ACADEMIA Letters Problems concerning metaphysical inquiry. F.H. Bradley’s concept of immediate experience Marcel Sa’id, University of Antwerp Introduction Francis Herbert Bradley (1846-1924) was one of the most prominent figures of the British idealists. He studied and taught at the University of Oxford and was the author of various significant works in the field of metaphysics of which Appearance and Reality (1983) and Essays on Truth and Reality (1914) are arguably his most important compositions. Bradley had great admiration for the philosophical ideas of G.W.F. Hegel, whose influence was already noticeable in Bradley’s Ethical Studies (1876) and Principles of Logic (1883). In general, the British idealists, to which Bradley belonged to, were by no means uncritical adherents of Hegel’s philosophy and despite the fact that Bradley’s philosophy was largely based on the intellectual legacy of Hegel, he adopted a critical attitude towards his precursor.[1] Anti-idealist thinkers like J.F. Herbart and Hermann Lotze had a profound influence on British philosophers and a rich variety of continental ideas were absorbed by the British idealists, who therefore contributed greatly to establishing the foundations on which analytic philosophy would thrive and blossom.[2] Bradley stressed the importance of studying Hegel’s work, but in addition to admiration, he was also a critic of Hegel’s work. A.E. Taylor was advised by Bradley to “make a thorough study of Herbart as an excellent corrective of Hegelian bias”. Bradley had little sympathy for the ideas of Immanuel Kant but remarked that he had never made a profound study of Kant’s work, and therefore, too much significance should not be attached to his criticism.[3] Although Bradley has written on a variety of disciplines such as history, ethics and logic, he is mostly recognized for his contributions to the field of metaphysics, extensively Academia Letters, October 2021 ©2021 by the author — Open Access — Distributed under CC BY 4.0 Corresponding Author: Marcel Sa’id, AbuDina808@gmail.com Citation: Sa’id, M. (2021). Problems concerning metaphysical inquiry. F.H. Bradley’s concept of immediate experience. Academia Letters, Article 3806. https://doi.org/10.20935/AL3806. 1 examining the fundamental structures of reality. According to British philosopher (and contemporary of Bradley) James Ward, it was Bradley who “has taught the English philosophers, as it was his one ambition to do, to deal systematically with first principles”.[4] This article will examine Bradley’s fundamental views on epistemology. Is it, for Bradley, possible to ever obtain certain metaphysical knowledge? Academia Letters, October 2021 ©2021 by the author — Open Access — Distributed under CC BY 4.0 Corresponding Author: Marcel Sa’id, AbuDina808@gmail.com Citation: Sa’id, M. (2021). Problems concerning metaphysical inquiry. F.H. Bradley’s concept of immediate experience. Academia Letters, Article 3806. https://doi.org/10.20935/AL3806. 2 1. Problems Concerning Metaphysical Inquiry. It is appropriate to briefly introduce Bradley’s metaphysics by means of the introduction to his magnum opus Appearance and Reality. Bradley writes: “We may agree, perhaps, to understand by metaphysics an attempt to know reality as against mere appearance, or the study of first principles or ultimate truths, or again the effort to comprehend the universe, not simply piecemeal or by fragments, but somehow as a whole. Any such pursuit will encounter a number of objections. I will have to hear that the knowledge which it desires to obtain is impossible altogether; or, if possible in some degree, is yet practically useless; or that, at all events, we can want nothing beyond the old philosophies.” “The man who is ready to prove that metaphysical knowledge is wholly impossible has no right here to any answer.” “He is a brother metaphysician with a rival theory of first principles.” To say the reality is such that our knowledge cannot reach it, is a claim to know reality; to urge that our knowledge is of a kind which must fail to transcend appearance, itself implies that transcendence.” “But to the question, if seriously I expect to succeed, I must, of course, answer, No. I do not suppose that is, that satisfactory knowledge is possible. How much we can ascertain about reality will be discussed in this book; but I may say at once that I expect a very partial satisfaction. I am so bold as to believe that we have a knowledge of the Absolute, certain and real, though I am sure that our comprehension is miserably incomplete. But I dissent emphatically from the conclusion that, because imperfect, it is worthless.” “And that is why, so long as we alter, we shall always want, and shall always have, new metaphysics.”[5] Bradley’s notion that “the critic has no right to an answer” is reminiscent of Immanuel Kant. After all, Kant argued that all synthetic a priori propositions concerning metaphysics are actually impossible and should be considered nothing more than mere speculation. As a result, metaphysics is irrevocably reduced to a pseudoscience. Bradley rejects the notion that the nature of reality is such that our knowledge cannot reach it. If no statements can be made about reality, then equally one can make no statement concerning the impossibility of metaphysical knowledge, without crossing that boundary oneself. This does not mean that Bradley therefore considers it possible to actually acquire metaphysical knowledge. At first, this seems contradictory. For what does Bradley mean when he rejects the idea of the sceptic that the acquisition of metaphysical knowledge is impossible, while remaining skeptical himself of the possibility of obtaining metaphysical knowledge? According to Bradley, everyday representations of reality contain hidden contradictions. Once these are brought to light and thought through, they inevitably lead to absurd and impossible conclusions. Bradley rejects the idea that reality can be understood as consisting of objects that exist independently of each other (pluralism), as well as the possibility of these Academia Letters, October 2021 ©2021 by the author — Open Access — Distributed under CC BY 4.0 Corresponding Author: Marcel Sa’id, AbuDina808@gmail.com Citation: Sa’id, M. (2021). Problems concerning metaphysical inquiry. F.H. Bradley’s concept of immediate experience. Academia Letters, Article 3806. https://doi.org/10.20935/AL3806. 3 objects to be experienced (realism). Bradley’s own conception of reality is a combination of substantial monism; the idea that reality is ultimately one and indivisible, and metaphysical idealism; the view that reality itself is ultimately incorporeal.[6] For Bradley, the universe must be understood as a whole. Reality is one and absolute. It is up to the study of metaphysics to reveal, if possible, what the nature or essence of this reality truly is. Bradley identifies metaphysics as an attempt to know reality as opposed to mere perception. Bradley uses the concepts of appearance and reality. The term reality is used by Bradley in the sense of ultimate reality. For Bradley, the Absolute and Reality are interchangeable, and by both he means the universe, understood as a whole. The term appearance stands for that which is subordinate to, or only partly an expression of, the whole. Appearances, or apparitions, do exist, but not in a real sense. Appearances are never independent, self-contained, or self-explanatory, as opposed to the Whole, which is truly independent and self-explanatory.[7] For Bradley, reality can only be understood as a unity. We are able to study and form theories about metaphysical concepts such as causality, the relationship between subject and object, primary and secondary properties, and time and space. However, knowledge of these concepts does not lead to a deeper understanding of a transcendent reality. On the contrary, it negates the possibility that one would be able to understand reality through objects that exist independently, and in relation to each other. In order to clarify this idea, Bradley provides an example regarding time, space and causation. If we try to comprehend the fact that our world necessarily had to have a ‘first cause’, with the knowledge that everything that begins to exist has a cause, we will naturally come to the conclusion that this ‘first cause’ would also require a cause, which itself, again, would also requires a cause, ad infinitum. We will therefore end up with the problem of an infinite regression and we are never able to arrive at the beginning of time. If one gets caught up in unsolvable thought experiments, such as the infinite regression in the example given, it is because hypotheses and ideas that are applicable to certain regions of reality cannot be applied to the Whole. In other words, the hypothesis only works when it is applied to appearance but fails when it is applied to the Absolute.[8] This idea of Bradley, that the Absolute can only be understood in its unity, will be further clarified in the following chapter. Academia Letters, October 2021 ©2021 by the author — Open Access — Distributed under CC BY 4.0 Corresponding Author: Marcel Sa’id, AbuDina808@gmail.com Citation: Sa’id, M. (2021). Problems concerning metaphysical inquiry. F.H. Bradley’s concept of immediate experience. Academia Letters, Article 3806. https://doi.org/10.20935/AL3806. 4 2. Immediate Experience For Kant, knowledge begins with experience. There is a clear difference between subject and object. What man thinks he knows are only impressions of external objects but are never true perceptions of the objects themselves. Man’s perception is colored by the a priori categories of the mind and it is therefore impossible for a person to obtain true knowledge about the essence of an object. Bradley rejects Kant’s phenomenological view that reality in its true form is not knowable. According to Bradley, there is no distinction between consciousness (subject) and between that of which our consciousness is aware of (object), which Kant calls the ding an sich, or thing in itself. According to Bradley, “There is an immediate feeling, a knowing and a being in one, with which knowledge begins.”[9] In the chapter Immediate Experience in his work Essays on Truth and Reality, Bradley explains what he means by this. Immediate experience “is not a stage which shows itself at the beginning and then disappears, but it remains at the bottom throughout as fundamental.”[10] Therefore, Bradley rejects Kant’s idea that knowledge of reality begins with sensory experience, as well as Kant’s distinction between object and subject. One definition of immediate experience that Bradley wants to exclude is the subconscious. It can stand for that of which a person is conscious of without being an object of perception, or for that which is not noticed. The subconscious is still part of a person’s psyche but is outside of what is experienced. This definition is not the definition which Bradley is referring to when he uses the term immediate experience. For Bradley, immediate experience stands for that which is wholly contained within a single state of undivided consciousness or feeling. This is immediate, as being an actual conscious experience.[11] Subject and object, and the relation between the two as the mind understands it, is more than mere feeling. However, the whole of this, according to Bradley, would be meaningless if it did not come to a person as felt. The idea that any actual experience would fall somewhere outside of “what is felt” seems impossible. At every moment a man’s condition is part of a Whole, of which he is immediately aware. Bradley refers to this as “an experience of non-relational unity of many in one.”[12] Object and subject and every possible relationship between these terms must fall within, and depend on, this felt unity. At any moment, the actual experience, although relational in the material sense, must be ultimately non-relational, because it finds its essence in the Whole. Bradley states that “everything which is got out into the form of an object implies still the felt background against which the object comes, and, further, the whole experience of both feeling and object is a non-relational immediate felt unity. The entire relational consciousness, in short, is experienced as falling within a direct awareness. This direct awareness is itself Academia Letters, October 2021 ©2021 by the author — Open Access — Distributed under CC BY 4.0 Corresponding Author: Marcel Sa’id, AbuDina808@gmail.com Citation: Sa’id, M. (2021). Problems concerning metaphysical inquiry. F.H. Bradley’s concept of immediate experience. Academia Letters, Article 3806. https://doi.org/10.20935/AL3806. 5 non-relational. It escapes from all attempts to exhibit it by analysis as one or more elements in a relational scheme, or as that scheme itself, or as a relation or relations, or as the sum or collection of any of these abstractions.” Immediate experience not only escapes any analytical approach but serves as the basis on which any analysis is made. Direct awareness, as a nonrelational immediate felt unity, can never be explained or described, because we are only able to explain things through terms and relations.[13] Conclusion This felt background, against which all objects appear, always remains immediate. Its relational content is also part of the felt background. Apparitions must always be grounded in Reality (which is behind the apparitions), in order to appear at all. We can perceive and analyze appearances, but not the Reality (the Whole, or the Absolute) that is behind the appearances. This Reality can only be experienced, as being felt. This experience of Reality is what Bradley calls the immediate experience. Immediate experience is not a stage that once existed and has ceased to exist. According to Bradley, “every distinction and relation still rests on an immediate background of which we are aware, and every distinction and relation (so far as experienced) is also felt, and felt in a sense to belong to an immediate totality. Thus in all experience we still have feeling which is not an object, and at all our moments the entirety of what comes to us, however much distinguished and relational, is felt as comprised within a unity which itself is not relational.”[14] Academia Letters, October 2021 ©2021 by the author — Open Access — Distributed under CC BY 4.0 Corresponding Author: Marcel Sa’id, AbuDina808@gmail.com Citation: Sa’id, M. (2021). Problems concerning metaphysical inquiry. F.H. Bradley’s concept of immediate experience. Academia Letters, Article 3806. https://doi.org/10.20935/AL3806. 6 3. Bradley vs. Hegel Hegel The central idea in Hegel’s philosophy is the unity of the universe; the idea that the ‘Whole’ forms the basis of all knowledge and all actions. The universe is a coherent system in which real and eternal elements provide meaning to our transient and fragmentary experiences. The central idea is that of an underlying principle of unity, a fundamental structuring principle that provides 1) order of things that exist in reality and 2) order or perfection in human experience. Reason does not reside in the subject (Kant), but pervades all of reality. The ‘Whole’ contains as part of itself a time process that is to be understood as a progressive manifestation of the ‘Absolute mind’, which is expressing itself in (and is therefore experienced by) the finite and limited human mind.[15] In Hegel’s dialectic, this revelation of the ‘Absolute Mind’, which is progressively revealed through a process of opposing ideas, manifests itself in the human mind in the form of propositions (thesis) and its opposites (antithesis) being resolved at a higher level of truth (synthesis). To clarify, each concept evokes the opposite concept. For example, the concept of ‘nothing’ evokes the idea of ‘something’. The convergence of the two concepts ‘nothing’ and ‘something’ creates a new concept, the concept of: ‘becoming’. This process of self-realization of the ‘Absolute Mind’, manifesting itself throughout history in the physical world and in the human mind, implies that Hegel understands phenomenality and visibility as revelation. In his work Identity and Difference (1957), Martin Heidegger argues that Hegel confuses ontology with theology. According to Heidegger, not only does Hegel equate ontology with theology, but he also Christianizes the first critique. ‘Being’ is exalted above all that exists, the ground of itself, causa sui. This is the metaphysical concept of God. Metaphysics is in accordance with its own nature and thus onto-theo-logical.[16] Hegel understands the concept of ‘being’ as ‘revelation’, but since ‘revelation’ is always present in reality, it is just as much a repetition of his ontology as it is revelation. Hegel refers to Reality (the universe, the Whole, or Absolute) by the term ‘spirit’, and it does not take a genius to recognize that the idea of ‘spirit’, (in German: geist) which progressively manifests itself into the world and reveals itself to mankind, shows a strong resemblance to the Christian concept of God and revelation. However, it would not be fair-minded to view Hegel as a person who would simply submit himself to Christian theology or revelation.[17] According to Heidegger, Academia Letters, October 2021 ©2021 by the author — Open Access — Distributed under CC BY 4.0 Corresponding Author: Marcel Sa’id, AbuDina808@gmail.com Citation: Sa’id, M. (2021). Problems concerning metaphysical inquiry. F.H. Bradley’s concept of immediate experience. Academia Letters, Article 3806. https://doi.org/10.20935/AL3806. 7 we must conclude that Hegel’s theology is not entirely religious, but a way of understanding revelation. Yet, in the Hegelian concept of the ‘Absolute Spirit’ there is only one authentic form of revelation, and that is the Christian revealed religion. In paragraph 564 of the Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences (1830) Hegel describes the theological aspect of the ‘Absolute Spirit’ as revealed religion and not as speculative or rational theology. Revelation is essentially Christian, and its content is ‘Absolute Mind’. The first lines of paragraph 564 state the following: “It lies essentially in the notion of religion, - the religion i.e. whose content is absolute mind – that it be revealed, and, what is more, revealed by God.”[18] According to Heidegger, Hegel equates ontology with revelation and religion, and therefore, Hegel’s concept of metaphysics is an onto-theo-logical metaphysics. Bradley It is often assumed that Bradley himself was personally hostile towards religion in general and to Christianity specifically. In his publication in Mind (1925) Taylor cites a conversation he had with Bradley in which Bradley stated that he was an Anglican, although had not practiced his religion for years. Professor Clement Webb remarked that with the coming of age, Bradley grew more emphatic to the conviction for the need for a genuinely spiritual religion and he did not disguise his desire for a general revival of the religious spirit. Nonetheless, Bradley remained critical of the church as an institution and his personal religious experiences can best be described as a form of mystical belief. For Bradley, this meant direct contact with the ‘Supreme’, outside of ecclesiastical practices of organized ceremonial worship. The most important aspect of religion is the fact that it makes an effort to stimulate the sublimity (or divinity) within ourselves.[19] Bradley shares with Hegel the idea that reality forms one coherent unity. It is worthy to mention a statement by Bradley in which he confirms the Hegelian concept of spirit: “Outside of spirit there is not, and there cannot be, any reality, and, the more that anything is spiritual, so much the more is it veritably real.” While both Hegel and Bradley recognize the unity of reality, Bradley differs from Hegel on the idea that the essence of things can be rationally comprehended by the mind and reason.[20] For Hegel there is no distinction between appearance and reality. There is no metaphysical reality hidden behind the sensible world. The visible world is permeated with reason itself and the structuring principle of unity underlying reality manifests itself in the order of things and the human mind. In Hegel’s philosophy, ontology is equivalent to the revelation of the Absolute Mind. In contrast to Hegel, Bradley attempts to show that reality cannot be Academia Letters, October 2021 ©2021 by the author — Open Access — Distributed under CC BY 4.0 Corresponding Author: Marcel Sa’id, AbuDina808@gmail.com Citation: Sa’id, M. (2021). Problems concerning metaphysical inquiry. F.H. Bradley’s concept of immediate experience. Academia Letters, Article 3806. https://doi.org/10.20935/AL3806. 8 understood through study of the sensible world of appearances. Any attempt to understand the whole of reality through the sensible world can only lead to conclusions which are in itself nonsensical. In his work Appearance and Reality, Bradley shows that in fact all appearances (causation, time and space, primary and secondary attributes) are contradictory when thought through. Although apparitions can appear because they are based in Reality (the Absolute), knowledge of Reality cannot be obtained from the different appearances. Reality can only be experienced, in the sense that it can only be felt, through ‘immediate experience’. With Hegel, the Absolute reveals itself in the human ‘mind’. With Bradley, the Absolute is that which transcends the ‘mind’ altogether. Therefore, the whole concept of ‘Hegel’s dialectic’ is rejected by Bradley, and the Hegelian idea of metaphysics as an onto-theo-logical science is absent in Bradley’s philosophy. Any attempt that is made to rationally approach and explain Reality as a whole, reveals to us only the incomprehensibility of Reality itself. Appearances that present themselves to us cannot be interpreted as a ‘revelation’ of the Absolute mind or spirit, despite the fact that it always appears against the felt background of the Absolute. Reality is not a system of interconnected logical categories, but completely transcends thought.[21] With Bradley, the study of ‘being’ cannot go any further than a study of relations between terms, objects and concepts. Reality simply does not allow us to uncover its essence, and there will always be a veil of mystery between us and the Absolute.[22] Academia Letters, October 2021 ©2021 by the author — Open Access — Distributed under CC BY 4.0 Corresponding Author: Marcel Sa’id, AbuDina808@gmail.com Citation: Sa’id, M. (2021). Problems concerning metaphysical inquiry. F.H. Bradley’s concept of immediate experience. Academia Letters, Article 3806. https://doi.org/10.20935/AL3806. 9 References: • [1] G. Dawes Hicks, “The Metaphysical Systems of F.H. Bradley and James Ward”, Journal of Philosophical Studies, vol.1/no.1, 1926, pp.20-37, p.21. • [2] Stewart and Pierfrancesco Basile Candlish, “Francis Herbert Bradley”, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2017, < https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2017/entries/bradley/ >. • [3] A.E. Taylor, “F.H. Bradley”, Mind, New Series, vol.34/no.133, 1925, pp.1-12. • [4] G. Dawes Hicks, “The Metaphysical Systems of F.H. Bradley and James Ward”, p.20. • [5] F. H. Bradley, Appearance and reality: a metaphysical essay, ed. 2nd edition, 9th impression, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1930, p.2-5. • [6] Stewart and Pierfrancesco Basile Candlish, “Francis Herbert Bradley”. • [7] G. Dawes Hicks, “The Metaphysical Systems of F.H. Bradley and James Ward”, p.24. • [8] Ibidem, pp.24-25. • [9] F. H. Bradley, Essays on Truth and Reality, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1914, p.159. • [10] Ibidem, p.161. • [11] Ibidem, pp.171-173. • [12] Ibidem, p.175. • [13] Ibidem, pp.176-177. • [14] Ibidem, p.178. • [15] G. Dawes Hicks, “The Metaphysical Systems of F.H. Bradley and James Ward”, pp.22-24. • [16] Martin Heidegger, Identity and Difference, New York: Harper & Row, 1969, p.14. • [17] Geert van Eekert en Herbert De Vriese, Het einde van de metafysica: Kant, Hegel en de jonghegelianen, Brussel: UPA, 2018, pp.164-165. Academia Letters, October 2021 ©2021 by the author — Open Access — Distributed under CC BY 4.0 Corresponding Author: Marcel Sa’id, AbuDina808@gmail.com Citation: Sa’id, M. (2021). Problems concerning metaphysical inquiry. F.H. Bradley’s concept of immediate experience. Academia Letters, Article 3806. https://doi.org/10.20935/AL3806. 10 • [18] Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences, < https://hegel.net/en/enz3.htm >, geraadpleegd op 27-12-2020. • [19] A.E. Taylor, “F.H. Bradley”, pp.9-11. • [20] G. Dawes Hicks, “The Metaphysical Systems of F.H. Bradley and James Ward”, pp.21-23. • [21] Stewart and Pierfrancesco Basile Candlish, “Francis Herbert Bradley”. • [22] A.E. Taylor, “F.H. Bradley”, p.12. Academia Letters, October 2021 ©2021 by the author — Open Access — Distributed under CC BY 4.0 Corresponding Author: Marcel Sa’id, AbuDina808@gmail.com Citation: Sa’id, M. (2021). Problems concerning metaphysical inquiry. F.H. Bradley’s concept of immediate experience. Academia Letters, Article 3806. https://doi.org/10.20935/AL3806. 11