paid leave to bond with a newborn or newly adopted child or to care
for a seriously ill family member. The PFL program is structured in the same way as DI, with identical
earnings eligibility requirements and wage replacement rate schedules. Both men and women can use
the six weeks of PFL, while birth mothers can separately claim both DI and PFL for a total of 16 to 18
weeks of partially paid maternity leave. Between 2004 and 2013, about 90 percent of PFL claims were for
bonding with a new child; the remainder were for caregiving purposes. Roughly 74 percent of PFL claims
were filed by women, although the gender gap has narrowed over time.
7
As of January 1, 2018, the wage replacement rate has increased to 60-70 percent. The 2018 weekly maximum benefit is
$1,216.
8
Work-related injuries are covered under the Worker’s Compensation Insurance program, which is separate from DI.
5
Paid leaves under DI and PFL are not directly job protected, although 12 weeks of job protection
is available if the job absence simultaneously qualifies under the federal Family and Medical Leave Act
(FMLA) or California’s Family Rights Act (CFRA).9 The lack of job protection may be a significant barrier to DI and PFL take-up for some workers. Other workers may choose not to use available benefits due
to career concerns, or because they are unable to afford to take time off with only partial wage replacement.
The firm environment can also play a critical role in determining whether or not employees choose
to take leave. Many workers—especially those who are low-income—only hear about government social
insurance programs through their employers, if at all (Winston et al., 2017). A survey of a random sample
of California registered voters shows that in 2014, a decade after PFL went into effect, only 36 percent
of respondents were aware of the program (DiCamillo and Field, 2015). Thus, employers can potentially
increase take-up through simply providing their workers with information on the government benefits
available to them.
Whether or not California employers have an incentive to encourage eligible workers to use DI and
PFL benefits is ambiguous. On one hand, the program provides partially paid leave to workers at no direct
cost to firms. Employers do not have to pay workers during the absence, nor do they pay the taxes that
finance the program. Thus, SDI allows firms to offer workers the opportunity to take partially paid leave
for family or medical reasons in a relatively cheap way.
On the other hand, worker absences may be costly for firms in other ways. Even if firms do not pay
workers for time spent absent from work, productivity may be lower when regular employees are gone, or
employers may have to hire temporary replacements. If these costs are high enough, firms may actively
discourage workers from utilizing the benefits to which they are entitled. While workers at large firms
are legally protected under the FMLA and CFRA during absences of up to 12 weeks, employers may
discourage take-up in other ways. For example, they may create a culture where leave-takers are passed
over for future promotions, experience slower wage growth, or are assigned less desirable tasks upon their
return to work.
9
The FMLA was enacted in 1993 and provides 12 weeks of unpaid job protected family and medical leave to qualifying
workers. To be eligible for the FMLA, workers must have worked at least 1,250 hours in the preceding year for an employer with
at least 50 employees (within a 75 mile radius of the employment location). The CFRA is nearly identical to the FMLA in its
provisions and eligibility criteria.
6
3 Data
We merge data from two administrative data sets available to us through an agreement with the California Employment Development Department (EDD). The first data set is the universe of DI and PFL claims
from fiscal year 2004 to 2013. For each claim, we have information on the type of claim (DI, bonding
with a new child, or caring for an ill family member), the claim filed and claim effective dates, the total
benefit amount received, the authorized weekly benefit amount, the employee’s date of birth and gender,
and a unique employee identifier. For women with a PFL bonding claim, we also have an indicator for
whether there is an associated DI claim for that birth.
The second data set consists of individual-level quarterly earnings data over 2000-2014 for the universe
of employees working for an employer that reports to the EDD tax branch.10 In addition to the employee
identifier (which we use to link to the claims data), it includes earnings in each quarter and in each job, a
unique employer identifier associated with those earnings, and the North American Industry Classification
System (NAICS) industry code associated with the employer. As with most administrative earnings data
sets, demographic characteristics about the workers are unavailable. We know worker age and gender only
for those individuals who ever file a DI or PFL claim in this period.
3.1
Key variables
Because we are interested in the role of firms in social insurance benefit take-up, we collapse the
individual-level data to an employer-level panel. For each employer, we calculate average employment and
total earnings in each fiscal year (July-June).11 We then use the claims data to measure the total number
of claims taken within a firm in each year.12 Since eligibility for DI and PFL benefits is determined using
base period earnings and not current employment, we link each claim to the individual’s employer in the
quarter immediately preceding the start of the claim. Therefore, we are attributing the leave to the firm at
10
Employers that employ one or more employees and pay wages in excess of $100 in a calendar quarter are required to report
to the EDD according to California law.
11
We conduct the analysis using fiscal years because PFL became available on July 1, 2004. Our analysis includes fiscal years
2004-2013 (and uses data on claims from July 1, 2004 to June 30, 2014). We have information on DI claims since 2000, and
results including these earlier years are very similar. However, in order to be able to better compare the results across different
types of claims, the main analysis is limited to the years in which both programs are available.
12
As mentioned in Section 2, birth mothers are eligible to take both DI and PFL for a total of 16 weeks of leave, and this is
recorded as two separate claims in the data. From the perspective of both the firm and the mother, this is often taken as a single,
continuous period of leave. To avoid double counting leaves taken by these women, we treat associated DI and PFL claims as a
single event in the total count of claims.
7
which the individual worked at the point when he or she most likely decided to make the claim.13
We also calculate the number of claims separately by type and gender. Our key dependent variables
are: the total number of claims of any type by gender of the claimant, the number of DI claims by gender,
the number of bonding claims by gender, and the number of caring claims by gender. If firms care only
about the total number of worker absences and do not differentiate between leaves taken for different reasons, then counting the total number of claims within a firm is reasonable. But we also separate out claims
by type because firms may have different attitudes toward leaves related to childcare, family member care,
and own health issues, and the effect of the firm premium may differ as well.14 We separate claims by gender because the overall take-up rates are quite different, and firms may treat male and female employees
differently in terms of norms regarding work absences.
To study leave duration and post-leave employment outcomes, we calculate the average leave duration
within the firm (conditional on the firm having at least one claim), the share of the firm’s claimants that
return to work in the firm or in any job within five quarters following the start of the claim, and the average
change in log real earnings of claimants between the quarter preceding the leave and the fifth quarter
following the start of the claim.15
3.2
Sample restrictions
We make several restrictions on our analysis sample. First, we exclude firms whose average em-
ployment over 2004-2013 is less than 5 employees. We do so because self-employed workers (including
independent contractors), individuals who are employers in sole proprietorships or partnerships, and individuals in family employment are not required to participate in the SDI program, and thus are not automatically eligible for benefits. Additionally, the probability of having a claim in any given year is close
to zero for very small firms.16 Second, because some public sector employees and domestic workers are
not covered by SDI, we exclude firms in the three industries least likely to be subject to SDI coverage:
13
Some individuals do not have reported earnings in the quarter preceding the claim. For these individuals, we use the employer
from two quarters before the claim. This constitutes 3.3 percent of the sample.
14
Although women who make associated DI and bonding claims are only counted once in the total claims measure, they are
counted as having both a DI and a bonding claim in the counts by claim type. Therefore, the total number of claims is not equal
to the sum of the other three measures.
15
We use five quarters because the maximum length of a DI claim is 52 weeks. Doing so ensures that none of the firm’s
claimants are still on leave for the relevant claim.
16
This restriction drops 68 percent of employer-year observations, but only 7.5 percent of workers. Results are qualitatively
and quantitatively similar when only single-person firms are excluded, as shown in Appendix Table A3.
8
elementary and secondary schools, public administration, and private households.
Third, since our main variables of interest are constructed by summing counts over quarterly data, we
exclude the 3.8 percent of firm-year observations where the firm is not observed in all four quarters of
a given fiscal year. In practice, this restriction implies that we often exclude the year that a firm enters
or exits the market. This exclusion is also important because former employees of firms that shut down
may be more likely to make a DI or PFL claim as a way to effectively extend unemployment insurance
benefits. As we seek to understand how the firm premium affects the likelihood that its current workers
make claims, the behavior of workers following a firm closure is not of primary interest in this paper.
Finally, as described below, the sample is limited to firms for which we can estimate a firm fixed effect.
This restriction effectively excludes firms that are not connected by worker mobility in the sample period
(see Section 4 for more detail).
3.3
Summary statistics
Our main analysis sample includes 2,709,253 firm-year observations. Table 1 shows summary statis-
tics for our main variables of interest. The first row shows the average firm claim rate by claim type.
Because overall take-up rates differ substantially by gender, the first four columns show female claims,
and the next four columns show male claims. When calculating rates, the denominator is total firm size in
the year, as we do not observe the gender of non-claimants in the data. The female overall and DI claim
rates are significantly higher than the male claim rates. Even accounting for the fact that only women can
file a DI pregnancy-related claim, women are still more likely than men to make a DI claim. This pattern
is true for bonding and caring claims as well.
The remaining rows of Table 1 show the mean claim rate by firm size groups, select large industries,
and terciles of the firm fixed effect distribution used to estimate firm quality (as described below). Larger
and higher fixed effect firms both have higher claim rates, previewing the regression results to come. There
is also substantial variation in the firm-level claim rates across industries. Firms in low-skill industries
such as retail trade and accommodation and food services have relatively low claim rates. Firms in the
healthcare and construction industries both have high female claim rates of about 6.2 percent (for any
claim), despite a dramatic difference in the gender composition across the two industries. For context,
only 9 percent of California construction workers between 2004 and 2013 were female, compared with
9
75 percent of workers in the healthcare industry. The age distribution of workers is less dispersed across
industries. Between 40 and 56 percent of workers in each industry are of childbearing age (age 20-39),
and 27-50 percent are age 40-59. Firms in accommodation and food services have the smallest share
of workers above age 40, while health care and manufacturing firms have the largest share. The vast
majority–92 percent–of bonding claims are made by workers age 20-39, while workers who make caring
claims are somewhat older on average. Women of childbearing age are more likely to make a DI claim
than older women, but the opposite is true for men. If 25 percent of all DI claims are for childbirth as
estimated by Chang (2015), then the non-childbearing related DI claim rates are approximately 36 percent
lower for younger compared to older women. This is very similar to the percentage difference in DI claim
rates for older and younger men.
Although we do not observe the gender or age composition of employment at the firm level, we do
know the demographic characteristics of California workers during this period at a more aggregate level.
There are approximately 6.3 female claims per 100 female workers in California, compared to 2.7 male
claims per 100 male workers. Female-specific claim rates are again higher than male claim rates for all
types of claims. Gender-specific claim rates vary across industries, with health care having the highest any
claim rate for both men and women. Importantly, while the levels differ, the pattern of the gender-specific
claim rates across industries are similar for men and women. This suggests that the differences in firmlevel claim rates in Table 1 are not driven by differences in worker composition across different types of
firms. Appendix Table A1 shows these gender-specific claim rates for workers in California.
4 Empirical Strategy
Our empirical strategy is comprised of two main steps. First, we estimate firm-specific earnings premiums, following the methodology originally proposed by Abowd, Kramarz and Margolis (1999) and
subsequently used by a growing literature on the role of firms in explaining earnings variance (Abowd
et al., 2003; Card et al., 2013, 2016; Macis and Schivardi, 2016; Lavetti and Schmutte, 2016). The idea
is to characterize the natural log of earnings as a function of additive worker and firm fixed effects. The
model is identified by job switchers, and predicts that the average earnings change of individuals who
move from a low to a high fixed effect firm will be opposite of the average earnings change of individuals
10
who move from a high to a low fixed effect firm.
Specifically, we use our quarterly earnings data from 2000 to 2014 to estimate:
Eijq = αi + φj(i,q) + γq + εijq
(1)
where Eijq is the log quarterly earnings of worker i with primary employer j in quarter q.17 The variable
αi is an individual fixed effect, which captures any time-invariant characteristics of the worker that are
rewarded equally at all firms. The firm fixed effect, φj(i,q) , represents the earnings premium that firm j
pays to all workers relative to a randomly chosen reference firm.18 We also flexibly control for aggregate
time trends in earnings through quarter fixed effects, γq , and εijq is an error term.
To reduce the computational burden, equation (1) is estimated using every third quarter of data from
the first quarter of 2000 through the fourth quarter of 2014.19 Because we are estimating both worker and
firm fixed effects, φj(i,q) is identified only within a “connected set” of employers. A group of workers and
employers is connected if the group includes all workers who ever worked for any employer in the group
and all employers at which any worker in the group was ever employed. We restrict the analysis to the
largest connected set, which includes 97.8 percent of firms and 99 percent of workers in the sample of
movers (workers observed at more than one firm over time) in California during this period.20
A central identifying assumption for estimating unbiased firm fixed effects is that mobility across firms
is unrelated to unobserved determinants of earnings changes among workers. This assumption would be
violated if, for instance, workers who were becoming more productive were systematically moving to only
certain types of firms. Additionally, model (1) assumes additive separability in the firm and worker fixed
17
Because some individuals have earnings from multiple employers in the same quarter and we do not observe hours worked,
we link workers to the firm at which they have the highest earnings in that quarter. The variable E therefore measures firm-specific
earnings in an individual’s highest earning job. Appendix Table A2 shows summary statistics for the AKM model.
18
Ideally, we would control for total worker experience, but we do not observe employment history prior to 2000. We have
also estimated a specification that controls for the worker’s cumulative quarters of experience since the first quarter of 2000. The
adjusted R2 of equation (1) only increases by about 1 percentage point when this measure is included. Fixed effects generated
with the inclusion of this experience measure produce results very similar to our main results, as shown in Appendix Table A4.
19
The estimation approach mirrors the Card et al. (2013) algorithm by extracting the sample of workers who changed
firms, finding the largest connected set and estimating the fixed effects using numerical methods. We modify Matlab code
available on Patrick Kline’s website: http://eml.berkeley.edu//˜pkline/papers/code_CHK.zip (retrieved 12/27/2017). We use the full period of earnings data to estimate the fixed effects in order to maximize the number of
observations per firm. We have also estimated fixed effects using only data from every quarter 2000-2004. Results are similar
and are shown in Appendix Table A5.
20
Although the connected set consists of almost all firms and workers within the sample of movers, not all workers change
employers between 2000 and 2014. The connected set includes 90.4 percent of all firms and 60.6 percent of all workers in
California during this period.
11
effects.
As evidence of the plausibility of these assumptions, we follow Card et al. (2013) and Card et al.
(2018) and plot mean log earnings for workers in six and three quarters before, the quarter of, and three
quarters after a job switch in Figure 1. We categorize workers into groups based on the mean earnings
quartile of other workers in the old and new firms. Specifically, we classify the earnings quartile of the old
job based on mean coworker earnings in the last year at that job, and the earnings quartile of the new job
based on mean coworker earnings in the first year at the new job. Job changers are then assigned to one of
16 cells based on the quartiles of the old and new firms. For ease of exposition, Figure 1 only shows the
earnings trajectories for workers in the eight cells that start at a firm either in the lowest or highest quartile.
The figure shows that, as expected, workers who start in the lowest and highest quartile firms have
different initial earnings levels. However, among workers who start out in a firm in the bottom coworker
earnings quartile, moving to a firm with higher coworker earnings raises own earnings. Analogously,
among those who start in a firm in the top coworker earnings quartile, a move to a lower quartile firm leads
to lower own earnings. Those who move to a firm in the same quartile experience very little change in
earnings on average. There is no evidence of any transitory change in earnings in the year before or after
a move, which, as Card et al. (2013) point out, suggests that the time-varying residual is uncorrelated with
mobility. Further, the symmetry of the gains for those who move from the first quartile to a higher quartile
and those who move down from the top quartile suggests that a simple additive model of worker and firm
fixed effects is reasonable.
The estimated firm fixed effects, φ̂j , can then be used to evaluate the relationship between the firm
earnings premium and paid leave benefit take-up. We first standardize the firm fixed effects, and then
estimate the effect of the firm’s earnings premium on the number of DI or PFL claims in a firm-year using
a Poisson model:
Claimsjnt = β φ̂j + δln(size)jt + ψP ctF emalent + θn + ηt + ǫjnt
(2)
where Claimsjnt is the number of claims in firm j in industry n and fiscal year t. The variable ln(size)
represents a firm’s average quarterly employment over the fiscal year, P ctF emale is the percentage of
female employees in the industry-year, and θn and ηt are industry and fiscal year fixed effects, respec-
12
tively.21 The coefficient of interest, β, captures the effect of a one standard deviation increase in the firm
earnings premium on the annual number of claims within the firm. To account for both the over-dispersion
in the data and the fact that φ̂j is a generated regressor, standard errors are bootstrapped 200 times.22
In order to interpret β as the causal effect of the firm earnings premium on the number of claims, the
estimated firm fixed effect cannot be correlated with any other unobservable determinants of claims. One
particular concern in this context is that we do not know what proportion of the firm’s workforce is eligible
to file a claim in any given year. While we assume that all of the firm’s employees pay into the SDI system,
not all workers will have a child and be eligible to make a bonding claim. Similarly, even if all workers are
eligible to potentially receive DI benefits, they need to experience a non-work-related illness or injury in
order to actually file a successful claim. We are therefore assuming that, conditional on firm size, industry,
and year, the firm earnings premium is uncorrelated with other demographic characteristics of the firm that
would affect the number of claims.
While this assumption is untestable in our data, we show that the effects of the firm premium are
robust across type of claim and observable firm characteristics. Moreover, prior research suggests that
the types of workers who are most likely to be eligible to take paid leave—e.g., women, who are more
likely than men to need leave for childbirth, bonding with a new child, or elder care—are over-represented
in low-premium rather than high-premium firms (Card et al., 2016). Thus, if anything, an unobserved
correlation between firm demographics and the firm-specific premium would bias us toward finding a
negative association between the firm premium and the leave-taking claim rate, which is the opposite of
what we show below. To further address concerns about sorting, we also aggregate the data to the industry
level and estimate regressions with and without industry-level controls in Section 5.3. This industry-level
analysis suggests that our main results are unlikely to be driven by sorting of workers into firms.
Lastly, we test for effects on a large number of outcomes. This creates a multiple inference problem
because the probability of making at least one Type I error due to sampling variability is increasing in
the number of estimates. We use the Bonferroni method to adjust the p-values to account for the multiple
21
Data on the percent of female employees in an industry-year in California comes from the 2004-2013 American Community
Survey.
22
If the left-hand side variable is over-dispersed, as is the case here, the Poisson model will still produce a consistent estimate
of β. The variance matrix can be consistently estimated using robust standard errors, and bootstrapping produces standard errors
that are asymptotically equivalent to the robust standard errors (Cameron and Trivedi, 2013). Bootstrapping in this setting is
extremely computationally intensive, but we have estimated the main results using 400 bootstraps and standard errors are almost
identical.
13
testing problem. This method controls the Family Wise Error Rate (FWER), which is the probability of
rejecting at least one true null hypothesis. The Bonferroni correction multiplies each p-value by M , the
total number of tests performed on a particular independent variable that are reported in all regular and
appendix tables. This ensures that the overall Type I error rate is maintained when performing all M
independent hypothesis tests. For example, for an estimated coefficient to be significant at the 1 percent
level, we would need a p-value, p, such that p ∗ M ≤ 0.01. The downside of the method is that it suffers
from poor power. As the number of hypotheses increases, the probability of Type II errors (failing to reject
the null when there is an effect) also increases. However, because of the size of our data set, the estimated
effects are quite precise and this loss of power is less of an issue than in other settings.
5 Results
5.1
Firm-specific premiums and leave-taking rates
Table 2 shows the effect of the firm earnings premium on the number of DI and PFL claims made by
employees of the firm in a given fiscal year. The reported coefficients from the Poisson model are incidence
rate ratios, obtained by calculating the exponential of the Poisson regression coefficients. Standard errors
are similarly transformed. The first column shows that a one standard deviation increase in the firm
premium is associated with a 56.9 percent increase in the firm’s overall claim rate for any type of claim for
both men and women. This effect is estimated with high precision, and the 95 percent confident interval
allows us to rule out effects smaller than 54.2 percent.
The remaining columns of Table 2 show the effects on the number of claims by gender and claim type.
The results present a remarkably consistent story. Higher premium firms have higher claim rates regardless
of the type of claim or the gender of the claimant. The percentage effects are somewhat larger for male
claims than female claims, and for PFL claims compared to DI claims. These results are not driven by
sample restrictions or choices involving the estimation of the firm fixed effects. Appendix Tables A3-A5
show the results are robust to including very small firms with 2-4 employees, including observed worker
experience in the estimation of the AKM fixed effects, and estimating the fixed effects using only data
from 2000 to 2004 (prior to the start of the main estimation sample).23
23
We have also estimated a specification that includes a measure of firm skill level as an additional control. We measure
14
Table 3 presents analogous results to Table 2, separated into claims made by younger and older workers. The first panel shows the effect of the firm premium on the number of claims among workers ages
20-39. These workers are of childbearing age, and make 92 percent of bonding claims in the estimation
sample. About 50 percent of DI claims and 33 percent of caring claims are made by individuals in this age
group as well. The second panel shows the effect on the number of claims to workers ages 40-59. These
older workers make 40 percent of DI claims and 56 percent of caring claims, but only about 6 percent of
bonding claims. While the underlying incidence rates of claims differ across these age groups, the estimated incidence rate ratios of the effect of working for a higher premium firm are similar to the overall
results in Table 2 for both younger and older workers.
In order to explore if these effects are driven by certain firm characteristics, Table 4 shows the effects
of the firm premium on the number of claims by firm size and industry. We present results for six firm
size groups and the six largest industries, and estimate separate regressions for each group. The results
suggest that the effects presented above are not driven by any one particular group. Although the effect
of the firm premium is generally increasing in firm size, the effect sizes are economically and statistically
significant for even the smallest firms. Interestingly, we do not find substantial differences in the effect
of the firm premium on firms with just above versus just below 50 employees. This firm size cutoff is
relevant because of eligibility for job protection under the FMLA and CFRA.24 This pattern indicates that
extending access to job protection may not be enough to reduce the gaps in leave take-up across different
types of firms.
There is more variation in the importance of the firm premium across industries. Table 4 shows the
effects on female claims are largest for firms in the construction sector, while the effects on male claims
are largest in accommodation and food services. In general, the effects are consistently positive across
industries. The one exception is that the effect of the firm premium on female claims is actually negative
for manufacturing firms. Manufacturing firms with a one standard deviation higher fixed effect have 51
average skill by taking the average of the individual fixed effects (estimated in equation 1) of the firm’s employees over the entire
sample period. The estimated effects of the firm premium on the number of claims are very similar with this added control. This
again suggests that the sorting of workers into firms is not driving the results. This measure of firm skill level is not included in
our main specification because we can only estimate individual fixed effects for movers in the connected set, and so it does not
capture the average skill of all workers in the firm. However, these results are available upon request.
24
Our measure of firm size is averaged over time, and therefore not a perfect proxy for FMLA/CFRA eligibility. Additionally,
FMLA/CFRA eligibility requires the employer to employ 50 or more employees within 75 miles of the work site, whereas we
observe total firm size and not establishment size or location.
15
percent fewer female claims overall, and the firm premium has no significant effect on the number of male
overall or DI claims.25 There is also no significant effect of the firm premium on DI claims among male
workers in the professional, scientific, and technical services industry, but the effects for male PFL claims
and all types of female claims are positive and significant. Overall, while there is variation in the effect
sizes across industries, there is no clear correlation between the firm premium and industry skill or other
industry characteristics.
The results presented so far show that high premium firms have higher leave-taking rates, and these
results are consistently significant across claim type, and the gender and age of claimant. The results are
also not driven by any particular industry or firm size group. The robustness of the effects of the firm
earnings premium on claim rates suggests that the relationship is unlikely to be solely driven by sorting
into certain types of firms by workers who need leave. Instead, the similarity of our findings across
worker and firm characteristics is more consistent with the interpretation that firm-specific culture—which
is associated with the earnings premium—is an important predictor of paid leave use.
However, one may still be concerned that the results are driven by only the highest skilled workers
within the firm. If high-premium firms are more supportive of only their top workers taking leave, but
are less inclined to support the low-earning workers, then the role of firms in reducing inequality in leave
take-up may be less important than it appears. To examine this possibility, we estimate the effect of the
firm premium on claims in each quartile of the firm-specific earnings distribution in Table 5. We find that
the firm premium has the strongest effects on the number of claims made by workers in the lower half of
the within-firm earnings distribution. In fact, the effects are monotonically decreasing in the within-firm
earnings quartile. A one standard deviation increase in the firm premium leads to more than a 100 percent
increase in the claim rate for all types of claims among workers in the bottom quartile. But the effects of
the firm premium on the number of claims in the top quartile are much smaller. For female overall and DI
claims, the estimates are actually significantly negative, although relatively small.
As high-ranking employees are the most likely to have access to employer-provided leave benefits
and/or flexible schedules, firms appear to play a bigger role in determining public social insurance take-up
among workers toward the bottom of the earnings distribution. The results in Table 5 imply that highpremium employers are relatively more supportive of their low-earnings workers taking paid leave through
25
Incidence rate ratios below 1 indicate a relatively lower likelihood of an event.
16
DI or PFL compared to lower-premium employers, but the role of the firm premium is less important for
relatively high-earning workers within a firm. Therefore, high-premium employers may contribute to
reducing disparities in leave use across high- and low-skill individuals.
5.2
Firm-specific premiums, leave duration, and post-leave outcomes
The results so far present clear evidence that higher-premium firms have higher paid leave claim rates.
However, conditional on having at least one employee who files a claim, firms with higher earnings premiums have shorter average claim durations. Table 6 shows that a one standard deviation increase in the
firm premium is associated with female claimants taking 1.02 fewer weeks of leave on average. Because
average duration is not a count variable, the regression results in this table are estimated using OLS, so
the coefficient can be interpreted as the effect of a one standard deviation change in the firm fixed effect
on average leave duration in weeks. The effect on DI claim duration is similar for men and women, but
the effect on bonding claim duration is more than twice as large for women than for men. This is largely
driven by gender differences in mean leave duration. Because birth mothers can also take DI, the firm-level
mean bonding leave duration is 14 weeks compared to 3.8 weeks for men. In percentage terms, the effect
is about twice as large for male bonding claims. The effect on the duration of caring claims is very similar
across claimant gender, and the mean claim lengths are similar as well at 4.3 and 4.0 weeks for women
and men, respectively.
There are at least two reasons why higher premium firms may have shorter average leave durations.
First, the results on the number of claims suggest that high-premium firms may nudge marginal employees
into taking leave, and these marginal claimants may need such leave for shorter amounts of time. Second,
these effects are also consistent with the idea that workers may limit the amount of leave they take in order
to reduce the risk of separating from a job with a high earnings premium. Not all workers have access
to job protection, and even if they do, they may be concerned about the negative career consequences of
spending time away from work (Stearns, 2018; Thomas, 2016). While it is not possible to distinguish
between these explanations completely, the latter suggests that high fixed effect firms should not only have
higher claim rates, but also a higher rate of return to the same firm following a period of leave. While
marginal claimants may be more likely to return to work than other claimants, there is less reason to think
that, conditional on making a claim, they would be more likely to return to the same firm.
17
The first row in Table 7 shows the effect of the firm earnings premium on the number of claims where
the worker returns to employment at any firm within five quarters, with employment defined as having
strictly positive earnings in a quarter. These regressions are again estimated with a Poisson model, and
we additionally control for the log of the total number of claims within the firm, regardless of whether
the claimants return to work. The first column shows that a one standard deviation increase in the firm
earnings premium increases the likelihood that a worker who makes a claim returns to employment within
five quarters. The effects are similar for female DI and bonding claims as well as male DI claims, but
much smaller for male PFL claims. This pattern makes sense, as the firm-level average rate of return to
work following a male PFL claim is 96 percent. The average rates of return to employment following a DI
or female bonding claim are lower, at around 84 percent for women and 78 percent for male DI claimants.
To evaluate whether high-premium firms have higher employee retention following periods of leave,
the second row of Table 7 shows the effect on the number of claims where the worker returns to the same
firm within five quarters. These results strongly suggest that better firms have much higher retention rates
among social insurance claimants. Conditional on the number of claims, a one standard deviation increase
in the firm premium increases the probability that female claimants return to the firm by 21 percent and the
probability that male claimants return by 24 percent. Though the magnitudes are larger, the pattern across
columns is very similar to the effects on returning to any employment, with similar point estimates for
male and female DI claims and female bonding claims, but smaller percentage effects for caring and male
bonding claims. This is consistent with the idea that workers at high-premium firms want to protect their
jobs. It is also consistent, however, with high-premium firms offering more supportive work environments
that promote employee retention.
How do these effects of the firm earnings premium on the return to work translate into effects on future
earnings? Table 8 shows the effects of the firm premium on the average change in log earnings of leave
claimants between the quarter prior to the start of the claim and five quarters after the claim, separately
by whether the claimants are employed at the same firm or a different firm. This sample is limited to
firms that experience at least one claim where the worker is employed at the same firm or a different firm,
respectively, in the fifth quarter following the claim. The regressions control for the total number of claims
within the firm, regardless of whether or not the workers return to work. The results in the top panel show
that for claimants who return to work at the same firm, the firm premium is associated with slightly higher
18
earnings growth. This is consistent with the idea that firms that encourage leave-taking are also less likely
to penalize workers who take extended absences. It also may be the case that firms with higher earnings
premiums have higher earnings growth in general. On the other hand, workers who file claims in firms
with higher premiums and then change employers experience substantially lower subsequent earnings
growth compared to those who start out at lower fixed effect firms. These effects are large. A one standard
deviation increase in the firm premium is associated with a 32-35 percent drop in earnings for movers
who make DI claims and a 19-28 percent drop in earnings for those who make bonding claims.26 These
effects are likely driven by several factors. First, because movers who start at a high premium firm are
mechanically more likely to move to a firm with a lower premium than are movers who start at a low
premium firm (consistent with Figure 1), we should expect a negative relationship if the firm premium is
a significant determinant of earnings. Second, there might be a direct effect of the employment gap on
future earnings that differs among individuals who start at higher versus lower premium firms. Finally, it is
important to note that we do not observe work hours and cannot distinguish between changes in wages and
changes in employment on the intensive margin. It is possible that workers at high-premium firms leave
if these employers are less willing to accommodate part-time work or more flexible schedules. But this
explanation seems unlikely given that workers at high-premium firms are actually more likely to return to
the firm following a claim.
5.3
Alternative Measures
Although the results presented above consistently show that use of public social insurance is posi-
tively correlated with the firm earnings premium, it is not possible to identify what characteristics of high
premium firms encourage public leave take-up. In particular, one concern is that firms that pay relatively
well are compensating for providing less desirable working conditions on other margins. Other work has
argued that employee transitions between firms can be used as alternate, revealed preference, measures of
firm desirability or quality (Sorkin, 2018; Bagger and Lentz, 2018). In Table 9, we show the effect of two
additional measures of firm desirability on the number of social insurance claims made within the firm.
26
Table 7 shows there is selection into returning to the firm as a function of the firm premium. We have therefore estimated
the overall effect of the change in earnings for all claimants who are employed five quarters following the claim and find negative
effects. We have also estimated effects for those who return to the same firm but move by the fifth quarter and for those who
never returned to the pre-claim employer. These results are available upon request.
19
Panel A shows the effect of a one standard deviation increase in the firm retention rate, measured as the
average share of employees who remain employed by the firm from one quarter to the next. These results
are qualitatively similar to the effects of the firm earnings premium: both higher premium firms and those
with a higher retention rate are more likely to have workers who file claims. Panel B shows the effect of
a one standard deviation increase in the poaching index, which is the average share of workers hired in a
given quarter who are “poached” from another firm as opposed to coming from non-employment. Bagger
and Lentz (2018) argue that the poaching index is an unbiased estimate of the firm’s rank in the distribution of firm productivity. Again, firms with a higher poaching index have higher claim rates, although
the relationship is generally weaker than it is for the firm premium or firm retention rate. Finally, Panel C
shows the effect of the firm earnings premium on the number of claims, controlling for the standardized
retention rate and poaching index. Even controlling for these alternate measures of firm quality, the firm
premium still has a large and statistically significant effect on the number of social insurance claims.
Finally, one alternate explanation for these results is that the type of people who work at high premium
firms are different in ways that are also correlated with program take-up. To address concerns about
unobservable sorting of workers into firms, we redo the main analysis at the industry level in Table 10.
To do this, we calculate the average firm premium in four-digit industries that can be identified in both
the EDD data and the ACS.27 We then regress the number of claims on the industry-aggregated firm
premium. There is less concern with worker sorting as a function of desired social insurance use at the
industry level, and Sorkin (2018) shows that about 55 percent of the variance in the firm pay premium is
between four-digit industries. The first panel of Table 10 shows that the results are qualitatively similar
when using this industry-level measure of the firm premium. This industry analysis additionally allows
us to test for the importance of selection on observables by controlling for other industry-level observable
characteristics that may be correlated with firm quality and the likelihood of leave take-up. In the second
panel, we add controls for observable gender-specific industry-level characteristics including the share
of workers who have employer-provided health insurance, are foreign-born, are above age 40, are an
under-represented minority, and have a four-year college degree, the usual hours worked per week, and
the average transportation time to work. The results are very similar when these controls are included,
27
We use the INDNAICS Specific Variable Codes in the ACS to define industries. While most industries are aggregated at the
four digit level, some large industries can be identified at the five or six digit level, and some small industries are aggregated to
the two or three digit level. We exclude industries with fewer than 500 ACS observations from 2004-2013.
20
corroborating the idea that selection on observables is relatively unimportant in this setting and that the
results are unlikely to be entirely driven by sorting of workers into firms.
6 Conclusion
The firm-specific earnings premium is an important predictor of both current and future earnings, and
also plays a meaningful role in determining social insurance benefit take-up. In this paper, we first estimate
the firm earnings premium using administrative earnings data from California, and then show that higher
firm premiums are associated with substantially higher DI and PFL claim rates. This finding is robust
across the type of claim, gender and age of the claimant, and other firm characteristics, suggesting that the
results cannot be driven by the sorting of workers into firms.
Our findings are important for several reasons. First, the results suggest that firm-specific factors
drive disparities in the use of public social insurance. Firms appear to influence inequality in leavetaking, even when benefits are—at least on paper—universally available to workers. As leave-taking is
positively correlated with health, employment, and cognitive outcomes of both workers and their families,
our findings suggest that firms may contribute not only to wage dispersion, but also to health- and familyrelated dimensions of inequality in America.
Second, firm-specific attributes appear to be more important in determining social insurance take-up
than are changes to specific policy levers. A back of the envelope calculation suggests that DI and PFL
take-up would be substantially higher if all employers cultivated a leave-taking culture more similar to
that of firms at the top of the firm premium distribution. In contrast, prior work shows that changes to the
wage replacement rate or benefit duration have much smaller effects on leave take-up.
Third, short-term leave benefits constitute an increasingly important part of the U.S. social safety net.
In 2017, California’s DI and PFL programs were the largest source of earnings replacement in the state,
paying out a total of over $5.6 billion in benefits. This amount exceeded the $5.3 billion in Unemployment
Insurance payments, indicating the extent to which workers value access to short-term paid leave. Our
results highlight the important role that firms can play in determining the scale of these programs, which
are currently particularly policy relevant as proposals for paid family and medical leave gain substantial
momentum at both the state and federal levels.
21
Although the firm earnings premium is strongly associated with leave-taking claims, we cannot infer
the specific aspects of firm behavior or culture that encourage program take-up. Prior work suggests
that employers are an important source of information about the existence of these policies and that peer
effects within firms play a significant role in determining use (Dahl et al., 2014). It seems likely that these
mechanisms are both at play in the California setting as well. Higher premium firms may promote leavetaking for own illness or family care as part of attempts to create a positive and productive workplace
culture. If workers can take leave without facing negative career consequences, their peers may be more
likely to choose to do so as well. We find that claimants experience earnings losses on average following
a period of leave even if they return to the same job, but this is not the case for workers who return to high
premium firms. This finding is consistent with the idea that high premium firms are more supportive of
their workers taking leave.
One important caveat to these results is that it is not possible to definitively determine whether an
increase in DI or PFL take-up is socially optimal. Although these programs serve as an important form of
social insurance, they are subject to moral hazard problems. While more research is needed to estimate the
welfare gains associated with increased take-up, the consistency of our results across types of claims and
types of workers suggests that take-up in lower-premium firms is below the individually-optimal level. In
this case, understanding which characteristics of firms promote social insurance take-up is key to extending
this form of the social safety net.
22
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29
8
Mean Log Earnings
8.5
9
9.5
10
Figure 1: Mean Earnings of Job Changers Classified by Quartile of Mean Earnings of Coworkers at Origin and
Destination Firm
-6
-3
0
Quarter Relative to Firm Change
1 to 1
1 to 3
4 to 1
4 to 3
3
1 to 2
1 to 4
4 to 2
4 to 4
Figure shows mean log earnings of job changers, classified by quartile of coworker earnings at the origin and
destination firm. For ease of interpretation, only workers who start in the top or bottom quartile of the coworker
earnings distribution are shown.
30
Table 1: Claim Rates by Firm Characteristics
Female Claims
Any Claim
DI
Bonding
Caring
Male Claims
Any Claim
DI
Bonding
Observations
Caring
Mean Claim Rate
0.045
0.044
0.014
0.001
0.018
0.016
0.002
0.000
2,709,253
Mean Claim Rate by:
Firm Size
Small
Medium
Large
0.042
0.050
0.065
0.041
0.048
0.062
0.013
0.015
0.019
0.001
0.001
0.002
0.016
0.023
0.029
0.014
0.020
0.024
0.002
0.003
0.005
0.000
0.000
0.001
2,005,409
529,236
174,608
Construction
Manufacturing
Retail Trade
Professional Services
Health Care
Accommodation
0.062
0.046
0.034
0.052
0.062
0.030
0.060
0.045
0.033
0.050
0.061
0.030
0.018
0.011
0.010
0.020
0.019
0.009
0.001
0.001
0.000
0.001
0.001
0.000
0.027
0.025
0.021
0.012
0.015
0.010
0.024
0.023
0.019
0.009
0.012
0.009
0.003
0.002
0.002
0.003
0.003
0.001
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
264,072
238,861
270,993
290,219
335,933
314,595
Firm Fixed Effect Terciles
Low
Middle
High
0.034
0.048
0.053
0.034
0.046
0.051
0.010
0.014
0.018
0.000
0.001
0.001
0.012
0.021
0.022
0.011
0.018
0.018
0.001
0.002
0.003
0.000
0.000
0.000
903,081
903,082
903,090
Industry
31
Notes: Table shows mean claim rates at the firm-year level from fiscal year 2004-2013. The measure of firm size used in calculating rates is time-varying. Small
firms have 5-24 workers, medium firms have 25-99 workers, and large firms have more than 100 workers. For this classification, firm size is averaged over all
years the firm appears in the sample and is constant over time. Industries shown are the six largest industries in California. Professional Services is Professional,
Scientific, and Technical Services, and Accommodation is Accommodation and Food Services. Firm fixed effects are estimated using the AKM methodology as
explained in Section 4 and divided into terciles.
Table 2: Effect of Firm Premium on Number of Leave-Taking Claims
All
Any Claim
Firm Premium
Mean Number of Claims
Female Claims
Any Claim
DI
Bonding
Caring
Any Claim
Male Claims
DI
Bonding
Caring
1.569*
(0.014)
1.447*
(0.013)
1.427*
(0.013)
1.512*
(0.013)
2.076*
(0.041)
1.797*
(0.026)
1.660*
(0.021)
2.628*
(0.051)
2.589*
(0.058)
2.218
1.407
1.352
0.369
0.037
0.811
0.671
0.123
0.017
Notes: Table shows the effect of the firm premium on the number of DI or PFL claims within the firm in a given year. All columns include 2,709,253 observations.
The effects are estimated using a Poisson regression and the estimates and standard errors have been exponentiated such that the coefficients shown here are
incidence rate ratios. Sample includes fiscal years 2004-2013. Controls include firm size, year fixed effects, industry fixed effects, and the share of women in
the industry-year. Standard errors (in parentheses) are bootstrapped 200 times. To account for multiple hypothesis testing, p-values have been corrected using the
Bonferroni correction. ∗ p<0.01.
32
Table 3: Effect of Firm Premium on Number of Leave-Taking Claims by Age of Claimant
Female Claims
Any Claim
DI
Bonding
Claims at Age 20-39
Firm Premium
Mean Number of Claims
Claims at Age 40-59
Firm Premium
Mean Number of Claims
Caring
Any Claim
Male Claims
DI
Bonding
Caring
1.427*
(0.012)
1.410*
(0.012)
1.526*
(0.013)
2.127*
(0.048)
1.868*
(0.030)
1.585*
(0.025)
2.633*
(0.052)
2.524*
(0.070)
0.804
0.778
0.345
0.012
0.348
0.235
0.106
0.007
1.586*
(0.022)
1.561*
(0.022)
2.078*
(0.031)
2.132*
(0.047)
1.809*
(0.027)
1.757*
(0.026)
2.660*
(0.065)
2.700*
(0.077)
0.484
0.459
0.016
0.022
0.367
0.342
0.016
0.009
33
Notes: Table shows the effect of the firm premium on the number of DI or PFL claims by age of the claimant within the firm in a given year. All
regressions include 2,709,253 observations. The effects are estimated using a Poisson regression and the estimates and standard errors have been
exponentiated such that the coefficients shown here are incidence rate ratios. Sample includes fiscal years 2004-2013. Controls include firm size,
year fixed effects, industry fixed effects, and the share of women in the industry-year. Standard errors (in parentheses) are bootstrapped 200 times.
To account for multiple hypothesis testing, p-values have been corrected using the Bonferroni correction. ∗ p<0.01.
Table 4: Effect of Firm Premium on Number of Leave-Taking Claims by Firm Size and Industry
Female Claims
Any Claim
DI
Bonding
Firm Premium
Firm Size 5-9
Firm Size 10-24
Firm Size 25-49
Firm Size 50-99
Firm Size 100-499
Firm Size 500+
34
Construction
Manufacturing
Retail Trade
Professional Services
Health Care
Accommodation
Caring
Any Claim
Male Claims
DI
Bonding
Observations
Caring
1.172*
(0.006)
1.217*
(0.005)
1.292*
(0.008)
1.328*
(0.008)
1.413*
(0.009)
1.566*
(0.022)
1.165*
(0.006)
1.208*
(0.005)
1.276*
(0.007)
1.309*
(0.008)
1.385*
(0.009)
1.547*
(0.022)
1.410*
(0.012)
1.486*
(0.012)
1.581*
(0.015)
1.591*
(0.016)
1.600*
(0.014)
1.545*
(0.023)
1.178
(0.048)
1.305*
(0.046)
1.699*
(0.064)
1.804*
(0.061)
2.181*
(0.049)
2.233*
(0.061)
1.363*
(0.011)
1.597*
(0.010)
1.793*
(0.014)
2.076*
(0.017)
2.145*
(0.018)
1.701*
(0.043)
1.302*
(0.011)
1.504*
(0.009)
1.648*
(0.013)
1.888*
(0.016)
1.925*
(0.018)
1.578*
(0.041)
2.004*
(0.045)
2.650*
(0.054)
3.515*
(0.071)
3.869*
(0.082)
3.709*
(0.051)
2.346*
(0.072)
1.655*
(0.136)
2.166*
(0.125)
2.574*
(0.148)
3.373*
(0.178)
3.516*
(0.107)
2.353*
(0.086)
1,115,617
2.302*
(0.068)
0.485*
(0.018)
1.443*
(0.034)
1.246*
(0.026)
1.753*
(0.020)
1.400*
(0.026)
2.255*
(0.067)
0.476*
(0.018)
1.430*
(0.033)
1.222*
(0.025)
1.730*
(0.019)
1.371*
(0.025)
2.831*
(0.114)
0.754*
(0.022)
1.203*
(0.038)
1.644*
(0.028)
1.906*
(0.022)
1.057
(0.016)
3.377*
(0.438)
0.672*
(0.044)
2.086*
(0.101)
1.624*
(0.064)
2.466*
(0.080)
8.242*
(0.619)
2.737*
(0.039)
1.066
(0.033)
2.933*
(0.084)
1.284*
(0.025)
2.032*
(0.040)
3.648*
(0.089)
2.560*
(0.037)
0.973
(0.030)
2.812*
(0.081)
1.071
(0.022)
1.776*
(0.035)
3.291*
(0.079)
4.804*
(0.128)
1.951*
(0.089)
3.513*
(0.187)
2.316*
(0.059)
3.256*
(0.091)
7.222*
(0.320)
4.022*
(0.260)
1.427*
(0.089)
3.622*
(0.156)
2.002*
(0.078)
3.198*
(0.188)
17.105*
(1.536)
264,072
889,792
347,930
181,306
143,719
30,889
238,861
270,993
290,219
335,933
314,595
Notes: Table shows the effect of the firm premium on the number of DI or PFL claims within the firm in a given year, subsampled by firm size and industry groups.
Firm size categories are based on employment averaged over all years in the data, and are constant over time. Professional Services is Professional, Scientific, and
Technical Services, and Accommodation is Accommodation and Food Services. The effects are estimated using a Poisson regression and the estimates and standard
errors have been exponentiated such that the coefficients shown here are incidence rate ratios. Sample includes fiscal years 2004-2013. Controls include firm size, year
fixed effects, industry fixed effects, and the share of women in the industry-year. Standard errors (in parentheses) are bootstrapped 200 times. To account for multiple
hypothesis testing, p-values have been corrected using the Bonferroni correction. ∗ p<0.01.
Table 5: Effect of Firm Premium on Number of Leave-Taking Claims by Within-Firm Earnings Quartile of Claimant
Female Claims
Any Claim
DI
Bonding
Quartile 1
Firm Premium
Mean Number of Claims
Quartile 2
Firm Premium
Mean Number of Claims
35
Quartile 3
Firm Premium
Mean Number of Claims
Quartile 4
Firm Premium
Mean Number of Claims
Caring
Any Claim
Male Claims
DI
Bonding
Caring
2.454*
(0.048)
2.420*
(0.046)
2.470*
(0.030)
4.049*
(0.209)
2.631*
(0.037)
2.427*
(0.033)
4.892*
(0.131)
4.800*
(0.189)
0.284
0.274
0.069
0.006
0.137
0.120
0.014
0.002
1.751*
(0.019)
1.722*
(0.019)
1.795*
(0.018)
2.908*
(0.080)
2.358*
(0.032)
2.136*
(0.027)
3.890*
(0.091)
4.052*
(0.121)
0.411
0.396
0.105
0.011
0.207
0.172
0.030
0.004
1.278*
(0.013)
1.259*
(0.012)
1.445*
(0.016)
1.778*
(0.034)
1.876*
(0.029)
1.695*
(0.026)
2.954*
(0.071)
2.783*
(0.080)
0.398
0.383
0.107
0.011
0.238
0.193
0.039
0.005
0.938*
(0.009)
0.923*
(0.009)
1.005
(0.011)
1.226*
(0.029)
1.236*
(0.018)
1.152*
(0.017)
1.654*
(0.031)
1.581*
(0.041)
0.314
0.300
0.087
0.009
0.230
0.185
0.039
0.005
Notes: Table shows the effect of the firm premium on the number of DI or PFL claims within the firm in a given year, subsampled by the within-firm
earnings quartile of claimants. Quartile 1 is the lowest 25 percent of earners within the firm and quartile 4 is the highest. The effect in each quartile
is estimated from a separate regression. All regressions include 2,709,253 observations. The effects are estimated using a Poisson regression and
the estimates and standard errors have been exponentiated such that the coefficients shown here are incidence rate ratios. Sample includes fiscal
years 2004-2013. Controls include firm size, year fixed effects, industry fixed effects, and the share of women in the industry-year. Standard
errors (in parentheses) are bootstrapped 200 times. To account for multiple hypothesis testing, p-values have been corrected using the Bonferroni
correction. ∗ p<0.01.
Table 6: Effect of Firm Premium on Mean Claim Duration (Weeks)
Any Claim
Female Claims
DI
Bonding
Caring
Any Claim
Male Claims
DI
Bonding
Caring
Firm Premium
-1.016*
(0.023)
-1.255*
(0.024)
-0.983*
(0.020)
-0.382*
(0.021)
-2.048*
(0.036)
-1.410*
(0.035)
-0.475*
(0.013)
-0.313*
(0.031)
Observations
Mean Claim Duration
717,453
11.643
705,925
10.181
337,788
13.991
42,980
4.258
524,970
11.383
481,444
12.514
117,671
3.769
25,490
4.007
Notes: Table shows the effect of the firm premium on the mean claim duration (measured in weeks) within a firm-year, conditional on having
at least one claim. The effects are estimated using an OLS regression. Sample includes fiscal years 2004-2013. Controls include firm size,
year fixed effects, industry fixed effects, and the share of women in the industry-year. Standard errors (in parentheses) are bootstrapped 200
times. To account for multiple hypothesis testing, p-values have been corrected using the Bonferroni correction. ∗ p<0.01.
36
Table 7: Effect of Firm Premium on Number of Leave-Taking Claimants Who Return to Work
Female Claims
DI
Bonding
Caring
Any Claim
1.089*
(0.002)
1.089*
(0.002)
1.096*
(0.002)
1.044*
(0.002)
4.794
4.675
2.674
1.213*
(0.005)
1.216*
(0.005)
4.249
717,453
Any Claim
Return to Employment
Firm Premium
Mean Number of Claims
Returning to Employment
Return to Firm
Firm Premium
37
Mean Number of Claims
Returning to Firm
Observations (all rows)
Male Claims
DI
Bonding
Caring
1.092*
(0.003)
1.096*
(0.003)
1.020*
(0.001)
1.031*
(0.003)
2.273
3.659
3.222
2.754
1.795
1.255*
(0.004)
1.101*
(0.005)
1.239*
(0.008)
1.254*
(0.008)
1.107*
(0.005)
1.090*
(0.007)
4.135
2.370
2.137
3.123
2.705
2.499
1.682
705,925
337,788
42,980
524,970
481,444
117,671
25,490
Notes: Table shows the effect of the firm premium on the number of claims made by workers who return to employment at any firm within five quarters
of the start of the claim (first row) and the effect of the firm premium on the number of claims made by workers who return to work at the same firm
within five quarters of the start of the claim (second row). The effects are estimated using a Poisson regression and the estimates and standard errors
have been exponentiated such that the coefficients shown here are incidence rate ratios. Sample includes fiscal years 2004-2013. Regressions control
for the log number of claims made within the firm-year, unconditional on returning to work. Additional controls include firm size, year fixed effects,
industry fixed effects, and the share of women in the industry-year. Standard errors (in parentheses) are bootstrapped 200 times. To account for
multiple hypothesis testing, p-values have been corrected using the Bonferroni correction. ∗ p<0.01.
Table 8: Effect of Firm Premium on the Average Change in Earnings of Claimants
Female Claims
DI
Bonding
Caring
Any Claim
0.054*
(0.003)
0.052*
(0.003)
0.083*
(0.004)
0.017
(0.004)
406,298
-0.070
400,631
-0.069
187,464
-0.071
-0.331*
(0.006)
-0.323*
(0.006)
246,327
-0.223
244,117
-0.218
Any Claim
Employed At Same Firm
Firm Premium
Observations
Mean Change in Log Earnings
Employed At Different Firm
Firm Premium
38
Observations
Mean Change in Log Earnings
Male Claims
DI
Bonding
Caring
0.051*
(0.004)
0.038*
(0.003)
0.058*
(0.006)
0.031*
(0.007)
36,686
-0.016
264,654
-0.066
241,810
-0.073
71,420
0.009
21,358
-0.014
-0.275*
(0.010)
-0.031*
(0.007)
-0.352*
(0.007)
-0.346*
(0.007)
-0.185*
(0.017)
-0.013
(0.014)
100,685
-0.186
27,803
-0.054
176,361
-0.209
165,063
-0.205
38,880
-0.095
16,227
-0.042
Notes: Table shows the effect of the firm premium on the mean change in log real earnings of claimants between the quarter prior to the start of the claim
and five quarters after the claim, conditional on the firm having at least one claimant who returns to employment. The top panel shows the effect for those
who are employed at the same firm in the fifth quarter after the claim, and the second panel shows the effect for those who are employed at a different firm
in the fifth quarter after the claim. The effects are estimated using an OLS regression. Sample includes fiscal years 2004-2013. Regressions control for the
log number of claims made within the firm-year, unconditional on returning to work. Additional controls include firm size, year fixed effects, industry fixed
effects, and the share of women in the industry-year. Standard errors (in parentheses) are bootstrapped 200 times. To account for multiple hypothesis testing,
p-values have been corrected using the Bonferroni correction. ∗ p<0.01.
Table 9: Effect of Alternate Firm Quality Measures on Number of Leave-Taking Claims
Female Claims
DI
Bonding
Caring
Any Claim
1.899*
(0.021)
1.854*
(0.020)
1.616*
(0.015)
5.945*
(0.182)
2.021*
(0.031)
1.812*
(0.028)
3.594*
(0.082)
6.370*
(0.229)
1.062*
(0.011)
1.054*
(0.011)
1.150*
(0.010)
1.434*
(0.030)
1.403*
(0.016)
1.330*
(0.015)
1.890*
(0.032)
1.609*
(0.041)
1.218*
(0.015)
1.550*
(0.022)
1.018
(0.010)
1.207*
(0.014)
1.528*
(0.022)
1.012
(0.010)
1.413*
(0.014)
1.157*
(0.013)
1.078*
(0.009)
1.189*
(0.027)
4.663*
(0.160)
1.348*
(0.028)
1.564*
(0.027)
1.334*
(0.024)
1.312*
(0.017)
1.475*
(0.026)
1.273*
(0.023)
1.245*
(0.016)
2.076*
(0.048)
1.682*
(0.042)
1.85*
(0.036)
1.616*
(0.043)
3.580*
(0.142)
1.543*
(0.041)
1.407
1.353
0.369
0.037
0.811
0.671
0.123
0.017
Any Claim
Panel A
Retention Rate
Panel B
Poaching Index
Panel C
Firm Premium
39
Retention Rate
Poaching Index
Mean Number of Claims
Male Claims
DI
Bonding
Caring
Notes: Table shows the effect of measures of firm quality on the number of DI or PFL claims within the firm in a given year. Panel A shows
the effect of the firm’s standardized average quarterly retention rate, and all columns include include 2,709,253 observations. Panel B shows
the effect of the firm’s standardized average quarterly poaching index, and all columns include 2,709,155 observations. Panel C includes the
standardized firm earnings premium, retention rate, and poaching index, and all columns include 2,709,155 observations. The correlation
between the firm premium and the retention rate is 0.47, the correlation between the firm premium and the poaching index is 0.21, and the
correlation between the retention rate and poaching index is 0.01. The effects are estimated using a Poisson regression and the estimates
and standard errors have been exponentiated such that the coefficients shown here are incidence rate ratios. Sample includes fiscal years
2004-2013. Controls include firm size, year fixed effects, industry fixed effects, and the share of women in the industry-year. Standard errors
(in parentheses) are bootstrapped 200 times. To account for multiple hypothesis testing, p-values have been corrected using the Bonferroni
correction. ∗ p<0.01.
Table 10: Effect of Industry Average Firm Premium on Number of Leave-Taking Claims
Female Claims
DI
Bonding
Caring
Any Claim
1.973*
(0.097)
1.931*
(0.093)
1.701*
(0.050)
4.308*
(0.451)
1.482*
(0.072)
1.353*
(0.067)
2.235*
(0.143)
2.411*
(0.228)
1.880*
(0.106)
1.868*
(0.104)
1.990*
(0.096)
2.378*
(0.222)
1.484*
(0.089)
1.402*
(0.085)
1.793*
(0.124)
1.538*
(0.145)
1935.832
1861.357
510.254
51.242
1093.192
904.659
165.147
23.385
Any Claim
No Industry-Level Controls
Average Industry Premium
With Industry-Level Controls
Average Industry Premium
Mean Number of Claims
Male Claims
DI
Bonding
Caring
40
Notes: Table shows the effect of the industry average firm premium on the number of DI or PFL claims within the industry in a given year. All columns
include 1,920 observations from 192 industries. The effects are estimated using a Poisson regression and the estimates and standard errors have been
exponentiated such that the coefficients shown here are incidence rate ratios. Sample includes fiscal years 2004-2013. All regressions include industry
size and year fixed effects as well as the percentage of the industry that is female. The bottom panel additionally includes gender-specific industry-level
controls for the share of workers who have employer-provided health insurance, are foreign-born, are above age 40, are an under-represented minority,
and have a four-year college degree, the usual hours worked per week, and the average transportation time to work. Standard errors (in parentheses) are
bootstrapped 200 times. To account for multiple hypothesis testing, p-values have been corrected using the Bonferroni correction. ∗ p<0.01.
Appendix A
Additional Tables
41
Table A1: Claim Rates by Worker Characteristics
Any Claim
Number of Claims
Claim Rate
Female Claims
DI
Bonding
Caring
Any Claim
Male Claims
DI
Bonding
Caring
42
4,032,876
0.063
3,879,858
0.061
1,061,309
0.017
104,248
0.002
2,307,892
0.027
1,914,805
0.023
344,613
0.004
48,474
0.001
Claim Rate by Age:
20-39
40-59
0.080
0.051
0.077
0.049
0.034
0.002
0.001
0.002
0.025
0.030
0.017
0.028
0.008
0.001
0.000
0.001
Claim Rate by Industry:
Construction
Manufacturing
Retail Trade
Professional Services
Health Care
Accommodation
0.051
0.062
0.074
0.050
0.079
0.055
0.049
0.059
0.071
0.048
0.076
0.054
0.015
0.013
0.018
0.019
0.018
0.016
0.001
0.002
0.002
0.001
0.003
0.001
0.026
0.033
0.036
0.016
0.037
0.019
0.023
0.028
0.030
0.011
0.029
0.016
0.003
0.004
0.006
0.005
0.008
0.002
0.000
0.001
0.001
0.000
0.001
0.000
Notes: Table shows mean gender-specific claim rates at the worker-year level from fiscal year 2004-2013. Claims data is merged with data from
the American Community Survey 2004-2013 to create gender-specific employment counts by year. Industries shown are the six largest industries in
California. Professional Services is Professional, Scientific, and Technical Services, and Accommodation is Accommodation and Food Services. Note
that this table is representative of workers, whereas Table 1 is representative of firms. This table also includes workers at very small firms of 1-4
workers, which are excluded from our main analysis, because firm size is not available. Workers at firms of 1-4 workers only make up 7.8 percent of
the California workforce and 3.6 percent of claims.
Table A2: AKM Model Summary Statistics
Sample Size
Person-Quarters
Individuals
Firms
Summary Statistics
Mean Log Earnings
Standard Deviation of Log Earnings
Summary of Parameter Estimates
Standard Deviation of Firm Effects
Standard Deviation of Person Effects
Correlation of Person/Firm Effects
RMSE of AKM Residual
Adjusted R2
Comparison Match Model
RMSE of AKM Residual
Adjusted R2
Model Including Potential Experience
RMSE of AKM Residual
Adjusted R2
Full Sample
Movers
Largest Connected Set
300,424,074
34,166,334
227,840,807
20,740,162
227,614,272
20,716,651
2,203,086
8.868
1.278
8.792
1.265
8.793
1.265
0.591
0.751
0.226
0.739
0.659
0.534
0.822
0.731
0.666
Notes: Sample includes every third quarter from the first quarter of 2000 through 2014. There is one observation per
person-quarter. If an individual held multiple jobs, the observation is the job from which they had the highest earnings. The comparison match model includes interactions between employers and individuals. The model including
potential experience includes the number of past quarters the person is observed in the data.
43
Table A3: Effect of Firm Premium on Number of Leave-Taking Claims, Including 2-4 Person Firms
All
Any Claim
Female Claims
Any Claim
DI
Bonding
Caring
Any Claim
Male Claims
DI
Bonding
Caring
Firm Premium
1.545*
(0.01)
1.429*
(0.012)
1.410*
(0.012)
1.495*
(0.011)
2.001*
(0.031)
1.760*
(0.023)
1.633*
(0.022)
2.381*
(0.042)
2.368*
(0.046)
Mean Number of Claims
1.366
0.868
0.835
0.229
0.023
0.498
0.412
0.075
0.011
Notes: Table shows the effect of the firm premium on the number of DI or PFL claims within the firm in a given year. All columns include 4,498,541 observations.
Sample includes all firms with an average of two or more employees. The effects are estimated using a Poisson regression and the estimates and standard errors
have been exponentiated such that the coefficients shown here are incidence rate ratios. Sample includes fiscal years 2004-2013. Standard errors (in parentheses)
are bootstrapped 200 times. To account for multiple hypothesis testing, p-values have been corrected using the Bonferroni correction. ∗ p<0.01.
44
Table A4: Effect of Firm Premium on Number of Leave-Taking Claims, Firm Fixed Effects Estimated Controlling for Experience
All
Any Claim
Female Claims
Any Claim
DI
Bonding
Caring
Any Claim
Male Claims
DI
Bonding
Caring
Firm Premium
1.594*
(0.01)
1.472*
(0.014)
1.451*
(0.014)
1.534*
(0.014)
2.125*
(0.044)
1.822*
(0.024)
1.681*
(0.022)
2.666*
(0.053)
2.654*
(0.063)
Mean Number of Claims
2.218
1.407
1.352
0.369
0.037
0.811
0.671
0.123
0.017
Notes: Table shows the effect of the firm premium on the number of DI or PFL claims within the firm in a given year. All columns include 2,709,253 observations.
The firm premium fixed effects are estimated while additionally controlling for the worker’s experience, measured as the number of past quarters they are observed
in the data. The effects are estimated using a Poisson regression and the estimates and standard errors have been exponentiated such that the coefficients shown
here are incidence rate ratios. Sample includes fiscal years 2004-2013. Controls include firm size, year fixed effects, industry fixed effects, and the share of women
in the industry-year. Standard errors (in parentheses) are bootstrapped 200 times. To account for multiple hypothesis testing, p-values have been corrected using
the Bonferroni correction. ∗ p<0.01.
45
Table A5: Effect of Firm Premium on Number of Leave-Taking Claims, Firm Fixed Effects Estimated Using 2000-2004 Data
All
Any Claim
Female Claims
Any Claim
DI
Bonding
Caring
Any Claim
Male Claims
DI
Bonding
Caring
Firm Premium
1.454*
(0.02)
1.356*
(0.014)
1.340*
(0.014)
1.389*
(0.014)
1.718*
(0.037)
1.606*
(0.026)
1.530*
(0.022)
1.883*
(0.046)
1.909*
(0.050)
Mean Number of Claims
2.556
1.620
1.557
0.417
0.044
0.935
0.774
0.140
0.021
Notes: Table shows the effect of the firm premium on the number of DI or PFL claims within the firm in a given year. All columns include 2,137,839 observations.
The firm premium fixed effects are estimated using earnings data from every quarter of 2000-2004. The effects are estimated using a Poisson regression and the
estimates and standard errors have been exponentiated such that the coefficients shown here are incidence rate ratios. Sample includes fiscal years 2004-2013.
Controls include firm size, year fixed effects, industry fixed effects, and the share of women in the industry-year. Standard errors (in parentheses) are bootstrapped
200 times. To account for multiple hypothesis testing, p-values have been corrected using the Bonferroni correction. ∗ p<0.01.
46