Alternatives 34 (2009), 203-227
Broken Lines of II/Legality and the
Reproduction of State Sovereignty:
The Impact of Visa Policies on
Immigrants to Turkey from Bulgaria
Zeynep Kasli and Ayse Parla*
After the granting of citizenship to 300,000 immigrants from
Bulgaria in 1989, Turkey has enacted visa regime changes concerning more recent migrants from Bulgaria, who, according to
the most recent modification, are only allowed to stay for 90 days
within any six-month period. In this article, the authors demonstrate that the broken lines of legality/illegality produced by
these changing policies further entrench the sovereignty of the
state through the "inclusive exclusion" of immigrants who are
subject to the law but not subject in the law. T h e temporary legalization of Bulgarian immigrants to Turkey in return for voting in the Bulgarian elections reveals that the state extends its
transnational political power by drawing and redrawing the broken lines of legality/illegality. We demonstrate not only the ways
in which the migrant population from Bulgaria is managed but
also the strategies deployed by the migrants themselves in the
face of such sovereign acts. KEYWORDS: immigration, Turkey, Bulgaria, visa policy, sovereignty
It has b e e n widely claimed t h a t the acceleration a n d intensification of
globalization, especially in conjunction with the neoliberal e c o n o m i c
restructuring of the last few d e c a d e s , poses challenges to nation-states
n o t only t h r o u g h transnational c o r p o r a t i o n s a n d i n t e r n a t i o n a l political bodies b u t also t h r o u g h the transnational ties m i g r a n t s forge beyond national borders. 1 N o n e t h e l e s s , as B a u m a n argues, "there seems
to be an intimate kinship, m u t u a l c o n d i t i o n i n g a n d reciprocal reinforcement between t h e globalization of all aspects of t h e e c o n o m y
•Department of Anthropology, Sabanci University, Istanbul, Turkey. E-mail: ayseparla
@sabanciuniv.edu
203
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Broken Lines of II/Legality and the Reproduction of State Sovereignty
and the renewed emphasis on the territorial principle." 2 The elective
affinity between globalization and the territorial principle, or what
others have more generally described as the continuing relevance of
the nation-state, 3 increasingly renders state borders and visa policies
the sites of an asymmetric relationship between the sovereign state
and immigrants who develop formal and informal strategies to expand spaces for maneuver, the limits of which are nonetheless still demarcated by the sovereign state.
It has also been argued that the reproduction of state sovereignty
often utilizes the temporariness of the legal status of immigrants. 4 According to Calavita's primarily economic emphasis, the law systematically reproduces the irregularity of migrants in order to ensure a
vulnerable and dispensable workforce. The sorting of people into categories of otherness no longer occurs on the basis of cultural or ethnic markers, but rather on their positioning in the global economy. 5
In a similar vein, King underlines that "illegality seems to be constructed in an illogical (but perhaps cynical) way by host societies which
seem to be willing to exploit cheap migrant labor (and even be structurally dependent upon it) yet at the same time to deny the legal and
civic existence of migrants." 6 Balibar, too, points to the reproduction
of illegality despite the rhetoric of immigration control but places the
emphasis on how illegality and discourses about illegality become the
raison d'etre of the security apparatus. 7
Other scholars have stressed the systematic nature of this temporariness by utilizing Giorgio Agamben's notion of the state-of-exception to understand the conditions of refugees: Sovereign states make
the ultimate decision to include or exclude primarily by wielding the
power of separating the rights of the citizen from the rights of man. 8
For Agamben, the separation of rights of the citizen from the rights
of man is consolidated through the "irrevocable unification of the
principle of nativity and the principle of sovereignty" in the formation of the nation-state, resulting in the "inclusive exclusion" of bare
life from the political life, or, of zoe from bios. As birth immediately becomes nation, the immigrant's subjecthood, irrespective of other affiliations, becomes homo sacer (bare life), which is not the subject in
the law but subject to the law, suspended in a permanent state of exception. 9
In his incisive analysis of global visa regimes, Mark Salter underlines the need to supplement Agamben's notion of exception-to-therule with Foucault's confessionary complex in order to recover the
agency of the subject who enters a national territory. According to
Salter, the specific decision for entry into the bios is not comprised of
exhaustive regulations, as a stricter reading by Agamben would have
it. Rather, the border-crosser can also resist the institutional and indi-
•
Zeynep Kasli and Ayse Parla 205
vidual decision—as the arbitrary embodiment of authority in the persona of the particular border official—to be included/excluded
"through the confessionary representation of his/her bodily, economic, and social information, which in turn is reconfigured by the
receiving state in terms of health, wealth, and labor/leisure." 10 Thus
resistance is possible, but it is a resistance that is structured by the sovereign. It is the particular embodiment of this resistance which Salter,
inspired by Foucault, finds to be the key: "It is not simply that the international population is managed, but that we come to manage ourselves through the confessionary complex." 11
Inspired by Salter's juxtaposition of Agamben's emphasis on sovereign authority with Foucault's biopolitics, this article seeks to analyze the role of constantly changing visa policies in the production of
yet another case of temporariness, that of the post-1990s labor migrants from Bulgaria to Turkey. We draw on Agamben in showing how
these incessant changes repeatedly redefine the "threshold in life that
distinguishes and separates what is inside from what is outside," 12 and
we draw on Foucault's emphasis on power not (just) as the endless resort that the state has to the state of exception but rather power as it
operates in the routinized, everyday practices of migrants who come
to manage their irregularity.
Extending Salter's analysis, we also call attention to the fact that
the bordering process and the moment of decision are not limited
to the acts of border-crossing. Rather, the changing immigration
policies reach beyond the border to shape the everyday experiences
of the post-1990s Turkish immigrants from Bulgaria and their encounters with the state. Our research is thus firmly located in the
anthropological approach to sovereignty, which, in the words of Das
and Poole, "instead of privileging metaphysical forms of reasoning
. . . focuses on the workings of the everyday." 13 Based on eighteen
months of ethnographic fieldwork conducted in Istanbul between
January 2007 and July 2008, we unravel the impact of the incessant
changes in the visa policies on the post-1990s Bulgarian Turkish immigrants' everyday lives. We conjure the traffic metaphor of "broken lines" to depict the ways in which the state continues to exclude
the immigrants while ostensibly including them. Rather than the
continuous lines that forbid crossing to the other side and restrict
travel to the same lane, visa policies, as "instruments of exclusion,"
resemble the broken lines that allow one to cross over to the next
lane and return as long as the traffic is not disrupted. The state lays
down rules for immigrants by constituting the boundaries of legality/illegality not as continuous but broken lines. These rules not only
define the legal lanes but more importantly determine the conditions and strategies that make the legal lanes transpassable. In other
206 Broken Lines of II/Legality and the Reproduction of State Sovereignty
words, "inclusive exclusion" produces broken lines of regularity and
legality, lines that the immigrants are constantly made to cross as
subject to the law but not subject in the law.
The reproduction of state power through this inclusive exclusion
concerns both the economic and political power of the state. In terms
of economic power, the more flexible visa regimes render, as we will
show, the immigrant labor force increasingly vulnerable and thus reinforce their dispensability according to the needs of the labor market. 14
In that, the Turkish state's move toward more flexible visa regimes
partakes in the global trend of regularization programs elsewhere in
Europe and the United States as dictated by the needs of the labor
market. However, there is an additional, political component to these
visa policies in the Turkish context that renders our analysis more
specific, and that concerns the "ethnic" character of this particular
migratory movement. The Turkish state instrumentalizes immigrant
illegality for transnational political practices such as getting the immigrants to vote in the Bulgarian national elections in return for
granting temporary residence permits. Keeping the immigrants in a
permanent state of exception also consolidates the transnational political interests of the state through the instrumentalization of migrants' ethnic affiliation.
Immigration to Turkey Since the 1990s
While Turkey used to be considered as a country of emigration origination rather than one of immigration destination, this has gradually
been reversed as a consequence of the economic and political
changes in the region. 15 On the one hand transit migrants, especially
from Afghanistan, Iraq, Pakistan, and African countries, increasingly
arrive in Turkey illegally with the intention of migrating to a third
country. 16 On the other hand, large numbers of people from neighboring countries, such as Iran, Iraq, Moldova, Romania, Bulgaria, the
Russian Federation, Ukraine, and Georgia, have started to enter the
country through legal routes to work in the informal sector such as
the suitcase trade 17 and domestic work. 18 Based on residence permits
issued by the Directorate of General Security as the only direct evidence on foreigners in the Turkish labor market, and on the number
of legal entries from the neighboring countries as indirect evidence,
Içduygu states that the estimated number of illegal workers would
have been 150,000-200,000 for the year 2005. He also notes that
some senior officials claim the presence of around "one million illegal foreign workers" in Turkey.19 The occupational breakdown of this
population without official papers shows women to be informally em-
Zeynep Kasli and Ayse Parla 207
ployed primarily in domestic work and the entertainment sector and
men in construction and agriculture. 20 Meanwhile, the total figure
for transit migrants who either entered or exited Turkey illegally between 1995 and 2006 stands at only 616,527, 21 which might be taken
as an indication of the cyclical nature of il/legal immigration that results neither in full illegality nor full regularization, but rather in systematic irregularity. 22
The recent upsurge in labor migration is viewed as the result of
the demise of the Soviet Union and communism; transitions to neoliberal capitalism; and subsequent economic difficulties in these sending countries. 23 As for the pull factors, Içduygu identifies the following:
Turkey's geographical proximity, the relative ease of crossing the border, low travel costs, low cost of living, and the existence of prior migrant networks. 24 One crucial additional pull factor has been the
flexibilization of the Turkish visa policy. Since the end of the Cold
War, there has been a significant decrease in control and an increase
in commercial as well as private traffic in the region, with the Bulgarian-Turkish border constituting the main transit path to Turkey. 25
More specifically, through a series of bilateral agreements and the introduction of "sticker visas" for nationals of Iran, the former Soviet
Union, and the Balkan countries, Turkish visa policy underwent a gradual liberalization after 2001. 26 The quantitative consequences of this
liberalization are evident in the number of entries: In 2005 6.2 million people from the Balkans and the post-Soviet world entered
Turkey, while this figure for 1980 was less than 54,000. 27 For immigrants from Bulgaria, too, the lifting of the visa requirement led to a
near tripling of entries: from about 140,000 in 1996 and 380,000 in
2000, to 1.3 million out of six million entries in 2004 from former Soviet republics, and Balkan and Middle Eastern countries. 28
Harmonizing with the Schengen Visa Regime
Besides the acceleration of neoliberal restructuring in the region and
the concomitant liberalization of the Turkish visa regime, another significant factor that influences both the nature and the management
of the migrants from Bulgaria is the EU accession process. Throughout
the 1990s and up until 2001, the Bulgaria-to-Turkey migrants needed
tourist visas to enter Turkey, limiting the legal immigration of those
seeking work. Nonetheless, it was still possible to acquire citizenship
once a migrant succeeded in staying legally in Turkey for two years
and renewed their residence permit regularly during that time. However, our respondents' narratives reveal that it became increasingly
difficult in the latter 1990s to obtain a tourist visa to leave Bulgaria,
208 Broken Lines of II/Legality and the Reproduction of State Sovereignty
and that visas were usually granted to only one of the partners per
family. This was not an official rule but the accounts of our informants suggest that it was practiced routinely. Given the increasing difficulty of getting tourist visas, people began to seek illegal routes to
reach Turkey, either in search of jobs or to unite with a partner who
had already migrated. We have observed that one out of every three
respondents who migrated in the late 1990s either sought recourse to
smuggling networks themselves or were aware of such a practice
through the experience of a friend or a relative.
In 2001 the Turkish government decided to lift the visa requirement for Bulgarian nationals. In this case, the Turkish government's
decision regarding visa requirements had to take into account not only
the relations between the two neighboring countries but also TurkishEU and Bulgarian-EU relations, with the two countries positioned as
two distinct candidates. Bulgaria was initially included on the Schengen
negative list that came into effect in September 1995. This was due to
the EU concern about Bulgaria's lack of adequate security measures
and the potential risk of illegal immigration originating from and transiting through Bulgaria. In March 2001 the EU Council removed Bulgaria from the negative list as a result of Bulgaria's attempts to adjust to
the Schengen rules. Turkey, however, remained on the negative list. According to Joanna Apap et al., and contrary to the former strict visa policy to stop the economically motivated migration from Bulgaria, the EU
decision to lift visa requirements for Bulgarian citizens became a major
motive for the Turkish government's decision to lift the strict visa requirement for Bulgarian nationals in June 2001. 29
From 2001 to May 2007, therefore, migrants from Bulgaria were
allowed to stay in Turkey on visa waivers valid for three months. This
new procedure also paved the way for legalization of those who had
entered the country on a tourist visa in the late 1990s and had overstayed, as well as of those who had entered the country illegally
through smugglers. As a result of this change, those who migrated as
a family pursued the "residence permit for person accompanying a
child studying in Turkey" (in Turkish, refakatçi izni), which does not
grant the right to work. The majority of others who came as independent migrants became circular migrants on visa waivers.
In May 2007 another new visa agreement came into force as part
of the ongoing harmonization with the Schengen visa regime. The
former procedure that permitted Bulgarian Turks legal stay as tourists
on visa waivers valid for three months was replaced by permission to
stay for a maximum of 90 days of every six months. Reciprocally, Turkish passport holders are subject to the same rule, and those who are
transiting to the Schengen area with a proper visa are no longer required to get a Bulgarian visa.30 Ironically then, compared to the pre-
Zeynep Kasli and Ayse Parla 209
vious regulation, the new visa agreement has created a more flexible
visa regime for Turkish nationals and a stricter one for Bulgarian nationals, including the Bulgarian labor migrants in Turkey. Therefore,
from the point of view of Bulgarian nationals, harmonization with the
Schengen visa regime changed the more permeable border between
Bulgaria and Turkey to a stricter one while granting the right to free
movement within the whole Schengen area for a maximum of ninety
days of every six months. Thus, in legal terms, we can claim that the
new procedure seems to equalize the conditions for migration from
Bulgaria to EU countries and to Turkey. For the labor migrants from
Bulgaria to Turkey, however, it has meant the stark choice between
losing their jobs and lapsing once again into illegality.
The Turks of Bulgaria Migrate to the "Homeland"
So far we have acknowledged the significance of the acceleration of
the neoliberal restructuring in the region and the concomitant liberalization of the Turkish visa policy and the mixed role of the EU accession process for the increasing number of migrants from Bulgaria.
We now turn to another factor that is peculiar to the group under
study and which has had a profound impact on the changing type and
pattern of migration as well. This concerns the "ethnic" character of
this particular migration flow. As scholars have pointed out, the management of the Turkish immigrants from Bulgaria has also to do with
the particular history of the Turkish state's relationship to those
groups officially considered as ethnic kin. 31
Historically the immigration of those who were officially believed to be the most assimilable to the construct of Turkishness was
encouraged and welcomed by the founding fathers of the Turkish republic. 32 Their goal was to create a sense of homogenous national
identity out of an ethnically and culturally diverse country and the
incorporation of desirable migrants was one strategy toward the realization of this goal. As opposed to those who neither speak Turkish
nor "belong to Turkish culture," among the groups seen as the most
assimilable were past immigrants from the Caucasus and the Balkans, who are ethnically Albanian, Bosnian, Circassian, Pomak,
Roma, Tatar, and so on but who speak Turkish. 33 The legal ground
on which these groups were appropriated into the national body is
the Turkish Settlement Law of 1934. Moreover, notwithstanding the
dearth of regulations to put this law into action, the most recent version of the Settlement Law, accepted in 2006, still purports to privilege immigrants of "Turkish descent and culture" in terms of
acquiring legal papers. 34
210 Broken Lines of II/Legality and the Reproduction of State Sovereignty
The 1934 Settlement Law, which permitted and occasionally even
encouraged the migration of those of Turkish ethnicity, facilitated
several large migration waves on the part of the Turkish minority in
Bulgaria, often designated, not unproblematically, as the "return" of
ethnic kin back to their "homeland." 35 The first wave occurred in
1925, following the agreement signed by Bulgaria and Turkey allowing voluntary resettlement; the second in 1950-1951, following the
advent of communism and the collectivization of land in Bulgaria;
and the third in 1968, by virtue of the treaty to unite separated families.36 The last and most massive wave of immigration took place after
the infamous assimilation campaign launched under the leadership
of Todor Zhivkov and directed toward the Turkish and other minorities in Bulgaria. More than 300,000 people migrated to Turkey in
1989 fleeing state repression. However, nearly a third of these returned soon after the regime change in Bulgaria in 1990 as the Cold
War ended. Those who stayed in Turkey were granted Turkish citizenship. 37
After the massive migration wave of 1989, people from Bulgaria
were once again on the road to Turkey. But the Turkish authorities
have taken an entirely different stance toward the "economic" migration of the Turkish immigrants, which became more frequent by the
late 1990s. In contrast to the 1989 immigrants who received Turkish
citizenship, the post-1990s migrants, who are technically entitled to
the same privileges accorded by the status of "ethnic kin," are being
subjected to constantly changing visa regimes. Why is it that a group
of people who have historically occupied a privileged position as preferred migrants suddenly find themselves relegated to the status of
"mere economic migrants?"
As Erder and Kaska have stated, the economic, social, cultural,
and historical differences among the sending countries of the former
Soviet Union and the differences in their diplomatic relations with
Turkey have resulted in different visa policies at the state level as well
as in different attitudes toward the migrants at the societal level.38
Notwithstanding this argument, we further claim that the differences
do not solely derive from the specificities of a particular form of migration but rather from how the state positions itself vis-a-vis immigrants
over time. In other words, the status of the immigrants are subject to
change as long as the terms and conditions of migration are shaped
and determined by the sovereign states that dictate who/how/why
will be allowed to enter/ stay/leave a national territory. Therefore, we
argue that both the policies and the attitudes toward any group of
migrants are contextual and relational, and are constantly reshaped
according to the political and economic needs of the state. More specifically, despite being motivated with the same ultimate aim to sustain
Zeynep Kasli and Ayse Parla 211
and extend its realm of sovereignty, in comparison with its stance toward earlier migrants from Bulgaria, the Turkish state takes an altered
stance toward the post-1990s migrants by keeping them in a permanent state of exception, by first including them through a more flexible visa regime in 2001 and then excluding them through the
withdrawal in 2007 of their privileged right of entry vis-a-vis the other
former Soviet Union countries.
The immediate explanation for the above shift is that Turkey is
simply adjusting its home affairs to changes in international affairs in
accordance with the dictates of both the neoliberal policy of flexible
visa regimes and the Schengen acquis. We argue, however, that beyond this seemingly obvious explanation, there are other dynamics
that need to be uncovered. The formal visa regulations enacted by
law are occasionally circumvented by the Turkish state through circular letters issued by the Ministry of the Interior. For example, almost simultaneously with the formal changes in the Schengen
negative list in favor of Bulgaria and the general flexibilization of the
Turkish visa regime in the year 2001, Turkey also released an
"amnesty" for those migrants who had overstayed their visas but who
were willing to vote in the 2001 Bulgarian general elections. The
same strategy, which we explain in detail below, was reenacted in 2005
and 2007, thus signaling the systematization of granting free residence permits in return for voting in the Bulgarian elections. As opposed to the former policies of welcoming "ethnic Turks" from the
Balkans and thus maintaining the image of a "protective state" on the
domestic and international scene, the Turkish state seems to have developed new strategies toward making use of the transnational ties of
the Turkish minority in Bulgaria. 39
So far we have unraveled the economic, international, legal, and
political dynamics that paved the way for a new migration pattern
from Bulgaria to Turkey in the course of the 1990s. In the rest of the
article we seek to demonstrate how such structural factors are being
used by the Turkish state to reiterate its sovereignty and to extend it
beyond territorial borders, but with an eye to understanding how immigrants respond to such sovereign acts.
Portraits
The data provided here is based on eighteen months of ethnographic
fieldwork conducted from January 2007 to July 2008, although we also
incorporate developments as late as March 2009 gleaned from ongoing work in the field. Fieldwork was undertaken in several districts of
Istanbul, ones that are densely populated by Turkish immigrants from
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Broken Lines of II/Legality and the Reproduction of State Sovereignty
Bulgaria. The anthropological methods of participant observation,
and semistructured and open-ended interviews were deployed to collect the data. In order to provide the "thick description" integral to
the anthropological method, relationships with the migrants who are
the subjects of the study were established over multiple encounters,
which included visits to their homes, participation in their social activities, and accompanying them to the association where they seek
legal advice. Interviews and participant observation were also conducted at the most established migrant association in Istanbul with
the association's president and newspaper editor. Finally, a cross-border ethnographic trip to Bulgaria was undertaken in September
2007, following the most recent change in visa policy. The trip was undertaken by bus, the most common mode of transportation used by
the migrants themselves. The journey across the Bulgarian-Turkish
border made possible the observation of the various arbitrary procedures practiced at the border as well as migrants' responses to these
practices. Our micro-level ethnographic analysis, which engages lived
experiences across a variety of contexts ranging from the private
spaces of the home to the public spaces of travel to the institutional
spaces of the association, resonates with the call of Adrian Favell and
others for capturing the "human face of migration."
Nurcihan
A mother of two children and a chemist by profession, Nurcihan
Hanim has been working as a live-out domestic worker in Istanbul for
ten years now. She came to Turkey in 1998 as a tourist, one year after
her husband migrated. She flew to Antalya via Moscow, as she was told
entry with a tourist visa through this southern border, also a prominent vacation resort, would be easier. (They had previously made an
unsuccessful attempt to enter via Batum, the northeastern border,
the entire journey lasting fourteen days.) In Antalya, she was harassed
by one of the border officials, who said, "Well I can't let you go without a cup of tea. What folly to leave such a beautiful woman and her
children unattended." Nurcihan said she cannot forget the face of
that officer, and neither can she forget the officer who in the end
helped her enter. Thus, crossing the border as a tourist in 1998, Nurcihan then overstayed her visa.
When their younger child began attending school in Istanbul,
Nurcihan settled with her family in the decrepit migrant settlements
in an outer Istanbul suburb that hosts a low-income population interspersed with middle-class residents of the newly built gated communities
throughout the area. The migrant settlements had been commissioned
for the earlier wave of 1989 migrants, many of whom were able to move
Zeynep Kasli and Ayse Park
213
into better residences and left the migrant settlements vacant. Nurcihan and her husband were able to legalize their status in 2001, when
the Turkish state granted a three-month residence permit for free for
those Bulgarian immigrants who overstayed their visas. This amnesty
was given in return for voting in the Bulgarian general elections in
which Movement for Rights and Freedoms (MRF), the party that by
and large represents the Turkish minority in Bulgaria, is a major contender. 40 This permit was nonrenewable, lasting only three months.
Unable to renew their permit, Nurcihan and her husband turned to
the new flexible visa regime which came into effect also in 2001 and
which allowed them to stay in Turkey on visa waivers valid for three
months. Then, due to a change in the law which requires a valid residence permit for their children to attend Turkish schools, they were
obliged to switch to the special residence permit, called the refakatfi
izni, to which they are entitled as the companions of their children.
Although they annually renewed this refakatfi izni from 2004 to 2007,
they still were not qualified to apply for citizenship as the standard
residence permit would have allowed and were not allowed to apply
for a work permit, either. In October 2007, when a similar amnesty
was granted in return for voting in the elections in Bulgaria, this time
for six months, they switched back to the standard resident permit.
However, when at the end of six months, no one who took advantage
of the amnesty was able to renew their residence permits as expected,
Nurcihan and her husband switched back yet again to the refakatfi
permit. "All those ten years, all that effort we spent, must count for
something," Nurcihan said. "I, too, want to pay taxes; I want to be a
citizen . . . I don't want my children to take the Foreign Student Exam
to enter the university, even if that means they will have to work
harder like everyone else for the national university entrance exams."
Dismissing the option of going back to Bulgaria on the grounds that her
children have been educated in Turkey and no longer speak Bulgarian, Nurcihan pointed to the huge map of Turkey plastered on the
wall in their living room. "We did not put this map here for nothing,"
she said, "We live here now and my children are more familiar with
this country than anywhere else." Currently with a standing application for citizenship filed with the Ministry of Interior more than a
year ago, Nurcihan is adamant in her desire to obtain Turkish citizenship, and, if possible, to legally practice chemistry, her true profession, in Turkey.
Aysel
Aysel has been working in Istanbul as a live-in nanny since 2006. She
had initially come to Turkey with her husband and two children as
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Broken Lines of II/Legality and the Reproduction of State Sovereignty
part of the forced migration wave in 1989, but returned to Bulgaria
in less than a year, thereby foregoing the citizenship granted to the
1989 migrants who stayed. She decided to migrate to Turkey again in
order to save money for the wedding expenses of her daughter and
the university expenses of her son. Until the visa regime change in
May 2007, Aysel was subject to the flexible visa regime that has been
in effect since 2001 and which allowed Bulgarian passport holders to
enter the country legally with visa waivers valid for three months.
From 2006 to 2007, therefore, Aysel kept her status legal by exiting
and reentering the country every three months (although she lapsed
into illegality for working without a permit). Once the May 2007 law,
which allowed Bulgarian passport holders up to 90 days only within
any six-month period, went into effect, she made an arrangement with
another circular migrant from Bulgaria: They would both work for
her current employer, rotating every three months. But when the free
six-month residence permit was granted in return for voting in the
elections, accompanied by semiofficial rumors that the resident permits would be renewed, they terminated the rotation as it no longer
appeared to be needed. However, as Aysel, along with all the other
migrants in the same situation, was unable to renew the permit as
hoped, she became once again subjected to the May 2007 agreement
that allowed her only 90 days legal stay in Turkey within every six
months.
At this point Aysel decided to seek legal aid from the oldest and
most established Balkan migrant association in Istanbul, the Balkan
Turks Solidarity Association. The general secretary wrote up her petition to the Ministry of Interior for the renewal of the permit. When
the official reply, technically due in three months, did not arrive, she
was instructed by the association that she was now entitled to sue the
ministry for not processing her claim. However the price demanded
by the association for the service for Filing the court action, which
would eventually open the path of filing for citizenship, was beyond
affordable, exceeding five months of her wages. She therefore decided
to wait instead for another amnesty or visa regime change, or go back
to the rotation arrangement. In the meantime, she left for Bulgaria
to oversee her daughter's wedding. Although she would have logically
arranged this most recent trip in accordance with the 90-day regulation, she ended up exiting more than 30 days late, which brings an
exorbitant fine at the border. However, her employer bought her a
plane ticket: During a previous trip when she had also overstayed, she
had been able to exit without being subjected to the fines that her fellow migrants, who traveled by bus at the same time, had not been able
to avoid.
This time, however, the plane arrangement did not work and she
Zeynep Kasli and Ayse Parla 215
was both fined and not allowed to reenter for three months. After waiting out the three months, Aysel returned to work, and once again
lapsed into illegality after 90 days of stay. She has just filed an application for an amnesty that was announced very recently in March 2009,
giving Turkish migrants from Bulgaria less than one week to apply for
one-year-long free residence permits. Like Aysel, thousands of irregular migrants who waited in the long queues in front of the Foreigners
Department found out, however, that the amnesty only applied to an
already determined list of 900 migrants who had previously filed an
application. At the urging of another migrant association, she decided
to file a petition to apply for the amnesty anyway, with the hope that
the amnesty would be expanded to include all migrants who were currently subjected to the maximum 90 days of stay rule.
The Everyday Manifestations of Law
While each individual's story is unique, the previous portraits were selected because they are representative of what we have found to be
the two most common responses to the shifting visa regimes and acts
of sovereignty on the part of the immigrants who share the predicament of being labor migrants from Bulgaria to Turkey in the 1990s.
Nurcihan's insistence on claiming exclusive belonging to Turkey represents one dominant strategy, while Aysel's prioritization of transnational ties and mobility represents another. However, before analyzing
in detail these two different responses to state policies, we first underscore the commonalities in these narratives in terms of how the laws
are manifested in the everyday lives of immigrants.
Nurcihan and Aysel are two of the 700,000 Turkish immigrants
from Bulgaria currently residing in Turkey, according to the records
of the Balkan Turks Solidarity Association (BTSA), the biggest and
most established Balkan migrant association in Istanbul. Included in
this figure are those who hold dual citizenship (namely the 1989 political migrants from Bulgaria who were granted Turkish citizenship
but the majority of whom also kept their Bulgarian citizenship); those
with regular residence permits or with refakatçi izni like Nurcihan; circular migrants on visa waivers like Aysel; and illegal immigrants. Already this categorization, however, belies the complexity of how the
law and legal categories get manifested in and translated into everyday
experience and the systematic slippages that occur in that process.
Nurcihan, for example, has been on a residence permit for accompanying a child since 2004. Yet this does not qualify her either for citizenship or for a work permit. Her status is thus as the companion of
a child, yet she lapses into illegality as someone who works informally
216 Broken Lines of II/Legality and the Reproduction of State Sovereignty
as a domestic. Similarly, although Aysel is legal in terms of her exits
and entries as a circular migrant with a visa waiver valid for three
months, she, too, lapses into illegality as a migrant worker, because
she has to work without a permit. Both Aysel and Nurcihan occupy
that gray zone between legality and illegality as people who enter
(Aysel) and who reside in (Nurcihan) the country legally but who become illegal as workers in the informal economy. Finally, the broken
lines of il/legality are constantly crossed by Aysel, Nurcihan, and all
those migrants without Turkish citizenship each time yet a new visa
policy or amnesty comes into effect and gets enacted in arbitrary ways.
Let us consider, for example, the most recent visa agreement
signed in May 2007 between the Bulgarian and Turkish governments
and which stipulated that Bulgarian passport holders are allowed to
stay in Turkey legally for a maximum of 90 days in every six-month period. News of the latest regulation spread by word of mouth through
migrant networks and usually originated from those migrants who
had been warned by border officials or bus drivers that a new law was
to come into effect soon. Other migrants complained of not being
able to access any information even at the border. Like Aysel, immigrants, who until then had been engaging in circular migration with
three-month visa waivers, began to calculate the remaining days they
had for legal stay in Turkey for that six-month cycle. The panic stirred
by the new policy was further exacerbated by the fact that no one
seemed to be certain as to how exactly the dates would be calculated,
whether starting on the day the agreement came into force or starting on the date of their last entry. Nor was it obvious how the fines
were to be determined. While migrants complained about the lack of
response to their inquiries with the Foreigners Department, a query
the researchers placed at the information desk of the Istanbul national airport yielded only a partial answer: The fines would increase
incrementally in proportion to the length of overstay.
How the exact fines were calculated became apparent only after
migrants began to cross the border. One of our respondents had
heard from a customs officer that they knew through acquaintances
that a day's extra stay cost 158 YTL (approximately $131 at the time) .41
The journey undertaken by Kasli across the Turkish-Bulgarian border
in September 2007, however, during the heyday of the new regulation, showed that one day of overstay amounted to 275 YTL (approximately $228 at the time). 42 While such discrepancies in information
obtained by the migrants do not necessarily provide evidence of arbitrariness in actual practice, we nonetheless highlight such discrepancies precisely because such circulating, semiofficial rumors were the
only information available until the actual border crossings began. 43
Another example of ambiguity concerned the discrepancy in the
"day counts" calculated by the migrants and the counts procured by
Zeynep Kasli and Ayse Parla 217
the b o r d e r officials, reinforcing the m i g r a n t s ' p e r c e p t i o n s of arbitrariness. H a l i m e , a 38-year-old m i g r a n t w h o h a d b e e n w o r k i n g in Turkey
for two years explained how she tried to calculate h e r exit d a t e in
o r d e r to avoid the fine:
First we thought that those days that we spent back home [in Bulgaria] were subtracted in calculating the 90 days. But then I heard
from my sister that she was fined for what turned out to be a miscalculation. My sister had added on the days she had spent in Bulgaria during that time, since we thought that those days would not
count toward our allowed stay of 90 days. So I calculated the days I
stayed in Istanbul once again, this time without subtracting the days
I had spent in Bulgaria between July 28 and August 6, and I hit the
road on the 88th day. But when I reached the Edirnekapi exit [which
is only a 6-8 hour bus drive from Istanbul], the computer counted it
as my 91st day. I had to pay the 275 YTL for that one extra day.
Beyond all t h e confusion that resulted from lack of i n f o r m a t i o n
a n d clear guidelines, we g a t h e r e d evidence of actual d i s c r e p a n t fining practices at t h e b o r d e r as well: We were told by t h e migrants that
p r o c e d u r e s varied also a m o n g the two m a i n land exit points, Derekoy
a n d Kapikule, with officials at t h e latter b e i n g m o r e l e n i e n t a n d ad
hoc a b o u t enforcing the fines. F u r t h e r m o r e , at least for a while, an
entirely different p r o c e d u r e s e e m e d to apply at t h e a i r p o r t checkpoints: Aysel was n o t fined at all a l t h o u g h she overstayed for almost a
m o n t h , because h e r e m p l o y e r h a d d e c i d e d to see if it would m a k e a
difference to buy Aysel's airfare a n d have h e r exit that way. W h e n a
friend of Aysel's was t u r n e d back at t h e Kapikule b o r d e r trying to
e n t e r a l t h o u g h she h a d n o t yet waited o u t h e r 90 days, she b o u g h t a
plane ticket e n c o u r a g e d by Aysel's e x p e r i e n c e , a n d was still in disbelief that the officers at t h e passport control h a d merely g l a n c e d at h e r
passport a n d said "Welcome to Turkey." 4 4
Finally Yasemin, a m i g r a n t w h o c a m e to Turkey with h e r family in
1999 t h r o u g h smuggling networks b u t w h o currently h o l d s a refakatfi
izni, p o k e d fun at the n o n s t a n d a r d applications of the regulations,
which she e x p e r i e n c e d n o t at the b o r d e r b u t at t h e F o r e i g n e r s Dep a r t m e n t . "We were in the same q u e u e with this n e i g h b o r for a resid e n c e permit. He got fined a n d I did not. You know, I am a lady
[laughter]." T h e g e n d e r e d dynamic that h a d delayed e n t r y for Nurcihan resulted, in this instance, in e x e m p t i o n from fines for Yasemin.
But in both instances, t h e arbitrary authority of the state, as e m b o d ied in the b o r d e r official w h o may or may n o t allow, manifests itself as
an exercise in sovereignty that is simultaneously a manifestation of
h e g e m o n i c masculinity.
Meanwhile, n o t all migrants took to the r o a d w h e n the new regulation was passed. Instead, some d e c i d e d to risk lapsing into illegality
218
Broken Lines of II/Legality and the Reproduction of State Sovereignty
and to wait and see if an amnesty would be released before the elections in Bulgaria. After all, such amnesties had been passed in 2001
and 2005, in both incidents right before the Bulgarian elections.
Those who voted in the elections had been given resident permits regardless of their prior (il)legal status. The official assumption here
was that the migrants would cast their votes for the Movement of Rights
and Freedoms Party (MRF). The general secretary of the Balkan Turks
Solidarity Association (BTSA) proudly told us, for example, that they
had been the ones to convince the state authorities to give the immigrants three-month resident permits in return for voting in the Bulgarian general election in 2001. 45
Indeed, this time around, too, the amnesty was granted on October 10, 2007, just eighteen days before the general election in Bulgaria. Ironically, however, the amnesty ended up covering only those
who had overstayed after the maximum of ninety days and were thus
in violation of the latest regulation. Therefore, only those migrants
who lapsed into illegality were able to receive the six-month residence
permits, while the ones who abided by the new law were not able to
take advantage. Then, contrary to the rumors and a circular signed
by the MRF, the six-month residence permits were not renewed. 46 It
turned out, therefore, that the amnesty only allowed a temporary period of legalization for these migrants who, once again, went back to
Bulgaria to "wait out" their 90 days, or decided to overstay and are
hoping for another amnesty to be declared.
Such arbitrariness, which our respondents perceive as peculiar to
the Turkish state, is actually yet another manifestation of the "enabling" as well as the "corrupt" faces of neoliberal states more generally.47 The agency of the decisionmaker actually plays a double role
here. On the one hand, some space is allowed the migrant for maneuvering the rules of the sovereign. On the other hand, such maneuvers remained as atomized acts that still work to reproduce the
power of the sovereign over migrants whose right to collective action
is not guaranteed by the law and who are not subjects in the law but
only subject to it.
Migrant Acts
We have so far pointed out what all labor migrants from Bulgaria
share in common in terms of their subjection to the shifting visa policies and the often arbitrary ways in which the state puts these into
practice through its bureaucratic agents. Now we turn to the strategic
ways in which immigrants respond to these policies and their arbitrary
Zeynep Kasli and Ayse Parla 219
applications. By focusing on the strategies undertaken by the migrants,
we hope to locate possible resistances to the arbitrariness of sovereign
power as well as the limits of such resistance. Some immigrants, especially those who migrated as a family, like Nurcihan, are adamant in
their pursuit of citizenship because they are unequivocal in their intention to settle in Turkey. Other migrants, like Aysel, however, do
not necessarily view Turkey as their permanent place of settlement.
Rather, they wish to secure themselves as well as possible against the
arbitrariness of visa policies, and find that the periodic amnesties provide them some respite. These migrants, too, might pursue the citizenship path, but in instrumental fashion.
Currently, claiming "Turkishness" is the primary legal means of
obtaining a residence permit which, if it is renewed for two subsequent years, grants the right to apply citizenship to those of "Turkish
descent" in accordance with Article 5 of the Settlement Law. Yet filing
an application with the Ministry of Interior in Ankara for the status of
münferit göçmen, which is the term granted those immigrants of Turkish descent, is not a transparent process, least of all for the irregular
migrants whose knowledge of the law is scant and who are intimidated by signing official documents for the obvious reason of being
irregular. The BTSA is the one association which claims to be the pioneer of providing "true" legal help to the post-1990s irregular migrants, basing this claim primarily on the fact that the general secretary
of the association holds a J.D. and a master's degree in international
law. The general secretary compiles the applications on behalf of the
migrants in return for a fee of 100YTL (approximately $83), dubbed
a "donation." 48 The petition sent to the Ministry of the Interior states
that the applicant has a relative of the first or second degree who is a
Turkish citizen (a valid national identity card of the said relative
needs to be attached to the petition) and that the applicant must thus
be given a residence permit in accordance with Article 5 of the 1934
Settlement Law, as he or she is of 'Turkish descent and culture." Although in theory Article 5 ought to provide sufficient grounds for obtaining a residence permit eventually followed by citizenship, the
general secretary underlines that the decisions for the permit are a
matter of politics rather than law, thus resulting in various inconsistencies in practice. Still, he insists that compared to other ways to apply
for a regular residence permit toward the acquisition of citizenship—
such as through marriage or enrolling in school—the most likely one
to work in practice for the post-1990s Bulgarian Turkish immigrants
is to obtain the special status of münferit göçmen.49 Moreover, what makes
these applications still a rational option for the migrants, according
to the general secretary, is that even if the ministry does not grant the
220
Broken Lines of II/Legality and the Reproduction of State Sovereignty
permit, the migrants are still better off for having put in an application: A standing application entitles them to a legal stay for an extra
six months, after which they receive an official reply.
The migrant association representatives, in their official communications, adopt a strict language of rights on behalf of the migrants
and boast of having set their goal as nothing short of obtaining citizenship for all the migrants from Bulgaria. The association grounds
its claims on natural entitlement: As "ethnic kin" from the Balkans,
the migrants are the bearers of the imperial legacy—the contemporary inhabitants of territories once owned by the Ottoman Empire.
The Turkish state is thus "indebted" to these migrants, in the association's view, and granting citizenship would be an evident way to repay
the debt. However, despite this nationalist discourse, the legal counseling provided by the association secretary also recognizes the arbitrariness of the process of applying for citizenship and explicitly
exploits that arbitrariness by pointing out that even if they do not end
up receiving citizenship, the migrants work the system to their advantage simply by applying.
It is precisely in this strategic fashion that Aysel has filed a petition via the association to be recognized as a munferit gdcmen. She hopes
the result will be positive so she can receive citizenship, which will enable her to come and go whenever she pleases instead of continuing
to be subjected to the changing visa regimes. Yet Aysel would also settle for the second option of filing repeated applications, even if each
application gets rejected so that she can keep "earning" the right to
an extra legal stay of six months in addition to the 90 days allowed by
the current visa regime. Aysel is pursuing the possibilities for citizenship not because she intends to settle but simply for the convenience
of work and travel. She has no qualms about stating that she works in
Turkey to save money for her family back home and makes no plans
for permanent settlement. Instead she makes short-term calculations
about overstays and fines based on the dictates of everyday life back
home; whether, for example, she will have saved up enough money
for the last piece of furniture for her daughter's wedding trousseau
within the legal period of stay allowed to her. The fact that Aysel maneuvers the system as best befits her cost-benefit calculations suggests
that she does not aspire to becoming the ideal political subject like
the 1989 immigrants or those who were granted munferit gdcmen status.
Unlike Aysel, who primarily constitutes herself as an economic
body, Nurcihan's self-representation is predicated on the declaration
of national belonging. Through the applications she has filed with
the Ministry of Interior, Nurcihan engages in legal proclamations of
allegiance to the Turkish state as a prospective citizen, one who is worthy of the status as someone of Turkish descent. In addition to the
Zeynep Kasli and Ayse Parla 221
particular course of legal action she takes, her commitment to the
Turkish state is "on display" on an everyday basis through the map of
Turkey hanging on her living room wall. She also discursively reiterates her loyalty to Turkey in her exchanges with us: She repeatedly
emphasizes her wish to pay taxes; her preference that her son takes
the national university entrance exams to although the latter is harder
than the foreigners exams; and her lack of interest in ever returning
to Bulgaria. Unlike Aysel, who engages in circular migration and
whose relationship to Turkey is transient, Nurcihan has settled in the
migrant residences with her family. She intends to pursue all it takes
to render her stay permanent and struggles to establish her "worth"
as a political subject through the law and through everyday discursive
acts. Ultimately, however, Aysel and Nurcihan's stories converge once
again on the broken line of il/legality: Regardless of their respective
motives and strategies, neither has been able to legalize her work and
residence status permanently.
Conclusion
We have argued that migrants are systematically kept at the edges of
legality in ways that best serve the political and the economic interests
of the state. Each encounter with sovereign authority thus ends up
creating a different form of subjection for the migrants. We have also
tried to show that migrants instrumentalize these encounters for their
own purposes as well. However, they seem to succeed only to the extent that these attempts are ultimately compatible with the interest of
the sovereign that continues to wield the power to define the statesof-exception. On the one hand, migrants develop tactics to negotiate
the changing conditions of il/legality, since, recalling our opening
metaphor, the boundaries of legality/illegality are constituted not as
continuous but as broken lines rendering the legal lanes transpassable. On the other hand, because it is the sovereign state that lays
down the rules of the flow, the individual strategies end up reproducing the power of the state, which reaffirms the tenuous legal status of the immigrants on the edge of being the exceptions to the rule.
Various scholars have pointed to the ways in which the legal status of immigrants is rendered temporary and that this temporariness
is sustained by the state. 50 At the economic level, the broken lines of
il/legality that the immigrants are constantly made to cross, work to
ensure a vulnerable labor force without the security of proper documents and who therefore are always disposable. We have also argued,
however, that the further twist in the case of immigrants from Bulgaria
is the added political dimension: The Turkish state keeps immigrants
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Broken Lines of II/Legality and the Reproduction of State Sovereignty
in a p e r m a n e n t state of e x c e p t i o n by m e a n s of t e m p o r a r y p e r i o d s of
legalization in o r d e r to e n c o u r a g e t h e m to vote in the Bulgarian elections. In contrast to the legal processes of h a r m o n i z a t i o n with t h e
S c h e n g e n acquis, which regulates a n d defines the limits to t h e movem e n t of p e r s o n s n o t only a m o n g m e m b e r states b u t also to a n d from
third countries, t h e Turkish state politically e x t e n d s its realm of sovereignty in a move toward what Basch et al. have called the "deterritorialised nation-state." 5 1 In that sense, "globalization of d o m e s t i c
politics," which is usually perceived as a b o t t o m - u p mobilization, 5 2 also
works as a top-down political tool, as e v i d e n c e d in the Turkish state's
policies to e n c o u r a g e i m m i g r a n t s ' political involvement in Bulgaria
t h r o u g h voting. It is also t h r o u g h such t r a n s n a t i o n a l ties a n d transnational political practices, therefore, that the neoliberal sovereign reproduces its e c o n o m i c a n d political power by this particular instance of
"inclusive exclusion."
Finally we have suggested that t h e state of t e m p o r a r i n e s s , reinforced t h r o u g h the c o n s t a n t redefinition of t h e " t h r e s h o l d in life t h a t
distinguishes a n d separates what is inside from what is outside," is n o t
limited to acts of b o r d e r crossing. T h e separation of t h e rights of m a n
from the rights of citizens within nation-states c o n t i n u e s to k e e p t h e
migrants in a p e r m a n e n t state of e x c e p t i o n as t h e subjects to t h e law
b u t n o t the subjects in t h e law. 53 T h e Turkish state reiterates its p o w e r
of the decision to i n c l u d e / e x c l u d e t h r o u g h the f r e q u e n t c h a n g e s in
the visa regimes a n d t h r o u g h r e n d e r i n g citizenship difficult for these
immigrants. T h e immigrants, o n t h e o t h e r h a n d , try t o take advantage of the e x c e p t i o n s to t h e rule as best as they can, such as t h e temporary amnesties or the arbitrary practices of the state agents or by
hailing the münferit göçmen status with r e f e r e n c e to t h e i r e t h n o n a tional identity. Yet such privileged treatments toward Bulgarian Turkish
immigrants as e x c e p t i o n s to t h e g e n e r a l visa policies are also t h e m selves constantly subject to c h a n g e . T h e r e f o r e , the b r o k e n line of i l /
legality seems to be p r e f e r r e d by the sovereign state over p e r m a n e n t
legality, which for the i m m i g r a n t s , b e c o m e s the t r u e e x c e p t i o n to the
"exceptions to the r u l e . "
Notes
Fieldwork for this article was conducted as part of the wider project, Forms
of Organization among New Migrants: A Comparative Analysis of Bulgarian
Turks, Iraqi Turkmens and Moldavians in Turkey, undertaken by Ayse Parla,
Mine Eder, and Didem Danis and funded by The Scientific and Technological Council of Turkey (TÜBITAK). Zeynep Kasli was part of the research
team as an assistant throughout the project and would like to thank the organizers of the 2008 Hrant Dink Memorial Workshop (Sabanci University, Istanbul) where the initial idea for this article was presented. Ayse Parla would
Zeynep Kasli and Ayse Parla 223
like to thank the organizers and participants of the workshop on Migrations
in the Age of Neoliberalism (University of Florida, 2009), as well as the fellows of the Liberalism's Others project at Columbia University for their feedback on various sections of this work.
1. The literature on this is vast and hence the references we provide inevitably partial. The guiding principle here has been to select a few key works
that have been influential across the disciplines of anthropology, sociology,
and political science. Stephen Castles and Alastair Davidson, Citizenship and
Migration: Globalisation and the Politics of Belonging (London: Macmillan, 2000);
Arjun Appadurai, Modernity at Large: Cultural Dimensions of Globalization (Minneapolis: Minnesota Press, 1996); Ulf Hannerz, Transnational Connections:
Culture, People, Places (London: Routledge, 1996); David Held and Anthony
McGrew, Globalization /Anti-globalization (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2002); Eva
Ostergaard-Nielsen,The Politics of Migrants' Transnational Political Practices," International Migration Review 37, no. 3 (2003): 760-786; Linda Basch,
Nina Glick-Schiller, and Cristina Szanton-Blanc, Nations Unbound: Transnational Projects, Postcolonial Predicaments and Deterritorialized Nation-States (Amsterdam: Gordon and Breach, 1994); James N. Rosenau, "Illusions of Power
and Empire," History and Theory 44, no. 4 (Dec. 2005): 73-87.
2. Zygmunt Bauman, Globalization: The Human Consequences (New York:
Columbia University Press, 1998), p. 67.
3. Etienne Balibar, We the People of Europe? Reflections on Transnational Citizenship (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2004); Michael Mann,
"Has Globalization Ended the Rise of the Nation-state?" Review of International Political Economy 4, no. 3 (Autumn 1997): 472-496; Aristede Zolberg,
"Matter of State: Theorizing Immigration Policy," in Charles Hirschman,
Philip Kasinitz, and Joshua DeWind, eds., Handbook of International Migration:
The American Experience (New York: Russell Sage Publications, 1999).
4. Christina Boswell, 'Theorizing Migration Policy: Is There a Third Way?"
International Migration Review 41, no. 1 (2007): 75-100; Simone A. Browne,
"Getting Carded: Border Control and the Politics of Canada's Permanent
Resident Card," Citizenship Studies 9, no. 4 (2005): 423-438; Kitty Calavita,
"Immigration, Law, and Marginalization in a Global Economy: Notes from
Spain." LAW & Society Review 3 (1998): 529; Kitty Calavita and Liliana SuarezNavaz, "Spanish Immigration Law and the Construction of Difference: Citizens and 'Illegals' on Europe's Southern Border," in Richard Warren Perry
and Bill Maurer, eds., Globalization Under Construction: Governmentality, Law
and Identity (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2003); Russell King,
"Towards a New Map of European Migration," International journal of Population Geography 8 (2002): 89-106 ; Nathalie Peutz, "Out-laws: Deportees, Desire, and T h e Law,'" International Migration 45, no. 3 (2007): 182-191; Ryoko
Yamamoto, "Crossing Boundaries: Legality and the Power of the State in
Unauthorized Migration," Sociology Compass 1, no. 1 (2007): 95-110.
5. Calavita, "Immigration, Law, and Marginalization in a Global Economy: Notes from Spain," note 4.
6. King, "Towards a New Map of European Migration," note 4, p. 102.
7. Balibar, We the People of Europe? Reflections on Transnational Citizenship,
note 3.
8. Bulent Diken, "From Refugee Camps to Gated Communities: Biopolitics and the End of the City," Citizenship Studies 8, no. 1 (2004): 83-106; Prem
Kumar Rajaram and Carl Grundy-Warr, "The Irregular Migrant as Homo
Sacer: Migration and Detention in Australia, Malaysia, and Thailand," International Migration 42, no. 1 (2004): 33-64; Mark B. Salter, "The Global Visa
224
Broken Lines of II/Legality and the Reproduction of State Sovereignty
Regime and the Political Technologies of the International Self: Borders,
Bodies, Biopolitics, " Alternatives: Global, Local, Politicals!, no. 2 (2006): 167189; Peutz, "Out-laws: Deportees, Desire, and 'The Law,'" note 4; Miriam
Ticktin, "Policing and Humanitarianism in France: Immigration and the
Turn to Law as State of Exception," Interventions 7, no. 3 (2005): 347-368.
9. Giorgio Agamben, Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life (Stanford,
CA: Stanford University Press, 1998), pp. 128-133.
10. Salter, "Global Visa Regimes," note 8, p. 176.
11. Ibid., p. 180.
12. Agamben, Home Sacer, note 9, p. 131.
13. Veena Das and Deborah Poole, "The State and Its Margins: Comparative Ethnographies," in Veena Das and Deborah Poole, eds., Anthropology in
the Margins of the State (Santa Fe, NM: School of American Research Press,
2004), p. 19.
14. Calavita, "Immigration, Law, and Marginalization in a Global Economy: Notes From Spain," note 4; Calavita and Suarez-Navaz, "Spanish Immigration Law and the Construction of Difference: Citizens and 'Illegals' on
Europe's Southern Border," note 4; Nicholas De Genova, "The Legal Production of Mexican/Migrant 'Illegality,'" Latino Studies 2, no. 2 (July 2004):
160-185; Belkis Kümbetoglu, "Enformellesme Siireclerinde Genç Göçmen
Kadinlar ve Dayanisma Aslari," Folklor/Edebiyat 11, no. 41 (2005): 5-25; Leyla
J. Keough, "Mobile Domestics and Trafficking Discourse in the Margins of
Europe," Focaa—European Journal of Anthropology 43 (2004): 14-26; Mine
Eder, "Moldavyali Yeni Gocmenler: Uzerinden Turkiye'de Neoliberal Devleti
Yeniden Dusunmek," Birikim 108 (2007): 129-142; Sema Erder and Selmin
Kaska, Düzensiz Göç ve Kadin Ticareti: Türkiye Ornesi (Geneva: International Organization for Migration—UNFPA, 2003).
15. Ahmet Icduygu, 'Turkey," in Philippe Fargues, ed., Mediterranean Migration 2005 Report (The European Commission, MEDA Programme: Robert
Schuman Center for Advanced Studies, 2005), pp. 327-371; Kemal Kirisci,
"Turkey: A Country of Transition from Emigration to Immigration," Mediterranean Politics 12, no. 1 (2007): 91-97.
16. Joanna Apap, Sergio Carrera, and Kemal Kirisci, "Turkey in the European Area of Freedom, Security and Justice," EU-Turkey Working Papers,
no. 3 (Brussels: CEPS, 2004); Didem Danis, "Integration in Limbo: Iraqi
Afghan and Maghrebi Migrants in Istanbul," MireKoc Project, no. 6 (Istanbul: Koc University, 2006).
17 Deniz Yukseker, "Trust and Gender in a Transnational Marketplace:
The Public Culture of Laleli, Istanbul," Public Culture 16, no. 1 (2004): 47-65.
18. Ayse Akalin, "Hired as a Caregiver, Demanded as a Housewife: Becoming a Migrant Domestic Worker in Turkey," European Journal of Women's
Studies 14, no. 3 (2007): 209-225; Didem Danis, "A Faith that Binds: Iraqi
Christian Women on the Domestic Service Ladder of Istanbul, "Journal of Ethnic
and Migration Studies 33, no. 4 (2007): 601-615; Eder, "Moldavyali YeniGocmenler Uzerinden Turkiye'de Neoliberal Devleti Yeniden Dusunmek," note
15; Selmin Kaska, "The New International Migration and Migrant Women in
Turkey: The Case of Moldovan Domestic Workers," MireKoc Project, no. 25
(Istanbul: Koc University, 2006); Keough, "Mobile Domestics and Trafficking
Discourse in the Margins of Europe," note 14; Kiimbetoglu, "Enformellesme
Siireclerinde Genç Göçmen Kadinlar ve Dayanisma Aslari," note 14.
19. Içduygu, "Turkey," note 15. As of 2008, a handful have been able to
obtain this permit, pointing to the difficulty, indeed virtual impossibility, of
taking advantage of this law in practice.
Zeynep Kasli and Ayse Parla 225
20. In 2005, there were around 132,000 foreign nationals with residence
permit in the country, nearly 50,000 from Bulgaria, around 8,000 from Azerbaijan, 7,000 from Germany, almost 5,000 from Iraq, more than 4,000 from
Iran, and another 4,000 from the Russian Federation. In 2006 there were
over 187,000 foreigners residing in Turkey with residence permits. While 18
percent of them were people with work permits and 13 percent were students, the remaining proportion of foreigners with residence permits were
mostly people who are the dependents of working and studying foreigners.
For more detailed information see 'Table 7: Indicative Number of Migration
to Turkey, 1996-2006," by MiroKoc at Koc University, Istanbul, available at:
http://www.mirekoc.com/mirekoc_documents/research_and_
statistics/statistical_data/2007/table07.htm
21. These numbers are compiled by Ahmet Icduygu from data obtained
from UNHCR Ankara Office (2002-2005). Bureau for Foreigners, Borders,
and Asylum at the Directorate of General Security of the Ministry of Interior,
(2000-2005). Available at: http://www.mirekoc.com/mirekoc_documents/
research_and_statistics/statistical_data/2007/table11.htm
22. The endemic difficulties of obtaining quantative figures for undocumented migration is extensively elaborated in Douglas Massey and Chiarac
Capoferro, "Measuring Undocumented Migration," in Alejandro Portes and
Josh DeWind, eds., Rethinking Migration: New Theoretical and Empirical Perspecties (New York: Berghan, 2007).
23. Eder, "Moldavyali Yeni Gocmenler Uzerinden Turkiye'de Neoliberal
Devleti Yeniden Dusunmek," note 14; Kaska, 'The New International Migration and Migrant Women in Turkey: The Case of Moldovan Domestic Workers," note 18; Yukseker, "Trust and Gender in a Transnational Marketplace:
The Public Culture of Laleli, Istanbul," note 17.
24. Ahmet Icduygu, "Irregular Migration in Turkey," IOM Research Paper
Series, no. 12 (Geneva: International Organization for Migration, 2003).
25. Apap et al., 'Turkey in the European Area of Freedom, Security and
Justice," note 16.
26. This change further encouraged the development of the "suitcase
trade," while illegal employment as well as prostitution and security, became
the other "questionable aspects" of this "flexible" visa policy. Apap et al.,
'Turkey in the European Area of Freedom, Security and Justice," note 16; Icduygu, "Irregular Migration in Turkey," note 24; Kirisci, "Turkey: A Country
of Transition from Emigration to Immigration," note 15; Keough, "Mobile
Domestics and Trafficking Discourse in the Margins of Europe," note 14;
Eder, "Moldavyali Yeni Gocmenler Uzerinden Turkiye'de Neoliberal Devleti
Yeniden Dusunmek," note 14; Erder and Kaska, "Duzensiz Goc ve Kadin
Ticareti: Turkiye Ornesi," note 14; Gaye Burcu Yildiz, "Foreign Workers in
Turkey, Their Rights and Obligations Regulated in Turkish Labour Law," European Journal of Migration & Law 9, no. 2 (2007): 207-227.
27. Kirisci, Turkey: A Country of Transition from Emigration to Immigration," note 15.
28. For detailed information see Tables 1 and 2 in Kemal Kirisci, "A
Friendlier Schengen Visa System as a Tool of 'Soft Power': The Experience of
Turkey," European Journal of Migration and Law 7 (2005): 343-367.
29. Apap et al., 'Turkey in the European Area of Freedom, Security and
Justice," note 16.
30. For detailed information, see the bilateral agreement between Turkish and Bulgarian governments. Available at: http://rega.basbakanlik.gov.tr/
eskiler/2007/05/20070509-3.html
226 Broken Lines of II/Legality and the Reproduction of State Sovereignty
31. Kemal Kirisci, "Disaggregating Turkish Citizenship and Immigration
Practices," Middle Eastern Studies 36, no. 3 (2000): 1-22; Kirisci, "Turkey: A
Country of Transition from Emigration to Immigration," note 15; Turgut
Tarhanli, "A Legal Analysis of Court Decisions in Turkey Concerning Refugee, Asylum and Immigration Issues" in BMMYK, ed., Court Decisions in Turkey
Concerning Asylum, Refugee and Immigration Issues (Turkey: BMMYK, 2000), pp.
1-37.
32. Apap et al., "Turkey in the European Area of Freedom, Security and
Justice," note 16; Kirisci, "Disaggregating Turkish Citizenship and Immigration Practices," note 31; Kirisci, 'Turkey: A Country of Transition from Emigration to Immigration," note 15.
33. Soner Çasaptay, Islam, Secularism, and Nationalism in Modern Turkey:
Who Is a Turk? (London: Routledge, 2003).
34. Apap et al., 'Turkey in the European Area of Freedom, Security and
Justice," note 16.
35. Ayse Parla, "Longing, Belonging and Locations of Homeland among
Turkish Immigrants from Bulgaria, "Journal of Southeast European & Black Sea
Studies 6, no. 4 (2006): 543-557.
36. Ali Eminov, Turkish and other Muslim minorities in Bulgaria (London:
Roudedge, 1997); Bilal N. Simsir, Bulgaristan Turkleri (Ankara: Bilgi Yayinevi,
1986).
37. Apap et al., 'Turkey in the European Area of Freedom, Security and
Justice," note 16.
38. Erder and Kaska, "Duzensiz Goc ve Kadin Ticareti: Turkiye Ornesi,"
note 14.
39. For a comparative analysis of the instrumentalization of ethnicity
with regard to Turkish immigrants from Bulgaria and from Iraq, see Didem
Danis and Ayse Parla, "Nafile Soydaslik: Irak ve Bulgaristan Turkleri Ornesinde Gocmen, Dernek ve Devlet," Toplum ve Bilim 114 (2008): 131-158.
40. The MRF underlines, however, that it is not an ethnic party, which is
unconstitutional in Bulgaria. The majority of the electorate are those who
identify as Turkish.
41. The amount is calculated according to the Indicative Exchange Rates
Announced at 15:30 on 09/28/2007 by the Central Bank of Turkey. Available at:
http://www.tcmb.gov.tr/
42. Ibid.
43. We would also like to note that during the trip Zeynep Kasli undertook across the border in September 2007, the difference in treatment was
striking. While the researcher asked the customs officer about the fines and
was able to receive answers, the immigrants who were inspected in detail and
with suspicion were not provided with any explanations but were told to pay
the fine that the computer automatically issued without further ado.
44. Nevertheless the same strategy did not work the second time around,
and she was fined for her last exit, which was after 90 days of overstay. So it is
hard to conclude that the difference in treatment is systematic. We might
rather claim that airports seem to "catch up" on this later, as it is extremely
rare for labor migrants to travel by plane.
45. This informal interview with the general secretary took place in April
5, 2008, in BTSA office in Cemberlitas, Istanbul.
46. In an interview on 8 November 2007 with the head of the neighborhood (muhtar) in which the migrant settlements are located, we were shown
this circular by the MRF.
Zeynep Kasli and Ayse Parla
227
47. Calavita and Suarez-Navaz "Spanish Immigration Law and the Construction of Difference: Citizens and "Illegals" on Europe's Southern Border,"
note 4; Eder, "Moldavyali Yeni Gocmenler Uzerinden Turkiye'de Neoliberal
Devleti Yeniden Dusunmek," note 14; Yamamoto, "Crossing Boundaries: Legality and the Power of the State in Unauthorized Migration," note 4.
48. The amount is calculated according to the Indicative Exchange Rates
Announced at 15:30 on 07/28/2008 by the Central Bank of Turkey. Available at:
http://www.tcmb.gov.tr/ The fee is much lower, the general secretary insists,
than what a regular lawyer would charge. Our informal meeting with the general secretary took place in 26 July 2008 in BTSA office.
49. The general secretary of BTSA states that this citizenship law will
change by the year 2010 and the differentiation between 'Turkish descent"
and "foreigner" will be no longer pursued by the law.
50. Boswell, "Theorizing Migration Policy: Is There a Third Way?" note
4; Browne, "Getting Carded: Border Control and the Politics of Canada's Permanent Resident Card," note 4; Calavita," Immigration, Law, and Marginalization in a Global Economy: Notes from Spain," note 4; Calavita and
Suarez-Navaz "Spanish Immigration Law and the Construction of Difference:
Citizens and illegals' on Europe's Southern Border," note 4; Peutz, "Out-laws:
Deportees, Desire, and 'The Law,'" note 4; Yamamoto, "Crossing Boundaries:
Legality and the Power of the State in Unauthorized Migration," note 4.
51. Basch et al, Nations Unbound: Transnational Projects, Postcolonial Predicaments and Deterritorialized Nation-States, note 1.
52. Ostergaard-Nielsen.'The Politics of Migrants: Transnational Political
Practices," note 1.
53. Agamben, Home Sacer, note 9.