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© Whole or part of this publication may be republished, stored in a retrieval system or
transmitted through electronic, photocopying, mechanical, recording or otherwise,
with permission of the publishers.
CLEEN Foundation
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Tel: 234-1-7612479, 7395498
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Dedication
To all victims and survivor of insurgency in Nigeria
v
Acknowledgements
CLEEN Foundation is obliged to many individuals, groups and
organizations who contributed to this publication. We are
grateful to Ford Foundation for making the North East Security
and Governance Project and this publication possible through its
funding support.
We acknowledge the invaluable contribution of the lead
researcher, Dr. Hussaini Abdu, Executive Director PLAN
International for his commitment and expertise throughout the
study and this publication. We wish to thank our researchers
from the six focal states who worked diligently for the success of
the study that led to this publication.
We appreciate the support of the Nigeria Stability and
Reconciliation Program (NSRP) of the British Council who
collaborated with CLEEN and Ford Foundation to validate the
research findings.
We acknowledge the efforts of Dr Mu’azu Abubakar,
CLEEN Foundation Board Member who played oversight role
on the project; Dr. Usman Musa, Department of Mass
Community; University of Maiduguri; Dr. Tabi Hamman Joda,
Executive Director, GreenAid International Charity, Adamawa
State; Dr. Titus Teseer Orngu, Gender Advocate and Human
Rights Defender, North East; Barr (Mrs) Rotkang Kyunni
Consultant and Mr. Chukwuma Umeh, Technical Adviser,
vi
German Agency for International Cooperation (GIZ) whose
inputs enriched the publication.
We commend Nigeria security agencies and other state and
non-state actors who have gallantly fought the insurgents and
CLEEN Foundation staff for their commitments and dedication
to the realisation of the project objectives.
vii
The North-eastern part of Nigeria has attracted significant
attention of the public, journalists, politicians, civil society
groups, social scientists, foundations and international agencies.
The attraction was not a palatable one, but of great concern to
the safety and security of people resident in that part of the
country occasioned by the activities of the Jama’atu Ahlus
Sunnah Liddawa’ati wal Jihad (People Committed to the
Teachings of the Prophet and Jihad). The organisation has
acquired global notoriety and is popularly referred to as Boko
Haram. Since its dislodgement in 2009, it has succeeded in
reinventing itself into a guerrilla force unleashing deadly attacks
on people, villages, police stations, military posts, prisons,
churches/mosques, motor parks, markets and schools;
kidnapping men, women, children; conscripting young people;
releasing videos celebrating its mindless attacks or threatening to
launch attacks or showing gruesome murder of its victims in its
self-acclaimed drive to Islamise Nigeria. The result is widespread
insecurity in Borno, Yobe and Adamawa States, places that bear
the brunt of the activities of Boko Haram.
CLEEN Foundation, in line with its mandate, organised this
research in six states – Adamawa, Bauchi, Borno, Gombe Taraba
and Yobe States – on Governance and Security in North East
Nigeria. The researchers have been able to gather and analyse
data from different respondents using a combination of research
viii
instruments – questionnaires, Focus Group Discussions (FGDs)
and Key Informant Interviews (KI-I) supplemented with desk
research and drawing on secondary data. The result of the
research conducted in each of the six states constitutes the
content of this volume.
The individual state focus has allowed the researchers to
provide a more insightful perspective on each of the states. While
there may be issues common to the states, which some informed
people may find repetitive, this allows for a treatment of the
common issues in different contexts which may not be common
to all the states. Readers will find that while the states are
ethnically and culturally diverse with some ethnic groups
existing in all the states, this does not confer commonality. The
strength of the individual researchers lies in this detailed
discussion of the situation in each state.
There is a sense in which the result of the study makes a case
for a wider understanding and recognition of security beyond the
physical. The respondents’ concerns sounds like a cry for help to
live a more meaningful existence in terms of education, health,
employment, electricity supply, clean water, good road network,
farm inputs, secure markets, religious tolerance, validation of
ethnic and cultural identities, connection with elected
representatives, and ensuring safety and security. It is in this that
one finds the connection between governance and security being
salient issues of concern to the public but which is treated with
apparent shoddiness by the authorities.
There is inherent in this, an invitation for civil society
presence to help drive respect for the people, listening to them
and involving them in the process of governance. Though this is
not stated explicitly, but the under currents and the subliminal
ix
references to the failures speak to that concern. It is to the credit
of the researchers that they were able to tease out these from the
respondents.
It is not in doubt that the situation in the north east cannot
remain as it was going by the experiences of the people under the
onslaught of Boko Haram. The people in that part of Nigeria
have now become conscientised by practical experience of the
failure of governance and would need to find ways of engaging
with the various state governments on their security. This is also
a wake-up call to the elected and appointed representatives,
exercising power on behalf of the people, to find ways of
connecting with the citizens, addressing their concerns and
ensuring that service delivery not only reach, but are also meant
for the relevant people in relevant places.
The failures that gave birth to the insecurity in the North
East has shown that even those who exercise power and
authority cannot operate unless they are transparent,
accountable and deliver services to the people otherwise, they
themselves, will not have the space and peace to operate the
machinery of government. It is in this context that they must
pay heed to the cry for help as captured by the researchers on
governance and security in the six states of the north-east.
The North East may be statistically the poorest of the
country and, indeed, its people enmeshed in poverty. However,
its rich arable land, existing rivers and dams, its diverse, creative
and energetic people suggest that new thinking is required to
pursue governance in partnership with the people. Governance is
not one set of officials operating in isolation on behalf of the
majority of the people. The various researchers have shown
respect for the people and their participation are necessary to
x
create a more secure and peaceful environment for the
development of the North-East.
Abubakar Mu’azu, PhD
University of Maiduguri, Maiduguri
Borno State, Nigeria
January 31, 2016
xi
Nigeria has witnessed a deteriorating internal security situation
since the return to democratic rule in 1999. This may be seen
from the proliferation and involvement of non-state actors in
security across the different sections of the country. There are
various forms of non-state actors (apart from private security
outfits) in different parts of the country ranging from Bakassi
Boys in the south-east, Movement for the Emancipation of Niger
Delta (MEND) in south-south to Boko Haram, Sara Suka and
Yankalare in the north-east. The military being present in more
than thirty-two states of the nation to restore order appears to be
virtually overstretched.
Many reasons have been advanced to explain the continued
deterioration of security in Nigeria. The main causes of
insecurity in the country are twofold - remote and proximate
causes. These may include:
•
•
•
•
absence of institutional capacity resulting in government
failure;
the gaping chasm of inequality and absence of fairness and
justice;
ethno-Religious conflicts;
disconnect between the people and the Government.
These and many proximate factors like, porous borders,
rural-urban drift, poverty, and unemployment have combined to
further aggravate the problem of insecurity in Nigeria.
Nigeria has experienced both military and civilian rule at
different times of her national development, each with its unique
xii
style of maintaining national security. It is generally believed
that the management of security under civil rule is also tinted
with elements of repression characteristic of military regimes in
Nigeria, so that the distinction between the two is very tenuous.
Whichever style of government used there is always a correlation
between governance and the nature of security. For an effective
security system to be fully operational, the leadership must
exhibit elements of good governance. Ideally, good governance is
the hall mark of credible leadership epitomized in today’s world
by democracy.
However, while democracy is often associated with good
governance, the situation in Nigeria appears to be the reverse.
Nigeria’s democratic experiment is characterised by conflicts,
political assassinations, unemployment among other challenges.
Studies were conducted in the six states that make up the
North-Eastern region – Adamawa, Bauchi, Borno, Gombe,
Taraba and Yobe – to find out the nexus between governance
and insecurity in these states. The research was carried out using
a combination of primary and secondary sources of data. The
primary data were sourced by administering questionnaires using
the purposive sampling system, conducting of focus group
discussions and key informant interviews. The secondary data
were gotten from the existing literature which includes but not
limited to journals, government policy documents, newspapers,
academic publications, CLEEN Foundation’s National Crime
and Safety Survey reports, social statistics compiled by the
National Bureau of Statistics and National Population
Commission.
The objectives of the study are as follows:
• To examine the relationship between security and character
of governance in the North-East region.
• To understand major drivers of insecurity in the states.
• To identify the gaps in governance and security in the states.
xiii
•
•
•
•
To determine the role of NGOs and civil society
organisations in improving governance and security in the
states.
To explore the various mechanisms employed by the
government at state and local levels with a view to enhancing
security and governance.
To recommend remedial measures with a view to
strengthening security and good governance.
To assess Government’s response to insecurity challenges in
the states.
!
The limitations encountered in the course of carrying out the
study were as follows:
•
Reluctance on the part of identified respondents particularly
the civil servants. There seems to be a lack of interest on their
part on the subject matter of the study.
•
There was reluctance on the part of women to be part of the
interviews; there was a high sense of mistrust and
unwillingness to respond to questions posed to them.
Insecurity challenges in the field also affected the time frame
within which the study was conducted.
•
•
•
xiv
Elected representatives have abused or misused their powers
and authority. Nepotism, ethnicity, religion and regionalism
are strong influencers of politics and governance in the
region.
Corruption is endemic among government officials’
particularly political office holders. The judicial system was
found to be non responsive to the plight of ordinary citizens
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
in the region because it is also bedevilled with corrupt
practices.
Citizens’ participation in governance is low and in some
places it does not exist. Organised civil society engagement
that could galvanise citizens’ engagement is also weak. Most
of the groups that exist were involved in health related
advocacy and mobilisation. This has created poor
accountability and service delivery processes at the local
government and community levels.
Accessibility of the citizens to public officials or government
functionaries does not exist. Gombe State was the exception
where the findings showed that 60 per cent of the
respondents were of the opinion that public official and /or
government functionaries were accessible to the citizens.
Security challenges in the region were high. There were
incidents of theft, burglary, gang attacks and communal
clashes. Some of the security challenges are traced to skewed
policies by government, discriminatory processes in
allocating resources and distribution of opportunities.
Security challenges were also traced to weak state institutions
and lack of capacity of the institutions to respond to the
security challenges.
Promotion of positive cultural, religious and social values
that would build national cohesion and development. This
should be adopted across the region.
Elected representatives should be made accountable to their
constituencies. Periodic report back/feedback dialogues
should be carried out with their constituencies and other
stakeholders. Transparency and accountability should be
encouraged at all levels.
There is an urgent need to facilitate and ensure community
participation in the governance process at the state and local
xv
•
•
•
•
government levels in the region. Marginalised groups such as
women and youths should be encouraged to take keen
interest in the governance processes in the region.
Skills acquisition programmes and other employment
opportunities should be identified and scaled up to get more
youths irrespective of gender and other interest. This is to
curb the trend of young persons joining insurgent groups in
order to secure means of livelihood.
Credible leadership should be encouraged in the region.
Development of the region should be at the core of any
strategy to curb the wave of insurgency in the region.
Appropriate capacity building and re-orientation for the
security and law enforcement agencies working in the region
particularly the police so as to build community confidence
and foster partnership.
Capacities of the civil society organisations need to be
strengthened to enable them function effectively in the area
of holding the government accountable and to be more
responsive to the citizenry.
The governance challenges in the north-east region of Nigeria
seem to be a microcosm of the larger country which has been
characterised by poor leadership. Although insurgency was
identified as the most important cause of insecurity facing the
region, there are still threats of armed robbery, and communal
clashes. The perception that the security agencies are unprepared
for the challenges in the region leaves more to be desired.
The general dissatisfaction with the various dimensions of
governance performance of electoral officials at all levels, lack of
transparency and accountability, endemic corruption created
opportunities that were exploited by insurgents to recruit socio
economic vulnerable persons to join their cause. This shows an
indication of interconnectivity between governance and security.
xvi
AIDS:
ANPP:
ASSN:
CAN:
CARE
Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome
All Nigeria Peoples' Party
African Security Sector Network
Christian Association of Nigeria
Cooperative for Assistance and Relief
Everywhere
CBOs:
Community- Based Organizations
CEDAW
Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of
Discrimination Against Women
CJTF:
Civilian Joint Task Force
CLEEN:
Centre for Law Enforcement Education in Nigeria
CSCE:
Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe
CSOs:
Civil Society Organizations
ECOWAS: Economic Community of West Africa States
FGD:
Focus Group Discussions
HIV/AIDS Human Immuno-deficiency Virus/Acquired
Immune Deficiency Syndrome
ICRC
International Committee of Red Cross
IDP:
Internal Displaced Persons
JAC:
Joint Account
JAS:
Jama’atuAhlis Sunnah Lidda’awatiwalJihad
JTF:
Joint Task Force
KII:
Key Informant Interviews
LGOSF:
Local Governance and Security Forum
LG:
Local Government
LGA:
Local Government Areas
xvii
MEND:
MOPOL
NAPEP:
NATO
NDHS
NECO:
NGOs:
NPC:
OECD:
Movement for the Emancipation of Niger Delta
Mobile Police
National Poverty Eradication Programme
North Atlantic Treaty Organization
Nigeria Demographic and Health Survey
National Examination Council
Non-Governmental Organizations
National Population Commission
Organization for Economic Co-operation and
Development
OND/NCE: Ordinary National Diploma/ National Certificate
on Education
OXFAM
Oxford Committee for Famine Relief
PDP:
People’s Democratic Party
SEGON:
South East Governance Network
SWOT:
Strength Weakness Opportunity Threat
TARCMA: Taraba Road Construction and Maintenance
Agency
UN:
United Nations
UNDP:
United Nations Development Programme
UNHCR:
United Nations High Commission for Refugees
UNICEF:
United Nations International Children’s
Emergency Fund
VIE:
Valence Instrumentality Expectancy
WASSCE:
West African Secondary School Certificate
Examination
WHO:
World Health Organization
YSDA:
Yangtu Special Development Area
xviii
"
Dr. Hussaini ABDU, Country Director, Plan International
Nigeria, Abuja, Nigeria.
Yagana BUKAR, Department of Geography, University of
Maiduguri, Maiduguri, Nigeria.
Dr. Saalah Yakubu IBRAHIM, Department of Public
Administration University of Maiduguri, Maiduguri,
Nigeria.
Abubakar. K. MONGUNO, Department of Geography,
University of Maiduguri, Maiduguri, Nigeria
Chigozirim OKORO, Senior Programme Officer, CLEEN
Foundation, Abuja, Nigeria
Emeka D. ORUONYE, Department of Geography, Taraba
State University, Nigeria
Mahmoud UMAR, Department of Public Administration,
Gombe State University, Gombe, Nigeria.
Dr. Saidu Tunenso UMAR, Department of Political Science
and Public Adminstration Adamawa State University, Mubi,
Nigeria.
xix
Dedication
Acknowledgements
Foreword
Preface
List of Abbreviations
List of Contributors
CHAPTERS
1. Introduction - #
– Hussaini Abdu
2. Governance and Security in Adamawa State - $%
-Dr. Saidu Tunenso
3. Security and Governance in Bauchi State of Nigeria - &'
-Dr Saalah Yaubu Ibrahim
4. Security and Governance in Bornu State - (&
-Abubakar K. Monguno, PhD
5. Security and Governance in Gombe State in Focus - ##)
- Mahmoud Umar
6. Governance and Insecurity Challenges in Taraba State - #&%
- E. D. Oruonye
7. Security and Governance in Yobe State - $*%
- Yagana Bukar
Appendix: CLEEN Foundation’s Publications - $)&
Bibliography - $+#
Index - 257
xx
Chapter 1
- Hussaini Abdu
Since the return of civil rule in 1999, Nigeria has been
experiencing rising spectre of violence and insecurity bordering
on natural resources (mis) management and control, citizenship
question, electoral contest, religious and ethnic polarisation, and
the current ferocious Islamist insurgency. To be sure, Nigeria is a
country of cyclical crisis – the history, dynamics and challenges
of its development are deeply rooted in tension, conflicts,
instability and insecurity (Abdu, 2013). The Nigerian nationstate has never enjoyed an appreciable period of stability that
could guarantee security and sustainable development. Each
phase of Nigeria’s political history is punctuated by different
security challenges - military coups, electoral violence, religious
disturbances, militancy and banditry.
In northern Nigeria in particular, poverty, class interest and
manipulations in the context of the struggle for the control of
state power and resources associated with it have resulted in
violent conflicts of different degree and proportion (Abdu, 2010).
The region has continued to experience conflicts, ranging from
2
Security and Governance in North-East Nigeria
small-scale communal and ethno-religious violence to highintensity insurgency of the Maitatsine in 1980s and Boko Haram
in recent years. In the last three decades, northern Nigeria has
been a major epicentre of violence. It is within this national and
regional security context that the situation in the northeast can
be better explained. While it is possible to isolate the north east
for analysis, it is important to understand that the governance
and security situation in the north east is not independent of the
broader situation in Nigeria.
The north east geopolitical zone consists of 6 states with
distinct socio-cultural and historical background. The region
shares international boundary with Niger, Chad and Cameroon
along the states of Borno, Adamawa and Yobe. With over 200
ethnic groups spread across six states, the zone is one of the most
culturally diverse regions of the country. It harbours some of the
poorest human development indicators: almost 70% of the
region lives below the poverty line, one of the worst maternal
mortality rates in the country, and high levels of illiteracy
(NDHS 2013). It is not surprising that it is currently the most
insecure region in the country. The region is going through one
of the worst spells of violence since the Nigerian Civil War.
The region can be tentatively clustered into a three distinct
but interpenetrating socio-cultural clusters. – The Kanuri, the
Hausa-Fulani Muslims and the ethnic minority Christian cluster.
The Kanuri axis covers Borno and Yobe states. They are
predominantly Muslims and have historically played relatively
distinct politics from the larger northern Nigerian politics. The
Hausa-Fulani Muslims axis covers Gombe, Bauchi, Adamawa
and parts of the Taraba State, and the axis gravitates towards the
politics of the North-West and has therefore been deeply
Introduction
3
influenced by the political direction of the North-West. Because
the ethnic minority Christians are also located in these states, the
politics is also influenced by the historical contentions between
these social groupings. Against the Hausa-Fulani dominated
politics of the north, the ethnic minorities who are also
predominantly Christians have more political affinity with the
Middle Belt (North-Central). The Middle Belt is politically
conceived to include the minority Christian areas of the NorthEast. Sometime the ethnic minority groups gravitate towards
southern parts of the country in building strategic political
alliances.
The northeast has been ravaged by spates of violence and
insecurity in the last two decades. Starting from cross border
banditry occasioned by civil war in the neighbouring countries
in the 1980s and 1990s, the region is currently going through a
complex mix of security challenges, including armed banditry in
the international border areas, different shades of communal
violence (ethnic and religious violence in Bauchi, Taraba, Gombe
and Adamawa states) and ferocious insurgency in almost all the
six states. Although the Boko Haram insurgency is more in
Borno, Yobe and Adamawa state, it has in many other ways
affected each of the states in the region.
With the level of violence in the region in the last few years,
the northeast has one of the worst cases of small arms and light
weapons proliferation, and also a huge presence of military
assault weapons in the hands of the militant groups. Closeness to
international borders, especially the Sahel region, has made
access to these weapons relatively easier. The zone has in the last
ten years produced militant youth groups, the Boko Haram and
Ansaru being the extreme ones. Others are ECOMOG in Borno
4
Security and Governance in North-East Nigeria
State, Yan’Kalare and Sara-suka in Gombe and Bauchi states
respectively.
The study attempts to systematically examine the
relationship between governance and security in the north east
of Nigeria. How has the character of governance in the region
influenced security? To what extent is the ranging insecurity in
the region linked to governance? The primary objective of the
study is thus to examine the relationship between security and
the character of governance in the region, and, also, to
understand the major drivers of insecurity in the region and
determine the role of civil society in improving governance and
security in the region.
Governance as a concept may have existed for a long time, but
its current usage in public discuss effectively started in the 1970s;
first in public administration literature and later in international
relations and comparative politics (Hyden 2011). The intellectual
heritage on which governance discourse rests is therefore varied
and complex. This complex heritage has been categorized into
two main parameters: effectiveness and legitimacy (Hyden 2011).
The former encourages a managerial and technocratic approach
to governance. It treats governance as an instrument to get things
done with better results. The latter gives rise to a focus on the
political aspects of governance and invokes issues such as
building democratic institutions, promoting social justice, rule of
law, human rights and how the state interacts with citizens
(Hyden 2011).
The concept of governance has now been part of
mainstream international development discourse for two
Introduction
5
decades. It however remained a versatile concept that means
different thing to different actors. It covers a wide range of
political, administrative, and economic issues.
Over the past two decades, the concept of governance has
experienced significant changes in both theory and practice. At
the theoretical level, the most remarkable shift has been towards
treating governance as regime management. This has meant a
greater emphasis on the rules of the game and on the political
dynamics surrounding their implementation. At the level of
practice, there has been an increasing recognition of the role of
citizens in formulating policy and holding government officials
to account (Hyden and Samuel, 2011).
Defining governance has preoccupied three different
constituencies in the last few years (Hyden 2011). One is the
academic community, which adopted the concept from various
perspectives in the 1970s and 1980s. Another is the international
donor community or development partners, which began
applying the concept to its programmes in the early 1990s. A
third is civil society activists, who have been at the forefront of
shaping the governance discourse in recent years (Hyden 2011).
Although some individual governments sponsored different local
participation initiatives, these initiatives have not attracted
international attention like the three identified consistencies.
Hyden therefore succinctly captures the storyline as follows:
The academics helped set the stage for what governance would
eventually become in policy practice; the donors developed the
concept into prescriptive devices; and activists today are challenging
the governance mainstream, because it focuses too much on
transferring institutions from the North at the expense of identifying
6
Security and Governance in North-East Nigeria
endogenous social forces that can help build sustainable governance
structures (Hyden 2011. 6).
Providing a generally acceptable definition of governance is
difficult. Goran Hyden attempted a working definition based on
the ranging international discourse as
The formation and nurture of the regime that constitutes the public
realm within which state and non-state actors interact to decide on
issues affecting the welfare and security of citizens.
Based on this conception, governance is the politics over rules: the
constitutional, legal, or procedural context in which policies are made
and implemented. It conceives citizens as the true constituency of the
state. As a result, governance has both a representative and
accountability dimension. While citizens elect their representative to
make governance possible, they are also expected to remain alert and
hold their representative accountable to make governance real.
Democratic governance is therefore not about the implementation of
specific policies but about the normative framework – the regime –
within which policies are formed and executed. It is about citizens
claiming the state in order to make it more responsive, inclusive, and
able to serve their welfare and security (Hyden 2011).
Although government is an important stakeholder in
governance, there is difference between governance and
government. While both concepts involve actions or decisions
on the part of an organization and its members to achieve certain
goals, governance is a broader concept than government.
Governments have the formal authority to act; they also have
powers to enforce compliance with their activities, rules, and
policies. In particular, governments have, and exercise, political
power. Depending on context and perspectives, there is almost a
consensus on the broad elements of governance. These include:
Introduction
7
•
The process whereby elements in society wield power,
authority and influence to enact policies and make decisions
concerning public life and economic and social development.
•
The capacity of the government to manage resources
efficiently and to formulate, implement and enforce sound
policies and regulations.
This broad understanding of governance doesn’t necessarily
make the measurement or assessment of governance a straight
and easy task. This is clearly reflected in the different approaches
that have been adopted for deconstructing and measuring
governance by different agencies. Some of the frameworks have
been deeply state centric, while others over emphasised the role
of non state actors.
Our attempt is to develop a framework that brings different
stakeholders in governance process including government
institutions, the private sector, citizens and their agencies – civil
society groups. At the same time, it is also recognises the
government as a duty bearer and therefore has the Constitutional
responsibility to provide and be held accountable by citizens and
their agencies.
For the purpose of the study, we categorised governance
into five broad dimensions – political, legal and judicial,
administrative and economic, and social. Each of these
dimensions refers to specific dimensions:
Political dimension: This is about the political space and the
contestations, conducts of political players including civil
society, institutional use and abuse of political authority and
citizens’ faith in the political process.
8
Security and Governance in North-East Nigeria
Legal and Judicial: This is the ability of the state to maintain law
and order, safeguard human rights and enable access and
delivery of justice.
Administrative dimension: Ability of the state to manage its
human, financial and technological resources and deliver
basic services.
Economic dimension: Ability of the state to create conducive
atmosphere for business in all sectors and ensure macroeconomic stability.
Social dimension: The capacity of the state to take care of the
vulnerable sections of the society. The role and quality of
the civil society, media and environmental governance.
This character and dimensions of governance have relevance
to security governance and human security.
The concept of security has gone through different stages of
development and understanding. It has grown from physical
security to human security, particularly since the end of the cold
war. The ‘human security’ approach provides that threats and
challenges to security transcend national defence, and law and
order to encompass all political, economic and social issues that
guarantee a life free from risk and fear. The focus has shifted
from the State to the security of persons; however, these are not
mutually exclusive. Security can be thought of as a “public
good”, responding to the strategic need to support sustainable
human development at the same time as promoting national,
regional and global peace.
During the past decades, broader security concepts have
moved from security research to policy. In the field of
international development and security sector reform policies,
Introduction
9
definitions of security that include the protection of individuals
and communities from violence have effectively replaced classical
understandings of security in military terms. Beginning with UN
Development Programme’s path-breaking Human Development
Report in 1994, the international community adopted ‘human
security’ concepts that ultimately introduced a “concern with
human life and dignity” into international security debates
(UNDP 1994; 22). As a lowest common denominator, current
human security concepts promote people-centred and
comprehensive approaches to counter the vulnerabilities of
individuals faced with critical threats to their lives and
livelihoods. This dual concern is frequently summarised as the
goal of promoting both ‘freedom from want’ and ‘freedom from
fear’ (Schroeder 2010).
From human security approach, in 2001 the OECD broadly
defined security as:
An all-encompassing condition in which people and communities live
in freedom, peace and safety, participate fully in the governance of
their countries, enjoy the protection of fundamental rights, have
access to resources and the basic necessities of life, and inhabit an
environment which is not detrimental to their health and wellbeing.
(OECD DAC, 2001: 38)
In 2007, the OECD DAC further specified that the
promotion of human security is a necessary ingredient of
international development policies.
Security is fundamental to people’s livelihoods, to reducing poverty
and to achieving the Millennium Development Goals. It relates to
personal and state safety, access to social services and political
processes. It is a core government responsibility, necessary for
10
Security and Governance in North-East Nigeria
economic and social development and vital for the protection of
human rights. (OECD DAC, 2007: 13)
Sustainable development in any society requires sustainable
peace. Scholars and practitioners are in agreement that for there
to be sustainable human security, society must evolve ways of
addressing the root causes of insecurity by fostering participatory
democracy, just and accountable governance, the rule of law,
respect for human rights, and a balance and equitable
distribution of resources, among a host of others. Security
initiatives must therefore be anchored on rights and the
responsibility of the state to protect and defend the rights of the
people.
Security challenges in Nigeria have been compounded not
only by the socio-economic challenges of the country, but also
the very narrow regime driven conception of security. The
security of a prevailing regime is almost synonymous to national
security. This conception of security doesn’t include vital aspects
of social and national development, such as responding to human
development needs and managing exclusion.
Societal-system analytics (Marshall and Cole 2008) provides a
useful framework for structuring a relationship between complex
webs of forces. Basic societal-system analysis takes into account
the interconnectedness of three fundamental dimensions of
societal systems – governance, conflict and development. The
conditions, characteristics, qualities, and prospects of each of the
three critically affect the others. Any change in one dimension
will have consequences for each of the other two (Marshall and
Cole 2008, 2014). The effectiveness or ineffectiveness in
performance of the societal-system is therefore expected to be
Introduction
11
both incremental and congruent among the three key
dimensions. The level of performance in each of the dimensions
can vibrate through the system with tremendous impact on the
delicate web of human relations and permeate every segment of
the dimensions. Societal-system performance is therefore
predicated on the system’s capacity for collective action.
Improvement in the conditions of social system thus requires
coordinated changes among all the three key dimensions. These
changes could be a combination of applied coordination –
effectiveness and voluntary compliance – legitimacy (Marshall
and Cole 2014).
Governance, conflict and development therefore influence
each other, a problem in one, will manifest in the other two, if
the problem is not managed effectively and resolved
systematically. The character and quality of governance and
development must therefore be taken into strong cognisance in
analysing conflict. Similarly, conflict and governance are
important determinants of the quality of development, same way
development and conflict influence governance (Marshall and
Cole 2008, 2014).
In the contemporary complex social formations define by
deep seated multiple identities and grievances, individuals and
groups can commit, withhold and even transfer loyalty among
deferent interests and platforms depending on their perceptions
of where their interest will be served and protected. Managing
conflict is an important governance issue. Protracted failure to
manage conflict could trigger or increase emotive content and
political salience, leading to greater mobilisation and polarisation
of constituent groups. It could also compound the ideological or
political differences between the governing elites and dissenting
12
Security and Governance in North-East Nigeria
groups often referred to as the “polar factionalism (Marshall and
Cole 2014). The consequences of protracted conflict could be
high on security as observed by Marshall and Cole:
The “unintended consequences” of political intransigence and
protracted social conflict accumulate over time and increase systemic
deterioration and societal atrophy through the diffusion of insecurity,
both intensively and extensively, and contribute to a syndrome of
societal-system un-and underdevelopment … The absence of political
will to resolve societal-systemic crises simply extends and expands the
ill effects (2014, 1).
After over three decades of military rule, the transition to civil
rule in 1999 provided an important opportunity for democratic
governance. While the transition ushered in regular elections at
the national and state level, citizens engagements in the
governance process and the capacity to hold their representatives
accountable have been at best limited, creating huge crisis of
governance. Oyovbaire (2007) observed that the crisis of
governance in Nigeria is fuelled by four related historical factors;
protracted military authoritarian rule, weak institutions,
corruption and personal rule.
The over three decades of military authoritarian rule is
observed to have trapped the country in a praetorian order in
which social structures and values have been moulded in the
fashion of authoritarianism, governance continues to be
conducted in that fashion. As a result, the executive branch is
seen, and behaves as both dominant and domineering organ of
government, if not the sole organ. The executive alone, to the
exclusion of the legislature and even the judiciary, is perceived to
Introduction
13
be government. As a consequence of the above, constitutional
institutions such as the legislature, the judiciary, political parties
and executive bodies are made to stunt and retard in growth or
they are gravely weakened. In the case of the legislature, there
was no space previously to experience the value of law making
derived from a representative social order because there was no
legislature distinct from the executive in politics and governance
under military rule. Indeed, since 1999, the legislatures at all
levels have failed to perform its constitutional oversight
responsibility and holding the executive to account. Conversely,
it is rather the legislatures that are working hard to perform
executive functions (through constituency projects) to remain
relevant in their respective constituencies. Every succeeding
election produces almost 80% new legislature. Therefore leaning
and growth in the business and politics of law making is
continuously been retarded by this high level of turnover.
Third, the political economy inherited by the fourth
republic. The class character of the economy in which unearned
wealth in the form of corrupt accumulation of state funds and
resources by a few individuals has tended to skew power
relations away from the majority of the people. The role of
money in elections has also made it difficult, if not impossible
for a large segment of the political class to participate effectively
in competing for power. Corruption has therefore been
democratised, permeating practically every segment of the
society and becoming a major lubricant of politics and electoral
contest and contributing to the growing poverty, inequality and
violence. While corruption, in itself is a huge problem, the
culture of impunity associated with this practice has become a
huge challenge to national security and stability. Corruption
14
Security and Governance in North-East Nigeria
undermines accountability, popular sovereignty and promote
personal rule. This increases personal rule by the President,
Governors and others in leadership positions. Personal rule is a
fundamental anti-thesis of constitutional and democratic
government (Oyovbaire 2007).
Other governance challenges include manipulation of ethnic,
regional and religious identities. Galvanising national consensus
to address any fundamental national issue has become a serious
challenge. Every national issue is seen from the prism of
ethnicity, religion, region or both.
The northeast region of Nigeria is one of the least governed
regions in the country. It ranks lowest in all the major
development and household indicators. The region harbours
some of the worst development indicators - escalating poverty,
huge unemployment and widening inequality. Nigeria’s large
informal economy, poverty and disaffection interact with
identity-based forms of economic organization, creating tensions
and opportunities that define the character of violence and
insecurity in the region. The economic deprivation and social
marginalization of youths in most urban areas provided
important space for violence and related crime (ONSA 2015).
In Borno in particular, desertification and the desiccation of
Lake Chad created a huge economic stress for large population of
people (ONSA 2015). This coupled with other environmental
factors created conditions for southward migration of people
from as far as southern Niger Republic into northern Nigeria
including Maiduguri. It has been estimated that the total
population of the entire Lake Chad basin area is 37 million, twothirds of whom live in the Nigerian portion of the lake. In the
1970s the annual production of the lake ranged from 130,000 –
Introduction
15
140,000 tonnes of fish, but this has dropped to an average of
84,030 tonnes between 1986 and 2013. (ONSA, 2015)
Table 1
Zonal Incidence of Poverty by Different Poverty Measures
Zone
Food
Absolute
Relative Dollar Per
Poor
Poor
Poor
Day
North Central
38.6
59.5
67.5
59.7
North East
51.5
69.0
76.3
69.1
North West
51.8
70.0
77.7
70.4
South East
41.0
58.7
67.0
59.1
South-South
35.5
55.9
63.8
56.1
South West
25.4
49.8
59.1
50.1
Source: National Bureau of Statistics, 2010
Historical resistance to formal education and the failure of
government to provide creative solution to the challenge has
created a huge army of uneducated and illiterate youth
population in the region. The high and persistent unemployment
and poverty have surpassed and stressed the absorptive capacity
of the informal economy and social network. There is the
competing down of incomes, the lack of capital, and increasing
employment as workers rather than entrepreneurs within the
informal economy (ONSA 2015). In many instances, traditional
artisanal occupations of different sectors of the informal
economy are being pushed out by better-educated and connected
actors. Narrowing livelihood opportunities in the informal as
well as the formal sector have triggered rising contestation by
indigenes over access to informal activities, which have
historically been the preserve of migrants (ONSA 2015). This has
impacted significantly on inter-ethnic, religious and communal
relations in the religion. This therefore, results in different forms
16
Security and Governance in North-East Nigeria
of violent crime, – from occasional communal violence to
protracted insurgency.
Relying on both primary and secondary data, the study covers
the six states of the geo-political zone. The secondary data was
sourced from an array of studies conducted; this includes books,
journals, magazines, newspapers and specialised studies like
CLEEN Foundation Security Assessment Reports and a host of
other national reports and policy documents. While the primary
data was derived from a three prone methods of data collection –
questionnaire, key informant interviews and focus groups. The
study was carried out in each of the states with standard sets of
questions and uniform sampling processes and frame. The idea is
to effectively guide the structure and create room not only for
individual state analysis but also give room for comparative
understanding of the states. While the character of security issues
in each of the states may differ, the context and causative factors
are almost the same.
The challenges of poverty, inequality, exclusion,
corruption, youth militancy and environmental issues are some
of the common governance and development issues across the
states. While insurgency, communal violence, rural banditry,
land disputes, chieftaincy tussle and political violence are some of
the common security challenges in the zone. The manifestations
of these challenges however differ from state to state.
The Adamawa study highlighted the increasing challenges of
governance and exclusion. Although it is one of the states
affected by the Boko Haram insurgency, the state has a long
Introduction
17
history of communal violence occasioned by poverty, exclusion
and manipulation of ethnic and religious identities. Empirical
data indicates a huge feeling of insecurity, lack of access to
government at all levels and deep-seated challenges of political
and governance crisis. The dislocations occasioned by the Boko
Haram insurgency have compounded the situation.
The Bauchi study indicates a society that is very active in
electoral politics, but less active in holding the political
leadership to account. Challenges of corruption, poor leadership
and social services have permeated the entire landscape of the
state. Violent crimes have been observed to have increased since
the return of civil rule in 1999. Prominent among these violent
crimes is the activities of a politically sponsored youth militant
group called ‘Sara-suka’. The group is made up of young people
often used as political thugs to intimidate the opposition.
Borno is the epicentre of the Boko Haram insurgency; the
study highlighted how a relatively peaceful state could transform
into one of the most violent and extremely unsecure states of the
Nigerian federation. Important in this process of transformation
is the historical failure of governance in the state as expressed in
the increased poverty, exclusion, corruption and impunity by
security agencies. Empirical data indicate active citizens’
engagement with the electoral process without corresponding
gains for their participation. The state government is observed to
have alienated itself from the people at all levels (through limited
access), providing little or no room for accountability.
Government decisions are hardly questioned no matter the level
of unpopularity. For more than ten years, the state failed to
conduct elections into the local government authority. This has
18
Security and Governance in North-East Nigeria
undermined local level participation and promoting corruption
and abuse of office at the local level.
The Gombe study is built around the activities of youth
militant groups called Kalare. This militant youth group was
used to intimidate the opposition and repress dissenting voices to
cover up for poor governance, leadership failure, corruption and
abuse of office. This situation had been compounded by
deepening poverty, unemployment, illiteracy and exclusion. The
study also identified poor citizens’ engagement with the
governance process, inadequate service delivery and lack of
legislative oversight as some of the major contributors to the
challenges of governance and insecurity in the state.
The Taraba study shows how complex historical and
political issues combined to undermine governance and security.
Being also in the fringe of the country with expansive land,
Taraba is observed to be one of the under governed states of the
country, with poor social services, high unemployment and
deepening poverty. The combined effects of historical conflicts
and contention over land/boundary, chieftaincy tussle and
electoral contest between different ethnic and religious groups
have generated some of the most protracted violent conflicts in
the region particularly the Chamba-Kuteb and Tiv-Jukun
conflict. Several local governments’ areas are faced with one
form of conflicts or the other. Since the return to democracy in
1999, violence has become increasingly associated with politics.
Other security challenges in the state include rural banditry,
pastoralist-farmers conflict, kidnapping, youth militancy, armed
robbery and political violence. Some of this violence could be a
spill over of conflicts in other parts of the region or country.
Introduction
19
Yobe and Borno state are located within the same cultural
zone. Until 1993, they constituted the old Borno state. It is
therefore not a surprise that the activities of Boko Haram are
largely in these two states. The Yobe study is therefore more like
the extension of that of Borno. The state is another example of
how a relatively peaceful society could transform into one of the
most violent. While Borno State is undoubtedly the epicentre of
the Boko Haram insurgency that has affected the greater part of
the North East region, it was in Kanamma, the headquarters of
Yunusari LGA in Yobe state located on the border with Niger
Republic that the group launched one of its early uprisings,
attacking the Local Government secretariat and the police
station in 2003 (Bukar 2016). Thereafter, the group went
underground and resurfaced in 2009 when it felt there was
sufficient ground and capacity to challenge the state. Since then,
Yobe and Borno states have recorded some of the worst violent
conflicts in the history of Nigeria.
The study also indicates that poverty, exclusion, corruption
and lack of public accountability have been the major drivers of
security in the state. Yobe is particularly observed to be one of
the poorest states in Nigeria. Absolute poverty in the state is
73.8% while the national average is 60.9% (NBS 2010). In terms
of literacy, it has one of the highest illiteracy rates in the country
with 85.3% females and 83.3% males without any form of
education (NDHS 2014). In the health sector, it is reported that
90 per cent of child deliveries take place at home, and less 30 per
cent of such births receive anti natal care.
The nature and scale of poverty reflect the interactions of
geography, ecology and politics. In terms of size, Yobe State is
the second largest state in Nigeria with a major portion of its
20
Security and Governance in North-East Nigeria
land area located in the semi environment characterized by low
potentials in terms of agriculture productivity (low rainfall,
limited topsoil; scarce water resources). In addition, majority of
the population are found in remote rural areas, which tend to
suffer from crises of social and economic exclusion. Sparsely
populated and isolated settlements usually face problems of lack
of access to basic infrastructures, transport routes and extreme
economic isolation. The nature and pattern of distributing
societal benefits, which places certain areas in perpetual
disadvantage is therefore a major source of poverty in the area
(Bukar, 2016).
The influence of powerful individuals otherwise known as
godfathers is another dimension to the democratic process in
Yobe State. Empirical data indicates that powerful individuals
possess the means to unilaterally determine who gets party ticket
to run for an election and who wins the election (Bukar 2016).
The phenomenon of “godfatherism” is indeed not peculiar to
Yobe State; it is recognized as one of the biggest dangers to
democracy in Nigeria.
This study shows a strong relationship between governance and
security in the north east of Nigeria. The security situation in
the region is a reflection of the crisis of governance and
accountability in the states. Security decision-making have been
over centralised and largely controlled by the governing elites.
This has continued to undermine citizens’ involvement in
security governance and democratic control of the security
agents. The state’s attitude to conflict is to suppress it with all
Introduction
21
violent means possible. Increasingly security is not only being
privatised it is also personalised. The failure of accountability in
the course of discharging their duties have created a state of siege
in most conflict zones, resulting in wanton violation of human
rights and the institutionalisation of a culture of impunity.
The north-east of Nigeria is clearly the most insecure part
of Nigeria in recent years. The level of insecurity may not be
uniformly spread across the six states, but the challenges of
governance are almost common. To respond to the growing
security issues, it will be important to improve governance in the
states. This will mean improving political, economic and security
governance. It will therefore be important to consider the
following.
!
Protracted conflicts and security contributes to the erosion and
contestation of the legitimacy of state and societal institutions.
State delivery capacity is largely undermined and citizen’s
engagement can be very difficult and conflictual. The three core
states affected by Boko Haram – Adamawa, Borno and Yobe,
exhibit different levels of state fragility and will therefore require
effective recovery effort. This effort can be enhanced by four
major frameworks – build responsive institutions, ensure
inclusive politics, increase community resilience to crisis and
build effective partnership (UNDP 2012). First in the framework
is to build responsive institutions to deliver necessary services to
the people. This will require equipping and building the
capacities of the state (federal government, state and local
governments) and civil society to ensure services are delivered in
a way that is not captive or partial to specific elite or identitybased interests. The second is to promote inclusive politics by
building mechanisms that allow for the legitimate and peaceful
22
Security and Governance in North-East Nigeria
expression of interests in a way that does not reverse
development gains (UNDP 2012).
The third framework is for public institutions to work
proactively with civil society groups and the private sector to
improve the resilience of the society to crisis and ensure the
participation of the affected communities in monitoring,
assessing, mediating, and responding to social conflict and
political crises that often accompany the turbulent post-conflict
period. The last of the framework is to build and emphasize
partnership as a means of achieving the first three frameworks responsive institutions, inclusive politics and resilient societies.
Partnerships with different national and international institution
including – federal government, interstate partnership; civil
society groups, UN agencies and other development partners
will be very important (UNDP 2012).
"
This should look beyond growth in income and macro-economic
indicators. Sustainable human development approach is based on
the following:
• Social progress - greater access to knowledge, better
nutrition and health services.
• Economics – the importance of economic growth as a
means to reduce inequality and improve levels of human
development.
• Efficiency - in terms of resource use and availability.
Human development is pro-growth and productivity as
long as such growth directly benefits the poor, women and
other marginalized groups.
• Equity - in terms of economic growth and other human
development parameters.
Introduction
•
•
•
23
Participation and freedom - particularly empowerment,
democratic governance, gender equality, civil and political
rights, and cultural liberty, particularly for marginalized
groups defined by urban-rural, sex, age, religion, ethnicity,
physical/mental parameters, etc.
Sustainability - for future generations in ecological,
economic and social terms.
Human security - security in daily life against such chronic
threats as hunger and abrupt disruptions including
joblessness, famine, conflict, etc.
#
It may not be Fukuyama’s end of history (1992), but democracy
has come to be recognised as the major means of managing
diversity and ensuring citizens’ engagement in the governance
process. It has effective mechanism and capacity to regenerate,
contextualise and provide space for popular participation. This
effort will require strengthening the legitimacy, accountability
and capacity of the governments at all levels. State credibility is
important for resource mobilisation and service delivery, this is
however a function of electoral mandate and responsive of the
government. There is a logical connect between credibility and
accountability (Odinkalu 2010). Accountability has both
political and institutional dimensions. At the political level it is
about citizen’s participation in the governance process and their
capacity to determine who governs them. At the institutional
level it is about the operational effectiveness of the institutions of
government. Providing the political and institutions services
requires a level of state capacity which is a function of
independence of the state institutions and their capacity to serve
24
Security and Governance in North-East Nigeria
public good against arbitrary and personalised interest of the
powerful and governing class (Odinkalu 2010).
The different state case studies show how poor security
governance has contributed to escalating insecurity. In some
cases, security agencies have directly contributed to escalating
violence. Attitude to security issues have been largely militarist.
Militarist solution to insecurity tends to place unnecessary
emphasis on the immediate issue or manifestation of conflict and
ends of up escalating the situation. It is state centric and does not
treat citizens as important stakeholders in security governance.
Security deployments are frequently based on the whims and
caprices of the individuals that control them than on strategic
interests and needs.
Because the security system has been so deeply personalised
– there are competing interests between the different security
agencies, all struggling to please their immediate masters without
any consideration for strategic collaboration across the services.
This has resulted into a loss of synergy, failure to share
intelligence and poor coordination. The Boko-Haram violence
has tellingly exposed this predicament. There have been cases of
open accusation and counter accusation between the security
agencies (Abdu 2013). It is therefore important to restrategise
security governance at all levels of government. Citizens must be
allowed to play their role in security governance and to
contribute to holding security institutions to account.
$
Abdu, H. 2013. “When Protectors become Aggressors: Conflict and
Security Governance in Nigeria,” in Abdul Raufu Mustapha ed.
Introduction
25
Conflict and Security Governance in West Africa, Malthouse Press,
Lagos.
-2010. Clash of Identities: State, Society and Ethno-Religious
Conflicts in Northern Nigeria. DevReach Publishers,
Kaduna.
Centre for Good Governance and AC Nietsen DRG MARG (?).
Framework for Assessing State of Governance: A Tool kit, Delhi.
Fukuyama, F. 1992. The end f history and the last man. Penguin books,
London.
Hyden, G. 2011. “Making State Responsive: Rethinking Governance
Theory and Practice”. In Goran Hyden and John Samuel, eds.
Making the State Responsive: Experience with Democratic
Governance Assessments. UNDP, Oslo Governance Centre.
Ibeanu, Okechukwu and Momoh Abubakar, 2008. State
Responsiveness to Public Security Needs: The Politics of
Security Decision-Making: Nigerian Case, CSDG Papers,
Kings College, London.
Marshall, M. G. and Cole, B. R. 2008. Conflict, Governance and State
Fragility. Global Report, 2008. Centre for Systemic Peace.
Marshall, M. G. and Cole, B. R. 2014. Conflict, Governance and State
Fragility. Global Report 2014. Centre for Systemic Peace.
National Bureau Statistics (NBS), 2010. Nigeria Poverty Profile. NBS,
Abuja
National Population Commission (NPC), 2013. Nigeria Demographic
and Health Survey Report. NPC, Abuja.
Odinkalu, A. C. 2010. “Corruption and Governance in Africa: How
do we break the cycle in Nigeria?” In Corruption and Governance
Challenges in Nigeria Conference Proceedings. CLEEN Foundation
Monograph Series, No. 7.
OECD DAC 2001. The DAC Guidelines: Helping Prevent Violent
Conflict. Paris: OECD Development Assistance Committee.
26
Security and Governance in North-East Nigeria
OECD DAC 2007. Handbook on SSR: Supporting Security and Justice.
Paris: OECD.
OECD DAC 2007. Encouraging Effective Evaluation of Conflict
Prevention and Peacebuilding Activities: Towards DAC
Guidance, Off-print of the OECD Journal on Development 2007:
Volume 8, No. 3. Paris: OECD Development Assistance
Committee.
Office of the National security Adviser (ONSA), 2015. Violent
Radicalisation in Nigeria: Economy and Society, Policy Brief,
ONSA, Abuja.
Sam E. Oyevbaire 2007. “The Crisis of Governance in Nigeria,”
Convocation lecture delivered at University of Port Harcourt,
Nigeria on the 15th of March 2007
UNDP 2003. Sources for Democratic Governance Indicators, Oslo:
UNDP Governance Centre.
UNDP 2004. Governance Indicators: A User’s Guide. Oslo: UNDP
Governance Centre.
UNDP 2012. Governance for Peace: Securing the Social Contract,
UNDP, New York.
Chapter 2
- Dr. Saidu Tunenso Umar
Recent events and the continuation of violence, destruction of
lives and property in the north-east of Nigeria, and Adamawa
state in particular, are indications that the security situation
needs to be looked into.
As a state in the Federation of Nigeria, Adamawa has
segmented social group networks. It has at least seventy-four
dialects, a figure that places it among the most ethnically diverse
and pluralistic states in the country. One result of this diversity
is that the state has problems when it comes to achieving
solidarity in action and purpose. In particular, its hyper-ethnic
composition makes it difficult to establish and sustain peace and
overall security. Over the years the state has faced threats and
different forms of violence from militia groups.
The state also suffers from widespread poverty, and from
inefficient health and educational services. There is a very low
level of human capital development, with underemployment,
poor water resources and sanitary conditions, epileptic energy
and power output, environmental degradation, poor housing and
transportation. The deplorable road network is a further
28
Security and Governance in North-East Nigeria
negative characteristic of the state, and is another reason for
failure to achieve development goals. Despite having a large area
of arable land, Adamawa state still records low crop yields, and
as a result, food insecurity. The private sector appears non-viable
and un-profitable (ADSEEDS, 2006).
All these issues have been highlighted by the SWOT analysis
carried out by the Adamawa State development blueprint. The
analysis revealed that one of the weaknesses of the state is the
lack of effective linkages between the agricultural and industrial
sectors. It also captured the major characteristics of the human
underdevelopment problem in the state referred to above,
namely low income, disease, epidemics, poor sanitation and
hygiene, low literacy rate, vulnerability to controllable natural
disasters, gender inequality, and generally poor public
infrastructure. With limited private sector jobs, the state
government has been left to shoulder the burden of providing
employment.
Problems in the area of governance include lack of
transparency and accountability, lack of security preparedness,
insecurity of life and property, as well as pervasive corrupt
tendencies and patronage values that have become deep-rooted in
not only the public, but also the private sectors. The analysis
noted the opportunistic and systematic manipulation of volatile
religious and ethnic values (ADSEEDS, 2006), which often
culminate in violent conflict with loss of life and property.
The concept of governance has continued to be a problem in
academic and administrative discourse. The World Bank has
identified all issues relating to the personalization of power,
Governance and Security in Adamawa State
29
denial of fundamental human rights, widespread corruption and
the prevalence of unelected and unaccountable government as
manifestations of bad governance (Boerminger, 1994). In other
words, governance simply refers to the manner in which power
is exercised in the overall co-ordination of a country’s economic
and social resources for all round transformation in the quality
of life of the citizenry. In the view of Landel-Mill and Sergeldin,
governance is the use of political authority and exercise of
control over a society and the management of its resources for
social and economic transformation. Governance also refers to
the capacity of a good government for efficient problem-solving
and conflict management. According to Adekunle, governance is
also the framework through which citizens and groups exercise
their rights, meet their obligations and articulate their interests.
These assertions can be summarized as central issues relating to
authority, reciprocity, trust, and accountability (Hidden and
Barton 1992). A process of governance is said to have been
established when all these elements are jointly practised. But
when they are not practised, governance is said to be bad. Thus
good governance exists when there is a framework that imposes
demands on policy makers in their exercise of power which
encompasses an effective state that provides an enabling political
and legal environment for economic growth and the equitable
distribution of the good things of life (Genyi, 2006).
By and large, the character and dimensions of governance affect
security. The concept of security has gone through different
stages of development and understanding, and has expanded
from physical security, to encompass human security –
30
Security and Governance in North-East Nigeria
particularly since the end of the Cold War. The ‘human security’
approach argues that threats and challenges to security transcend
national defence or law and order, to encompass all political,
economic and social issues that guarantee a life free from risk and
fear. This has shifted the focus from the State to the security of
persons; however, these are not mutually exclusive. Security can
be viewed as a “public good”, responding to the strategic need to
support sustainable human development, and at the same time, as
promoting national, regional and global peace. In the last decade,
broader security concepts have moved from security research to
policy. In the field of international development and security
sector reform policies, definitions of security that include the
protection of individuals and communities from violence have
effectively replaced the classical understanding of security in
purely military terms, as can be seen from the UN Development
Programme’s ground-breaking 1994 Human Development
Report.
Over the years, Nigeria’s national security has practically
been reduced to the security of the ruling class. Certainly the
ruling classes have failed in their attempts to provide the general
public with even military or physical security, let alone the type
of security that includes vital aspects of social and national
development, such as basic social services. In a broader sense,
security has been categorized into five broad dimensions, namely
political, legal and judicial, administrative, economic and social
securities. The political dimension connotes political
contestation, the conduct of political players (including civil
society), institutional use and abuse of political authority and
citizens’ faith in the political process. The economic dimension
relates to the ability of the state to create conducive atmosphere
Governance and Security in Adamawa State
31
for business in all sectors and to ensure macroeconomic stability.
The social dimension refers to the capacity of the state to take
care of the vulnerable sections of the society, and the role and
quality of civil society, the media, and to environmental
governance.
The data for this study is sourced from secondary and primary
sources. The primary sources include interviews, observation and
Focus Group Discussions (FGD). The State Coordinators and
Field Assistants interacted with different stakeholders on issues
of governance and insecurity in the study area. Information was
generated from two local government areas in each of the three
senatorial Districts, namely: in Adamawa North – Mubi-North
and Madagali LGAs; in Adamawa Central – Yola North and
Hong metropolitan LGAs; and in Adamawa South Senatorial
District, Numan and Ganye LGAs. The secondary sources
include newspapers, radio, television, magazines, the Internet
and official documents from relevant bodies and institutions.
Others include published books and official documents, journals
and civil society groups.
A total of 240 completed questionnaires were collated for
analysis and drawing inferences. Based on the sampling methods
and sampling frame, a homogenous group of respondents (that is,
individuals having some common interest or characteristics) were
engaged in discussion using an open-ended interview guide with a
moderator who interacted with the members.
Key Stakeholder Interview: Stakeholders (that is, people
who have a direct bearing and influence on governance and
security) were identified through a rapid stakeholder analysis and
32
Security and Governance in North-East Nigeria
community power mapping. Stakeholders in this regard include
experts, decision makers, and people affected by conflict. These
individuals were interviewed using the open-ended interview
guide.
The sample was stratified by location, gender and
economic/political status. Data were collected from six LGAs,
three urban and three rural, distributed across the three
senatorial districts. Data were obtained from the following
populations or groups: Elders, Youths, Women, Ethnic groups,
Security agencies such as police and prison staff, Traditional
institutions, Teachers in primary and secondary schools, Trade
unions – namely the Nigeria Labour Congress and Nigeria
Union of Teachers, government officials, vigilante groups, road
transport workers, motorcyclists, tricycles, media organizations,
civil society organizations, and community and faith-based
groups.
Demographic data of Respondents
Figure 1: Sex of the respondents
Governance and Security in Adamawa State
33
34
Security and Governance in North-East Nigeria
!
Governance and Security in Adamawa State
35
"
#
The data reveals that 94.2% of the respondents were
indigenes of Adamawa State. The majority of the respondents
77.9% were males while only 22.1% were females. This is a valid
36
Security and Governance in North-East Nigeria
reflection of the rate of involvement of women in community
affairs in the state. This is similar to the result obtained in the
assessment of the Adamawa State Economic Empowerment
Strategy (ADSEEDS, 2006).
Similarly, the analysis on professional or occupational
nature of the respondents shows over 50 per cent are civil
servants. This corroborates the fact that private sector
participation in the state is low; the State can be said to be a
typical ‘civil servant state’. 60 per cent of the respondents are
Christians, 39 per cent are Muslims while 1% are traditional
believers. Over 80 per cent of the respondents spread across
Christianity and Islam have obtained tertiary education. 34.6%
of the respondents are within the youth age bracket which is 29 38 years.
$
The analysis of the data indicates that there is a nexus between
the challenges of governance and insecurity in Adamawa State.
When the respondents were asked to rate the performance of
the state legislature, majority of the respondents 56.7% were of
the opinion that the performance of the State legislature was
poor. One respondent noted: “The members of the State House
of Assembly are after election and re-election of themselves or
the Governor of the state, and nothing else.”
There is no space for participation of opposition parties or
ideas in the State. An equal democratic process that guarantees
equal participation and inclusiveness of all parties including
minorities and opposition parties does not exist in the State. This
is more obvious in the rural areas where civic participation in
Governance and Security in Adamawa State
37
governance is not encouraged. There is the belief among the
people that their votes do not count during the elections.
The data showed that over 60 per cent of the respondents
were located in urban areas in the State. 22.3% of them were
aware of the existence of civil society organisations (CSOs)
which includes nongovernmental organisations (NGOs). They
stated that CSOs and NGOs performed well in the provision of
essential services to the communities; 8.3% of respondents
considered that NGOs and CSOs were engaged in community
mobilization. 28 per cent were of the opinion that they were not
involved in activities that are related to participating in
governance.
Feedback from the respondents indicates that most of the
CSOs in the state are like social clubs such as football
associations, or gender-based traders associations. Very few of the
CSOs perform any watchdog role with a view to enhancing
governance in Adamawa State. Community-based policing
groups are also evolving in the state and they benefit from local
support and knowledge of the environment. They are adjudged
to be accessible and effective. However, there has been no
mechanism to coordinate their activities with that of the formal
police organisation.
$
From 1999 to date, Adamawa State has experienced a series of
security challenges which have emerged from a variety of causes:
ethnic, religious, election violence, armed banditry and militia
group operations. Many respondents identified the threat posed
by political thugs, politicians and security agents, with 82.9%
expressing the view that crime and security challenges in their
38
Security and Governance in North-East Nigeria
community took various dimensions and had resulted in many
cases of crime. Priority security challenges identified were
terrorism, commercial violence, crimes and ethno-religious
violence. These threats were identified by respondents from the
Adamawa South Senatorial District (Numan and Ganye LGAs).
The opinion of respondents on the response of local government
officials to security challenges was not favourable, with 42.5%
rating the response of local government officials as very poor,
while 21.3% were of the view that local governments had failed
to respond to security challenges in their communities. Views
about the preparedness of the Nigeria Police Force were hardly
better, with 49.6% saying that it lacked the equipment to
maintain law and order. 35 per cent felt that its level of
preparation to meet the challenges was neither good nor poor,
but 5% opined that the level of police preparation is not directed
towards tackling security problems. Respondents did not feel
that the police were capable of stopping threats to life, citing
poor and out-dated equipment as a key responsible factor.
When respondents were asked for the views on the
performance by the Adamawa State Government in preventing
or handling security challenges such as extremism, militia and
communal violence, 37.9% of the respondents disagreed with the
statement that the State Government is not making any serious
effort to handle the trend towards violence – particularly the
insurgency – in their communities. However 69 per cent noted
that the Adamawa State Government had been unable to stop
inter-faith wars, and ethnic crisis. There are still people without
conscience who manipulate communities under the disguise of
Governance and Security in Adamawa State
39
faith or ethnic affiliation. We still have persons clamouring for
ethnic nationalities or religious entities to kill.
$
Respondents were of the view that the state’s administrative
machinery has not been directed towards strengthening public
services such as health and education, or to establish anti-poverty
schemes. Nearly half of the respondents (45.4%) opined that
accessing government functionaries is always very difficult and
complained that the local government which ought to be closer
to them has no impact on their lives, and that public officials are
only seen in the locality during elections or when wedding or
burial ceremonies are taking place. Many of the respondents
described the government as insensitive to the yearnings and
aspirations of the people. In the words of a key informant:
“The health, educational and road services are at a dilapidated level…
we are left at the mercy of medicine vendors. The roads are in a
deplorable condition, one can hardly transport the farm produce to
the nearest market.”
Despite (or perhaps because of) the preponderance of civil
servants among the respondents to the questionnaire, most of
them opined that corruption has taken over the state’s
administrative machinery, and that services are no longer
provided by the Adamawa State ministries and agencies: “The
state ministries, agencies and boards exist only on paper, the only
work now is in the office of Accountant General of the state.”
71.7% of the respondents stated that electricity services had
disappeared. Although only 24.2% of respondents in the state
40
Security and Governance in North-East Nigeria
capital complained of epileptic electrical services, discussions
with key informants revealed that:
“We in this neighbourhood asked the service providers of electricity to
cut-off all the lines, because we are tired of paying bills without
electricity.”
Thus those who have the means depend on generators as
their main source of energy in Adamawa State.
Educational services are still extremely poor, and this means
that there has been no opportunity for children and vulnerable
persons to have access to basic civic and health education.
When respondents were asked about primary education,
51.3% opined that the delivery of primary education has been
politicized. Basic education is seen as being of low or poor
quality and unfairly distributed. Respondents said that although
public primary schools in urban centres had witnessed a rapid
increase in the building of classrooms, this was because contracts
had been awarded to meet the aspirations of political allies. But
the teachers recruited did not have relevant teaching skills and
the level of enrolment level is very low. Respondents complained
that the few who were enrolled demonstrated unsatisfactory
levels of performance, especially in numeracy skills. In addition,
glaring gender and geographical disparities were noted. Schools
in the rural areas were reported as suffering total neglect in terms
of facilities, poor quality of teachers and lack of supervision by
educational administrators. Against this background, it is not
surprising that the majority of the respondents 70 per cent
expressed dissatisfaction with primary educational services.
Governance and Security in Adamawa State
41
A majority of the respondents (72.1%) were dissatisfied with
water services, with only 23.3% expressing satisfaction. The
available sources of water are streams, wells and pump-operated
boreholes. However the number of hand pumps is not
commensurate with the needs of the population. 74.6% of the
respondents had a very low opinion of the quality of sanitation
services, and respondents also complained that when refuse is
dumped, there are no vehicles or means of removing or
otherwise disposing of the waste, particularly having regard to
the large distances to official dumping centres. In focus group
discussions participants said that poor sanitation and poor health
services meant that people are still dying from diseases that
should have been eradicated. For example, children are still
dying from malaria due to the failure to control mosquitoes,
while women are still dying from maternal complications. The
filthy environment makes the people of Adamawa State
vulnerable to diseases such as cholera, diarrhoea and typhoid
fever, particularly in the urban centres where most of the study
was conducted.
Housing services are very poor, particularly in the state
capital, Yola. The shortage of housing has left civil servants
vulnerable to high rents charged by landlords. In the words of
some respondents and participants in interviews and group
discussions:
“These services are generally very poor. As a whole, it makes life so
difficult for us… Cholera is always on the increase…With the epileptic
education, health and electricity services, we have a very low sense of
security…We in Adamawa State have continued to experience bad
governance from all the regimes under our democratic dispensation.
42
Security and Governance in North-East Nigeria
The state is almost fourteen years behind other states of the
federation.”
On the whole, responses to the questionnaires showed that
the government has been cutting costs by reduced services to the
underprivileged in Adamawa State. Resources and facilities have
not been extended to farmers in the rural areas, and they have
not received any adequate training on modern farming skills
from government extension workers. With attacks from
insurgency groups like Boko Haram, the State faces the threat of
food insecurity, since the farming communities of Madagali,
Gulak, Michika, Betso, Bazza and Sabon Gari are all in camps for
internally displaced persons.
Respondents complained that the government of Adamawa
State has failed in its responsibility to assist the peasant farmers
who produce food for the teeming population of Nigeria. Only
37.1% felt that the state government had achieved average
effectiveness in promoting agriculture in the state. 69 per cent of
the respondents said that they have no access to credit and loan
facilities, while only 16.7% of the respondents said they had
accessed such faculties. While 37.1% of respondents said that
they had received advice from the state’s agricultural extension
staff, 55.8% said they had never had any advice or training from
the state government.
As regards employment, 65.4% of respondents said that job
opportunities were not available in Adamawa State, with many
graduates and school leavers remaining without jobs. The 1999
Constitution placed education on the concurrent list, and it is on
this basis that the Universal Basic Education, which is supposed
to be “an assistance to the state and local government in Nigeria
Governance and Security in Adamawa State
43
for the purpose of uniformity and qualitative basic education
throughout Nigeria” (UBE, 2005) was introduced.
The impetus for the intervention of government in basic
education stems from a number of international conventions
such as the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of
Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), on corruption, and
on the Rights of the Child. These conventions recognise that the
human family is a fundamental grouping within society which
provides the environment for the growth and well-being of all its
members, particularly women and children. But despite these
various instruments, extensive discrimination against women and
children continues in Adamawa State, and is reflected in the
numbers of vulnerable and disadvantaged street children,
orphans and children from Qur’anic schools (or Almajiris).
Respondents were of the view that the Adamawa State
government has done little to make it possible for these
disadvantaged persons to benefit from these rights.
The data generated indicates wide geographical variation
between the rural and urban locations, with children in rural
areas appearing to be generally disadvantaged. Above all, the girlchild has been more discriminated against by being denied
enrolment even at basic levels of education.
Most respondents (64.2%) said that none of the anti-poverty
programmes undertaken by the state or local governments had
reached them. The implementation of these programmes was
seen as discriminatory, with one respondent stating that:
“All the anti-poverty programmes so far undertaken by the state are
only among friends and family of the executive branches of
governance.”
44
Security and Governance in North-East Nigeria
North eastern Nigeria in general and Adamawa State in
particular faces a threat from global warming and climate change.
Conferences and research on climate change have warned that as
global warming increases, there will be an increase in disease,
while water levels and resources will shrink, resulting in reduced
crop yields. Environmental conditions are therefore more likely
to lead to famine. Soil fertility has decreased to such an extent
that it is now in danger of exhaustion. The southern part of
Adamawa State, which has a high potential for biofuels has been
neglected, with desert encroachment posing a real threat. No
attempt has been made to harness the bountiful wind energy
potential blowing from the north, and a viable alternative to
solar power is thus being wasted. Thus instead of the high winds
providing resources for the benefit of the people, they bring
desert encroachment, which is another cause of insecurity.
Respondents expressed their dissatisfaction with the Adamawa
State government by saying:
“In the past few years or so, in every government sector, conditions
have either failed to improve, or they are worsening. Public health has
been threatened due to unclean water, along with poor sanitation.
Many people are dying. Each year…there are several health
problems.”
$
Generally, insecurity has continued to increase since 1999. The
crisis of security in Adamawa State has many different aspects.
Firstly, for the past two decades, fear of general insecurity has
impeded commerce, causing epileptic social capital development
and undermining normal economic activity. Consequently
Governance and Security in Adamawa State
45
poverty has increased, with many in the state facing social and
economic challenges. Secondly, the administrative system of
Adamawa State has been destroyed, with the Governor and the
Commissioners being seen as not accountable to the people.
There appear to be many cases of financial misappropriation, and
as at the time of this research (August, 2014), the state’s civil
servants had not been paid for over four months. Respondents
noted a complete lack of coordination or coherence in
government activities, and a reliance on out-dated solutions.
During interviews and discussions, respondents said that several
individuals who hold no official position in the government, and
many institutions that had been created without any legal
backing, were performing official functions, exercising state
powers and expending public funds. The most egregious example
was the eldest son of former Governor Murtala Nyako, who was
said to have taken leave of absence from military service. Despite
holding no official position in the Adamawa State government,
he wielded enormous power under the Special Project Unit
(SPU), the headquarters of which was located in the former
Governor’s personal residence. Decisions taken by him at the
SPU were officially binding; and because virtually all the state’s
major public contracts and expenditure pass through it, the SPU
is the clearing house of Adamawa State contracts. On the one
hand, the lack of any legal instrument establishing the SPU
means that there is no official responsibility or accountability of
the type that would be obtainable under civil service rules and
procedure, while on the other hand, most public officials have
been prevented from performing their primary role, with the
result that public servants in the state are frustrated and reluctant
(Ardo, 2011).
46
Security and Governance in North-East Nigeria
Section 7 of the 1999 Constitution establishes local
government as the third tier of government: the objective behind
this is to bring government closer to the people and to encourage
participatory democratic government. Respondents in this study
however, expressed the view that the local government system in
Adamawa State has been practically destroyed. The statutory
allocations to local governments from the Federation Account
had been brazenly deducted by the state governor, leaving the
local governments unable to pay staff salaries for several months.
Furthermore, there have been no local government elections for
two years: instead, the local government councils have been run
by career civil servants for two years.
Respondents characterised Adamawa State government’s
leadership as poor and corrupt. They protested about alleged
phantom public expenditure which has destroyed the state’s
financial standing and prevented necessary expenditure on
essential resources such as roads, health, electricity and water.
One example of the wastage of public funds was the alleged
hiring of between 15,000 and 50, 000 special assistants, each of
whom was paid various amounts each month. Respondents
alleged that nobody in government is able to state the actual
number of such special assistance, or to identify what their
schedules of duty might be.
Another concern for respondents to this study was the way
that human rights in the state were being trampled upon, while
the rule of law was not being respected. They cited the
destruction of posters and billboards of opponents of the
government in power in the state on the excuse that these were
“unlawful”, and the use of the Nigeria Police to disrupt lawful
meetings when these were held by opposition parties. Extra-
Governance and Security in Adamawa State
47
judicial killings were alleged to be on the rise, especially in Mubi,
Shelleng, Numan, Namtani and Ganye. Despite violence which
resulted in loss of life, injury and destruction of property, no
culprits were arrested, with the state government being seen as
playing politics with the lives of the people. Its insistence that all
was well indicated a lack of concern, whereas the perception of
respondents was that identity patronage and ethnic and religious
disquiet was being stoked. Such was the conclusion of the
Administrative Panel of Inquiry into the Numan/Lamurde Civil
Disturbances of 8th and 9th June, 2003.
It was a combination of all these issues as identified by
respondents to this study that were seen as having led to the
impeachment of Governor Nyako in 2014.
% &
$
Since the return to civil rule in 1999, Adamawa State has
experienced intense insecurity, the reasons for which are
numerous and interrelated. Most of the factors fuelling insecurity
stem from religion, ethnicity, politics, unemployment and
poverty.
Ethnic politics has become an obstacle to the establishment
of social order in the state. There has been rapid decrease in trust
among citizens, and between citizens and the government.
Associations such as Ethnic Development Associations and
unions, social clubs, religious groups and political party
membership tend to rally around ethnic identities (Howard,
1981). These tendencies have been described by (Galtung 1996) as
vertical cleavages, and this view has also been expressed by
(Akpata 2000). This situation has been described by Fanon as
follows:
48
Security and Governance in North-East Nigeria
“The National or State bourgeoisie could not stand up to defend its
immediate interests and sees no further than their nose, reveals itself
incapable of simply bringing national unity into being, or of building
up Nation or State on a stable and productive basis. The National
front which has forced colonialism to withdraw cracks up, and wastes
the victory gained.”
Ethnicity continues to be used as a violent and poisonous
instrument of competition, but behind this ethnic jingoism is a
struggle for a share of modern goods and services. In urban areas,
Nigerian communities tend to live in relative peace and harmony
until there is competition for goods and services. Although the
elite wield power in the name of the nation, it uses most of this
power for itself, leaving only crumbs for the rest of the
community.
The influx of people from neighbouring countries and states
has also been a major issue as regards security within Adamawa
State. Some are people of questionable character with no fixed
abode. Some of them pose as dry season farmers, water hawkers,
shoe makers, fingernail-cutters and kolanut-sellers, but many are
juvenile delinquents, with a large number of unemployed and
uncontrollable children roaming the streets.
The media, both local and international have also been
accused of inciting conflict through their reportage. Some
recorded messages of preachers in public places such as market
squares and centres of worship have also been inflammatory.
Indeed, religious doctrines propagated in this way have caused
serious divisions among people of the same faith.
'
The deplorable circumstances in Adamawa State and its socioeconomic and political landscape will continue to experience bad
Governance and Security in Adamawa State
49
governance and security challenges until its ethnic diversity and
bountiful resources are harnessed and strengthened by
progressive leadership. This can be achieved when all its citizens,
both leaders and followers, share a common aspiration to live in
peace with one another. Living in peace is the only route to the
meaningful transformation of human endeavour in the State.
Therefore, the following measures should be implemented:
i. the art and process of governance is the common human
heritage that can produce and secured generation now
and in the future;
ii. leaders and followers should collectively stand against
inhumanity from any quarter. National laws should be
harmonized with international treaties as instruments for
the support and the respect for human rights;
iii. enhance national capacity for emergency preparedness
and response support the development of national
strategies and plans for disaster and emergency
management;
iv. promote the use of positive cultural heritage for national
cohesion and development. Promote the use of dialogue
as a tool for conflict prevention, management and
resolution;
v. promote measures that will encourage private sector
participation and investment. Strengthen capacity for
monitoring and evaluating development programmes.
Support mainstreaming of gender-related issues. Promote
and develop processes and the review of policies and
legislation that hinder access of vulnerable groups;
vi. promote partnership with local communities, civil society
organisations (CSOs) and other national development
Security and Governance in North-East Nigeria
50
actors in order to undertake activities that empower the
poor and other vulnerable groups to participate in
poverty reduction programmes, advocate for the
equitable provision of basic social services, maintenance
and expansion of existing ones.
APPENDICES
S/n
Names
From
To
Durations
1.
Col. Mohammed
Dahiru Jega Sokoto
24th July 1978
1 year 5
months
2.
Brig A. R. A.
Mahmud Bandel
Alhaji Abubakar
Barde Jalingo
Taraba
Wilberforce Juta
Maiha
Alhaji Bamanga
Tukur Jada
4th
February
1976
25th July
1978
1st
October
1979
3rd May
1983
1st
October
1983
4th
January
1984
1st
September
1985
26th
September
1986
5th
January
1990
5th
January
30th September
1979
2nd May 1983
1 year 2
months
3 years 8
months
30th September
1983
30th December
1983
5 months
1st September
1985
1 year 8
months
26th September
1986
11 months
31st July 1988
1 year 11
months
2nd January 1992
2 years
2nd January 1992
2 years
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
Mohammed Dahiru
Jega Yayi Gomna
Sau (2)
Col. Yohanna
Madaki Kaduna
8.
David Jang Jos
9.
CMA Isa
Mohammed Kamba
10.
Abubakar Salihu
Kamba
3 months
Governance and Security in Adamawa State
11.
Abubakar Saleh
Michika, Michika
12.
Group CAPT
Girgori Abononi
Bandel
Isma’ila Mustapha
Bernin Kebbi
13.
14.
NAVY Kalu
Igboma Abirba
15.
LT. Col. A. G.
Hussani Plateau
Mr. Boni Haruna
Michika
Admiral Murtala
Nyako
Alh. Ahmadu
Umaru Fintiri
Barr. Bala James
Ngilari
16.
17.
18.
19.
1990
2nd
January
1992
13th
December
1993
21st
September
1994
22nd
August
1996
6th August
1998
29th May
1999
29th
May,2007
15th July,
2014
8th
October
2014
51
18th November
1993
1 year
21st September
1994
1 year
21st August 1996
2 years
6th August 1998
1 year 5
months
29th May 1999
10 months
29t May,2007
8 years
15th Jult,2014
7 years
8th October,2014
3 weeks
29th May 2015
7 months
Source: Mohammadu Bassoro – ANDAL – FA’IDAJI
June, 2004
!
Place
Numan, Lamude,
Ngbalang
Numan, Demsa, Lamude
Ethnic/Religious
January, 2010
Lamurde, Lafia, Ruggange
Ethnic
January 2011
February, 2012
Lamurde, Tsuwa, Lafiya
Ethnic
Lamurde, Lafia Chulmo, Ethnic
Luggare
Ganye
Insurgency (BokoHaram)
Date
8 June, 2003
th
22nd March,
2013
Type
Ethnic
Security and Governance in North-East Nigeria
52
August, 2014
May, 2014
S/
no
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10
.
11
.
12
.
13
.
14
.
15
Hong, Kobri, Gashela
Insurgency (BokoHaram)
Madagali, Gulak, Sabon Insurgency (BokoGari, Shuwa
Haram)
Special Project and Programme Unit (S.P.P.U) Report of Data
Statistic of Adamawa State Ethnic Groups
Local
Ethnic Group and Per centage
govt. Area
Madagali
Marghi 72%, Matakam 13%, Sukur 07%, Fulani
05% and others 03%
Michika
Higgi 86%, Fulani 06% and others 08%
Mubi
Gude 73%, Fulani 10% and other 17%
South
Mubi
Fali 58%, Dandankwa 31%, Fulani 06% and
North
others 09%
Maiha
Nzanyi 81%, Fulani 13% and others 06%
Hong
Kilba 89%, and others 11%
Gombi
Ga’anda 48%, Hona 18%, Lala 13%, Bura 11%,
Gwaba 07% and others 03%
Song
Yungur 51%, Mboi 15%, Holma 12%, Bata
07%, Fulani 10%, Gudu 03% and others 02%
Girei
Bwatiye 42%, Fulani 38%, Tambo 15% and
other 05%
Yola
Laka 17%, Hausa 24%, Igbo 20% and others
North
33%
Yola South Bata 11%, Verre 23%, Fulani 29, Hausa 07%
and others 04%
Fufore
Bata 23%, Verre, 37%, Fulani 29, Hausa 07%
and others 04%
Mayo
Nyandag 41%, Mumuye 07%, Fulani 32%,
Belwa
Chaamba 12%, Gomla 05% and others 03%
Jada
Chamba 45%, Fulani 27%, Koma 13%,
Mumuye 09% and others 06%
Ganye
Chamba 71%, Fulani 18%, Mumuye 08% and
Governance and Security in Adamawa State
.
16
.
Toungo
53
others 03%
Chamba 73%, Fulani 13%, Mumuye 10% and
others 04%
Special Project and Programme Unit (S.P.P.U) Report of Data on
Adamawa State Religions and Percentage
S/ Local
Christianity
Islam
Traditional
n
govt.
1. Madagali Christianity 64% Islam 31% Traditional 05%
2. Michika Christianity 73% Islam 25% Traditional 02%
3. Mubi
Christianity 43% Islam 55% Traditional 02%
North
4. Mubi
Christianity 77% Islam 22% Traditional 04%
South
5. Maiha
Christianity 33% Islam 64% Traditional 03%
6. Hong
Christianity 80% Islam 18% Traditional 02%
7. Gombi
Christianity 78% Islam 19% Traditional 03%
8. Song
Christianity 67% Islam 21% Traditional 02%
9. Girei
Christianity 59% Islam 40% Traditional 01%
10 Yola
Christianity 55% Islam 44% Traditional 01%
.
North
11 Yola
Christianity 40% Islam 58% Traditional 02%
.
South
12 Fufore
Christianity 52% Islam 45% Traditional 03%
.
13 Mayo
Christianity 65% Islam 33% Traditional 02%
.
Belwa
14 Jada
Christianity 57% Islam 41% Traditional 02%
.
15 Ganye
Christianity 60% Islam 37% Traditional 03%
.
16 Tounga
Christianity 53% Islam 45% Traditional 02%
.
54
Security and Governance in North-East Nigeria
List of Governor Nyako’s Commissioners Indicating Ethnic
Affiliation
Source: The Broom, 2007, Vol. 1 No.
Governance and Security in Adamawa State
55
1999 Constitution (as amended in on 4th March 2011) establishing the
National Industrial Court.
Abdu, H. (2010) Clash of Identities, State, Society, and EthnoReligious Conflict in Northern Nigeria, Desreach Publishers.
Abdu, H. (2013). “When Protectors become Aggressors: Conflict and
Security Governance in Nigeria,” Abdul Rauf Mustapha ed.
Conflict and Security Governance in West Africa, Malthouse Press,
Lagos.
Adamawa State Economic Empowerment and Development Strategy
(ADSEEDS) 2006.
Alhaji (Dr.) Mohammed Barkindo Aliyu Mustapha, the Lamido of
Adamawa.
Analysis, Vol. 3, No. 3, September, (2003). Nigeria Governance and
Corruption Survey, Overall Summary Report, June, 2003.
Anjor, T. K. (ND). Contemporary Ideologies; Published by Oracle
Business Ltd. Makurdi
Aondoka, E. K. (2013). “Global Terrorism and Deadly Phenomenon and
the Need to Forestall its Strength’’ Oracle Business Ltd. Makurdi.
Artdo, U. (2011) Governor Murtala Nyako: Destructive governance and
politics in Adamawa State (Text of a press conference in Yola on
Wednesday 18th September, 2011.)
Ayo, M. (2012),” Issue of Phenomenon and Poverty Reduction in
Nigeria;’ Destiny Ventures Makurdi.
Centre for Good Governance and Nietsen, A. C. (ND). Framework
for Assessing State of Governance: A Toolkit, Delhi.
Dan-Bazzau, L. (1981). Politics and Religion in Nigeria. Vanguard
Printers and Publishers Ltd Kaduna.
Effrat, A. (ND) Perspectives in Political Sociology Published by BobsMerit Company, New York.
Fact Sheet No. 16, Published by the Committee on Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights.
56
Security and Governance in North-East Nigeria
Fogani, P. K. (1997).The Law of Contract: Simplified series, Malthouse
Press Ltd.
Falana, F. (2014). Nigeria Crises: Corruption, Impunity and the Paradox
of Democracy, Keynote address delivered at the ASUU National
Delegates Conference held at the University of Ibadan, Oyo,
Nigeria.
Ige, T. (1994). Human Rights made Easy: An Introductory Text on
Human Rights published by Legal Research and Resources
Development Centre, Lagos, Nigeria.
INEC Study on 2011 General Elections in Nigeria: Report from North
Eastern States.
Leneke, J.L.S. (2000). Survey of Benue Congo Family in Nigeria, Love
Power House.
Madhi, A. (2007) Nigeria: The Education Trap and Development
Predicament (Text of a pre-convocation lecture at Adamawa State
University, Mubi).
Nwankwo, A. (1997). African Dictators and Lessons from History,
Fourth Dimension publishers.
Nsugh, M. (ND.)Nigerian Government Politics, Revised edition,
Rayodok Publishing Company Makurdi.
Omisakau, I. S. (1998).Crime Trends and Prevention Strategies in
Nigeria: A study of old Oyo State.
Proceedings of the Adamawa State House of Assembly, 3rdAssembly
First Assembly Report (HANSARD) Vol. 1, 7th June, 2003 6th
June, 2004.
Report of the Ad hoc Committee to Investigate the Compliance or
Otherwise of the Resolution of the House on Deductions made
from May 2014 Salaries of State Employees and non-payment of
September and October, 2014 Salaries Areas. Submitted to
Adamawa State House of Assembly June, 2014.
Governance and Security in Adamawa State
57
Report of the Seven (7) man Panel Investigating Gross Misconduct
against Murtala Hammanyero Nyako; Submitted to the Adamawa
State House of Assembly on the 14th July, 2014.
Ritzer, G.& Steprisky, J. (2014). Sociological Theory: McGraw Hill,
Education.
Sorkaa, A. (2003). Development as Ethnics, and Accountability in
Government: The way forward for Nigeria.
State of Education in Adamawa State; A Study Conducted Team of
Researchers from Adamawa State University, Mubi, Submitted to
the Adamawa State Universal Basic Education Board (ASUBEB)
2009.
Taylor, G. (2010). Power, Ideology and Identity in an Age of complexity:
The New Political Sociology Palgrave-Macmillan.
UNDP. (2006) Report on the activities of in Adamawa State on
Millennium Development Goals (MDGs).
UNDP (2003). Sources for Democratic Governance Indicators. Oslo:
UNDP Governance Centre.
UNDP (2004). Governance Indicators: A User’s Guide. Oslo: UNDP
Governance Centre.
58
Security and Governance in North-East Nigeria
Chapter 3
- Dr. Saalah Yakubu Ibrahim
In recent times, African countries have been experiencing the
rising spectre of violence and insecurity. The drivers of this
unfortunate situation vary from region to region and from
country to country. Within the West African sub-region for
instance, there are several drivers of such unrest, ranging from
political to religious and economic factors. Nigeria being the
largest and most populated had its own specific causes, and even
within Nigeria, different regions have witnessed different levels
and drivers of insecurity such as militancy in the Niger Delta,
Bakassi Boys in the south east, O’dua Peoples’ Congress in the
south west and the Boko Haram insurgency in the north-east. As
a result, citizens across the country are living under various levels
of insecurity, which can in some cases be debilitating and almost
overwhelming. This review is an attempt to understand the
relationship between governance and the rising insecurity with
particular reference to Bauchi State.
According to the World Bank (1989), governance concerns
the manner in which power is exercised in the management of a
country’s economic and social resources for development.
60
Security and Governance in North-East Nigeria
Governance is the exercise of authority – political, economic and
administrative – to manage natural resources and affairs. On the
other hand, security is the condition of feeling safe from harm or
danger, the defence, protection and preservation of core values
and the absence of threats to acquired values. David (2006) sees
security as the survival and condition of human existence; that it
promotes peace, development, and justice, but that its absence
creates condition of conflict and insecurity. Elaborating on
insecurity, Bassey (2001) argues that the condition can be
characterized by the forced exodus of populations which creates
refugee flows, genocide, the rape of women, ethnic cleansing, and
organized killing of the unarmed, child soldiering, antipersonnel mining of farmlands among other threats to human
wellbeing.
The concept of good governance is generally defined with
some level of flexibility. Depending on the context and the
overriding objective, the concept encompasses full respect for
human rights, the rule of law, effective participation, political
pluralism, transparent and accountable processes and
institutions. Because good governance relates to political and
institutional processes and outcomes that are deemed necessary
to achieve the goals of development, it can be said to be ‘good’ to
the degree to which it delivers on the promise of human rights –
which includes civil, cultural, economic, political and social
rights. Resolution 2000/64 of the Commission on Human Rights
identified the key attributes of good governance as: transparency,
responsibility, accountability, participation and responsiveness.
The north-eastern part of Nigeria is presently going through
one of the most critical and difficult periods of its history. The
unfortunate conditions being experienced in the region are the
Security and Governance in Bauchi State of Nigeria
61
product of multiple variables, which, to all intents and purposes,
revolve around the lack of good governance.
Since Nigeria returned to civilian rule in 1999, the nature of
governance in the country has been the subject of debate by
scholars and citizens alike. This is because governance in Nigeria
cannot be explained in isolation from the country’s historical
experience, since that is the structural basis for the current wave
of ethno-religious and politico-economic crisis in the land. This
state of affairs raises serious concerns about the question of
governance in Nigeria where the politics of deprivation and
mismanagement of resources appears to overshadow the
principles of accountability, transparency and responsibility.
This situation has thrown up security challenges in Nigeria’s
poverty-ridden society.
The primary objective of this chapter is to examine how the
character of governance in Bauchi State impacts on security. Its
specific objectives are to:
• Examine the relationship between security and character of
governance in the region.
• Understand the major drivers of insecurity in the state.
• Identify the gaps in governance and security in the state.
• Determine the role of civil society in improving governance
and security in the state.
Odock (2006) sees good governance as a system of government
based on good leadership, respect for the rule of law and due
process, on the accountability of the political leadership to the
62
Security and Governance in North-East Nigeria
electorate as well as transparency in the operations of
government. A critical question to ask is whether it is possible to
have good governance without good leadership? The level of
personalisation in Nigerian politics would seem to create the
reality that the former is logically derived from the latter; at least
to the extent that good governance is at least possible where
there is effective and efficient leadership.
Peace on the other hand, is seen as the absence of war and
although by logical extension, war is seen as the absence of peace,
this is faulty because, the true meaning of peace is missing.
Ibeanu (2005) approached peace from a sociological perspective
to argue that peace is a condition of social harmony in which
there are no social antagonisms. Peace, therefore, is a condition
in which there is no social conflict, and in which individuals and
groups are able to meet their needs, aspirations and expectations.
From this structural functionalist perspective, peace can be
achieved where existing social structures perform their functions
adequately, supported by the requisite culture, norms and values.
Similarly, Galtung (1990) identified two dimensions of
peace. First is negative peace, which means the absence of direct
violence, war or fear on the part of the individual, the nation, the
region and indeed at the international levels. Second is positive
peace, meaning the absence of unjust structures or unequal
relationships, and the presence of justice and inner peace of the
individual. Violent conflict, whether social, political or
environmental, contributes to crisis situations in terms of loss of
human lives and material capital. So it is that the lack of peace
experienced in the north-eastern region of Nigeria has
contributed to the condition of underdevelopment in the region.
Security and Governance in Bauchi State of Nigeria
63
Security is viewed as the condition of feeling safe from harm
or danger, the defence, protection and preservation of values, and
the absence of threats to acquired values (Terrif, 1999). In fact,
security is about survival and the condition of human existence.
Thus it can broadly be viewed as freedom from danger or threats
to an individual or a nation. McNamara (1968) sees security as
tantamount to development. Kofi Annan (1998) emphasized the
human perspective of security when he posited that security
means much more than the absence of conflict, and that lasting
peace – an inherent ingredient of security – will encompass areas
such as education, health, democracy and human rights, as well
as protection against environmental degradation and the
proliferation of deadly weapons. Indeed, there can hardly be
security in the midst of starvation, peace building without
poverty alleviation, or true freedom built on the foundation of
injustice.
On the relationship between citizenship and security,
Aligwara (2009) submits that security of the individual citizen is
the most important. He argues that security is for the citizens,
and not citizens for security, and so, that for citizens to live in
peace, the basic necessities of life such as food, good health, job
opportunities, justice, freedom and all other ingredients of life
must be provided.
Bauchi State evolved from the North-Eastern State. It was
created out of the old Northern Region in 1967. During the
colonial era up to independence in 1960, it formed part of the
Bauchi-Plateau Province of the old Northern Nigeria. In the
1967 state creation exercise, Bauchi Province, together with
64
Security and Governance in North-East Nigeria
Borno, Sardauna and Adamawa provinces, constituted the
former North-Eastern State.
The original Bauchi state, which then comprised the present
Bauchi and Gombe states, came into being in 1976. Gombe State
was carved out of the old Bauchi State. The present Bauchi State
is made up of twenty (20) Local Governments namely: Alkaleri,
Bauchi, Bogoro, Dambam, Darazo, Dass, Gamawa, Ganjiwa,
Giade, Itas/Gadau, Jama’are, Katagum, Kirfi, Misau, Ningi,
Tafawa Balewa, Toro, Warji and Zaki.
Bauchi State has a total of 55 ethnic groups, of which the
main ones are Hausa, Fulani, Gerewa, Zaar, Jarawa, Bolawa,
Kare-kare, Warjawa, Zulawe and Badawa. These different ethnic
groups have their languages, settlements, customs, festivals,
historical background, occupational patterns, beliefs and many
other features that form part of the existence of the people of
Bauchi State. There are similarities in their languages,
occupational practices, and dress modes of the ethnic groups
with high degree of ethnic interaction especially in marriage and
economic activities.
Bauchi State covers a total land area of 49,259.01 square
kilometres, which represents about 5.3% of Nigeria’s total land
mass. The state is bordered by seven states: Kano and Jigawa to
the north, Taraba and Plateau to the south, Gombe and Yobe to
the east and Kaduna to the west. Agriculture is the major
occupation of the people of the state, where 75 per cent to 80 per
cent of its inhabitants engage in food and cash crop farming. The
population of the state, based on the 1991 population figures,
was 4.2 million in 2004 with an average annual growth of 3.0%
per annum. 50.5% of the population is males while 49.5% are
females.
Security and Governance in Bauchi State of Nigeria
65
Source: Directorate of Statistics Ministry of Budget and Economic Planning,
Bauchi
In conducting the research, both primary and secondary sources
of data were used. The main secondary sources were books,
journals, reports and web search. For the primary sources, a
research assistant was engaged and trained to assist in the
66
Security and Governance in North-East Nigeria
distribution and retrieval of questionnaires. A few individuals
were also interviewed personally for clarity, but the main
instrument used was a questionnaire containing fifty-three (53)
questions. The major issues investigated centred on governance
and its effect on security. The variables are political, judicial,
administrative and economic. Five local governments were
selected based on Senatorial Districts. The state capital, Bauchi,
was chosen in the Bauchi South Senatorial district, two each –
one urban and one rural – were selected from the Northern and
Central Senatorial Districts. For this purpose local government
areas created before 1997 were chosen as urban while those
created after 1997 were treated as rural. The local governments
thus selected are; Shira and Giade for Bauchi North; Ganjuwa
and Darazo for Bauchi Central and Bauchi for Bauchi South.
The details of questionnaire administration are presented in
Table 2.
Senatorial District
Bauchi South
Bauchi Central
Bauchi North
TOTAL
Local Government
Bauchi
Ganjuwa
Darazo
Giade
Shira
5
Number
60
30
30
30
30
180
Source: Field work, 2014
Of the 180 questionnaires distributed, 170 were retrieved. This
reduction in number was caused by the failure of some
respondents to return the questionnaires within the time
Security and Governance in Bauchi State of Nigeria
67
available: six of these were in Bauchi local government while
four were in Shira local government. The composition and
features of the respondents are presented below.
!
Variable
Origin:
Sex:
Ages:
Religion:
Level of Education
Occupation/profession
Location:
!
"
No
Indigenes
165
Non-indigenes
05
Males
141
Females
29
48
18 – 20
78
29 – 39
40
40 – 50
04
51 – 60
00
60 and above
148
Islam
22
Christianity
00
Traditional
00
Others
Primary
05
Secondary
16
Tertiary
148
Non-formal
01
89
Civil Servants
21
School teachers
10
Self employed
Private
Sector 01
06
employee
03
Trade/business
32
persons
08
Industrialists
Students
Unemployed
Urban
90
Rural
80
Source: Fieldwork, 2014
!
Percentage
91.5
08.5
82.9
17.1%
28.2
45.9
23.5
2.4
0.0
87.1
12.9
0.0
0.0
2.9
9.4
87.1
0.6
52.8
12.3
5.9
0.6
3.5
1.8
18.8
4.7
52.9
47.1
Security and Governance in North-East Nigeria
68
Table 3 shows that almost all essential and interest groups
were represented, with a fair distribution between urban and
rural areas.
"
#
$
Under this heading, questions were raised on political
participation, representation and the performance of elected
officials, voting and the activities of government institutions.
The responses of respondents on each have been collated and
presented in Table 4 below.
%
Variable
Yes
No
Total
No.
150
20
170
Percentage
88.2
11.8
100
Source: Fieldwork, 2014.
The responses received indicated that a large of number, up
to 88.2% went to cast their votes in the last Gubernatorial and
House of Assembly elections. The inability of some to vote was
for reasons such as names not being on the voters register or not
being qualified to vote. Others did not vote because they were
either unavailable during the elections or because they did not
feel like voting.
A major way of demonstrating good and effective
governance is communication between political office holders
and the electorate. It is through this contact that the problems of
the governed can be understood and properly articulated. The
Security and Governance in Bauchi State of Nigeria
69
study therefore investigated the level and quality of such
communication. The responses obtained are produced below:
# $
%
Variable
Not easily accessible
Accessible with some difficulty
Easily accessible
Don’t know
Total
!
No.
62
45
40
23
170
%
Percentage
36.5
26.5
23.5
13.5
100
Source: Fieldwork, 2014.
Table 5 shows that most respondents (63%) felt that political
office holders are either not easily accessible or only accessible
with difficulty (the nature and magnitude of which could not be
measured due to some differential interests), while only 23.5%
felt that they were easily accessible with 13.5% not knowing
whether political office holders are easily accessible or not.
The Nigerian Constitution bestows certain authority and
responsibilities on those who are elected into office. In the
discharge of these responsibilities as well as in exercising
authority, abuses occur either intentional or otherwise. In
Bauchi State, an effort was made to assess the extent of any
possible misuse of power. For this purpose, attention was paid to
the activities of three key groups of actors, namely the governor
and his cabinet; the legislature; and the Local Government
Chairmen and councillors. The responses received are presented
in Table 6 below:
70
Security and Governance in North-East Nigeria
& '
Variable
Extremely high
High
Neither high nor low
Low
Extremely low
(
%
No.
60
55
26
07
04
Don’t know
Total
18
170
)
Percentage
35.3
32.4
15.2
04.1
10.6
02.4
100
Source: Fieldwork, 2014.
In this context, the expression “misuse of power” refers to
the use of power by incumbents over and above normal practice,
for example by appropriation of power for personal gain, selfenrichment or nepotism. It was in this context that respondents
gave their views regarding political office holders in Bauchi State.
No single individual was targeted or identified, rather the
questions related to the entire spectrum of political office
holders. The responses as presented above give the impression
that misuse of power in Bauchi State by elected political office
holders is high; with 67.7% the respondents opining that the
level of the misuse is extremely high or high.
Local governments were established as the third tier of
government in Nigeria to bring governance nearer to the people.
Advocates of modern democracy urge that many people should
be involved in decision-making processes. This study sought to
assess the extent of such involvement in Bauchi State through the
opinions of the respondents who are predominantly indigenes.
Their responses are shown in Table 7 below:
Security and Governance in Bauchi State of Nigeria
* +
%
Variable
I don’t participate
I participate to some extent
I participated very well
I don’t know
Total
,
No.
54
86
20
10
170
- )
Percentage
31.8
50.5
11.8
5.9
100
71
)
Source: Fieldwork, 2014.
The responses in the above table 7 show that communities
are involved in the activities of their local governments, with
only 5.9% saying that they do not know whether local people
are involved in the activities of their local governments, although
31.8% said that they do not participate. For the 62.3% who
participate to some extent or very well, it is not clear at what
level they are involved, and it is likely that at best their
involvement may not go beyond some form of self help
measures.
The world has become a global village with expanding access
to information and communication technology. Philanthropists
have widened their approach to cover almost all aspects of
human endeavour, more especially in third world countries. At
the same time, many nations have embraced the idea of liberal
democracy and are at various stages of democratization. Since
many non-governmental and community-based organizations
(NGOs and CBOs) have taken it upon themselves to embark on
advocacy as well as other activities, the study attempted to
ascertain the level of awareness of such NGOs and CSOs among
the people of Bauchi State.
72
Security and Governance in North-East Nigeria
. /0
Variable
Yes
No
Total
1-2
No.
140
30
170
Percentage
82.4
17.6
100
Source: Fieldwork, 2014.
This shows a high level of awareness of the existence of
NGOs, but since some of such NGOs have been in existence for
a considerable time, the study went further to probe awareness
of the activities of these organizations in Bauchi State.
3 $ )
Variable
Policy advocacy
Service provision
Community development work
Community mobilization
Peace Restoration
All of the above
Total
1-24
No.
18
58
62
22
03
07
170
Percentage
10.6
34.1
36.5
12.9
1.8
4.1
100
Source: Fieldwork, 2014.
The responses shown in Table 9 indicate that the NGOs are
actively involved in socio-economic and political affairs of
Bauchi State, and that their activities extend to a wide range of
activities. This involvement can point the way for development
in Bauchi State.
There can be no doubting the importance of the private
sector in a country’s socio-economic and political development.
Some developed nations point to the private sector contribution
to governance as a major factor in their attainment of their
present status. In Nigeria, the private sector is contributing to
Security and Governance in Bauchi State of Nigeria
73
the socio- economic and political system of the country. The
private sector can also influence government in the area of policy
formulation and implementation. Where this is done through
sponsoring candidates for elected office, it is a patron-clientele
type of politics, and it is this kind of relationship that has
characterized Nigerian politics. The study therefore delved into
the extent to which private individuals influence the government
in Bauchi State, and if so, in what ways.
5
Variable
Very influential
Somehow influential
Influential
Not influential
Don’t know
Total
)
65 !)!
No.
31
59
45
17
18
170
)
Percentage
18.2
34.7
26.5
10.0
10.6
100
Source: Fieldwork, 2014.
The responses in Table 10 suggest that private individuals
exert influence on the government of Bauchi State and its local
governments. Whether or not this influence is for good of
society as a whole, there can be no doubt that it shapes the
nature of governance in the state. The study probed further to
see what forms this influence has taken.
In developing nations like Nigeria, governments are faced
with more demands than their resources can meet. To make up
for the deficiency, some private individuals are called upon to
assist the government. However, where such calls are made, a
few individuals may take advantage and advance their own
interests without consideration of the impact on or consequences
Security and Governance in North-East Nigeria
74
for the wider society. Some of these consequences are
detrimental to the socio-economic development of society while
some are beneficial. Table 11 shows the areas seen as beneficial to
the general public as well as the level of input beneficial only to
individual interests.
"
)
Variable
Support to state and local government
Support to the police
Work only for their business
Fund security agencies
Don’t know
Total
)
No.
81
23
32
30
04
170
!
%
Percentage
47.7
13.5
18.8
17.6
2.4
100
Source: Fieldwork, 2014.
Table 11 shows that a large majority (78.8%) of respondents
identified areas of support to government from the private sector
or individuals that can be said to be of benefit to the community
as a whole, while 18.8% were of the view that such support to
state and local government was for their own narrow interests.
Whatever is the rationale for such support, there can be no
doubt that the private sector and individuals are seen as
supporting state and local governments in Bauchi State.
"
Governments establish certain structures in order to control and
regulate individual conduct and behaviour in the society, as a
means of mitigating what sociologists call ‘survival of the fittest’.
Such structures protect every member of society and assist in the
equitable distribution of resources. But where such structures are
Security and Governance in Bauchi State of Nigeria
75
weak, with the result that a society is characterized by injustice,
unpleasant developments are the likely outcome.. This section
examines these structures and the impact of their strength or
weakness in Bauchi State.
Variable
Yes
No
Total
/0
No.
104
66
170
%
Percentage
61.2
38.8
100
Sources: Fieldwork, 2014.
The majority (61.2%) of the respondents agreed that they are
facing security challenges. As mentioned earlier, this is partly
attributable to the failure of the structures established to govern
society. Further questions identified the different types of
security challenge in Bauchi State as shown in Table 13.
7
N0
Type of crime
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
Terrorism
Ethno-religious violence
Armed rubbery
Theft
Drug abuse
Sara suka
All of the above
Undecided
Total
%
No. of
respondents
15
07
16
42
02
1
33
54
170
Percentage
8.8
4.1
9.4
24.7
1.2
0.6
19.4
31.8
100
Source: Field work, 2014.
Read with Table 12, Table 13 shows that even though 38%
did not believe that Bauchi State faced any security challenges,
76
Security and Governance in North-East Nigeria
only 31.8% did not identify any particular type of crime, while
68.2% were able to identify specific types of crime.
In addition to the more general types of crime, a group or
criminal gang particular to the area – ‘Sara Suka’ – was identified.
Sara Suka is a group that indulges in the use of dangerous drugs.
During the key informant interview it was discovered that the
group emerged as a result of neglect and the failure of the
authorities to integrate them into society in any meaningful way.
The active or visible members of the group are youths, who
carry weapons and attack victims, but they also have sponsors,
or passive members. The group’s operations are targeted and also
random. Targeted operations mean attacking individuals either
because they are seen as interfering with its business, or because
the group’s sponsors identify them for attack. Untargeted
operations take the form of the indiscriminate attacks and
destruction of property.
Sara Suka have two sources of finance: firstly, from their
sponsors who are mostly politicians. The group itself creates the
second source, mostly from stealing. It is not clear when this
group emerged, but it became prominent in Bauchi State after
the return to civil rule in 1999. It has been difficult to identify
the areas where its members are most highly concentrated, but
the general belief is that they are all over the state. Further
inquiries to establish whether Sara Suka has any relationship
with ‘Yandaba’, a social group that existed before 1999
confirmed that there is no such connection between the two
groups. While the Yandaba’s activities consist of hunting of
animals in the bush, the ‘Yan Sara Suka attacks human beings.
While these security challenges necessarily call for a response
from the security agencies, the crimes take place within
Security and Governance in Bauchi State of Nigeria
77
communities and society for which government is primarily
responsible. The study therefore sought the views of respondents
on the governments’ response to the various types of crime
identified.
- )
Variable
Very poor
Poor
Neither poor nor good
Good
Very good
Undecided
Total
No.
52
63
09
35
03
08
170
Percentage
30.6
37.0
5.3
20.6
1.8
4.7
100
Source: Fieldwork, 2014.
The responses in Table 14 show deep dissatisfaction with
government responses to crime in Bauchi State, with 67.6%
expressing the view that in regard to ensuring peace and security
– the essential conditions for good governance as championed by
the social contract theorists – the performance of the Bauchi
State structures had been poor or very poor.
One of the institutions of government charged with the
responsibility of ensuring peace and security is the Nigeria Police
Force. The perceptions of the study’s respondents as to this
institution’s preparedness to handle these responsibilities and
respond to security challenges are given in Table 15.
Security and Governance in North-East Nigeria
78
#
Variable
Not prepared
Somehow prepared
Prepared
Very prepared
Undecided
Total
!
!
No.
49
68
35
12
06
170
%
Percentage
28.8
40.0
20.6
7.1
3.5
100
Source: Fieldwork, 2014.
Table 15 indicates that those who consider the police in
Bauchi State prepared to handle security issues are similar in
numbers to those who consider that they are not prepared
(27.7% and 28.8% respectively). While the larger percentage (40
per cent) adopted the lukewarm view that the police were
‘somehow prepared’, the substantial percentage who are not
impressed is an indication that much more needs to be done by
the police in Bauchi State.
Closely related to the issue of how security is handled, is the
relationship between the police and people. This relationship is
vital because the people constitute the greatest source of
information for effective and efficient policing. Responses on
perceptions about the nature of relationship between the police
and the people in Bauchi State are presented in Table 16.
& 1
Variable
Strongly disagree
Disagree
Neither disagree or agree
Strongly agree
Undecided
Total
(
No.
35
51
30
43
11
170
Source: Fieldwork, 2014.
!
Percentage
20.6
30.0
17.6
25.3
6.5
100
Security and Governance in Bauchi State of Nigeria
79
These responses show that half the respondents in Bauchi
State do not believe that there is a good relationship between the
people and the police, and only 25.3% agree that the relationship
is good. With 17.6% standing between these extremes, it is
doubtful if the police have healthy enough relations with the
people to have a positive impact on their performance in Bauchi
State.
Behind the incidence of crime and security challenges or the
capacity of the Nigeria Police Force to deal with them lies the
issue articulated by a Sara Suka member: neglect and failure on
the part of government. While the primary responsibility for this
rests on society itself, the public service of that society, which is
established to serve the people, is a major means by which that
responsibility is carried out, and by which the good things of life
are provided to the people (as championed by social contract
theorists). To achieve this, a public service must live up to the
norms and values of that society. Institutions upon which public
trust is bestowed must live above board. Therefore, if some
individuals within those institutions engage in corrupt practices,
they may be regarded as ineffective in delivering the desired
societal goods. It is for this reason that the study investigated
public perceptions about corruption in Bauchi State’s public
service.
Security and Governance in North-East Nigeria
80
* /0
)
Variable
Strongly disagree
Disagree
Neither disagree or agree
Strongly agree
Undecided
Total
No.
24
27
30
72
17
170
Percentage
14.1
15.9
17.6
42.4
10.0
100
Source: Fieldwork, 2014.
Table 17 shows that a large percentage of respondents
strongly agreed that corruption exists in the public service in
Bauchi State, while 30% disagreed. Given the large percentage of
respondents who are themselves in the public service, either as
civil servants or teachers (see Table 3), it is safe to say that
corruption exists in the public sector in Bauchi State.
The institution charged with the responsibility of ensuring
justice in society is the judiciary. Its strength or weakness
influences both governance and security. Institutions of the
judiciary, namely the courts, are found in Bauchi State at various
levels. But for them to be able to function properly, and to
apportion blame and ensure justice, all parties before it must be
given a fair hearing, whether as accused persons in criminal trials
or as plaintiffs or defendants in civil trials. Only when fair
hearing is assured can courts deliver judgments that will
guarantee peace and security. That is why this study investigated
the views of people in Bauchi State on whether the courts really
observe the principle of fair hearing.
Security and Governance in Bauchi State of Nigeria
. 2
)
Variable
Strongly disagree
Disagree
Neither disagree or agree
Strongly agree
Undecided
Total
81
%
No.
33
44
28
35
30
170
Percentage
19.4
25.9
16.5
20.6
17.6
100
Source: Fieldwork, 2014.
Table 18 shows that as high a percentage as 45.3% of
respondents maintained that courts in Bauchi State do not give
cases before them a fair hearing. 16.5% were neutral while only
20.6% asserted positively that courts in the state observe the
principles of fair hearing. While 17.6% expressed no view, the
simple reason appears to be that they have not been involved in a
situation that would cause them to appear in court. Against this
background, the lack of confidence in the judiciary in Bauchi
State has grave implications for security, the maintenance of law
and order or avoidance of resort to self-help.
The study revealed the situation in Bauchi State is as follows:
•
•
•
No disenfranchisement in regard to voting unless the
individual is not interested or prioritizes other activities.
Political office holders are not easily accessible by the
electorate. This was the view of over 60 per cent of the
respondents.
Misuse of power by representatives of the people occupying
political office exists in Bauchi State, a situation that over 65
per cent of the respondents claimed to have encountered.
82
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
Security and Governance in North-East Nigeria
Communities are actually involved in the activities of local
governments where up to 60 per cent of respondents
confirmed that they or their community participate in the
activities of their local governments.
The people are aware of the existence of NGOs and CBOs in
the state, viewing them as active in various forms of
community development.
Private individuals do influence the government and its
agencies by providing assistance to both state and local
governments. In some cases, this is to secure advantage for
themselves.
There is a wide range of criminal activity and threat to
security in Bauchi State. Government response to these
challenges is not adequate.
The police are not prepared to handle security issues
effectively in Bauchi State.
The relationship between the police and the people in Bauchi
State is not good enough to enhance police effectiveness.
Corruption exists within Bauchi State’s public service.
Adherence to the principle of fair hearing by the courts in
Bauchi State is poor.
The cumulative effect of all these conditions above is an
indication of the absence of good governance, the consequences
of which are discontent, underdevelopment and apathy, which
are drivers of insecurity. In line with Vroom’s Valence
Instrumentality Expectancy (VIE) theory, there is a direct
relationship between good governance and high levels of security
on the one hand, and between bad governance and insecurity on
Security and Governance in Bauchi State of Nigeria
83
the other. Thus where the parameters of good governance earlier
described are not met, there is likely to be insecurity, and where
insecurity exists there is almost certainly a lack of good
governance.
&
Aligwara, P.O. (2009) “National Security and the Challenges of the 21st
century” in Albert, I.O. Eselebor, W.A. Danjibo, N.D. (eds.)
Peace Security and Development in Nigeria, Abuja: Society for Peace
Studies and Practice. In Collaboration with John Archers
Publishers Ltd. (Ibadan)
Bassey Ate (2001) Introduction in Akindele and Ate (eds.) Beyond
Conflict Resolution: Managing African Conflict in the 21st Century,
NIIA Lagos: Vintage Publish.
David Francis (2006) Peace and Conflict Studies: An overview of basic
concepts, in S. G. Best (ed.) Introduction to Peace and Conflict
Studies in West Africa, Spectrum Book Ltd, Ibadan.
Galtung, J. (1990) “Cultural Violence” in Journal of Peace Research, vol.
27 No3s.
Ibeanu. O. (2005) “Conceptualizing Peace” in Gaya Best S. (ed.)
Introduction to Peace and Conflict Studies in West Africa, Ibadan,
Spectrum Books.
McNamara, R. (1968) The Essence of Security, New York, Harper and
Row.
Odock, C.N. (2006) Democracy and Good Governance, Lagos: NOUN.
Owutu, I.U. (2012) Politics, Governance and Security: Reflection on the
Nigerian State, Africa news circle.
Terriff, T. et al (1999) Security Studies Today, Cambridge: Polity.
United Nations Conference on anti-corruption measures, good
governance and human rights, Warsaw, 8-9 November 2006.
Vroom, V. (1964) Work and Motivation, Wiley, New York
84
Security and Governance in North-East Nigeria
World Bank Report (1989) Sub-Sahara Africa: From Crisis to Sustainable
Growth, Washington: World Bank.
Chapter 4
- Abubakar K. Monguno, PhD
Nigeria has witnessed a deteriorating internal security situation
since the return to civilian rule in 1999. This may be seen from
the proliferation and involvement of non-state actors in security
across the different sections of the country. Such non-state actors
(apart from private security outfits) in different parts of the
country range from Bakassi Boys in the south-east, Movement
for the Emancipation of Niger Delta (MEND) in south-south to
Boko Haram, Sara Suka and ‘yankalare’ in the north-east. The
military, which is present in thirty-two states of the nation to
restore order (Sanda, 2014) appears to be overstretched.
One of the worst-hit of all the states in terms of declining
security is Borno State, which has been the epicentre of Boko
Haram insurgency in the last few years.
Until 2009, although the state was generally one of the most
peaceful in the country, there was episodic religious violence,
which can be loosely categorized into two. First were internal
religious violence that occasionally followed events such as lunar
eclipses, characterized by the looting of shops (particularly those
belonging to the Igbo ethnic group) and the vandalisation of
brothels and beer parlours, allegedly perpetrated by Muslim
86
Security and Governance in North-East Nigeria
youths (Imam 2006). These were often isolated events, which
mostly occurred in urban areas. The second dimension of
violence includes spill over effects of religious violence from the
northwest region of Nigeria, such as the Maitatsine uprisings or
the protests that followed the publication in Denmark of
cartoons of Prophet Mohammed.
The turn of events since 2009 has been deeply disturbing.
The level, scope and magnitude of violence have been well
beyond people’s expectations or experience. A weekly tracking
of the security situation in Nigeria conducted for over five years
by the US-based Council on Foreign Relations (2014) shows that
Borno State is the most insecure of all the 36 states of Nigeria
with a record of over 2,400 deaths in only two years. Most of
these casualties have been attributed to Boko Haram.
There may not be a single explanation for this, but
examination of a number of factors that appear to have
combined may help us to understand this rapid transformation
of Borno from a relatively peaceful state to a violent and insecure
one. The search for explanations and the examination of
response measures by government point to issues related to
governance – especially social and economic factors – as
overarching (Monguno, 2013). A more potent perspective
perhaps lies in the nexus between governance and insecurity.
George-Gbenyi (2013) for instance, reminds us that for effective
security, elements of good governance such as the rule of law,
transparency and accountability in the management of resources,
political stability as well as the provision of basic needs and
services are sine qua non. It is in this context that this study
examines the relationship between governance and security in
Borno State.
Security and Governance in Borno State
87
The objectives of the study are to:
(i) examine the relationship between security and the character
of governance in Borno State;
(ii) understand the major drivers of insecurity in Borno State;
(iii) identify the gaps in governance and security in the state ; and
(iv) determine the role of civil society in improving governance
and security in Borno State.
In terms of landmass, Borno State is the largest state in Nigeria
with an area of 69, 435 km2. In 2006 the total population of the
state was put at 4,171,115 (National Population Commission,
2010). Borno is part of the larger pre-colonial political empire of
Kanem Borno that lasted over a thousand years and spread across
sections of countries around the region, including Niger, Chad
and Cameroun. Though separated by borders, the people still
maintain strong cultural ties. The state occupies Nigeria’s
international borders over 650 km long with three countries:
Niger, Chad, and Cameroun. These borders are poorly manned,
thus allowing for the easy cross-border movement of small arms
and light weapons. Chad and Niger in particular have been badly
affected by internal conflict, and this has also had grave
implications for Nigeria’s security as it relates to these particular
borders.
The area today called Borno used to be the nucleus of, and
politically the most significant part of the former North-Eastern
State that was created in 1967 and which presently constitutes
Nigeria’s north-east geopolitical zone. 1976 saw the creation of
Borno and Bauchi States from the North-eastern State, while the
88
Security and Governance in North-East Nigeria
creation of Yobe state in 1991 reduced Borno State to its current
size and form. The state is presently comprised of 21 Local
Government Areas (LGAs) and has three senatorial zones, Borno
North, Borno Central and Borno South. Borno North includes
Abadam, Guzamala, Gubio, Kaga, Marte, Monguno, Kukawa,
Nganzai, Magumeri and Mobbar; Borno Central has Ngala,
Mafa, Konduga, Maiduguri Metropolitan, Jere, Dikwa, Bama and
Kala Balge; while Borno South covers Biu, Chibok, Gwoza,
Askira/Uba, Bayo, Kwayakusar, Damboa, Hawul and Shani.
Borno State is ethnically diverse, having about 30 different
indigenous ethnic groups (Seibert, 2000) with Kanuri being the
dominant group found in the northern and central parts. Other
ethnic groups include Babur/Bura, Marghi, Glavda, Kibaku, and
Kanakuru, who inhabit the southern part of the state. Interethnic marriage, particularly between Kanuri and Shuwa Arab,
as well as the hegemonic role of the Kanuri over other groups for
centuries, has ensured the assimilation of large numbers of
minority ethnic groups, especially the Marghi, Maffa, Mulgwai
and Gamergu, along with some minority ethnic groups from the
neighbouring countries. As a result, a large proportion of the
members of these otherwise distinct ethnicities have been
culturally assimilated to become Kanuri. Borno is often reputed
to be the gateway to Islam in Nigeria, as Islam was declared a
state religion in Kanem Borno as early as the eleventh century
(Alkali, 1987). Thus the people of Borno are predominantly
Muslims. Sunni Islam of the Tijaniyya order is the main practice,
although there have been rapid inroads by the Izala (Salaf) in the
last few decades. Christian missionary activity in the southern
part of the state in the early part of the twentieth century has
Security and Governance in Borno State
89
also given rise to a sizeable population of Christians in the state,
producing a distinct cultural landscape.
Contact with the West has become a dominant factor in not
only Borno State’s socio-cultural and religious differences, it also
reflects on the differential level of development within the state.
For instance, the southern part of the state is more advanced in
formal education and therefore shows better social development
indicators. While development indices are generally not readily
available on the basis of the different regions within the state,
where they are available, they reflect poor development
indicators. For instance, the literacy rate for men in Borno was
observed to be 41.7% against a national average of 75.2%, while
that of women was 22.2% as against a national average of 53.1%
(NDHS, 2013). NDHS also puts the median age at first marriage
for women in the state aged 20-49 years, at 17.3 years. Recent
data on economic indicators disaggregated according to states
hardly exist, but a recent General Household Survey Panel
estimated that 50.2% of the people in the north-east are poor
(World Bank, 2014). More specifically, in 2010 the National
Bureau of Statistics estimated that 55.1% of the people in Borno
earned less than one US dollar a day (National Bureau of
Statistics, 2012). In terms of health indicators, the current
conflict in the state has had a negative impact on healthcare
delivery. The state has also been reported as having only ten
doctors for its 4.5 million population (Alhassan, 2014).
The study employed a mixed methodological approach in
generating data. However, the primary instrument of data
90
Security and Governance in North-East Nigeria
collection was a 53-item questionnaire which sought to find
answers to four key governance and security issues.
The governance issues identified are political, legal/judicial,
administrative and socio-economic dimensions. The study was
conducted in five LGAs of Borno State, cutting across the three
senatorial Districts. In Borno North the study was conducted in
Monguno and Nganzai; in the Borno Central it was conducted in
Maiduguri Metropolitan; and for Borno South senatorial district
the study covered Biu and Hawul.
In Borno North and Borno South senatorial zones, one
urban and one rural LGA were selected, while Maiduguri, the
state capital, represented Borno Central. Hawul (Borno south)
and Nganzai (Borno north) are considered rural while Biu and
Monguno are classified as urban. The simple justification for this
classification is that Biu and Monguno were created in 1976, and
as such, they are deemed to have existed long enough to acquire
urban characteristics. On the other hand, Hawul and Nganzai
were created much later and are still essentially rural in terms of
the predominant livelihood of the people, which is agriculture.
In all, 180 persons were targeted: 30 respondents in each of the
LGAs selected in the southern and northern zones, while 60
respondents were targeted in Maiduguri. The higher number of
questionnaires in Maiduguri was due to the fact that the town
has about one-third of the entire population of the state (Waziri,
2009). Some 12 questionnaires were not returned, leaving a total
of 168 completed. The questionnaires were administered with
the help of research assistants conversant with the sampled
LGAs. Additionally, ten key informant interviews were held in
Maiduguri to help complement the quantitative data generated.
Security and Governance in Borno State
91
A few limitations need to be borne in mind with regards to
the data generated. Initially, the research assistants interviewed
respondents themselves, but the lengthy nature of the questions
made some respondents abandon the interview. As a result, the
questionnaires were later made for self-completion, that is, they
were given only to literate people in the sampled LGAs.
Governance and security are two important concepts that have
dominated social science discourse in the last decade or so,
especially with respect to developing countries. Governance is
simply the utilization of power by those in authority. It has been
defined by the World Bank as “the way in which power is
exercised in the management of a country’s economic and social
resources for development” (World Bank, 2004). This includes
the process by which leaders are selected, monitored and
replaced; the capacity of the government to effectively formulate
and implement sound policies; and the respect of citizens and the
state for the institutions that govern economic and social
interactions among them.
Security, on the other hand, refers to safety or the absence of
threats. It is technically defined as the absence of threat to core
human values including the physical safety of the individual
(Hamson, 2001, cited in Salkire, 2003). Other core human values
include protection of basic liberties, economic needs and
interests. Security may be of different types but two main types
are of immediate concern to us in this study: human security and
national security, both of which are intricately related and
mutually reinforcing. Human security, a concept which
developed more recently in the 1990s, has been defined by the
92
Security and Governance in North-East Nigeria
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) as “safety
from chronic threats such as hunger, disease and repression”, as
well as protection from hurtful disruptions in the pattern of life
in jobs, in homes and in communities (UNDP, 1994). Human
security has evolved as a paradigm shift from security seen
largely as a territorial issue, to security as a human affair. It has
six major dimensions: personal, economic, environmental,
community, health and food security. National security on the
other hand, is often viewed as the protection of a nation’s
sovereignty and territory from external attack (Acharya, 2001).
The concept of security, including national security has been
changing in response to new ideas and challenges. For instance
while national security has traditionally been viewed as the
defence of a country from external attack, experiences from
Nigeria and Mali, where insurgency perpetrated by citizens
against the state has posed a considerable threat to national
security, calls for a better conceptualization of national security.
Acharya (2001) reminds us why definitions of concepts in
security change. He recognised six major catalysts of change that
help us define security, namely new ideas about international
relations, the emergence of new forms of threats and perceptions
about such threats, shifts in the distribution of power, and new
international leadership. Others are new kinds of warfare
(including technological changes that are associated with them),
domestic political change, and advocacy by international
institutions.
Nigeria has experienced both military and civilian rule at
different times of her national development, each with its unique
Security and Governance in Borno State
93
style of maintaining national security. It is generally believed
that the management of security under civil rule is tainted with
the same elements of repression that are characteristic of military
regimes in Nigeria, so that the distinction between the two is
tenuous. Whichever form of government, there is always a
correlation between governance and the nature of security. For
an effective security system to be fully operational, the
leadership must exhibit elements of good governance (GeorgeGbenyi, 2010). Ideally, good governance is the hallmark of
credible leadership epitomized in today’s world by democracy.
However, while democracy is often associated with good
governance, the situation in Nigeria appears to be the reverse.
Nigeria’s democratic experiment is characterized by conflict,
political assassination and unemployment, among other
challenges (Ogundiya, 2010). Studies conducted in south eastern
Nigeria show that the failure of government in the provision of
basic necessities often contributed to insecurity (Ukiwo, HenriUkoha and Emole, 2012; Ikwuamadi, 2012). These studies
qualitatively examined how the nature of governance impacted
on insecurity. A nexus between governance and insecurity in
Nigeria has been more succinctly provided in a recent study of
three major conflicts, namely the Odi crisis in Niger Delta, the
Tiv/Jukun conflict in Benue and Taraba States, and the Boko
Haram insurgency in Borno/Yobe by Abdu (2013). One of the
main conclusions reached is that conflicts in Nigeria are largely a
reflection of the crisis of governance. Specifically, Abdu,
observed thus,
“The Odi violence and subsequent invasion was largely a function of
the larger violence in the Niger Delta, caused by a long history of
Security and Governance in North-East Nigeria
94
poverty, exclusion, environmental degradation and struggle for selfdetermination with a good dose of ethnic identity politics. In Benue,
the years of conflict over land and other economic resources had led
to violence between the major Tiv and Jukun ethnic groups. Almost all
the major studies and reports on Boko Haram indicate that the conflict
is rooted in widespread poverty, extreme levels of youth
unemployment, growing illiteracy, and widening inequalities.” (Abdu,
2013, p.187).
!
To situate the study within the current security situation in the
state, the background characteristics of the respondents –
location, age, education, gender and occupation – are necessary.
Respondents interviewed for this study were mostly resident in
the urban areas (68.5%) against 31.5% interviewed in the rural
areas. 62 per cent of the respondents are indigenous to Borno
State against 38 per cent who came from other states. Even
though the sample was purposive, this finding indicates that
there are still many people from other states living in Maiduguri
despite the security problems being faced. Only respondents 18
years and above were targeted but most respondents were still
young, being between 18 and 28 years (50.6%). The smallest age
group was 51 – 60 years constituting only 4.8% of the sample.
Muslim and Christian respondents in the sample constituted
71.4% and 26.2% respectively, reflecting the numerical
predominance of adherents of Islamic faith in the state. An
insignificant proportion of respondents practise African
Traditional Religion (4.2%). Educationally, most respondents
have attained post-secondary education (79.2%). The large
proportion of respondents with higher education resulted from
the changes in certain aspects of the methodology, which is the
Security and Governance in Borno State
95
change from administering the questionnaire by interview by
field assistants to handing it out for respondents to complete it
by themselves, which meant distribution to only literate
respondents. As a result, only 4.2% of the respondents in the
sample had no formal education.
"
#
#
This aspect of the study sought to elicit views on the
respondents’ satisfaction with how government functions in the
state. Variables used included the respondents’ assessment of
corruption in government, proper functioning of the legislature,
accessibility to leaders, community participation, and civil
society awareness. Most of the sampled respondents (70.2%)
voted during the last gubernatorial and House of Assembly
elections in 2011: again, this is probably due to their higher level
of education. Only 50 respondents (29.8%) did not vote during
those elections. Disaggregated data on voting by sex showed that
slightly higher percentage of females (35 per cent) than males (29
per cent) did not vote (table 1). For respondents who did not
vote, the reasons for their failure to do so were quite varied
(figure 1). Forty per cent of them said that they were not
available during the elections; while 18 per cent were not
qualified (the high number of respondents 18 – 28 years discussed
earlier should be borne in mind). It is important to observe that
only eight per cent of respondents said that they simply did not
feel like voting.
Security and Governance in North-East Nigeria
96
$%
Voting Status
Yes
No
Total
Male (n=118)
71
29
100
Female (n=50)
65
35
100
Source: Field data, 2014
&
$%
Source: Field data, 2014
Despite the high percentage of respondents who voted in the
2011 elections, there was a general feeling that elected
representatives were guilty of abuse of power. In the perception
of 48.2% of respondents, elected representatives abused power to
a large extent, while 23.8% considered that they did so to some
extent. Only 14.9% feel otherwise. This perception is similar
with respect to corruption by government officials and the
functioning of the state legislature. Corruption among
Security and Governance in Borno State
97
government officials was perceived to be extremely high by 47
per cent of respondents as against only 1.8% who think it is
extremely low. Interestingly, a significantly higher percentage of
males (79.7%) than females (20.3%) held the belief that
government officials are corrupt. This large discrepancy may be
attributed to men’s greater access to information and contact
with those in positions of power (employment or authority) that
could have placed them in situations where they are more likely
to experience corruption. Similarly, the perception of 29.2% of
respondents is that the state legislature has functioned very
badly, while 35.7% consider that it has functioned badly. This
contrasts with the only 7.1% who believe it has functioned very
well. This finding seems to reflect the fact that currently, most
legislators in the state have abandoned their constituencies and
their legislative duties, but are seen as having resorted to
exploiting the poverty situation by giving hand-outs, apparently
in preparation for the 2015 elections.
The perception of the leadership provided by the state
governor however, is slightly different (figure 2). 35.2% of
respondents think it is average; 17 per cent think it is not
effective at all while 7.9% believe it is very effective. Data
disaggregated by sex shows however that slightly more females
(10.9%) than males (7.6%) think the leadership provided by the
state governor is very effective. The greater percentage of the
respondents who view the governor’s leadership as average may
be due to his more populist approach to governance when
compared to his predecessor. For instance, a respondent reported
that when counter-insurgency measures adopted by the military
in the state led to the burning of people’s properties, the state
government responded by paying compensation for damaged
98
Security and Governance in North-East Nigeria
property and giving cash assistance to families whose relations
were killed in the conflict. Specifically, it was pointed out by the
respondent that
‘This governor has tried. He has given money [compensated]
people whose homes were destroyed by soldiers in Gwange ward
and all families who lost their members’ – (KII, Maiduguri,
12/9/2014).
Additionally, since 2013 when the state started to experience
massive internal displacement of people, the state government
was seen to be responsive to their needs. Such measures were
highly valued by ordinary people in the state and this may be
what is responsible for the slightly better performance of the
governor in their perception.
& % '%
Source: Field data, 2014
Citizens’ access to government is central to proper
management and functioning of the process of governance.
Security and Governance in Borno State
99
Accessibility was measured in terms of the ease of reaching
government officials and local authorities. Table 2 shows the
level of access respondents have at the LGA and state levels.
Generally, only 13 per cent of respondents think government
officials are easily accessible. Over half of them believe
government functionaries can only be reached with great
difficulty. Since ideally, government at the local level is supposed
to be closer to the people, the respondents’ rating of the
accessibility of their local government authority was also elicited.
Nearly half of all respondents think local government authorities
are only accessible with difficulty (48.8%) while one-fifth believes
they are not accessible at all (19.6%). Only 7.7% think local
government officials are easily accessible. This dismal perception
of the accessibility of local government officials has a very strong
gender bias, with only 25 per cent of respondents who perceive
them as accessible being women. Lack of accessibility of local
government authorities may also have been exacerbated by
leaders who are not accountable to the people because for eight
years there have not been any local government elections.
Instead, the state government has been appointing caretaker
committees to run the local governments every six months. Such
appointed leaders (whose attrition rate is often high) are hardly
held accountable by the people, and do not consider themselves
accountable, preferring to remain aloof. This may also explain
the low participation in local government activities by
respondents.
Participation in governance by citizens adds value to the
quality of governance. But only 19 per cent of respondents said
they participate adequately in the activities of their local
government, while 35.1% do not participate at all. Key
100
Security and Governance in North-East Nigeria
informant interviews conducted revealed that where there was
participation, it was mainly in the area of politics and revolved
around matters such as who should be considered for
appointment to represent the communities at the local level.
Occasionally, individuals participated in mobilization for
development, particularly to advocate for certain services at the
community level. By contrast, civil society organizations (CSOs)
are perceived as participating in governance more than individual
members of communities. About 25 per cent said that CSOs
participate to a large extent while 33.9% said that they participate
somewhat.
'
Response
!
Accessibility
Government
Officials (%)
Not accessible at all
20.2
Accessible
with 57.7
difficulty
Accessible
6.0
Easily accessible
13.1
Don’t know
3.0
Total
100
"
#
of
of Accessibility
Local Government
Authority (%)
19.6
48.8
14.3
7.2
10.1
100
Source: Field data, 2014
The availability of infrastructure and services is an equally
important indicator of governance. The responses showed low
levels of availability of electricity, water housing, primary
education and sanitation. Table 3 shows the responses on the
availability of these services. The service rated as the most
Security and Governance in Borno State
101
available is primary education with 56 per cent, while the least
available is sanitation which is only 25 per cent benefit from.
(% #
Infrastructure/service
Electricity
Primary education
Water
Sanitation
Housing
$
Yes (%)
36.3
56
38.7
25.0
26.2
%
No (%)
58.9
44
50.0
63.7
60.7
Don’t know (%)
4.8
0
11.3
11.3
13.1
Source: Field data, 2014
Legal/Judicial Governance Issues
In the context of this study legal/judicial issues pertain to how
law and order is maintained by the authorities and the citizens’
perception of such maintenance. The greatest threat to security
in Borno State is extremism as indicated by 56 per cent of
respondents while theft poses the least threat (4.8%). A greater
proportion of males (63 per cent) compared to females (40 per
cent) rated extremism as the major security threat in the state.
However more women (22 per cent) rated ethno-religious
violence as a challenge than men (10 per cent). Interestingly, all
the four main types of threat to security identified were
mentioned by 11.2% of respondents, i.e. including armed
robbery and communal/ethno religious violence. While these
threats were seen as continuing to affect citizens very negatively,
the state and local government response to them was rated
generally ‘fair’ by respondents. For instance, while 26.8% and 19
per cent believe the response is very poor and poor respectively,
17.9% and 12.5% think it is ‘good’ and ‘very good’ respectively.
More disturbing is the respondents’ perception that the police
are not prepared or well-enough equipped to deal with the
102
Security and Governance in North-East Nigeria
security situation in the state (figure 3). Most of the respondents
(35.7%) think the police are not equipped to face the challenges
to security faced by the people. This was also restated by almost
all the respondents during the key informant interviews.
& % (%
&
'
Source: Field work, 2014.
While respondents generally think the police are ill-prepared
to deal with the threats to security in Borno State, the judicial
process was seen as exhibiting certain irregularities. The judicial
process is therefore rated as ‘very bad’ by 19.6% of respondents
and ‘bad’ by 31.5%. Only 34.4% perceive that the judiciary is
good. In terms of corruption, nearly half the respondents (46.7%)
strongly agree that the judiciary in Borno State is corrupt. Table
4 shows respondents’ perception of certain irregularities in the
judicial process, for example bribery to obtain judicial services
Security and Governance in Borno State
103
and to escape sentence under law. The responses in both
instances are very similar. For instance, while 42.3% of
respondents feel strongly that citizens need to pay bribes to get
services that are ordinarily theirs by right, 46.4% believe people
pay bribes to escape unfavourable sentences. The gender aspect
of these responses does not show large differences in the way
men and women perceive corruption in the judicial system,
although more women feel strongly that people pay bribes for
judicial services. These perceptions indicate that there is gross
abuse of the judicial process and an accelerating reduction in
citizens’ confidence in the judiciary. It should be noted that
escape from sentence simply means the aborting of punishable
cases either at the level of the police or at the law courts.
)%
!
(
Response
Bribery
to
obtain
service
Male
Female Bribery
Male
to escape
sentence
Strongly
disagree
Disagree
20.2
34.7
38.0
16.7
21.1
19.5
14.3
45.7
34.0
18.5
12.7
20.0
Neither
16.7
11.8
14.0
11.3
17.8
14.0
Strongly
agree
Don’t
know
42.3
5.0
8.0
46.4
44.9
42.0
6.6
2.0
6.0
7.1
3.0
4.0
Source: Field data, 2014
Female
Security and Governance in North-East Nigeria
104
*
#
+
Economic and social issues are the obvious indicators of
governance in any given setting, as the scorecard of governments
is normally tied to them. For instance, a government that fails to
provide jobs or create the enabling environment for business to
thrive is usually rated low by citizens. These failures can have
severe adverse consequences for the security of the nation.
Accordingly, the respondents’ opinion on the state government’s
performance on agriculture, employment, marketing and general
welfare of the people was sought. Borno State government’s
promotion of agriculture was assessed to be average by most
respondents (35.7%), but 16.1% rated it ‘not effective at all’.
Agriculture is a major employer of labour, and this may be why
the availability of job opportunities in the state within the last
ten years was perceived to be low by 61.9% of respondents. That
only 4.2% of respondents rated government’s concern for
agriculture as ‘very effective’ is instructive. The welfare of
vulnerable groups such as women, children and the disabled in
Borno State, was equally perceived to be poor, and only 13.1%
strongly agree that the welfare of these vulnerable groups is well
catered for by the government, while 41.7% simply disagreed
with the statement that their welfare was well catered for by the
government while 15.5% disagreed strongly. Responses were
somewhat contradictory between males and females on the
extent to which the welfare of women and children has been
addressed by government, with a greater percentage of females
than males in each case agreeing and disagreeing with the
statement that their welfare has been adequately addressed by the
government (figure 4).
Security and Governance in Borno State
105
Nevertheless, it is clear that the general perception is that
poor attention is given to the welfare of women, children and
the disabled in the state, and this is a reflection of their plight in
Borno State. Since the escalation of violence in the state
especially from 2011 to date, the welfare of women and children
has not only suffered serious setbacks, but also their rights have
been violated. For instance, primary and secondary school
students could not attend schools for nearly one whole session
due to insurgency. More worrisome has been the abduction of
nearly 300 secondary school girls from Chibok town in April,
2014. Women and children also constitute the largest group
among the internally displaced persons currently taking refuge in
public camps and host communities in the state.
&
)%
!
)
+
Source: Fieldwork, 2014
*
106
Security and Governance in North-East Nigeria
The preceding analysis points to the weakness of governance in
Borno State, a weakness which appears to be part of a general
problem in Nigeria. The data show that while people are
generally enthusiastic about democracy – as evidenced by the
high percentage of respondents who voted in the last elections in
the state – it has largely failed to yield the desired dividends to
the people. A recent survey conducted on the economic
conditions of Nigerians shows a decline between 2003 and 2008.
While only 30 per cent of respondents perceived their economic
condition as very good in 2003, by 2005 and 2008, the
corresponding figures had declined to 26 per cent and 28 per cent
respectively (Afrobarometer Round 5 Survey, 2013). A similar
survey, the Nigeria Harmonized Living Standard Survey (2010),
has also indicated a progressive increase in the incidence of
poverty among Nigerians. Poverty increased from 28 per cent in
1980 to 46 per cent in 1985 and 66 per cent in 1992; in 2010 it
was estimated that 69 per cent of Nigerians were poor (National
Bureau of Statistics, 2010). A review of Nigeria’s democracy and
governance (Oke, 2010) posits that the symptoms of poor
democratic rule in Nigeria’s fourth republic are corruption,
civilian authoritarianism, and economic and infrastructural
decay. Specifically, it has led to abysmal economic failures that
“culminated in serious infrastructural decay to the extent that
most institutions of government were not working to
expectation” (Oke, 2010, p. 37). Being indices of economic
development, these economic failures often become reflected in
the general development of the nation so that Nigeria’s
development becomes both a symptom and consequence of bad
governance (Ogundiya, 2010). This is similar to the views of
Security and Governance in Borno State
107
Ogbonnaya, Umoju and Udefuna (2012) that the challenges to
Nigeria’s
democratic
governance
lie
in
electoral
irregularities/malpractices, intra and inter-ethnic rivalries,
religious crises and insecurity, poverty, inadequate/weak
democratic institutions as well as institutionalized corruption.
Indeed the findings of this study also show that government
in Borno has alienated itself from the people at all levels through
limited accessibility which give little room for accountability.
Thus, there is no opportunity to question decisions taken at all
levels of governments, no matter how ill-conceived or misplaced
they may be. One factor that may have accentuated this problem
is the failure to conduct elections into the local government
councils since 2007. The immediate implication of this is that
appointed local government executives do not feel any obligation
to the people they govern.
One of the most important issues surrounding governance in
Nigeria today is the maintenance of law and order. The judicial
process in Borno, whether handled by local authorities, the
police or law courts is perceived to be marred by fraudulent
practices and gross miscarriages of justice such that respondents
rate their performance very low. Again, this appears to be
confirmation of a general trend in Nigeria’s judicial system. In a
recent survey on the perceptions of Nigerians, 98 per cent
identified corruption among the police as an issue
(Afrobarometer, 2013). That 66 per cent of survey respondents
in 2001 and 70 per cent in 2003 identified the police as corrupt
indicates growing public mistrust in the nation’s judicial system
in general, and the police in particular (Lewis and Alemika,
2005). Pascal (2012) notes that the Boko Haram insurgency has
raised credible issues of abuse by security agencies which must be
108
Security and Governance in North-East Nigeria
addressed if the insurgency is to be checked. The extra-judicial
killing of the Boko Haram leader Mohammed Yusuf and many
others thereafter immediately come to mind here. Similarly, the
numerous allegations that the police have been sharing
information with suspected members of Boko Haram raise
questions on both credibility and corruption.
From the foregoing, governance in Borno State appears to
be a microcosm of the greater Nigerian situation characterized
by poor leadership. This is believed to have contributed to the
current level of insecurity in the state. The most important
challenge to security identified in this study is insurgency,
although other forms of threats such as armed robbery, theft and
communal violence have also been identified to a lesser extent.
However, it is obvious that the security agencies particularly the
police are seen as being unprepared for the challenges that lie
ahead. This may be seen from the continuing violence against
citizens by Boko Haram, whose fighters often overpower not
only the police, but also the combined team of security agencies
– the Joint Task Force. At the time of writing, there are nine
local governments (one-third of the total) under occupation by
Boko Haram insurgents, who have hoisted their flag to replace
the Nigerian flag. These are Bama, Askira/Uba, Gwoza,
Konduga, Ngala, Marte, Abadam, Dikwa and Mafa.
Consequently, Borno State has been rated as the most dangerous
place in Nigeria, while Maiduguri, its capital, the second most
dangerous local government after Damaturu (Nigeria Stability
and Reconciliation Programme, 2014). Several studies point to
poor governance as reflected in economic, political and social
issues as the underlying and facilitating factors behind the
current insecurity (Pascal, 2012; Shettima, 2012; Campbell, 2011.
Security and Governance in Borno State
109
Nigeria is currently faced by a progressive decline in the welfare
of the people. Some fifteen years of democracy suggests little or
no improvement in the administrative, judicial and social and
economic condition of the people. Unemployment, corruption
among civilian and the military, an unjust judicial system are just
a few of the many symptoms of poor governance that may have
contributed to insecurity in the state, and may have contributed
to the growth of groups like Boko Haram. In Borno State and
indeed other parts of the country, there has been an increase in
the level of violent conflict, resulting in massive displacement of
people. Either as a consequence or as a causative factor, the
welfare of vulnerable groups in the state has not been properly
addressed in Borno. Again, this points to poor governance. To
counter these, greater accountability and accessibility is required
from public and law enforcement officials to the people as well
as increased levels of participation in the decision-making
process, especially at the level of communities and local
government. Quicker dispensation of justice is also necessary as
part of overall improvement required in the judicial process.
Abdu, H. (2013) When Protectors Become Aggressors: Conflict and
Security Sector Governance in Nigeria. In Mustapha, A.R. (ed.).
Conflicts and Security Governance in West Africa. Abuja: Altus
Global Alliance, pp. 160-198.
Achaya, A. (2009) Changing Conceptions of Security in the 21st
Century: Power, Institutions, and Ideas.
Paper presented at the Conference on “The Nexus Between
Traditional and Non-Traditional Security Dynamic: Chinese
110
Security and Governance in North-East Nigeria
Experiences Meet Global Challenges”, Zhejiang University,
Hangzhou, 18-20 September.
Afrobarometer (2008) Public Opinion and Local Government in
Nigeria. Afrobarometer Briefing paper no. 53.
Afrobarometer (2013) Results from the Afrobarometer Round 5
Survey in Nigeria, May 22. Available
athttp://www.afrobarometer.org/files/documents/media_briefin
g/nig_r5_presentation1.pdf
Afrobarometer (2013) Results from the Afrobarometer Round 5
Survey in Nigeria, June 25. Available at
http://www.afrobarometer.org/files/documents/briefing_papers
/AfrobriefNo53.pdf
Alkire, S. (2003) A Conceptual Framework for Human Security.
Centre for Research on Inequality, HumanSecurity and Ethnicity,
Oxford University working paper no. 2
Campbell, J. (2011) ‘Mapping Violence in Nigeria’, Daily Trust July 21,
p.16.
Campbell, J. (2013) Nigeria: Dancing on the Brink. (Excerpts) available
at
http://www.cfr.org/nigeria/nigeria-dancing-brink/p22833?excerpt=1
Alhassan, A. (2014) Numbers. Daily Trust, November 1, p.2
George-Genyi, M.E. Good Governance: Antidote for Peace and
Security in Nigeria. European Journal of Business and Social Sciences
2(2) pp. 56 -65.
Imam, Y. O. (2004) Religious Crises and Social Disruption in NorthEastern Nigeria, Ibadan: Loud Publishers.
Lewis, P. & Alemika, A. (2005). Seeking the democratic Dividend:
Public Attitudes and Attempted Reform in Nigeria.
Afrobarometer Working Paper no. 52
Marchal, R. (2012).Boko Haram and the Resilience of Militant Islam in
Northern Nigeria. Norwegian Peace Building Report National
Bureau of Statistics (2012) Nigeria Poverty Profile 2010
Security and Governance in Borno State
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National Population Commission (2010). Priority Table Volume III:
Population Distribution by Sex, State, LGA and Senatorial
District.
Nigeria Demographic and Health Survey (2013). National Population
Commission/ICF International
Nigeria Stability and Reconciliation Programme (2013) Response by
Borno and Yobe State Governments to Conflicts Since 2009.
Report submitted to Nigeria Stability and Reconciliation
Programme (NSRP),
Nigeria Stability and Reconciliation Programme (2014) Nigeria Watch.
Fourth Report on Violence in Nigeria 2006-2014.
Ogbonnaya, U.M. ,Omoju, O.E., Udefuna, N.P. (2012)The Challenges
of Democratic Governance in Nigeria’s Fourth Republic.
Mediterranean Journal of Social Sciences, 3 (11) pp. 685-693.
Ogundiya, I.S. (2010). Democracy and Good Governance: Nigeria’s
Dilemma. African Journal of Political Science and International
Relations. 4(6) pp. 201-208.
Oke, L. (2010).Democracy and Governance in Nigeria’s Fourth
Republic. Africa Research Review4(3a)pp.31-40
Sanda, J. (2014). The Effects of Security Measures on Youth
Radicalisation. In Radicalisation, Counter-radicalisation and
Deradicalisation in Nigeria. An NSRP Project (forthcoming).
Seibert, U. (2000). Languages of Borno
http://www.uiowa.edu/intlinet/unijos/nigonnet/nlp/taraba.htm
(2000) Retrieved on 13th July 2011
Ukiwo, U., Henri-Ukoha, A., Emole, M.O., (2012). ‘Governance and
security in Abia State’. In Ukiwo, U., and Chukwuma, I. (eds.)
Governance and Insecurity in South-East Nigeria. Lagos:
Malthouse/CLEEN Foundation, pp. 27-66.
United Nations Development Program. 1994. Human Development
Report. New York: Oxford University Press.World Bank (2014).
Nigeria Economic Survey
112
Security and Governance in North-East Nigeria
Chapter 5
- Mahmoud Umar
For over half a decade, Nigeria has been enmeshed in a firestorm
of insecurity that has caused the deaths of scores of innocent
civilians, foreigners, security personnel, elected officials and
many government workers. Security challenges have assumed
formidable dimensions, and have forced the country’s political
and economic managers – and indeed the entire nation – to rue
the loss of their loved ones, investments and property. The lack
of safety across the country is reflected in the high number of
violent crimes such as kidnapping, ritual killing, suicide
bombing, religious killing, politically motivated killing and
violence, ethnic clashes, armed banditry and other crimes that
have become a characteristic of life in Nigeria since 2009
(Imhonopi and Urim, 2012). Not only has the continued state of
insecurity threatened the very fabric of national integration and
created ecology of fear, disquiet and anxiety; it has also dealt a
deadly blow – or what may be called ‘spectral bite’ – to
governance and development in Nigeria.
The situation has assumed deeper dimensions in the northeastern part of Nigeria, which has witnessed the worst cases of
114
Security and Governance in North-East Nigeria
proliferation of small arms and light weapons, widespread use of
assault weapons in ethno-religious violence, political thuggery
and insurgency orchestrated by different groups using names
such as the Jama’atu Ahlis Sunnah Lid da’wati waljihad otherwise
called ‘Boko Haram’ or simply ‘JAS’; Jama’atu Ansarul
Muslimina fee Biladis Sudan or simply ‘Ansaru’. Others include
the political thugs known as ‘Ecomog’ in Borno State, ‘Yan
Kalare’ in Gombe State, and ‘Sara Suka’ in Bauchi State.
As one of the centres of this violence, Gombe State has
witnessed fewer insurgent attacks compared to Borno,
Adamawa, Yobe and Bauchi States, but has suffered more from
political thugs threatening the peaceful coexistence of different
communities in the state.
The broad objective of this study is to examine the relationship
between security and governance in north-eastern Nigeria, with
reference to Gombe State. The specific objectives are:
i. To determine the major drivers of insecurity in Gombe State.
ii. To explore the various mechanisms employed by the
government at state and local levels with a view to
enhancing security and governance.
iii. To determine the role played by NGOs and civil society
organizations in enhancing security and governance in the
state.
iv. To recommend remedial measures with a view to
strengthening security and good governance in Gombe State.
To achieve these objectives, the study posed the following
questions:
Security and Governance in Gombe State
115
How have the state and civil society organizations fared in
terms meeting security and governance challenges in the NorthEast?
Is there any link between governance and security in Gombe
State?
What fundamental changes are needed to transform the
security architecture and sustainable governance in Gombe State
in particular, and the north-east in general? These and other
related questions structure this study and will be answered from
the information generated during its course.
Gombe is a state in north-eastern Nigeria, created out of Bauchi
State on 1st October 1996 by the administration of late General
Sani Abacha. Its capital is at Gombe. Called the ‘Jewel in the
Savannah’, Gombe State covers an area of 20,265 km² and has a
population estimated to be around 2.7 million. Gombe State
shares boundaries with Yobe State to the North, Adamawa and
Taraba States to the South, Borno State to the East, and Bauchi
State to the West.1
Historically, Gombe State is a fusion of two distinct groups
of people: the emirate of Gombe North, and the ethnic grouping
of Gombe South. Bubayero established the emirate during the
Sokoto jihad of 1800 when it emerged as part of a larger statebuilding force.
The government of the emirate, which had its headquarters
in Gombe Abba, was formed to control the larger part of what
1
(http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gombe_State).
116
Security and Governance in North-East Nigeria
constitutes Gombe State today. It did so until the advent of the
British colonialists in the early 20th century, following which
the area was governed through two administrative units, namely
Gombe Native Authority and Tangale Waja Native Authority.
However, with Independence in 1960 and subsequent military
administrations, local governments have been created. Between
1976 and the present, the then two Native Authorities had
metamorphosed into the present 11 local governments, namely
Gombe, Billiri, Akko, Balanga, Shomgom, Nafada/Bajoga,
Funakaye, Dukku, Yamaltu/Delba, Kaltungo, and Kwami.
Source: http://gombestatemhe.com.ng/
The state is home to many ethnic groups including Tangale,
Terawa, Waja, Kumo, Fulani, Kanuri, Bolewa, Jukun,
Security and Governance in Gombe State
117
Pero/Shonge, Tula, Cham, Lunguda, Dadiya, Banbuka, Hausa
and Kamo/Awak. Hausa is the commercial language among the
people.
The people of Gombe state are primarily farmers producing
food and cash crops such as cereals – maize, sorghum, rice and
wheat; and legumes – cowpeas, groundnuts, soya beans and
bambara nuts; They also produce fruits – orange, lemon, mango,
guava, paw-paw and grapefruit; and vegetables – tomato, pepper,
onion, okra, pumpkin and melon. Tree crops cultivated in the
state include gum Arabic, kenaf, sugar cane, sunflower and
ginger. Industries in Gombe State include Ashaka Cement Plc,
cotton ginneries, furniture and block-making industries, and
other small-scale industries. Gombe is also blessed with natural
resources such as uranium, gypsum and limestone. Recently,
petroleum deposits were reported to have been discovered in the
state.
For the purposes of this research, both primary and secondary
methods of data collection were employed.
The primary method of data collection was the
administration of questionnaires and Key Informant Interviews.
180 questionnaires were distributed across the state which, for
this purpose, was divided into three clusters based on senatorial
district contiguity as shown below:
118
Security and Governance in North-East Nigeria
Senatorial
District
Local Government Selected
Gombe North
Gombe Local Government
60
Gombe South
Billiri Local Government
Shomgom Local Government
30
30
Gombe Central
Akko Local Government
Yamaltu/Deba Local Govt.
30
30
Total
Number of
Questionnaires
180
Source: Field Survey 2014
The above breakdown shows that Gombe Local
government, a metropolitan local government, took all sixty
questionnaires for the Gombe North Senatorial district. This was
because of its urban nature and because it has a comparatively
large population with people from different backgrounds.
In Gombe South Senatorial district, Billiri local government
was treated as an urban local governments, and thirty
questionnaires were randomly administered there, while
Shomgom local government, a rural local government also had
thirty questionnaires. In Gombe Central Senatorial district,
thirty questionnaires were administered in rural Yamaltu/Deba
local government and thirty were administered in Akko local
government, an urban or semi-urban area.
Of the 180 questionnaires distributed, 168 were returned,
and the data analysis is based on these.
Key informant Interviews were also conducted to elicit firsthand information from top government functionaries, security
agencies, paramount rulers, leaders of thought, imams and
pastors, NGOs and leaders of vigilante groups.
Security and Governance in Gombe State
119
Secondary data was obtained from literature on security and
governance such as books, journals, magazines, relevant
specialized studies, government policy documents and online
sources.
!
#
"
$
Security and governance, like most social science concepts, are
widely contested and evolving concepts. Central to the debate is
the attempt to deepen and widen the concept of security from
the level of the state, to societies and the individual; and from
military to non-military issues (Krahmann, 2003:9). The
challenge to a state-centric notion of security builds upon the
argument that the end of the Cold War has significantly reduced
the likelihood of inter-state war, whereas a wide range of threats,
from civil war, transnational crime and terrorism to infectious
diseases, appears to have increased. In 1999, about 32,000
individuals were killed in interstate wars worldwide. But in the
same year, more than 900 people were killed through terrorist
attacks, while 2.8 million were killed by AIDS (UNAIDS, 2000).
While scholars have remained divided over the necessity of a
more inclusive notion of security (Krause and Williams, 1997),
politicians, the military and the security industry quickly picked
up on these new security threats after the Cold War. NATO and
the Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE)
for instance, have expanded the scope of their security functions
to areas such as the war on terrorism, international peace
keeping, refugee settlement and the promotion of civil society.
The European Union and its member states are defining an
increasing array of their concerns in terms of security, including
120
Security and Governance in North-East Nigeria
immigration and development aid (Manners, 2002). Although
some scholars have criticized the securitization of political, social
or environmental issues (Waever, 1995), this study suggests that a
broad notion of security (one that incorporates social and
economic security, as opposed to the traditional notion of
security that is only based on the protection of life and property)
has come to define much of the practice of contemporary
security policy-making and is therefore used throughout this
study.
At the same time as government and international
organizations have expanded their security functions however,
limited resources, lack of expertise in non-traditional areas of
security, and divergent interests among the governments of – for
example West African states – have led to the increasing
fragmentation of authority in security policy-making. In dealing
with the insurgency in north-eastern Nigeria for example,
Nigeria has accused Cameroon of not giving support to the
Nigeria military (Peregrino Brimah, 2014). More generally,
Nigeria has failed to develop a single narrative on the violence
raging in the north east, largely because of lack of capacity to
understand the dynamics of unconventional warfare. The
political environment is therefore awash with conspiracy
theories and attempts to shift blame and responsibility.
Currently, in addition to national government and international
organizations, a variety of private actors ranging from charities
to commercial security companies have emerged in local,
regional and global security, dealing with issues such as
humanitarian aid (OXFAM, 2000; CARE, 2001), human rights
monitoring (Amnesty International, Human Rights watch 2002),
Security and Governance in Gombe State
121
refugees (ICRC, 2001; International Rescue Committee, 2002)
and military training and protection.
The first duty of a government is to keep its citizens safe. As
Hobbes observed, only the state has the wherewithal to
guarantee security and save society from anarchy, and since
government represents the state, the state through its
government should provide adequate security to justify its raison
d’être (Gaskin, 1996). Omede (2011) sees security as a dynamic
condition which involves the relative ability of the state to
counter threats to its core values and interests. McGrew (1988)
holds that the security of a nation hangs on two important
pillars. First is the maintenance and protection of the socioeconomic order in the face of internal and external threats;
second is the promotion of a preferred international order which
minimizes threats to core values and interests, or to the domestic
order. For Nwolise (2006) security is an all-encompassing
condition, which suggests that a territory must be secured by a
network of armed forces and that the sovereignty of the state
must be guaranteed by a participatory and patriotic government,
which in turn must be protected by the military, police and the
people themselves. He argues that the people must not only be
secure from external attacks, but also from the devastating
consequences of internal upheaval such as unemployment,
hunger,
starvation,
disease,
ignorance,
homelessness,
environmental degradation, pollution and other socio-economic
injustices. Citing Rothschild, Nwagboso (2012) argues that in the
long sweep of history, security has been about people, and that
without reference to the security of the individual, security
makes no sense at all (McSweeney, 1999). Dike (2010) and
Omede (2011) have taken this argument a step further by
122
Security and Governance in North-East Nigeria
emphasizing that Nigeria’s security should be viewed holistically;
that it should be made to see citizens as the primary beneficiaries
of every security and developmental deliverable that the state can
offer. Thus Nigeria’s security will involve efforts to strengthen
the capacity of the Federal Republic of Nigeria so that it can
advance its interests and objectives to contain internal and
external aggression, control crime, eliminate corruption, enhance
genuine development, progress and growth, and improve the
welfare and quality of life of its citizens.
The current security situation in north-eastern Nigeria,
particularly in Gombe State, is very disturbing. With the 2015
general elections approaching, politicians recruited political
thugs known as ‘Kalare boys’. This heated up the polity and
compounded an already dangerous security situation in the state.
Being the antithesis of security, insecurity has attracted such
common descriptors as want of safety, danger, hazard,
uncertainty, want of confidence, state of doubt, inadequately
guarded or protected, instability, trouble, lack of protection and
being unsafe (Achumba, Ighomereho and Akporobaro, 2013).
Achumba et al. argue further that in a state of insecurity there
exists a vulnerability to harm, loss of life, property or livelihood.
Therefore insecurity is a state of not knowing, a lack of control
and the inability to take defensive action against forces that
portend harm or danger to an individual or group, or that make
them vulnerable. For Beland (2005), insecurity is “the state of
fear or anxiety stemming from a concrete or alleged lack of
protection.” It refers to lack of safety, or inadequate freedom
from danger. This definition reflects physical insecurity, which is
the most visible form of insecurity, but it feeds into other forms
Security and Governance in Gombe State
123
of insecurity such as economic insecurity and social insecurity.
These are included in the scope of this study.
As regards security relations between diverse groups have
traditionally been conceived in terms of alliances or
communities. However the fragmented but overlapping
networks which structure collaboration among the growing
range of public and private security actors seem to be adequately
described by the concept of governance. Although this is
sometimes defined as a generic term that includes any form of
coordination of interdependent social relations (Jessop 1999:35)
ranging from centralized state control to self-regulation (Rhodes,
1996:653; Eising and Kohler-Koch, 1999:68), the notion that
government can be differentiated from governance appears to be
more nuanced.
While government refers to the political control of a
centralized state, governance denotes the coordination of social
relations even in the absence of a unifying authority at the subnational, national or international level (Czempiel, 1992: 250;
Gordenker and Weiss, 1996:17).
Krahmann, (2003) defines governance as:
...the structures and processes which enable a set of public and
private actors to coordinate their interdependent needs and interests
through the making and implementation of binding policy decisions in
the absence of a central political authority.
Gautam, (2013) defines governance as the exercise of
economic, political and administrative authority to manage a
country’s affairs at all levels. It consists of the mechanisms,
processes and institutions, through which citizens and groups
articulate their interests, exercise their legal rights, meet their
124
Security and Governance in North-East Nigeria
obligations and mediate their differences. Without good
governance, developmental schemes cannot bring about any
improvement in the quality of life of citizens.
These different definitions of governance show that
government is but one actor in the governance process among
several others in society such as non-governmental organisations
(NGOs), community-based organisations (CBOs), the private
sector, civil society and the general public. Not only public
agencies, but non-governmental stakeholders also exercise
influence on the way the rules of the game are formulated and
how they are played out in the public domain. Therefore
governance is a broader concept than government, and multistakeholders operate it. This conceptual definition of governance
is used in this study to examine the relationship between
governance and security, how security in north-eastern Nigeria is
shaping governance, and how governance is being shaped by
security.
%
&
Many reasons have been given for insecurity in Nigeria, both
remote and proximate (Onifade, Imhonopi, and Urim, 2013).
These may include the following:
'
$
Fukuyama (2004) calls this the breakdown of institutional
infrastructures. The foundations of Nigeria’s institutional
framework are mostly shaky and have provoked deterioration in
governance and democratic accountability, paralyzing the
existing formal and legitimate rules vested in the hierarchy of
social order (Achumba et al. 2013). This view is corroborated by
Security and Governance in Gombe State
125
Igbuzor (2011) who sees the state of insecurity in Nigeria as a
function of government failure. That failure manifests in the
incapacity of government to deliver public goods to its citizens.
This lack of basic necessities has created a growing army of
frustrated Nigerians who resort to violence with little or no
provocation or opportunity. Such is the scenario in Gombe State
where the group known as ‘Kalare Boys’ are responsible for
several atrocities and assaults on innocent citizens. Although
Nigeria has the resources and capacity to provide for the needs of
its people, the entrenched culture of corruption in public service
has resulted in the dearth of basic necessities: what Hazen and
Horner (2007) called a “Paradox of Plenty”. The result of these
and related problems is that crime has increased, and the security
of lives and property is no longer guaranteed.
( #
$
)
The perception of marginalization by many Nigerians is
informed by the ostentatious lifestyles of the political class and
the elite against a background of the grinding poverty of most
citizens. Even security has almost become the exclusive preserve
of those who can buy it. As Egwu (2000) says, the security of the
Nigerian nation-state has been reduced to that of the ruler and
his immediate supporters. Thus the security calculus of the
Nigerian State can be said to have failed because it does not
understand the vital point that social and national development
must be supported by the basic social, economic, or even
military conditions necessary for effective national security.
Although this state of inequality, unfairness and injustice has
126
Security and Governance in North-East Nigeria
forced Nigerians to become more self-reliant, it has also made
them more likely to resort to self-help.
* +
,Ethno-religious conflicts break out when the relations between
members of different ethnic or religious groups is characterized
by lack of cordiality, mutual suspicion and fear, and a tendency
to use violence to settle grievances. In a multi-ethnic and multireligious society such as Nigeria’s, these conflicts have revolved
around a myriad of concerns, for example the distribution of
scarce resources, public offices, power, land, chieftaincy titles,
the creation, demarcation and control of local government
councils, control of markets and religious activities. Many of
these ethno-religious conflicts have resulted in violence and largescale killings (Adagba et al., 2012).
4. .
"
$ $
Over the years, there has been observed a growing disconnect
between people and their government which neither civilian nor
military administrations have been able to bridge, leaving
misunderstanding, mistrust and resentment to fester. Because the
people do not understand government, or have a perception that
government does not care about their welfare, they become easy
prey to centrifugal forces.
/ !
,
The collapse of moral values within Nigeria is another factor
behind the continued security challenges that the country faces.
The modern age may have brought greater individual freedoms,
but it has also seen a disintegration of traditional communal
Security and Governance in Gombe State
127
values which despised and punished greed, oppression and
exploitation of the weak. New values that are zero-sum,
narcissistic, chauvinistic and corrupt in nature and which preach
that might-is-right are in the ascendancy. Enduring social values
and morals have been exchanged for the more destructive aspects
of western or modern culture (Onifade, Imhonopi, and Urim,
2013).
These and many proximate factors such as porous borders,
rural-urban drift, poverty and unemployment, have combined to
aggravate the problem of insecurity in Nigeria.
0
Gombe State, like the rest of Nigeria, is home to large number of
unemployed young men who have little opportunity for
legitimate employment or socio-economic advancement. As in
other parts of Nigeria, some of these youths in Gombe have
formed loosely organized criminal gangs and turned to violent
crime to make a living. In Gombe, these gangs and their
members are generally referred to as Kalare or “Kalare Boys”
(HRW, 2007).
Just like the other negative trends discussed in this report,
the Kalare boys have proved to be easy prey for politicians who
offer them small amounts of money, drugs, alcohol and weapons
in exchange for carrying out acts of intimidation and assault, or
simply for accompanying their campaigns in a demonstration of
muscle. An activist who works to rehabilitate ex-Kalare Boys
who have turned away from violence and crime told Human
Rights Watch:
Security and Governance in North-East Nigeria
128
“They take drugs, they are out of their minds, but that is what
government wants. [Politicians], go to their temples [meeting places]
and give them money, motorbikes, and alcohol.”
Because of this political connection, Gombe’s Kalare gangs
have committed not only politically related crimes since 2003,
but also other forms of violent abuses with complete impunity.
Law enforcement agencies have made no meaningful attempt to
rein them in. As one senior civil servant put it, “They are an
authority unto themselves, they do what they want in Gombe.”
From politically motivated attacks, their activities have
degenerated to crimes against ordinary civilians such as assault,
rape, harassment, and extortion of ordinary civilians, all of
which continue alongside their continuing political role which
latter was most notable during the election period of 2007.
Many Kalare youth are armed, most commonly with machetes,
clubs and similar weaponry.
The Gombe Elders Forum, an association of respected
former state and federal government ministers, doctors, religious
figures and civil servants, commissioned research by local doctors
into the scale of the human rights impact of the Kalare on their
state and published their findings in the national press. They
allege that between December 2003 and April 2007, at least 115
people were killed and scores more injured as a result
of Kalare violence in Gombe state. It is not clear how many of
the dead were innocent bystanders as against participants in
fighting between rival gangs or political factions.
1
$
$
0
Civil society, opposition and other sources in Gombe alleged
that prior to the 2003 elections, the Peoples Democratic Party
Security and Governance in Gombe State
129
officials in Gombe were said to have recruited unemployed
young men, armed them and paid them to intimidate their
opponents, chase voters away from polling stations and disrupt
voting. They played a significant role in rigging the outcome to
oust the incumbent All Peoples’ Party (APP) Governor
Abubakar Hashidu and pave the way for the installation of
Danjuma Goje of the PDP (HRW, 2007).
The Kalare gangs continued to engage in acts of intimidation
of political opponents even after the 2003 elections. A former
Commissioner in the State government who had left the PDP for
an opposition party alleged that his farm was attacked
by Kalare boys in 2005:
Kalare came to my farm and burnt it,” he said. “They burnt orchards,
livestock, and crops. Two of my workers were beaten as well. One
was lucky to escape with his life. Now, every time I go to the farm, I
go armed.
In September 2006 two All Nigeria Peoples Party (ANPP)
governorship aspirants were attacked by political thugs. The
youths attacked the convoy of the national secretary of the
party, Senator Saidu Umar Kumo, destroying over 20 vehicles
and injuring many of his followers.
Prominent former politicians in Gombe told Human Rights
Watch that many powerful figures within the Kalare gangs are in
fact on Gombe’s state and local government payrolls. One
former government official gave Human Rights Watch a list
of Kalare leaders, many of whom, it was claimed, occupy senior
positions within the state government, including special advisors
and personal assistants to the Governor. Other activists, lawyers
and civil servants in Gombe town confirmed the connection,
Security and Governance in North-East Nigeria
130
adding that these leaders and their associations are well known in
Gombe.
1
-
$
#
Variable
Frequency
Percentage
Gombe Indigenes
125
74
Non-Indigenes
43
26
Source: Field Survey 2014
With the majority of the respondents (74 per cent) being
indigenes of Gombe State while only 26 per cent are nonindigenes, most participants can be expected to have first-hand
knowledge of Gombe State and its peculiar problems.
#
(
Variable
Frequency
Percentage
Male
96
57
Female
72
43
Source: Field Survey 2014
Table 1.2 indicates that there are more male respondents: 57
per cent against 43 per cent female. However, the distribution
seems to be representative enough as both have a reasonable
percentage.
Security and Governance in Gombe State
#
131
*
Variable
Frequency
Percentage
Urban Centre
108
64
Rural Area
60
36
Source: Field Survey 2014
The above table shows that 64 per cent of the respondents
were from urban centres while 36 per cent were from rural areas.
Given that 60 questionnaires were distributed in the Gombe
metropolis, which is an urban centre, as well as two other urban
centres which took 30 each, this representation is adequate.
#
2
Variable
Male
Female
To large extent
52
40
Some what
21
12
Not at all
15
10
I don’t know
08
10
Source: Field Survey 2014
The table above shows that the majority of respondents of
either gender opined that political office holders have abused or
misused their power and authority a lot or somewhat (75 per
cent of men and 52 per cent of women). A mere 15 per cent and
10 per cent of respondents (male and female) felt that they have
not abused their powers, while 8% and 10 per cent of male and
Security and Governance in North-East Nigeria
132
female respondents respectively expressed no opinion. This is
quite disturbing as it is likely to result in voters losing confidence
in political office holders, with political apathy being the result.
#
/
Variable
Frequency
Percentage
Extremely High
56
33
High
35
21
Neither high nor low
33
20
Low
22
13
Extremely low
10
06
I don’t know/ I can’t say
12
07
Source: Field Survey 2014
Table 1.5 indicates that corruption is perceived to be
extremely high with 54 per cent of respondents asserting that it
is high or extremely high: in other words, more than half of the
respondents share the view that corruption among government
officials is high in Gombe State. Some 20 per cent of the
respondents however opined that corruption is neither low nor
high, 19 per cent thought that it is either low or extremely low.
Some 7% said that they do not know or cannot say.
Security and Governance in Gombe State
#
133
3
Variable
Frequency
Percentage
Very bad
32
19
Bad
45
27
Neither bad nor good
30
18
Good
40
24
Very Good
18
10
I don’t know/ I can’t say
03
02
Source: Field Survey 2014
Table 1.6 shows that mixed perceptions regarding how well
the state legislature is functioning. 46 per cent of the respondents
felt that it is performing either badly or very badly; 18 per cent
took the neutral view that it is neither bad nor good; while 30
per cent considered that its performance is either good or very
good. Only 2% had no view at all.
#
4
!
Variable
Frequency
Percentage
Very bad
22
13
Bad
29
17
Neither good nor bad
33
20
Good
48
29
Very Good
26
15
I don’t know
10
06
Source: Field Survey 2014
Security and Governance in North-East Nigeria
134
Table 1.7 indicates that 46 per cent of respondents took a
favourable view of the performance of the state governor and his
cabinet, with 44 per cent rating it as good or very good: this was
much more than the 30 per cent who rated it bad or very bad.
Some 20 per cent had a neutral opinion on the quality of service
from the governor, while 6% of the respondents indicated they
do not know.
#
5 "
Variable
Male
Female
I Participate
17
11
I participate to some extent
18
14
I participate very well
12
08
I don’t participate
49
39
Source: Field Survey 2014
Table 1.8 above shows that the numbers of those who
participate in local government activities, to whatever extent, is
lower than the numbers who do not participate, for both male
and female respondents. This indicates alienation of both genders
from the processes of grassroots governance.
#
6
#$ %
!&%
Variable
Frequency
Percentage
Yes
61
36
No
107
64
Source: Field Survey 2014
Security and Governance in Gombe State
135
Only 36 per cent of respondents are aware of the presence of
civil society organizations in their communities, with a large
majority of 64 per cent stating that they are not aware of the
presence of such groups in their communities.
#
7
Variable
Frequency
Percentage
To large extent
32
19
Some what
18
11
Not at all
72
43
I don’t know
46
27
Source: Field Survey 2014
Table 1.10 Given the lack of awareness of civil society
activity indicated in Table 1.9, it is hardly surprising that only 30
per cent of the respondents were of the view that civil society
groups participate in the governance process, while 43 per cent
said there was no participation by NGOs and CBOs in the
governance process and 27 per cent said that they do not know.
Security and Governance in North-East Nigeria
136
#
Frequency
Percentage
Support the police
16
10
Support State and Local Government
12
07
Work only for their business interest
76
45
Fund Security agencies
09
05
I don’t know
55
33
Variable
Source: Field Survey 2014
Table 1.11 shows that while some respondents believe that
the private sector supports public bodies such as the police,
security agencies or state and local governments (22 per cent),
most respondents (45 per cent) were of the view that the private
sector works only for its own business interests, while 33 per
cent indicated that they do not know.
#
Variable
(
Frequency
Percentage
Yes
146
87
No
22
13
Source: Field Survey 2014
The table above shows that 87 per cent of the respondents
were aware that there are security challenges or threats in their
area, with only 13 per cent saying that there are no security
challenges in their area.
Security and Governance in Gombe State
#
137
* '
Variable
Frequency
Percentage
Extremism, Terrorism & Insurgency
38
23
Communal/Ethnic/Religious Violence
16
10
Armed Robbery
22
13
Petty Crime/theft
20
12
All of the above
20
12
Any other (e.g. attack by Kalare boys)
50
30
Source: Field Survey 2014
The above table reflects a fairly even distribution as regards
the specific types of security threat that respondents face in
Gombe State, although a disturbing 30 per cent indicated that the
main threat was attacks of the kind mounted by the Kalare boys,
while 23 per cent identified extremism, insurgency and terrorism
as the main security problem.
#
2
Variable
Frequency
Percentage
Very poor
43
26
Poor
24
14
Neither poor nor good
19
11
Good
52
31
Very Good
14
08
I don’t know
16
10
Source: Field Survey 2014
Security and Governance in North-East Nigeria
138
Total 1.14 indicates those who felt that the state and local
governments’ response to security challenges was poor or very
poor (40 per cent) was almost matched by those who considered
that their response has been good or very good (39 per cent).
While 11 per cent took a neutral position, ten per cent were
unable to say.
#
/
Variable
Frequency
Percentage
Very Irresponsive
25
15
Irresponsive
18
11
33
20
Responsive
58
34
Very responsive
34
20
Neither
Irresponsive
responsive
nor
Source: Field Survey 2014
Table 1.15 above shows that a majority of the respondents
(54 per cent) considered that government and security agents had
been either responsive or very responsive on crime, while only
25 per cent considered that the response had been either
irresponsive or very irresponsive, with 20 per cent taking a
neutral position.
Security and Governance in Gombe State
#
3
Variable
139
(
Frequency
Percentage
Very bad
30
18
Bad
46
27
Neither good nor bad
25
15
Good
33
20
Very good
26
15
I don’t know
08
05
Source: Field Survey 2014
Table 1.16 shows that only 35 per cent of respondents
considered the performance of the judicial system as good or
very good, while 45 per cent rated it bad or very bad. With 15
per cent saying that it was neither good nor bad and 5% saying
that they did not know, it is difficult to say that the judiciary is
living up to its billing as “the last hope of the common man” in
Gombe State.
#
4 )
Variable
Frequency
Percentage
Not accessible at all
45
27
Accessible with some difficulty
56
33
Easily accessible
31
19
Don’t know/can’t say
36
21
Source: Field Survey 2014
Security and Governance in North-East Nigeria
140
Table 1.17 shows that while 27 per cent of the respondents
indicated that government functionaries are not accessible to the
public at all, 33 per cent opined that they are accessible with
some level of difficulty with 19 per cent saying that government
functionaries are easily accessible. 21 per cent stated that they do
not know how accessible government officials are.
#
5
Variable
*
Frequency
Percentage
Very Satisfied
31
19
Satisfied
44
26
Neither Satisfied nor
Dissatisfied
24
14
Dissatisfied
29
17
Very dissatisfied
22
13
I don’t know
18
11
Source: Field Survey 2014
Based on the breakdown in table 1.18 above, a greater
percentage of respondents (45 per cent) are either satisfied or
very satisfied with the quality of agricultural input such as seeds
and fertilizer provided to farmers by the government. However,
while 14 per cent are neither satisfied nor dissatisfied, 30 per cent
are either dissatisfied or very dissatisfied, with 11 per cent
expressing no view.
Security and Governance in Gombe State
#
6
Variable
141
+
Frequency
Percentage
Yes
83
49
No
65
39
I don’t know
20
12
Source: Field Survey 2014
Table 1.19 indicates that 49 per cent of respondents
considered that job opportunities have increased in Gombe State
over the last ten years, while 39 per cent feel that they have not.
12 per cent of the respondents indicated they do not know.
#
(7 ' ,
Variable
#
Frequency
Percentage
Strongly disagree
26
15
Disagree
17
10
Neither disagree
30
18
Strongly agree
85
51
I don’t know
10
06
Source: Field Survey 2014
The above table clearly shows that while 25 per cent of
respondents disagree or strongly disagree with the statement that
the Gombe State government addresses the welfare needs of
Security and Governance in North-East Nigeria
142
women, children and persons with disabilities, a majority of 51
per cent strongly agree with it.
#
( "
-
Variable
Frequency
Percentage
Yes
88
52
No
62
37
I don’t know
18
11
Source: Field Survey 2014
Table 1.21 above shows that more than half of the
respondents (52 per cent) lived in communities that were covered
by one anti-poverty programme or another of the state or local
government, but while 37 per cent said that their communities
were not benefiting from such programmes, 11 per cent were
unable to say.
"
Interviews with key respondents indicated that there has been a
continuous rise in insecurity in Gombe State since Nigeria’s
return to civilian rule in 1999. A security officer identified one of
the major drivers of insecurity as the political class itself
(Personal Communication, 2014), noting that in their efforts to
capture political power by all means, those involved saw politics
as a zero-sum game with the winner taking all and the loser
completely vanquished. Since those who participate in politics
do so only to win, with losing not being seen as an option, they
recruit gangs such as Kalare boys as political thugs to attack
Security and Governance in Gombe State
143
political opponents with knives, machetes and cutlasses. He
noted that this menace had assumed worrying dimensions with
the killing of rival political thugs, attacks on passers-by, fights
over the division of money offered by politicians and the
snatching of ballot boxes, while their political connections meant
that they perpetrated a variety of other crimes such as theft,
burglary, and rape with impunity, and asserted that no less 20
cases of one atrocity or another committed by the Kalare boys
were reported every week.
Those interviewed identified poverty and unemployment as
major drivers of insecurity in the state, since these factors meant
that poor and unemployed boys were readily available to be
mobilized as political thugs for relatively small amounts.
A community organizer running the Nura Ahmed NGO
expressed dissatisfaction with the “Anti-Kalare Squad” security
outfit established by the then Goje Administration with a view
to stopping or curtailing the activities of Kalare boys, noting that
their attacks had continued unabated. However the Dankwambo
administration had made positive efforts to integrate some of the
Kalare boys into the Gombe State public service of the state as
marshals whose duty it is to assist police, road traffic and
environmental sanitation inspectors in the state.
But in the run up to the 2015 elections, opposition
politicians such as N. Ahmed, expressed the view that what
Governor Dankwambo had done was convert the Kalare boys
into protective guards for the power elite in the state, and that he
could not face elections in the state without the Kalare boys
(Ahmed, N. personal communication, October 2014).
This appears to have been corroborated during the state’s
local government elections which were conducted in 2012. The
144
Security and Governance in North-East Nigeria
Governor was alleged to have declared that as far as political
thuggery in the state is concerned: “Wai an cire wa yan Kalare
sunbatta.” The implication was that the ban on Kalare activities
had now been lifted and so in return, they must ensure the
success of the PDP in the local government elections. Although
there is no independent evidence to support this allegation
against the Governor, there is no doubt that the local
government elections witnessed assassinations and fights between
rival Kalare groups, while since those elections, there has been an
increase in violence, theft, killings, attacks and counter-attacks,
all of which have been blamed on different Kalare groups in the
state.
On the issue of governance generally, Gombe State appears
to have done well in meeting the expectations of citizens. An
officer with the state’s Ministry of Works referred to what he
described as people-oriented projects that had been embarked on
throughout the state. Examples of such projects by the present
administration cited by this interviewee include road
construction, improvement of Gombe township roads and the
dualization of other roads within the state, construction of
bridges such as the great Kuri Bridge in Yamaltu/Deba local
government, the expansion of potable water provision to the
Federal low cost housing estate, and laying of water pipelines to
townships. Other projects cited as people-oriented were poverty
alleviation programmes that had been introduced to enhance
capacity acquisition by women in different fields such as fishery,
sewing, beauty salons in which women were not only trained,
but were also given business equipment related to their area of
specialization, and the sum of N50,000.00 start-up capital (Degri;
Personal Communication, October 2014).
Security and Governance in Gombe State
145
The Centre for Community Health and Development, a
civil society organization which caters for orphans and the less
privileged, as well as health advocacy, said that it had received a
lot of goodwill and support from the state government in the
area of funding, and moral and financial support for orphans.
The state government had also mobilized paramount rulers to
support its HIV/AIDS programmes such as voluntary
counselling and testing.
.
The following findings were obtained from the information
generated during this study:
1. Elected representatives have abused or misused their power
and authority (see Table 1.4). This view is not unconnected
to a common trait of the political class which, when seeking
political office, presents itself as engaging in politics in order
to support the aspirations of the people and to protect their
interests, but which, once power is attained, becomes
inaccessible to the masses and fails to champion their cause.
2. Corruption among government officials is high in Gombe
State. With 54 per cent opining that it is either high or
extremely high, it is hardly surprising that the former
Governor was charged to court for alleged corrupt practices
involving funds for pensioners and contracts awarded by his
administration. However, as is usual in such cases, some
respondents alleged political motives for the prosecution.
3. The State House of Assembly is not functioning very well in
the view of nearly half of the respondents (46 per cent saying
its functioning was bad or very bad) (See Table1.6).
146
4.
5.
6.
7.
Security and Governance in North-East Nigeria
The study reveals also that the quality of service delivery by
the Governor and his cabinet is fairly good although the
results were mixed, and the 30 per cent who considered
service delivery to be bad or very bad should not be glossed
over. The Governor was rated as having done well as regards
infrastructure and physical projects, views which were
corroborated
during
interviews.
However,
some
communities complained that they were not being
supported in terms of funds to expand their business and
other handcraft activities.
Communities and respondents are not adequately
participating in the activities of their local governments.
This may be because there are not enough development
associations and civil society groups to mobilize the
government and the people to engage in development and
community self-help efforts.
Civil society groups do not participate effectively in
governance processes in the state. Empirical evidence
suggests that the ones that are present in the state, such as
Centre for Community Health and Development (which is
actively involved in HIV/AIDS counselling and care for
orphans and the destitute) interact well with state and local
governments, but the lack of awareness of the activities of
NGOs and CBOs by most respondents suggests that the
number of such organizations in the state is unduly low.
Private sector organizations are seen as working only to
maximize their business interests, with only low percentages
being aware of any support from this sector for government
or the police and other security agencies. It is likely that
most respondents are unaware of the level of collaboration
Security and Governance in Gombe State
8.
9.
147
between government, security agencies and the private
sector. However security experts in the state maintained that
synergy between them and the organized private sector in
tackling the menace of crime in the state was good.
Security challenges ranging from theft, burglary, gang attack
by Kalare groups, to communal clashes along the DadiyaTure-Tangale axis abound in the state. Other forms of
security challenges include insurgency-related attacks such as
the late 2011 attacks on the MOPOL Command, the attack
on Gombe Township Police Station on 24th February 2012,
attacks in Bajoga Police Station and a bank in the local
government, an attack on Kumo Police Station at the
headquarters of Kumo Local Government. The state has also
suffered from suicide bombing attacks, with such attacks
taking place at the Governor’s residence on Thursday June
5th 2014 and at the 301 battalion of the Nigerian Army at
Gombe on Sunday 8th of June 2014.
The level of response given by both state government and
security agents recorded mixed results. Though one can say
in sum that the response was viewed positively by a
majority, with 54 per cent considering them to have been
either responsive or very responsive (see Table 1.15), a
disturbing situation on the ground was revealed, with
frequent crimes being committed by Kalare boys with
intermittent attacks blamed on Boko Haram elements. The
reluctance of the government and security operatives to
confront groups such as the Kalare boys was ascribed to the
fact that the power elites in the state hire some of them.
This is because, they are known to commit the worst crimes
such as murder and robbery, while it was also alleged that
148
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
Security and Governance in North-East Nigeria
some of these criminals had been hired as Personal Assistants
(PAs) to the Governor. Against this background, little
should be expected in terms of curtailing the activities of
Kalare groups in the state.
The judicial system is not responsive to the plight of
ordinary citizens, and is seen as bedevilled with corrupt
practices on the part of judicial officers, including judges.
With the perception that justice and equity are compromised
for money and positions, the likelihood of resort to self-help
is increased.
Government functionaries are accessible to the public but,
with some level of difficulty.
Job opportunities have increased in the last ten years, but
the state’s efforts are seen as only opening up employment
within government circles. Private investment remains low,
as quite apart from the lack of security for property and
persons, the government is not considered to have provided
conducive atmosphere for the private sector to operate and
thrive.
The state government is perceived as making efforts to
provide for women; children and persons with disabilities
(see Table 1.20). Anti-poverty programmes are bringing
benefits to the people of every community in the state.
Interviewees also cited skills acquisition and training for
women, efforts to facilitate marriages for widows and the
divorced as being of both social and economic benefit.
In general however, insecurity persists, and is seen as not
improving.
Security and Governance in Gombe State
149
%
Conclusively, the abuse and misuse of power and authority by
elected representatives is quite disturbing given that it will erode
the confidence reposed in them by the electorate and could lead
to political apathy. Corruption being considered high among
government officers in the state is a serious threat to good
governance. Lack of ready access to elected representatives by
citizens or voters is a serious threat to good governance and will
erode the confidence reposed in them. The response on the
quality of service delivery by the governor and his cabinet is
quite encouraging and that it is true to say that there is good
governance in some sectors in Gombe State, but not in all,
particularly security sector governance which faces a lot
challenges. It is disheartening that many communities are not
aware of the activities of civil society organizations but this
situation can be changed if the state government takes positive
steps to empower citizens to establish such organizations. By
reinforcing the idea that governance is a collective responsibility,
good governance in the state will be enhanced.
The presence of security challenges of different dimension in
the state is quite problematic because they paralyze social,
economic and even political activities in the state. The
purchasing power of the people is very low because of security
threats to life and property this has affected trade and commerce
in the State. In particular, the Kalare boys constitute a great
danger to the collective good of the people of Gombe State.
These threats should be tackled both by government policy and
institutions and through advocacy by civil society organizations.
150
Security and Governance in North-East Nigeria
Recommendations
i. Elected representatives should live up to expectations by
fulfilling campaign promises and implementing constituency
projects such as skills acquisition for youths, provision of
pipe borne water, construction of access roads etc. to
provide jobs and improve infrastructure.
ii. Government officials must be transparent in managing public
funds in their custody. This can be achieved by regular
auditing of their accounts and the introduction of e-payment
in all government transactions in the state, as this will go a
long way towards combating the menace of corruption
among government officials.
iii. There is a dire need for State House of Assembly members to
improve service to their respective constituencies. This can
be done by opening an office in their respective
constituencies and periodically making themselves available
in such offices. This will enhance accessibility and give them
first-hand knowledge of the problems peculiar to their
constituents, so that they can address them in the House,
thereby enhancing the prospects for good governance in
Gombe State.
iv. The Governor and his cabinet need to do more to improve
security and to provide good governance. Youths in the state
should be empowered in the same way that efforts were
made to empower women. This can be achieved through
partnership with the private sector to establish skills
acquisition centres where youths can be engaged, trained and
offered start-up capital for their businesses. This will help to
reduce petty crime and political thuggery in the state.
Security and Governance in Gombe State
151
v. Community participation in the governance process at both
local and state government level should be facilitated. This
can be done by government at all levels mobilizing
community members to establish self-help organizations or
CBOs, NGOs and civil society groups which can liaise with
the government to carry out governance-related projects.
vi. Government at both state and local government level must
curtail the activities of Kalare boys and similar groups in
order to secure the future of the people of Gombe State. The
most realistic way of doing this is by ensuring that
politicians do not provide them with monetary incentives to
carry out politics-related crimes, or give them cover when
apprehended for suspected crimes. Government should
rehabilitate Kalare boys by integrating them into the
proposed youth skills acquisition programmes. The
government should also work for their moral re-generation
and rehabilitation to become good and responsible citizens,
including teaching by clerics. For the common good of
society, the Gombe State Governor must commit himself to
reverse the evil trend of supporting and financing these
thugs.
vii. Attacks by insurgents can be curtailed if the security
infrastructure is properly empowered to promptly respond
to any attack by such groups. Also if the insurgents can be
accessed, efforts should be made to urge them to embrace
peace and to re-integrate them into society. This will ensure
the collective peace and security for all, not only in Gombe
State but in the whole of the Nigerian nation.
152
Security and Governance in North-East Nigeria
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156
Security and Governance in North-East Nigeria
Chapter 6
- Emeka D. Oruonye
The increasing rate of crime and violence caused by insurgent
groups, with the attendant loss of lives and property, has
brought the north-eastern part of Nigeria to world attention.
With insecurity challenges persisting since 2009, citizens have
been forced to wonder whether Nigeria still has functional
government institutions. Such is the level of distrust and lack of
confidence in government that the situation has engendered in
the north-east region.
Until 2009, the north-east of Nigeria was relatively peaceful
but now, despite the huge presence of military personnel and
security operatives, the security situation is seen to be getting
worse. This has raised a number of questions: Why has this crisis
persisted? Whom do we hold responsible for the deteriorating
security situation in the region? Could it be that the government
no longer knows what to do, or that it lacks the ability to
contain the situation? Are the security operatives and military
personnel incompetent? Do they lack the necessary facilities and
logistic capacity to contain the situation? It is these and other
questions that have informed the need to examine the nexus
158
Security and Governance in North-East Nigeria
between governance and insecurity in the north eastern part of
Nigeria, with special reference to Taraba State.
One of the greatest problems of development in Taraba
State, especially the southern part, is ethno-religious and
communal conflict. For several years Taraba State has suffered
violent conflicts which have resulted in the militarization of
young people and the accumulation of small arms. The
combined effects of historical conflict and contention over land,
boundary disputes and electoral contest have generated varying
levels of violence. A number of local governments in the state are
faced with one form of communal violence or the other, much
of it associated with politics. Violence in the state is dominated
by ethnic conflicts arising from land disputes, conflict between
nomadic and sedentary farming communities, and chieftaincy
disputes. Criminal violence is also common. Armed conflict in
Taraba State is also influenced by violence in other parts of the
country, which has on some occasions spilled over in to Taraba
state. It is this complex dynamics of security and governance that
this study examines.
1.
2.
3.
4.
To examine the relationship between security and the
character of governance in Taraba state.
To examine the major drivers of insecurity in Taraba state.
To examine the links between governance and insecurity in
Taraba state.
To assess government response to security challenges in the
state.
This study will therefore pose some pertinent questions:
Governance and Insecurity Challenges in Taraba State
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
159
What is the state of security in Taraba State since the return
to civil rule in 1999?
What is the state of governance in Taraba State since 1999?
What are the key drivers of insecurity in Taraba State since
1999?
To what extent is insecurity in the state linked to
governance failure in the state?
How does the state of governance influence security in the
state?
What are the challenges in state and civil society responses to
insecurity in Taraba State?
What needs to be done to engender sustainable peace and
security in the state?
In what ways can improvements in governance yield peace
and security dividends in the state?
This study is based on a survey conducted in Taraba state over a
period of two months from 18th August to 24 October 2014. The
main sources of data used in this study were key informant
interviews (KII), focus group discussions (FGD), responses to
questionnaires and interviews with a cross section of citizens.
Twenty KIIs with persons occupying leadership positions in
government, civil society and the private sector were conducted,
while six FGDs were held. Secondary materials such as books,
journals, articles, memoranda to Commissions of Inquiry into
various conflicts, and reports on specific cases were consulted.
Resources from CLEEN Foundation and statistics compiled by
160
Security and Governance in North-East Nigeria
the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) and National Population
Commission (NPC) have also been very useful.
Purposive sampling was adopted for the KIIs, FGDs and
administration of the questionnaire. The criteria for the selection
of the local governments where the study was conducted were
geographical spread and representation of urban and rural
settings, the span of existence of the LGA, its size, population,
infrastructure and accessibility. Also factored into the selection
process were the risk factor, and the prevalence of insecurity
issues. One rural and one urban LGA was selected in two of the
three senatorial districts in the State, while in the Northern
Senatorial District, only the state capital, Jalingo, was selected,
giving a total of five LGAs as follows: Jalingo in Taraba North,
Sardauna and Bali in Taraba Central Senatorial District, and
Takum and Ussa in Taraba South Senatorial District (Table 1).
Thirty questionnaires were administered in each LGA
except Jalingo, which had 60. The questionnaires were used to
elicit information on four key governance and security areas,
namely political, legal/judicial, administrative and socioeconomic. Interviews were recorded with hand-written notes,
and where the respondents permitted, photographs were taken.
The data collected using questionnaires were analysed using
the SPSS statistical package, while content-analysis was deployed
for the data obtained from the individual interviews and focus
groups, and it was subjected to descriptive analysis.
One of the greatest challenges encountered in the course of
this research was the reluctance of respondents, especially civil
servants in the state, to participate. Civil society organizations,
particularly youth organizations and road transport workers
unions exhibited high levels of enthusiasm because of their desire
Governance and Insecurity Challenges in Taraba State
161
for change. By contrast, many civil servants were not
enthusiastic and showed little interest in the subject matter.
Women’s groups also seemed uninterested, adopting a “This
doesn’t concern us” attitude, and taking refuge behind tradition
and religion to treat governance and security as a ‘men’s affair’,
since the men were the ones in power, and it was men who took
all the decisions concerning governance and security in the state.
This attitude is not unconnected with the dominance of Taraba’s
political terrain by men. Since the return to civilian rule the state
has elected only one female Senator (Senator Aisha Jummai
Alhassan – Taraba North) and only one elected female
representative in the State House of Assembly (Hon. Mrs.
Rashida Mohammed, Nguroje constituency) out of 24 legislators.
In the state executive council, there have never been more than
three female commissioners at any given time. Out of 163 elected
councillors, only sixteen were women and this number was only
achieved after the then First Lady had appealed to the ruling
Peoples Democratic Party to ensure that women were given an
opportunity to contest elections.
Taraba State was created out of the now-defunct Gongola State
by the Federal Military Government led by General Ibrahim
Babangida, on the 27th August 1991 along with eight other states.
It derives its name from the River Taraba, which is one of the
main tributaries of River Benue. Historically, Taraba State
comprises the pre-1976 divisions of Muri, Mambilla and Wukari.
The state is the second largest state in terms of landmass in
Nigeria. It is located in the southern part of north-eastern
Nigeria along the eastern borderland between Nigeria and
162
Security and Governance in North-East Nigeria
Cameroon. The state lies roughly between latitude 6o25’N and
9o30’N and between longitudes 9o30’E and 11o45’E. It is bordered
on the west by Nassarawa and Plateau States, to the north by
Bauchi and Gombe States, by Adamawa State to the northeast,
and by Benue State to the south-west. Taraba State is bounded on
the south and south-east by the Republic of Cameroon (an
international boundary) that runs for a distance of 437 km
(Oruonye and Abbas, 2011). The porous nature of Nigeria’s
international frontiers allows for the unregulated movement of
people, goods, as well as arms and ammunition across the
borders. The state covers a land area of about 60,291km2 with a
population of 2,300,736 people according to the 2006 census.
Taraba State has abundant natural resources as aptly
captured by the sobriquet “Nature’s gift to the Nation”. It is well
endowed with climate and vegetation types that range from a
humid climate and forest vegetation in the south, to a seasonal
wet and dry climate and savannah vegetation in the north.
Despite these resources, the people suffer from poverty.
Bashir (1993 and 2000) described the state as the neglected and
grossly underdeveloped part of the former Gongola state.
Because of its rugged topography, lack of access roads from other
parts of the country, and the neglect it suffered from past
administrations, the state remains largely peripheral to the
nation’s economic and political life (Bashir 1993 and 2000).
According to the 2006 National Population Census, the
population of Taraba State was 2,300,736, of whom 1,199,849
(52.2%) were males, and 1,100,887 (47.8%) were females; a
surplus of 98,962 more males than females. This imbalance gives
Governance and Insecurity Challenges in Taraba State
163
a gender ratio of 48:52. The state’s population growth rate is
3.1% per annum (Oruonye and Abbas 2011). Based on this, it is
projected to be 2,948,300 in 2014. The state has a very youthful
population as shown in Table 1, with 47.4% of the population
falling into the less productive group aged between 0-14 years,
while the working age population (15-59 years) constitute 49.6%
of the population. Those aged 60 years and above constitute 3%
of the population. Of the working age population, those aged 3059 are considered the most productive, but these constitute only
23.9% of the total population. This large population of young
makes gives a high dependency ratio for the state, and this in
turn, makes saving and investment difficult. The high proportion
of youth also means that there is a high demand for educational
facilities and certain types of health care. The implication is that
Taraba State ought to invest heavily in providing for the health
and educational development of its youthful population. Limited
resources mean that these basic needs can only be met at the
expense of investment in infrastructural development and
industrialization to facilitate productive economic ventures. At
the family level, the high population of youth impacts heavily on
individual incomes, especially with the extended family system,
making saving and investment difficult, and thereby perpetuating
the vicious cycle of poverty.
Security and Governance in North-East Nigeria
164
S/NO
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
Gender
Male
Female
Total
Age group
0–4
5 – 14
15 – 29
30 – 44
45 – 59
60 – 64
65 – 69
70
and
above
Population
1,199,849
1,100,887
2,294,800
Percentage
52.2
47.8
100
352,012
738,536
591,289
379,621
170,254
25,308
11,503
32,210
15.3
32.1
25.7
16.5
7.4
1.1
0.5
1.4
Source: National Population Commission Abuja.
Taraba State is one of the most ethnically diverse states in
the Federation, with over 80 different ethnic groups, including
Mumuye, Ichen, Wurkun, Mambilla, Kuteb, Chamba, Jukun,
Tiv, Yandang, Fulani, Jenjo, Kunini, Ndoro, Kambu, Kaka,
Bandawa, Munga, Zo and Banbuka. Other ethnicities such as
Igbo and Yoruba are also found in the state. Hausa is a
commonly spoken language in the state irrespective of ethnicity.
The state is also religiously diverse with large populations of
Christians and Muslims. Although this ethnic diversity could
have been a source of strength, it has been a source of conflict
that has stalled development. Most of such ethnic conflicts are
rooted in historical animosity, mutual suspicion and distrust
among the different ethnic groups, but these divisions have been
Governance and Insecurity Challenges in Taraba State
165
exploited by politicians for electoral advantage, thereby
deepening differences among the people.
!
At the time of its creation, Taraba State comprised only nine
Local Government Areas, namely Jalingo, Zing, Lau, KarimLamido, Sardauna, Bali, Gashaka, Wukari and Takum. In
September 1991, three more LGAs, namely Ibi, Yorro and
Donga, were created, while in 1996, a further four LGAs: ArdoKola, Kurmi, Ussa and Gassol, were created. The state presently
has sixteen LGAs administered by elected Chairmen.
Taraba State has three Senatorial Districts. Of these, the
Northern district comprises six LGAs: Jalingo, Yorro, Ardo
Kola, Karim Lamido, Lau and Zing. The Southern has five
LGAs, namely Wukari, Takum, Ibi, Donga and Ussa, and the
Central district also has five LGAs, namely Bali, Gassol, Kurmi,
Gashaka and Sardauna.
Apart from these LGAs, Taraba State has eighteen district
areas, which are units based on cultural factors that emphasize
ethnic affiliations (Bashir, 2000). Bashir further observed that
unlike the LGAs, which operate officially and are
constitutionally recognized as the third tier of government, the
districts are administered traditionally through a hierarchy of
chiefs or emirs, village and ward heads. The state has seventeen
chiefdoms or emirates headed by chiefs or emirs of various
grades. The traditional setup of the district level administration
serves as an important link between the grassroots population
and the local government administration. This arrangement,
though not yet sufficiently exploited, appears to have helped to
166
Security and Governance in North-East Nigeria
reduce tension and conflict among some of the various ethnic
groups in the state (Bashir, 2000).
"
The formal structure of governance in Taraba State consists of
the Governor, who is the state’s chief executive, assisted by the
Deputy Governor, the Secretary to the State Government, and
Commissioners who make up the State Executive Council,
which is the highest governing body in the state. In addition,
there are Special Advisers and Special Assistants. The Governor
also has primary responsibility for security in the state, for
which there is a Security Committee chaired by the Governor
who, like many of his counterparts all over Nigeria, is often
styled ‘Chief Security Officer’. To facilitate this, the Taraba State
Governor has a special security vote which has recently been
increased from N80 million naira per month to N200 million
naira (Ehichioya, ND).
The chief executive officer at local government level is the
Chairman, who also has primary responsibility for security at
that level. He is assisted by the Vice Chairman, the Secretary to
the Local Government and five Supervisory Councillors who
together make up the eight-person executive council at LGA
level. Each LGA has a security committee which is backed by
law and chaired by the Chairman of the LGA. Other members
are the Vice Chairman, the Secretary of the LGA, three
members nominated by the Chairman, the most senior Police
officer in the LGA, the most senior Customs officer, the most
senior Immigration officer, the most senior military officer and
the most senior officer of the State Security Service all within the
LGA; a representative of the Muslim Council, a representative of
Governance and Insecurity Challenges in Taraba State
167
the Christian Association of Nigeria (CAN) and a representative
of the traditional rulers/council.
Each security committee holds monthly meetings to review
the security situation in its area. When the need arises,
emergency meetings are held. Ordinarily the committee uses the
resources at its disposal, but if there are security challenges, it
seeks funds from the State Government through the Bureau for
Local Government and Chieftaincy Affairs. The Local
Government Chairman also has a security vote which he shares
with the security operatives in his LGA to facilitate their work.
From time to time the Chairman also holds special meetings
with representatives of various communities in the LGA, such as
the traditional leaders (Ardos and Jauros), which affords such
community representatives the opportunity to report any
security threat or challenge in their domain (Interview, 2014c).
At the district/village level, there are the traditional council
headed by chiefs, emirs, village heads and title-holders in the
chiefdom/emirate. The traditional council plays an advisory role
to the local and state government on customary and security
matters.
There is a legislative body at both state and local council
level. At the state level this is the State House of Assembly, while
at local government level, it consists of elected representatives
from local council constituencies, namely ward councillors. The
legislative arm of government is responsible for making byelaws
at the council level, while at the state level, it makes laws,
approves appointments and exercises oversight function with
regard to the activities of the executive arm. The legislative arm
is headed by an elected Speaker of the House of Assembly.
Security and Governance in North-East Nigeria
168
The judicial arm of government, headed by the Chief Judge,
consists of High Courts and Magistrates Courts, while the Sharia
court is headed by a Grand Khadi.
The 1999 Constitution provides for the separation of
powers, and for checks and among these three arms of
government. Since the return to civil rule in 1999, Taraba State
has been governed by the Peoples Democratic Party (PDP): Rev.
Jolly Nyame (29th May, 1999-29th May, 2007), followed by
Danbaba Suntai (29th May 2007 to date). The PDP has also
produced all the Senators and Members of the Federal House of
Representatives from the state since 1999.
#
!
About 80 per cent of Taraba State’s working population is
directly engaged in agriculture, while 20 per cent are engaged in
other economic activities, including white collar jobs (TSEEDS,
2004). The crops most commonly cultivated in the state include
cereals such as maize and rice; legumes such as groundnut and
beans, and tubers such as cassava and yam. Taraba State has the
largest land area in the country devoted to the cultivation of
sweet potato (30.72 ha), with an output of 245,800 metric tons in
2009 (NPAFS, 2009). Tree crops in the area include palm oil,
banana/plantain and orange. Cash crops produced in the state
include coffee, tea and groundnut. The State’s agricultural sector
is dominated by small scale rural farmers.
The state has over 52 discovered solid mineral resources,
with the highest hydroelectricity power potential in the country.
It is also a tourist haven with the largest National Park in West
Africa (Gashaka Gumti National Park).
Governance and Insecurity Challenges in Taraba State
169
Fishing is an important economic activity in the state, with
an average annual production of 1,987 metric tonnes (TSEED,
2004). The daily fish catch in some LGAs such as Ibi, Lau and
Donga, is about 3,000 kg. Over 30,000 families are fully engaged
in fishing (TSEED, 2004). The state has one of Nigeria’s highest
concentrations of livestock, with over 10 million herds of cattle,
most of them on the Mambilla Plateau. About 30 per cent of the
state’s population is engaged in pastoralism (TSEED, 2004).
Lumbering is also carried out in some parts of the state, such as
Sardauna, Gashaka, Kurmi and Ussa LGAs.
About 70 per cent of the population lives in rural areas. In a
study on the structure of rurality in Nigeria by Madu (2008),
Taraba State ranks seventh in the country, after Gombe, Kogi,
Plateau, Bauchi, Kwara and Kebbi States. A rural state, with a
rurality index of 4.973, less than 25 per cent of the population is
engaged in white collar work or non-agricultural activity. The
state has a high rate of unemployment, which was put at 26.8%
in 2009.
Poverty is especially severe in the rural areas where social
services and infrastructure are limited or non-existent. The
majority of those who live in rural areas are poor, and depend on
agriculture for food and income. Taraba state has only three
Microfinance Banks out of the 866 in the country (Tobi and
Akani, 2014). The Nigerian Bureau of Statistics (NBS) 2010
poverty profile report shows that only 31.1% of the people in
Taraba State fall within the non-poor category, while 68.9% are
core poor (Table 2).
The state ranks low in all major development and household
indicators (Table 2). The National Demographic and Household
Survey (NDHS) 2014 report shows that 95.6% of women in the
Security and Governance in North-East Nigeria
170
state do not own a house and 93.5% do not own any land. 43 per
cent of men in the state do not own a house and 53.1% do not
own any land.
$
Primary School Enrolment 533,130 (2008)
Secondary school enrolment 122,000 (2008)
No. of Primary schools 1,502 (2008)
No. of Primary School Teachers 15,607 (2008)
No. of Secondary schools 91 (2008)
No.of Secondary School Teachers 2,682 (2008)
Health
No. of Registered Doctors 58 (2008)
No. of Registered Nurses 846 (2008)
No. of Pharmacist 96 (2008)
Total Health Facility (Public - 416, private 195) 611 (2008)
Unemployment Rate of unemployment 26.8% (2008)
Poverty profile Core Poor68.9 % (2010)
Non Poor 31.1 % (2010)
Security
No. of Policemen 5,054 (2007)
No. of Police stations 71 (2007)
No. of Police posts 123 (2007)
No. of Village post 33 (2007)
Ratio of Population to one Policeman 455
(2007)
Reported armed robbery 80 (2008)
Prison Inmate Population 957 (2008)
Prison capacity 1,650 (2008)
Education
Source: NBC/CBN/NCC Social Economic Survey on Nigeria, 2008.
Taraba State’s internally generated revenue and its statutory
allocation from the Federation Account has almost tripled in less
than a decade, as has its annual budget (Table 3). However this
has not translated into any meaningful impact on the welfare of
Governance and Insecurity Challenges in Taraba State
171
the people of the state, whether by the provision of
infrastructure, facilities or employment opportunities. Table 3
shows that the state spends more on recurrent expenditure than
capital expenditure. This has implications for infrastructural
development in the area. Key sectors in the state such as
agriculture, education and health are still begging for
government attention, a factor reflected in the NDHS 2014
report which shows that 70 per cent of people in the state
experience difficulty in accessing health care facilities and 35.6 %
of school age children are out of school.
%
Source: Taraba State Ministry of Finance, Jalingo.
Educationally, the state is very backward. Although the
number of schools and of pupils and students has increased since
the 1999 transition to civil rule, the quality of teaching in the
schools leaves much to be desired. This is reflected in the fact
that Taraba State has not recorded more than a 16 per cent pass in
secondary school terminal examinations such as the West
African Secondary School Certificate Examination (WASSCE)
Security and Governance in North-East Nigeria
172
and National Examination Council (NECO) in the last decade
(Oruonye, 2014). According to the National Population
Commission, the distribution of population age six and above in
Taraba State by literacy status stood at 856,756 (499,141 male and
357,615 female), which is 64.4% of children within the schooling
age-group. This information is presented in Table 4. A National
Literacy Survey (2010) conducted by the NBS estimated adult
literacy rates in Taraba State at 23.3% and illiteracy rates at
76.7% (Table 4). Apart from the obvious benefits of being able to
read and write, literacy also enables citizens to participate
effectively in the governance of their community, but this
opportunity is denied the large youthful population of the state
who lack qualitative education, vocational training or requisite
skills. With the high poverty rate of 68.9% and an
unemployment rate of 26.8%, these excluded youths can become
easy tools for conflict, crime and violence – portending a serious
security threat.
&
S/No
1
2
3
4
5
6
Schooling Status
Population
Never attended school
848,028
Attended in the past but not
309,452
now
Attending Primary School
271,359
Attending Junior Secondary
88,324
School
Attending Senior Secondary
112,737
School
Attending Tertiary School
159,278
Governance and Insecurity Challenges in Taraba State
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
Educational Attainment
None
Nursery
Primary
Junior Secondary School
Senior Secondary School
OND/NCE
University Graduate
Post Graduate
Others
173
Population
936,642
210,092
156,596
133,076
251,552
68,457
23,541
5,337
3,885
Source: National Population Commission Abuja, 2006.
According to the CLEEN Foundation nationwide crime
survey, views on corruption in Taraba State show that 36.9%
believe that it is decreasing while 51.2% believe that it is on the
increase (Alemika, 2013). However, only 9% reported demands
for bribes by government officials; the lowest in the country.
The crime survey report also shows that at 1%, experience of
armed robbery in Taraba State is the lowest in Nigeria. 10 per
cent of the respondents to the CLEEN Foundation survey have
experienced crime, with mobile phone theft making up 41 per
cent of reported crimes, and physical assault making up 18 per
cent. 14 per cent of respondents to that survey had reported
crimes to the police. Despite this, 99 per cent of Taraba citizens
suffer from fear of crime: the highest rate in the whole country
(Alemika, 2013).
The most common forms of criminal victimization suffered
by household members in Taraba State range from robbery
(0.6%), domestic violence (13.7%), physical assault (3.6%), theft
of money (26.8%) and burglary (8.9%) (Alemika, 2013). The
personal crime victimization was reported to be low (10 per cent).
174
Security and Governance in North-East Nigeria
Crime victimization surveys by CLEEN Foundation in 2011
show that perceptions of safety from crime and violence now,
compared to the past ten years, ranges from worse (30.4%) to
better (40.5%). In 2007, Taraba State had 5,054 policemen, with
three Area Commands, 17 Divisional headquarters, 71 Police
stations, 123 Police posts and 33 Village posts. This gives a ratio
of one policeman to 455 persons.
'
"
!
(((
Rev. Jolly Nyame was the first civilian governor of Taraba State
after the 1999 return to civil rule. Previously he had been elected
as governor in 1992 (which term was truncated by the
November 1993 military coup), but he served two full terms for
the eight years from 29th May 1999 to 29th May 2007. On
assuming office in 1999, Nyame inherited security challenges
from his military predecessor which had led to loss of life and
destruction of property, hospitals and other infrastructure.
Nyame set out to improve Taraba State’s infrastructure. He built
a modern specialist hospital in Jalingo equipped with state-of-theart facilities, and referral hospitals in other parts of the state. An
extensive road network was developed in Jalingo, including an 11
km by-pass which he named after himself, while housing units
were built for civil servants. Unfinished projects from the
Nyame era include a modern market and an airport, which has
not been commissioned up to the time of writing. Governor
Nyameh instituted projects designed to develop human capital,
such as training programmes and the construction of a modern
sporting complex. An urban transport scheme which provided
youths in the state with buses, taxi cabs and motorcycles had the
Governance and Insecurity Challenges in Taraba State
175
triple objectives of easing movement, providing cheap
transportation and providing employment. On the governance
front, Nyame ensured that local government council allocations
were released regularly. Furthermore, a broad spectrum of the
ethnic groups in the state, were represented in his cabinet.
When Danbaba Suntai succeeded Nyame as the governor of
the state, in order to speed up work on the proposed Taraba
State University, the State College of Education was relocated to
Zing. The Taraba State Polytechnic was similarly relocated from
Wukari to Suntai (his home town), in order to create space for
the newly approved Federal University of Wukari.
In the health sector, work commenced on the construction
of a modern school of Nursing and Midwifery, while Takum
General Hospital, which had been destroyed during the ethnic
crisis of 1997, was rebuilt and equipped with modern facilities.
To improve the rehabilitation of roads, the Taraba Road
Construction and Maintenance Agency (TARCMA) was
established, and it not only contributed to the expansion of
urban roads in Jalingo, it also constructed four kilometres of
roads in each of the state’s 16 LGAs. The intra-state road
network was improved by the construction of the Jalingo-SuntaiGarba-Chede road, the further extension of which to Bali,
Gashaka and Sardauna LGAs is still in progress. The Agricultural
Products Marketing Agency was established to buy excess food
crops at reasonable prices, to encourage farmers to maintain and
improve production.
Danbaba’s administration was seen as strongly committed to
improving the welfare of women and children, and indeed, the
‘Children’s Parliament’ was established during his first term.
176
Security and Governance in North-East Nigeria
In a bid to monitor the effective management of financial
resources at local government level, Danbaba merged local
council accounts with those of the state government in the ‘Joint
Account’ (JAC). This gave the state government effective control
over all statutory allocations to LGAs from the Federation
Account. The effect was to almost completely paralyze
governance at the local council level, effectively reducing LGAs
to extensions of state ministries, instead of a separate tier of
government. Oruonye (2013) observed that the incessant
dissolution of local councils by the state and imposition of
caretaker committees, together with the Joint Account, have
eroded the principles of democracy at the local council level. The
thus incapacitated local councils have found it difficult to tackle
the many challenges they face, such as the high level of illiteracy,
poor medical facilities, lack of financial resources, lack of social
amenities, lack of participation and involvement of local
communities in governance, as well as general indiscipline among
local government workers. This failure and lack of social service
delivery alienated the people at the grass roots (Oruonye, 2013).
Governor Danbaba Suntai was seen as being passionate
about maintaining peace and protecting the lives and property of
Taraba State residents. Indeed, many of those interviewed during
this study asserted that there were no cases of recurring crisis
during the greater part of his tenure, and ascribed the relative
peace enjoyed in the state to the Governor’s proactive approach
to security-related issues. For example, when it appeared that the
annual Kuchecheb cultural festival in Takum LGA might erupt in
violence, the Governor prohibited it. Residents observed that
once there were signs or rumours of any security problem or
threat anywhere in the state, security operatives would
Governance and Insecurity Challenges in Taraba State
177
immediately be sent to contain the situation. The Governor was
also proactive about making peace, and was able to successfully
resolve long-standing inherited chieftaincy disputes such as those
in Sardauna and Takum LGAs. To support security agencies in
the state, 29 Mitsubishi pickup vans and 5 Toyota Hilux vehicles
with Motorola multi-security utility systems were purchased for
joint police and military patrols at the porous border between
Taraba State and the Republic of Cameroon.
Despite these efforts, Governor Danbaba Suntai faced major
challenges. First was interference by his predecessor. Having
assisted Danbaba to succeed him even though Danbaba did not
contest for the party’s ticket during the primaries, ex-Governor
Nyame was said to have dictated practically everything about
governance in the state until the inevitable rift. Those appointed
by Danbaba after he broke away from Nyame were seen as more
urbane and educated, while Danbaba vowed that it would no
longer be “business as usual” in the state (Jaiyeola, 2014).
However, during his second term, Danbaba fell out with his
deputy, Alhaji Sani Abubakar Danladi. As a result, Danladi was
impeached and removed by the State House of Assembly, and
Alhaji Umar Garba was appointed as Deputy Governor in his
place in October 2012.
One week after Deputy Governor Garba was appointed;
Governor Danbaba sustained serious injuries when a plane he
was piloting crashed at Yola International Airport in Adamawa
State. Three weeks later, on the 14th of November 2012, the
Taraba State House of Assembly made Umar Garba Acting
Governor. The ensuing political crisis brought with it new
governance challenges. Although the Acting Governor
maintained that he was holding brief for the Governor, when
178
Security and Governance in North-East Nigeria
Danbaba returned from his overseas treatment in August 2013,
he dissolved Garba’s 13-member cabinet and appointed a new
Secretary to the State Government (Mr. Gebon T. Kataps).
Acting Governor Garba however challenged these actions and
ordered the affected commissioners to remain in office.
Governance in Taraba State was thus at the mercy of two
factions – the Governor’s and the Acting Governor’s – with two
State Executive Councils (Ayodele, 2013) and corresponding
division in the State House of Assembly. Each faction schemed
to control the machinery of government, but neither litigation
over the constitutional position, nor the intervention of the PDP
to broker peace, was able to resolve the impasse.
In the run-up to the 2015 general election, the political scene
in Taraba State was marked by regionalism, religion and
ethnicity. The Muri Emirate, which extends across both the
Northern and Central zones, has dominated Taraba State politics
since its inception, leaving those in the Southern zone agitating
that it was their turn to produce the next Governor. On the
religious front, Muslims were dissatisfied that no Muslim had
been elected Governor since the creation of the state. For this
reason they threw their support behind either Acting Governor
Garba, or a Muslim from the Southern zone. Respondents were
of the view that a combination of factors such as finance,
popularity, party platform, ethnicity and religion would be
needed to win power in the state in the 2015 elections.1
1
In the end, Darius Ishaku won the PDP’s ticket and eventually emerged as winner of the 2015
gubernatorial elections.
Governance and Insecurity Challenges in Taraba State
179
!
This section reviews the respondents’ satisfaction with the way
government functions in the state as regards the legislature,
accessibility of leaders, community participation and civil society
awareness. 86.1% of respondents to the questionnaires
administered for this study had voted in the 2011 gubernatorial
election, while 13.9% had not voted. Of this 13.9% who did not
vote, 81 per cent did not give any reason for not voting.
42.2% of the respondents were of the opinion that their
elected representatives misuse their power and authority to a
large extent, 25 per cent felt they did so to some extent, while 9.4
were of the view that they did not misuse their power and
authority, with 22.2% unable to give an opinion.
50.6% of the respondents believed that corruption among
government officials is extremely high, 27.8% believed it is high,
and 10 per cent felt that corruption was neither high nor low.
Only 0.6 said that corruption among government officials is low,
with 3.3 % saying that it is very low, while 7.8% do not know.
The perceived high level of corruption among government
officials has implications for service delivery, and this in turn can
heighten insecurity in the state.
)
!
"
$
#
%
S/No Perception of Corruption Frequency
1
Extremely high
91
2
High
50
3
Neither high nor low
18
4
Low
1
5
Very low
6
6
Do not know
14
7
Total
180
Source: Fieldwork, 2014
#
Percentage
50.6
27.8
10
0.6
3.3
7.8
100
Security and Governance in North-East Nigeria
180
18.3% of respondents are of the opinion that the state
legislature’s performance is very bad, 20.6% that it is bad, 20.6%
that it is neither bad nor good, 25 per cent that it is good and
7.2% that it is very good, while 8.3% expressed no opinion (Fig.
1).
&
'(
%
)
&
16.7% of respondents are of the opinion that the leadership
provided by the Governor and his commissioners is not effective
at all, 14.4% that it is not effective, 43.3% that it is averagely
effective, while only 13.9% believe it is effective and 7.8% that it
is very effective, with 3.9% saying that they do not know.
One aspect affecting perceptions about the quality of
leadership is the amount of access citizens have to those in
positions of authority, that is, the ease or difficulty experienced
in making contact with government officials. The respondents’
Governance and Insecurity Challenges in Taraba State
181
rating on this aspect as regards the Governor and commissioners
at state level, and council Chairmen at local council level, is
presented in Table 6. 26.7% of the respondents are of the opinion
that the Governor and his Commissioners are not accessible at
all, 42.8% say that they are accessible with some difficulty, while
14.4% admit that they are accessible and 8.3% find them easily
accessible, while 7.8% could not say. Despite the idea that local
government is supposed to be closer to the people, this trend of
inaccessibility is replicated at the local council level reflecting the
belief of most respondents that governance at the local council
level exists in name only, and has little or no impact on the lives
of rural dwellers. 17.2% of the respondents were of the opinion
that elected local government officials are not accessible at all,
48.9% are of the opinion that they are accessible with some
difficulty while only 16.7% of the respondents believe that they
are accessible, 11.7% easily accessible. 5.5% said that they do not
know.
*
S/No Response
1
2
3
4
5
6
!
Not accessible at all
Accessible with
difficulty
Accessible
Easily accessible
Do not know
Total
$
#
Accessibility to
governor and
commissioners
26.7%
42.8%
14.4%
8.3%
7.8%
100
Source: Fieldwork, 2014
*
Accessibility to
Local council
authorities
17.2%
48.9%
16.7%
11.7%
5.5%
100
Security and Governance in North-East Nigeria
182
On the quality of the functioning of the governor and his
cabinet, 18.3% of the respondents are of the opinion that it is
very bad, 15.6% that it is bad, 26.1% see it as neither good nor
bad, while 31.1 % believe that it is good and 4.4% that it is very
good, while 4.4% do not know. This trend is also replicated at
local council level where 26.1% of the respondents are of the
opinion that the functioning of the local government authority is
very bad, 26.9% that it is bad, 18.3% that it is neither bad nor
good, while only 17.8% say that it is good and 7.2% very good,
with 5.5% saying that they do not know. The functioning of the
Governor and his cabinet is rated better than that of local
government authorities (see Table 7).
+
$
S/No Response
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Very bad
Bad
Neither good
and bad
Good
Very good
I do not know/I
can’t say
Total
#
Functioning of
Governor and
cabinet
18.3 %
15.6 %
26.1 %
Functioning of
Local government
authority
26.1 %
26.1 %
18.3 %
31.1%
4.4 %
4.4 %
17.8 %
7.2 %
5.5 %
100
100
Source: Fieldwork, 2014
31.7% of the respondents hold the view that members of
their communities do not participate in local government
activities, 38.9% say that they participate to some extent while
17.8% believed that members of their communities participate
Governance and Insecurity Challenges in Taraba State
183
fully, with 11.7% expressing no view. This low participation
reinforces the earlier opinions about local government councils,
by which they are seen as mere extensions of state ministries,
lacking the capacity to face the many different challenges
confronting them, and being neither responsive nor accountable
to the people. Some respondents recognised that the
participation of citizens in the political process is an essential
part of good governance, as it helps to improve public resource
management and reduces levels of corruption by making public
servants and political leaders accountable to the people. In
FGDs, discussants observed that neither the country nor the
state have made much progress since the return to civil rule. One
commented:
“If we consider the amount of money that both the federal and state
governments have earned since the return to democratic rule and
compare it with what is on the ground as work done, then we will see
that we have not made any progress. There is no solution to our
present problem because our political leaders are very corrupt and
non patriotic. An individual can embezzle a state’s resources and walk
away free. The security operatives and judiciary are more or less
errand boys and working tools that help the political class accomplish
their ambition to loot the state treasury. I wish that the country was
still under the colonial rule because our political leaders have betrayed
the trust and confidence of the people.” (FGD, 2014a).
,
-.
This section examines law and order issues as well as the
perception of the citizens about the functioning of the judiciary
and law enforcement agencies and institutions. The findings of
the study shows that most respondents (38.3%) consider
communal and ethno-religious violence to be the greatest
Security and Governance in North-East Nigeria
184
security challenge in Taraba State, 19.5% believe it is petty
crime/theft, while only 18.3% consider extremism, terrorism
and insurgency to be the greatest threat (See Figure 2).
' /$
45
40
35
30
25
20
15
10
5
0
!
# +
*
Series1
14.4% gave the state’s judicial system a very bad rating while
19.4% rated it bad, 31.7% neither good nor bad, while 22.8%
believe it is good and 4.4 % that it is very good, while and 7.2%
do not know. Only 10.6 of the respondents strongly disagree
that the state’s judicial system is corrupt and 16.7% disagree.
26.1% neither disagree nor agree while 38.9% strongly agree that
the judicial system is corrupt while 7.8% say they do not know.
Governance and Insecurity Challenges in Taraba State
185
0
Several factors have raised levels of insecurity in Taraba State,
and these include chieftaincy disputes, through land and
boundary disputes, leadership problems, unemployment,
poverty and economic disparity. These were identified during
the study, and expanded upon during Key Informant Interviews
and Focus Group Discussions.
1
1
One such conflict has its origins in the rivalry between the
Kuteb and Jukun-Chamba in Takum LGA. While the Kuteb
people claim to be the original inhabitants of Takum and see the
Jukun-Chamba ethnic groups as migrants, the Jukun-Chamba
claim that it is they who were the original inhabitants of the
area. Following the death of the traditional chief of Takum
(Ukwe) in 1997, the Jukum-Chamba ethnic group insisted that it
was their turn to produce the next chief. The fierce resistance of
the Kuteb led to violent conflict in Takum.
The traditional chieftaincy of Sardauna LGA also witnessed
a dispute between the indigenous Mambilla ethnic group and the
resident Fulani that lasted for many years. This dispute was
successfully resolved by the state government, and a new Emir
has been installed.
0
Disputes over the siting of the boundary between Benue and
Taraba States have manifested in disregard for boundary
demarcations and instability in the political control of the towns
and villages on the disputed borders. The crisis over the
boundary between Takum and Ussa LGAs following the 1996
creation of local governments led to violent conflict and the
186
Security and Governance in North-East Nigeria
forceful displacement of some people who were left deprived and
disenfranchised in their place of birth.
The creation of Ussa LGA in 1996 was itself an attempt to
resolve the problem of ethnicity in Takum LGA. All the Kuteb
communities in Takum LGA were constituted into the newly
created Ussa LGA without any consideration for geographical
proximity, causing the emergence of orphaned communities. For
example, the four communities of Jenuwa Gida, Jenuwa Kogi,
Kwambai and Bika, which were less than five kilometres away
from Takum, were incorporated into the new Ussa LGA in a
way that made no sense. The problems caused by this 1996 LGA
creation caused a conflict that lasted for three years. Eventually,
those affected – who were left neither in Takum nor in Ussa
LGA – were able to persuade the state government to make a
fixed commitment to the area, which in March 2008, resulted in
the enactment of legislation creating the Yangtu Special
Development Area (YSDA). Commenting on this law, Governor
Danbaba Suntai declared:
“From the commencement of this order and notwithstanding the
provision of section 87 (1) and (2) of the Taraba State Local
Government Law 2000, the village areas/communities of Kwambai,
Bika, Jenuwa Kogi and Jenuwa Gida are hereby constituted and
created as a Development Area to be known and called YANGTU
Special Development Area (YSDA).” (cited in Oruonye and Abbas,
2011).
The state government therefore provided funds for the
establishment of an administrative structure and the furnishing
of a temporary secretariat, and the YSDA presently receives a
direct budgetary allocation from the state government. However,
the affected people have continued to express a desire to either
Governance and Insecurity Challenges in Taraba State
187
belong to an LGA or be constituted into a separate and
independent LGA. During the sixteen years that this problem
has persisted they have written to the National Assembly
protesting against their exclusion from local government
administration, pointing out that since the last LGA creation,
voters in three wards in the area can only vote in Presidential,
National Assembly and Governorship elections, but cannot vote
or be voted for in State House of Assembly or local government
elections.
" 2
-' !
The January 2002 dispute between local farming communities
and Fulani herdsmen over grazing lands in Tonga Maina village
on the Mambilla Plateau displaced hundreds of people.
According to the United Nations High Commission for
Refugees (UNHCR), an estimated 17,000 Nigerians – mostly
Fulanis – fled to the Republic of Cameroun in the wake of the
conflict (IPCR, 2006).
In 2014 Fulani herdsmen and Tiv/Jukun crop farmers
clashed in the southern part of the state, with the Fulani
herdsmen being accused of moving from village to village, killing
and burning the houses of those perceived to be Tiv or Jukun.
3
!
!
The high rate of youth unemployment in the state, particularly
in the southern part where violence has been on the increase in
the last decade, is a major driver of conflict in the state. The
dangers posed by unemployment are worsened by increasing
poverty in the state. Where the majority of the people are jobless
and hungry, yet the political options offer nothing new, those at
Security and Governance in North-East Nigeria
188
the grass roots express feelings of being at the same time under
threat, and abandoned. In this regard, the results of this study
agree with previous studies (ActionAid, 2008), that conflict is
caused by the systemic and structural injustice of the
institutional framework.
4
The inability of leaders to bring the different peoples in the state
together for dialogue also contributes to crises in some parts of
the state, particularly in the Wukari-Ibi area. Although the
Jukun believe that their traditional ruler, the Aku Uka is
supreme and that his pronouncement on any issue is final and
must be accepted by all irrespective of position or attainment in
life, the Aku Uka has not exploited this position to bring about
lasting peace. Views expressed by those interviewed for this
study indicated that his interventions had rather had the opposite
effect. For example, the crisis of 2nd September 2014 followed a
peace meeting at the Aku Uka’s palace. A participant in a FGD
said:
“Several times we hear of peace meetings and immediately after such
meetings, crisis will break out. The participants to such meetings and
their deliberations or outcomes are not made public. How would the
people know who and who represented them and whether the
representation was adequate and their interest presented in such
meetings?” (FGD, 2014b).
Another participant alleged that the present crisis at Wukari
started with the accession of the present Aku Uka, noting that
his predecessor, Aku Atoshi, had representatives of all the ethnic
groups in Wukari in his cabinet, but that the present Aku Uka
had not continued this practice.
Governance and Insecurity Challenges in Taraba State
189
1
The disposition of the people in terms of their culture, religion
and poverty contribute to insecurity. This is where particular
groups dominate the political arena of a community in terms of
the ‘have’ and ‘have not’. The masses are neglected, as the
politicians distance themselves from the people. People resort to
violence to get their voice heard by those in governance
whenever they perceive any unjust policies or government
decisions that do not favour them. This is worsened when such
government is not accessible to the masses and there is no
effective mechanism for seeking redress.
!
-
#
Economic disparity among different ethnic groups in Taraba
State also acts as a driver of conflict. The Fulani, who were
considered to be migrants on the Mambilla Plateau, are said to
have become wealthy and to have taken control of a large
expanse of land for grazing their livestock. The indigenous
Mambilla ethnic group on the other hand, who constitute 90 per
cent of the population, complain of having little land left to
cultivate. A similar situation exists in the Wukari area where the
migrant Hausa Muslims have become very enterprising and
successful in business.
However, although the real foundation for some of the
conflicts in the state may be economic disparity, the differences
highlighted by this disparity can assume the guise of religion or
ethnicity, and are often manipulated in this way.
Alubo (2011) observed that ethnic conflicts in Taraba State
are long standing and predate the birth of modern Nigeria (p.
95). This is particularly so with reference to the Tiv and Jukun
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Security and Governance in North-East Nigeria
ethnic groups. Historical accounts show that the major bones of
contention between the two groups are land related, and control
over economic resources and political power. This contention
over land led to violence between the two ethnic groups in 19901992, with widespread killings and whole villages destroyed on
each side. (Avav and Myegba, 1992).
The conflict between the Jukun-Chamba and the Kuteb in
the southern part of the state dates back to the 1990s, but it
flared up again in March 1997, when the Jukun-Chamba attacked
the Kuteb during the annual Kuchicheb festival celebrated by the
Kuteb people to offer thanks for the previous year’s harvest,
purification of the new farming session, and supplication for
peace and good neighbourliness. (Mbave, 2012). The fighting,
which started in Takum, soon spread to the neighbouring
villages, and featured the use of dangerous firearms.
Religion is also used in political campaigns as a divide-andrule tactic to breed distrust among the people, often being the
primary consideration in respect of the distribution of political
appointments, employment, facilities or infrastructure. As a
result, crises in Taraba State often assume a religious dimension.
Indeed, there is only a thin dividing line between ethnicity and
religion in many communities in northern Nigeria, as was amply
demonstrated in the recent Ibi-Wukari crisis. While some
Muslims groups claim that it is a religious crisis, Christians
dispute this, citing the fact that some Muslim Jukuns remain
untouched in Wukari because they respected and have regard for
the Jukun culture. The complicated nature of the Ibi-Wukari
crisis, with its indigenous Christian Jukun and traditionalists on
one side, against indigenous Muslim Jukuns and non-indigenous
Hausa/Fulani Muslims on the other illustrates many of the
Governance and Insecurity Challenges in Taraba State
191
challenges that Taraba State faces, and how government
responses can ameliorate or exacerbate insecurity.
Christian Jukuns accused the former Acting Governor of
working with unofficial sources of information such as top civil
servants (e.g. Alh. Sani Sule Saleh – a Permanent Secretary) and
politicians (e.g. Alhaji Danladi Shehu – Deputy Chairman of the
Peoples Democratic Party) instead of the formal structures of
governance such as traditional leaders, LGA Chairs or elected
representatives in the State House of Assembly. Christian Jukuns
objected to the permanent secretary and party chieftain being
put forward as representing a crisis-ridden LGA at the state
executive council meeting.
Another common cause of complaint in such conflicts
relates to discrimination in the provision of relief, and in this
case, it was alleged that the former Acting Governor only made
provision for the Muslim Jukun victims of the crisis: they were
moved to Jalingo for treatment and attention at the IDP camp,
while the Christian Jukun victims who had fled to Gboko and
Makurdi were left unattended to.
In such conflicts each side perceives itself as being on the
receiving end of uneven responses to security challenges, and the
Wukari crisis again, amply illustrated this sense of grievance and
victimhood. While Christian Jukuns alleged that once any
Muslim culprit was arrested, an order would come from
‘government house’ to hand such suspect over to the
Commissioner of Police after which the person would be
released. They complained that although there were two army
barracks in Taraba State at Takum and Baruwa, an army check
point at Bantaje that was later moved to Dorowa, was manned
by soldiers deployed from Yola, whose commander does not
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Security and Governance in North-East Nigeria
take instructions from Army commanders in Taraba State, but
from Yola. They alleged that these soldiers, who had been
deployed by the efforts of the former Acting Governor, were
there to protect only the Muslims, since these soldiers only
patrol one ward out of the ten wards in the LGA. The Christian
Jukun alleged that the Wukari crisis had persisted for so long
because it was government sponsored.
On the other hand, some of the Muslim Jukuns interviewed
for this study alleged that the crisis was a calculated attempt by
the Christian Jukuns to convert Wukari town into a Middle Belt
Christian headquarters, as indicated by many banners and
signposts carrying the inscription “Wukari, the new Jerusalem
annex”. Muslim Jukuns claimed that Christian Jukuns have
vowed to rid Wukari town of Muslims and the Islamic religion,
and accused the Aku Uka of Wukari of fuelling the crisis by
openly taking sides and supporting the Christian Jukuns whom
they accused of instigating the violence against the Muslim
Jukuns and Hausas in the area.
"
Good governance entails respect for the Constitution and the
rule of law by all, including the President, Governors, Ministers
and other high public officials and political representatives.
Where political or public office holders and military leaders
violate the Constitution or engage in acts that disregard the rule
of law when dealing with citizens or their opponents, they
inevitably contribute to outbreaks of violence. Thus,
government officials and senior security officials can contribute
to insecurity by the way and manner in which they conduct
themselves. The findings of this study agree with the views of
Governance and Insecurity Challenges in Taraba State
193
previous scholars, that the insecurity challenges in Taraba State
are strongly related to state weakness and governance failings.
The people’s lack of confidence in their leaders has created an
atmosphere of tension and distrust, and left the state unable to
contain the insecurity challenges.
These failings are demonstrated by the inability of the state
government to make public the outcome or implement the
recommendations of various judicial commissions of inquiry or
panels of investigation into various crises in the state, for
example, the 2013 Ibi-Wukari crisis. This type of specific failure
on the part of government is an indicator of general governance
failure and state weakness when it comes to protecting the lives
and property of citizens in the state. Despite consistent
recommendations from several commissions, committees, panels
of enquiry and so on, few have ever been implemented. Alubo
(2011) observed that the ten point recommendation of the
Commission of Inquiry into the Tiv–Jukun crisis of 1990/93 was
not implemented, and that this failure triggered the 2001/2002
conflict between the two ethnic groups. Conflicts re-occurred
because a lasting solutions were either not found, or where
recommendations (of committees or panels of inquiry), are not
implemented, particularly if the victims of such conflict are left
with the impression that government’s failure to act is because it
is supporting the other party. Where this perception takes hold,
they resort to self-defence.
Most of the respondents were of the opinion that
governance in the state under the former Acting Governor
contributed to security challenges (Iroka, 2014). Some considered
that he was partial and not fair to all parties involved in recent
crises in the state. Respondents observed that even when
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Security and Governance in North-East Nigeria
government officials received warnings about impending
breaches of the peace, they would not respond until the attacks
had been carried out. It was alleged that on one occasion, after
the former Acting Governor had compelled the people to sign a
peace pact without listening to the contending factions, conflict
broke out the very next day.
One of the key informants interviewed accused the
Government of not helping matters when it came to the Wukari
crisis. He said that after a meeting of stakeholders had
unanimously agreed that the way out was to constitute a panel of
investigation to investigate the matter, then make public the
outcome and implement its recommendations, the state
government had agreed and constituted a panel which had
finished its investigation and submitted its report, but that
nothing had been seen or heard of the report since then. The
report was never made public and no action has been taken. He
argued that had the recommendations of the panel been
implemented and those responsible prosecuted, the situation
would have improved. This failure or refusal to implement
recommendations was laid at the door of the former Acting
Governor who was accused of directing that the panel of
investigation’s recommendations should not be executed. Indeed,
some respondents interpreted every action of former Acting
Governor Umar as partisan. When he had called the
commanding officer of the Army Barrack Takum to deploy to
Wukari to contain the situation, and the commanding officer had
indicated that he could not do so without a directive or
permission from his superior at Abuja, Garba was alleged to have
called the commanding officer at Yola, who was a personal
friend of his. The Yola commanding officer had responded
Governance and Insecurity Challenges in Taraba State
195
immediately with a military helicopter and ten vans of armed
military personnel who arrived at Wukari before the soldiers
from Takum (less than 60km away) arrived.
One of those interviewed alleged that past Tiv-Jukun crises
were a major source of arms in the town:
“The crisis exposed us to the use of sophisticated weapons and guns.
At that time, the leaders mobilized money from the local council and
traditional sources to purchase the guns and weapons for the youths,
as the major concern was how to protect the territorial integrity of the
Jukun community. All hands were on deck without any discrimination
of sectionalism or religion. When the fighting finally ended, there was
no effort to either disarm the militant youths or withdraw the weapons
and arms at their disposal. This made many youths in the region to
take to robbery since they no longer enjoy the loot from the fighting.
Some of the youths that were very good at handling weapons were
even hired to go and assist their neighbouring communities in fighting
their enemy and even beyond the region. The increasing spate of the
violence has now made it necessary for everyone in the community to
look out for a means to purchase gun to protect his or herself. If I get
the opportunity, I will do everything I can to have my own gun
because if I had my gun, those youths wouldn’t have burnt down my
house or else I would have killed as many of them as I could.”
(Interview, 2014a).
This was corroborated by Alubo (2011) who found that in
the Tiv-Jukun conflicts, the Tiv accused Group Captain Ibrahim
Kefas, a retired Air Force Officer and former Military
Administrator of Cross River State, of arming and training the
Jukun militia, with Retired General Theophilus Y. Danjuma also
accused of providing military personnel and materials to his
Jukun ethnic group. General Danjuma was also accused of
enlisting soldiers to fight for the Jukun during the time he was
Minister of Defence under the Obasanjo presidency. The retired
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Security and Governance in North-East Nigeria
General has remained a central and controversial figure in the
long running Tiv-Jukun conflict (Alubo, 2011). A role that he
reprised in the conflict between the Chamba-Jukun and the
Kuteb and the chieftaincy dispute in Takum LGA, in which the
Kuteb accused him of preventing the installation of the
traditional chief in Takum in order to favour his Chamba-Jukun
kinsmen, as well as complicity in the boundary dispute between
Takum and Ussa LGAs. According to a key informant
interview:
“Governor Danbaba Suntai may have succeeded in settling the
chieftaincy tussle at Sardauna LGA but he couldn’t have done it at
Takum because first he is a Chamba by tribe, one of the contending
ethnic group to the chieftaincy and secondly because of fear of some
powerful individual. Retired General T.Y. Danjuma is a Chamba who
has strong influence in the corridors of power at the federal level. It is
a known fact that in Nigeria, there are individuals that are more
powerful than institutions. This is the power play in the whole
scenario.” (Interview, 2014b).
As it is, the high expectations of citizens at the dawn of the
present democratic dispensation appear to have been dashed.
Some respondents even claimed to prefer military rule to civilian
administrations because according to them, under civilian
administration the masses suffer both from communal conflict
and from attacks by insurgent groups in the area. Another
respondent alleged that during Governor Nyameh’s regime, the
silent assassination of political opponents and critics of
government had occurred, but that under Governor Danbaba
Suntai, people felt free to speak their minds without reprisal.
Most respondents said that during Governor Danbaba’s first
term, there were very few communal conflicts if any, while
Governance and Insecurity Challenges in Taraba State
197
robbery and other violent crimes also reduced. During his
second term however, particularly following his plane crash, the
security situation in the state degenerated under the Acting
Governor. The competition between the Danbaba faction and
Acting Governor Garba’s adherents to control the institutions of
Taraba State meant that the state itself was often an issue in
conflict situations. The resulting weakness meant that Taraba
State was ill-prepared to meet the challenge posed by the fresh
threat of the insurgency due to the fact that conflict often thrives
in failed, weak or poor states (ActionAid, 2008).
"
!
When Boko Haram insurgents began to attack major towns in
north eastern Nigeria, Governor Danbaba Suntai banned the use
of motorcycles (popularly known as okada) in Jalingo. For his
part, Acting Governor Garba directed all LGA chairmen to be
security conscious and ensure that there is no breakdown of law
and order in their respective areas. LGA Chairmen were also
directed to ensure that the traditional rulers were carried along in
the fight against insecurity. Garba stated that meetings were
being held with stakeholders at all levels and that special
committees for this purpose had been inaugurated in all the
LGAs (Owuamanamand, 2014). To tackle the new security
challenge, the state government donated 180 motorcycles to
vigilante groups for patrols. 35 Toyota Hilux vans were also
donated to the State Police Command to help maintain peace
throughout the state (Yushau, 2014). These donations were
intended to boost the morale of the vigilante groups and
complement the efforts of the security agencies. The state
government also deployed senior civil servants to their respective
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Security and Governance in North-East Nigeria
areas to assist in the promotion of peace in their local
communities, while security personnel were deployed to the
crises areas and provided with patrol vehicles.
Even before the Boko Haram insurgency, six camps had
been established by the state government for IDPs at Jalingo,
Bali, Mutum-Biyu, Wukari, Ibi and Donga to cater for, among
others, the over 30,000 people displaced by the Ibi-Wukari crisis
(Taraba State Emergency Management Agency). As noted above,
the state government had set up a Commission of Inquiry into
the immediate and remote causes of the Ibi-Wukari crisis.
Respondents to this study described this Commission as one of
the most popular and widely publicized of all the investigations
into conflicts in Taraba State in recent times. While inaugurating
the commission, Acting Governor Garba promised that:
“…perpetrators of the recent crisis in Wukari and Ibi Local
Government Areas will be prosecuted to serve as deterrent to others.”
(NBF, 2013).
The Commission has finished its investigation and
submitted its report. While receiving the report, Garba said:
“Government will take a hard look at the details of the report and act
accordingly in a manner that is just and fair. Those that have a case
to answer will be made to face the music, while those whose hands
are clean will have nothing to fear. We cannot continue to condone
the culture of impunity which has recently been responsible for loss of
precious lives and wilful destruction of property.” (Itodo, 2013)
This was the last statement on the report, which has not
been disseminated and cannot be accessed by members of the
public. Many respondents complained that the Acting Governor
Governance and Insecurity Challenges in Taraba State
199
Garba was not proactive, compared to Governor Danbaba
Suntai who was seen as proactive and fair and just too all groups,
irrespective of religious or ethnic identity.
The response of the Federal Government to the conflicts in
the state has not been very decisive, although it has occasionally
sent armed troops and Mobile Policemen to conflict spots, and at
other times, has sent relief materials to victims of the crisis
through the Taraba State Emergency Management Agency.
Asked about what civil society could do as regards peace
building in Taraba State, one respondent asked what role they
were expected to play, noting that as long as government failed
to punish the culprits, it would not be safe for civil society to get
involved in peace-building. Another discussant commented as
follows:
“As NGOs, we don’t have the mandate to arrest or prosecute but to
advise the government appropriately and voice out our feelings. If all
effort fails, then everyone may have to take the laws into his hands. If
there are no actions taken, then indirectly you are saying please
continue. With this situation, there is no way you can curtail the crisis.
The machineries of government are not responding adequately to the
challenges of insecurity in the state.” (FGD, 2014a).
When respondents to the questionnaires were asked to rate
the level of the state and local government response to these
security challenges, 30.6% of them believed that it is very poor,
20 per cent poor, 23.9% that it is neither poor nor good, while
13.9% rate the response as good and 6.1% as very good, with
4.4% saying that they do not know. Most respondents believed
that the police are ill-equipped to enforce law and order in the
state. Asked whether the people in the state are at ease with the
200
Security and Governance in North-East Nigeria
Police, 21.1% strongly disagree, 28.9% disagree and 20 per cent
neither disagree nor agree. Only 23.3% strongly agree and 6.7%
said that they do not know.
1
This study has examined governance and security challenges in
Taraba State, and the link between these and government’s
response to the security challenges. The findings of the study
show that there is a strong relationship between the quality of
governance and the intensity of security challenges in the state. It
shows that Taraba State’s security challenges are caused by poor
government policy, unjust policies and discrimination in
allocation and distribution of opportunities and resources.
Security challenges are also exacerbated by the weakness and
failure of state institutions in responding proactively to potential
security threats. The study has found that apart from those
dealing with reproductive health and HIV/AIDS advocacy, most
civil society organizations in the state are not well known to the
citizens. The majority of citizens do not participate in the
governance process, especially at the local government level, and
hardly engage the state in demanding service delivery and
accountability. Since the culture of self-help is not well
entrenched in the state, and the people are dependent on
government and international development agencies to provide
them with basic needs such as borehole, dispensaries and schools,
this failure to engage directly affects the quality of benefit they
derive from governance. At the same time, the dependence of the
people on government for basic goods and services makes the
struggle to control the various levels of government all the more
intense. The electoral process and appointments into key
Governance and Insecurity Challenges in Taraba State
201
government positions are influenced to a large extent by
ethnicity, religion and regionalism. Leaders and politicians in the
state exploit cultural and religious differences for their own
advantage and to the detriment of the state. Insecurity also has
adverse effects on the credibility and transparency of elections,
with people tending to vote for an inadequate candidate who
shares their religious or ethnic identity, rather than a credible
candidate who is from a rival group.
5
!!
Security challenges can be reduced in the state if the following
are entrenched in governance:
1. Empowerment of the civil society organizations in the state
to be advocates for the peaceful co-habitation of different
ethnic groups in the area. The membership of such CSOs
should reflect diverse identity groups.
2. Transparency in the electoral process.
3. Accountability of those in governance to the electorate
4. Equity and justice to all citizens irrespective of ethnicity,
religion or geographical background and
5. Credible leadership
5
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Wikipedia, free encyclopaedia. en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Boko-Haram
Yushau, Alhassan (2014). Insecurity: Taraba Government donates 35
Toyota Hilux vans to Police. Peoples Daily Online Newspaper.
Wednesday, 21st May, 2014. www.peoplesdaily.com/insecuritytaraba...
FGD, 2014a. Focus Group Discussion with members of the Nigerian
Union of Road Transport Workers on 2nd September, 2014 at
1:30pm at the Awoniyi Motor Park Jalingo.
FGD, 2014b. Focus Group Discussion with members of the Taraba
Youth of Visions, a Civil Society Organization in Wukari on
Saturday, 6th September, 2014 at Taraba State University Jalingo
premises (under the tree behind Dean of FASS office) between
10:15 – 12:20noon.
Interview, 2014a. Interview with Hon. Murtala I. Bawa, a two-term
councillor of Avyi ward, Wukari Metropolitan on 3rd September,
2014 at Taraba State University Exams Office Jalingo between
9:30 to 10:45am.
Governance and Insecurity Challenges in Taraba State
205
Interview, 2014b. Interview with Dr. Gambo Matudi, a lecturer at
MAUTECH Yola on 14th September, 2014 at 2:25pm at his
residence in Mayo Dasa along old airstrip, Jalingo.
Interview, 2014c. Interview with the Secretary of Sardauna Local
Government Area, Eng. Katung Abraham between 9:10am to
10:30am, held in his office, at the LGA Secretariat on 10th
September, 2014.
206
Security and Governance in North-East Nigeria
Chapter 7
- Yagana Bukar
Against a background of pervasive poverty, corruption and
widespread unemployment, nearly three decades of military rule
in Nigeria saw massive deterioration in government institutions
and weakened governance capacity at all levels. The transition to
civilian rule in 1999 was therefore accompanied by high
expectations of peace and social development. Democracy was
presented as the only framework within which development
expectations could be facilitated because it is based on consent
and popular participation. But the anticipated opportunities
seem to have given way to disillusion and disenchantment. This
has been attributed to crude politics, corruption, selfishness and
greed on the part of political leaders. According to Ibrahim
(2013), since the inception of democratic governance in 1999, the
federal government of Nigeria has done little or nothing to
improve human rights and the protection of its citizens’ lives and
property, despite these being among its cardinal responsibilities.
Democracy is viewed as having failed so far to deliver good
governance: instead, insecurity, poverty, unemployment and
other social problems have become basic features of Nigeria’s
208
Security and Governance in North-East Nigeria
identity. Idada and Uhunmwuangho (2012) opine that the
liberalisation of the political atmosphere brought about by civil
rule in 1999 was used to mobilize primordial sentiments and
identity politics, the attendant consequences of which –
insecurity and violence, ethno-religious crises with resulting loss
of lives and property – have become widespread and rampant.
Adekola (2010) attributes the lack of good governance,
corruption and widespread security problems mainly to the lack
of free, fair and credible elections; lack of freedom of speech and
publication; refusal to accept defeat by political gladiators;
corruption and the non-observance of the rule of law, all
consequences of the long period of military rule.
For many commentators, the absence of security constitutes
the single most significant threat, not only to democracy and
good governance, but to the corporate existence of the country
as a single entity (Adekola 2013; Idada and Uhumwuangho 2012).
Indeed, violence has assumed such serious dimensions such that
ethno-religious crises, militancy, religious riots, vandalism, arson,
and political assassinations have been basic features of Nigeria’s
democracy since the country returned to democratic rule on 29th
of May 1999.
The Nigerian situation encapsulated above is not different
from that of Yobe State, which can be considered microcosm of
Nigeria’s plurality in terms of religious and cultural diversity.
The insecurity in Yobe State was instigated by a sectarian group,
Jama’atuAhlis Sunnah Lidda’awatiwalJihad (JAS) otherwise
known as Boko Haram, which has engaged in terrorist activities
to kill, maim and destroy thousands of lives and properties in the
state and other parts of the north east region since 2009. The
group has killed innocent citizens and attacked security outfits.
Security and Governance in Yobe State
209
Its activities have had a huge impact on the socio-economic and
political development of the State. Indeed, the spate of bomb
blasts, kidnappings, vandalism and killings attained such
alarming proportions that Yobe State, together with Borno and
Adamawa States, has been under emergency rule since 2013.
While neighbouring Borno State is undoubtedly the
epicentre of the Boko Haram insurgency affecting the north east
region, it was in Kanamma, the headquarters of Yunusari LGA
in Yobe State located on the border with Niger Republic, that
the group launched one of its earliest uprisings, when it attacked
the LG secretariat and the police station in 2003. After this, the
group went underground, but resurfaced in 2009, apparently
believing that there was sufficient basis to declare an Islamic State
or Caliphate, and engaging in target killings as well as hit and run
attacks towards that goal. Since then, Yobe and Borno States
have recorded some of the worst violence in the history of
Nigeria. Although the frequency of insurgency attacks on
Damaturu and other major towns have significantly reduced in
recent months, the state capital is currently experiencing an
influx of internally displaced persons from surrounding LGAs
who wander the streets helplessly, and whose situation
compounds the security challenges. Meanwhile, the rural areas
are still faced with grave insecurity and in some places;
insurgents have completely taken over some LGAs, for example,
Gujba and Gulani LGAs.
JAS claims that its basic mission is to impose Sharia law or
create a Caliphate, but in attempting to understand this mission,
many are dismayed by its mode of operation, which features
wanton killing and the murder of innocent civilians, as these are
alien to the religion it seeks to propagate and are quite contrary
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Security and Governance in North-East Nigeria
to the teachings of Islam. It is therefore not surprising that many
citizens link the emergence of JAS to a failure of leadership to
provide good governance; a failure characterized by youth
unemployment, political thuggery, poverty, endemic corruption,
proliferation of small arms and religious extremism.
The situation in Yobe State is seen by many as a
demonstration of the inability of government to execute one of
its fundamental functions, namely to provide and guarantee
security of life, property and liberty. It is against this general
background that this study seeks to investigate the relationship
between security and the character of governance in Yobe State
by identifying the major drivers of insecurity since 1999. The
study also examines the issues and phenomena that bedevil
effective governance and the extent to which insecurity is linked
to governance.
The framework within which this study is conceptualized
relates to the structural violence paradigm as advocated by
Galtung (1969), which underscores the role of socio-cultural
systems, political structures and state institutions as direct drivers
of violent conflicts. Indeed it is widely recognized that the
absence of economic, social and political development are
instigating factors of terrorism (Briscoe and Ginkel 2013).
Individual and group grievances such as poverty, unemployment,
illiteracy, discrimination and economic marginalization can be
used as mobilizing instruments by sinister groups to find support
and recruits for terrorist violence. It must be noted though, that
while structural violence may explain the attraction to groups
like Boko Haram, it does not take account of other causal
factors, since not every member of Boko Haram is economically
disadvantaged and indeed not every illiterate or unemployed
Security and Governance in Yobe State
211
youth is a member of the group. The study therefore
acknowledges the complexities that exist in assessing the extent
to which the structural violence paradigm explains the
insurgency.
Yobe State was carved out of former Borno State on the 27th of
August 1991 by the regime of President Ibrahim Babangida. The
state is located between latitudes 10.50 and 13.10 north and
longitude 9.50 and 13.50 east, with a total land area of 47,153km2.
Yobe State is bordered to the east by Borno State, Gombe State
to the south, and Bauchi and Jigawa States to the west. In the
north, it shares Nieria’s international border of 323 km with
Niger Republic.
The 2006 National Census puts the population of Yobe State
at 2,432,321 with one of the lowest population density in Nigeria
of 49 persons per km. The current projected population stands at
about 3.5 million. The state is pluralistic in both ethnic and
religious composition, with a diverse historical and cultural
background. The Kanuri are the most dominant ethnic group
while the Fulani, Kare-Kare, Bade, Bolewa Ngizim and Hausa are
all found in large numbers. Hausa language has gained
widespread acceptability as a common medium of
communication among the people as is the case in most parts of
Northern Nigeria. The majority of the population are Muslims
while Christians are also found in significant numbers, especially
among minority tribes such as the Kare-Kare, Ngizim and
Ngamo. Tribal and ethnic identities appear to be suppressed by a
religious identity which plays a major role in the history and
politics of the area in such a pronounced manner such that it is
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Security and Governance in North-East Nigeria
very common for individuals to describe their identity first and
foremost as Muslims before mentioning their ethnic affiliations.
Located on the fringes of the fragile semi-arid region, Yobe
State is one of the poorest and most ecologically vulnerable states
in Nigeria faced with problems of drought, desertification and
general environmental degradation. Agriculture, which is the
major source of livelihood, is highly constrained by variable and
inadequate rainfall, high temperatures and lack of soil fertility as
well as several socio-economic factors. Small-scale subsistence
farming engages more than 80 per cent of the population who
grow crops such as millet, sorghum, and beans for local
consumption. Cash crops such as wheat, rice and vegetables are
cultivated along the Fadama areas of Nguru wetlands and along
the Kumadugu Yobe Basin.
Other sources of livelihood in the state include pastoralism,
fishing and local mining. It is one of the largest suppliers of cattle
and reputed to have the largest cattle market in West Africa at
Potiskum, the economic nerve centre of the state. The
Kumadugu Yobe River system, together with the Hadejia-Nguru
Wetlands, provides one of the richest fishing grounds in the
country.
Despite this, Yobe lacks a basic revenue base. As a result it
depends hugely on statutory transfers from the federal
government: indeed, such transfers account for over 80 per cent
of the state’s revenue. Based on Human Development Indicators
such as literacy, health and life expectancy, the state compares
unfavourably with other states of the Federation. The NBS
(2010) estimates that the measure of relative poverty (defined by
reference to the living standards of the majority in a given
society) is 73.3% in the north-east region, the highest in the
Security and Governance in Yobe State
213
country. It is estimated that 2.1 million of the 3.5 population in
Yobe State live below the poverty line: this means that 78 per
cent of the population survive on less than a dollar per day.
The 1999 transition to civilian rule witnessed the emergence
of Bukar Abba Ibrahim as the Governor from 1999-2007,
followed by Mamman Bello Ali who died in office in 2009. The
present administration is headed by Governor Ibrahim Geidam
who assumed office in January 2009.
Yobe State comprises of 17 Local Government Areas (LGAs) and
three senatorial districts. A combination of stratified and
purposive sampling procedure was utilized to select six LGAs for
this study. It was intended to select two LGAs in each Senatorial
district on the basis of urban and rural LGAs, but the LGAs
selected in Yobe South Senatorial district – namely Damaturu
and Potiskum – are both urban because these areas have recorded
some of worst cases of violence since the beginning of the
insurgency in 2009. It should also be noted that the study was
not conducted in LGAs controlled by insurgents for obvious
security reasons, nor was it conducted in areas where insurgency
is entirely absent. The selected LGAs are shown in Table 1.
A convenient sampling technique based on a respondent’s
willingness to participate was used as the selection criteria. The
participants included both male and female respondents drawn
from all cadres of society, namely civil servants, students, traders,
farmers, as well as the unemployed. A well-structured
questionnaire was used to elicit primary data from respondents
in the selected LGAs. Interviews were conducted with four key
informants in Damaturu and Potiskum, the two major towns in
214
Security and Governance in North-East Nigeria
the state. Two research assistants were used to facilitate the
process of data collection. Secondary data was collected from
government publications, textbooks, journals, and online
material. Descriptive statistical tools were utilized in the analysis.
SENATORIAL
DISTRICT
Yobe East
Yobe North
Yobe South
LGAs
Bursari; Geidam;
Gujba; Gulani;
Tarmuwa; Yunusari
Bade; Jakusko;
Machina; Karasuwa;
Nguru; Yusufari
Fika; Fune; Nangere;
Potiskum; Damaturu
SELECTED LGAs
Geidam; Bursari
Bade; Karasuwa
Damaturu;
Potiskum
The logistics of conducting a field research in a conflict zone can
be exceedingly challenging considering the risks associated with
travelling and the high level of mistrust in the society which
makes interactions and associations quite difficult. There were
difficulties in establishing rapport and creating conducive
environment without raising suspicion, and this usually took a
lot of time. Probing to obtain high quality information or asking
politically sensitive questions carried the inherent risk of being
misconstrued. The inability of the study to conduct Focus
Group Discussions (FGDS) meant that we were unable to hear
the full narrative behind the statistics which might have provided
deeper and richer insights on complex issues raised by the
Security and Governance in Yobe State
215
subject. However, Key Informant Interviews were used to
compliment and triangulate the information obtained from the
questionnaire.
There is a broad and continuing debate on the concept of
governance and what really constitutes good governance in the
worldwide discourse on politics and development. Gisselguist,
(2012) defines governance as the processes and systems by which
a government manages the resources of a society to address socioeconomic and political challenges in the polity. Good
governance is identified as a worthy goal and a means by which
economic growth and development can be achieved and has
assumed a firmly entrenched position as a primary factor for
development and an indicator of measuring the development of a
country. According to the UN (1998) good governance is
perhaps the single most important factor in eradicating poverty
and promoting development. It consists of a public service that is
efficient, a judicial system that is reliable and an administrative
system that is accountable to the public. The key components of
governance, which include the exercise of economic, political,
judicial and administrative authority to manage the affairs of the
state at all levels, are important indicators of the aggregate
wellbeing of democratic governance. It is a concept that is
applicable to all sections of society that provide the necessary
anchors for the act of governance.
It is within this context that this section examines the
character of governance in Yobe State by looking at the domestic
216
Security and Governance in North-East Nigeria
political situation in which power is exercised in managing and
distributing social and economic resources.
Most of the respondents (74 per cent) voted during the last
gubernatorial elections while the 26 per cent who did not vote
claimed that their reluctance to vote stemmed from a feeling that
their votes did not count. Indeed even among the respondents
who did vote, many perceived the elections as a charade and feel
quite disenfranchised. The general opinion was that the electoral
process is riddled with corruption and is characterized by votebuying, multiple voting and manipulation of results by officials
of the electoral commission and security agencies. In particular,
an interview with a youth leader in Potiskum revealed instances
where ballot boxes were snatched and taken to unknown
destinations, as well as instances of intimidation and harassment
which were attributed to political thugs. While it was generally
agreed that democracy thrives where people are free to stand for
election and to vote during elections, with individuals being
allowed to make their choice freely, respondents interviewed
alleged that not only the officials of the electoral agency, but also
law enforcement agents and even voters are all involved in the
business of election rigging. If a democratic system is judged
according to its adherence to the basic tenets of democracy, a
fraudulent electoral process characterized by electoral violence
and corruption is clearly a threat to the genuine expression of the
people’s will and the emergence of a credible and competent
leadership.
Security and Governance in Yobe State
217
The influence of powerful individuals (otherwise known as
godfathers) adds another dimension to the democratic process in
the state. The majority of respondents (65 per cent) asserted that
powerful individuals possess the means to unilaterally determine
who would get the party ticket to run for an election, as well as
who wins the election. The phenomenon of “godfatherism” is
not peculiar to Yobe State, it is considered as one of the biggest
dangers to democracy in Nigeria. Yet paradoxically, it only
survives with government support. It is a contractual
relationship between godfather and godchild, in which the
godfather continues to influence the affairs of governance once
the godchild is installed in office. According to Ayoade (2006),
godfatherism negates all tenets of democratic process by
obstructing candidate selection and even executive selection once
government is installed. Ultimately it reduces the legitimacy of
government and voids the electoral value of the citizenry as a
whole.
The study showed that elected officials are generally not easily
accessible because they do not make much attempt to penetrate
the social and economic fabric of their communities except
during electioneering campaigns. As shown in Table 2, Local
Government officials appear more easily accessible than the
Governor, and Cabinet and House of Assembly Members. Most
Members of the House are rarely seen in public and indeed, no
longer reside in the state but operate from Abuja because they
are the primary targets for kidnapping and assassination by
insurgents. LG officials are also rarely present in the
communities they serve, let alone accountable to the people they
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Security and Governance in North-East Nigeria
govern. With the insecurity affecting most LGAs, elected
officials are even less present in the communities while some
LGAs (Gujba, Gulani, and Fune) now run the affairs of their
domain from Damaturu, the state capital. As a result, there is
little or no information on budgetary allocations and community
development projects. Farmers complain of lack of fertilizer and
other agricultural incentives at the Government-subsidized rates.
It has been pointed out in the literature that government
agencies are more likely to be held accountable if they extract
revenues in form of taxes, bills and other forms of revenue
accruable to the state. Where such income from such sources
appears low, there is no incentive for LG officials to be
transparent or accountable, or even to function effectively. This
partly explains the clear disconnect and lack of communication
between the “grassroots” government and their constituencies.
Among the various components of good governance,
transparency is widely recognized as a core principle which
allows citizens to hold institutions and governments responsible
for their policies and performance and ultimately, to reduce
corruption. In this regard, transparency is closely related to
accountability. The lack of transparent and accountable political
institutions at various levels of governance in essence indicates
the failure of governance to meet its responsibilities.
Half of the respondents indicated that they participate in the
activities of civil society organizations engaged in activities such
as community development and mobilization, provision of
services and policy advocacy. The major organisations, such as
Network of Yobe Civil Society Organizations, Civil Society
Organizations Network for Peace and Civil Liberty
Security and Governance in Yobe State
219
Organizations, are active in the governance process at the state
level.
Not
accessible
at all (%)
L
G 12
Officials
House of 47
Assembly
Governor 15
and
Cabinet
Accessible
with
Difficulty
(%
45
Accessible
(%)
Easily
accessible
25
10
Don’t
know/
can’t
say
8
33
10
5
5
57
17
3
8
Source: Fieldwork 2014
The level of corruption is perceived to be very high as indicated
by 72 per cent of respondents. As is the case with the rest of the
Nigerian State, corruption seems to exist in every structure of
governance. Discussions with officials of the Network of Yobe
State Civil Society Organizations revealed that corruption is so
widespread and varied that it cannot be holistically attributed to
any single factor or institution. Corruption is not confined to
elected officials alone; it exists in every arm of government. In
fact LG officials are viewed as more corrupt than the state
officials. Transparency International’s report on corruption in
Nigeria, observed that:
“Every single responsible institution in Nigeria is corrupt and has failed
to appreciate fully the obligations upon it to do something about
corruption. Consequently, the effects of corruption on the state and
220
Security and Governance in North-East Nigeria
the society in general are so devastating to the point that the nation’s
political structures have significantly lost their capacity to perform
their constitutional functions” (This Day 2004:6).
In terms of performance, despite being relatively more accessible,
LG officials are judged “bad” by 45 per cent or respondents, a
worse figure than the 37 per cent who judged the House of
Assembly members bad, or the 15 per cent scored by the
governor/cabinet members. These much better scores for the
governor and cabinet are remarkable enough to elicit further
inquiry which revealed that this more favourable perception is
probably related to the high level of illiteracy and lack of
awareness about the responsibilities of different levels of
government. For example, the presence of the governor at sites
of violent disturbances or the presentation of relief to insurgency
victims are not seen as the governor discharging his duties, but as
humanitarian or compassionate gestures, as though the governor
were distributing relief from his personal wealth. Thus, 27 per
cent of respondents thought that the leadership of the Governor
and cabinet is effective while 47 per cent indicated the view that
their performance was average.
LG
officials
House of
Assembly
Governor
and
cabinet
Very bad
Bad
10
18
Very
good
5
Don’t
know
7
28
18
10
7
38
28
10
9
Good
35
Neither
good/bad
25
18
19
7
8
Source: Fieldwork 2014
Security and Governance in Yobe State
221
While the judiciary is recognized as an institution that plays a
mediating role among various stakeholders in society, 48 per cent
of the respondents do not consider it effective or impartial in
enforcing the rule of law. Most of the respondents do not regard
the judiciary as a platform from which to get justice and 40 per
cent “Strongly agree” that citizens have to bribe officials to
escape liability or sentencing. Thus the court system as an avenue
to fair hearing and timely verdicts is highly contested by the
respondents but surprisingly, they stopped short of rating the
judiciary as “corrupt”, as 47 per cent of the respondents could
“neither disagree/agree” that the judiciary is corrupt. This may
not be unrelated to the fact that despite its poorly rated
performance, compared to the other arms of government, the
judiciary is still a revered institution which is held in high
esteem.
The responsibility of the Nigeria Police Force is to foster
peace and security, and it ought to be the hope of the common
man, the downtrodden, and victims of abuse. However, people
generally describe the Police as monsters, tormentors and
enemies because of their negative behaviour and attitudes
towards both complainants and suspects. The study revealed that
57 per cent of respondents disagree that people are generally at
ease with the police. Citizens do not volunteer useful
information to the police and would rather conceal such
information in order not to become victims of unlawful arrest. A
majority of the respondents (68 per cent) reported that they had
been the victims of police extortions or brutality at some point
in time. Respondents complained about illegal road blocks where
all motorists have to pay before crossing; the jailing of innocent
222
Security and Governance in North-East Nigeria
individuals for crimes they did not commit; and that many are
languishing in prison because they do not have bail money. 54
per cent of those interviewed disagree that they receive fair
treatment if arrested. Consequently, in times of crises, the police
are usually the first target of aggrieved youths, armed robbers,
and terrorist organizations. Police stations are seen as the lion’s
den rather than places were justice can be sought. 55 per cent of
the respondents do not view the police as prepared and equipped
to enforce law and order with only 13 per cent believing that the
police are prepared to enforce law and order.
Security is considered a critical foundation and cornerstone for
sustainable development and economic growth. In Yobe State,
widespread poverty and poor governance have created an
environment where ethno-religious crises and extremism have
reached an intolerable scale that has impacted hugely on
economic and social activities in the state. Indeed, the level of
insecurity in the state is identified as the single most important
challenge to its economic development.
The major attacks that culminated in the imposition of a
State of Emergency in Yobe State in 2013 include the attack on
Damaturu in November 2011 which remains the single deadliest
attack the state has witnessed since the beginning of the crisis.
The operation, which started around 6pm and lasted till 6am the
next day, saw the destruction of the Police and JTF headquarters,
the Federal and State secretariats, and the looting of three
Security and Governance in Yobe State
223
commercial banks.1 The sect also bombed or razed all the
churches in the town to the ground. The second attack, during
which over 200 people lost their lives, took place in December
2013. At the time Boko Haram insurgents had taken over and
were in control of Buni Yadi, Buni Gari and Goniri villages – all
in Gujba LGA, while Katarko Bridge that links Buni Yadi to
Damaturu was destroyed. The insurgents also targeted and
destroyed vital economic nerve centres such as the cattle markets
in Potiskum and Ngelzarma.
Many respondents noted that Damaturu and other major
towns have been experiencing relative peace in recent times.
However, the relative peace was shattered by the November 3rd
2014 attack in Potiskum which targeted a religious procession of
the Shite sect marking the end of Islamic Calendar Year known
as the Ashura, and in which 30 individuals were killed and many
more wounded.
In assessing the response of the various arms of government
to the insurgency, the LG authorities are generally rated to have
performed poorly but some respondents were quick to add that
the LGs do not have the capacity to deal with the insurgency
considering the scale and intensity of attacks. The response of the
state government officials and the security agencies was seen as
“neither responsive nor irresponsive”: this suggests that if
adequately equipped, security agencies and government officials
have the capacity to respond to crime and security challenges.
A number of facilitating factors have been identified for the
upsurge of violence, chief among which are poverty, rising youth
1
The Guardian, Lagos, November 6, 2011
224
Security and Governance in North-East Nigeria
unemployment, the use of thugs for political violence and the
proliferation of small arms and light weapons. The major drivers
of conflict and their link to failure of governance, and
implications for security are examined in the following section.
!
Poverty has been conceptualized in several different ways by
scholars and development experts with divergent backgrounds
and perspectives. One approach to defining poverty may treat
inadequate access to government facilities or services,
environmental issues, ignorance and illiteracy, as relevant factors.
The UNDP’s (1994) definition of poverty cites the inability to
provide such physiological subsistence (food, shelter, clothing,
basic education, healthcare transportation and gainful
employment) to the extent of being unable to protect human
dignity. This study draws its analysis of poverty from this
definition. Compared with other states in the federation, Yobe
State is identified as one of the poorest according to different
national survey reports. Absolute poverty in the state is 73.8%
while the national average is 60.9% (NBS 2010). In terms of
literacy, it has one of the highest illiteracy rates in the country
with 85.3% females and 83.3% males without any form of
education (NDHS 2014). In the health sector, it is reported that
90 per cent of child deliveries take place at home, and less 30 per
cent of such births receive ante-natal care.
The nature and scale of poverty in the area also tend to
reflect the interaction of geography, ecology and politics. In
terms of size, Yobe State is the second largest state in Nigeria
with a major portion of its land area located in the semi-arid
environment characterized by low potential in terms of
Security and Governance in Yobe State
225
agricultural productivity (low rainfall, limited topsoil; scarce
water resources). In addition, the majority of the population are
in remote rural areas which tend to suffer from crises of social
and economic exclusion. These sparsely populated and isolated
settlements face the problem of lack of access to basic
infrastructures, transport routes and extreme economic isolation.
The nature and pattern of distribution of societal benefits, which
places certain areas at a perpetual disadvantage, is therefore a
major cause of poverty in the area.
With reference to population, the age structure in Yobe
State is similar to what obtains in other parts of the country,
with nearly three-quarters of the population below the age 30
(NPC, 2006). An increasingly youthful population with low
levels of education, unemployed and economically deprived is
easily drawn to violence and extremist activities. Violent
extremists seek to exploit the economically vulnerable in the
society. A study conducted by CLEEN Foundation (2014) on
youth radicalization in Yobe State identified poverty and
unemployment as the major drivers for youth extremism and
violence, while illiteracy was identified as the second factor
driving the insurgency. Respondents, particularly in Geidam
LGA, reported instances where Boko Haram members were
openly offering as much as 50,000 naira and automatic guns as
incentives to potential recruits.
Poverty is also seen as a result of unemployment and lack of
access to regular means of livelihood because individuals not
only lack access to basic amenities such as shelter, they also lack
adequate income to enhance their active participation in society
to such an extent that it limits the actualization of their
potential. Jobless youths are frustrated due to inequality and
226
Security and Governance in North-East Nigeria
economic deprivation that have rendered them unemployed. In
this perspective, poverty is the product of poor management of
human and material resources on the part of government
institutions. A study conducted by Adole et al., (2013) on the
impact of political violence on the socio-economic development
of Yobe State found that poverty and unemployment are the
outcome of poor management of human and material resources
or leadership failure, and are observed to be the main drivers of
political violence. The authors attribute political violence in
Yobe State to systemic leadership failure and bad governance.
A key informant in Potiskum explains:
“The Boko Haram crisis has its roots in years of bad governance that
have produced an army of unemployed, unemployable, disenchanted
and demoralized youths who are now willing tools for those seeking to
perpetrate violence.”
The inability of government to constructively engage the
teeming youth population has inadvertently created a steady
supply of potential recruits to extremist groups. A report by
NSPR (2011) on the mapping of conflicts in Borno and Yobe
States indicated that conflicts are driven by bad governance and
the resulting disconnect between government and the governed,
which breeds injustice. The NSRP study traced the insurgency in
the two states to the failure of governance and deteriorating
institutions against a backdrop of youth poverty, illiteracy,
unemployment and political violence.
Although the literature often points to an indirect and
complicated connection between poverty, education and
extremism, the large number of young people living on the
margins of society who are easily drawn to extremist activities
Security and Governance in Yobe State
227
points to a clear linkage between education, poverty and
extremism. Indeed, members of Boko Haram are mostly
“almajiris”, school dropouts, illiterate youths and political thugs.
Briscoe and Ginkel (2013) reveal that individual and group
grievances such as poverty, unemployment, illiteracy,
discrimination and economic marginalization can be used by
sinister groups to find support and recruits for terrorist violence.
"
Good governance requires that government functionaries and
institutions are accessible and promptly respond to the needs,
grievances and aspirations of all citizens. The study found that 50
per cent of respondents feel government functionaries are not
easily accessible, and that 53 per cent believe that such
functionaries are not responsive to the needs of the respondents.
To further examine the performance of government, the study
assessed the availability of basic facilities such as water,
electricity, education and sanitation. It was found that most (63
per cent) of the respondents indicated that they had access to
water, but it was also observed that in most of the rural LGAs,
water access did not meet the WHO/UNICEF (2005) minimum
standards of accessibility to water defined in terms of time spent,
distance covered, quantity of water used and indeed the quality
of water itself. Pipe-borne water connection is virtually nonexistent in Geidam and Bursari and Jakusko LGAs. Most of the
residents in Bade LGA depend on vendors who fetch water from
government provided boreholes. Several households in
Damaturu and Potiskum depend on personally drilled boreholes.
At the same time, 45 per cent of those interviewed do not have
access to proper sanitation. Housing problems appear to be the
228
Security and Governance in North-East Nigeria
most common and this is not surprising considering the socioeconomic status and the level of poverty in the state as a whole.
The lack of housing was a major problem facing 62 per cent of
those interviewed. Issues related to electricity largely have to do
with unstable power supply, which has made many people to
depend on generators. The unstable power supply has
constrained the performance of small scale businesses such as
mechanical works, business centres, and tailoring, among others.
The education sector appears to be one of the sectors
receiving significant attention from government. Several recently
renovated primary schools were observed in each of the LGAs
under study and indeed, 70 per cent of respondents indicated the
availability of primary schools in their area. However, the
insurgents specifically targeted and destroyed several primary
and secondary schools, leaving many pupils and teachers dead,
and leading to the temporary closure of schools. The state
recorded three major attacks on institutions of learning which
attracted wide attention and condemnation. The first was the
July 6th 2013 attack on Government Secondary School Mamudo
which left 31staff and students dead, while the second deadly
attack took place on the 30th of September 2013 at Yobe State
College of Agriculture Gujba in which over 50 staff and students
lost their lives. Thirdly, the attack on FGC BuniYadi in
February 2014 killed 43 students while the school was
completely razed to the ground. As recently as 10th November
2014, there was another major attack in Potiskum targeting the
Government Science Secondary School Potiskum in which 48
students were killed and over 100 wounded during a morning
assembly. These and many other deadly insurgency attacks have
affected the education sector in the state. To reverse the
Security and Governance in Yobe State
229
situation, the state government adopted a deliberate strategy of
fighting the insurgency with the arsenal of very same education,
the destruction of which is at the core of its warped ideology. So
far, the state government has renovated several schools in most
parts of the study area. In the last three years it has constructed
over 1,251 classrooms in different primary schools across the
state, distributed 111,808 books and assorted library materials
and 21,048 pieces of furniture, in addition to renovating and
fencing of schools. It also recruited over 2000 NCE teachers and
it is on record that Yobe State is the first state in Nigeria to
implement the N18, 000 minimum wage for primary school
teachers.
#
!
"
!
Source: Fieldwork 2014
Successive governments have made robust attempts to
alleviate poverty through initiatives such as NAPEP 2001; Yobe
Socio-Economic Reforms Agenda II (YOSERA II being the state
version of SEEDS.) The YOSERA II sets out clear and
comprehensive policy priorities which include the creation of
Security and Governance in North-East Nigeria
230
employment opportunities and support for infrastructural
growth along with several other objectives. In the last few
months, the state government has distributed machines and
other poverty alleviation materials worth 99 million naira to
small scale entrepreneurs, community based organizations
(CBOs) and retired civil servants (Daily Trust August 15, 2014).
#
!
#
"
!
Level of Satisfaction with Basic Services
40
35
30
25
20
15
10
5
0
Very Satisfied
Satisfied
Neither
Very
Dissatisfied
Dissatisfied
Can't say
Source: Fieldwork 2014.
Despite the tremendous effort on the part of government in
providing basic services as observed in the last section, it appears
that people are generally not satisfied with the services as shown
in Fig 2. This may not be unrelated to the lack of accountability
and transparency or lack of involvement of all stakeholders in
the process. In any given community, there are usually several
actors with differing viewpoints and interests and it is a feature
Security and Governance in Yobe State
231
of good governance to accommodate these varied interests, and
reach a broad consensus on how to achieve goals. This requires
that all categories of people particularly the vulnerable groups
have the opportunity of participating in the determination of
what will best improve their wellbeing. The absence of such
platforms generally leads to dissatisfaction and disenchantment.
$
This study assessed the character of governance and its linkages
to increasing insecurity in Yobe State. Based on the assessment of
the various dimensions of governance, it was observed that there
is a general dissatisfaction with the performance of elected
officials at all levels. This is largely attributed to lack of
transparency and accountability among government officials and
as a result, the level of corruption in the state is perceived to be
extremely high. There is a low level of education, high
unemployment, widespread poverty and an unequal distribution
of economic and social benefits. The insurgency was able to
exploit these political and socio-economic fault lines to recruit
the economically vulnerable to its cause. While socio-economic
depravation is clearly a powerful tool in the insurgency crisis, the
predominant narrative points to the failure of governance to
deliver on the so-called dividends of democracy. The present
administration is however making concerted efforts from several
fronts to remediate the insecurity particularly through economic
incentives.
Based on the findings, the study makes the following
recommendations:
232
•
•
•
•
•
Security and Governance in North-East Nigeria
Violent extremists exploit the economically vulnerable in
the state: it is therefore necessary to improve governance,
strengthen the rule of law and to stem the tide of
corruption. To achieve this, government must be more
transparent and must invest more resources in providing
the basic needs of citizens, as this will go a long way in
denying the insurgency its appeal and potential recruits.
The government should improve on the mechanisms of
accountability by making it more participatory and
inclusive to achieve a broad-based legitimacy. This will
increase the level of confidence in governance.
Despite the efforts of the state government to strengthen
the education sector, much more still needs to be done,
particularly in regard to the recruitment of pupils and
monitoring of dropouts.
Government needs to provide skills acquisition
programmes and employment opportunities and other
means of livelihoods to reduce the number of
unemployed youths who are frustrated due to economic
deprivation. This will reduce poverty and the attraction
to join violent extremist groups such as Boko Haram.
The government also needs to strengthen grassroots
organizations and stake holders at the LG level. Though
they cannot replace formal agencies, building on the
capacity of NGOs and CBOs in security and conflict
management may assist government to work more
inclusively and effectively. In this regard, the success of
the Civilian Joint Task Force (CJFT) in Borno State in
stemming the tide of the insurgency easily comes to
Security and Governance in Yobe State
233
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