Clinical research
The Kraepelinian tradition
Paul Hoff, MD, PhD
Introduction
I
n the 21st century, Emil Kraepelin’s views remain
a major point of reference, especially regarding nosology and research strategies in psychiatry. However, the
“neo-Kraepelinian” perspective has also been criticized
substantially in recent years, the nosological dichotomy
of schizophrenic and affective psychoses being a focus
of this criticism. A thorough knowledge and balanced
interpretation of Kraepelin’s work as it developed alongside the nine editions of his textbook (published between
1883 and 1927)1 is indispensable for a profound understanding of this important debate, and for its further development beyond the historical perspective.
Emil Kraepelin (1856–1926) was an influential figure in
the history of psychiatry as a clinical science. This paper, after briefly presenting his biography, discusses
the conceptual foundations of his concept of mental
illness and follows this line of thought through to late
20th-century “Neo-Kraepelinianism,” including recent
criticism, particularly of the nosological dichotomy of
endogenous psychoses. Throughout his professional
life, Kraepelin put emphasis on establishing psychiatry
as a clinical science with a strong empirical background.
He preferred pragmatic attitudes and arguments, thus
underestimating the philosophical presuppositions of
his work. As for nosology, his central hypothesis is the
existence and scientific accessibility of “natural disease
entities” (“natürliche Krankheitseinheiten”) in psychiatry. Notwithstanding contemporary criticism that he
commented upon, this concept stayed at the very center of Kraepelin’s thinking, and therefore profoundly
shaped his clinical nosology.
© 2015, AICH – Servier Research Group
A brief biography
Emil Kraepelin was born in Neustrelitz (Mecklenburg,
West Pomerania, Germany) on February 15, 1856. He
studied medicine in Leipzig and Wuerzburg from 1874 until 1878. He worked as a guest student at the psychiatric
hospital in Wuerzburg under the directorship of Franz von
Rinecker (1811–1883). He began his professional career in
1878 working with Bernhard von Gudden (1824–1886) at
Author affiliations: Professor of Psychiatry, University of Zurich, Switzerland
Dialogues Clin Neurosci. 2015;17:31-41.
Address for correspondence: Psychiatric University Hospital, Clinic for Psychiatry, Psychotherapy and Psychosomatics, Lenggstr. 31, CH 8032 Zurich,
Switzerland
(e-mail: paul.hoff@puk.zh.ch)
Keywords: Kraepelin; nosology; diagnosis; psychopathology; reification; natural
kind
Copyright © 2015 AICH – Servier Research Group. All rights reserved
31
www.dialogues-cns.org
Clinical research
the District Mental Hospital in Munich, where he stayed
until 1882. Kraepelin then moved to Leipzig to work with
Paul Flechsig (1847–1929) and Wilhelm Erb (1840–1921).
He was promoted to university lecturer there in 1883.
In Leipzig, his lifelong personal and scientific relationship with Wilhelm Wundt (1832–1920) began. Encouraged by Wundt, Kraepelin, aged 27, wrote his Compendium of Psychiatry in 1883, the precursor (formally
the first edition) of his influential textbook Psychiatry.
Kraepelin continuously stayed in contact with Wundt by
correspondence and paid him several visits until Wundt’s
death in 1920. Often in his publications Kraepelin acknowledged and emphasized the importance of this relationship for the development of his psychiatric thinking.
In 1884 Kraepelin married Ina Schwabe. The couple
was to have eight children, of whom died at very young
ages from birth complications or infectious diseases. After
a short period of employment in Leubus (in Silesia) and
Dresden, Kraepelin was appointed professor of psychiatry at the University of Dorpat (Baltic) in 1886. In 1891
he took over the chair of psychiatry at the University of
Heidelberg. From 1903 until 1922 Kraepelin was ordinary professor of psychiatry in Munich where, in 1904,
he opened the new building of the psychiatric hospital
of the Ludwig Maximilian University. The main part of
this complex is still in use nowadays. Despite the adverse
conditions caused by World War I, Kraepelin founded
the German Research Institute for Psychiatry (Deutsche
Forschungsanstalt für Psychiatrie) in Munich in 1917 to
encourage and improve psychiatric research.2 During his
long sojourn in Munich, Kraepelin’s colleagues at the university hospital and the research institute included Alois
Alzheimer (1864–1915), Franz Nissl (1860–1919), Korbinian Brodmann (1868–1918), Walter Spielmeyer (1879–
1935), August Paul von Wassermann (1866–1925), and
Felix Plaut (1877–1940). In 1924 the research institute was
integrated into the Kaiser Wilhelm Society and, in 1945,
became the Max Planck Institute of Psychiatry as part of
the Max Planck Society. Emil Kraepelin died in Munich
on October 7, 1926, aged 70. Kraepelin’s memoirs were
published in German (1983) and in English (1987).3
Three authors with substantial influence
on Kraepelin’s thinking:
Griesinger, Kahlbaum, Wundt
Wilhelm Griesinger (1817–1868) was a seminal figure
in 19th-century psychiatry since he called for thorough
32
clinical and pathophysiological research based on the
premise that mental illnesses are illnesses of the brain.
However, this often-quoted statement does not at all
prove Griesinger’s adherence to a plain materialistic
position. He held differentiated views on the problem
of somato- and psychogenesis, although favoring the
first in the case of what were later to be called “endogenous psychoses.” As Verwey4 has shown, Griesinger`s
position may be labelled as methodological materialism insofar he clearly voted for an empirical, especially
neurobiological, approach when it comes to research
on the etiology of (severe) mental illness.5,6 But he did
not support metaphysical materialism that categorically
denies the existence of anything but material—in our
field: neurobiological—phenomena. At the end of the
20th century, eliminative materialism became a prominent representative of such a radical position.7
Griesinger also was one of the founders of social
psychiatry by suggesting psychiatric outpatient services
in heavily populated urban areas.8 This aspect, however,
did not play a major role in Kraepelin’s reception of
Griesinger’s work.
Karl Ludwig Kahlbaum (1828–1899) continued the
traditions of French psychopathology as represented by
Jean-Pierre Falret (1794–1870) and Antoine Laurent
Jessé Bayle (1799–1858). He had developed a clinically orientated research method in the second half of
the 19th century in Germany, strongly focusing on the
course of illness. This approach, like Griesinger’s, was
believed by many authors to overcome the speculative
concepts of romantic medicine.9,10 Kahlbaum emphasized the conceptual and methodological differences
between neuroanatomy and psychopathology. With
“progressive paralysis of the insane” as a powerful example he exemplified the way from a mere syndrome
course unit (Syndrom-Verlaufs-Einheit) to an etiologically defined disease entity (Krankheitseinheit).11
Wilhelm Wundt (1832–1920), one of the founders
of experimental psychology, influenced Kraepelin in a
way that can hardly be overestimated. Wundt’s aim, on
the one hand, was to establish psychology as a natural
science with an experimental approach to collect data.
In this line of thought, he harshly criticized the speculative concepts of philosophy of nature in the sense of
Friedrich Wilhelm Schelling (1775–1854) and Friedrich
Schleiermacher (1768–1834). On the other hand, he—
like Griesinger—did not agree with materialism or association psychology, the latter having been introduced
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The Kraepelinian tradition - Hoff
to the German-speaking countries by Johann Friedrich
Herbart (1776–1841) some decades before. Especially
in his earlier writings, Wundt strongly favored a parallelistic point of view in the mind–body problem. The
young Kraepelin, who had worked at Wundt’s laboratory in Leipzig for some time, was impressed by these
Wundtian ideas, since they allowed experimental research to be successfully applied in psychology without
ignoring the epistemological differences between the
mental and the physical. Over time, Kraepelin modified
Wundt’s concepts by extracting what he regarded as
useful for empirical research in clinical psychiatry. That
is why Wundt’s psychology, viewed through the “filter”
of Kraepelin’s texts, may appear much more unified and
straightforward than it really was. Kraepelin simplified
and, in a way, “smoothed out” Wundt’s concept, but he
did not adulterate it.12 However, as Engstrom13 recently
pointed out, there are divergent positions as to the degree of practical relevance which Wundtian psychology
reached for the development of Kraepelin’s psychiatry.
Kraepelin and philosophy—an ambivalent
issue
In his student years, Kraepelin, according to his autobiography, took considerable interest in philosophical
topics.2 But this attitude changed. As a psychiatrist and
researcher, he became more and more skeptical as to
the relevance of philosophical perspectives on psychiatry. As Engstrom14,15 has shown, Kraepelin’s view of
what (natural) science was, and what impact it had or
should have on social and political developments, was
typical for the self-concepts of natural scientists at the
turn from the 19th to the 20th century. Notwithstanding his growing skepticism towards philosophy, Kraepelin did apply, albeit often implicitly, major theoretical
frameworks to his understanding of scientific psychiatry. The most important ones—realism, parallelism,
experimental approach, and naturalism—shall now be
discussed in some detail. Afterwards, Kraepelin’s application of degeneration theory to his concept of mental
illness will be outlined.
Realism
For Kraepelin, like for most of his contemporaries in
academic psychiatry, there was a “real world” existing
in full independence from persons perceiving it, de-
33
scribing it, or doing research on it. This world included
other people and their healthy or disturbed mental processes. Therefore, Kraepelin, at least implicitly, accepted
a “realistic” framework in the philosophical sense of
the term. He often emphasized that the psychiatric researcher has to describe objectively what “really” exists
and what “nature presents” to him or her. This is precisely the cornerstone of any realistic philosophy.
The consequences for psychiatric nosology are evident: Kraepelin strongly advocated the view that different mental disorders are categorically distinct objects,
“natural kinds” or, as he usually put it, “natural disease
entities” (“natürliche Krankheitseinheiten”). These he
firmly believed to exist independently of the researcher
or clinician. They both describe what they find; they
deal with “given things.” Their own activities in collecting data and formulating scientific hypotheses or
diagnostic criteria are underestimated or may even go
unnoticed. One consequence of this basic attitude was
Kraepelin’s emphasis on the descriptive approach in
psychopathology in general and in psychiatric diagnosis
in particular, which implied a largely skeptical position
towards heuristically oriented methods. These issues
will later be addressed again in the context of modern
operationalized psychiatric diagnoses on the one hand
and of the actual topic of “reification” of psychiatric diagnoses on the other hand.
Parallelism
Kraepelin advocated the concept of psychophysical
parallelism: for him, mental and physical (neurobiological) events are separate, but closely linked and act as
“parallel” phenomena. Like Wilhelm Griesinger, whom
he admired for his critical attitude towards speculative
psychiatric theories, he disapproved of reductionist materialism which once and for all identifies mental events
with neurobiological processes. Hence, he defended the
existence of mental phenomena against all kinds of what
he, like Karl Jaspers, called “brain mythologies.” Contrary to Wundt, however, Kraepelin, although a parallelist, did not enter the longstanding and highly ramified
philosophical debate on this issue. For example, he did
not differentiate between parallelism and interactionism,
nor did he comment on the problem that any strict parallelism makes it more than doubtful if mental phenomena
still may be regarded as an independent sphere: Should
they not be (at least partly) independent, but stand in a
Clinical research
one-to-one relationship with the somatic level, then the
step to (causal) determinism—which Kraepelin was not
willing to accept—is a small one.
For this reason, one might call Kraepelin’s position
in the mind-body debate ambivalent, if not blurry. Indeed, there is an implicit tendency towards monism in
Kraepelin’s writings, particularly when it comes to his
ideas about psychology as a natural science. But this
monistic tendency, quite similar to what one finds in
Griesinger’s writings, was not a metaphysical one, but
again a weak version of methodological monism. The
main argument here is Kraepelin’s continuous emphasis on quantitative empirical methods, thus strongly
moving psychiatric research in the direction of natural
sciences. Consequently, the scientifically controlled experiment became a central tool for him.
Experimental approach
From his early years, Kraepelin strongly supported
the development and implementation of psychological and psychophysiological experiments into psychiatric research. For him, this approach constituted the
via regia to any profound understanding of disturbed,
but also of healthy mental processes. Both Wundt and
Kraepelin realized the difference between a physical
and a psychological experiment, but in their views the
experimental design as such did not differ significantly
in both areas. Kraepelin went so far as to consider the
experimental approach a kind of guarantee for the scientific status of research in psychiatry. Consequently,
he rated it higher than the mere description of clinical
phenomena, although he also accepted and promoted
the latter method as indispensable tool, at least for the
time being. Clinical research, especially, on the longterm course of mental illness became—as mentioned
above—a methodological cornerstone of his nosology.
However, Kraepelin maintained a skeptical attitude towards subjective, especially biographically determined,
aspects of mental disorders, which could not or at least
not easily be studied experimentally. This general assumption also led to Kraepelin’s harsh, not to say polemical, criticism towards psychoanalysis.16
Naturalism
The question how far the explanatory power of physical, chemical and, especially, biological findings might
34
reach was a main topic for the scientific community at
the end of the 19th century. The answers of leading authors not only in biology and medicine, but also in philosophy often favored a strong version of naturalism. Emil
Kraepelin clearly was one of these authors. To give an
example: In his early writings—mainly in those on forensic topics—he stated that a priori ideas (in the sense of
Kantian philosophy), freedom of the will, and personal
autonomy based on individually accepted (or declined)
moral values do not exist. For him, man is nothing but a
part of nature, and, consequently, anything man can do is
a product of this natural existence. This position closely
resembles what is nowadays called evolutionary naturalism.17-19 Later in his life, he became somewhat more
cautious concerning these matters, but there is no reason
to believe that he substantially changed his mind. His
naturalistic, antimetaphysical point of view made Kraepelin feel sympathetic towards Darwinist and biologistic
theories. However, he did reject oversimplifications that
were highly popular at that time, such as those in the monistic theories of Ernst Haeckel (1834–1919), Jakob Moleschott (1822–1893), and Ludwig Büchner (1824–1899).
But also in this regard he did not engage himself in a detailed debate on philosophical issues.
Kraepelin’s attitude towards degeneration theory
There has been substantial criticism of Kraepelin`s
broad, albeit neither uncritical nor unlimited, acceptance of degeneration theory. His position was even
said to have carried “overtones of proto-fascism,”20,21
thus creating more or less direct links between the basically naturalistic attitude of most academic psychiatrists
in the end of the 19th century, the increasing influence
of degeneration theory during the same period of time,
and the rise of national socialism including its horrible
crimes against the mentally ill.
It should be noted that degeneration theory is far
from being only a psychiatric or even medical issue. It
had gained wide influence not only in the natural sciences, but also in philosophical and political circles in
the last decades of the 19th century. As for psychiatry,
major roots can be found in French psychopathology,
especially in the writings of Bénédict Augustin Morel
(1809–1873) and Valentin Magnan (1835–1916). The
central idea of this concept was that in “degenerative”
illness there is a steady decline in mental functioning
and social adaptation from one generation to the other.
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The Kraepelinian tradition - Hoff
There might, for example, be an intergenerational increase of the degree of mental and social dysfunction
from a nervous character to major depressive disorder,
then to overt (and often chronic) psychotic illness and,
finally, to severe cognitive impairment, ie, dementia.
Degeneration theory was a vague and speculative
concept, brought forward decades before the rediscovery
of Mendelian genetics and their application to medicine
in general and to psychiatry in particular. It did, indeed,
gain influence when combined with social Darwinism
and the movement of “racial hygiene.” The “Society of
Racial Hygiene” was founded in 1905 by the physician
Alfred Ploetz (1860–1940). One of the founding members was the Swiss psychiatrist Ernst Rüdin (1874–1952)
who had worked at Kraepelin’s clinic in Munich from
1907 on and—more than 25 years later—became a central figure in preparing and executing laws that were
enacted by the national socialist regime and cost many
mentally ill or handicapped people their lives.22-28
Decades earlier, at the end of the 19th century, Emil
Kraepelin and most of the contemporary authors of psychiatric textbooks broadly used arguments derived from
degeneration theory. Kraepelin made a special reference
to them with regard to manic-depressive illness, paranoia,
and personality disorders. However, like Eugen Bleuler
(1857–1939) in Zurich, Kraepelin`s attitude towards degeneration theory was not straightforwardly positive, but
also critical. For example, he commented approvingly on
the basic ideas of Cesare Lombroso`s (1835–1909) “criminal anthropology,” but did not accept the idea of overt
“stigmata degenerationis,” by which individual persons
could be identified as being “degenerated” simply by
their physical appearance.29
There is no doubt that Kraepelin in many respects
accepted degeneration theory and implemented it in
the debate on etiology and pathogenesis of mental disorders. However, it is not appropriate to draw a simple
and direct line from earlier versions of degeneration
theory to National Socialism. A differentiated view is
needed here, which will only be reached by thorough
and unbiased research.30
Kraepelin`s psychiatric nosology
The theoretical perspective
On the clinical level, Kraepelin changed the details of
his diagnostic system over and over again. On the basic
35
level, however, his nosology showed remarkable stability over time. Between the second and the ninth editions of his textbook (ie, from 1887 to 1927) Kraepelin
did not change his central postulate that was based on
his clear-cut, albeit mostly implicit, philosophical realism mentioned above. As for the essential features of
mental disorders, he stated that especially psychotic
disorders will eventually be classified in a “natural”
system. Consequently, he postulated that there would
be no fundamentally different nosological findings depending on the scientific method which is applied. Pathological anatomy, etiology, or clinical symptomatology
including long-term course of illness (the latter being
his own life-long focus of research): for Kraepelin, all
these approaches would necessarily converge in the
same “natural disease entities,” simply because they are
natural kinds. These natural kinds will, in the best case,
be detected by research; they are not seen as being constructed by research.
The scientific discussion that emerged after Kraepelin had published the principles of his nosology in
many respects resembles present-day debates: What is
the nature or, more modestly, the epistemological status
of mental illness? Are there natural kinds of mental illness? Specifically, what are the advantages and limitations of the bio-psycho-social model?
The differentiated debate on psychiatric nosology during Kraepelin’s professional life cannot be reflected upon
in much detail here. However, some hallmark positions
shall be mentioned. Erich Hoche (1865–1943) formulated
an especially harsh criticism: In his view it comes close
to a waste of time to concentrate psychiatric research
on—Kraepelinian or other—disease entities, since, given
the scientific means at hand, one could not even decide
whether they exist or not, not to say identify them. For the
time being, he suggested staying with describing, defining, and evaluating clinical syndromes.31 Karl Birnbaum
(1878–1950) differentiated between “pathogenetic” and
“pathoplastic” factors in mental illness, thus focusing
much more on the “inner structure” of psychoses than
Kraepelin had done.32 Robert Gaupp (1870–1953), on
the basis of the famous case of “Hauptlehrer Wagner,”33
debated the possibility of psychogenic delusions. In 1913,
Karl Jaspers published his seminal Allgemeine Psychopathologie (General Psychopathology).34 For decades, this
book set the standards for the definition and self-understanding of psychopathology as a science, and this explicitly included the area of nosology.
Clinical research
In three papers, written between 1918 and 1920,
Kraepelin addressed theoretical issues of psychiatric nosology and research. Here, he commented on
critical arguments against his point of view and partly
adapted his earlier, epistemologically strong position
of the existence and scientific accessibility of mental disorders as “natural disease entities.” The titles of
these programmatic papers were “Ziele und Wege der
psychiatrischen Forschung” (“Ends and means of psychiatric research”),35 “Die Erforschung psychischer
Krankheitsformen” (“Research in the manifestations
of mental illness”)36 and, probably the most important
one, “Die Erscheinungsformen des Irreseins” (“Clinical
manifestations of mental illness”).37 Kraepelin now acknowledged that it might be difficult to detect the link
between psychiatric disease entities on the one hand
and clinical symptomatology on the other hand. Symptoms were nosologically unspecific, as he knew, being
the highly experienced clinician who he was. Therefore,
in the 1920 paper, Kraepelin introduced what he called
“psychopathological registers” as a middle course between unspecific symptoms and specific diseases. This,
of course, comes close to Erich Hoche’s position, in
fact his main opponent when it comes to nosology. But,
and this is essential, it was only a compromise concerning the status of scientific knowledge at that time, not
a fundamental change of view. At no time, also not in
his publications from 1920 until 1926, when he died, did
Kraepelin abandon his core postulate of the existence
of distinct natural disease entities in psychiatry.38 As
will be discussed later in this paper, here was one of the
starting points for neo-Kraepelinian authors in the last
quarter of the 20th century.
The clinical perspective
Kraepelin’s clinical nosology is best separated into
three periods.12 The early period, 1880–1891, is characterized by the search for a reliable and valid psychiatric
system between clear-cut naturalistic beliefs and the
methodological framework of experimental psychology in the sense of Wundt. As for nosology, Kraepelin
slowly moved away from earlier 19th-century concepts which he criticized as unreliable and ill-defined
from a clinical and, especially, prognostic point of view.
In these years, he did not yet use the term “dementia
praecox.” A group of clinically heterogeneous paranoid
and hallucinatory psychoses tending to chronicity was
36
labeled Wahnsinn (insanity). It probably resembled the
cases now known as schizophrenic psychoses developing residual states. In addition, Kraepelin introduced
Verrücktheit (madness) into his nosological system as
a chronic psychosis with a better prognosis, which explicitly did not lead to residual states. The affective psychoses were split into three groups: melancholia, mania,
and periodical or “circular” psychosis.
In the middle period, 1891–1915, Kraepelin’s thinking reached the most systematic and influential level regarding its clinical and scientific implications: Kraepelin significantly broadened his clinical experience and
self-consciously created a complete nosological system.
He finalized his concept of ”natural disease entities”
as discussed above. The main clinical result of this period—first proposed in the sixth edition of 1899—was
the well-known dichotomy of endogenous psychoses:
that is, the separation of “dementia praecox” with, as he
saw it, a poor prognosis, from manic-depressive illness
(today called bipolar disorder) with a good, or at least
better, prognosis. With respect to “dementia praecox,”
he supposed an organic defect as the basis of the illness,
a kind of “auto-intoxication,” leading to the destruction of cortical neurons. The patient’s personality may
promote the development of the psychotic illness, but
it is not a central pathogenetic factor; contrary to most
other nosological areas, “degeneration” was believed
to be of low importance in “dementia praecox.” “Paraphrenia” was conceptualized as a psychosis with acute
and heterogeneous clinical symptomatology, including
the development of lasting deficits. Its separation from
typical cases of “dementia praecox” was justified by the
postulated absence of massive disturbances of volition
and by a much lesser degree of affective flattening.
In manic-depressive illness the etiology was said
to be even less clear than that of “dementia praecox.”
Kraepelin proposed a genetically determined irritability of affectivity, so that the psychosis itself emerged
from certain predisposing “basic states” (Grundzustände). Here, as opposed to “dementia praecox,” the concept of degeneration was an important element. In this
period, Kraepelin integrated different types of circular
or recurrent affective illness into the overarching concept of manic-depressive insanity (Manisch-depressives
Irresein, 6th edition, 1899).1
Kraepelin’s concept of paranoia was also modified
several times in this period. After the broad concept
of “Verrücktheit” in the early editions of his textbook,
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The Kraepelinian tradition - Hoff
which proved to be of restricted clinical use, he significantly narrowed it, especially in the 5th edition of 1896.1
Here, paranoia was defined as a severe and chronic delusional illness without constant alteration of personality and volition. The existence of abortive or benign
cases was denied up to the 7th edition of 1903/04.1 In
the 8th edition of 19151 this very rigid concept was
broadened again, but not to such a degree as in earlier
editions. Kraepelin now accepted cases with low severity and a comparably good prognosis, but he maintained
the strict separation of “dementia praecox” and paranoia.
In Kraepelin’s view—typical of his way of thinking
within the theoretical framework of degeneration theory—disorders of personality resulted from a circumscript retardation of psychological development. He
argued that, since some patients with personality disorders reach a “normal” or mature level of affective and
cognitive functioning and some don`t, it was not justified in this field to postulate clear-cut disease processes
as, for example, in “dementia praecox.”
In his later period, 1916–1926, Kraepelin had to deal
with criticisms of his nosology. Hoche’s syndromatic
theory has already been mentioned. Ernst Kretschmer
(1888–1964) suggested supplementing the Kraepelinian
system with a multidimensional approach.39 Kraepelin
moved towards an internal broadening of his system by
reformulating his disease concept as discussed above.
He accepted a more differentiated view of pathogenesis
and the role of individual psychological factors. However, his postulate of the existence of “natural disease
entities” in psychiatry remained unchanged. It had always been and it stayed the cornerstone of his nosology.
Kraepelin and 21st-century psychiatry
There are several reasons why Kraepelin’s psychiatry
became so influential, especially when it comes to nosological issues. Two of them shall be mentioned: first,
his approach gained credibility by being grounded in
clinical observations, and it proved to be applicable in
practical psychiatric work since the question of prognosis had always been a major issue in describing and
understanding mental illness. Second, it had been developed by a self-confident author who focused on
straightforward quantitative and naturalistic research
methods. He claimed to abandon speculative aspects of
psychiatry as far as possible. However, he, albeit unin-
37
tentionally, “imported” implicit theoretical and, in part,
speculative aspects into his concept.
In the years after World War II, Kraepelinian ideas
and neurobiological approaches in general largely lost
influence. They were even discredited and were discussed, if at all, mainly from the historical point of view.
Two decades later a major change of paradigm took
place. From the 1960s and 1970s on, “biological psychiatry,” the precursor of present-day neuroscience, gradually became the most influential field of psychiatric
research, and it “reinvented” Kraepelinian psychiatry.
Researchers and clinicians from the English-speaking
countries began to be called and to call themselves
“Neo-Kraepelinians.” 40-42 But “Neo-Kraepelinianism”
was (and is) nothing less than a clear-cut scientific theory. It is a heterogeneous set of concepts, all of them
striving to strengthen the methodological basis and
theoretical impact of neurobiological research in clinical psychiatry. Central to “Neo-Kraepelinianism” is the
intention to identify the biological basis of mental disorders, their “natural” basis, in Kraepelin’s words.
However, neurobiological and psychopathological
findings and also the recent debate on the epistemological status of mental illness created a much more complicated picture. Whereas the Kraepelinian approach of
orienting psychiatric research on “natural,” ie, neurobiological parameters is widely accepted as a powerful tool,
the concept of “natural entities” suggested by Kraepelin,
especially his dichotomy of major psychoses (“dementia
praecox” vs “manic-depressive insanity”) is facing an increasing number of critical arguments.43,44 Such a critique,
of course, is not new; on the contrary: from Wilhelm
Griesinger5 to Werner Janzarik45 and Karl Rennert,46 to
mention a few, many authors supported the concept of
“unitary psychosis” (“Einheitspsychose”). They postulated a continuum of all psychotic, if not all psychiatric
disorders, denying any clear boundary between single
diagnostic entities, whether they are believed to have a
neurobiological basis or not.47
More recently, towards the end of the 20th century,
the idea of “denosologization” of psychiatric research,
if not of psychiatry in general, attracted much interest, especially with regard to neurobiological data.48
The leading concept behind “denosologization” postulated that there might be quite different, especially
(neuro)-biologically defined boundaries separating
the various types of mental illness than those based on
psychopathological findings, ie, on clinical symptom-
Clinical research
atology and long-term course of illness. For example,
if serotonin proved to be a central pathogenetic, if not
etiological factor in various affective, anxiety, and obsessive-compulsive disorders, in the view of denosologization of psychiatric classifications (sometimes also
called “deconstruction,” although both terms by far are
not synonymous) the functional status of the brain’s
serotonergic system could become a major diagnostic
criterion, leaving less specific phenomena like psychopathological symptoms far behind.49- 51
However, neurobiological findings that do not support, or that even clearly contradict, Kraepelin’s nosological dichotomy are not necessarily evidence against
his basic ideas. One must not overlook the fact that
Kraepelin had acknowledged that all diagnostic criteria and categories are due to change according to the
actual state of the art in psychiatric research. Accepting
this postulate does also nowadays not imply that one
is fundamentally questioning Kraepelin’s core hypothesis, the existence and scientific accessibility of “natural
disease entities.” For example, future neuroscientific
research may well define boundaries between different types of mental disorders that are quite different
from the more or less Kraepelinian ones we use today. But—and this is the essential point—21st-century
“Neo-Kraepelinians” could still argue that there is no
reason to abandon the idea of “natural kinds” when it
comes to the conceptualization of mental disorders. In
other words, the terminology of the proposed “psychiatric natural kinds” may change significantly over time.
However, in a neo-Kraepelinian perspective, this does
not weaken the option that there are such natural kinds.
One pitfall has to be mentioned: Neo-Kraepelinian
authors are at risk, as was Emil Kraepelin, of overestimating the explanatory power of neurobiological findings and concepts. They could, for example, generally render biological data and criteria more reliable and valid
than psychopathological or social ones. In that case, the
result could be what Michels52 ironically labeled “HyperKraepelinianism.” Here, Kraepelin’s principles of psychiatric research and nosology tend to be applied rigidly,
not to say dogmatically, to clinical or scientific findings,
sometimes clearly surpassing the original author’s framework. For example, Gerald Klerman’s53 basic principles
of neo-Kraepelinianism might partly face such a critique.
Matter-of-factly, he declared:
There is a boundary between normality and mental illness. … There are distinguishable mental illnesses. Mental
38
illnesses are not myths. There is not one, there are many
mental illnesses. Like in other medical specialties, the task
of scientific psychiatry is to investigate causes, diagnosis
and treatment of mental illnesses.
Of course, some aspects of these postulates are fully
acceptable. However, Klerman’s theses do express a
general tendency to reify and naturalize mental illness
without systematically reflecting upon this issue, just as
it was the case in Emil Kraepelin’s writings.
As for the scientific credit given to descriptive psychopathology, there is a strong link between “Neo-Kraepelinianism” and operationalized diagnostic manuals,
at present the International Classification of Diseases,
10th edition (ICD-10)54 and Diagnostic and Statistical
Manual of Mental Disorders, 5th edition (DSM-5).55-58
For both, it is of crucial importance to reliably describe
and delineate different mental disorders from each
other (and, what usually is tacitly included, from the
area of mental health). The question of whether there
are “natural kinds” in psychiatric nosology or not, is
of minor relevance in this context. The main intention
is to improve the reliability of psychiatric diagnoses
by establishing and continuously developing clear diagnostic criteria and algorithms. Describing what is
observable on the behavioral level becomes the most
important method, whereas heuristic approaches are
rated as problematic, if not unscientific, the programmatic headline being “description, not interpretation.”
Such a position is very close to Emil Kraepelin’s view
of the diagnostic process in psychiatry.
Finally, this leads to an especially important issue in
psychiatric nosology, if not in the whole field of psychiatry, the topic of “reification” of mental illness. With his
fundamental postulate of the existence and scientific recognizability of “natural kinds” in psychiatric nosology—
“natural disease entities” in his words—Kraepelin was
one of the most influential exponents of “reification.”
Derived from the Latin term “res” for “thing” or “object,”
the epistemological term reification covers any scientific
concept that acknowledges the existence of “real things,”
of “reality” in general, that do exist independently from
any researcher or philosopher and his or her conceptual
frameworks. For example, a strong version of reification
could declare schizophrenia a clear-cut neurobiological
disease entity, fully detectable by objective measures. For
this position, the question of the nosological status of
schizophrenia—is it a disease, an illness, a disorder, a syndrome or something completely different?—is easy to
Dialogues in Clinical Neuroscience - Vol 17 . No. 1 . 2015
The Kraepelinian tradition - Hoff
answer. Other authors, however, express severe doubts
by formulating a contradictory view: “Schizophrenia is
not an illness,” as Read et al put it.50
To avoid misunderstandings, ICD-10 and DSM-5
have to be mentioned again at this point. Their authors
advise users not to regard diagnostic categories as once
and for ever definite, not as “natural kinds,” but as scientific conventions which need further verification—or
falsification. Consequently, operationalized diagnostic
manuals have to be monitored and adapted continuously according to empirical evidence or conceptual
developments.59
Up to now, for reasons that have been elucidated in
this article, there are only traces of a dialogue between
(neo-)Kraepelinian approaches and psychopathological concepts with decisively heuristical elements. However, if one takes the bio-psycho-social model of mental
illness seriously, this should no longer be accepted as
the state of affairs in 21st-century psychiatry. As many
seminal theoreticians of psychiatry postulated decades
ago, eg, Karl Jaspers, Arthur Kronfeld, or Ludwig
Binswanger, to mention a few, quantitative and qualitative approaches in psychiatric research and practice are
not at all mutually exclusive.60,61 On the contrary, they
both depend on each other, given the general aim of
our field, to get as close as possible to the “object” of
psychiatry which, in fact, is the mentally ill person. In
recent years there has been a thoughtful debate about
neo-phenomenological concepts that, from different
perspectives, strengthen hermeneutical and subjective
elements in psychopathology and at the same time try to
establish links to the neurobiological, but not necessarily the neo-Kraepelinian field.62-68
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Clinical research
La tradición Kraepeliniana
La tradition kraepelinienne
Emil Kraepelin (1856-1926) fue una figura influyente en
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