ISSN 2079-4843 Volume 3 Number 2 August 2013 Journal of Development Studies Special Issue: Perspectives on Youths and Development Institute of Ethics and Development Studies Uganda Martyrs University In association with Journal of Development Studies Notes for Contributors Policies: Submission of a manuscript implies that: 1) the work being described, in whole or substantial part, is not concurrently being considered for publication elsewhere; 2) those submitting them are willing to transfer their copyright to the publisher, if the article is accepted; 3) those contributing the manuscripts accept the Editor’s prerogative to effect changes to the manuscripts as may be deemed it for purposes of quality assurance; and 4) in case of two or more authors, all the co-authors have endorsed the submission of the manuscript. Contributors must not use sexist language (e.g. the notion that man is a generic term that includes women). 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Submission and enquiries: submit manuscripts, as Microsoft word attachments, and enquiries to the Editor at: jds@umu.ac.ug. Journal of Development Studies Editor Doctor Jude Ssempebwa, Uganda Martyrs University Editorial Consultants Professor Benedict Mongula, University of Dar es Salaam, Tanzania Professor Peter Boula Hensbroek, University of Groningen Professor Edward Kirumira, Makerere University Professor Peter Kanyandago, Uganda Martyrs University Wilson Eduan, Ofice of the President, Republic of Uganda Professor Eric Aseka, Kenyatta University, Kenya Professor Joe Oloka- Onyango, Makerere University Professor Shireen Hassim, University of Witwatersrand, South Africa Associate Professor Joseph Kisekka, Uganda Martyrs University Professor Marjorie Mbilinyi, TGNP Tanzania Professor Segun O. Adedeji, University of Ibadan, Nigeria Professor Michel Lejeune, National Council for Higher Education, Uganda Professor Leo de Haan, ISS Erasmus University, The Netherlands Doctor Edward Kafeero, Uganda Martyrs University Professor Shiila Meintjes, University of Witwatersrand, South Africa Doctor Modest O’damakayi, Uganda Martyrs University Assistant Professor Robert Dowd, University of Notre Dame, United States Associate Professor Maximiano Ngabirano, Uganda Martyrs University Doctor Jude Ssebuwufu, Uganda Martyrs University Editorial Assistant Abisagi N. Kasoma Journal of Development Studies Special Issue: Perspectives on Youths and Development Institute of Ethics and Development Studies Uganda Martyrs University In association with Journal of Development Studies Aims and Scope: The Journal of Development Studies (JDS) publishes empirical articles, critical reviews and case studies that are of interest to policy makers, scholars and practitioners in the area of development studies. The JDS puts particular focus on issues that are of concern to the Third World. It is the goal of the JDS to advance knowledge and debate in the ield of development studies, by providing a platform through which scholars and practitioners can share their views, indings and experiences. Given the diverse nature of development studies, contributions are accepted from a wide range of disciplines and preference is given to articles that integrate multiple disciplinary perspectives. 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Any views expressed in this publication are the views of the authors and are not necessarily the views of the Editor, Uganda Martyrs University, the Institute of Ethics and Development Studies or their partners. Journal of Development Studies Contents 1 Jude Ssempebwa, Editorial 5 Robert Senath Esuruku, Youth Identity, National Unity and Development in Uganda: Prospects and Options 21 Ngozi M. Nwakeze, Youth Bulge and Demographic Dividend in the Context of Africa: What Do We Really Know? 33 Jimmy Spire Ssentongo, Youth, Social Heritage, Political Manipulation and Pluralism in Kibaale District, Uganda 63 Lino Owor Ogora, Youth and Cultural Identity in Post-Conlict Northern Uganda 77 Louis Oyaro Olanya, Youth Reconciliation and Political Participation: The Case of Northern Uganda 97 David N. Tshimba, Narratives of the Youth in Post-War Kitgum, Northern Uganda 115 Eric Awich Ochen, Engendering Social Rejection among formerly Abducted Young Women in Northern Uganda 133 Jacqueline Nakaiza, Potential of Peer Support to Fight Stigma against Former Child Soldiers in Northern Uganda 145 Paul Bukuluki, Access to Justice among Youth in Post-Conlict Northern Uganda 177 Charles Okello Ayai, Youth Unemployment and Post-Conlict Recovery in the Acholi Sub-Region 197 Eunice Akullo, Using University Education to Capture Opportunities Lost through Child Soldiering 215 Jephias Matunhu, University Education for Youths Entrepreneurship: The Case of Midlands State University, Zimbabwe viii Journal of Development Studies 3 (2) (2013) 1 - 3 Editorial A well accepted premise relating to youths and development is that youths have enormous potential to promote or foil the development of their communities, depending on how they are used or abused. Youth is a period of opportunities, extraordinary talent, creativity and resilience. With their energy, innovative capacity and aspirations, youths are an asset that no state or society can afford to ignore. However, experience has shown that, compared to other groups, youths are particularly prone to involvement in delinquent and disruptive activities that could undermine the stability and prosperity of their communities. In Africa, the State of the African Youth Report of the African Union states that the emergence of a harmonious and prosperous Africa cannot be achieved without taking issues concerning youths seriously. Creating the conditions and opportunities that transform youth dynamism, enthusiasm, energy and courage for building a quality and productive population is a must for the meaningful development of the continent. Conversely, most of the continent’s youths live in conditions of extreme poverty, challenged by unemployment, HIV/AIDS, conlict and various forms of exclusion. It is with this cognizance that International Alert and the Institute of Ethics and Development Studies of Uganda Martyrs University dedicated this special issue of the Journal of Development Studies (JDS) to discussion of perspectives on youths and development. Drawn from scholars and practitioners in Nigeria, Uganda and Zimbabwe, the papers in the issue are diverse — touching on the nature of youths as well as on their potential, the risks they pose and recommendations for harnessing their potential whilst avoiding their risks. The irst three papers, by Esuruku, Nwakeze and Ssentongo, concern themselves with the nature and meaning of youth, the youth bulge in Africa and conceptual perspectives that are pertinent to the discussion of the role of youths in development. The papers illustrate some of the things youths can do to promote development after which they highlight the role of politics, conlict and education in frustrating and demobilising them from developmental work and inclining them towards counter-productive activities. The papers concur on a number of conclusions: 1) constructive engagement of youths in the political process requires the support and tacit Esuruku: Youth Identity, National Unity & Development agreement of political and civic elites; 2) addressing concerns leaders may hold against the participation of youths in political processes promotes effective programming; and 3) the success of youth programmes depends largely on the extent to which young people are given the opportunity to determine priorities and leaders are given the opportunity to understand the beneits of engagement with the youth. Accordingly, the three authors demonstrate that discussion on youths is germane to discourse on Africa’s development. The rest of the papers in the issue touch on three general areas: 1) crime among youths; 2) role of youths in conlict, peace-building and post-conlict reconstruction; and 3) youths, higher education and development. Taking the case of Nigeria, Bukoye and Ogidan delve into the causes of crime among youths after which they discuss possible panaceas. Situating their work in the wider discourse on crime and development, these authors start with review of literature on the concept and scale of crime. Subsequently, they develop a discussion on “the ideal youth” before scrutinising whether gender, ethnicity and religion bear on the incidence and options for control of crime among youths in Nigeria. Ogora discusses the cultural identity of youths in post-conlict Northern Uganda. This paper highlights the role of culture in peace-building and post-conlict recovery. Thereafter, it notes that, unfortunately, in Northern Uganda, the youths have been acculturated, which limits their potential to contribute to post-conlict recovery. Therefore, the study traces some of the reasons underlying the acculturation after which recommendations that are targeted at these reasons are propounded. The papers by Olanya and Tshimba concur on the role that the youths in Northern Uganda played in sustaining the LRA conlict. They also concur that these youths have a role to play in the pursuit of sustainable peace and post-conlict reconstruction. However, the authors decry that government has not provided satisfactory opportunities for these youths to contribute to peace-building and post-conlict recovery. Ochen and Nakaiza focus on the rehabilitation of youths that were formerly conscripted into the service of rebel groups. More speciically, Ochen addresses the engendering of social rejection among formerly abducted young women in Northern Uganda while Nakaiza’s paper addresses child soldiering in the larger Great Lakes region of Africa. Nevertheless, both papers discuss the stigmatisation, among the other challenges, that the formerly conscripted youths face. Subsequently, the papers suggest recommendations towards successful rehabilitation and integration of these youths into their communities, as a necessary condition for realisation of sustainable peace. Bukuluki’s study is also closely related to the motif of the papers by Ochen and Nakaiza. Addressing the question of post-conlict recovery from the point of view of justice, the study investigates the type of justice youths that committed offences during 2 Journal of Development Studies the protracted conlict in Northern Uganda have access to. The study traces access to two types of justice, namely, retributive and restorative. This is with the conclusion that both are negotiated. The implications of this inding for successful reintegration of the youths into their communities and, subsequently, realisation of sustainable peace in these communities are discussed. Ayai’s paper discusses youth unemployment in a region that has been the victim of protracted armed conlict. Grounded on review of related literature, the paper adopts a labour market perspective as a frame for analysing the youth unemployment problem. It articulates a sobering conclusion: there is a mutually reinforcing relationship between youth unemployment and conlict. In as much as conlict hurts economic production and exacerbates youth unemployment, unemployed youths are particularly disposed to involvement in various forms of insurgency. Accordingly, Ayai underlines the urgency of the need to address the youth unemployment problem. Interestingly, the papers by Akullo and Matunhu discuss suggestions towards alleviation of the problem. Akullo reports on the indings of a study on ways in which Nkumba University, in Uganda, is using its study programmes to empower youths that were conscripted into military service during the armed rebellion in Northern Uganda; while Matunhu reports the efforts Midlands State University, in Zimbabwe, is making to promote entrepreneurship among youths. It is our hope that development policy makers and implementers ind this issue of the JDS a useful resource. It is our hope, too, that the journal reinforces research and discussion on the role of youths in development. Production of this issue beneited from the inancial support of the Swedish International Development Cooperation Authority (Sida), within the framework of the Investment in Peace series programme. Through this programme, International Alert aims to contribute to building a peaceful and prosperous Uganda where everyone, including youths, is a stakeholder and the organisation thanks Sida for its support. Our thanks also go to Richard Businge, Robert Senath Esuruku, David Okidi, Bernard Atuhaire and Stephen Okello – all of International Alert, Uganda, who have supported processes of this publication. We are also grateful to Levis Mugumya and the anonymous reviewers that advised on the suitability of the manuscripts submitted for the issue for their constructive reviews. Jude Ssempebwa, PhD Uganda Martyrs University P. O. Box 5498 Kampala, Uganda E-mail: jssempebwa@umu.ac.ug 10 August 2013 3 Journal of Development Studies 3 (2) (2013) 5 - 20 Youth Identity, National Unity and Development in Uganda: Prospects and Options Robert Senath Esuruku * Abstract: This article provides a conceptual overview for understanding youth identity, national unity and development in Uganda. The central concern of the article is based on understanding the complexity of transition from childhood to adulthood amidst a web of social, economic and political obscurities. Grounded on this conceptual framework, the paper discusses youth-driven identities and national unity, citing cases in which the involvement of youths in sports, pop culture, innovativeness and development activities has promoted national unity and development. Keywords: Youth Identity; National Development; Unity 1 Introduction Sub-Saharan Africa is the world’s youngest region, with a population of over 870 million young people.1 This represents the largest youth bulge2 ever. Pressure on inite resources, notably land, water, social services and on institutions and governments will increase, since the population of youths is expected to increase to 1.5 billion within a generation. Large parts of the region still suffer from severe poverty, hunger and disease. Despite notable improvements recorded over the last ifty years, majority of the urban dwellers in sub-Saharan Africa live in slums--without durable housing, legal rights to the land where they live, access to electricity, clean water and proper waste disposal.3 Whether the youth bulge represents an opportunity for sustainable growth and poverty reduction or threatens to introduce high rates of unemployment, economic and social exclusion, differs signiicantly across countries and regions. Although African governments are implementing various programmes to address unemployment crises, 54 per cent of Africa’s youths remain unemployed and nearly three-quarters of them live on less than * E-mail: robert.esuruku@gmail.com Esuruku: Youth Identity, National Unity & Development two dollars a day.4 This is a recipe not only for lost opportunity but also for political instability and economic chaos. Since the attainment of political independence in 1962, youths in Uganda have been confronted with several social, economic and political problems whose root causes have not been effectively addressed. There are increasing ethnic tensions, acute land conlicts, widening economic divides, deepening socio-political cleavages and corruption. Most Ugandans tend to identify more closely with their tribal identities than with the broader national identity.5 In addition, civil conlicts, an educational system that is removed from contemporary labour market needs, unemployment, HIV/AIDS, rapid population growth and abject poverty have continued to take a heavy toll on the youth. Civil war along religious and ethnic lines has also left Uganda with a legacy of displaced communities where fear, anger, and mistrust hinder return and reconciliation.6 In Northern Uganda, the focus of peace-building activities since the ceaseire of 2006 has been on post conlict recovery — under the auspices of the Peace, Recovery and Development Plan (PRDP) that is aimed at consolidating peace, tackling the root causes of conlict and improving the welfare of Ugandans. Despite a visible reduction in poverty nationally, there is signiicant divide between Northern and Southern Uganda, especially in the districts most directly affected by the LRA conlict.7 A generation of youths have grown up in internally displaced persons (IDP) camps amidst poverty, insecurity and without access to reliable services. In addition to widespread exposure to violence, the majority of these youths face the challenge of securing a livelihood with little or no formal education and training.8 Accordingly, understanding the youths in Uganda and the role that they can play in promoting national unity and development requires a framework that relects the complexities involved in their transition to adulthood amidst the aforementioned constraints. This paper attempts to contribute to the development of this framework. The paper is divided into three parts. The irst part builds a discussion on the youths and the challenges they face. Subsequently, the second part develops a conceptual framework for understanding youth identity, national unity and development in Uganda. In the third part, the paper discusses youth driven identities and national unity, citing cases in which the involvement of youths in sports, pop culture, innovativeness and development activities promotes national unity and development. 2 Putting the Youths in Perspective Youth is the period during which young women and men begin to be heard and recognised outside their families. They start to participate in social and political life on their own. This involves rights, such as the right to vote and the right to a fair trial, and obligations, 6 Journal of Development Studies such as paying taxes.9 According to the African Union, 65 per cent of the total population of Africa is below the age of 35 years, and over 35 per cent are between the ages of 15 and 35 years, making Africa the most youthful continent. Although more than half of Africa’s population comprises youths, most of them live in extreme poverty. They are particularly challenged and vulnerable as a result of poverty, unemployment, adolescent health issues, including HIV infection, conlicts and lack of participation in decisionmaking processes.10 Sociologically, youth denotes an interface between childhood and adulthood. In many African societies, the status of adulthood is largely determined by the capacity to sustain marriage.11 Those who are not married are in school and are not economically sound and dependent on their family for support. They are regarded as children or youth. On the other hand, a 13 year old boy or girl who is traditionally initiated to adulthood through circumcision is considered an adult. Thus, in the African context, deining youth poses a big challenge since it connotes different characteristics across the continent. In this paper, young women and men between the age group of 15-35 years was adopted to deine youth.12 Uganda has one of the youngest age structures in the world, with over 78 per cent of its population under the age of 35.13 The population of Uganda is currently growing by about one million people per year, and given the force of demographic momentum, Uganda will see higher rates of population growth for decades to come.14 Uganda’s demographic situation impacts on all aspects of its development, from economic growth to quality of education to health care provisions. Governance, political stability, security and adaptation to climate change are also deeply inluenced by demographic mechanisms. 2.1 Youths and Violence In an apparent response to the youth-led Arab Spring, African heads of state decided to accelerate the 2009–2018 Decade of Youth Action Plan at the African Union 2011 Summit held in Malabo, Equatorial Guinea. Deliberations at the summit noted that high youth unemployment is an impending threat to stability in Africa.15 Youth in Africa hold great potential as drivers for economic growth through participation in labour markets and also as consumers. A young population can also be a resource that leads to innovation and supports governance and political reforms. However, a large youth population that is not gainfully employed can also be a liability – further undermining growth prospects.16 The dynamics underlying the hardening ethno-regional and political identities in Uganda and their conversion into armed conlicts of alarming proportions can be explained by, among others, the underlying dynamics of social exclusion and inequality as well as state crisis and corruption. Political antagonism and conlict do not only exist 7 Esuruku: Youth Identity, National Unity & Development on the discursive level but are also produced by demographic and social contradictions that cannot be resolved within the conciliation mechanisms of the state or in accordance with the tenets of Africa’s traditional political cultures. In the recent past, youth rebellions, a new social and political idiom has become common in Uganda. Factors like ethnicity and cultural difference have been brought into play in recent years with references to ethnic oppression, and with opposition parties, civil society groups or rival presidential candidates being branded as tribalist, non-nationals and immigrants. Youth groups, for instance in Nigeria, have emerged among speciic ethnic groups and declared themselves, under the threat of intimidating violence, the custodians of public order.17 Thus, the discourse of autochthony and ethnic exclusionism has entered the politics of generational conlict. For example, in Uganda, the run-up to the celebration of Buganda’s Youth Day 2009 was marked by tension which culminated in riot in many parts of Buganda when Buganda’s Katikkiro18 was forcibly interdicted while on his way to Kayunga District as part of an advance party making preparations for the Kabaka’s19 visit to oficiate at the celebrations. Uganda government was accused of stoking tribal lames between the Baganda and the Banyala. This led to running battles between the police and youth groups which culminated into fully blown up riots which led to the death of about 10 people and the arrest of several youths and charged with treason.20 Authoritarianism and weak educational structures are more prone to youth violence, especially against the background of the demographic youth bulge. Socially rooted patterns of repeated violent practice or performance among certain groups become integrated in a way of life and thrive on intimidation and the abuse of power. Obviously, there is a contagious effect to state violence, often applied without measure and quite devastatingly, which may evoke similar practices in response. In a culture of violence, they become ends in themselves, a source of arbitrary and gratuitous inliction of physical suffering and pain on others often people from their own communities of origin. For example, following the presidential election of February 2011, the opposition leader Kizza Besigye organised demonstrations dubbed walk-to-work, to protest the country’s soaring fuel and food prices in Kampala City. Security forces responded quickly and brutally crashed the rioting opposition leaders and their supporters. The public outrage over the government’s heavy-handedness was instant. By April 14 2011, Ugandans had seen images of Besigye, the victim of a rubber-gunshot wound, standing outside Kampala Hospital with his hand bandaged and in a sling, and walk-to-work campaigns had spread to four cities across the country. Clashes between the protestors and police left at least ive people dead including a two-year-old child who was shot in the head and chest by security forces. Several people were injured and hundreds 8 Journal of Development Studies arrested, the majority of them being youths. Most of the youths that participated in the demonstrations were redundant and had nothing productive to do. 2.2 Youth Unemployment and Underemployment Youth unemployment is one of the main drivers shaping African politics over the next generation. Unemployed youths know better than anyone what it means to be without work. Nobody knows their aspirations, fears and frustrations as well as they themselves do. What marks young people out, with or without a job, is their innovative ability, creativity, energy and dedication.21 Speaking at the Heroes’ Day celebrations on 13th August 2012, Robert Gabriel Mugabe, Zimbabwean President, said youth unemployment and underemployment present one of the biggest challenges facing the nation’s peace and stability.22 The majority of youths in Africa are engaged in informal sector activities as shop assistants, farm hands, clerical assistants, typists, stewards and cooks in hotels and restaurants, in street trading, casual labour and illegal activities such as touting, stealing, armed robbery, dealing in prohibited substances such as drugs, and prostitution.23 A large proportion of youth are thus underemployed and sometimes working long hours under poor conditions yet for little remuneration. Uganda has a big challenge of a labour force that is largely unemployed. Despite this huge unemployed labour force, the Ugandan economy still has a big shortage of appropriately skilled workers which means that the education system has failed to tailor its outputs to the needs of the economy. The result has been a large number of unemployed youths who are becoming a social and economic threat. The failure to match the skills needed in the economy creates a gap in the human capital which is critical for economic and social transformation.24 Youth unemployment poses a serious political, economic and social challenge to the country and its leadership. Its persistence is making it increasingly dificult for Uganda to reduce its poverty levels. The 2009/2010 Uganda National Household Survey revealed that the unemployment rate was at 4.2 per cent in 2009/2010 compared to 1.9 per cent in 2005/2006. The survey also showed that the general proportion of youth between the age groups of 15-24 years rose from 27 per cent in 2005/2006 to 28 per cent in 2009/2010.25 Some of the major reasons behind the high youth unemployment rate are attributed to the fact that many youth lack employable skills, access to resources like land and capital. The youth also have a negative attitude towards certain types of work. Additionally, the overall existing policies also continue focusing on creating job seekers and not job creators. Every year, higher education institutions in Uganda graduate over 100,000 job seekers, the majority of whom are young people between the age group of 23-30 years. 9 Esuruku: Youth Identity, National Unity & Development Youth unemployment in Uganda stands at 83 per cent, ranking second after Niger in the world.26 The labour force is growing at a rate of 3.4 per cent per annum – resulting in 390,000 new job seekers and yet about 8,120 jobs are available each year. Uganda’s national unemployment rate stands at 3.2 per cent while that of the youths stands at a staggering 22.3 per cent (UBOS, 2010)27. Youths in Northern Uganda have very limited access to key assets, including land and physical and human capital. Most of them are poorly educated and generally less healthy compared to the rest of the country.28 Many of the youths depend on subsistence agriculture and the informal sector, where returns to labour and capital are generally low. Although important reforms to promote vocational and technical skills have been initiated by government and development partners — relecting a new and more integrated approach to education, training and employment — these are still inadequate. Multiple constraints such as an inability to adapt programmes to the needs of economies and fragmented training among different agencies still hamper the progress of technical and vocational skills training reforms. A study conducted by International Alert in 2012 indicated that the labour markets in the post-conlict environment in Northern Uganda are generally characterised by a mismatch between the labour skills on offer and the skills needed by employers. This is especially the case among young girls who are more affected by labour market conditions than boys because they face more constraints.29 For example, the culture in Northern Uganda dictates that a girl’s place is at home and not in public arena. Additionally, young mothers have to juggle domestic and formal work responsibilities. 2.3 Youth Participation in Political Processes and Development Efforts to engage youths in policy formulation at all levels have increased over the past few years. Youth participation across Africa occurs through various ways, such as through youth organisations, national youth councils, and youth parliamentary positions set up at the national or regional levels. Nevertheless, the majority of young people are excluded from decision-making procedures concerning issues that affect them. The political participation of young people bears no relation to their increasing demographic importance. Youth participation is the active engagement of young people throughout their communities. It is often used as a short-hand for youth participation in many forms, including decision-making, sports, schools and any activity where young people are not historically engaged. Youth participation has been used by government agencies, researchers, educators, and others to deine and examine the active engagement of young people in schools, sports, government, community development and economic activity. 10 Journal of Development Studies Although the youth form the biggest proportion of the population, they remain one of the greatest untapped resources in Uganda. They are not actively involved in leadership and decision-making processes. The government must wake up to its responsibilities and recognise the fact that the youths are not only tomorrow’s leaders and custodians of the future, but are active agents of social change and transformation in the present. Young people are capable of leading initiatives and proffering social solutions which when accepted in good faith and translated into positive actions could become indices of authentic growth and sustainable development. Increasing citizen participation in the governance process is the biggest challenge to strengthen democratisation process. The young people’s participation in this process should go beyond merely being used as voting instruments and agents of violence and negative change to seeking accountability, getting their voices heard and informed participation in decision-making. The potential for the youths to promote positive peaceful change towards Uganda’s development is great. Ugandan youths have the energy and intellect necessary to be a powerful force in economic, social and political transformation. Constructive youth engagement in political processes cannot happen without the support and tacit agreement of political and civic elites. Taking time at the outset to address any concerns or objections of leaders will ensure effective programming. The success of youth programmes has depended largely on the understanding that young people are given the opportunity to participate in the determination of priorities, while political and civic leaders are given the opportunity to understand the beneits of direct engagement with the youths.30 Allowing the youths to contribute to the setting of development agenda builds trust and creates buy-in and ownership. 3 Conceptualising National Youth Identity and Unity Young people’s self-concepts and identities are invariably more complicated than dominant trends in policy and academia can capture. Promoting dialogue among youths should be a priority as well as developing consciousness about the other and about commonalities. Ubuntu is an African philosophy which promotes mutual understanding and tolerance among diverse ethnic and cultural groups, between youths from different religious backgrounds and between genders. Ubuntu lends itself as a pattern for analysing youth identity and national unity in this paper. 3.1. Ubuntu and National Identity The word Ubuntu is abbreviated from the Xhosa proverb Umuntu ngumuntu ngabuntu, which loosely translates as a “person is a person through other persons”.31 Ubuntu is the 11 Esuruku: Youth Identity, National Unity & Development African philosophy of life and belief systems in which peoples’ daily-lived experiences are relected. It lows within African existence and epistemology in which the two aspects Ubu and ntu constitute a wholeness and oneness.32 Thus, Ubuntu expresses the generality and oneness of being human. It cannot be fragmented because it is continuous and always in motion. The idea of Ubuntu is regarded as indispensable to the African socio-ethical relection and it elucidates the joint rootedness and interdependence of persons. The expression of a human being depends on others, focussing on the communal rootedness of an individual to other individuals. Ubuntu inspires us to render ourselves to others. Social orientation as a point of reference, as well as collective relations with peers, is decisively imperative to the African.33 Ubuntu offers itself as a critical and relevant lens through which youth identity and national unity can be discussed. Situating youth identity and national unity in the philosophy of Ubuntu is important, because it provides the youths a sense of identity, self-respect and achievement. Ubuntu evokes ideals of truth and interconnection and confronts the greed and individualism often found in African societies. It allows the other to be and to become. Because Ubuntu gives expression to self-realisation through the other, the other needs to be respected and taken seriously.34 It enables the youths to deal with their problems in a positive manner by drawing on the humanistic values they have inherited and perpetuated throughout their history. The youths can thus make a contribution of these values to the rest of humankind through their conscious application of the values. Young people’s experiences and transactions within the social system also inluence and shape the way they relate with their family and in school. Family, peer group, and wider community provide complex systems of interaction and meaning that young people can shape and sometimes control. The importance of youth concepts, identities and systems is illustrated in cases discussed in this paper. 4 Youth, National Identity and Unity Youth dominance undoubtedly has certain advantages, not to mention the promise of tremendous dynamics. Youths have immense potential, creativity, energy, determination and a drive for innovation. It implies that youths have the capability to effect change independent of outside actors. This premise does not preclude working with adult supervision and through organisational structures. Nations cannot be built without the popular support and full participation of their youth. Economic crisis cannot be resolved without the full and effective contribution, creativity and popular enthusiasm of the vast majority of the young people. In this section, the role of religion, music, dance and drama and sports in fostering national identity, unity and development in Uganda is discussed. 12 Journal of Development Studies 4.1 Youth and Religion While in the 20th century there was massive involvement of African youths in political and violent insurgent movements, in the 21st century there is a remarkable shift towards religious activity.35 Religion is seen as an alternative circuit of meaning and dignity after failure of political engagement. Recourse to religion combines the quest for meaning in an insecure world with the creation of a sense of belonging to a wider community and presents an alternative way of knowing in the absence of access to proper public education and scientiic knowledge.36 Religious groups provide a new universe of values, replacing or superseding the family or ethnic context. There is a notable upsurge in religious life in Africa, with many youths becoming involved in Pentecostal and other Christian churches, Islamic revivalism and, in some places, neo-traditional indigenous movements.37 In any event, religious thought and its global resurgence among youths have to be taken seriously. The point made in this paper is that African youths are greatly attracted by the new religious movements and are joining in large numbers – a discourse of morality and identity that holds out the promise of regeneration and collective power with transnational resonance. These movements have a big impact on their members’ self-image, their view of traditions and on leadership ideals and roles. In addition, the economic dimension of these transnational religious movements is not to be underestimated. Not only do they receive funds from fellow members and related groups overseas, but also subsidies to propagate their faith and build new religious schools, churches and mosques in Africa.38 As the well-known examples of the Pentecostal churches in Africa illustrate, religious movements often function as frameworks of vigorous, joint economic action, promoting a new work ethic and creating new networks of opportunity. Pentecostals in Uganda are best associated with the youths. This is due to the appeal of Pentecostal Christianity to the youths, who are not contented with traditions and rigid liturgies.39 Pentecostals in Uganda have taken advantage of the liberalised media industry and set up radio and television stations. These are avenues through which youth gospel artists and preachers sell their products. The prosperity gospel, a Pentecostal teaching that presents material and economic wellbeing as a mark of approval before God appeals to the jobless and idle youths. 4.2 Music, Dance and Drama Music, dance and drama both choral and instrumental and art transcend language barriers and enable true interaction to take place among those involved. Thus, they promote peace, national unity and cooperation through mutual understanding, and are essential for the education of youths. Ugandan music is as diverse as the ethnicity of 13 Esuruku: Youth Identity, National Unity & Development its people. The country is home to over 65 different ethnic groups and they form the basis of all indigenous music. Uganda’s music fraternity comprises mainly of young men and women across the country. Music creates an arena of interaction among people of different social and cultural backgrounds. Music and dance are part of everyday life and relects traditions that have been handed down from generation to generation. A combination of music and dance presented in a ceremony constitutes a local social interaction and a form of expression of the African life and soul. The irst form of popular music to arise out of traditional music was the solo guitarist style, locally known as Kadongo Kamu, which rose out of traditional Ganda music. Later music genres drew from Kadongo Kamu – making it one of the most inluential music styles in Uganda. Currently, because of the effects of globalisation, Uganda, like most African countries, has seen a growth in modern audio production. This has led to the adoption of western music styles like Dancehall and Hip Hop. Current Ugandan popular music is part of the larger Afro pop music genre. Today, the music, dance and drama industry has attracted youths from all corners of the country regardless of their tribe, language, region and religion. Annual music, dance and drama festivals in schools, churches and cultural centres are common in Uganda. In 2003, an annual popular music competition called the Pearl of Africa Music Award was founded. It brings together musicians from Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania and Uganda with Zain (the predecessor of Airtel Telecommunications Company) as the main sponsor of the event. The event brings together people, the East African region and from different parts of Uganda regardless of their region, tribe and political afiliations. 4.3 Sports as a Uniting Factor When Stephen Kiprotich won Uganda’s Olympic gold medal in the marathon in London, the whole country celebrated. President Museveni invited him for a special breakfast and gave him two hundred million Ugandan shillings and promised to build his parents a three bedroom house and a sports ground in Kapchorwa. The Vision Media Group organised a special fund for Kiprotich which attracted the interest of both big and small companies and individuals who contributed over three hundred million Ugandan shillings for the champion. Kiprotich was also appointed Youth Ambassador of International Inspirations by the British High Commission in Uganda, to inspire the youths in the country. As a Youth Ambassador, he joins the ranks of renowned footballer David Beckham and former British world record athlete Colin Jackson. Uganda prisons also promoted Kiprotich to the rank of Senior Superintendent of Prisons (SSP). Similarly, when Akii Bua won an Olympic gold medal in 1972, President Idi Amin setup a special committee led by the then minister of education to organise a reception 14 Journal of Development Studies for the champion. In appreciation for Akii Bua’s efforts, the president gave him a house at Kamwokya; promoted him to the rank of Senior Superintendent of Police (SSP); and a road and sport stadium were named after him. The legend Akii Bua left behind still lives on and he is still the undisputed standard for sport excellence in the country.40 These are only two examples of sports achievements out of many which go beyond the sports arena. Sports transcend all social, political and ethnic barriers. Its appeal crosses educational levels, religious preferences and all language groups. Its ability to bring people together makes sports a powerful communication tool. When Kiprotich and Akii Bua stepped on the podium and were watched by the whole world, and received their gold medals and the Ugandan National Anthem was played, the whole nation celebrated. During the promotion of Kiprotich to the rank of Senior Superintendent of Prisons, the Minister for Internal Affairs, Mr Hillary Onek, proposed that Kiprotich becomes an ambassador of patriotism in Uganda. Sport is a social event which brings together people of different cultures, gender, age groups, political afiliations, race, ethnicity and religious backgrounds, either as sport producers or consumers. This was clearly demonstrated when the nation wept when the Kipolopolo of Zambia defeated the Ugandan Cranes at Nambole Stadium in a bid to qualify for the premium African football tournament as Nsubuga writes: “They all wept…. Cranes players, children, teenagers, women and men, soldiers, policemen and even politicians …it was about failure to qualify for the premium African football tournament” Nsubuga, Aldrine.41 In cooperation with relevant sector departments, sports and recreation have the ability to assist in eradicating poverty, promoting youth development, develop skills, promote tourism, intensify the campaign against HIV/AIDS, intensify the struggle against crime and contribute to peace and development initiatives. Mental and physical development through participation in sports and recreation also improves the quality of life. Participants generally have a higher life quality than non-participants. Sports can also promote development of good infrastructure, tolerance, unity, endurance, discipline and diplomacy. Values of sports for the participant include growth and development, improved cardio-respiratory functional capacity and physical working ability. Increasingly, some NGOs are using sports to reach people to tell them about important development issues such as HIV/AIDS awareness, drug abuse and noncommunicable disease prevention. Physical education and sports is a holistic integral part of education that contributes to life-long education. It is an indispensable component of education that enhances the three domains of cognitive, affective and psychomotor faculties that cannot develop through any discipline. The physical education and sports department introduced Sports 15 Esuruku: Youth Identity, National Unity & Development for Life in Karamoja (SLIK) project where it trained 512 teachers in coaching football, netball and volleyball, with support from UNICEF. It held a irst ever Kids Athletics Competition for primary pupils to identify talents among children regardless of their tribes, gender and religious afiliations. 4.4 Youth as Agents of Development Youths have always been perceived as a social and economic resource that can be cultivated. In the development assistance approach, the image of youths as a resource has traditionally emphasised the potential that youths have to steward the growth and stability of their countries and the roles they will play as the next generation. Education systems and interventions also operate according to the belief that youths are our future resources and need to be prepared for real life. In being converted to adulthood, youths rely on the guidance of their elders. The notion of youths as existing in a state of becoming suggests that people who are not able to cross the boundaries that mark the transition to adulthood will never be fully human, or at least not fully a part of society. Young people are characterised as a generation in waiting. If youths cannot fulil their development-prescribed role as resources for the future, their agency in the present becomes invisible. Marginalisation of the youths will further reinforce the social, economic and political separation of youths from adults. In various ways the youths in Uganda continue to demonstrate that they are innovative and they can drive the development of the country. Recently, Makerere University students developed a two-seater electric vehicle named Kiira-EV. In November 2011, it successfully completed its irst test run, reaching a top speed of 65 kilometres per hour and nimbly making its way up a 55-degree incline. According to Paul Isaac Musasizi, who oversaw the development of the project, Kiira-EV is capable of reaching a speed of 150 kilometres per hour, and can run for up to 80 kilometres on a single charge. Aside from its steering wheel and other accessories, every other component was designed and constructed domestically. Perhaps what is more important is what this innovation symbolises for the youth and Uganda. According to Musasizi, when the project started, they wanted to demonstrate that Uganda has as good talent as that in the US or Germany. Development of any country hinges directly and indirectly on the promotion of not only socioeconomic policies and infrastructure but cultural understanding and development as well. Given their large numbers, the youths should see themselves as the prime labour force and should engage in productive activities for the development of the country. The youths should become conscious in and of themselves by realising that the country belongs to all irrespective of their social origin, tribe, race, religion, 16 Journal of Development Studies language, political party and region. Therefore, the youth should take centre stage in building bridges among people of diverse backgrounds to nurture a strong nation. Thinking about youths as a social, cultural and economic resource in the present, with rights to participation and value for society may lead to national unity. 5 Conclusion Youth identity and national unity in a multi-ethnic society presents challenges that call for a multi-pronged approach. In Uganda, these challenges have fuelled socio-political conlicts that have threatened unity and peaceful coexistence. There are many forms of identity that impose limits on people’s access to resources. These are principally linked to ethnicity and nationality, in addition to political afiliation, class, religion, education, language and gender.42 In such an environment, patronage and corruption thrive and result into a perception that cultural diversity represents exclusion to the detriment of national identity, unity and development. In order to take full advantage of its youths, and to ensure future prosperity, heavy investment is needed in the education, health and employment of these youths. The effective implementation of youth policies requires that youth-related issues are prioritised on the development policy agenda. Youth-related issues are often marginalised due to challenges such as internal conlicts or poverty. However, issues concerning youths require critical thinking and strategic planning. To date, many relevant issues have been responded to in an ad-hoc manner, without adequate consideration for their long-term implications on youth populations. However, this paper demonstrates that we need to build a country where social, economic and cultural conditions allow all the citizens, including the youths, equal opportunities to freely participate in the political affairs of the country. Notes United Nations, 2010.World Programme for Youth report in Youth and the United Nations, New York: United Nations. 1 A country incurs a youth bulge when the population group under the age of 24 is larger than all other age groups. 2 Chabane, Collins Ohm, 2011. Putting Young Africans to Work: Addressing Africa’s Youth Unemployment Crisis, Johannesburg: The Brenthurst Foundation. 3 4 Ibid. 17 Esuruku: Youth Identity, National Unity & Development CSOPNU 2004. The Need for National Reconciliation: Perceptions of Ugandans on National Identity, Kampala, Uganda: CSOPNU/JAYAK. 5 Latigo, James Ojera 2008. Northern Uganda: Tradition-based Practices in the Acholi Region. In Traditional Justice and Reconciliation after Violent Conlict: Learning from African Experiences, Stockholm: International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance. 6 International Alert 2010. International Alert Uganda Three Year Programme Strategic Plan 2011-2013, Kampala: International Alert. 7 International Alert 2012. Unlocking Opportunities for War-affected Youth in Northern Uganda, Kampala: ACCS Report 8 World Bank, 2006. World Development Report 2007: Development and the Next Generation. Washington, D.C.: The World Bank. 9 Organisation of African Youth, 2012, Putting Young People at the Heart of Regional Development, African Youth Conference on Post-2015 Development Agenda, Nairobi: January 2013. 10 Chigunta, Francis, 2002, The Socio economic Situation of Youth in Africa: Problem, Prospects and Options www.yesweb.org/gkr/res/bg.africa.reg.doc. Assessed 12th January 20123. 11 This is in line with 2006 African Union youth charter and Uganda government’s very recent eligibility criteria for youth venture capital fund. 12 POPSEC, 2012. The State of Uganda Population Report 2012, Kampala: POPSEC/ UNFPA. 13 Population Action International, 2010, The Effects of a Very Young Age Structure in Uganda, Washington DC: PAI 14 African Union. 2011. Decisions Adopted during the 17th African Union Summit, 23 June– 1 July, 2011, Malabo: African Union. 15 Agbor, Julius, Taiwo Olumide & Smith Jessica. 2012. Sub-Saharan Africa’s Youth Bulge: Demographic Dividend Or Disaster? http:// www.brookings.edu /~/media/research/iles/ reports/2012/1/ priorities% 20foresight% 20africa/ 01_youth_bulge_agbor_taiwo_smith. pdf. Accessed 5th January 2013. 16 Abbink , Jon. 2005. Being young in Africa: The politics of despair and renewal, Leiden: Leiden University. 17 18 One of the most powerful appointed advisers of the Kabaka, he is in charge of the kingdom’s administrative and judicial systems, effectively serving as both prime minister and chief justice. 19 Kabaka is the title of the king of the Kingdom of Buganda. 18 Journal of Development Studies International Crisis Group, 2012. Uganda: No Resolution to Growing Tensions, Africa Report N°187, Nairobi/Brussels: International Crisis Group. 20 Lübeck, Media Docks. 2004. Youth and the Job Market: Prepared for Each Other? http:// www.ilo.org/public/english/employment/yen/downloads/events/1lc/youth_dialogue_1708. pdf. Accessed on 14th January 2013. 21 22 Dumisani Muleya, Editor‘s Memo: Mugabe speech dramatic irony writ large, Zimbabwe Independent, August 19th 2012. Okojie, Christiana E.E. 2003. Employment Creation for Youth in Africa: The Gender Dimension, paper presented during Expert Group Meeting on Jobs for Youth: National Strategies for Employment Promotion, 15-16 January, 2003, Geneva, Switzerland. 23 Government of Uganda. 2012. Draft Uganda Vision 2040: Accelerating Uganda’s Socioeconomic Transformation, Kampala: National Development authority. 24 Uganda Bureau of Statistics, 2010. Uganda National Household Survey-2009/2010: Socio-Economic Module, Kampala: UBOS. 25 Young Leaders Think Tank for Policy Alternatives N/A. The Challenges of Youth (Un) Employment in Uganda, http://www.kas.de/wf/doc/kas_29017-1522-2-30. pdf?111020125918. Accessed on 3rd January 2013. 26 To further lend credibility to these indings, in the 2011/2012 budget of Uganda, the Minister of Finance recognised that because of the high levels of unemployment, the Ugandan economy can only absorb 20% of its youth (MoFPED, 2011). 27 International Youth Foundation, 2011. Navigating Challenges, Charting Hope: A CrossSector Situational Analysis on Youth in Uganda, Kampala: International Youth Foundation/ Youth Map Uganda. 28 International Alert, 2012. Youth Perceptions on Economic Opportunity in Northern Uganda: Findings from Acholi and Lango, Kampala: International Alert (Coming soon). 29 Bryan, Shari. 2010. The Youth Bulge in Africa: Opportunities for Constructive Engagement in the Political Process. www.ndi.org/iles/Youth_Bulge_Africa_102710.pdf. Accessed on 5th January 2013. 30 Swanson, Dalene M. 2007 Ubuntu: An African Contribution to (re)search for/with a Humble Togetherness. Journal of Contemporary Issues in Education 2(2): 53-67. 31 Nabudere, Dani Wadada N/A. Ubuntu Philosophy: Memory and Reconciliation, http:// www.grandslacs.net/ doc/ 3621. pdf. Accessed on 28th September 2012. 32 Nabudere, Dani Wadada N/A. Ubuntu Philosophy: Memory and Reconciliation, http:// www.grandslacs.net/ doc/ 3621. pdf. Accessed on 8th January 2013. 33 Villa-Vicencio, C. 2009. Walk with Us and Listen: Political Reconciliation in Africa, Washington DC: Georgetown University Press. 34 19 Esuruku: Youth Identity, National Unity & Development Argenti, N. 2002, ‘Youth in Africa: A Major Resource for Change’, in A. de Waal & N. Argenti (Eds.), Young Africa: Realising the Rights of Children and Youth, Trenton/Asmara: Africa World Press. 35 Abbink , Jon. 2005. Being young in Africa: The politics of despair and renewal, Leiden: Leiden University. 36 Kanneworff, Anna Besty. 2008. “These Dread-Locked Gangsters” The Mungiki as Dramatic Actors in Kenya’s Public Arena: From Political Protest to Political Participation? In Abbink, Jon & Dokkum, André van eds., Dilemmas of Development: Conlicts of Interest and their Resolutions in Modernising Africa, Leiden: African Studies Centre. 37 Abbink, Jon. 2005. Being young in Africa: The politics of Despair and Renewal, In Abbink, J. & Kessel, W. M. J. van eds., Vanguard or Vandals: Youth, Politics and Conlict in Africa, Leiden: African Studies Centre. 38 Musana, Paddy. 2012. The Effects of the Pentecostal Movement in Uganda: Changing Perceptions of Pentecostalism, In Understand Uganda: 50 Years of Independence 9th October 1962 - 9th October 2012, Kampala: Daily Monitor. 39 40 Vision Group. 2012. Uganda: Building of A Nation, Kampala: Vision Group 41 Nsubuga, Aldrine, 2012. When the nation Wept, Saturday Vision, October 20, 2012. John De Coninck, 2011. Pluralism: what relevance for Uganda? http://www. opendemocracy.net/john-de-coninck/pluralism-what-relevance-for-uganda. Accessed 23rd January 2013. 42 20 Journal of Development Studies 3 (2) (2013) 21 - 32 Youth Bulge and Demographic Dividend in the Context of Africa: What Do We Really Know? Ngozi M. Nwakeze 1, * 1 Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Lagos, Nigeria Abstract: One of the greatest development challenges facing Africa today is meeting the expectations of the young population and to equip them with the necessary skills that will enhance their productivity. In response to this challenge, this paper re-examines the concept of youth bulge and the interlinked issue of demographic dividend in the African context. Speciic emphasis is put on the youth unemployment crisis. Using secondary data, descriptive statistics and using secondary data and descriptive analysis, the results allowed for a deep understanding of the concepts of youth bulge and demographic dividend as well as the intricacies involved in applying the concepts across space. It was evident from the Nigerian example that unemployment increases as the population expands. The indings provide insight into the future of Africa’s youthful population and suggest policy measures to cope with the youth bulge. Keywords: Youth Population; Youth Unemployment; Demographic Dividend 1 Introduction On 31st October, 2011 the world population was estimated to be 7 billion. A large proportion of this population are youths and a substantial share is from the global south, particularly Africa. No doubt, the youths consists of the crucial human resource required by a developing economy, particularly for the attainment of MDGs. This is because they are usually energetic young men and women with creative minds. Hence, it is important to maximise fully their potential. The youths have more tendencies to migrate from rural areas to cities with the hope of getting better access to education and employment opportunities as well as * E-mail: ngnwakeze@yahoo.com Nwakeze: Youth Bulge & Demographic Dividend in Africa adequate health care. Unfortunately, they do not always get their hopes and aspirations materialised. The challenge facing many countries in recent times is how best to meet the needs of their large youth populations, something that will ultimately determine their peace, security and progress. It is assumed that with the right investments in the youth through education, health, agricultural development and entrepreneurship, the large youth population can be an opportunity and not a threat to peace and development. But, these investments are not being made in most African countries. The major objective of this research paper is to re-examine the concept of youth bulge and the interlinked issue of demographic dividend with special reference to Africa. The speciic objectives are: 1. To examine the age structure of the population of African countries with a view to ascertaining whether the continent has a youth bulge or “excess youth” population; 2. To highlight the enormous potential and contrasting realities of the African youths in terms of employment; and 3. To suggest ways and means for African countries to reap the dividend of her youthful population. 2 Conceptual Framework and Literature Review 2.1 The Concept of Youth Bulge The word youth has been variously deined. According to UNFPA (2003:4), the youth covers the age bracket 15-24 years. Youth bulge is hereby deined as demographic period in which the proportion of youths in the population increases relative to other age groups. This deinition is consistent with Assad and Barsoum (2007) who explain youth bulge as a situation where the proportion of youths in the population increases signiicantly compared to other age groups. However, the concept of youth bulge is not clearly understood demographically. There are many important and contentious issues related to the issues of youth bulge and demographic dividend especially in the context of Africa. An unanswered question is whether youth bulge is a sound scientiic statement or mere political statement. 2.2 Demographic Dividend Demographic dividend is deined as a situation when falling birth rates changes the age distribution so that fewer investments are needed to meet the needs of the youngest age groups and resources are released for investment in economic development and family welfare (Ross, 2004). A similar assertion is made by Lundberg and Lam (2007). As the age structure changes within a population, there is noticeable change in the value of economic variables such as savings, labour supply, education, health care and retirement 22 Journal of Development Studies income. The age group 0-15 requires intensive investment in health and education, the age group 15-64 supplies labour and savings while those above 65 years require health care and retirement beneits. There are two levels of the demographic dividend. The irst period is the stage of demographic transition when there are low fertility and mortality rates. At this stage, there is less young population relative to the population entering the labour force. This creates opportunity to move resources to investment in economic growth and development. Other things being equal, per capita income grows more rapidly and this is the irst dividend. The second dividend occurs as a result of the saving ability of the older working population nearing retirement. They save to accumulate assets and to meet their consumption needs during retirement. However, the second dividend may not occur if there is perception on the part of prospective retirees that their future needs will be met by the government or family members. The demographic dividend is delivered through a number of ways among which is labour supply, savings and human capital are the most important. The high rate of population growth especially among the youths increases the supply of new entrants into the labour market. During this period, the working population grows relatively more than the dependent population thereby allowing for excess resources for savings and investment in economic development. The savings effect of the demographic dividend is as a result of excess income generated from the working population. People in the working-age often tend to produce more and save more as a result of the fall in the number of people dependent on them. Furthermore, the ability to save increases when individuals born during the periods of high fertility move into their 40s--with their children now independent and requiring less support. Therefore, these savings are mobilised and channelled into productive uses. Increase in the number of the working population is a vital source of human capital. At the start of the demographic transition, there are low fertility and mortality rates and this results in better health for the population especially women. As a result of this, opportunities exist for women to be educated and join the workforce thereby increasing the quality and quantity of human capital. It is, however, important to note that the demographic dividend will only materialise when there is sound macroeconomic environment to facilitate investment. There is also expected to be investment in human capital vis-à-vis education and health and improvement in the domestic inancial market to aid savings. What is the situation in Africa? 23 Nwakeze: Youth Bulge & Demographic Dividend in Africa 2.3 Investing in the Youth Bulge There is need to address the critical challenges facing the youths in order to maximise their potentials for social and economic development and, for instance, reverse the trend of the HIV/AIDS pandemic. Over the years, there has been a gradual increase in global awareness about the vital role of the youths in sustainable development. For example, in 1985, the United Nations drew the attention of the world to the importance of the youths, by declaring that year, International Youth Year for Development and Peace. Afterwards, the roles of the youths in sustainable national development in any society have attracted interests in academic literatures. At the same time, the emergence of the youth bulge can also be used to predict the probability of political and civil violence. It has been argued that if the youths are marginalised and not adequately and appropriately integrated into the decision-making process, they can resort to violence and other socioeconomic activities which are anti-development (Tegenu, 2011 and Hendrixson, 2003). Unfortunately, most of the Nigerian youths belong to the latter category. They have not been given due attention and appropriately integrated into national development process. Investing in young people is not an end in itself; rather it is a means to an end. Breaking the cycle of poverty among young people will empower them to be agents of development. Increased investment in young people’s education, health (Sexuality and HIV/AIDs), skills and employment can be a source of increased economic growth and development via increase in productivity. Investment in education must be accompanied by job creation to achieve the desired goals of increased productivity. Appropriate investment in the youths can also help to reduce the risk of political instability, violence, criminal activities, drug abuse and abuse of technology. Finally, involvement of young people in policies which directly or indirectly affect them helps to develop self-conidence in them and boost their self-esteem. As a result of their participation, they see themselves as active participants rather than passive observers in the development process. Consequently they would volunteer to render service to their community and society at large. Bloom and Williamson (1997) and Bloom, Canning and Malaney (1999) look at the debate on youth bulge comprehensively. They argue that if economic opportunities exist or expand in the same proportion as the youth population, enormous economic growth can result. Another empirical support for a positive effect of the youth bulge is provided by Ross (2004). He posits that personal and national savings capable of fuelling investment and economic growth are likely to increase as the structure of the population shifts away from the very young age distribution. Unfortunately, the youth bulge often strains the educational system (for examples, there are limited facilities/equipment and 24 Journal of Development Studies high teacher/students ratio) and aggravates unemployment thereby increasing the risk of confusion, frustration, discontentment and rebellion. There has also been literature on the relationship between the population of the youth and violence (Staveteig, 2004; Hendrixson, 2003; Cincotta, et al, 2003; Hammel and Smith, 2002; Urdal, 2002). For instance, Staveteig (2004) argues that while factors like presence of valuable resources, the degree of ethnicity and political regime are major determinants of insurgence, the age structure of the population should not be ignored. She concludes that countries with more youths are often poor and less developed. In line with the view of Staveteig (2004), Mastny (2004) points out that a youth bulge without adequate jobs, training and employment aggravated the problem of civil war in Sierra Leone. A study by the National Intelligence Council (2004) views the youth bulge as a threat to development in the future. It adds that a youth bulge, weak states and poor economies are likely to combine together to fuel conlicts in various parts of the world. This is the case in the Arab world today. Other studies have also linked terrorism to youth bulge without economic opportunities (Sprinzak, 2000; Pape, 2005). In the opinion of Tegenu (2011), the size of the youth itself is not the problem but rather it is the kind of development policy the country is pursuing that matters. 3 Methods The data used in this paper were obtained from the ILO (2012), The World Bank, Population Reference Bureau and Fund for Peace (2012). The analysis was done using descriptive statistics. In order to ind out the relationship between growth rate of real gross domestic product (GDP), unemployment rate and population, a case of Nigeria was presented using a trend analysis. 4. Findings and Discussions 4.1 The Structure of the African Population The age structure of a population affects a nation’s key socioeconomic issues. In fact, evidence abounds that the divergence in global economic growth and development are partly as a result of population dynamics. Countries with young populations need to invest more in the education and health sectors while countries with older populations need to invest more in the health sector. The population pyramid of Africa shown in Figure 1, clearly indicates that the continent has a young population. It is projected that the population will continue to increase up to 2100 given the built-in momentum. 25 Nwakeze: Youth Bulge & Demographic Dividend in Africa Figure 1: Population Pyramid of Africa Africa: 1950 Africa: 2010 105 100 105 100 90 90 80 Females Males 80 70 70 60 60 50 50 40 40 30 30 20 20 10 10 0 100 50 0 50 Africa: 2050 100 0 105 100 105 100 90 90 80 80 70 70 60 60 50 50 40 40 30 30 20 20 10 10 0 100 50 0 50 100 0 100 50 100 50 0 50 Africa: 2100 0 50 100 100 (millions) Source: United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division (2011): World Population Prospects: The 2010 Revision. This trend clearly marks the emergence of a youth bulge in Africa as the proportion of the population classiied as youth has shown a steady rise over the last decade. To further buttress this point, see Table 1. 26 Journal of Development Studies Table 1: Countries with the Youngest and Oldest Populations in 2011 Youngest per cent Ages <15 Oldest per cent Ages 65+ Niger 48.9 Japan 23.2 Uganda 48.3 Germany 20.7 Mali 47.6 Italy 20.2 Angola 47.3 Greece 18.9 Zambia 46.5 Sweden 18.5 Burundi 46.3 Portugal 17.9 Congo Demo. Rep 46.0 Bulgaria 17.7 Mozambique 45.3 Austria 17.6 Chad 45.3 Finland 17.5 Burkina Faso 45.2 Latvia 17.4 Source: Population Reference Bureau (2011) From Table 1, the top ten countries in the world with youngest population are from Africa. Each of these ten countries has more than 45 per cent of the population below age 15. Also none of the top ten countries with oldest population is from Africa. In the past decade, few African countries (e.g. South Africa, Botswana and Zimbabwe) experienced fertility transition. In countries like Ghana and Kenya, the decline in fertility rates appears to have stalled. The explanations for the reversals are not very clear, an indication that Africa will remain a young population even in decades to come. What is the implication of this scenario on the African economy? Certainly, there are risks as well as opportunities for having a young population. It is important to note that a country’s age structure shows a strong relationship with the strength of the State. According to Earth Policy Institute (2011), the index of failed states is found to be closely linked to the demographic indicators. For instance, the countries that have 60 per cent or more of their population under 30 years of age and have poor employment prospects are considered especially at risk for political instability. The failed state index for 2012 indicates that out of the top 20 failed states in the world, 16 are from Africa. The variables used in computing the index are demographic pressure, poverty and economic opportunities, human light, security, among others (see Table 2). 27 Journal of Development Studies Refugees and IDPs Group Grievance Human Flight Uneven Development Poverty and Economic Decline Legitimacy of the State Public Services Human Rights Security Apparatus Factionalized Elites External Intervention 15 16 17 18 19 20 Somalia DRC Sudan South Sudan Chad Zimbabwe Afghanistan Haiti Yemen Iraq CAR Cote d’Ivoire Guinea Pakistan Nigeria Guinea Bissau Kenya Ethiopia Burundi Niger Uganda Demographic Pressures 1 2 3 N/R 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 Total Table 2: Failed States Index (2012) 114.9 111.2 109.4 108.4 107.6 106.3 106.0 104.9 104.8 104.3 103.8 103.6 101.9 101.6 101.1 9.8 9.9 8.4 8.4 9.3 9.0 8.9 9.5 8.8 8.0 8.8 7.9 8.3 8.5 8.4 10.0 9.7 9.9 9.9 9.5 8.4 9.0 8.1 8.7 8.5 9.7 9.0 8.0 9.0 6.5 9.6 9.3 10.0 10.0 9.1 8.7 9.4 7.0 9.0 9.7 8.5 9.0 7.9 9.6 9.7 8.6 7.4 8.3 6.4 7.7 9.0 7.4 8.8 7.0 8.6 5.6 7.6 8.0 7.2 7.6 8.1 8.9 8.8 8.8 8.6 8.9 8.1 8.6 8.4 8.7 8.7 7.7 8.1 8.2 8.9 9.7 8.8 7.3 7.3 8.3 8.9 7.7 9.5 8.7 7.7 8.0 7.4 8.9 7.2 7.5 9.9 9.5 9.5 9.1 9.8 9.4 9.5 9.3 9.1 8.4 8.9 9.6 9.5 8.3 9.1 9.8 9.2 8.5 9.5 9.5 9.1 8.5 9.3 9.0 7.8 9.1 8.3 8.6 7.0 9.1 9.9 9.7 9.4 9.2 9.3 8.9 8.5 7.7 8.4 8.3 8.5 8.3 8.7 8.6 8.6 10.0 9.7 9.7 9.7 8.9 8.7 9.7 8.2 9.7 9.9 9.6 8.9 9.4 9.3 9.2 9.8 9.5 9.9 10.0 9.8 9.8 9.4 9.0 9.8 9.6 9.1 9.9 9.2 9.1 9.8 9.8 9.6 9.5 10.0 7.8 7.5 10.0 9.7 8.3 9.0 9.3 10.0 7.3 9.4 6.6 99.2 8.7 7.5 5.7 7.7 7.8 9.0 9.3 8.5 7.5 9.4 9.2 8.9 98.4 97.9 97.5 96.9 8.9 9.6 8.8 9.3 8.4 8.7 8.9 6.9 8.9 8.1 8.0 7.7 7.7 7.0 5.9 6.0 8.2 7.9 7.9 7.6 7.3 7.4 8.8 8.6 8.6 7.2 8.3 8.4 8.1 8.4 8.5 9.2 7.4 8.6 8.1 7.9 7.6 8.1 7.4 8.2 9.0 8.7 7.9 8.6 8.4 8.2 9.0 8.4 96.5 8.8 8.2 7.7 6.9 8.1 7.5 8.0 8.6 7.8 8.3 8.7 7.9 28 Journal of Development Studies The big question is: how best can African countries realise the beneits of their large and still growing youthful population? 4.2 Youth Bulge and Employment Crisis Unemployment is not a new issue in development discourse but what is worrisome is the ever increasing number and lack of opportunities of decent jobs. The situation is worsened by the global economic crisis. Employment crisis has serious implications for youth migration and their transition to adulthood. Unfortunately, the statistics on youth unemployment is grossly inadequate in Africa. According to the ILO (2012), youth unemployment has been shown to be tightly linked to social exclusion. On the economic point of view, idle youths are not contributing to the economic activities of their countries. Instead of being net assets, the unemployed youths are net burden as they depend on their family for inancial support. The labour market situation is such that the youth face speciic barriers such as the inexperience trap and they are more likely to have fewer contacts. The youths, especially women, face structural barriers in their attempt to secure decent jobs. Due to limited information, there is often a mismatch between the demand and supply of skills in the labour market. Education should serve as a shield against unemployment for many youths but with a large youth population graduating, it is increasingly dificult to get employment. Nigeria, the most populous African country, is a classic example for exploring the link between population and unemployment as well as the growth rate of the economy. 4.3 The Nigerian Case Figure 2 shows a trend analysis on growth in real gross domestic product, unemployment and population growth for the periods 1980 to 2012. There was a steady increase in unemployment rate during the last decade, from 13.1 per cent in 2000 to 23.9 per cent in 2012. The real gross domestic product exhibited a more oscillatory pattern. It was 7.4 per cent in 2012. The population growth rate remained relatively the same at rates above 2.5 per cent over the period (Figure 2). 29 Nwakeze: Youth Bulge & Demographic Dividend in Africa Figure 2: Trend in population growth rate, unemployment rate and growth rate of real gross domestic product (1980-2012) 30 25 20 15 GRGD 10 UNEMP 5 POP 0 -5 80 82 84 86 88 90 92 94 96 98 0 2 4 6 8 10 12 -10 -15 In the Nigerian case, demographic pressure may have contributed to youth employment crisis. The high rate of unemployment attests to the fact that the “economic window of opportunity” termed demographic dividend is not a reality for Nigeria. 5 Summary and Conclusion This paper has re-examined the concept of youth bulge and demographic dividend in the context of Africa. The demographic structure of African population clearly indicates that the continent has a youthful population and that the trend will continue in decades to come due to the population momentum. Unfortunately, economic and decent job opportunities are limited. To reap the full demographic dividend, there is a need to invest in the education of the young people as well as create employment opportunities. This will greatly minimise the unproductive use of the youth’s time and energy such as engaging in drug traficking, internet fraud, child traficking, prostitution, kidnapping and terrorism. Finally, the paper suggests strategies for Africa to maximise the gains from the youthful population in order to turn youth demographic pressure into demographic dividend: Those youths that are neither in education or employment (NEET) are more of risk than opportunities to their countries and focus should be on them. The youth labour market situation in Africa requires appropriate macroeconomic policies to promote better labour market outcome for the youths. Skills for life should be emphasised. 30 Journal of Development Studies The youths should be actively involved in decision-making because it will give them a sense of hope and responsibility. The spirit of volunteerism should be re-engineered in the youths for effective community participation. References Assad, R. G., Barsoum, G. (2007). Youth Exclusion in Egypt: In Search of ‘Second Chances’, Middle East Youth Initiative Working Paper No. 2, September 2007. Bloom, D. E., D. Canning, P. N. Malaney (1999). Demographic Change and Economic Growth in Asia (CID Working Paper). Cambridge, MA: Centre for International Development at Harvard University. Bloom, D. E., J. G. Williamson (1997). Demographic Transition and Economic Miracles in Emerging Asia (Working Paper 6268). Washington, DC: NBER. Cincotta, R. P., R. Engelman, D. Anastasion (2003). The Security Demographic: Population and Civil Conlicts after the Cold War. Washington, DC: Population Action International. Earth Policy Release (2011). Data Highlight on Demographics and Failed States. Available at www.earth-policy.org/data_highlights/2011/highlights20 Fund for Peace (2012). Failed State Index. Available online at http/www/fundforpeace.org. Hammel, E., E. Smith (2002). Population Dynamics and Political Stability. In Neil J. Smelser and Faith Mitchell (eds.). Discouraging Terrorism: Some Implications of 9/11. Washington, DC: National Academic Press. Hendrixson, A. (2003). The “Youth Bulge”: Deining the Next Generation of Young Men as a Threat to the Future. Hampshire: Population and Development Programme. ILO (2012). Global Employment Trends for Youth 2012. Geneva: ILO. Mastny, L. (2004). The Hazards of Youths. World Watch Magazine. Pp 18-21, September/ October. National Intelligence Council (2004). Mapping the Global Future, Reports of National Intelligence Council’s 2020 Project. Washington, DC: Available online at http://www.foia. cia.gov/2020/2020.pdf. Pape, R. (2005). Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism. New York: Random House Inc. Population Reference Bureau (2011). 2011 World Population Data Sheet. Available at http:// www.prb.org/Publications/Datasheets/2011/world-population-data-sheet.aspx. (Accessed on September 23rd 2013). Sprinzak, E. (2000). Rational Fanatics. Foreign Policy. 120, Pp 66-73, September/October. Staveteig, S. (2004). Age Structure, Valuable Resources, and the onset of Civil War Worldwide, 1960-2000. Vienna: Paper presented at the Young Scientists Summer Programme MidSummer Workshop, International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis. 31 Nwakeze: Youth Bulge & Demographic Dividend in Africa Tegenu, T. (2011). The Youth Bulge, Rapid Urbanisation and Political Violence. http://www. aigaforum.com/articles/understanding Egypt rev.php. Urdal, H. (2002). The Devil in the Demographics: How Youth Bulge inluences the Risk of Domestic Armed Conlict, 1950-2000. Paper presented at the International Studies Association 43rd Annual Convention, New Orleans: Louisiana. UNFPA (2011). State of World Population 2011. UNFPA. World Bank (2012). World Development Indicator. Washington D.C.: The World Bank. 32 Journal of Development Studies 3 (2) (2013) 33 - 62 Youth, Social Heritage, Political Manipulation and Pluralism in Kibaale District, Uganda Jimmy Spire Ssentongo 1, 1 * Uganda Martyrs University Abstract: Considerable research has been done about ethnic conlict in Kibaale. However, in spite of their active role in the conlict, the youth as a category hardly feature in the studies so far done. Such omission leaves a knowledge gap that would cripple any analysis on the possibilities of co-existence in the area. This paper tries to explore the ethnic intricacy that the youth of Kibaale District are faced with and to discuss some of their views on the causes of the existing tension and possibilities for pluralism. The study is based on a single-site case in order to allow for in-depth analysis, basing on the researched people’s own accounts, and it is qualitative in approach. Data was collected on youths both in and out of school through triangulating one-to-one interviews, observation and focus group discussions. In the youth’s perception of the causes of ethnic tension in the area, political manipulation featured as one of the key factors, thus explaining why tension often escalates around election time. Other causes include memories of oppression, exploitation and marginalisation of the Banyoro by the British and the Baganda. Some elders use these painful memories to mobilise the youths ‘to claim their time’ and not allow history to re-occur. The non-Banyoro, on the other hand, fear that they could be evicted from Kibaale, yet it is their new home. In this mazelike situation, the youths’ agency is seen in claiming their space in dealing with issues that concern them. Keywords: Social Heritage; Political Manipulation; Pluralism 1 Introduction Extracted from a wider PhD research1, this paper is motivated by the observation that peace initiatives often fail because of a failure to engage with the multi-dimensional * E-mail: jssentongo@umu.ac.ug Ssentongo: Social Heritage, Political Manipulation and Pluralism nature of conlicts/tension. The other signiicant observation is that even where peace initiatives are put in place, they often fail because of their limited participatory compass. Some groups only come on board as implementers of what has already been decided without their input, thus often leading to detachment from the peace initiatives due to failure or refusal to own the initiatives. Among such often excluded groups are the youths yet this is the group that is known to be actively involved (often used by others) in times of violence. The youths must be in a position to understand the dynamics and evolution of the conlict that they are faced with. But this is not to say that they should only be on a listening end as audiences for lectures from elders who often make an exclusive claim to community memory. They should be part and parcel of the peace initiatives, with their voices and aspirations brought on board. They should be participants in shaping the future. This paper, therefore, tries to bring forth and engage with some of these voices within the context of the entangled ethnic realities in Kibaale District. Kibaale District, which is part of Bunyoro Kingdom, is located in western Uganda. As shall be highlighted in the background of this study, the phenomenon of ethnic tension in Kibaale District is an intricate one. It is entangled within a conglomeration of ethnically polarised histories, the agency of both painful and victorious collective/individual memories, politicised ethnicity, and ethicised politics. The historical dimension of the tension apparently exacerbates the problem by occasioning a tendency to sideline the youths (especially the Banyoro) in peace initiatives since they ‘do not have the memory of the evolution of the problem’. The tension is further complicated by a drastic immigrant population growth plus the rise in economic and political strength amidst a native population still nursing memories and other effects of subjugation by ‘foreigners’ (the British and the Baganda). For the youths, the possibility of pluralism within such an environment remains a big question (but not of the kind that cannot be answered). It is a question of a complexity stretching beyond mere possibility to the interrogation of what such pluralism would entail. The spirit of the interrogation is based upon the acknowledgement that pluralism itself, though with some universal benchmarks (Plaw 2005), is, to an extent, contextual. 2 Context of the Study Humanity is grappling with a number of social issues that have seemed to elude solutions up to today. One of the key problems facing contemporary society is that of managing the various forms of difference. “Difference animates key conlicts of our time. Claims about difference breathe life into cultural, ethnic, religious and values conlict” (Brigg 2008, 6). Among the most notably sensitive differences in the African context is ethnicity 34 Journal of Development Studies which has led to social tension and exclusion of some groups from their full rights as citizens (Ratcliffe 2004). Youths have equally been victims (and perpetrators) to this, but rarely active frontline agents. Unfortunately, as reported by Kurtenbach (2008), mainstream peace-building literature and peace-building initiatives have only begun to include youth as important actors. In its Vision 2025, where it commits itself to the task of carefully managing ethnic diversity in the country, the Uganda government acknowledges that although the country is very beautiful in almost all ways, “Uganda has been, regrettably, really rotten from within in terms of ethnic conlicts” (Republic of Uganda 1998, 303). To substantiate the above strong statement, among others, it highlights the following violent ethnic confrontations in Uganda’s history: The uprising of the Bamba and Bakonzo against the Batooro and the Central Government in 1962; the 1966 confrontation between the Baganda ethnic group and the Central Government [in which the latter deposed the former’s king by military force] which was deemed to be Northern [in inclination]; the wanton and brutal massacres of members of the Acholi and Langi ethnic groups during the Amin regime; the equally wanton and brutal retribution by these latter groups against ethnic groups from the West Nile region – Idi Amin’s home region – after the fall of Idi Amin; the war in the Luwero Triangle; and ... the ... civil war in the north (Republic of Uganda 1998, p.303). The above testimony serves to illustrate the urgency of coming up with sustainable solutions, especially by youths as they try to shape a better society for their future. It should, however, be emphasised that the execution of reconciliation and/or peacefostering measures is often (or ought to be) a contextualised exercise. This means paying attention to all the tiny details with regard to the conlict/tension at hand. It may not be possible to disentangle without a careful scrutiny of the knots and dynamics in a given entanglement. Kibaale District was one of the vivid hotspots of ethnic tension at the start of the st 21 century. However, like with most forms of socio-political organisation and relations in Africa (Mamdani 2001; 2004), the roots of this tension can be traced back to colonial times, and this helps us to contextualise the complexity of its resolution. In the 1890s, the British colonialists faced much resistance in establishing their rule in Bunyoro Kingdom. Hence, they resorted to collaborating with Buganda Kingdom (who had pre-colonial rivalry with the Banyoro over territory and might) to ight the Banyoro. This move marked the defeat of Bunyoro towards the end of the 19th century and, in appreciation of the support from Buganda and/or for strategic reasons2, the British ‘donated’ a big and very culturally signiicant fraction of Bunyoro land (six counties3 – later to be known as the ‘lost counties’) to Buganda (Schelnberger 2005; Espeland 35 Ssentongo: Social Heritage, Political Manipulation and Pluralism 2006). This chunk of land was geographically larger than the original size of Buganda – too large to be ignored by Bunyoro. In humiliation of the Banyoro, through the authority of the British colonisers, Buganda effectively sent chiefs to administrate and embark on ‘Bugandanising’ Bunyoro by entrenching Baganda language and culture and thereby acculturating the Banyoro (Kihumuro 1994). By legal means, Runyoro (the language of the Banyoro) was effectively banned from oficial communication and all the Banyoro had to adopt Baganda names. Many Banyoro elders still nurse these memories as they still bear Baganda names such as Musoke, Lwanga, and others. This is a memory that some Banyoro youths know about but are relatively less attached to in comparison to their elders, some of whom experienced it and still do through their Luganda names. Sometimes youths are sidelined from peace-related decision-making on account of this memory gap and relegated to a position of instruments to be mobilised and used during conlict. In 1964, as had been recommended by the colonialists upon their departure in 1962, a referendum was held in two of the six ‘lost counties’, Buyaga and Bugangaizi. The vote was in favour of returning the territories to Bunyoro. Schelnberger (2005) reports that, consequently, the Baganda chiefs and their agents were chased away from Bunyoro with spears and machetes. But they left without giving up their legal ownership of the land and kept their oficial land titles for more than 2,995 square miles (Republic of Uganda, 2006). These are known as ‘absentee landlords’. This situation left the Banyoro effectively as squatters in their native land, and had to pay feudal dues (land rent) to the absentee Baganda landlords. This caused bitterness, thus fuelling negative memories of domination. Even though a Land Fund was later established by government in 2002 to redress the historical injustices and inequities in the ownership by buying out the absentee landlords from the area, much land still remains in the latter’s hands. It is this land that the youth are told was fought for by their fathers and grandfathers and, therefore, that it is their turn to ight for it as their heritage. As we shall see later, their heed to this elders’ call has not been without consequences. In addition to this historic presence of the Baganda and the Banyoro people in the area, a number of other ethnic groups have been settling in Kibaale over time. Most of these settlers are from south-western and western Uganda. Some have settled through oficial state resettlement schemes. The Commission of Inquiry into Bunyoro Issues (2006) indicates that about 300 Bakiga families were resettled in Ruteete – Kagadi in 1973 by the government under an arrangement initiated by Kigezi leaders in consultation with the Omukama of Bunyoro (Sir Tito Winyi). Another oficial resettlement scheme was the Bugangaizi resettlement scheme of 3,600 Bakiga families in Nalweyo – Kisiita in 1993 who were previously evicted from Mpokya Forest Reserve. Due to the above 36 Journal of Development Studies resettlement schemes and other factors, the largest population of the Bakiga (126,312) in Bunyoro Kingdom is found in Kibaale District (Republic of Uganda 2006, 38). The upsurge in numbers of migrants has to some extent brought about fear among the indigenous Banyoro youths as the former are seen to be occupying a lot of land and taking up political positions that would otherwise be a reserve of the Banyoro. In observation of these series of resettlements, the Mubende Banyoro Committee, an ethnic pressure group formed in 1918 to ‘ight’ for Banyoro rights, feels that, by resettling groups of people there, government has turned their region into “a dumping ground of refugees and migrants” (Mubende Banyoro Committee Memorandum – MBC – 2005, in Republic of Uganda 2006, 213). It can be read from MBC’s memorandum that this feeling is not helped by the fact that the Banyoro did not consent to government’s resettlement schemes. This group was later to mobilise the Banyoro, especially the youth into violent confrontation with the non-Banyoro. However, some of the new settlers were invited by the native Banyoro and were given land along forests in order to shield the Banyoro’s gardens against vermin and wild animals (Nsamba-Gayiiya 2003). Some were given land by local chiefs for token payments while others bought it from the native Banyoro. Many more people have migrated to the area in search of land and/or following their relatives. Bunyoro has been a convenient place for resettling other Ugandans who were overpopulated in their areas (especially Kabale and Kisoro districts) because the war between the British government and the kingdom, from 1893 to 1899, and the diseases that broke out thereafter left the area with virtually no population (Kihumuro 1994; Republic of Uganda 2006). Initially, the settlers were quite well received in the then sparsely populated area and they mainly served as labourers for the indigenous Banyoro. But with the increase in numbers of settlers and the attendant cut-throat competition for resources and power, inter-ethnic conlicts started to emerge in the wake of the 21st century (Green 2006). Large scale open violence took place between February and May 2002 when a Mukiga was elected as the District Chairman4. The incumbent Munyoro Chairman refused to hand over power to someone they considered to be a ‘foreigner’ and clashes ensued between Banyoro and the settlers. The Banyoro started to claim back land from non-Banyoro. Violence again emerged in April 2003 when news spread that land that belonged to Bakiga was being allocated to the Banyoro by the District Land Board (Espeland 2007). The violence that followed left three people dead, several others injured, huts burnt, and livestock killed (Schelnberger 2005). In 2005, Schelnberger observed that the situation was calm but the conlict has remained at a stage of high alert where it could easily break out into open violence again. The tense situation is not helped by the worsening 37 Ssentongo: Social Heritage, Political Manipulation and Pluralism youth unemployment in the district that is creating an atmosphere of hopelessness and frustration. With a tendency of escalating during elections, tension remains to date. In the analysis of the Committee of Inquiry into Bunyoro Issues, “the Banyoro think that they are being re-colonised while the other tribes think that their survival in the region will be guaranteed only if they are in charge” (2006, 45). Such feelings seem to put the two sides on a conlicting path. To further complicate the case, government intervention has at times only served to aggravate the tension. This is partly because it is viewed in terms of the side government would be believed to support in the Banyoro–Bafuruki polar equation. After the Mufuruki (immigrant) LC V Chairman had been forced to step down for a compromise replacement in 2002, government felt that there was a need to come up with a policy to prevent such a scenario from recurring. In a letter titled Guidance on the Banyoro/Bafuruki Question (July 2009), the president, who apparently justiied the Banyoro’s rejection of non-indigenous leaders, asks: 1. If the Bafuruki dominate political space in the area to which they migrated, where do the indigenous people of the area ind another political space? 2. If the Bafuruki were more nationalistic, why could they not ind some persons among the indigenous people and vote for them? 3. Can some people from indigenous groups successfully compete, politically in the areas of origin of the Bafuruki? If not, is this not an unequal relationship? 5. Suppose we were to infuse 100,000 Bafuruki into Acholi or Karamoja [other Ugandan ethnic communities], what would be the reaction? If the Acholis and Karamojong were to react violently, would it mean that they are not Ugandan enough or would it be that the policy was wrong? In an apparent condemnation of the migration of the Bakiga [the dominant immigrant group] into Kibaale, “an already enfeebled population [of the indigenous Banyoro] on account of history”, he argued that “horizontal rural migration by peasants after they have exhausted land in one area is not a progressive way of creating national integration. The more correct way is vertical migration, from the farm to the factory”. On account of the above contentions, as one of the possible solutions, the president proposed as 20-year afirmative action: 1. Ring-fencing the LC V positions in the whole of Bunyoro region for the indigenous people; and also ring-fencing the sub-county leadership except for the sub-counties around the Kisiita and Luteete areas [the resettlement schemes]; 2. Ring-fencing the positions of members of parliament in the whole of Bunyoro region for the indigenous people, except for the special constituencies created around Luteete [sic] and Kisiita resettlement schemes. 38 Journal of Development Studies The president’s suggestion was considerably lauded by the Banyoro. In a rebuttal, Mirima (2009) argues: The Banyoro, understandably, fully support the president’s position. They say that they have been victims of colonial suppression for generations, a marginalised minority, purposely kept backward to satisfy colonialists policies, which polices [sic, policies] were unfortunately inherited by independent Uganda’s successive governments even after the country attained independence. ... Banyoro’s prayer is that these proposals reach cabinet, then go to parliament and are given the force of law so that they can be implemented. However, some Banyoro, represented by the LC V Chairman of Masindi District (also within Bunyoro Kingdom), felt that the suggested ‘afirmative action’ was an insuficient concession. Instead, they suggested that: “For anybody to contest for any leadership position from parish level to member of parliament, that person’s paternal grandparent should have lived in Bunyoro by 1926” (cited in Gyezaho 2009). This requirement would certainly disqualify most of the Bafuruki. On the other hand, the president’s suggestion was met with resistance and contempt from a wide section of the non-Banyoro within and outside Bunyoro. Commenting on the president’s proposal in the Abu Mayanja Memorial Lecture – August 7, 2009, Mamdani felt that in such a suggestion: The real shift is in the deinition of citizenship. Nationalists deined citizenship as Ugandan, regardless of origin; Amin deined it as black Ugandan. But, today, it is proposed that the core rights of citizenship - the right to political representation - be deined on a tribal basis. The NRM47 is the irst government in the history of independent Uganda to propose a dilution of national citizenship in favour of a tribal citizenship. My argument is that if we adopt this proposal, we shall be returning to an arrangement resembling colonial rule. In re-emphasis of his thesis of contemporary African politics as more of a colonial legacy, Mamdani interprets the president’s proposal as the usual reference to the colonial book in ‘times of crisis’. In another move to resolve the tension, in 2010, the president passed a directive to the Attorney General and Minister of Local Government to create two new counties/ constituencies. He said: “we need to split Buyaga with a new constituency centred around the former Lutete [Ruteete] refugee camp to cater for the Bafuruki, and also to split Bugangaizi, to create a county/constituency around Kisiita [resettlement scheme] to cater for the Bafuruki there” (Lumu 2010). Although the move was rejected by Bunyoro 39 Ssentongo: Social Heritage, Political Manipulation and Pluralism Kingdom, it was ultimately implemented. The idea seems to have been that of making sure that each group gets representation at parliamentary and other local government levels6. Whether this can help in bringing about short- and long-term harmony remains a lingering question. More to this question is the anxiety about the place of the youth in this solution. Does it merely guarantee ethnic balance or also try to accommodate the generational concerns between the youths and their elders? Still in a bid to sort Bunyoro’s issues and in display of their signiicance, in 2011 a fully ledged Ministry for Bunyoro Affairs was announced. The minister appointed to head the above ministry (Saleh Kamba) was neither from the area nor a Munyoro. In response to this development, the Prime Minister of Bunyoro Kingdom (Yabeezi Kiiza) said: “We thank the president for creating a ministry for us but the appointment of a minister who is not a Munyoro is a big concern for us. We have several people from Bunyoro who qualify to head it (the ministry)” (quoted in Mugerwa 2011). The above response together with the rejection of a non-Munyoro LC V Chairman in Kibaale in 2002 seem to point to a nativist feeling among the Banyoro that issues of Bunyoro ought to be, irst and foremost, their business to determine. But this is contested by some non-Banyoro and it raises questions on its implications to wider society if, after oficial endorsement, it spills into other areas in Uganda. It also raises concern over the possibility of pluralism amidst such ethnic differences in Kibaale, especially, in this case, as projected by the youth. This study reveals that the Banyoro are not happy with what they call the arrogance of the Bakiga and their refusal to adopt Banyoro culture, respect their king (Omukama) and learn their language (Runyoro). MBC also claimed that “due to arrogance, the settlers have failed to be assimilated or learn the ways of the people who hosted them” (Republic of Uganda 2006, 192). It is not well-received among a wide section of the Banyoro that a number of Bakiga still practise their culture and speak their languages and have even re-named some of the places in Kibaale with Rukiga7 names. There is a simmering fear among both old and young Banyoro that their culture could give way to that of the immigrants. On the other hand, in an open memo to the president authored by 36 “leaders from the non-Banyoro community living in Kibaale District”, it is argued that “we believe that non-Banyoro living in Bunyoro do not have to deny their culture and identity in order to be considered respectful. We also believe that respect for one community’s culture cannot be a one-way street” (The Observer 2009). In the same communiqué, the immigrants also feel that it is their constitutional right to stand for any electoral position in the area, practise their culture, and legally settle where they wish. 40 Journal of Development Studies With regard to pluralism and for the concern of the youths, the demands and aspirations of the two groups as presented above cannot be met simultaneously. Since “goals and activities become incompatible when one’s own interests are threatened by the actions of another [and] ... tensions essentially emerge due to the pursuit of different outcomes or disagreement on the means to attain the same end” (Jeong 2008, 5). The trends and events in Kibaale District raise anxiety about the possibility of pluralism in Kibaale. The above background serves to highlight that the complexity of the Kibaale equation is in its entanglement in history, political manipulation, inlux of immigrants and mutual fears between the indigenous population and migrants. It is important to establish and analyse what the youth make of this entanglement, especially in view of the possibilities for co-existence. The next sub-section explains the methodology that was used in this study. 3 Research Methodology The study was designed around a single-site case that is mainly aimed at an in-depth analysis and understanding of the selected case. As argued by Stark and Torrance (2005), under such a design, it would be possible to engage with and report the complexity of social activity in an ethnic setting in order to represent the meanings that individual social actors bring to the setting and manufacture in it. The design adopted here raises a serious epistemological question: “What can be learned about the single case” (Stake 2005, 443)? This being a qualitative study, the focus was on ‘typicality rather than generalisability’ (Henn et al. 2006). However, as contended by Bechhofer and Paterson (2000) and Henn et al. (2006), whereas representativeness and generalisability may not be key concerns in qualitative studies, the typicality of the selected cases can allow for some degree of analytic generalisation/wider resonance. Analytically, the indings from this study may be generalised to other communities of ethnic tension which, for theoretical reasons, may behave in a similar way. The adoption of a qualitative approach is because of the assumed value of the speciic local context and in order to foreground local people’s own lived experiences (Marshall and Rossman 1995). In a study on the human experience, it is essential to know how people deine and explain their situations and give meaning to their daily lives (Berg, 2001). Accordingly, a situational ethno-methodological perspective is speciically adopted here. Situational ethno-methodology studies a wide range of social activity in order to “… understand the ways in which people negotiate the social contexts in which they ind themselves” (Cohen et al. 2007, 24), speciically in this case, how they (youth) negotiate a context of ethnic tension. 41 Ssentongo: Social Heritage, Political Manipulation and Pluralism Data was collected by triangulating observation, one-to-one interviews and focus group discussions in order to come up with a comprehensive picture and cross-validate indings. Archival data was also used to beneit from prior studies and other relevant records. 43 Although some relevant data from categories other than the youth is presented and discussed in this study, the targeted population is speciically the youths. The rationale for selecting the youths was that they do not only feature a lot as active agents in ethnic violence/ tension but they are also a category often sidelined in decision-making, in conlict resolution, and difference negotiation mechanisms. This happens in spite of the fact that any engagement in exclusion of youths, who are a vital category, may not be sustainable. 4 Youth, Ethnic Tension, and Pluralism in the Literature 4.1 The Concept of Youth The deinition of youth varies from one culture to another and, in some cases, from one individual or organisation to another. The UN General Assembly deines youth as population that falls in the age bracket of 15-24 (cited in World Bank 2006). According to Kurtenbach (2008), in some societies, the upper age limit for youth goes as high as 34. The Uganda National Youth Policy8 (2001) places youth between 12 and 30 years, three years below the UN General Assembly lower limit and six years above its upper limit. Ironically it identiies itself as being ‘in harmony’ with the UN deinition! The policy vindicates its deinition as an attempt to capture a period of time where an individual’s potential, vigour, adventurism, experimentation with increased risks and vulnerabilities show in a socially meaningful pattern. It further argues that it is around the age of 12 that family and extended kinship ties loosen and children start assuming adult responsibilities. It is also normative in the sense that it is at this age that preparing young people for adult responsibility should start. Arguing that deinitions of youth are highly dependent on history and culture, Kurtenbach (2008) observes that the concept of youth only became an important category in the process of industrialisation and urbanisation when the unity of work and life was dissolving. Youth as a social category was non-existent in traditional societies. In Kurtenbach’s view, therefore, in the traditional setting, youth came in as a transitional stage in the process of growth from childhood to adulthood. Otherwise, traditionally one was either a child or an adult. However, Kurtenbach’s view may not apply to all traditional societies. Among the Baganda, the youth category has existed as abavubuka (youths). Whereas youths are excluded from the adult category, depending on circumstances, they may sometimes be referred to as children. Before elders, they remain children; whereas in contrast to children, they are abavubuka. 42 Journal of Development Studies From another point of view, youth may be referred to as the period of life between primary education and work. Such a period is characterised by a number of stages involving: the end of compulsory education, entry into marriage, and/or economic independence from the parents (World Bank 2006). This signiies that the youth concept is highly dependent on context. It should be noted that even when we choose to consider transition from compulsory education, the educational stages and corresponding age may differ from one society to another. The baseline in our deinition of youth, therefore, needs to be established within the context/case at hand without necessarily operating within rigid age brackets that may exclude historical and cultural realities of some societies. 4.2 Understanding Ethnicity The term ethnicity and its derivative ethnic cannot be taken for granted. Apart from the fact that it is a contested category, ethnicity comes along with a variety of connotations. It has been used as a metaphor for a variety of things which could be understood differently (Muhereza and Otim 1998). It is, therefore, important that we explore its use in the literature and discuss it for conceptual and operational clarity. Bates (2005) takes ethnicity to connote group identiication based on a common name, descent and culture, and common language and territory. To him, it is mainly perceived as a psychological aspect and an attitude of mind and practice. On top of its socio-anthropological leaning, ethnicity can thus be understood better through studies in group psychology. Chazan et al. (1992) think that ethnicity has its foundations in combined remembrances of past experience and in common inspirations, values, norms, and expectations. In line with Bates’ view, Chazan et al. contend that in ethnicity’s capacity to stimulate awareness and a sense of belonging among the potential membership of a group, the psychological dimension of ethnicity complements and buttresses the political dimension of interest-oriented social action. Bates also notes that ethnicity is often used to mean collectivities that share a myth of origin. His deinition is close to an earlier one by Weber (1968). Weber emphasises the importance of ancestry and history, and, most often, migration and settlement or political passage, be it escape from oppression or the colonisation of new territory. Barth (1969), on the other hand views ethnicity as a form of social organisation in which the participants themselves play a primary role in determining and maintaining their identity. The sense of attachment to an ethnic group is normally voluntary. But Barth’s deinition falls short of clarifying forms of social organisation that can be considered ethnic and those that are not. Not every social organisation where the participants themselves play a primary role in determining and maintaining their identity is ethnic. 43 Ssentongo: Social Heritage, Political Manipulation and Pluralism Although insuficient in explanation, his relating of ethnicity with identity maintenance (or boundary marking) is an important dimension. Brink, cited in Okuku (2002, 8), summarises the concept of ethnicity as “a sense of … identity consisting of the subjective, symbolic or emblematic use by a group of people of any aspect of culture in order to create internal cohesion and differentiate themselves from other groups”. This deinition subtly suggests that ethnic groups are only concerned about internal and not external cohesion (coexistence with other ethnic groups). But in a society growing more cosmopolitan and globalised by the day, ethnic groups are taking on a dynamic path where cohesion with others outside the group is sometimes strategically put into the picture, especially in the context of the rational choice theory9. Moreover, in certain instances, internal cohesion may necessitate external cohesion. For example, internal cohesion would be affected if an ethnic group was not at peace with the surrounding ethnic groups or those with whom they live. In this study, and drawing from the above review, ethnicity is considered to denote relationships between groups of people who consider themselves to be culturally10 distinct from others. 4.3 Youths in Ethnic Tension Felice & Wisler (2007) and Kurtenbach (2008) observe that youths are generally perceived either as victims or as perpetrators of violence in discussions of youth in conlict. It is only recently that they started appearing in literature as autonomous actors. It is, however, largely the case that youths feature actively in many instances of tension and violence. A number of explanations have been given as to why youths tend to be active players in conlict and/or circumstances under which they become violent. One such explanation has been provided by Huntington in his book, The Clash of Civilisations (1996). It has come to be popularly known as the ‘youth bulge thesis’. Huntington argues that societies with a large age group of young males that lack perspectives for the future are more conlict-prone than others. Whereas the youth bulge thesis could bear some truth, it is reductionist in stance. It does not put into consideration the other social changes that may come with demographic shifts and, by extension, their polarising effect. It also fails to consider cases where youths are simply mobilised into violence even where there may not be any youth bulge. But one important aspect to pick from the thesis is that youths act violently out of frustration or lack of perspectives for the future. We shall see that this is a big factor in the Kibaale ethnic tension. We also need to critically look at the phenomenon of youth manipulation and mobilisation by elites and/or elders with their own agenda or agenda that may genuinely concern the youths. The World Youth Report (2003, 375) observes that “leaders use 44 Journal of Development Studies emotional appeals – placed within religious, cultural, [ethnic], and political contexts – to mobilise people; youth are targeted, in particular, as they are more susceptible to ideological messages”. Youths often become a gullible target in situations where they harbour frustrations, which the manipulators can take advantage of to mobilise them. According to Adossi (2009), adults in such scenarios take advantage of the fact that the youth’s faculty of analysis is not fully developed for drawing the right conclusion from what is proposed to them. In Adossi’s view, it is important that we consider that the age category of youth is the biological period for adolescence and post-adolescence. This period is prone to idiosyncratic conlict characteristics such as envy, jealousy, prejudice, physical aggression, teasing, gossiping, bullying and conlict of identity. It is interesting to note that these characteristics coincide with a moment of physical energy and determination to overcome obstacles. It should be added here that the above characteristics do not as such indicate that youth will always tend towards conlict, but that the characteristics make them vulnerable to manipulation and mobilisation towards conlict especially where the mobilisation is built upon their own anxieties and frustrations. One of the sources of frustration is the fact that: Youth ... are often marginalised in decision-making processes. At the local and national levels, they are expected to obey political and religious community leaders [and elders]. At the international level, they have little say in the formulation and implementation of policies that are meant to protect their interests and well-being during peacetime and wartime. Nonetheless, they must endure the sometimes brutal socioeconomic effects of these decisions, and their long-term needs are left unmet (World Youth Report 2003, 378). Their exclusion from decision-making exercises often results into their concerns being side-lined and/or a feeling of being marginalised and not being appreciated. This is not to say that adults will always side-line them maliciously. Sometimes they are not involved on the paternalistic assumption that they cannot make wise decisions and, therefore, need to be thought for. Whereas the above assumption may hold to some extent, it is not enough reason for their exclusion. They ought to be listened to and, as much as possible, participate in making decisions that impact on their well-being and aspirations. 4.4 Youth and Pluralism In the sense in which the term pluralism is used in this paper, it is a relatively new concept. In some writings, pluralistic society is one that is diverse (Okuku 2002). According to Eck (2006), pluralism is not diversity alone, rather, it connotes the energetic engagement with diversity. In the words of Marty (2007, 16), “speak of ‘pluralism’ and you venture to a 45 Ssentongo: Social Heritage, Political Manipulation and Pluralism terrain in which people have thought about what to do about diversity”. Pluralism is thus viewed as a stance that embraces the fact of plurality and gives it a positive interpretation (Pratt 2005). Whereas diversity tends to be a given, pluralism is not; it is an achievement. Mere diversity without real encounter and relationship will yield increasing tensions in our societies (Eck 2006) As such, in Uganda’s context (and Kibaale in particular), the peaceful accommodation of ethnic differences remains key to successful democratic development (Berman et al. 2004). More speciically, how youth feature in this encounter is of paramount signiicance that calls for due study and emphasis. Bellamy (2001) further clariies that pluralism is not just tolerance, but the active [but sometimes spontaneous] seeking of understanding across lines of difference (Eck 2006, emphasis mine). Tolerance is a necessary public virtue, but it does not require people of different ethnic groups to know anything about one another. It is thus seen as too thin a foundation for a world of ethnic difference and proximity. In Eck’s view, tolerance does nothing to remove our ignorance of one another, and leaves in place the costly stereotype, the half-truth, and the fears that underlie old patterns of division and violence. In further contrast of pluralism with relativism, Connolly (2005) argues that pluralism is not ‘absolute tolerance’, which is the stance of relativism. In his view, pluralism sets limits to tolerance. Connolly contends that pluralists are not relativists because “… our image of culture encourages us to embrace certain things in this particular place; to be indifferent to some; to be wary of others; and ight militantly against the continuation of yet others” (p.42). He grants that pluralism tries not to set limits to diversity. It will allow a wide diversity of religious faiths, sensual habits, ethnic traditions, gender practices, and several other forms of diversity. However, a ‘democratic pluralist’ will not allow the state to torture prisoners; parents to deprive their children of education; wealthy citizens to evade taxes; or narrow utilitarians to get into positions of public authority. In this pluralistic sense, Connolly (2005, 43) adds, “a diverse culture is one in which pluralistic virtues of public accountability, self-discipline, receptive listening, grittedteeth tolerance of some things you hate, and a commitment to justice are widespread”. Connolly, therefore, believes that pluralism ought to operate within the bounds of civic virtues. Among such virtues, Parekh (2000) highlights recognition of human worth and dignity, promotion of human well-being or of fundamental human interests, and equality. But enlisting and abiding by these civic virtues does not necessarily resolve issues of value conlict. Parekh himself admits that such values deal with the most basic aspects of human life about which there is generally little serious disagreement, and fail to guide us once we go beyond such aspects. Unlike absolute tolerance, pluralism invites diverse people to come as they are and be themselves, with all their differences, pledged only to the common civic demands of 46 Journal of Development Studies citizenship. It is yet to be established whether Ugandan society is ethnically pluralistic. For example, Gaju (2005) has already shown that, contrary to popular belief, to a large extent people are egoistically tolerant since entrants have to adapt to the natives’ cultures in order to be accepted. But such a practice could as well be a marker of intolerance to difference. The principle seems to be: ‘you either become like us or we do not accept you’. ‘We can tolerate you if you become like us’. Put differently, “if they [you] insist on retaining their separate cultures, they [you] should not complain if they [you] are viewed as outsiders and subjected to discriminatory treatment” (Parekh 2000, 197). That cannot be tolerance. Moreover, there is always no guarantee that when one assimilates they will be fully accepted. They could still be excluded on account of their past identity or even an aspect of their identity such as physiological features, which they cannot put aside. Forster et al. (2000) insist that pluralism should not be confused with assimilation. To them, assimilation involves the merging of minority and majority groups into one, with a common culture and identity. As such, under assimilative circumstances, much is not on terms of equality. Much power is wielded by the majority group especially in the presence of an immigrant minority group. This scenario could as well occur in favour of a minority group that has the advantage of force, such as in colonial encounter. In both cases, for its survival, the minority group has almost no option but to adopt the norms and traditions of the dominant group. Assimilation is thus seen as an ethnocentric, superiority-oriented and patronising imposition on minority peoples struggling to retain their cultural and ethnic integrity (Alba and Nee 2003). It inconsiderably narrows room for difference by projecting majority culture as the ideal whose adoption is the gatepass to acceptability. I would agree with Parekh (2000) that there is nothing wrong with assimilation if it comes as a deliberate choice of minorities but that it should not be a necessary precondition for citizenship. Minorities also have a right to retain and promote or transmit their ways of life whose denial would not only be unjust but could also lead to resistance. Apart from the consideration that youths are often side-lined in decision-making and in engaging with ethnic differences in communities, it is important to investigate how youths actually engage with differences and why they feature in those particular ways. Among other reasons explained in this paper that make the youth a crucial category with regard to pluralism is because “that is the age of acquiring experience and learning how to live and coexist with other people who do not have the same background and standard of life” (Adossi 2009, 25). We expect social interaction between groups and individuals with competing interests and interests to reveal basic incompatibility. How such ‘incompatibility’ (real or perceived) is allowed to be managed, actually managed or/and thought about by the 47 Ssentongo: Social Heritage, Political Manipulation and Pluralism youth is important to understand in order to ascertain the possibilities for pluralism in a given context and, in this case, within a case as entangled as Kibaale. 5 Voices of Kibaale Youths One of the aims of this study was to investigate the youth’s perceptions of the causes of ethnic tension in Kibaale. Basing on these perceptions, the study sought to establish the youth’s imaginations of the possibilities for engagement with ethnic differences in the area especially with their active participation in shaping a society of coexistence. With no disregard for the other factors that account for ethnic tension in the area, key emphasis will be put on manipulation and instrumentalisation of the youth. This is mainly because, from the indings, the youth’s role in the tension mainly gravitates around these factors. An attempt is also made to discuss the reasons for their situational prominence. 5.1 Manipulation and Instrumentalisation of Youth in Kibaale Conlict The World Youth Report (2003, 375) reveals that “leaders use emotional appeals – placed within religious, cultural, [ethnic], and political contexts – to mobilise people; youths are targeted in particular, as they are more susceptible to ideological messages”. This observation is attested to by the indings from Kibaale. In one of the interviews, a young man narrated how he came to participate in the conlict that ensued after the election of a non-Munyoro LC V Chairman in 2002. He recalled that a number of young people were approached by agents of the MBC. The youths, including the interviewee were given money before they boarded cars to go to attack the Bafuruki who were ‘stealing their land’. They came in organising the youth (who did not know anything about the [Mubende] Banyoro Committee) that we should block those people who have come into our district – that they are going to take our land. So they come in with an idea that they are protecting the things of Bunyoro and what they are feeding is the past. That in the past they used to cut people’s property, kill people, and burn their houses... Because they had got some money, some people boarded [lorries] without knowing what they were going to do! (Interview held on September 19, 2012) This testimony shows that the youths are rendered gullible by their desperation due to lack of money or means for survival. It came up in several interviews and casual conversations that there are many youths in the area without any meaningful employment. In such desperation, they can easily heed the war calls especially as the targeted ‘enemy’ is painted as part of their problem. The ‘ethnic others’ are enemies who have come ‘to take away our land, our ancestral land’. 48 Journal of Development Studies The youths would also feel that this is their time and that they have a duty to carry on the ight against a marginalisation that is weaved in history and retold by the mobilising elders that narrate how they fought sellessly against colonial British and Baganda domination. In this discourse, one igure that one will hardly miss in the story of Bunyoro, in general, and Kibaale, in particular, is the late Joseph Mujoobe Kazairwe. Among the Banyoro, he is credited for reinforcing Banyoro patriotism by introducing the militant approach in the MBC in the 1950s as they fought against Baganda rule and agitated for the restoration of the lost counties to Bunyoro. He was also the front igure in the revival of the MBC in 2001 – to rise against the Bafuruki threat. In this study, Kazairwe’s name featured so often in accounts of youth mobilisation during the times of ethnic tension. In his biography of his father (Kazairwe), Mirima (2004) narrates that youths from the farthest corner of Bunyoro-Kitara made daily visits to Kazairwe’s home to bring political mobilisation reports and to be briefed on political mobilisation developments. It is told how, through the popular Kibaale-Kagadi Community Radio (KKCR), he would emotionally tell stories of the heroism of their days that the youth were told to learn from, in order to claim their time. The non-Banyoro respondents also severally pointed out Kazairwe’s messages not only as a cause for their fear and insecurity at the time but also as a shaper of their preparedness to ight for their stay. The youth recounted that “what they are feeding us [with] is the past”. The narratives of the bravery of their forefathers in ighting the oppressors of their time and the historical losses are then supposed to spirit up the youth today in ighting the Bafuruki threat. The emotive impact of the relayed ‘sense of victimhood that stems from unacknowledged [or acknowledged but] and unreconciled historic losses’ should not be underestimated (Montville, cited in Cairns and Roe 2003, 4). The motive of the elders in using this history as a mobilising instrument may be innocent since the pain in the Banyoro story is conspicuous. It is, however, clear that, regardless of the genuineness of the cause, appealing to such a memory in times of tension turns youths into lethal agents against their targets. And that is what they precisely became at the time. They adopted Kabalega leega (Kabalega stretch – as with a bow and arrow) as a war cry (Mirima 2004). It strategically appeals to the memory of Kabalega as a great Munyoro patriot who fought against the British in defence of his kingdom. This is not to mean that the youth are only manipulated into but not affected by Bunyoro’s past, especially in a direct way. The question of land is still a sensitive one. Although some would argue that the issue of land titles being owned by ‘absentee landlords’ is epiphenomenal, it came up in a focus group discussion with youths as a critical factor. One participant said: 49 Ssentongo: Social Heritage, Political Manipulation and Pluralism We do not know which land we are going to inherit. Our fathers and grandfathers do not own land here, they are mere squatters! Can you believe that most land here is owned by Baganda, some of whom do not even know that they have land here? We have no securities for acquiring loans to start-up businesses, no land to call our own! (Focus Group Discussion held on September 18, 2011) This view was also echoed by the youth representative in the Bunyoro Kingdom parliament (Rukurato). Pointing at the bush outside where we were seated at Birembo War Memorial Institute, he said: “... all those lands you see, it is for absentees! The landlords are in Buganda; they are in the UK!” Although he did not support violence against non-Banyoro, his remark brings forth a jittery feeling of dispossession whose eventual character is hard to precisely imagine but could border on tension. The fact that land is still in the hands of absentee landlords is corroborated by the Presidential Advisor on lands11’ revelation that of 3,636 absentee landlords in Kibaale, since 2003 only 360 landlords had been cleared through the Land Fund12. The non-Banyoro youths would say that they also work hard to acquire their land. It should be noted, however, that in the two resettlement schemes in Kibaale (Ruteete and Kisiita), each family was given land of about 10 to 12 hectares. The Banyoro youths argued that they ind it unfair for an in-coming group to be given land of their own while the indigenous people are still squatting on their ancestral land. This was highlighted as one of the causes of the tension. It may not be a strong factor in itself, but when it is inlamed by manipulative politicians and dressed in polarising tones – it is blown out of proportion. One youth who unsuccessfully contested for a member of parliament position in 2011 argued that “the conlict is always attributed to land... But the real issue is at times of politics”. In more emphasis of the role of politics in the tension, another non-Munyoro youth explained: ... if it is not an election period, the word Omufuruki is not existent amongst the people of Kibaale. We cooperate well, you ind a Munyoro drinking with a Mufuruki and a Mufuruki drinking with a Munyoro. We eat together! Even in times of dificulty; at times you may have failed inancially, you call and ask: ‘Do you have 100,000/= there?’ We even do business together. It was, therefore, important to interrogate the views of youths on politics in connection to ethnic relations in the area. It should be recalled that the spark of full-blown conlict in Kibaale was around politics. This was with the election of a non-Munyoro as the LC V Chairman, which is the highest political position in the district. Politicians from both sides were very active in mobilising for ‘their own’. According to one non-Munyoro 50 Journal of Development Studies respondent, who was a youth leader at the time of the 2001-2003 conlict, said that “it was every goat on its peg13’. Another youth added that for the young non-Banyoro, tension starts at this point. “We knew little about the history and the Baganda–Banyoro conlicts of old. They came reminding us how they carried out [sic] the conlicts. They inculcated in us the Mufuruki–Munyoro differences”. It is a common accusation in Kibaale that the Bafuruki are arrogant. The ‘arrogance’ is partly attributed to their insistence on taking up leadership positions in Kibaale where ‘they have been hospitably hosted’. They came as farmers and are expected to stick to farming and leave leadership alone. In a way, this is projected as a gesture of gratefulness and respect for their hosts. In the same vein, Kasiriivu Atwooki, the member of parliament for Bugangaizi West argued at the Bwanswa Peace Dialogue that when you go to an area: ... you must know the area; you must know the people; you must know their history. After knowing, then you understand. It is not enough to know, you must understand; and after understanding you appreciate. If you do the three things: you know, you understand and after understanding you appreciate, you go a long way. However, some non-Banyoro youths argue that they were born and bred in Kibaale and should not be excluded in an attempt to show appreciation for the memory of pain and injustice of the Banyoro. As such, the non-Banyoro’s attempt to claim political space, which is their constitutional right, sometimes innocently opens up the wounds of the Banyoro history. This scenario projects the ethnic tension in Kibaale as a maze so dificult for the youths to trace their way out for coexistence. The section that follows highlights and discusses the Kibaale youth’s engagement with their maze-like ethnic realities in shaping the society that they want. 5.2 The Role of Youth in Pluralism It is important to establish the youth’s role in engaging with ethnic difference. This includes establishing whether the youth actually participate in drafting measures for coexistence and implementation. Where they participate, we try to interrogate the form of participation and to think through the youth’s views on pluralism in their area. There was a ield scenario that provides an important glimpse of youth participation in managing ethnic differences in Kibaale and exempliies their demand for more space beyond momentary agency determined for them by others. There is a feeling among the youth that they are marginalised at the planning stage as expressed by one youth at a peace dialogue: “But Mzee why don’t you involve us the youth in these stages of planning and strategising? You only call upon us when you want us to execute your resolutions in times of conlict”. 51 Ssentongo: Social Heritage, Political Manipulation and Pluralism This is, however, refuted by those involved in the planning – mainly the elderly (in the youth’s views) as expressed by an ‘elderly’ planner: “We always invite everyone on radio. Do you people want a special invitation? We invite everyone and you do not turn up, then you complain! What do you want us to do for you?” The youth attach their exclusion from the planning processes to the inancial greed of the ‘elderly’ in organisations such as the MBC: “When they are given money [by government] they keep quiet and eat it alone. When it is inished they come and mobilise us to attack the Bafuruki!” The above revelation indicates the frustration of the youth with the way they are reduced to mere instruments because they are excluded from higher forms of participation in envisioning the society they want. After the tension in 2002-2003, there were a number of delegations to the president for dialogue. Looking through the records and from the accounts of some of the delegates, it is conspicuous that on both sides (Banyoro and non-Banyoro), the youths were not represented. The groups were exclusively constituted by elders! This exclusionary practice is partly rooted in the anachronistic14 cultural belief prevalent in most Ugandan societies that wisdom comes with age. In a number of cultures in Uganda, elders ought to be looked at by the young as fountains of honour and wisdom whose assumedly experienced voice tends to count more than that of the young. This belief is, for example, exempliied in the adage that ‘old age is wisdom’. Such an approach is not sustainable as it breeds a feeling of exclusion and lack of ownership of the peace initiatives. It also negatively impacts on the youth’s self-worth and ambition. Secondly, the elders (at least of MBC) possess a considerably vital triumphant memory of dealing with differences in the past which is considered relevant in addressing the current tension. Respecting and listening to elders on the above account may not be wrong in itself but it poses the danger of building a condescending and patronising attitude by which youths could be stripped of their voice. The third revelation from the above encounter is that the youth are demanding for space in dealing with the tension in Kibaale. This also emerged in other interviews and focus group discussions. They are claiming/agitating for space in civil society, in local government, in pressure groups, and the various forms of dialogue going on in the district. It is indeed a good sign that at the peace dialogue at Bwanswa the majority of the participants were the youth; and they were very active in the discussion. They 52 Journal of Development Studies unequivocally insisted on their involvement in peace initiatives and reminded every participant that they equally had a stake in the affairs of Kibaale. As argued by Adossi (2009), the youth stage is a stage of energy and aspirations. It is a stage of anxiety about the future. Therefore, their desire to be included in decision-making is an attempt to be active shapers of their future and for their agency to be acknowledged and appreciated. For example, one youth wondered, “... if it is our future that they are ighting for, why would they be reluctant to see us participate in making decisions about it but instead only want to tell us what to do!” But, despite the limitations, are there any youth initiatives towards ethnic pluralism which could be an indicator that their agency can be meaningful? This is an important question and for which answers abound. The study found out that in Kagadi Secondary School15, pupils form clubs that are ethnically mixed. In such clubs they learn more about each other and this helps to tone down ethnic stereotypes. Of course stereotypes still exist. For example, it is common that when one does something outlandish, they are told that they behave ‘like Bakiga’. The Bakiga students said that they are countering this stereotype by proving in their clubs that they can be good performers as well. Banyoro are also stereotyped as lazy and jealous of their hardworking Bakiga classmates. And to the Banyoro, too, this poses a task to prove that they can also work hard and excel. Although stereotypes do not die away easily, in such mutual engagement, the students of different ethnic groups have been able to show each other that many of the divisive stereotypes are based on falsehoods. Generally, they revealed that the school environment is helping a lot in ironing out ethnic differences and in fostering mutual appreciation. The pluralistic strength in this school was also attested to by some older respondents who said that they had come to appreciate the ethnic otherness through school interactions where they learnt each other’s languages and made friends. However, such interactions may not necessarily guarantee coexistence since what brings about tension is not always lack of knowledge about and appreciation of the other. For example, when ethnic tension is motivated by economic competition, knowledge of each other may not necessarily count as a conlict deterrent. Some youths held a view widely acclaimed in Kibaale that intermarriage would create and strengthen the bonds between people of ethnic identities. Citing his own marriage, one youth said: “... now that I have a wife from the Banyoro, they are my in-laws. Even if [ethnic] chaos was to break out now, they will not treat me as a Mufuruki. I have their blood in my family! So they will have to treat me as their own”. 53 Ssentongo: Social Heritage, Political Manipulation and Pluralism The idea is that from the intermarriage they will bring forth children who will attract identiication from both the Banyoro and non-Banyoro thus toning down the ethnic polarities against political manipulation. Attractive as this form of pluralism sounds, it may suggest, on the other hand, that it is impossible for the members of different ethnic groups to appreciate and accept each other in their differences. In a way, it comes forth as forced coexistence. However, it could be argued that being ready to consider each other for marriage is a sign of mutual appreciation. Such marriages could have strategic advantages in the long run. They are based on love of one another albeit with consciousness that the partners come along with different ethnic afiliations. Such marriages are also viewed as a way of exemplifying the possibility of ethnic cohesion that could be projected in other sectors like politics and business. When we look at other cases of ethnic tension, however, we ought to put a caveat to the pluralistic potential through intermarriage. The 1994 genocide of Rwanda serves a relatively recent example. Mamdani (2001) observes that there had been intermarriages between the Hutu and Tutsis for centuries but that did not seem to be any loss in identity as to fuse the ethnic divide. Being a patriarchal society, the wife would take on the identity of the husband. The social identity is passed on through patrilineal descent. If the father is a Tutsi, then the child will be socially identiied as Tutsi; and if the father is a Hutu, the child will be identiied as Hutu. As the child takes on a one-dimensional identity, that of the father, the identity of the mother - whether Hutu or Tutsi – is systematically erased. So it happens that the child of generations of intermarriage and cohabitation between Hutu and Tutsi comes into this world unequivocally Hutu or Tutsi (2001, 53). During the genocide, it is reported that, in some cases, wife would go against husband, and vice versa. Where one’s father was Tutsi, such a person was regarded as a Tutsi despite having ‘Hutu blood’! Intermarriage, therefore, failed to serve as an insulating force. In terms of ethnic identity in inter-ethnic marriages, the patriarchal setting of the tribes in Kibaale is not any different from that of the Hutu and Tutsi. Even here, the child will take on the ethnic identity of the father and will socially be identiied as so. Where a Munyoro man marries a Mukiga woman, the children will be Banyoro. The patriarchal one-dimensional identiication in itself is not a problem for pluralism, just as we would argue that ethnicity in itself is not a hindrance towards coexistence. Findings from Kibaale reveal that despite the patrilineal inluence on the ethnic identity of the children born in intermarriages, there is often a cultural mix. Where a Mukiga marries a Munyoro, due to the fact that mothers interact more with the children, the children are very likely to speak the language of the mother at home. Even where the 54 Journal of Development Studies father’s culture is dominant, there will also be bits of each of other’s culture in the home. In effect, this is expected to check on ethnic radicalism on either side. It will take strong manipulation and mobilisation for people raised in such an environment to be convinced that members of the other ethnic group are enemies that have to be fought. Therefore, whereas Rwanda’s case reminds us that intermarriage may not always work in ensuring inter-ethnic coexistence, it should not be used to argue that intermarriages do not have a pacifying effect. Language also came out as an important ground in working out social cohesion among the youth. There was an apparent attempt by all respondents (Banyoro and nonBanyoro) in learning the dominant languages in the area (mainly Runyoro and Rukiga). At the minimum, each was able to greet and say thank you in both languages. However, effort was seen to be more from the non-Banyoro to learn Runyoro. This is attributed to the fact that, even with the increased number of non-Banyoro in the area, Runyoro still remains the language of wider communication. It was also said to be a way of identifying with the Banyoro natives for acceptability and harmony. This echoes Fasold’s view cited in Chriosti (2003, 13) that: When people use language, they do more than just try to get another person to understand the speaker’s thoughts and feelings. At the same time, both people are using language in subtle ways to deine their relationship with each other, to identify themselves as part of a social group... It should be recalled that one of the Banyoro issues in the tension is that migrants, especially the Bakiga, arrogantly stuck to their languages. This is interpreted by the Banyoro as disrespect and abuse towards the hosts. The lingual practice is not helped by the memory that the Banyoro were once forced to speak Luganda by the Baganda subcolonialists. Language is an important and considerably sensitive issue in engaging with the ethnic diversity in the area. Most non-Banyoro youths in this study insisted that they only speak their languages among themselves but use Runyoro when speaking to Banyoro. As such, with a few spatial exceptions, Runyoro is the unoficial public language16. Having to learn a people’s language in order to be accepted is an assimilative move. Forster et al. (2000) do not contend assimilation as a mark of pluralism. They dismiss it on account of its tendency towards wielding more power for the majority or dominant group (in this case the Banyoro). In refuting it, Alba and Nee (2003) add that it is not only an ethnocentric tendency but also superiority-oriented in its attempt to patronise ‘others’. Linguistic assimilation would, therefore, be seen as suffocation and narrowing of room for difference. 55 Ssentongo: Social Heritage, Political Manipulation and Pluralism However, as earlier argued in the review of literature, whereas assimilation ought not to be a necessary pre-condition for citizenship, I would agree with Parekh (2000) that there is nothing wrong with assimilation if it comes as a deliberate choice of incoming groups. It might be hard to precisely tell when it is a deliberate choice and when it is coerced (directly or indirectly) but where it is truly one’s choice to learn another’s language on account of its wider reach, then that is not a choice to condemn. What should be condemned, on the other hand, is the tendency towards deliberately killing of another’s culture in an attempt to reinforce it because it is regarded as superior or simply dominant. Some cultures or cultural aspects might surely have to die off, but this should only occur where, with time, they are rendered anachronistic or irrelevant without any imposition in their replacement. The adoption of Runyoro by non-Banyoro youths should be appreciated in the above light. It should also be appreciated in consideration of the reciprocal appreciation and respect of non-Banyoro cultural aspects by Banyoro youths. Youth respondents indicated that the fact that everyone is allowed to hold their cultural functions and rituals indicates that there is respect for difference. For example, the Banyoro attend introduction ceremonies of non-Banyoro and they abide by the procedural norms of the hosts; and vice versa. One Mukiga youth accordingly remarked: “when the Banyoro are going to pay tribute to Omukama [Bunyoro King], we accompany them. The king also takes us as his subjects”. Such multi-cultural mutual respect cannot be underestimated in its potential for trustbuilding and social cohesion. In analysing youth involvement in pluralism measures, it is very important to consider the gender issues within. It is insensitive to bundle youths together as of homogenous agency in ethnic issues only varying by ethnic afiliation. This study has revealed that young women feature far less than young men in public peace initiatives such as dialogues. Culture is certainly a key player in this phenomenon. In most cultures of the people in Kibaale District, women belong to the private sphere. The public sphere is widely a preserve for men. This discriminative gender landscape is changing but rather very slowly. It will not be enough to have young men participating in peace initiatives and then claim that youths are on board. Such participation should be disaggregated by gender. The indings of this study indicate that young women need to be empowered further for meaningful involvement in the affairs of the area. The Uganda Rural Development and Training Programme (URDT), a civil society organisation at Kagadi – Kibaale, has tried to bridge the gender gap by initiating the African women’s university and a girls’ 56 Journal of Development Studies secondary school. URDT also offers vocational training programmes for both men and women through which some youths have been empowered with self-sustaining skills that reduce idling and violence proneness. As we shall emphasise in the recommendations, more of such initiatives are needed in the area. Certainly, as with any maze, there is a complex system of paths where it is very easy to get lost. The different ways in which youths are engaging with the entangled ethnic realities in Kibaale should be seen as possibilities among several others through which coexistence could be worked out. As presented and discussed here, they certainly have their limitations but also bear marks of promise that should be reinforced and streamlined with initiatives of wider society. 6 Conclusion and Recommendations 6.1 Conclusion This paper aimed at analytically exploring youth engagement with the complex ethnic realities in Kibaale for coexistence. The complexity is seen in the entanglement of the present ethnic relations in memories of the antecedent relations in the area; in mutual fears of the Banyoro and non-Banyoro; and political manipulation. In the youth’s perception of the causes of ethnic tension in the area, political manipulation featured as one of the key factors. Politicians play the ethnic card, especially during elections, in order to achieve their political gains while pitting one side against the other. It is largely for this reason that tension and, sometimes, violence tends to build up during election time. The youths’ views further indicated that although political manipulation is important in the tension, there are other factors that fuel it. Such factors include memories of oppression, exploitation and marginalisation of the Banyoro by the British and the Baganda. These memories, the ensuing pain and the partially triumphant battles of the past are used by the elders to mobilise the youths ‘to claim their time’ and not allow history to re-occur. Moreover, there are some injustices of the past that are relayed into the present – as such affecting youths today. One of such injustices highlighted in the study is that of land insecurity due to vast land being owned by absentee landlords. Migrants are thus looked at with the fear that they are only going to aggravate land scarcity. On the other hand, due to threats from some Banyoro, the migrants also have a fear that they could be evicted from Kibaale yet it is their new home. When politics comes in, it picks these memories and fears, blows them out of proportion and instrumentalises them for political scores. Youths are engaging with these intricacies irst by claiming their space in dealing with issues that concern them. They are questioning exclusionary tendencies such as 57 Ssentongo: Social Heritage, Political Manipulation and Pluralism those of elders of the Mubende Banyoro Committee. They seek to be part and parcel of decision-making, and not only to be seen and used as agents of violence. Not only do they do this through agitation but also by taking their own initiatives for coexistence in a bid to prove the possibility and power of their agency. Their agency has been shown through civil society initiatives such as participation in peace dialogues, formation of school clubs across lines of ethnic difference, learning each other’s languages, intermarriage by some youths, and so on. The viability of these pluralism initiatives for existence has also been discussed in this paper. It would sufice to infer here that, although there are limitations, the youth are making meaningful strides in working out mechanisms for inter-ethnic coexistence. Their involvement may not necessarily provide a pathway out of the maze but makes the engagement more inclusive and, therefore, expanding on the base of pluralism possibilities. Their inclusion is also of importance in averting the obstacles to coexistence (especially frustration and violence) that are associated with their exclusion. 6.2 Recommendations Among the youth limitations in engaging with ethnic difference which need to be looked into are: Firstly, it was evident the women/girl marginalising role of patriarchy extends to the youth category. Most front roles in peace dialogues and related initiatives were revealed to be done by male youths. Girls still need more empowerment for selfassertion and ability to challenge gender roles that exclude them. Such empowerment should start right from the family (with parents sensitised irst) to the schools. Initiatives such as the African women’s university and a girls’ secondary school by Uganda Rural Development and Training Programme (URDT) at Kagadi – Kibaale are commendable in this line. Girls should be brought up and trained in a way that enables them to claim their space and voice their concerns without fear. Accordingly, socio-cultural barriers to their participation should be systematically addressed at all relevant levels through cultural institutions (such as Bunyoro Kingdom), religious institutions, and relevant non-governmental organisations. It was also revealed that one of the reasons as to why youths are easily targeted by politicians for manipulation is their lack of meaningful employment. Whereas URDT has helped in providing a number of Kibaale youths with vocational skills in carpentry, metal works, building and construction and car mechanics, more still needs to be afirmatively done by the central government through Kibaale local government. The study conirms that for historical reasons and due to conspicuous omissions of all post-colonial governments, Kibaale remains relatively deprived. Agriculture needs 58 Journal of Development Studies to be boosted for more employment opportunities. But this will go hand in hand with infrastructural development so as to boost trade and attract investors in the area. By principle of afirmative action and distributive justice, part of the much anticipated oil revenue could be allocated for Kibaale development. References Adossi, K. M. (2009). Conlict resolution and transformation: A participatory approach for youth. Nairobi: Paulines Publications Africa. Alba, R., Nee, V. (2003). Remaking the American mainstream: Assimilation and contemporary immigration. Cambridge, Massachusetts, and London: Harvard University Press. Barth, F. (ed.) (1969). Ethnic groups and boundaries. Boston: Little Brown. Bates, R. H. (2005). Ethnicity in development. Cheltenham: Elgar Companion to Development Studies, Edgar, Elgar. Bechhofer, F., Paterson, L. (2000). Principles of research design in the social sciences: Social research today. 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(2010). Museveni orders new Bafuruki constituencies, The Observer (22-29 April 2010). Kampala: Observer Media Ltd. Lwanga, L. S. (2007). The struggle for land in Buganda. Kampala: Wavah Books. Mamdani, M. (2001). When victims become killers: Colonialism, nativism and the genocide in Rwanda. New Jersey: Princeton University. Mamdani, M. (2004). Citizen and subject: Contemporary Africa and the legacy of late colonialism. Kampala: Fountain Publishers. Mamdani, M. (2009). Buganda and Uganda at crossroads. Paper presented at the Abu Mayanja Memorial Lecture, 7th August 2009. Marshall, C., Rossman, G. B. (1995). Designing qualitative research, 2nd Edn. London: SAGE Publications. Marty, M. E. (2007). Pluralisms. The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science. 612 (13), 14-25. Mirima, F. (2009). The Banyoro case: Why should Bunyoro-Kitara be treated as a special case? Unpublished. Mugerwa, F. (2011). Bunyoro kingdom criticises new minister. The Daily Monitor, 31st May. Muhereza, F. E., Otim, P. O. (1998). Neutralising ethnicity in Uganda. In Salih, M. A. M. and Markakis, J. (Eds). Ethnicity and the state in Eastern Africa. Uppsala: Nordiska Afrikainstitutet, 190-203. Museveni, Y. K. (July 2009). Guidance on the Banyoro/ Bafuruki question. Letter to the Minister in Charge of the Presidency. Kampala: Unpublished communication. Nsamba-Gayiiya, E. (2003). The Kibaale Land Question. A Research Commissioned by the Uganda Land Alliance. Uganda Land Alliance Research Series No. 1. Kampala: Uganda Land Alliance. 60 Journal of Development Studies Okuku, J. (2002). Ethnicity, state power and the democratisation process in Uganda. Discussion Paper 17. Uppsala: Nordisca Afrikainstitutet. Parekh, B. (2000). Rethinking multiculturalism: Cultural diversity and political theory. London: MacMillan Press Ltd. Plaw, A. (2005). Introduction. In Plaw, A. (Ed.). Frontiers of diversity: Explorations in contemporary pluralism–probing the boundaries. 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In Denzin, N. K., Lincoln, Y. S. (Eds). The sage handbook of qualitative research, 3rd edn. Thousand Oaks, London, and New Delhi: Sage Publications, Inc., 461-466. Stark, S., Torrance, H. (2005). Case study. In Bridget Somekh and Carthy Lewin. Research methods in the social sciences. London: SAGE Publications, 33-40. The Observer (2009). Bafuruki memo to Museveni. The Observer, 10th August 2009. United Nations (2003). World youth report: Youth and conlict. New York: United Nations. Weber, M. (1968). Economy and society. Glencoe: The Free Press. World Bank (2006). World development report 2007: Development and the next generation. Washington DC: World Bank. Notes 1 The wider PhD research investigates spaces for pluralism in ethnically sensitive communities with speciic reference to Kibaale District. 2 Kiwanuka (1968) contends that it was more for strategic reasons than for appreciating Buganda that the counties were annexed to the latter. He argues that, the British having appreciated the administrative 61 Ssentongo: Social Heritage, Political Manipulation and Pluralism structure of Buganda, they wanted to take advantage of it in Bunyoro as well and to curb further resistance to their rule. 3 The number of counties actually given by the British to Buganda is still contested. Contrary to the popular account of six (or seven) counties, Kiwanuka (1968) and (Samwiri 2007) argue that only two counties (Buyaga and Bugangaizi) were extended to Buganda, the rest had already been conquered by Buganda. 4 This is the highest position at District level within Uganda’s decentralised framework. It is also referred to as Local Council Five (LC 5) as the highest of the ive local government councils. LC 4 is the County, LC 3 the Sub-county, LC 2 the Parish while LC 1 is the village. 5 6 National Resistance Movement, which is the ruling party. The creation of a constituency goes with creation of other sub-units there under such as LC III. Leadership of these is also through elections. 7 8 Rukiga is the language for the Bakiga. Issues to do with youths are reserved for the National Youth Policy. The Constitution of Uganda is totally silent about the category of youths. 9 Rational choice theory explains ethnicity as driven by calculations for group and individual beneit. People’s identiication with ethnic groups is here viewed as a strategising point for some beneit. 10 Culture is here deined as “a system of beliefs and practices in terms of which a group of human beings understand, regulate and structure their individual and collective life” (Parekh 2000, p.143). This deinition would also encompass religions as cultures, but, for this study, they are excluded from the deinition of ethnicity. 11 Kasirivu Atooki, as of 2009. 12 The Land Fund was instituted as an initiative to buy off land from the absentee landlords, return the land titles to the Uganda Land Commission, and then give the land to the current occupants/ squatters. 13 The expression ‘every goat on its peg’ is used to mean that people should rally behind ‘tribe-mates’ when it comes to elections. 14 I refer to it as anachronistic because it belongs to the era when knowledge was mainly gathered through experience. Thus the older one was the more the experiences they had and, therefore, the knowledge collected. The youths would accordingly not be expected to know much due to their limited life experience. 15 The researcher only visited one school (Kagadi Senior Secondary School) in Kibaale District. The indings from the school may not be representative of all the schools in the district but helped provide some insight into youth inter-ethnic relations due to the school’s multi-ethnic composition. 16 The oficial language of Uganda is English. It is thus the oficial medium of instruction in schools. The other languages are mainly used for communication in informal settings. The dominance of any of these other languages in a social setting often goes with numerical dominance of the ethnic group to which the language is associated and, in most cases, it is the indigenous group. 62 Journal of Development Studies 3 (2) (2013) 63 - 75 Youth and Cultural Identity in Post-Conlict Northern Uganda Lino Owor Ogora Abstract: This paper discusses the cultural identity of youths in post-conlict Northern Uganda. Situated in a wider discussion of literature related to the concepts of youth and cultural identity, the paper discusses the impact of the protracted armed conlict in the region on the cultural identity of the youths in the region. It reports the incidence of acculturation among the youths and discusses its immediate causes. Subsequently, it examines some of the implications of the acculturation for successful post-conlict recovery before propounding recommendations towards the inculcation of cultural values in youths that may beneit post-conlict recovery. Keywords: Cultural Identity; Acculturation; Post-Conlict Reconstruction 1 Introduction An Acholi elder once remarked: “Today’s youths don’t know how to be Acholi”. Perhaps this elder made this remark in reference to the manner and nature in which the youth in Northern Uganda conduct themselves and also in light of the reality that many traditional cultural practices and norms which were strictly observed by the former Acholi are no longer practised as they used to be. In Northern Uganda, there is a tendency to blame many existing societal ills on the conlict. These societal ills include behaviours such as drunkenness, child and family neglect, escalated land conlicts, deilement, rape, incest, disrespect and neglect of the elderly, non-adherence to taboos and abominations, and a host of other behaviours that are considered misplaced in Acholi culture. While such ills existed prior to the conlict, many elders are quick to point out that they were not as widespread compared to today. The biggest ‘culprits’ in this case appear to be the youth, although a number of elders equally engage in such unbecoming practices. Ogora: Youth & Cultural Identity in Post-Conlict Northern Uganda As a result, post-conlict youths have been referred to by various names. They are sometimes referred to as ‘Museveni-era children’ (in reference to children born during Museveni’s regime), ‘the dot com generation’ (in reference to their love for and knowledge in information technology), or simply as ‘lotino me kom kare ni’, loosely translated as ‘children of these days. While there is consensus that traditional cultural norms and practices have signiicantly declined and lost their appeal amongst the youth, there seems to be no consensus regarding the causes. One of the easiest scapegoats for cultural deterioration is the conlict, in addition to other post-conlict challenges currently being faced by Northern Uganda. Some people have, for example, argued that during the conlict, a generation of young people was born amidst its settings such as displacement. This generation is to blame for the deterioration of culture because they neither appreciate nor understand traditional cultural practices. But is the conlict really to blame? Northern Uganda has been under conlict for over 22 years now. The civil war, which started in 1986, had disastrous impacts upon the population, among which was the abduction of between 28,000 and 38,000 children by the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) to serve as child soldiers, sex slaves and porters (Pham et al. 2007). Most of the children and other people abducted by the LRA underwent severe and unimaginable suffering, which has been recounted in several publications1 and, therefore, does not require detailed recounting in this paper. It is estimated that over 1.8 million people were displaced and forced to live in the squalid conditions of the IDP camps. Thousands more people lost their lives as a result of deliberate killings and massacres perpetrated chiely by the rebels of the LRA. At one point, a study by UNICEF (2007) estimated that over 1000 people died in the IDP camps daily. In June 2006, the Juba peace talks between the Ugandan government and the LRA, aimed at inding a peaceful solution to the conlict, commenced. These talks showed potential of bringing a real chance for peace, following the failure of other attempts which had been made in earlier years2. These talks lasted for close to three years, and culminated into the signing of six agenda items3 and the conclusion of negotiations in April 2008. The inal peace agreement, however, was not signed because the LRA leader, Joseph Kony, was not satisied with the accountability measures stipulated in Agenda Item Three4 of the agreement. In December 2008, the UPDF lost patience with the LRA’s failure to sign the inal peace agreement, and launched Operation Lightening Thunder, which saw the relocation of the LRA from Garamba, in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, to the Central African Republic. Although the talks did not end as many people had anticipated, they opened a fresh debate on traditional justice mechanisms. The debate on the use of traditional justice 64 Journal of Development Studies mechanisms had actually been started way back in 2004, when the irst International Criminal Court (ICC) prosecutor Louis Moreno Ocampo announced his intention to indict four top commanders of the LRA, which later saw the issuance of arrest warrants in 2005. Acholi elders argued that the intervention by the ICC would entrench rather than help to resolve the conlict, by increasing the LRA leaders’ resolve to continue with the rebellion. As an alternative to the ICC intervention, they proposed the use of traditional justice mechanisms, which they argued could be revived and used for promoting reconciliation and healing. This debate actually gained more momentum when the Juba peace talks opened in June 2006. The talks brought traditional justice on the agenda, and it became one of the chief items that dominated discussions on Agenda Item Three - Accountability and Reconciliation. As such, article 2.1 of the agreement on Accountability and Reconciliation stipulates the use of formal and non-formal mechanisms for the promotion of Accountability and Reconciliation (GOSS 2008). Article 3.1 of the agreement further recognises the important role of traditional justice mechanisms (GOSS 2008). And so, for the three years that the Juba peace talks lasted, traditional justice mechanisms often featured as a key mechanism for the promotion of Accountability and Reconciliation. Traditional justice mechanisms in Northern Uganda refer to those traditional and customary practices which have for ages been used by ethnic groups in Northern Uganda for conlict resolution and maintenance of social order. They include, for example: Mato Oput of the Acholi, Kayo Cuk of the Langi, Ailuc of the Iteso, Ajupe of the Kakwa, Ajufe of the Lugbara, Aja of the Alur, and the Tolu Koka of the Madi, among others. Across the African continent, other mechanisms such as Inkundla in South Africa, Gacaca in Rwanda, Magambo in Mozambique, and Bashingantahe in Burundi are examples of traditional justice mechanisms. In all their diversity, traditional justice mechanisms are increasingly being associated with the concept of Ubuntu (Nabudere, 2004), because most of them universally focus on the restoration of broken relations. Many scholars and practitioners seem to be in agreement that traditional cultural mechanisms are instrumental in the promotion of healing and reconciliation. However, traditional justice mechanisms also come with their challenges. Except for a few known attempts such as the Gacaca in Rwanda, many African cultural mechanisms are still grappling with challenges of evolving to suit contemporary environments and conlicts, and this sadly, is the fact for Northern Uganda. Modern conlicts, for example, have come with new deinitions such as crimes against humanity, war crimes, and genocide, and the general consensus is that these crimes are beyond the capacity of traditional mechanisms. In Northern Uganda, for example, Mato Oput is often presented and discussed in a manner that does not cater for how crimes such as mass massacres and 65 Ogora: Youth & Cultural Identity in Post-Conlict Northern Uganda unknown killings can be handled. This has consequently led many writers and researchers to dismiss traditional mechanisms as unsuitable for dealing with war crimes and crimes against humanity. Even more challenging is the fact that the rituals and ceremonies which have been proposed for conlict resolution are still discussed as though the conlict never occurred. For example, the Acholi, besides Mato Oput, have several traditional rituals used for resolving crimes or disputes, which include nyono tongweno (stepping on the egg) which is used for welcoming people who have been away from home for an extended period of time; moyo/yubu kum (cleansing of the body) to relieve a person of cen; and moyo piny, or cleansing of areas where abominations such as mass massacres were committed. While some of the rituals such as nyono tongweno have since been adapted for re-integration of ex-combatants, it is not immediately clear how a major ritual such as Mato Oput can be adapted to handle more serious crimes such as murder or crimes against humanity. For example, in a 2005 study, many elders across Acholi agreed that there was little sense in pursuing Mato Oput on a case by case basis since too many people had been killed and it is dificult to trace who killed who and, therefore, which clans to engage, and how to pursue matters such as the payment of symbolic compensation (JRP 2007). But perhaps the most disturbing aspect is that traditional justice debates in Northern Uganda have been discussed in the context of the conlict, but not in the post-conlict phase. Debates have focused on how war crimes can be solved, with little focus on its relevance to the everyday lives of people living in the post-conlict era. In the same vein, there have been few discussions on how the youth can be helped to know about their culture, a process which would also involve ‘censorship’ of cultural practices to determine which aspects are still relevant and which ones are no longer relevant. Following the launch of Operation Lightening Thunder, the LRA relocated to Southern Sudan and the Central African Republic, thereby strengthening the security situation in Northern Uganda, which had been relatively stable since 2006 when the Juba peace talks started. The departure of the LRA also triggered off a massive return process by thousands of internally displaced persons (IDPs) from the squalid conditions of IDP camps to their homesteads. This was an indicator that Northern Uganda had entered that crucial stage of post-conlict recovery, and that the time was probably ripe for the implementation of traditional justice mechanisms in earnest. This would be the time for cultural revival and reversing impacts of the youth being born within settings of captivity. The reality, however, is that since the return of relative peace to Northern Uganda, traditional justice mechanisms have not been implemented on a massive scale commensurate with the many debates they attracted between 2004 and 2008 during the 66 Journal of Development Studies Juba peace talks. In fact, the debate on traditional justice mechanisms has been silent, and the many reconciliation and healing ceremonies that were expected to occur following the return of relative peace have not been held. This could be partly due to the fact that these debates were raised during the Juba peace talks, and were discussed in the context of the conlict without a clear plan of how they would be implemented in the post-conlict phase. The focus then was to seek a solution to the conlict, and ind means and ways of re-integrating ex-combatants into the community, and to promote reconciliation and healing. Cultural revitalisation, especially among the youth and other groups was sadly overlooked. 2 Youth and Cultural Identity Cultural practices give the communities involved a sense of identity (Ojera 2008). Acholi youths are proud to be Acholi, just as youths in other cultural groups of Northern Uganda are proud to belong to those cultural groups. The problem is that generally most of the youth are not knowledgeable in their cultures, which includes the various practices and rituals which are required in certain scenarios. As already mentioned above, during the Juba peace talks, much concentration and effort went into thinking of ways in which traditional justice mechanisms could be used for ending the conlict, and thereafter promoting reconciliation and healing, rather than drafting a master plan for a large-scale cultural revitalisation programme. Rituals such as mato oput, nyono tongweno, and moyo kum took centre stage as they were the main mechanisms relevant for crimes that had been committed during the conlict. With the collapse of the talks, these rituals never got to be implemented on a wide scale as envisioned by the Juba peace negotiators. However, an even bigger problem was that the Juba peace negotiators never looked beyond the conlict. They never looked at a massive revitalisation of the culture in the event that the conlict ended. They probably assumed that all would return to normal with the return of peace. The return of relative peace, however, could be likened to the lifting of a fog which revealed the ruins of a hailstorm which had hitherto remained hidden. Youth representation at the talks was also lacking, and while various consultations were carried out by the peace delegates, the views on the youth regarding traditional justice were never sought. Instead traditional justice mechanisms were adopted at the talks with the assumption that the youth would automatically embrace them in their entirety. And yet during the conlict in Northern Uganda, a new generation of youths that has little knowledge or regard for traditional ceremonies and rituals was born and bred in settings of displacement and coninement. Addressing the generational gap was not 67 Ogora: Youth & Cultural Identity in Post-Conlict Northern Uganda given priority. And yet the generational gap is one of the biggest challenges that face the implementation of traditional justice mechanisms and their use in post-conlict Northern Uganda. In addition, Western education, cultures and religions have also played a role in inluencing youth perceptions and entrenching their disregard or alienation from culture. In fact, many youths in Northern Uganda today do not regard culture as a relevant factor in their day-to-day lives. They are selective about what aspects of culture to believe in or to reject, depending on a variety of factors such as religion, and educational levels among other factors. Most people will not hesitate to blame the conlict for this, and they could be right to a certain extent. 3 Loss of Cultural Identity among the Youth As a youth, I recall a particular incident that occurred at the funeral of my father. Most accurately, I could describe it as a standoff between my father’s siblings and my elderly aunt. The standoff had been brought about by a proposal by my aunt that all the children of the deceased had to strip naked and walk to a nearby stream, where they would be bathed. The purpose of this act was to ward off any evils that would come with the death of my father. Led by our elder siblings, who were mostly born-again Christians, we all refused and the ceremony did not occur. It was something we considered to be in the past, and not relevant to the current situation. We could not see how the death of our father could determine any aspects of our future lives, let alone bringing us bad luck (in conversation with a youth, Layibi, Gulu District, March 2000). The above is an example of a culture practice that is rarely practised in present day Acholi, and may readily be shunned by the youth. Like in the case of the above youth, there are a number of signiicant cultural practices today that are either rejected, or not practised at all by the youth, and even elders alike. In other instances, they are simply disregarded. Such attitudes towards cultural practices provide examples of loss of cultural identity among the youth, which manifests itself today in a number of ways. The youth today are ignorant of cultural rituals and ceremonies. Many youths today are neither able to identify Acholi rituals nor describe their signiicance. The Acholi had various rituals and ceremonies which were used for correcting various misconducts or misbehaviour considered to be improper. For example, the ritual of Mato Oput was used for resolving crimes involving death (JRP 2005). The ceremony of Mato Oput, or ‘drinking the bitter root’ often occurred after long process involving mediation between the two clans of the victim and the perpetrator by a neutral third party; truth seeking to establish facts surrounding the crime; payment of symbolic compensation; and inally 68 Journal of Development Studies restoration of relationships between the two clans5. The Mato Oput ceremony is one of the most renowned ceremonies in Acholi tradition given that taking a human life was the one of the most serious crimes one could commit. However, the Acholi had hundreds of other rituals as well for dealing with other crimes or abominations. For example, a person who had been away from home for an extended period of time was supposed to be welcomed back home using the ritual of Nyono Tongweno, as a means of cleansing the person of any evils that they could have committed during the time they were away from home. There were rituals of initiation into adulthood; rituals for initiating babies born as twins. In case the rains failed, there were rituals that elders would perform to the ancestors and the gods to plead with them to be merciful to the people. There were rituals to cleanse a man and a woman who had quarrelled; rituals to cleanse a woman who was barren or a man who was sterile; rituals for cleansing homesteads of evils; rituals for calling the spirit of a dead person home in case he died at a distance, and many other rituals. While these rituals are still in existence, they are practised on a lower scale as compared to the past. The possible causes of this decline will be discussed later. As a result, many of the youths today are ignorant about these rituals. In a similar light, the youth today are ignorant about traditional dances and folklore. The Acholi traditionally had many cultural dances such as the bwola dance which was a royal dance and used mainly to honour a chief, dingi dingi for young girls, larakaraka for courtship, Otole which is a war dance, lacukucuku, apiti, and many other dances. To be fair to the youth, a good number of people in Acholi beyond their youthful years are also ignorant about these dances. Like the youth, they can neither name nor perform the dances let alone identify their purposes. Perhaps, another factor that can be blamed for this is the changing environment. With rapid urbanisation and today’s youths being compelled to spend more time within school environments, traditional folk dances are considered an opportunity cost. In many urban and semi-urban centres, for example, youths will prefer entertainment provided by discos to traditional dances. The same goes for traditional folk stories, which many youths are equally ignorant about. An elder lamented; Our folk stories are completely being forgotten. When youths tell folk stories today they will blend it with modern scenarios. For example, I one time heard a youth telling a story involving apwoyo (rabbit) and at one point he told how apwoyo was piloting an aeroplane. There were no aeroplanes in Acholi (Acholi elder 2012).” Perhaps the youth are not to blame for this change, given that there are new exciting avenues for entertainment such as television and radio. Music systems are also more easily accessible and affordable and these play a role in luring the youth away from traditional forms of entertainment. 69 Ogora: Youth & Cultural Identity in Post-Conlict Northern Uganda Perhaps one factor which has taken Northern Uganda by storm is the inluence of religion. In Northern Uganda, the main religious denominations are the Catholics, Protestants, and Islam. Outside these there are hundreds of other religious denominations which have cropped up, most of them commonly referred to as the ‘born-again faith’ or ‘Pentecostals’. Many youths have embraced these religions, which have been inluential in determining their perceptions about culture. Religion has taken such a stronghold on the society in Northern Uganda to the extent that it is common to ind cultural ceremonies beginning with Christian-led blessings or prayers. For example, the Acholi have a custom of holding last funeral rights for their deceased. These funeral rights are usually held after the main funeral or burial ceremony has taken place. It is usually accompanied by performance of rituals such as calling the spirit of the dead person home; slaughtering of animals; and feasting for days. While embracing religion is good for the youth, many of them have taken this as the go-ahead to reject culture in its totality. And yet not all cultural practices are negative. The Acholi Religious Leaders’ Peace Initiative has, for example, often promoted the use of ceremonies such as mato oput, and nyono tongweno. But this has not helped in changing perceptions of the youth towards these ceremonies. Furthermore, many youths have a high disregard for ancient Acholi taboos and abominations, referred to as kirr. Kiir is a transgression of the moral order which is believed to cause serious misfortune, including disease, spiritual haunting and death (JRP 2007). Taboos and abominations in the past were strictly avoided, and if a person committed one then there had to be a cleansing ceremony. However, the rate at which the youth today commit acts which would be considered abominable by the elders is alarming. It was, for example, abominable to have sexual intercourse in the bush in the past. However, youths engage in this without giving it further thought. It was abominable to steal from a granary or from someone’s garden; and to commit deilement or have sex with a child who was considered not ready for marriage. Incest was also frowned upon and considered to be an abomination. Other practices such as ighting nearby a well or water points were also abominations. Acts of abortion and neglect of children were also abominations. For example, a mother who refused to breastfeed her child had to have a ritual performed because such an act was considered a taboo or an abomination which could result in the death of the child or even the mother herself. However, the youth today engage in most of these practices, and they do not think about the consequences. There is also high disrespect for the elderly by the youth today. The elderly were highly respected in the Acholi tradition. Elderly people were not only a source of wisdom, but were also considered to be the natural dispensers of justice, and custodians of traditional customs and norms. They were respected and listened to by all people, and their decisions were respected whenever they judged a case. In the past, the youth grew 70 Journal of Development Studies up and adhered to cultural norms with the hope of growing up into respectable elders and continuing in the traditions of their predecessors. In contrast, the elderly people today are one of the most vulnerable categories of people who exist in Northern Uganda. For example, during the period in which the Northern population was holed up in camps, the elderly were among the most vulnerable, and they lacked the basic necessities of life such as food and health care. And when the time came for IDPs to leave the camps and return home, many of the elderly were stranded in the IDP camps because they could not construct houses for themselves in their original homesteads, and the youth within their extended family lines were reluctant to assist. This demonstrates the extent to which respect for culture and tradition has lost its hold among the youth. Perhaps the most lamentable aspect of youth and cultural identity is their disregard for the ancient means of livelihood that sustained the Acholi society for ages before the advent of the monetary economy. Traditionally, the Acholi were an agricultural community, relying on farming and cattle keeping as a means of livelihood. Few youths today appreciate this ancient form of livelihood, with many of them preferring to perform odd jobs in Gulu town such as boda-boda (motor cycle taxis) riding or working as porters at building sites, other than going back to the rural areas to farm the land. Perhaps, in this case, the conlict is to blame, given that many of the youths and even non-youths who grew up in camps were actually never initiated in traditional means of livelihood. Many people survived on food hand-outs from the World Food Programme (WFP) and NGOs while they lived in the IDP camps, and thus developed a dependency syndrome which is dificult to reverse. 4 Possible Causes of Decline in Culture Having looked at some examples of how loss of cultural identity is manifesting itself among the youth today, the question that is briely addressed in this section is whether this is a consequence of conlict or a mere reality that these norms are out of touch with the present times, or even a combination of both. As already pointed out above, the two decades conlict that ravaged Northern Uganda caused havoc beyond mere loss of life and property. As such, culture and the social fabric were not spared. Displacement of the local population, for example, did not only disrupt the traditional ways of life and livelihoods of the Acholi people, but also ensured that certain cultural norms and practices died out. Generational and social teachings around these concepts [were] severely disrupted by the ‘uprooting’ of approximately 1.8 million people from their homesteads and their transfers to internment camps (Ojera 2008). With limited space in IDP camps, there was an increase in immorality, such as premarital relationships, deilement and teenage pregnancies. Discipline could not be 71 Ogora: Youth & Cultural Identity in Post-Conlict Northern Uganda easily enforced among the youth. With the entire population dependent on food handouts, men lost their roles as providers for their families, given that oficials of the WFP often preferred to distribute food through women other than men, for logistical reasons6. Within the IDP camps, drunkenness became the order of the day, to the extent that even the very elders who were supposed to act as role models for the youth were often engaged in the vice. Displacement was, therefore, one aspect of the conlict that was enough to disrupt social ways and lead to a decline in cultural practices and norms. As one writer concluded, over the years, the social space and social fabric have been desecrated by the prolonged conlict and the internment of entire communities in the camps. Thus, the application of the traditional systems cannot readily be appreciated, especially by the younger generation (Ojera 2008). Still within the context of the conlict, the custodians of culture themselves have lost their place in society – resulting in disrespect for elders and traditions – compared to the past. The Acholi Kingdom was composed of kaka (loosely knit clans), each headed by a Rwot Moo (anointed chief) derived from a royal clan. Each Rwot Moo was supported by a Council of Elders through which he ruled based on consent, rather than force. Under the British colonial administration, the Rwot Moo were stripped of power and replaced by the Rwot Kalam, translated to ‘men of the pen’ – educated men who served the colonial administration (JRP 2005). As Ojera (2008) concludes, the [traditional justice] system relies heavily on the contribution of the elders’ knowledge and experience in varying circumstances, as opposed to professional mediators. Once leaders and providers of their own people, elders and chiefs along with their subjects were herded into the IDP camps and forced to survive on hand-outs from the WFP (JRP 2005). While the demise of traditional Acholi chieftains began during the colonial period, the conlict provided the inal straw that fanned the lames of their demise to what they are today. The Acholi traditional institution represented by Ker Kal Kwaro Acholi is today trying to regain its authority and rebuild its reputation. However, this is proving challenging amidst an Acholi population that recognises only the symbolic leadership of the institution, and a strict government policy that prohibits traditional leaders from engaging in politics. As noted by JRP (2005), the roles of [traditional] leaders have been signiicantly transformed and in political terms, replaced by state oficials. The weakening of the authority and essential roles of the elders and chiefs in enforcing understanding and adherence to local standards has been obvious (Ojera 2008). It is against this background that residents in the internment camps often called for the revitalisation and empowerment of the home-grown traditional structures and practices 72 Journal of Development Studies of their society as the only avenue of relief from their dire situation, as opposed to some alien and abstract justice system (Ibid). Beyond the conlict, another plausible explanation could be the strong inluence of Western religions and cultures, coupled with urbanisation, education and development. As already pointed out above, religion has taken such a strong hold on the Acholi and subsequently inluenced certain aspects of culture. Religion has led to certain practices such as consultation of a witchdoctor or spirit medium being regarded as satanic. Many people are left in a dilemma regarding which aspects of culture to follow and which ones to disregard. Culture has also clashed signiicantly with certain practices considered to be ‘Western’ such as gay marriages. With urbanisation and development, children no longer live in environments in which they can learn and pursue traditional activities such as Acholi dances and folklores – with entertainment being dependent on discotheques, televisions and multimedia. All in all, culture has not evolved fast enough to cope with demands of the contemporary Acholi society. As already mentioned above, the Juba peace talks focused on mechanisms of Accountability and Reconciliation for solving crimes committed during the conlict, without an overall focus on other social aspects of cultural revitalisation. As such, it appeared as though the discussions of the Juba peace talk delegates were detached from the reality on the ground. Accountability mechanisms such as Mato Oput were discussed as though they would operate separately from other cultural practices and norms which were already in decline, and the youth, critical stakeholders in determining the success of cultural revival mechanisms were left out of these discussions. 5 Conclusions and Recommendations As one report (JRP 2006) rightly pointed out, “the articulation of any justice system, complementary or as an alternative to the ICC requires technical support, time, and consensus building”. Mechanisms such as Gacaca are a manifestation that traditional mechanisms can indeed be restructured for use in contemporary societies – keeping in mind the challenges and the changing scenarios in which the youth today live (Clark 2006). Many of the challenges, critiques and debates that traditional mechanisms are being subjected to point to the need to evolve the mechanisms to suit contemporary conlicts – including appealing to the youth. This would call for change in methodologies and codiication of different rituals and ceremonies to create a modiied version of culture that appeals to the youth. However, change - especially with regard to culture - is often synonymously associated with an erosion of cultural values; a fear of the unknown which makes custodians of culture cling to their ancient ways of doing things. As such, cultural leaders 73 Ogora: Youth & Cultural Identity in Post-Conlict Northern Uganda are often accused of being conservative. The scenario presented by Northern Uganda indicates that if traditional mechanisms are to remain relevant to populations such as the youth, then this rigidity and conservativeness has to go, and cultural leaders should respond to the demands of modernity. Culture is not static as many people would like us to believe. It can evolve while maintaining its original values. While this can be done in a number of ways, this paper will propose only three. Firstly, there is need for cultural leaders themselves, or the custodians of culture, to sincerely and deliberately examine all aspects of Acholi culture to determine which ones remain relevant and which ones are not relevant. Many aspects of culture such as observance of taboos and abominations are good for the health of society and for strengthening social ties among the people, and as such they are likely to be embraced and practised by the youth. Others are likely to meet stiff resistance, as seen in the example of the youth who refused to strip naked in order to be bathed by their elderly aunt following the death of their father. There should be a deliberate and directed censorship of culture in order to determine which aspects to keep and which ones to discard. The best people to lead this process are the traditional and cultural leaders. Secondly, once the above is attained, there will be a need for a deliberate, massive sensitisation programme targeting all sectors of the population, such as the youth, bornagain Christians, women, and other categories. All these different groups need to be sensitised about different cultural practices, and their relevance, and what role they can play in revitalising their culture. Various social media, such as radio, television or even cultural revitalisation campaigns can be put to use for this purpose. Finally, cultural leaders need to regain their place in Acholi society. Acholi has iftyfour oficially recognised chiefdoms, each with a chief and an administrative structure. Cultural leaders, however, have lost the inluence and respect they used to command among the population, particularly among the youth. This could partly be blamed on the conlict. Cultural leaders need to regain their place and inluence, as dispensers of justice and leadership among the people. Only then can they promote respect for culture and social harmony. Until traditional justice mechanisms embrace change and evolve to address contemporary situations, they will remain highly unappealing to the youth. References Clark, P. (2008). Hybridity, Holism and ‘Traditional’ Justice: The Case of the Gacaca Courts in Post Genocide Rwanda. George Washington International Law Review. Vol. 39. No. 4. 765-837. Government of Southern Sudan (2008). The Final Peace Agreement Between the Government of the Republic of Uganda and the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA). Human Rights Watch (2003).“The Scars of Death: Children Abducted by the Lord’s Resistance Army in Uganda. 74 Journal of Development Studies Justice and Reconciliation Project (2005). Roco Wat i Acoli: Restoration of Relationships in Acholiland. Justice and Reconciliation Project (2007). Accountability, Reconciliation and the Juba Peace Talks: Beyond the Impasse. Available at http://justiceandreconciliation.com/2006/10/ accountability-and-reconciliation-at-the-juba-peace-talks-beyond-the-impasse-fn-iii/. (Accessed 24th September, 2013). Justice and Reconciliation Project, 2007: “Abominations and Local Belief Systems in Acholiland”. Nabudere, D. (2004) “Ubuntu: Pieces of the Puzzle: keywords on Reconciliation and Transitional Justice. Cape Town: Institute for Justice and Reconciliation. Ojera, J. L. (2008). Northern Uganda: Tradition-based practices in the Acholi region. Luc Huyse and Mark Salter (Eds.). Traditional Justice and Reconciliation after Violent Conlict: Learning from African Experiences. Stockholm: International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance. Pp. 85-120. Phuong, P., Patrick, V., Eric, S. (2007). Abducted: The Lord’s Resistance Army and Forced Conscription in Northern Uganda. Refugee Law Project (2005). Whose Justice? Perceptions of Uganda’s Amnesty Act of 2000: The potential for Conlict Resolution and Long Term Reconciliation. Kampala: Refugee Law Project Working Paper No. 15. Sverker, F. (2008). Living with Bad Surroundings and Everyday Moments in Northern Uganda”. Duke: Duke University Press. Notes For example see reports by Human Rights Watch (The Scars of Death) and Sverker Finnstrom, Living with bad surroundings. 1 2 Earlier attempts included negotiations by Betty Bigombe and the Acholi Religious Leaders’ Peace Initiative between 1994 and 2000 3 These include; The Protocols to Accountability and Reconciliation, Cessation of Hostilities Agreement, Agreement on Accountability and Reconciliation, Annexure to the Agreement on Accountability and Reconciliation, Implementation Protocols, and Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration. Among other requirements, agenda item three did not clearly provide immunity for Joseph Kony and his top commanders from indictment by the ICC, a factor which proved critical in inluencing his decision not to sign the inal peace agreement 4 5 For more information please see Roco Wat I Acholi. 6 It was easier to distribute food through women other than men as it was a way of ensuring that food actually reached the children. It was also an easy avenue of dealing with polygamous families as it would not appear that one man was receiving more than one ratio of food. 75 Journal of Development Studies 3 (2) (2013) 77 - 96 Youth Reconciliation and Political Participation: The Case of Northern Uganda Louis Oyaro Olanya Abstract: This paper examines the history of youth participation in Uganda; the state of the youth in Northern Uganda; the level of youth participation in the Peace, Recovery and Development Plan for Northern Uganda (PRDP); non-governmental interventions; and participation in the political process. Using key informant interviews and focus group discussions with youths in the Northern Ugandan districts of Gulu, Amuru, Nwoya, Kitgum, Lamwo, Pader and Agago, information was collected on the national legal and policy framework for the youth in Uganda; the LRA conlict and the youth; and the role of the youths in the PRDP. The paper calls for increased youth participation in the development process in Northern Uganda and suggests ways through which the required level of youth participation in the development process may be achieved. Keywords: Peace-building; Reconciliation; Northern Uganda 1 Introduction Youths present an opportunity for a sustained effort to participate in Uganda’s development process because they possess greater energy and potential. According to the Uganda Bureau of Statistics population report for 20121, youth constitute 78 per cent of Uganda’s population of 34 million people. Nationally, the youth continue to make a huge contribution to sustainable growth for the economy but are also the most left out persons when it comes to matters of decision-making. Unemployment, poverty, poor education, HIV/AIDS, rapid population growth, corruption, land conlicts and absence in key decision-making processes as well as a lack of suficient political representation continue to characterise the youth in Uganda. Olanya: Youth Reconciliation and Political Participation The above notwithstanding, there is uniqueness in the dilemma facing the average youth in Northern Uganda in comparison to other youths in other parts of the country. Youths, both male and female, are simultaneously the primary victims and primary actors in the two-decade-long war in Northern Uganda. Even in conlicts other than the LRA/M one, the youths have been used and suppressed depending on whether their interests favoured the government of the day. In addition, some of the conlicts that have affected the region could have been avoided if youth issues had been properly addressed. Instead they were neglected, leaving most of them with no option but to fuel various conlicts in our history and provide a manpower resource base for recruitment into various movements. Youth inclusion in the transition process, economic and social reforms is, therefore, very vital and crucial for sustainable peace and development in the region and the country as a whole. 1.1 Youth in the Context of Northern Uganda For more than 20 years, Northern Uganda was marred by conlict between the LRA and the government of Uganda (GoU). The conlict was characterised by mutilation, rape, murders, abductions, torching of villages, and a breakdown of government structures and services. According to the Human Rights Watch; Human Rights Review; and Uganda 2004, an estimated 66,000 children and youth were abducted by the LRA during conlict. Most of them were abducted to increase the numerical strengths of the rebel outit; others especially the girls became sex slaves and trophy wives for the commanders; and those who were weak, resisted or tried to escape were killed. According to the review, government forces, the Ugandan People’s Defence Forces (UPDF), also committed abuses against civilians such as rape and murder. 2Lawlessness and essential service provision were at their abysmal worst as a result of destruction and breakdown of state and non-state structures of accountability and service delivery. In an effort to isolate the LRA, the government forcibly relocated many people to IDP camps, “protected villages,” which were guarded by the UPDF. An estimated 90 per cent of the population in Northern Uganda were displaced resulting in a 1.6 million IDPs (80 per cent of these comprised of women and children) living in over 200 camps throughout the region (UNICEF Uganda Annual Report 2006 &2007)3. Life in the camps was dificult, with IDPs suffering from; chronic poverty, inadequate nutrition, poor sanitation and limited access to health care services and education. In mid-2005, a multi-agency health and mortality survey led by the World Health Organisation (WHO) - (Health and Mortality Survey in IDP in the districts of Gulu, Kitgum and Pader, July 2005) found that nearly 1,000 people died each week in IDP camps in Northern Uganda due to preventable diseases. 78 Journal of Development Studies Young people in Northern Uganda have been, perhaps, the group most deeply affected by the conlict between the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) and the government of Uganda – a struggle that lasted over two decades and was characterised by a brutal civil war and a protracted humanitarian crisis. Thousands of young people saw their communities attacked and destroyed, lost parents and relatives to violence and disease and were separated from their families and displaced into internally displaced peoples’ camps (IDP’s). Thousands of young men and women were abducted by the LRA and forced to participate in violence, or serve as porters, cooks and sex slaves, resulting in many young women becoming mothers at a young age. As one recent research put it: “...no child was safe; ...very young children died of disease at high rates, just as they begun to gain strength against diarrhoea and respiratory illness, they became targets for abduction by the LRA and if older adolescent were less appealing to the LRA, they were a threat and subjected to torture and other forms of violence. It was a vicious circle where many children lost their lives”4. Even for the urban youths it was a period of fear and uncertainty as they commuted in designated protected areas for safety in the night and for the ‘lucky’ few, they had the burden of being in school the next day. The over two-decade-long conlict left a lasting impact on the lives of many youths in Northern Uganda. It is little wonder that many citizens experienced a growing disinterest and even hatred for the NRM government for its failure to address the situation promptly5. “It is not uncommon to hear people saying that the because of the war a whole generation of Acholi were lost. That is why today we see so many youth engaging in extreme bad behaviour including killing people for money. The war in Northern Uganda traumatised them; they were still young but unfortunately experienced a lot”( comment by an Acholi elder on the youth in Northern Uganda today). The extreme nature of the impact of the conlict on the lives of people of Northern Uganda raised widespread national and international concern and put pressure on the government to ind a lasting end to these atrocities. The Juba peace talks formed the basis of the agreement between the government of Uganda and the Lord’s Resistance Army/Movement to end the hostilities6. Following the signing of Agenda Item 3 of the peace talks in 2007, relative peace has since returned to the region and an estimated 92 per cent of IDPs have returned to their communities of origin or settled in locations closer to home7. The transition process has offered people in the region an opportunity to rebuild their lives in settings where they lived prior to being displaced to the camps. At a policy level, the GoU formulated a comprehensive development framework, the Peace, Recovery and Development Plan (PRDP), as a strategy to reduce poverty, improve 79 Olanya: Youth Reconciliation and Political Participation the welfare of the populace in Northern Uganda and address the great discrepancies in the development of the region. This framework seeks to reverse the prolonged effects of the war and usher the region on the road to recovery. Ideally, this initiative targets and derives its legality and relevance from the participation of individuals across all levels including the youth. It is envisaged that for peace reconciliation and recovery to come to fruition, the participation of all, including the youth, is crucial. 1.2 The Problem Right from the peace process that started with the Juba peace talks, the youth have been left out of participation in key decision-making and implementation processes aimed at lasting peace and development of Northern Uganda. Their issues remain unaddressed at the community, regional and national levels. At the national level, for example, their input and involvement in the development of Uganda’s Five-Year National Development Plan (2009 to 2014) has not been sought, even on key issues such as unemployment, education, health and poverty. At the regional level, youth participation in key recovery processes for example the PRDP have not been sought and in most cases interventions that exist to address their issues are not real to their needs. As Northern Uganda moves forward in the uncharted territory of peace and transition, it faces the challenge of rebuilding and designing appropriate strategies and recommendations for recovery. Young people have a key role to play in shaping this process. International and national interventions should strive to better understand, support and uphold the rights of youths affected by armed conlict. Young people’s own voices, opinions, perspectives and recommendations are a necessary and critical resource to rebuilding the region. “By involving a large number of national youth…we are creating a large base of the public that will be able to support, engage with and promote national development.”8 This paper examines the history of youth participation in Uganda; the state of the youth in Northern Uganda; the level of youth participation in the PRDP, non-governmental interventions, and participation in the political process. It calls for increased youth participation in the development process in Northern Uganda. 2 Methodology The methodology involved the use of qualitative method of data collection. The respondents were probed depending on their mandate in line with the issues raised. This paper is based on informal discussions that arose from issues highlighted during an Access to Justice ield study in Northern Uganda. It is based on information obtained 80 Journal of Development Studies from the seven districts of Acholi, that is: Gulu, Amuru, Nwoya, Kitgum, Lamwo, Pader and Agago. The discussions covered existing interventions by the government and non-government actors with special focus on the PRDP in relation to youth issues; their challenges, relevance and participation in the recovery, reconciliation and political process of Northern Uganda. Key informant interviews and focus group discussions were carried with a crosssection of youth individuals and groups in speciic locations in the Acholi sub-region. Two focus group discussions consisting of male and female youths (between the ages of 15 and 30) were conducted per district. Each focus group discussion consisted of 20 participants. Five (5) key informant interviews were conducted in each of districts in the region (Figure 1). Figure 1: Districts of Acholi sub-region LAMWO KITGUM PADER AMURU AGAGO GULU NWOYA The key informants interviewed included; youths, youth leaders, Local Council I and III’s, members of the Ker Kal Kwaro Acholi and; government oficials including the district gender oficer and population oficer. 3 Conceptual and Theoretical Background Primary data was guided by the key theme of the long-term conlict and the current peace being experienced in the region. There are various governmental and nongovernmental interventions in the region leading in the drive to reconciliation, recovery and development of Northern Uganda. The government of Uganda launched the Peace, Recovery and Development Plan (PRDP) in October 2007 to demonstrate its commitment to the reconstruction of Northern Uganda through a set of coherent programmes in one 81 Olanya: Youth Reconciliation and Political Participation organising framework. This paper gives unique attention to the PRDP as the major government initiative; the perspectives and role of young people and; existing laws and policies that call for the participation of the youth. It focuses on the challenges to the youth and their voice on how these issues can be addressed. 3.1 National Legal and Policy Framework for Youth in Uganda The youth, like women, people with disabilities, workers and the army are identiied as special interest groups that need afirmative action. The justiication was largely based on their rather marginalised position in society and, therefore, the need for afirmative action and representation in various structures including those in the decentralised local government system. The 1995 constitution (the Constitution of the Republic of Uganda 1995) has very enabling provisions that encourage participation of different citizen groups and there are speciic provisions for the youth. Besides the constitution, there are several other legislations that provide a context or entry points for the youth and other interest group. These include the Youth Council Act, the Local Government Act, Access to Information Act and others. The constitution provides for the foundation for youth participation. Objective 1 of the National Political Objectives provides for representation and participation of all persons in governing themselves. Objective 2 under the National Unity and Security provides that “every effort shall be made to integrate all the peoples of Uganda while at the same time recognising the existence of their ethnic, religious, ideological, political and cultural diversity”. Objective 6 ensures gender balance and fair representation of all marginalised groups in all constitutional and national bodies. Objective 10 calls on the state to take all the necessary steps to involve the people in the formulation and implementation of all the development plans and programmes that affect them. This participation extends to all spheres of decision-making, including participation in the political and reconciliation process in areas that have faced conlict or are still facing conlict. UNESCO’s contribution in regard to Youth Policy calls on governments to devise a national youth policy, which would act as a blue print for youth participation in national projects. It rightly acknowledges that although most countries call for youth participation, there is no existing policy framework to guide its implementation. It afirms that the process of formulating a National Youth Policy has the potential to identify the distinctive needs and concerns of youths and to promote substantial youth participation and integration in the making of our societies (Director General UNESCO). World Action Plan for Youth to the year 2000 and beyond and Plans for Actions of four World Youth Forums have stressed the importance of recognising the constructive contribution 82 Journal of Development Studies of the youth and the need to develop a speciic national youth policy. In line with this, the government of Uganda adopted a National Youth Policy in 2001 and 2004. The Uganda National Youth Policy, 2004 deines youth as: …passage from adolescent to full adulthood. The deinition does not look at the youth as a homogenous group with clear-cut age brackets but rather as a process of change… It relects the reality on the ground that the family and extended kinship ties loosen due to the different factors [and that] many young people by the age of 12 years have assumed adult responsibilities. The National Youth Policy recognises the large number of the youth, their strategic importance and immense potential for the development of the country. It notes that the youth have only been inadequately involved and their resources less harnessed in the socioeconomic development and in the promotion of peace, democracy, good governance and upholding the values of the society. The policy advocates mobilisation of resources to promote youth participation and integration in the mainstream of national development. The policy notes with concern the problems that affect the youth and their increased gendered risks and vulnerabilities due to socioeconomic, political, cultural, and other factors. It notes, too, that the youth are powerless; most lack education and proper health care; they are unskilled with limited employment opportunities and options; and lack control over resources. The policy seeks to create awareness on these youth concerns and to deine a place for the youth in society and national development. This policy seeks to guide, harmonise, complement, enhance and promote the distinctive, yet complementary, actions and roles of all the stakeholders at all levels in development to enhance effectiveness of all efforts. A key drawback though is that despite the rather impressive legal, policy, institutional and to an extent, normative framework for policy making, in practice the situation is not as rosy. Uganda is known to develop impressive policies which do not get implemented. There is a common view in the region that Uganda invents and other countries in the region, especially Rwanda and Tanzania, take the ideas and implement them (Uganda Paper for Youth Development Symposium in Arusha, Tanzania, 2007). 3.2 Youth Participation in Uganda Planning for youth development dates back to the 1960s when government established a section on youth affairs within the Ministry of Culture and Community Development. Besides having a speciic ministry for the youth the government also established three youth organisations, namely: National Union of Youth Organisation (NUYO), which was replaced by Uganda Youth Development Organisation (UYDO) in the 1970s; National Union of Students of Uganda (NUSU); and Young Farmers Union (YFU). NUYO 83 Olanya: Youth Reconciliation and Political Participation targeted out-of-school youth between the ages 13 and 30 while the YFU targeted inand out-of-school youth between 10 and 25 years; and the National Union of Students of Uganda (NUSU) targeted youth in secondary and tertiary institutions. Each of these youth bodies fell under the mandate of different ministries. NUYO was under the Ministry of Culture and Community Development; the YFU was under the Ministry of Agriculture, while NUSU was under the Ministry of Education (National Youth Policy of Uganda 2004). These youth organisations received substantial and extensive support from government in terms of resources and facilities. They also enjoyed support from international agencies like Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO), United Nations Children Fund (UNICEF) and United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). In the last two decades, however, many of the youth structures either collapsed or fell into disuse. At the moment, efforts have been devised to encourage youth participation at the national level. A more recent attempt, the National Youth Council Statute, was enacted in 1993 to ‘organise’ youths into a uniied body to participate in the development process. The National Youth Policy suggests youth involvement and participation in leadership, decision-making is low and the youth are being marginalised, with their involvement seen only as beneiciaries of programmes and services rather than as active participants in the development process. In terms of political participation at national level, there is a provision for ive youth representatives in parliament. At the district level, the law provides for district youth councils, sub-county youth councils and even village youth councils. But still, participation or representation of the youth below the age of 25 or those who are illiterate or semi-illiterate in the position of leadership at all levels is limited. More recently, there seems to be efforts to revamp youth participation in the policy and development process engineered from civil society organisations outside the state. Despite dificulties encountered in this re-engineering process, the situation represents some hope for independent youth participation which, if nurtured and protected from over-dependence on donors and the state, could just be an option for self-determination. 3.3 The Youth in Northern Uganda The youth in Northern Uganda have not been immune to decline in youth attention and participation at the national level. They have been victims of many conlicts that have terrorised Uganda as far back as the post-colonial era. As a region, Northern Uganda was a resource base for youth leaders and was at the forefront in the advancement of the youth discourse and participation. But as our history has taught us that one can only be relevant as long as they are in government or not against the government. Consequently, many youth movements have 84 Journal of Development Studies simultaneously been used and suppressed by regimes. This is the time in the history of the youth movement to choose to remain patronised by government and donors, on the one hand, or alternatively walk the path of self-determination by taking advantage of their numerical strength and existing opportunities to exert their inluence in shaping the development agenda and the future of their country. At the moment, it is quite clear that the situation of the youth in Northern Uganda is dire; many have lived all or most of their lives in a state of insecurity, poverty and displacement. Most of the current youths are products of this turbulence; some speak of a ‘lost generation’ of Acholi. However, there has been little data available to truly identify the magnitude of the effects of the war and displacement on the youth, and apparently, their unique role and participation in the post-conlict period. 3.4 The LRA Conlict and the Youth For over two decades, the Lord’s Resistance Army/ Movement (LRA/M) and the Uganda Peoples Defence Forces (UPDF) insurgency and counter-insurgency strategies had a devastating impact on the lives of the people of Northern Uganda. The conlict, which has since shifted to other countries, namely, (South) Sudan, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and the Central African Republic (CAR), destroyed infrastructure; weakened all sectors of government; fragmented sections of the society; and damaged the social fabric including traditional norms and values. The conlict was characterised by gross violations of human rights9. A number of interventions and programmes have been devised to protect the existing peace, guide the transition process and rebuild the communities, thus encouraging economic growth and empowerment of the region. These interventions have been devised by a number of state as well as joint state and non-state actors including UN organisations. Key state or government interventions include the Peace, Recovery and Development Plan for Northern Uganda (PRDP) and the Northern Uganda Social Action Fund (NUSAF). But it is pertinent to remember that, for all these interventions to have a comprehensive impact, all relevant stakeholders should be involved in the design and implementation of the programme. Youths in Northern Uganda are key stakeholders for any lasting peace, reconciliation and development to take root. 3.5 The Peace Recovery and Development Plan Amidst all these laws and policies, there are various programmes that have been designed by the government to spearhead the reconciliation process. The main programme, the Peace, Recovery and Development Plan for Northern Uganda (PRDP), is important to explore in relation to other government programmes to establish the extent to which laws and policies have been implemented to advance the interests of youths in Northern Uganda. 85 Olanya: Youth Reconciliation and Political Participation The PRDP is a post-conlict recovery plan designed to eradicate poverty in Northern Uganda after more than 20 years of conlict and population displacement. It is a strategy aimed at addressing the unique challenges in each of the sub-regions based on the conlict status and the extent of vulnerability. It involves establishing a irm coordination framework for all programmes and projects in the North, setting out certain objectives and targets for the region. The overall goal of the PRDP is to consolidate peace and security and lay a foundation for recovery and development. This is to be achieved through four core strategic objectives that are mutually reinforcing. These are: 1. Consolidation of state authority; 2. Rebuilding and empowering communities; 3. Revitalisation of the economy; and 4. Peace-building and reconciliation. Those targets will be met by various activities undertaken through normal channels: central government, local government, UN agencies, civil society and the private sector. As the PRDP is a new framework, and represents a special effort for the North, it needs a small supervising structure, comprising technical staff and a policy body to coordinate activities and review progress against the targets. It started in 2007 and is expected to go on until June 2015. The PRDP was prepared on the basis of lessons that had been learnt from implementation of a plethora of programmes in the North by various actors. In light of these lessons, the PRDP was launched to address a number of key issues including: 1. Supporting ongoing political dialogue and existing frameworks; 2. Developing efforts to reverse the decline in welfare and growth by achieving peace and stability; 3. Organising existing frameworks and adapting them to the conlict context in the region and ensuring better coordination, supervision and monitoring of ongoing interventions; 4. Ensuring political, security and development linkages by adopting a conlict framework – it is expected that socioeconomic investments will be better linked to changes in security approaches; and 5. Mobilising of resources to address development gaps: analysis of current international and national interventions suggests that there are gaps in responses to the conlict. Since its launch, however, the PRDP has achieved little because of insuficient funding, corruption, incoherent project selection and widespread confusion across sectors, districts and local communities about how implementation is supposed to proceed. As a result, the PRDP has thus far been a continuation of politics as usual rather than the afirmative action for Northern Uganda that was promised. 86 Journal of Development Studies 4 Findings and Discussion 4.1 State of Youth in Northern Uganda The youth are not a homogenous group, there are divided into many groups. For, example, the formally educated group can be divided into the employed and unemployed – the unemployed form the huge bulk. The semi-educated (formally) youths comprise mainly those that dropped out of school; most of them can read and write and engage in the semi-white-collar jobs to earn a living. Most of these two groups are in urban areas. The other group, the formally uneducated youths form the biggest proportion of the youth and face irst-hand challenges affecting the youth. They are mainly rural-based although a substantial proportion of them live in urban areas, mainly engaged in blue-collar or odd jobs. The issue of land and the resultant conlict has not left the youth unaffected. Land is one of the few ixed assets that many communities have turned to in this time of extreme poverty, unemployment and an apparent lack of alternative resource. This is not helped by countless external interests that aim to exploit this resource, as well. Many communities have called upon their youth to protect their heritage as it now offers the only means of survival. Attempts such as the Madhvani Group’s interest in Lakang, Amuru District, the gazetting of certain areas in Apaa, Amuru District as game reserves and the land wrangles with neighbouring ethnic group/s in Adjumani District, West Nile, are seen by the youth as personal attacks on their continued existence and as such the urgent need to do all possible to protect it. There are also internal threats to land and land disputes within communities, clans and individuals. This friction extends to ownership of land and other resources by the youth. Land ownership in Acholi is seen as a preserve of elders since most land tenure is customary in nature. The youth have no say and most times have to wait for their elders to pass on before they can own land. The challenges affecting the youth are limiting their participation10; core among this are unemployment, corruption, drug abuse and resultant criminal acts. National survey (UBOS Report, 2006) shows that 83 per cent of the youth are unemployed. In Northern Uganda, most of the youth are engaged in manual labour or what some call ‘dirty-collar’ jobs. In Gulu, for example, most of the youths are involved in activities such as bodaboda (commercial motorcyclist) ridding and providing manual labour at building sites. A huge number of youths, especially in the rural areas, are engaged in subsistence farming; and sadly, the abuse of drugs and alcohol is high among the youth11. This tends to drive more youths into criminal activity. The abuse of drugs and alcohol could be attributed to redundancy and unemployment. 87 Olanya: Youth Reconciliation and Political Participation During the focus group discussions conducted, majority of the participants were not aware of the National Youth Policy. This casts doubt on the respondents’ involvement in the making of the Policy. According to UNESCO’s guidelines on developing a National Youth Policy, if this is not brought at the forefront, it will shelf youth interests and lead to their continued exploitation, manipulation and neglect. 4.2 Youth Participation in the Peace and Development Process in Northern Uganda Despite marginal involvement in government interventions aimed at bringing peace and development, the youth have persisted in efforts for relevance. During the conlict and post-conlict periods, they have used mechanisms, including faith-based movements to call for peace and end to conlict. Youth camps and associations in various parts of Northern Uganda were involved in pushing the agenda of the end of conlict. This was extended to the entertainment scene; musicians like Bosmic Otim, Twong Gweno and Obol Simpleman had albums and songs centred on peace and the return of the rebels from the war. They called upon fellow youths participating in the war to return home and develop their regions instead of engaging in destructive activities. They rallied themselves across the region to advocate an end to war and reconciliation of the warring parties. In relation to this, one transitional justice expert said: I do not remember any album that said otherwise. To show evidence that these youth agendas, through songs to bring peace in Northern Uganda were effective, Joseph Kony demanded some of the albums because their lyrics focused on reconciliation12. The youth, through their groups, employed various methodologies to bring relief to those in the camps. They organised fundraising for items like clothes and foodstuffs, which they distributed to camps during the period when most of the people were in these so called protected settlements. Lobbying for scholastic support for IDP schools, university groups like Acholi Makerere Students Association (AMSA) donated items to the poor. They also partnered with international youth organisations in their drive to bring about sustainable peace and called on sister organisations to push for an end to the conlict. At the local level, the youth became involved in traditional reconciliation practices like mato put (Acholi justice tradition of drinking a plant mixture to signify reconciliation and burying past wrongs). They played an active role in supporting the elders of their respective communities and learning how this impacts on their community13. 4.3 Peace, Recovery and Development Plan for Northern Uganda The interventions of government such as the PRDP are special interventions beyond the normal provisions and duties of the state. The PRPD has failed to fulil its obligation as such; it is confusing in regard to what projects fall under it and what interventions have 88 Journal of Development Studies so far been carried out. The PRDP as a framework is very complicated to comprehend. Many people raised questions about its objectives, its targets and the relevant strategies14. Most times when the government allocates services and funds to the region, it is hard to know whether that falls under the normal budget allocation or falls under the PRDP. Government and politicians lined in favour of the government are not shy to categorise government expenditures under the national budget as PRDP. The strategies and objectives of the PRDP are not conlict-sensitive. They comprise government priorities rather than urgent recovery requirements for the people of Northern Uganda. A good example is the PRDP strategy that seeks to consolidate state authority. Many youths interviewed noted: Consolidating state authority is not a strategy for reconciliation and even when mentioned, it only brings fear. Strategic objectives in relation to the state should be about consolidating state legitimacy or its relevance15. The objective of consolidating state authority has created a feeling or tendency of the North not belonging to the rest of the country. In reference to the above, one youth activist said: It (the government) has not been making proper priorities for the people but selish political ambitions. They went with a framework which was already designed. No survey was done, and the government did not understand the problems of the people and the youth. Up to now, people cannot understand the PRDP clearly. Conceptually, it is quite contentious. You can only consolidate state [authority]on the basis of a sound and strong reconciliation. Government is looking at its own priorities instead of cosequencing [sic] these matters (Senior Transitional Justice Analyst). Although government interventions have had an element of reconciliation and maintaining peace, their major undoing has been corruption; “They failed because the money was swindled. They did not fulil the purpose for which they were set up and in that regard they are hopeless programmes”16. The PRDP, for example, had to be renewed; however, it would have been interesting to know if there were any tangible achievements before the renewal. In many places, it was visible that the PRDP was still in its conception and there were no direct physical or tangible beneits to refer to. It is interesting to note that the PRDP was launched in 2008 and was supposed to run until 2012, but it was extended for three years, its immediate effect is still to be seen. The youth are suspicious of the government interventions in the region. They question government intention behind the PRDP and look at it as a way for government to window-dress or show their perceived interest in the region. According to one youth in Amuru District, the PRDP was meant to 89 Olanya: Youth Reconciliation and Political Participation validate government presence in the North and a ploy for outsiders to come and take their resources17. It should be understood that most of the youth cited that this programme by government to rehabilitate the region was a brilliant idea, but it is the manner in which it is implemented and the possible interest and the ulterior motives that concern them. In strong connection to the PRDP, various youths in all the districts visited raised concerns of corruption. This manifests a fall in trust and conidence in initiatives designed and implemented by the government. The PRDP is being implemented by the ofice of the Prime Minister through district oficials. Some people have been recruited to give technical direction to the programme. According to them the programme cannot be successful because it was under the same arrangement that the Northern Ugandan Social Action Fund (NUSAF) was implemented18. A lot of money was lost in corruption and as someone cited, this was a “signpost project”19; the signposts were more colourful than the actual projects being conducted. Unfortunately, the youth have been left out and marginalised in key strategic areas affecting the region. 4.5 Youths and the Conlict in Northern Uganda The youth are still very bitter about the violence they faced and the resultant murky situation they are in right now. One of the youths openly said: Were it not for the war, maybe I would be a doctor, because that is what I wanted to be as a child. Because of the insecurity, I had to drop out of school and today I am a bodaboda rider. It is important to note that the suffering the youths have faced and their subsequent omission from development processes has fuelled more suspicion towards efforts and interventions to help them. They regard themselves as pawns or scapegoats of an already existing controversy. For example, one young man wondered: Why reconcile or even participate when we have suffered like this. The government should irst provide us jobs, hospitals and then apologise before I can even think of participating in these things (A young man in Amuru District). During the conlict, a huge number of schools either closed or were redundant. Pupils feared going to school and most times were preoccupied with survival. For the schools that were open, the quality of service provision was low and, in most cases, these schools lacked essential facilitation; low teacher turn-up and little or no availability of scholastic materials. As a result there was low pupil turn-up. In the same light, it encouraged a web of migration to more secure places for education. This option was only available to the more well-to-do Acholi. A good number of young people were left without any formal education. 90 Journal of Development Studies 4.6 Amnesty Although many of the youth did not directly disagree with the amnesty they expressed concerns about the unlimited protection it offered to ex-combatants. This view was widely held by the girls who said that they had suffered a lot and yet reconciliation favoured their former tormentors. According to the Amnesty Commission, over 13,000 former LRA ex-combatants have been pardoned since the enactment of the Amnesty Act to date20. Most of the girls raised concerns about the manner in which ex-combatants are treated after surrender. They noted that government treatment towards ex-rebels; “it is too soft”21. A girl who had returned home without the father of her children did not stand to beneit from this at all. As one child mother put it; “…We should also be included in this amnesty”22. Young female returnees highlight this omission as a big failure in the reconciliation process. It is within this context that they decry schemes by government to resettle ex-combatants, apportion them resources like land and capital to re-start their lives whilst the child mothers, former abducted children who were forced to participate in the war, are instead left out. Countless times we have heard how government forces are implicated in atrocities that happened during the war. These range from killings in the most gruesome ways like smoking people to death which is alleged to have happened at Buchoro Primary School, Gulu District; the Barlonyo massacres in Lango23; the ‘rape’ of men in places such as Olwiyo and Palaro in Nwoya and Gulu districts, respectively24.They look at all these attempts of ‘soft landing’ for these former rebels as a ploy to conceal information and save the government from the spotlight, thus enabling them to avoid accountability for these heinous crimes. When asked about amnesty and the treatment given to excombatants, a young woman had this to say: Amnesty was a very good idea; however its implementation is making people cautious. A third party free from government and individuals in Uganda should handle it. It should be a proper functioning institution free from inluence. This is not possible however, that is why we should have another country handling the Amnesty process. 4.7 Interventions by NGOs The youth have been left out of most interventions by non-governmental organisations. This relects a bias in aid and attention towards children and towards the formerly abducted. In reality, the youth are struggling at least as much as children, and in some cases more so. And even then, children who were the main beneiciaries have been left without any real support and focus as they have grown older and transcended youthful age. There are countless narrations by formerly abducted children being left to fend for 91 Olanya: Youth Reconciliation and Political Participation and reintegrate themselves in their new communities once the dust has settled after their return25. This point goes on to highlight the existing gap in the follow-up and monitoring that governmental and especially programmes by non-governmental actors have had in handling these matters. A huge bulk of the people, including the youth, still think NGOs should continue operating in the region. Poor service delivery by the government leaves a gap requiring complementation. However, most non-governmental organisations see themselves only as organs to strengthen existing government activities but not as sole providers. One NGO staff said: Our intention is not to take over service provision but to ensure that the government is supported and strengthened to handle matters on its own. Although there may be truth in this statement, this can only work if government agencies signiicantly improve on their eficiency – something that most people do not believe in. 4.8 Political Participation and the Youth Many youths consider politics as an employment, a means to derive livelihood and graduate from the poor class to the next level. People are no longer becoming MPs because they want to help and bring changes in their communities. Those in power or in positions of leadership see it as a privilege and not as an opportunity to serve. This mentality has forced the youth to the periphery in political participation and representation. They are forced to take a back seat and when it comes to representation it is only those with the means that can afford the money to run campaigns – this is an investment26. Politically, the youth are not suficiently involved at the national and regional levels. Regional representation of the youth in parliament is inadequate. The manner in which they are elected also breeds a recipe for corruption and vote rigging. A young man in Gulu asked: How can you have one youth MP for the whole region yet have a woman MP for every district? If we have one youth MP in the region representing youth in Northern Uganda, how adequate is that? What is their use? They can easily be manipulated by the older MPs anyway. Women are being emancipated and being given the opportunity for an MP for each district, why not the youths? Besides, they are more dynamic and have fresh ideas? All the regions in Uganda need this because we have all been affected by conlict right from the time we got independence up to now; all the regions in Uganda need representation. Northern Uganda has a strong history of political participation: 92 Journal of Development Studies Looking at the youth and their role in the political process should be seen from a historical context. Northern Uganda used to be the nursery bed of politicians and inluential leaders in the country. The education relected this, in schools this talent was nurtured and cultivated. In those days, we had the Northern debating clubs at the apex of youth participation. It helped many Acholi youths come to parliament. (Interview with a youth leader) Politically, the youth have joined various political parties to see their interest advanced. Most of them seem to have joined parties that form the greatest threat to the National Resistance Movement (NRM). This, to them, constitutes an act of constructive deiance. They see this as a response to a government that has failed to help them or even address their issues. Most of them are eager to participate in civil protests against the government. Their actions are also moulded on the fact that most of them are redundant, poor, or involved in drug and alcohol abuse. But a careful analysis reveals that all these are in fact effects of continued neglect by government. During the walk-to-work (demonstration against the rising cost of living organised by the pressure group- For God and my Country) in Gulu in mid-2011, a very big number of youths were involved and when asked if they would still participate in civil demonstrations amidst government brutality against such uprisings, most of them expressed willingness to participate: What is peace if we are like this? Of what use is it to me to continue living this way? If there is the slightest opportunity for me to bring change, I will take it (A youth).. It is important to note that youth issues are sensitive and if not urgently addressed, constitute a time bomb to government and to peace in the region and the entire country. 5 Conclusion Undermining youth interest in the reconciliation, development and peace process in Northern Uganda has had a negative impact on the outputs of various interventions. Youth issues are not being addressed and the views of the youth are not relected in regional and national interventions. This affects not only the eficiency of these programmes but also poses a risk to the continuity of peace and development interventions in the region. True to the foregoing, undermining youth priorities and involvement has been a downfall of countless societies and regimes in the world. This friction tends to leave with it a trend of destruction, insecurity and lost hopes. Youths present a great opportunity and potential for development in Uganda. Their vast numbers, strength and dynamism make response to their needs a crucial mandate and not just an option. For sustainable growth to come to fruition, this young generation of Ugandan men and women should be brought on aboard in decision-making. Their 93 Olanya: Youth Reconciliation and Political Participation voices, perspectives and aspirations have to constitute a vital element of governmental and non-governmental policies, laws, interventions and programmes. 6 Recommendations • • • • • • • Government programmes have to be transparent and inclusive from their inception through implementation. Efforts to educate people about government programmes and how they can beneit should widely be done in the urban and rural centres. Radio broadcasts and decentralised training seminars have to be carried out in this regard. The youth should be included in the decision-making, participation and appraisal of government programmes and their views and opinions sought on a regular basis; this may be monthly or quarterly. Regional counselling and youth centres should be established and given priority. Unique attention has to be given to the psychological effects of the LRA/M violence – the mindset of the youth has to be demilitarised. National reconciliation drives have to be carried out to enable countless youth and people of Northern Uganda to move on from bad experiences in the war. This may involve truth-telling commissions where the government and other actors in the over-two-decades-long war should come out openly about their roles and mistakes; and where necessary apologise to the people of Northern Uganda in order for past wrongs to be forgiven and launch the genesis of the reconciliation process. Government and other non-governmental interventions should focus on specialised funds to address the issues affecting the youth in Northern Uganda. This calls for projects strategically aimed at creating employment for the youth; combating drug and alcohol abuse; poverty alleviation among the youth; and addressing challenges created as a result of the education gap between the youth in Northern Uganda and other youths in the rest of the country. The youth in Northern Uganda have to be empowered and their capacity built; extensive training projects focusing on national youth policies and laws, reconciliation, peace and development should be carried with the youth as the target beneiciaries to bring them on board. Programmes should also focus on increased youth involvement in their inception, decision-making and implementation. The youth should be encouraged and supported to form youth movements and other awareness platforms alienated from political interference. Platforms should be built to enable Northern Uganda to interface with other youths within Uganda and from countries with similar experiences. This is aimed at sharing experiences and best practices. 94 Journal of Development Studies • More research-based advocacy on youth issues should be carried out to bring out the youth as a special group that requires attention and interventions aimed at encouraging their participation in the development of their communities and countries. Non-governmental organisations should include youth support and strengthening programmes into their activities. Non-governmental organisations should continue to play a big role in service delivery to the people of Northern Uganda. They should be encouraged to support the government in service delivery. Youth representation in parliament should be improved; every district should have a youth member of parliament to enable youth issues to be brought at the fore front and advocate youth issues in the political, decision- and policy-making arena of the legislature. • • • Notes 1 Uganda Bureau of Statistics (UBOS) Report, 2006 2 Interview with an Acholi Elder 3 UNICEF Uganda Annual Report 2006 &2007 4 Child/Youth as Peace builders (CAP) Survey 2011 5 International Crisis Group, Northern Uganda; Seizing the Opportunity for Peace, 2007 6 Cessation of Hostilities Agreement between the Government of Uganda and the Lord’s Resistance Army/Movement, Juba, Sudan, available at http:/www.northernuganda.usypp. gov United Nations, Uganda Humanitarian Proile, 2011, available at http:/www.ochadms. unog.ch. 7 8 The Social Development Advisor, Uganda- Youth Participation and Development, a guide to development partners Amnesty International (2007)- “Doubly traumatized: Lack of access to justice for female victims of sexual and gender-based violence in Northern Uganda. Available at: http://www. amnestyusa.org. 9 10 Interview with an expert on traditional justice and youth issues in Northern Uganda 11 Interview with a youth in Kitgum 12 Interview with a senior mobiliser, youth analyst and former president of UYD 95 Olanya: Youth Reconciliation and Political Participation 13 Interview with a member of the Ker kal kwaro Acholi 14 Interview with a youth in Agago district 15 Interview with a senior youth mobiliser 16 Interview with a youth in Pader district 17 Interview with a group of youth in Amuru 18 Interview with a group of youth in Agago district 19 Interview with a youth in Agago district 20 New Vision of Tuesday May 29th 2012 page 3. (the Amnesty Act expired on 25th May 2012) 21 Interview with a formerly abducted female youth 22 Interview with a formerly abducted female youth 23 FGD with male youths 24 FGD with male youths 25 Interview with a Male youth 26 Interview with a district oficial. 96 Journal of Development Studies 3 (2) (2013) 97 - 114 Narratives of the Youth in Post-War Kitgum, Northern Uganda David N. Tshimba 1, 1 * Uganda Martyrs University Abstract: In post-war contexts, questions about how best to deal with the bitter legacies of the past often split different clusters of the post-war society, including external interveners. Basing on an empirical research carried out ive years after armed confrontations between the Uganda Peoples’ Defence Forces and the Lord’s Resistance Army insurgency had ceased, this paper examines how war victims’ narratives are silenced by those who seek to speak on their behalf. The ieldwork engaged with postwar Kitgum Town youths by means of structured questionnaires, focus-group discussions as well as in-depth interviews. The conclusion drawn from the indings underscores that unless post-war youths’ concerns in today’s Kitgum are incorporated in the post-war reconstruction agenda, the disbursements of such reconstruction will remain elusive. Keywords: War Affected Youths; Post-war Recovery; Kitgum 1 Introduction No member of a given community lives without attachment to a historical background of that particular community. Arendt (1958) argues that no human life, not even the life of the hermit in nature’s wilderness, is possible without a world which directly or indirectly testiies to the presence of other human beings. Consequently, the very fact that the existence of a living being requires the pre-existence of another being does imply that humans too possess a sense of belonging which is signiicantly dear to them. In the same vein, Ngabirano (2008) points out that people, regardless of their social category or status, are born within a community that possesses a past. Certainly, this past becomes the past of the newly-born as well as the past of the one yet to be born. Hence, * E-mail: dtshimba@umu.ac.ug Tshimba: Narratives of the Youth in Post-War Northern Uganda “the stories of individuals affected by narrative conlicts are thus embedded in the story of the community from which they belong and from where their identity is derived” (Ngabirano 2008, p.3). This paper attempts to capture the forgotten narratives of today’s Northern Ugandan youths, living in a precarious post-war context. Peace at any rate, the paper maintains, ought to be a future-oriented endeavour. Since both children and youths are seen as the hope for the future of the community to which they belong as well as the wider world with which they are to interact, their concerns should form the core of any peacebuilding initiative. However, this appears not to be the case for post-war reconstruction in today’s Kitgum, in particular, and Northern Uganda, in general. The youths’ concerns for post-war Kitgum recovery, which include an education that is empowering, adequate healthcare and sustaining employment, continue to be tampered with by mainstream post-conlict discourse and actions. Unsurprisingly, by muting the voices of the young of the post-war society (children and youths) who still constitute the majority (78.7 per cent according to the 2002 Uganda Population and Housing Census) of total population of Kitgum District), peace after violent conlict remains elusive and those at the centre-stage attempting to craft ways forward to postconlict reconstruction do so with little or no satisfactory results. How possible will durable peace and sustainable development in today’s postwar Kitgum be forged if both voices and contributions of its youths are not adequately harnessed and considered? This question informs the central thesis of this paper. In the following parts, the paper provides both conceptual and theoretical discussions related to its main thesis, as well as the presentation and discussion of its research indings. The paper inally suggests some ways forward to rebuilding formerly broken human relations among the youth in post-war Kitgum, in particular, and Northern Uganda, in general. These include the restoration of social justice after violent conlict, essentially caused by and impacted on the youths of this area. 2 Contextual Background In contexts where mass atrocities and repression have been systematic and/or widespread, children and youths are always amongst those most negatively affected by physical, psychological, social, economic and political consequences. Both children and youths are not only caught up in violence but they also suffer war crimes such as rape, torture, slavery, or illegal recruitment, because of their vulnerability. The Lord’s Resistance Movement/Army rebels (LRM/A) have abducted thousands of minors into their ighting ranks, which eventually alienated them from the local population (Angucia 2010). 98 Journal of Development Studies The 1995 Ugandan Constitution, Article 17 (1) (c), stipulates that the duty of every Ugandan citizen is “to protect children and vulnerable persons against any form of abuse, harassment or ill-treatment.” The constitution, in Article 34(4), further states that children under the age of 16 “are entitled to be protected from social and economic exploitation, and shall not be employed in or required to perform work that is likely to be hazardous or to interfere with their education or to be harmful to their health or physical, mental, spiritual, moral or social development.” However, the LRA has been known to practise forced conscriptions, large-scale atrocities, abductions of children for rebel activities, as well as rape and forced marriage of the female abductees. It is believed that tens of thousands of children have been abducted into the LRA and, as an initiation ritual, they have been forced to kill members of their families and communities (Angucia 2010). Distressingly, as it was reported, government forces used formerly captured children for intelligence-gathering or to identify LRA positions and weapon caches (Human Rights Watch, May 2005; Report of the UN Secretary-General, October 2006). No doubt, there has been a lot of human suffering, more so, inlicted on the then children who are today’s youths in post-war Kitgum. At various moments during the course of the devastating conlict, people as well as entities of all walks of life misinterpreted the concerns of Northern Uganda to the detriment of the ideal. Realities registered on the ground were and perhaps still are narrated in an utterly distorted manner. From the very beginning of this armed conlict between incoming government forces and outgoing (metamorphosed) rebel forces in late 1980s and early 1990s, many voices deep-down the local tier have gone silenced at the expense of hegemonic discourses. For a considerable amount of time, as war in Northern Uganda unfolded, the ruling government denied any alarming scale of the shattering LRA-led rebel activities (Gingyera–Pinycwa, 1992). What is more agonising is the fact that the international community simply echoed the applauses of Museveni’s government for cosmetic democracy, economic recovery as well as the ight against HIV/AIDS, while at the national level Ugandans, be they government oficials or ordinary citizens from other parts of the country, referred to the conlict/war in Northern Uganda as an Acholi predicament, something that the Acholi deserved as a punishment for the atrocities that they committed in the infamous Luwero Triangle massacres between 1981 and 1986 (Oryem, 2004). Fierce ighting by government forces and LRA abuses signiicantly decreased around 2006. The government’s strategy of pursuing a military solution to the conlict did contribute to humanitarian suffering of civilian populations, and most signiicantly the youths; it is reported that government soldiers — Uganda Peoples’ Defence Forces (UPDF) –and the auxiliary Local Defence Units (LDUs) committed human rights 99 Tshimba: Narratives of the Youth in Post-War Northern Uganda violations including, killings, beatings, rape and other such human rights abuses (Human Rights Watch 2005; Amnesty International 2007). The LRA, too, was responsible for the killing, torture, rape, mutilation and abduction of thousands of children and adults, which continued to be carried out throughout the region (Acholi, Lango and Teso subregions) until late 2005. Peace talks between the Ugandan government and the LRA oficially opened in July 2006 in Juba (South Sudan), and a cessation-of-hostilities agreement was signed in August by both parties. Although the Final Peace Agreement (FPA) was never signed by the two parties to the conlict, following the logjam after six months of negotiations, the Juba peace process and the LRA deliberate relocation to the rainforests of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and the Central African Republic (CAR) brought some security improvement upon the civilian populations in Northern Uganda, who since then started resettling into their original dwellings. Post-traumatic stress disorder, nevertheless, remains an under-treated legacy of children who have been trapped in the shoot-and-shell of battle as well as those displaced as either IDPs or refugees. At the pinnacle of challenges is the increase in, and plight of, child soldiers. These children of war are vulnerable to three profound sequels in their adult lives. The irst of these is that the de-socialisation and dehumanisation of a young adolescent’s mind becomes self-perpetuating. The excitement of interpersonal physical conlict, of combat, of dominance and of sexual violence entraps such victims (Pearn, 2003). Secondly, the ‘lost childhood’ of these victims means that schooling and subsequent rehabilitation are very dificult. Thirdly, and perhaps more jeopardising, the long-term sequel of life and childhood in combat ranks underscores the inescapability of post-traumatic stress disorder. Aptel and Ladisch (2011) note that, despite the extent of human rights violations and crimes suffered by children and youths, transitional justice mechanisms, which include truth commissions, criminal justice, reparations, and institutional reform efforts, have often overlooked the latter’s interests and perspectives. Practitioners have only recently begun to acknowledge the signiicance of the participation of children and youths in these post-conlict measures. This failure, it is believed, is in part due to the relative disempowerment of the young, in general, and of child victims, in particular. It is compounded by their lack of representation in and by political entities and civil society organisations, the existence of international organisations such as UNICEF and Save the Children notwithstanding. The research carried out for this paper endeavours to contribute not only to the existing body of knowledge on conlict and peace in today’s Northern Uganda and 100 Journal of Development Studies the Great Lakes region of Africa as a whole, but it also suggests a couple of policy recommendations along which youth-sensitive peace-building processes could be imagined and sustained in the context of the post-war Northern Uganda, in general, and Kitgum Town, in particular. This study was undertaken to achieve the following objectives: 1. To capture the perceptions of today’s Kitgum Town youths about the post-conlict scenario; 2. To ind out the aspirations of the youths in post-war Kitgum; 3. To examine the different understandings about justice and reconciliation among today’s youths in Kitgum; and 4. To suggest youth-sensitive peace-building processes in post-war Northern Uganda. This paper focuses on Kitgum Town. The town lies on an area of 29.6 square kilometres, with a total number of households currently at 12,242. The area had 42,493 people of whom 73 per cent were male and 27 per cent were female. Children were the majority, constituting 48 per cent. It was found out from the recent Local Council I Population Register (as of May 2009) that the total population of Kitgum Town Council amounts to 69,587, of whom 23,943 are physically able children and 278 children are with disability. Regarding the conceptual understanding of a youth in terms of age brackets, the ambiguity exposed in several of the legal deinitions and cultural perceptions of youth relects the challenge involved in drawing a clear line between children and adults. By and large, the term “youth” has no legal demarcation, with deinitions ranging from those aged 15 – 24, or even up to 30 years old (Aptel & Ladisch 2011). Other deinitions focus on deining the youth according to the stage of life – between childhood and adulthood. That distinction depends in part on the context, culture, issue at hand, and also on the individual. Aptel and Ladisch (2011) further argue that from a legal and protection perspective, it is crucial to set a clear distinction between children and adults, and to mark the distinction chronologically at the age of 18. More often than not, the crucial question to be dealt with in a fragile context of the aftermath of war is whether formerly abducted children who participated in grave violations should be treated as adults, which they are now or as children, given the time they were victimised. 3 Methodology The research took narrative analysis as its approach. Contrary to content analysis, which allows making inferences by objectively and systematically identifying speciied characteristics of messages, thus enabling analysts to compare the content of communication across a variety of settings, narrative analysis goes “deeper into the causes, explanations, and effects of the spoken word” (Druckman 2005, p.277). In a 101 Tshimba: Narratives of the Youth in Post-War Northern Uganda narrative analysis approach, the emphasis is on what is said, as well as why, and its effect. As such, context is signiicant. Tellers of the narratives, as Druckman (2005) points out, are the experts of their own stories whereas emotion and non-verbal behaviour can be included as part of the analysis. This allows for broad or thematic understandings of the conlict processes that capture not only what is said, but also the meaning behind it. Like action research, the subjects in narrative analysis are active participants in the process. A case-study design with speciic selection of Kitgum Town was adopted for the study. The population for this research comprised of samples from formerly internally displaced youths who have now resettled in their respective previous homesteads or relocated to new dwellings within the town. A group of one hundred youths, (60 males and 40 females), were subjected to in-depth focus group discussions, one-on-one interviews, and structured questionnaires. Focus group discussions were formed based on the descriptive characteristics of a group (by gender, age bracket and occupation) while one-on-one interviews were accorded with speciic youths, given their sphere of inluence in commanding youths’ opinion within the town. The structured questionnaires were evenly distributed to the entire study sample. This research made used of purposive sampling technique, given the peculiar characteristic of the study’s interest. To ensure methodological integrity, the study relied on both primary and secondary sources of data. The secondary or library sources included scholarly works on conlict/war in Northern Uganda, in general and, more particularly, post-conlict challenges (since 2006) as well as rehabilitation processes in the region. Furthermore, in order to ill the gap in the existing literature, the study involved the narrative analysis approach through one-on-one interviews as well as focus-group discussions (Oruka, 1991). This method, Bryman (2008) notes, seeks to understand sociological questions about groups, communities, and contexts through the individual’s lived experience. Besides interviews and focus group discussions, this study also made intensive use of the participant observation method. This was appropriately chosen as method to avoid what is referred to as the “Hawthorne effect,” an effect by which the subjects of an experiment are changed by the mere fact that they are the objects of observation and experimentation. Qualitative methods for data analysis were mainly used on the data collected although there was limited presentation of statistical data, derived from the structured questionnaire. Qualitative data was derived from the interview guide, the observation checklist and the focus group guide whereas quantitative data from the structured questionnaire used the Likert scale, from 1 to 5 with the corresponding values as follow: strongly disagree (SD)— disagree(D) — not sure (NS) — agree (A)— strongly agree(SA). 102 Journal of Development Studies 3.1 Demographic Characteristics of Respondents The youths who participated in this research were categorised in the two different sexes (male and female) and three age groups (15 to 19; 20 to 24; and 25 to 30). These respondents were Kitgum Town dwellers, who have been badly affected — either directly or indirectly — by the two-decade-long insurgency which devastated the entire Northern Ugandan region. Female respondents constituted forty (40) per cent of the study population while male respondents made sixty (60) per cent. The irst two age groups (15-19 and 20-24) made thirty (30) per cent of respondents each, while the last age group (25-30) consisted of forty (40) per cent of respondents (see Table 1.) The study interest was consonant with the fact that the last age group spent the longest time of their youthful age in the insurgency (armed conlict). Table 1: Distribution of respondents by age and gender Age group 15-19 20-24 25-30 Total Gender Male 18 18 24 60 Percentage Female 12 12 16 40 30 30 40 100 The age bracket was paramount in informing the study and upon which depended the formation of different focus group discussions as well as the selection for key informants, who were subjected to a one-on-one in-depth interview. 4 Findings 4.1 Kitgum Youths’ Perception of the Post-War Context The Ugandan government, together with many other non-state actors, including intergovernmental humanitarian institutions hitherto operational in the Northern Uganda war zone went on to declare Northern Uganda a post-war region in the aftermath of the UPDF-led Operation Iron Fist of 2002 – 2005 and Operation Lightning Thunder of 2008. This study attempted irst and foremost to harness the perceptions of current Kitgum youths (previously enmeshed in violent armed conlict at younger age) about the post-war scenario. When asked whether they concurred with the Ugandan government’s perception that northern Uganda is ably in a post-war context, 90 per cent of the respondents agreed, with an emphasis from the other 10 per cent of respondents who strongly agreed. 100 per cent of those who simply agreed with the government’s perception belonged to the irst two age groups (15-19 and 20-24) whereas those who strongly agreed belonged to the 103 Tshimba: Narratives of the Youth in Post-War Northern Uganda last age group (25-30). It can thus be implied that those who spent the longest of their life span in the period of insurgency or violent conlict clearly establish the contrast between their badly affected past and their redeemed present times. Although 55 per cent of all respondents agreed that the government has, ever since the end of the war, been running different programmes geared towards empowering badly affected youths in post-war Kitgum Town, 35 per cent (all female respondents) simply disagreed while 10 per cent were not sure. In three different focus-group discussions with female respondents aged between 15 and 19, and between 20 and 24, it was made clear that the few government programmes extended to Kitgum youths end up beneiting male youths. The systemic cultural apparatus seems to continue working against female youths during the implementation of some governmental programmes for post-war youth empowerment. Table 2: Assistance to selected youths in post-war Kitgum Age group 15-19 20-24 25-30 Total M F M F M F D NS 10 1 1 3 4 1 10 11 14 35 A Percentage 18 18 11 18 14 24 15 100 17 20 55 That 35 per cent of respondents (all of them female youths) disagree with the statement that the Ugandan government is fully active, steering up the consolidation of stability and collaborative development is no wonder. One interviewee aged 25 said: The average rehabilitation work is carried out by some NGOs in the area who are also suffocated by the local government wanting to beneit from the implementation of their activities. By the time the so-called recovery package reaches down to the real beneiciary, it is just meagre, not to mention the strongly patriarchal tendencies at the grassroots level, which work against female beneiciaries… (Interview on 26 April 2012). 4.2 Youths’ Aspirations in Post-War Kitgum Like anybody else, youths in the aftermath of war may seem to rethink their pursuit of life goals and tend to revisit what they may perceive to be ideal situations. Aggregately, there are some forms of post-war aspirations that may prevail in the post-war society regardless of social categories one may belong to. The youths, given the anticipated 104 Journal of Development Studies future lying ahead of them, have aspirations which they yearn for in the aftermath of violent conlict. To begin with, 95 per cent of the study respondents agreed that the war in the entire region of Northern Uganda shattered most of their desires and dreams for the future. All respondents aged between 25 and 30 strongly agreed that the two-decade long armed conlict has shattered their desires and dreams for the best possible selves they much wanted to become. In a focus group discussion, one young man aged 27 expressed himself in the following terms: I felt the effects of the Northern Ugandan insurgency when I was still 5 years old by the time Kony was still under the cover of Lakwena. By that time, I had already imagined my professional life as a successful pilot. Little did I know that for the rest of my childhood and adolescence I would never visit a piloting school nor would I be given a chance to go after my dream… Things got even worse when I had to adjust to IDPs camp life after a narrow escape from LRA abduction and now here I am, a Senior 6 leaver, with no assurance of joining university anytime soon (Focus group discussion on 30th April 2012). In an in-depth interview with one respondent aged 29, who had previously illed the structured questionnaire, her response when asked about her current aspirations in postwar Kitgum was the following: Having lived in a village IDP camp for over four years as a result of war and where I had given birth to a baby girl who has no image whatsoever of her father, I still cannot take full advantage of the many NGOs operating in this area given that my level of education does not permit me to work in any of their ofices. I only wish that my child, almost 10 years old, could grow in a violence-free society where respect for women’s dignity is the norm and that she can acquire good education to compete with others in the job market available. (Interview on 03 May 2012) No wonder that 100 per cent of female respondents as well as 95 per cent of male respondents concurred with the idea that the establishment and coordination of a meaningful education structure dedicated to the war-affected and marginalised youths in Kitgum would signiicantly help awaken many youths’ desires and dreams in the aftermath of war. Cumulatively, all the respondents agreed that today’s youths in Kitgum still lack a viable platform on which they can perform their skills for career development. Although animated by hopes for a brighter future, these youths’ aspirations, including an education that is empowering and decent occupation are almost always tampered with by the mainstream adult post-war public discourse and actions. 105 Tshimba: Narratives of the Youth in Post-War Northern Uganda Whereas the majority of youths in Kitgum, by inductive logic, still agree that social structures, including the family, clan, religious institutions, non-state actors as well as the government remain capable of resurrecting today’s youths’ desires and dreams, all female respondents echoed their aspiration for immediate health facilities given the dramatic effects of war. Such health facilities could tackle not only the physical damages to the body but also the general psychological therapy. In a focus group discussion with female participants belonging to category (a) of respondents, an adolescent girl aged 16 expressed her anguish in the following words: […]It is even sad that a young sick person has to go all the way to Mulago Hospital in Kampala from Kitgum in order to be diagnosed of this infamous nodding disease. This disease has started attacking even those who are no longer children. The war has had so many effects on us to the extent that only an adequate healthcare could salvage us from incurring the suffering in a post-war context. Further still, many of us are still traumatised by the impact of the insurgency and there seems to be no facility at our disposal to nurse our psychological wounds inherited from the war and camp life. With no proper health facilities in place, we are all likely to succumb to the bad effects of war as well as the unpredictability of a post-war scenario. I wholeheartedly aspire to a well-functioning health system in our area to help us live our lives and attain our life objectives (Focus group discussion, 08 May 2012). 4.3 Reparation Forgiveness Debate among Youths in Post-War Kitgum The notion of justice per se means different things to different people. Even more, in the post-war context, different members of society have divergent views about what justice ought to mean in the aftermath of violent conlict. Such differing understandings of justice tend to polarise any post-war society as it sets for the implementation of recovery/postwar reconstruction agenda. This study not only attempts to tap into the understandings of justice held by the youths in post-war Kitgum Town, but also endeavours to establish whether the dominant differing views of retributive and reparative justice, on the one hand, and restorative and forgiving, on the other hand, could be reconciled in the aftermath of a violent conlict which devastated the entire region of Northern Uganda, Kitgum inclusive. When asked whether any form of traditional reconciliatory mechanism (speciic for the Acholi culture) has been employed to bring about peaceful coexistence among the youths in post-war Kitgum, responses were as different as the categories of respondents themselves. Angucia (2010) already points out that conlict and war have broken and disrupted the coherence and embeddedness so much desired of the Northern Ugandan post-war society. By and large, re-establishing constructive relationships for the 106 Journal of Development Studies betterment of both the badly war-affected youths (ex-LRA abductees) and the rest of the wider society (indirectly affected) calls for a balance between demands for social justice and the need for post-war community reconciliation. This is precisely what makes ‘positive peace’ (Galtung, 1996) dificult to attain, more so in the aftermath of such violent conlict. Even where the absence of direct violence tends to characterise the relational life of youths in today’s Kitgum Town, conlicting youth’s demands are still being made, especially between ex-LRA abductees and the non-abductees. The totality of respondents between the ages of 15 and 19 years did not acknowledge any usage of a culturally-embedded reconciliatory mechanism in a bid to ensure peaceful coexistence amongst youths in post-war Kitgum, most especially between former abductees and the rest of the youths. At the same time, the other 30 per cent between the ages of 20 and 24 years were not sure about whether such traditional reconciliation practice between former LRA abductees and non-abductees has ever taken place at all. Those aged between 25 and 30 agreed that a culturally-embedded reconciliatory mechanism has ever taken place at different levels of the post-war society, and as such peaceful coexistence amongst youths in today’s Kitgum has been fully restored, more precisely between ex-abductees and non-abductees. As mentioned in the contextual background above, the LRA rebels were and perhaps still are fond of conscripting children into their armed forces and transform the latter into merciless killers with no discrimination whatsoever. This logically implies that a signiicant number of today’s youths in Northern Uganda could appropriately be referred to as formerly abducted children, most of whom being in their adolescent age. Therefore, part of today’s youths who were formerly abducted children belong to the irst category of respondents between the ages of 15 and 19. That no Acholi reconciliatory mechanism has been employed in a bid to ensure harmonious coexistence between the formerly abducted and non-abductees in the aftermath of war, is a rather serious shortcoming in the process of social reintegration as well as their recovery/rehabilitation. In a focus-group discussion with seven male young men between the ages of 15 and 19, one of them aged 19 years said: A lot of my friends were abducted by the LRA and were meant to kill anyone on the orders of the commander, beginning with some of their siblings and relatives. For more than three years, some of them were living by the gun as their only source of livelihood and protection…Ever since they returned to their respective homes it has always been taken for granted that these guys are okay and just as they have to learn to live with us, we too have to learn to live with them. I personally have no problem at all relating to them although they seem to have dificulty relating to me as it used to be before their abduction. One can perceive a sense of guilt whenever one communicates with 107 Tshimba: Narratives of the Youth in Post-War Northern Uganda them. Some of my friends who were never abducted are never at ease with former LRA abductees… (Focus group discussion, on 09 May 2012). While 60 per cent of the total number of respondents agreed that the performance of the Mato Oput tradition is effective enough to settle down all sorts of on-going wrangles and/or suspicion amongst youths in post-war Kitgum, 40 per cent of the study respondents disagree with such a view. During an interview with one respondent aged 26, the following was his submission vis-à-vis the performance of Mato Oput in a bid to reconcile former abductees and non-abductees: The majority of former LRA abductees are young people who never got chance to enjoy any stability in their rural areas and so have no idea at all about what the Mato Oput reconciliation process is all about…In my view, former LRA abductees need intensive psycho-therapy to be followed by economic support for their livelihoods in a post-war context. It is only then that any reconciliatory performance can take place (Interview, on 09 May 2012). Out of 100 respondents who participated in this study, 29 disagreed with the view that former LRA abductees are fully reconciled with the rest of other youths in the aftermath of war in Northern Uganda. 30 respondents, however, agreed while 34 other respondents were not sure that such reconciliation process was ever carried out or whether it is still in the pipeline. Two respondents between the ages of 15 and 19 strongly disagreed while 5 others from category(c) strongly agreed with the view at hand. It is nevertheless important to note that 100 per cent of the study respondents strongly concurred with the idea that reconciliation should take precedence in the very implementation of the postwar reconstruction agenda. Throughout focus-group discussions as well as interviews, all the respondents maintained that there still is some level of suspicion amongst today’s Northern Ugandan youths, on the one hand, and between today’s Northern Ugandan youths and the rest of youths across other parts of the country, on the other hand. Collective blame, which in most cases has been accompanied by collective guilt, continues to hinder a prevailing atmosphere of healthy rapports and harmonious coexistence in the aftermath of violent armed conlict. Although the idea of broad-based reconciliatory practices was unanimously held by the study respondents as the one to be at the pinnacle of post-war recovery, it was equally striking to note that 80 per cent of the study respondents agree that the Ugandan government (a party to the armed conlict which is within reach) ought to compensate today’s Northern Ugandan youths — both those directly badly affected and those who 108 Journal of Development Studies indirectly bore the effects of war — for the losses (including lost childhood and early education) they incurred during the course of the war. Such compensation, they argue, should be in form of reparation for the damages caused by the war in order to advance a degree of afirmative action through educational opportunity, healthcare and employment opportunities. Twenty respondents (20 per cent) strongly agreed with this idea. It would, therefore, be counter-productive for any interveners (whether governmental or otherwise) in today’s Kitgum to act in disregard of such concern for compensation or reparation for the losses/damages incurred. 4.4 Kitgum Youths in Post-War Recovery Peace, at any rate, ought to be a future-oriented endeavour. This futuristic dimension of search for peace seems to suggest a mandate to incorporate younger generations (children and youths) in any peace-building processes, more so in the aftermath of a prolonged violent armed conlict. The indings of this research have also testiied to this dimension. 95 per cent of the study respondents concurred with the view that post-war reconstruction and long-term peace-building activities in today’s Kitgum should focus more on today’s youths. Considering themselves as a force to reckon with, especially in the aftermath of war, these youths have had no other wish than to play a decisive role in steering both the short-term recovery and the long-term peace-building agendas. Nonetheless, views became divergent when the study respondents were faced with the following question: Are today’s youths in Kitgum still feeling marginalised in comparison with youths from other parts of the country? Table 3: Feedback on marginalization Age group 15-19 D NS A M 18 F 20-24 Total 12 M F 25-30 SA 18 12 2 F 10 24 18 12 18 M Percentage 12 20 38 2 24 6 16 20 18 100 Male and female respondents between the ages of 15 and 19 strongly agreed and simply agreed, respectively, to the existence of marginalisation of today’s youths in post-war Kitgum. Elsewhere, almost all male respondents between the ages of 20 and 30 were not sure about such feeling of marginalisation. However, a majority of female respondents between the ages of 20 and 30 did not agree to any such feeling of marginalisation. The 109 Tshimba: Narratives of the Youth in Post-War Northern Uganda stories which tended to back up these divergent positions appeared to be revealing. In a focus group discussion with some seven male respondents between the ages of 15 and 19, one of the participants aged 18 shared his story: In all my years of education both at primary and secondary levels, my school has organised various excursions in different parts of the country. Although we follow the same educational curricula and sit for the same questions in UNEB papers, it is deinitely clear that students from the South of the country are far more exposed than we are. Our school visits in the South of the country focus on huge infrastructure of economic development such as airports, railways, hydroelectric dams as well as other important historical buildings such the parliament, the independence monument, and so on. I do not recall having seen students from the South of the country coming to visit here in the North, just because there is almost nothing for students to see up here…(Focus group discussion, on 10 May 2012). Respondents between the ages of 20 and 30 held different views vis-à-vis the existence of a feeling of marginalisation of post-war Kitgum youths, in particular, and in Northern Uganda, in general, in comparison to their counterparts in other parts of the country. A 24-year old respondent, in a focus group discussion, shared his viewpoint: It is no longer a debate that the war has ended in the entire North of the country. The past has not been an easy time for many of us, but now things are surely getting back to normal. The South of the country has got its own challenges too. Things are not all that good as one may wish to see. So, I am of the view that all youths in the country are at par, facing the same problem of unemployment and the same opportunities for a brighter future. I am, therefore, not sure whether we in the North are still marginalised as such (Focus group discussion, on 10 May 2012). Uniquely, female respondents between the ages of 20 and 30 held a categorical stand quite different from the rest of respondents. In an interview, a 27-year old respondent, who illed the structured questionnaire as well, stated the following: True that the war left behind a lot of traumatic events and misery with many of us — who now are the vibrant group our post-war society counts on. However, ever since the war ended, things have moved on and more so in an interesting dimension. The encounter with so many players in our post-war society, including the government as well as nongovernmental actors has extended a massive opportunity for us all. Rather than feeling marginalised as the result of war, I for one have instead been empowered to stand tall against the challenges the future lies before me. Whether from Kampala or Mbale or Gulu or Kitgum, chances are equal for any youth to prosper in this country. And so are the youth-related challenges. No marginalisation at all… (Interview, on 10 May 2012). 110 Journal of Development Studies It could, therefore, be inferred that today’s young people in post-war Kitgum (those between the ages of 15 and 19), most whom are still undergoing secondary education, continue to bear a strong sense of being marginalised in terms of social welfare vis-àvis their counterparts from other parts of the country. The trend seems to suggest that the older one is, the less marginalised they tend to perceive themselves. Hence, there seems to be a correlation between the degree of welfare and age among youths in a post-war scenario. This correlation is even pronounced with the implementation of the afirmative action for gender equality in a patriarchal society, which consists of extending preferential treatment to female candidates in competition with their male counterparts for societal beneits by various actors (governmental and non-governmental) in the postwar recovery agenda. The highly noted degree of indifference by male respondents tends to suggest a contrary view to the above correlation, citing the general realisation that exclusion of youths from enjoying societal welfare, especially decent employment, has characterised the country has a whole. Still, many male youths in post-war Kitgum conspicuously complain about the implementation of the so-called afirmative action for the female gender which, they believe, worsens an already bad situation. In an interview with a 26-year-old respondent, the following was his view about post-war recovery agenda in Kitgum Town: Whereas we are the most hit by the two-decade-long war between the Ugandan government and the LRA, it is only unfortunate that we are the least considered when it comes to the implementation of the recovery agenda. Worse still, when gender preference comes into play, we, the male youths, remain at a big loss. Moreover, people from other parts of the country have come in to direct, lead, or coordinate most of the recovery activities as we quietly sit and wait to be directed, led, or coordinated (Interview, on 10 May 2012)! 5 Conclusion Lederach (2005) notes that no peace-building frameworks suggest solutions; at best, they pose a series of questions useful for thinking about and developing responsive initiatives and processes in settings of deep-rooted conlict. Such processes must deinitely be connected with situational parameters within which they are to be applied. On the one hand, community stories are not just told; they are lived. These are told and lived within a certain context. Eventually, although the past could help free the future from similar past violence, if well consulted, the same past can still provide dangerous narratives resulting from bitter memories. In the latter possibility, such recollected past may allow recurrence to violent conlict even when conlict has long ended. This is precisely why 111 Tshimba: Narratives of the Youth in Post-War Northern Uganda suggesting solutions for post-war scenarios is not an easy task. A silenced voice which is being recollected from a bitter memory will always speak back, perhaps in an even more violent manner. Society, whether post-war or not, is deinitely not something people discover but rather something they do create; it is thus an invention and not a mere discovery. Consequently, social stability — more especially in the aftermath of violent armed conlict — is not something granted to people living in society. This is rather an ongoing human search based on good will. Looking into post-conlict conlict prevention, the issue at hand is no longer conlict as such but rather violence, or precisely the capacity of human communities to non-violently settle conlict. Ultimately, given the fact that authentic reconciliation and durable peace after violent conlict does not just occur as a result of reconstructing a legitimate and inclusive national-level government, paying due attention to silenced voices (more so youths’) in a post-war context is a promising step towards political and socioeconomic reconstructions at the local tier. Otherwise, just as meteorologists could predict rainfalls or drought in a coming time, social scientists, too, would be given the opportunity to predict yet another violent outburst in a post-war context unless the way in which post-war narratives shaping action are narrated is constructively transformed. 6 Policy Suggestions Given that the odds of peaceful coexistence in the aftermath of violent conlict largely depend on how best dissenting voices from different clusters of the post-war society are dealt with, any post-war society is hence characterised by both challenges of fragility and prospects for stability. In a scenario where the youths constitute a signiicant majority of the population in today’s Kitgum, not to pay substantial attention to their deep-seated concerns in the aftermath of violent armed conlict would be counterproductive to full post-war recovery. In a bid to contribute towards the generation of ways forward to durable peace in post-war Kitgum, this paper recommends the following policy suggestions for today’s post-war youths in today’s Kitgum – and Northern Uganda by extension: 6.1 To the Uganda Government Given the position of the Uganda government as previously party to the armed conlict, a special compensation fund should be set up by the central government to help the badly war-affected youths in conlict-ridden zones of Northern Uganda. Such a compensation fund should solely serve towards the realisation of these youths’ concerns, including providing speciic education, holistic healthcare and entrepreneurial seeds for employability. At decentralised local government levels, room for direct youth 112 Journal of Development Studies participation in the decision-making and implementation processes in a bottom-up manner should be created and sustained. 6.2 To Local Civil Society While civil society organisations in post-war scenarios perform, with the same political weight, the duty of representativeness in peace-building processes as well as advocacy for inclusiveness of the often silenced voices such as youths’ deep-seated concerns, there is much likelihood for more stability in such post-war context in the event where the affected themselves (surviving youth victims of the armed conlict) could voice their concerns without further go-between. More often than not, a great deal of disservice is done by those who seek to speak on behalf of victims. 6.3 To Non-State International Organisations International organisations which are still operational in today’s Northern Uganda need to revisit the modus operandi vis-à-vis their relationships with badly war-affected youths (both the victims-made-perpetrators and perpetrators-made-victims). These organisations should take greater consideration for the long-silenced deepseated concerns affecting youths emerging from a violent past, for without dealing with the youths’ desires, including genuine reconciliation, adequate education, proper healthcare and opportunities for employment, durable peace in post-war Northern Uganda will remain elusive. References Amnesty International (2007). Uganda Doubly Traumatised: Lack of Access to Justice for Female Victims of Sexual and Gender-Based Violence in Northern Uganda. November 2007, AI Index: AFR 59/005/2007. Angucia, M. (2010). Broken Citizenship: Formerly Abducted Children and their Social Reintegration in Northern Uganda. [Published doctoral dissertation] University of Groningen, the Netherlands. Aptel, C., Ladisch, V. (2011). Through a New Lens: A Child-Sensitive Approach to Transitional Justice. Available at www.ictj.org. (Accessed August 2011). Arendt, H. (1958). The Human Condition. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Bryman, A., (2008). Social Research Methods. 3rd ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Druckman, D. (2005). Doing Research: Methods of Inquiry for Conlict Analysis. London: Sage Publications. Galtung, J., 1996. Peace by Peaceful Means: peace and conlict, development and civilization. London: Sage Publications. 113 Tshimba: Narratives of the Youth in Post-War Northern Uganda Gingyera-Pinycwa, A. G. (1992). Northern Uganda in National Politics. Kampala: Fountain Publishers. Human Rights Watch (2005). Uprooted and Forgotten: Impunity and Human Rights Abuses in Northern Uganda. September 2005. New York: HRW Press. Lederach, J. P. (2005). The Moral Imagination: The Art and Soul of Building Peace. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Ngabirano, M. (2008). Typology of Victimhood: the concept of Justice between the Biblical Conlict of Cain-Abel and the Great Lakes Conlict of Hutu- Tutsi. Mtaiti Mwafrika Monograph Series No. 21. Kampala: African Research and Documentation Centre. Oruka, H. O. (1991). Sage Philosophy: Indigenous Thinkers and Modern Debate on African Philosophy. Nairobi: African Centre for Technological Studies (ACTS) Press. Oryem, L. C. (2004). Breaking the Cycle of Violence. Mennonite Central Committee Peace Ofice Publication, Vol. 34. No. 2. 3-10. Pearn, J. H. (2003). Children and War. Journal of Paediatrics and Child Health, Vol. 39. No. 3. 166-172. 114 Journal of Development Studies 3 (2) (2013) 115 - 132 Engendering Social Rejection among Formerly Abducted Young Women in Northern Uganda Eric Awich Ochen 1, 1 * Faculty of Social Sciences, Makerere University Abstract: Exploring the lived experiences of the young women coming out of conlict, the study documents the challenges and pitfalls of resettlement and reintegration in Gulu and Amuru districts, Northern Uganda. The study suggests that the young women experienced signiicant dificulties in their resettlement and reintegration process. This dificulty mainly pertains to the way they relate to and are regarded by people within their communities – a scenario which was constructed by them as social rejection by the community. This problem was partly due to their gender, but also due in part to other contextual issues within the community. The social rejection was clearly evident in the day-to-day relationships of the young women; how their children were treated; and their perception of being different (construction of otherness). This rejection, real or imagined, has been one of the factors constraining the effective resettlement and reintegration process. Yet psycho-social support agencies’ emphasis on relationship, as a factor in the reintegration process, has been weak in terms of programming and implementation of interventions. The main lesson from the indings of the study is that social relationship(s) is/are critical to the successful reintegration of young people emerging out of conlict and should be at the core of any interventions that may be planned to address issues of stigma and reintegration. Keywords: Child Soldiers; Rehabilitation; Post-Conlict Reconstruction 1 Introduction The abduction of children in Northern Uganda, arising from the emergent armed conlict occupied a greater part of the last three decades and left many families and communities devastated. Since the beginning of the conlict in 1986, between 25,000 and 30,000 * E-mail: eaochen@ss.mak.ac.ug Ochen: Engendering Social Rejection among formerly Abducted Young Women children are estimated to have been abducted and deployed in various capacities with the rebels (Human Rights Watch, 2006). McKay and Mazurana (2004) put the proportion of girls abducted at 30 per cent of the total number of abducted children while Annan et.al. (2006) indicate a igure of 15 per cent1. The profound impact of abduction and the repertoire of experiences the children are subjected to have been devastating for the psychosocial functioning and development of children in Northern Uganda (Corbin, 2008; McKay, 2004). In some cases, children have been forced to commit horrendous atrocities against their own families and communities. These have raised moral and ethical problems for the children with the resultant feeling of hopelessness, desperation, confusion and emotional turmoil. While information exists about resettlement and reinsertion initiatives (see Angucia 2010; Maina 2010, Bainomugisha, 2011) the dynamics of the post-reinsertion experiences of the formerly abducted children (FAC) have not been widely explored in the aftermath of disbandment of IDP camps. Moreover, there is widespread debate within the literature on what exactly constitutes reintegration, and what it exactly means for both the individual returnee and the community of reinsertion. Studies suggest that mistrust, fear and reservations exists among community members regarding children and young people returning from captivity (see for example Ochen 2011, Frerks et.al. 2005; McKay, 2004; Mazurana et al., 2010). The literature (e.g. Frerks et al 2005; Okello and Hovil 2007; Maina 2010; Angucia 2010) also recognises the challenges of reintegration of the young women who were abducted as young girls and have since returned to the community. The ramiication for young women who returned from rebel captivity and have resettled within the community is something which current scholarship is yet to explore adequately (see also Ochen 2011; Ochen and Okeny 2011, Maina, 2010). This pertains mainly with regards to how the young women negotiate the dificult terrains of reintegration within irst the IDP camps and lately the original villages where communities were displaced from. Abduction, its aftermath and the resulting experiences raised signiicant implications for the wellbeing of the girls. The nuanced gender relations in Acholi society implies that women, whether married or not, ind themselves at the receiving end of a culture which is heavily gender-predicated. The social expectations for women are that of submission and loyalty. As the study later shows, these social expectations are understood by and widely followed by members of society, but the bush society while it mirrored what happens in the normal Acholi society also had its challenges in terms of the culture of power control and domination over the young women. The experience of the women in the bush was to lead in many cases to social rejections on return, partly attributed to their failure to observe the acceptable gender norms and standards. Yet it is possible that such women by account of their 116 Journal of Development Studies bush experiences would form a wall around themselves to guard against further abuse, exploitation and gender injustices. This paper also argues that the social rejection of the young women has been constructed differently by the different young women (child mothers), although similarities also arise in such responses. 2 Methodology The research utilised a mainly qualitative approach in data collection with emphasis on social constructionism (see Schwandt, 2003). A design borrowing from ethnography, narrative analysis and phenomenology, putting emphasis on the lived experiences of the formerly abducted young women and interactions with the community was utilised in the current study. The study focus was on the interactions and relationships that existed between the latter group and the general community, the reasons for emerging views and perspectives. An in-depth narrative interview was carried out with 21 young women who returned from rebel captivity. This was the major method used to elicit their views on their post-return experiences, the nature of life within the community and what meanings they put on their everyday experiences. It was deemed not necessary to consult other actors in the community as the study was primarily aimed at exploring issues around the experiences of the young women and how they construct such issues. To enable us understand and appreciate more the experience of the young women, some key informant interviews and focus groups discussions were carried out with community members. Data was analysed mainly using thematic analysis. A variant of thematic analysis known as template analysis (King, 2004) was utilised for categorisation and organisation of data at analysis stage. The generated template guided the presentation of the indings based on the major themes and sub-themes emerging from the study. This data was subjected to the selected theoretical frame for purposes of inferring meanings and making sense of the data as well as drawing conclusions from the study. 3 Related Literature Within the last two decades, there has been increased research into the effects of armed conlict on girls and women (Mazurana et al 2008; Annan et al 2007; Frerks et al., 2005; McKay and Mazurana, 2004; UNFA 2002; Machel, 1996). In almost all civil conlicts in developing countries, women and girls have suffered either directly or indirectly. They have been targeted by ighting forces to be used as cooks, domestic servants, sex slaves, porters and in some cases as ighters (McKay, 2004; McKay and Mazurana, 2004). Commenting on the scale of exploitation of women and girl-children in Teso, Eastern Uganda, De Berry (2004) writes that girls were at risk of being sexually exploited by 117 Ochen: Engendering Social Rejection among formerly Abducted Young Women both the rebels and the government forces. De Berry identiies a number of factors that increase vulnerability for girls, including militarisation, displacement, soldiers dictating movements within the camps2 and commoditisation of sex (De Berry, 2004, p.52). She also suggests that many girls within situations of war forgo their own sexual protection in the face of survival. De Berry identiies exposure to HIV/AIDS and social ostracism as some of the risk factors associated with sexual abuse of girls. Her study also identiies some of the supportive factors for girls coping with sexual abuse and exploitation during war, including “affective ties” between the young person and the family, and availability and accessibility of business opportunities for girls and women. She concludes that in Teso, the girls were both victims of adversity and “active resilient survivors” (De Berry, 2004, p.58), noting that the agency of the girl was visible in their taking advantage of business and other opportunities within the camps to ensure own and dependants’ survival. In this case, the girls were not just apathetic victims but mustered efforts to direct to some degree the course of their lives under the circumstances. Other writers have also questioned the presentation of women and girls only as victims in situations of conlict. It has been suggested that girls have played an active part in many conlicts, not only as victims of aggression but ighters and perpetrators of violence (Haeri and Puechguirbal, 2010; Francis, 2007). Francis, however, suggests that while the participation of children and young people in conlict has been both voluntary and involuntary, in most cases the young people do not have a choice at all and joining ighting groups is perceived as giving the best option for survival in a dificult context. It is, however, the view of some scholars that much remains to be learnt from children and young peoples’ experiences of conlict and its aftermath (Boyden and De Berry, 2004; Maina, 2010; Angucia 2010, McKay et al., 2010; Ochen 2011). Boyden and De Berry lament the signiicant dearth of empirical information on long-term outcomes of conlict on children. They note that research needs to pay more attention to how political conlicts affect adolescents’ economic and social roles as well as the effects on gender relations within childhood and inter-generational relations (between children and their parents or grandparents). There are different reintegration challenges for rural and urban areas. For example, reintegration in rural areas is sometimes a challenge due to the limitation of land while for urban areas; there are dificulties in obtaining employment in both the formal and urban informal sectors for the returnees (Frerks et al., 2005). Other constraining factors for employment of former child soldiers appear to be their low level of education and skills as indicated by case studies from Namibia, Uganda, Ethiopia and Mozambique (Frerks et al., 2005; Mazurana et al., 2008; Annan et al., 2006). These are often the result of early conscription of young people into the armed forces before they have been 118 Journal of Development Studies exposed to adequate basic education, thus limiting their later livelihood opportunities. Whereas Annan et al. (2006) suggest a generally high level of support within the communities (in Northern Uganda) for formerly abducted children in Cwero IDP camp in Gulu District, it was noted that families were more supportive compared to general community members (Corbin, 2008). Still the support within the family and community was not deconstructed or reanalysed to determine its nature, magnitude, dimensions and who among the family members is more supportive. This study attempts to answer some of these questions. Within the literature there has been criticism that demobilisation, disarmament and reintegration (DDR) programmes do not tend to favour women/girls compared to the men/boys as in most cases girls do not have the military hardware “guns to exchange” as in Sierra Leone (Adanan, 2010; Maina, 2010; McKay and Mazurana, 2004; Chitalia and Odeh, 2004). This challenge was also noted by the representatives of governments that gathered in Paris, France, to review support to children affected by armed conlict3. The Paris Commitment recognised the devastating effects of armed conlict on children and noted that “girls continue to be largely invisible in programming and diplomatic initiatives regarding the unlawful recruitment and use of children by armed forces or groups.”(Paris Commitment, 2007, p.2). The Commitment also stresses the primary responsibilities of state parties in protecting children from recruitment or use by armed forces and further emphasises the role of the state in supporting the reintegration of children used by armed forces in addition to reporting and monitoring progress on the violation of children’s rights. The lack of prioritisation of the young women’s experiences of captivity does not leave much room for their unique experiences and conlict o be understood and relected upon. Swaine and Feeny (2004) also point out one important factor in the coping of young people. They note that the disruption of family and community support networks signiicantly undermine a girls’ ability to make sense of events and experiences they undergo. In other words, it compromises their coping abilities. In a study in Gulu District, Corbin (2008) found that girls had not been exposed to more dificult experiences than their male counterparts. She added that boys argued that girls often married off and in their view, had an easier life. These indings, however, seems to differ signiicantly from other studies (such as McKay, 2004; McKay and Mazurana 2004; Frerks et al. 2005). Even Corbin (2008, p.330) acknowledges that: …the invisibility of female experiences is a barrier to addressing their physical, economic and social needs, thereby compounding their challenges of reintegration. 119 Ochen: Engendering Social Rejection among formerly Abducted Young Women This situation apparently arises from the inability or unwillingness of the FAC to talk about their experiences. Another situational factor which has ramiications for resettlement and reintegration is the poverty that formerly abducted young women return to. In Northern Uganda, the high level of poverty has often affected reintegration programmes as the returnees are left with few options in terms of livelihood, and have to depend on humanitarian agencies (Abola et al., 2009; Corbin, 2008; McKay, 2004). In terms of factors aiding the resettlement and reintegration process, the primacy of the role of the family over social groups and other afiliations such as religion, have been identiied by studies (Corbin, 2008). In some communities, traditional cleansing ceremonies are seen as important in aiding the process of “cultural reconnection to the larger community” (Corbin, 2008, p.325). This has also been identiied in other studies (Frerks et al., 2005; McKay and Mazurana, 2004). Having noted that the family is seen as playing a key mediation role in the process of traditional cleansing, Corbin (2008) wonders what the implications of the role of the family would be for those returnees who ind no trace of their families on return from the bush, thus raising the question as to whether the extended family and the clan system steps in to perform this role. In many African communities (including Acholi in Northern Uganda), cultural functions are normally performed by the wider extended family or clan (see Angucia, 2010; Shanahan, 2008; Frerks et al., 2005; Mazurana et al., 2008), hence Corbin’s fears could be contextualised. While Frerks et al. (2005) allude to cultural and social institutions using traditional practices as a method for rehabilitation and reintegration; they observe that boys appeared to have utilised this method more than female returnees. It has also been suggested that other than the psychological beneits, there is at present no documented study on the effectiveness of traditional practices in enhancing reintegration in the community4 (Allen and Schomerus, 2006). The main challenge for resettlement and reintegration arises from the fact that many abducted children had been turned into instruments of subjugation and violence against their own communities. Other scholars have also raised concerns about how the rehabilitation and reintegration process is managed when the philosophies underpinning deinitions and conceptualisations of childhood differ from local socio-cultural context (see Acirokop, 2010; Francis, 2007; Shepler, 2005). This study contributes further to the reintegration programming by recognising that many young people in the community are not being effectively reached in spite of several years of programme interventions. Other studies (e.g. Abola et al., 2009; Okello and Hovil, 2007; Allen and Schomerus, 2006) have also recognised these challenges. 120 Journal of Development Studies Moreover, gender issues in the experiences of the young women are something that scholarship is yet to explore adequately. Recent studies on children affected by armed conlict have indicated that the greater composition of the rebels as well as its top leadership is male. Therefore, from both their captivity experiences and their efforts at reconstituting their lives in the community, gendered power imbalances are at play. Studies from Eastern Uganda, Sierra Leone, Angola and Mozambique all point out the gendered power imbalances and exploitation of the girl children (Frerks et al., 2005; Mazurana and McKay 2004; De Berry 2004). It is probable that power structures might be at play in the community’s ‘protection’ systems and structures which might in turn further alienate women and girls from the needed psychosocial support, thereby constraining reintegration programmes (UNICEF 2005, p.203). Analysis of power systems inherent in the experiences of the young women is thus an important step and process. The cultural perceptions of child mothers as adults clouded social support to the girls and in other cases the lack of recognition of the growth and development of the child mothers into young adults made it dificult for them to be effectively supported. This has been exacerbated by interventions which treated the young women as children and not young adults. The individuated experience of the young women and how this can be brought to bear on the reintegration process was thus lost (see Ochen, 2011; McKay et al., 2010; McKay and Mazurana, 2004). The deterministic approach to support further created more challenges of identity among the young women, compounding their dificulties. It is suggested that in planning interventions for the young women, focus should be made on these issues and intersection of their abduction experience, perception of identity, gender and cultural positioning. Such an approach can only come out if the intersectionality of the experiences of these young women is taken into consideration. In analysing the data, African feminist scholarship and interpretation of the African woman’s situation has been considered (see Oyewumi, 1997, 2000; Mikell, 1995; Bakare-Yusuf, 2003). To paraphrase Mikell (1995), African feminism recognises the importance of men and disregards militant opposition to patriarchy and hostility towards males. It thus recognises the interdependency among men and women for social harmony and societal progress. The African feminist perspective, however, also recognises the presence of oppression among some familial and patriarchal elements. Mikell notes that African feminist scholars whether literary or otherwise appreciate that not all men “are brutal and repressive” (Mikell, 1995, p.406). Still it would be important to identify, understand and appreciate young women’s experiences in African cultural context and how this is informed by ground/gender factors, as well as how such factors deine and explain women’s status and positions within society. 121 Ochen: Engendering Social Rejection among formerly Abducted Young Women Oyewumi (2000) suggests that some feminist anthropology of Africa does not bring out the nuanced issues about gender relations; as Western constructions and assumptions about gender relations are often used as philosophical bases. She argues that ‘woman’ and ‘wife’ might not be articulated as one category. In Oyewumi’s view, ‘wifehood’ is seen as a transitioning phase to ‘motherhood’ which in Oyewumi’s words is “the preferred and cherished self-identity of many African women” (2000, p.1097). Yet, for the current subject of study, their motherhood experience did not bring the joy they would have wanted, nor did their social environment provide an opportunity within which their motherhood would be thus celebrated and effectively embraced. This study seeks to contextualise the issues under investigation within feminist research perspectives, particularly those aspects which pertain to gendered power relations (see Haralambos and Holborn, 2008; Saul, 2003; Nicholson, 1990). Studies have noted demonstrated gender power imbalances in the political economy and socioeconomic and cultural circumstances of most conlict affected communities (Frerks et al., 2005; De-Berry, 2004; McKay and Mazurana, 2004). This is the same community in to which the formerly abducted girl children and young women ind themselves returning. Issues emerging from the research will be discussed and analysed within an African feminist theoretical positioning which recognises the difference and uniqueness of the African situation and experiences from other social positioning, including the consideration of local realities. 4 Findings The stories of young women returning from rebel captivity and trying to re-establish themselves within their communities are as varied and particular as the individuals themselves. Some similarities emerge in these experiences: notably the relationship the young women have with signiicant others in their community and the perception of the support (or lack of it) in the process of resettlement and reintegration. Stories from these young women depict tales of acceptance, rejection and nonchalance experienced at different points in the reintegration process. In some cases, what emerges in the postreunion5 period is the situation of a rejected and dejected young woman perceived by her family and other people within the community as ‘other’ or an outsider. This makes some of the young women shun going back to their original homes on disbandment of the internally displaced person camps, and remain within the vicinity of the camp/urban centre. A community focus group discussion notes: Up to now if you move and go to the centre [trading] you are going to ind some houses that have remained in the [IDP] camp…..you will ind that some of them are for former abductees because they feel that they cannot go anywhere. Their homes are there, maybe 122 Journal of Development Studies their brothers’ but they think that if they go back they would be looked at as ‘different’. So what they do is to remain in the camp and start small businesses such as restaurants to make ends meet (Focus group discussion with local leaders and Child Protection Committee, Alero Sub-County, Amuru District). Interviews with the young women however reveal that they do not perceive themselves as other. The young women consider themselves as people whose rights have been violated through abduction and the resultant abuse in the bush, and should not be treated any differently from other young women of their generations who were never abducted. While sensitisation messages were very clear and far-reaching and penetrative about the forced experience, subjugation, exploitation and domination of the young women in the bush; the social rejection (open or subtle) of the young women still occurred. This scenario had made the young women harbour thoughts of both belonging and not belonging to the community. In a discussion with one of the young women, she noted that: It is like you belong to two worlds, all in your environment. While I could understand and feel the pain of the community at what the rebels forced us to subject them, I also expected that they would understand my experiences and the reasons why things happened the way they did….truly the things I went through in the bush, or was forced to do were not my own making. It is painful what we have been made to go through in our own community and villages but you have to deal with it anyway (Interview with young woman). The social rejections were manifested in the relationships community members maintained with the young women on return. This included the immediate family, extended family and the wider community. Illustrating the subtle rejection within the family, one young woman noted: You are allowed to build a small hut in the compound but you are only allowed to cultivate behind the hut. When you ask for a garden, they will tell you that the land has already been allocated to someone else. For those child mothers whose parents, especially mothers, are still alive, they are a bit okay because their mothers always stand irm behind them (Interview with respondent in Alero Sub-County, Amuru District). In some cases, there was minimal interaction with the young women and in other cases children in the community were discouraged from interacting with the young women’s children who returned from rebel captivity. It appears as if the parents and other community members regarded such people as a bad or unwanted inluence on their own children. 123 Ochen: Engendering Social Rejection among formerly Abducted Young Women What made me realise that people in the community could be harbouring something against me is that when my children go to play with other children those children leave them. When this happened a couple of times, my children came and told me. In another situation also, when I went to borrow some salt from Min….Oweka..she told me she didn’t have it, yet I knew she had a lot of salt. Later, I heard from another lady that Min [mother of] Oweka said she cannot share her things with people like me – returnee young women. These days I am more careful who I interact with (Interview with returnee young woman). In the preceding quotation the interviewee narrates her and her children’s dificulties in building a positive relationship with their neighbours. Such situations make the young women withdraw from social interactions with certain people within the community and also curtail the pace of reintegration into normal life within society. It also constrains the development of trust, openness and a general symbiotic relationship with community members. In cases where the young women sought for marriage partners for companionships further alienations and rejections were experienced: Another problem we have is that for us who returned from captivity with children, once a man shows interest[romantic] in you, people always ill-advise them saying ‘even that one who has returned from the bush?...she is very senseless’. So you ind that men are no longer interested in us or you ind that most of us who have returned from captivity, we do not have any kind of stable relationship with any man. So most of them [formerly abducted young women] have settled alone and for those who have men, the men pretend to love them but they do not like the children that you came back with (Interview with returnee young woman). All the time in the house, he is reminding you that ‘do not behave like you are from captivity in my house’. So I found out that it is dificult to live with men ....Even me (sic) who is speaking I also had a man and lived with him for only three months and we separated.... (Interview with returnee young woman). The predominant construction emerging from the girls’ perspectives is that their rejection is a manifestation of a lack of concern, care, appreciation and understanding of their bush experiences and a demonstration of a virtual lack of acceptance by the community. On the other hand, there are those child mothers who construct the rejection from a failure on their part to it within the society. Their situation is looked at as a misfortune which relects bad omens, family challenges and fate or destiny: there is nothing they could have done about it. Such pathetic and fatalistic dispositions also determine, to some extent, whether efforts would be made by the young women to change their lives. 124 Journal of Development Studies Young women who perceive themselves as not deserving of being supported equate their behaviour to jealousy and envy on the part of the community. Jealousy and envy relates apparently to two things: 1. reactions and response of parents and or relatives of girls who have remained entrapped in captivity, and 2. jealousy for the progress of the girls. It appears as if some sections of society would relish the failure of the girls so that they continue suffering for the crimes they committed against it. Envy has also arisen in situation where the young mothers’ children have been given better support, kept at school and given other help. It is signiicant to note that even the families (immediate and extended) were also perceived by the girls as envious of them. The sentiments expressed in the above quotations relect the psychosocial turmoil that the young women have to deal with on a day-to-day basis. Despite the virtual emotive component of such sentiments, it is not all doom and gloom among such young women. Many have developed strong positive resilience to deal with such issues and challenges of everyday life and used such negative experiences to attain something positive. It is also noteworthy to point out that some of the young mothers constructed their social rejection positively. While they recognise and contextualise their rejection; the energy was converted into a positive outcome. A view of one of the young women sufices here: When I realised that I was perceived as a social outcast in my own home community, I had two reactions and thoughts: behave so badly that people now know that I can be bad….but yet again when I relected over this and my children’s future, I decided to do the exact opposite. So I set my heart and body to work. I invested all my energy in work and ‘turned a deaf ear’ to all that people were saying…..just concentrated on working. I have been fairly well successful and generated some income to look after my children and save part of the money, too. Now the very people who used to laugh at me and talk badly against me are the very ones coming to me for soft loans and other assistance (Interview with returnee young woman). Such positive construction of adversity exhibits how human beings utilise the choices available to them to transform their lives in situations of dificulties. It also suggests that agency might not necessarily imply the presence of clear opportunities but can also arise signiicantly out of a challenging situation: adversity produces and nurtures agency to some extent. It is thus important to note that young women who constructed their experiences positively had better outcomes. 5 Discussion The rejection of the young women, real or perceived, had serious repercussions on their lives. The rejection has been constructed and responded to separately and differently 125 Ochen: Engendering Social Rejection among formerly Abducted Young Women by the young women, illustrating varied amount of individual coping resources as well as differences in social support system of the young women. Isolations and withdrawal from the wider social life has been one of the dominant responses by the young women. While on the surface it appeared as if the young women were living normally within the community, a critical look at their circle of friends suggests that these young women have kept to their own groups and circle of acceptance. This circle was composed mainly of fellow former young women captives with whom the young women had had a common experience of adversity in rebel captivity It was only within such smaller groups of trusted colleagues that the young women would fully open up to talk about their challenges, aspirations, fears and also share successes and breakthroughs which they had registered. Recognising such groupings as a good method of mobilising the FACM around development issues, NGOs started encouraging the formation of groups involving both abducted and non-abducted youths. While such groups have enabled the young women to take advantage of certain opportunities existing within the community, it did not disband the inner circle and existence of the trust group which remains a point of withdrawal for the young women. It is in this inner space (consisting a few individuals) that the young women would open up to a discussion of more intimate issues and challenges. When the researcher sought to ind out from the young women why such a stringent approach to friendship building and creation of boundaries was taken, it was indicated that this was the only way the young women would protect their innermost walls from being exposed and aligned for destruction: they needed to keep what might make them maintain hope in life and not throw everything to the community (society). It is noteworthy, however, that such a bastion of support was not absolute, nor was it clearly visible, easy to construct and available in equal measure to the different categories of young women. It is also important to note that different young women used the bastion of support differently at different times and to varied degrees. Analytically, while such inward-looking groups provide some social capital and resources which the young women have been using, it also creates an environment of mistrust with the members of the community. The members of the community perceive such tendency as proof of their assumptions that the young women are unable to relate effectively with other people; when, on the other hand, the young women are also trying to minimise interactions to avoid instigating members of the community. This environment of mistrust and limited information thus produces (generates) an unexploited space (inaccessible to both community members and the young women) and constrains the quality of the relationships. 126 Journal of Development Studies Another emerging issue in the construction of social rejections is the tendency of the young women to forever remain child mothers. The concept of child mother itself is a creation of development agencies, perceived by both the returning young women and other actors as being paternalistic, stigmatising and condescending (see Ochen, 2011; Allen and Schomerus, 2006). It does not bring out the agency and fortitude of these young women in their efforts to re-establish their lives within the community. A survival mode which some of the young women undertook is the utilisation of the concept as a way to ‘remain in the books’ of the support agencies to generate as much support (remedial and rehabilitative mainly) as possible. Indeed some commentators have regarded the concept not only as stigmatising but generating dependence of the young women and a desire to maintain the status quo and depict a life of neediness and vulnerability. Yet, when these issues are analysed from a rights-based perspective, the focus for any intervention is to enable the individuals generate personal strengths, initiatives and restore functionality so that they can proactively manage their own lives. For some of the young women, the support from the agency was thus paternalistic in nature and devoid of any rights-based connotations. Most of the interventions were aimed at providing survival handouts and vocational skills opportunities which were dificult to apply and utilise in the changing Northern Ugandan context. It should be noted that most of the interventions overemphasise the vulnerability of the young women, something which some of the young women themselves bought into and agreed to present themselves as needy. This is not to say that the young women do not have genuine needs, but a more positive and involving approach would have identiied and utilised the strong points of these young women who no doubt present great potentials: a potential which was not fully recognised and exploited by actors and change agents. The construction of vulnerability and the presentation of an image of need was thus a creation of the NGOs, embossed in their strategies, assumptions and outputs. From an interventionist point of view, development agencies have sowed the seeds of dependency and a culture of expectancy in the young women, instead of identifying, promoting and building the young women’s own agency and strengths. The latter would have provided better opportunities and prospects of effective psychosocial and socioeconomic reintegration among the young women and enhanced their post-reunion coping. It should also be recognised that a critical resource in the development of resilience among the young women has been their strong will-power, and the existence of friends among other community members: people, who understand the experience of the young women and are thus genuinely supportive to them. It is important to note that the construction and delineation of opportunities or resources also came from the young women’s resilience as well as social support network within the wider and immediate 127 Ochen: Engendering Social Rejection among formerly Abducted Young Women family environment. Two types of acceptance of the young women can be deconstructed and identiied. While there was supericial acceptance exhibited by tolerance for the young women, interactions with them and minimal acceptance and support to their children, this was not followed by real acceptance and integration exempliied by coexistence and implementation of joint peaceful activities for the unconditional acceptance of the young women which the study suggests has been mainly exhibited by the immediate family, especially the mothers. Different attitudes have emerged from fellow women, especially the mothers-in-law in situations where the young women have sought romantic relationships. This construction of ‘otherness’ by the signiicant others in the young women’s environment also constrained the marital integration of the young women, and is embedded in the patriarchal expectations and systems (see El Bushra and Sahl, 2005; Oyewumi 2000, 2003). Attributes of aggressiveness, lack of cooperation and a perceived inability to relate freely with others was labelled on the young women. The moral expectations for good behaviour were very strong and the young women were expected to behave in ways much higher and of a better moral standard than their counterparts who were never abducted. Yet, there is no evidence and indication to suggest that the latter were morally more upright compared to the former. These indings thus raise interesting scenarios and contest the authenticity of assumptions about whether entrusted relationships and social support systems provide the support and social insurance it is expected to do (see Angucia, 2010; Ochen et al. 2010). It suggests that such assumptions need to be re-evaluated against emerging factors within the context of resettlement. This also implies that assumptions regarding family support which is at times taken for granted and factored in reintegration and rehabilitative support framework might not work out as implied. These indings further provide a good learning for the agencies working with young people affected by conlict, especially when gender issues are considered. 6 Conclusion This paper has examined the post-captivity experiences of young women formerly abducted by the Lord’s Resistance Rebels (LRA) in Northern Uganda. It has been argued that the young women have faced signiicant life challenges in their endeavour to integrate back in the normal society. It is noteworthy that the context in which the young women have had to negotiate and re-negotiate survival and generate livelihoods has itself been signiicantly changed by the conlict. The challenges cut across both the personal spaces of the individual young women, the family sphere (environment) and the community’s space. While no direct comparison with male counterparts has been made, an in-depth investigation has been made on the experiences, challenges and efforts of 128 Journal of Development Studies the young women as they try to adapt to life within the normal community and explore what this means for the young women’s wellbeing. The argument in this paper is that the construction of the experiences was varied, diverse and individuated. Nevertheless, two main response strategies emerge: 1) the positive construction of rejections and attendant responses of hard work and fortitude, and 2) the negative construction and isolation from mainstream social life. For the latter category, they put themselves in a situation where they have locked themselves away from opportunities which social interactions could have brought. Collectively, the withdrawal of the young women into their own circles (differentiated from ‘aloneness’) cannot be regarded as a negative thing per se as some interesting social capital resources have emerged as a result and facilitated the young women’s livelihoods. The main lessons and learning which we derive for social work practice is that it is important that the spaces for realisation of aspirations be considered as a critical issue in any intervention. It is also important to note that people construct and deconstruct meanings around social phenomena, events and developments. It is the meanings attributed to such events which might determine how agents and actors respond to a particular situation. Another key lesson that arises from the case study is that pace and space is critical for interventions. These two concepts should not be taken for granted and it is important to recognise that young people’s pace and space differs and so is their response to life’s challenges. 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Notes 1 The big disparity could be a result of methods used in the estimation of the number. It should be noted here that data gathering and management in Uganda, especially by local and central government authorities, is rather weak. 2 At the height of the insurgency in Teso, the camps were under a virtual curfew with regulations of movements of people controlled by the army. 3 The Paris Commitment to Protect Children from Unlawful Recruitment or Use by Armed Forces or Armed Groups, February 2007 It should be noted that traditional cultural practice (using traditional conlict resolution and cleansing rituals) as a way of redressing the wrongs committed by the rebels against the community has recently been advocated by a number of stakeholders, especially during the process of the Juba Peace Talks between the government of Uganda and the LRA rebels. While the Acholi community has cultural provisions for handling heinous crimes including killing, the society had never before dealt with the current level of intra and inter communal violence, many a time involving children against own families at the behest of rebel commanders. 4 5 This is the period when a young person who returned from rebel captivity has been reunited with her family. 132 Journal of Development Studies 3 (2) (2013) 133 - 142 Potential of Peer Support to Fight Stigma against Former Child Soldiers in Northern Uganda Jacqueline Nakaiza 1, 1 * SNE Consultants Inc. Abstract: The Great Lakes Region of Africa has experienced a number of conlicts over the last 30 years. In most of these conlicts, children have been conscripted into the military. As tangible peace is slowly returning to the region, there is more concern for the sustainability of this peace. Among other things, ensuring that insurgency does not recur requires that the former child soldiers who fought in the wars are not only mobilised to embrace peace but also supported to fully reintegrate into their communities, so that they are not inclined towards crime and other dissident behaviours. A host of governmental and non-governmental agencies are implementing educational, microinance and counselling services for the former child soldiers. Presently, a persisting challenge pertains to stigmatisation of the former child soldiers —by members of the communities where their captors forced them to commit atrocities during the wars. It is against this background that this paper examines the potential of peer support to combat this stigma. Grounded on secondary data on transitional justice in the region; ethnographic indings on child soldiers collected from Northern Uganda, South Sudan, the Democratic Republic of Congo and Rwanda over the last three years; and the review of related literature, the paper suggests that mobilising the children into peer support groups through which they could share experiences, friendship and work together may help the children and their communities to appreciate each other and, subsequently, overcome the stigma. Keywords: Child Soldiers; Rehabilitation; Post-Conlict Reconstruction 1 Introduction Over the last three decades, the Great Lakes Region has not known total peace. Incidentally, several of the conlicts that have rocked the region over these decades have * E-mail: nakaiza@sne-consultants.com Nakaiza: Case for Peer Support in Fighting Stigma against Former Child-Soldiers roots in the earlier conlicts that characterised the regions between the 1950s and 1970s. Thus, the region appears to be stuck in a vicious cycle of conlict. Among others, a possible, but much ignored, explanation for the vicious nature of the conlicts relates to the impact that the conlicts make on the attitudes of the children they affect towards crime. This is especially the case when it is taken into account that several of the major wars, and other atrocities, through which these conlicts have been perpetrated have been among civilian populations and, in many instances, by children that are conscripted into the military, thereby being exposed to various forms of crime, including aggravated ones like substance, human and arms traficking; rape and deilement; and robbery. Moreover, in many instances, conlicts in the region have produced situations in which people are inclined to survive on involvement in crime, as a maladaptive strategy of coping with the devastating consequences of the socioeconomic breakdown due to war and other atrocities. Besides, in some parts of the region, the incidence of conlict resulted into encampment and displacement, with the consequences of familial breakdown and educational deprivation. Most of the rebellions in the region have conscripted child soldiers, where these children are not only armed, they are trained how to attack and kill civilians, moreover not killing with bullets but cutting up people with machetes to save bullets; they learn how to rape; how to be violent; how to murder; and how to use drugs. For instance, with the LRA rebellion, children were forced to commit unspeakably brutal acts. Yet, as victims and perpetrators of crime and violence, these child combatants had to learn that the more violent acts they committed, the greater their privileges and rewards. While for the girls, they were raped and abducted as sexual slaves. Others were forced into prostitution by the harsh conditions of war so as to survive. Many of them were forced to become wives of rebel commanders and ended up producing fellow children. Those who were formerly abducted were later rejected by their communities. Taking Northern Uganda as an example, formerly abducted young girls are normally rejected by their communities when they try to be reintegrated and many of them resort to going back into captivity to become wives while the boys ind it dificult to live outside armed struggle. They get involved in looting and harassing people. They get aggressive. They are not friendly. They are hyper alert and never respect anyone; while others re-join rebel groups or are integrated into the army. Those who stay within the communities have to endure stigmatisation, harassment and verbal abuse. Therefore, as tangible peace is slowly returning to the region, there is more concern for the sustainability of this peace. Among other things, ensuring that insurgency does not recur requires that the former child soldiers who fought in the wars are not only mobilised to embrace peace but also supported to fully reintegrate into their communities, 134 Journal of Development Studies so that they are not inclined towards crime and other dissident behaviours. In turn, this reintegration requires that the governmental and non-governmental organisations responsible for the reintegration of the former child soldiers have quality information on these children’s needs — to point them to what needs to be done for successful reintegration of the children to occur. This paper reports the indings of a study that was undertaken to respond to this need for information on the former child soldiers’ needs. Conducted in Northern Uganda region, the study posed and attempted to respond to two major research questions: 1) What challenges do former child soldiers in Northern Uganda face in their efforts to reintegrate into their communities? 2) What support mechanisms have been put in place to promote successful reintegration of the former child soldiers in Northern Uganda? The indings were that the former child soldiers face six main challenges, namely: 1) stigmatisation and rejection from the community; 2) pressure to join the army; 3) lack of income; 4) lack of land; 5) lack of familial support; and 6) fear of vengeance from members of the communities where they lived. It was also found that a host of governmental and non-governmental agencies are implementing educational, microinance and counselling services for the former child soldiers. The organisations are involved in the provision of farm inputs, humanitarian assistance, counselling services, community justice and reconciliation measures and reuniting them with their families. A persisting challenge pertains to stigmatisation of the former child soldiers by members of the communities where their captors forced them to commit atrocities during the wars. This could threaten the sustainability of the peace gains that have been made in the region, since failure of the children to comfortably settle into their communities could dissuade them against civilian life and force them back into dissident behaviour and/or associated criminology. Cognizant of this threat, this study scrutinised the indings on the challenges that the former child soldiers face and the supports availed to them in order to identify gaps to which the persistence of the stigma might be attributable. Concurrent interpretation of the indings led to the conclusion that although the efforts to support the former child soldiers to cope with civilian lifestyles have made indisputable contributions, their contribution may be enhanced by mobilising the beneiciaries to support each other in facing and rising above the stigma. Indeed, a key gap noted in the efforts to reintegrate the former child soldiers is that they have tended to be left at the periphery of the design and implementation of the strategies that are being adopted to reintegrate them. It is against this background that the proposed paper examines the potential of peer support to combat this stigma. Grounded on secondary data on transitional justice in the region; ethnographic indings on child soldiers collected from Northern Uganda, 135 Nakaiza: Case for Peer Support in Fighting Stigma against Former Child-Soldiers South Sudan, the Democratic Republic of Congo and Rwanda over the last three years; and review of related literature, the paper suggests that mobilising the former child soldiers into peer support groups through which they could share experiences, friendship and work together may help them and their communities to appreciate each other and, subsequently, overcome the stigma. The understanding that children have a zeal for personal and community peace; former child soldiers understand and know their priorities; and children can ensure each other’s protection, underline the potential of peer support in addressing the stigma that the returnee child soldiers face from their communities. 2 Methodology Data were collected from former child soldiers selected from Northern Uganda, following a cross sectional survey design. A convenient sample of returnee child soldiers was selected using the snow ball sampling technique. This was done in such a way that the researcher identiied returnee child soldiers and solicited information from them after which information on the whereabouts of other returnee child soldiers they knew of was sought. This was done to a point of saturation. This procedure was used because there is no comprehensive information about the number and location of returnee LRA ex-combatants to enable the construction of a sampling frame. The questionnaire used had simple-to-understand questions in order to avoid ambiguity or problems related to misinterpretation. The researcher assured the respondents of conidentiality in relation to the information they provided and did not solicit information that could lead to their identiication. The data collected were analysed using descriptive statistics and presented on bar graphs. 3 Findings and Discussion 3.1 Challenges Faced by Returnee Child Soldiers The returnee child soldiers were asked to specify (on a Likert Scale) the extent to which they would agree that they experience speciied challenges in coping with civilian life. The results are summarised in Figure 1. 136 Journal of Development Studies Figure 1: Challenges faced by returnee child soldiers Strongly Agree Agree Disagree Strongly Disagree 25 20 15 10 5 18 17 22 2 1 12 10 9 7 10 14 12 42 9 19 12 3 1718 5 2 12 Fear of Vegence No land No Family No income/Destitution Pressured to join the army Stigmatisation 0 The results in Figure 1 indicate that the majority of the respondents either “Agreed” or “Strongly Agreed” that they faced challenges in coping with civilian lives. These challenges included; stigmatisation and rejection from the community; pressure to join the army; lack of income; lack of land; lack of familial support; and fear of vengeance from members of the communities where they lived. However, in a comparative sense, lack of income and access to land were ranked as the main challenges followed by stigmatisation or rejection. A number of the children interviewed reported incidents of inger pointing and name calling by members of their communities and sometimes their own families. For instance, one of the respondents explained that, “People sometimes fail to greet me as I pass” while another explained that, “We [the returnees] are often called olum olum (people from the bush, or rebels) as we walk through the camps…at times the name calling is even more explicit, such as ‘you see they are the ones that are from the bush.” This inding is in concurrence with Blattman and Mazurana (2008), Corbin (2008) and CRS (2002) who report rejection of returnee child soldiers in the communities to which they return after the conlicts. For instance, Blattman and Mazurana (2008) explain that the community is very dificult for those [girl child soldiers] who come back [from war] with children. Many of them are shunned by their communities, with their families refusing to accept responsibility for the “bush babies”. Many communities regard these children as “Kony’s children” and have a dificult time accepting the children which is even more psychologically traumatising for the mothers, who have to accept and care 137 Nakaiza: Case for Peer Support in Fighting Stigma against Former Child-Soldiers for these children. Indeed, a notable number of the respondents indicated that they live in fear of vengeance from members of the communities where they live. Upon concurrent interpretation, the challenges cited in Figure 1 seem to be interconnected. Apparently, among other causes, exclusion of the former child soldiers from income-generating activities/ resources like land could arise out of the rejection against the children in the communities where they are supposed to work and earn a livelihood (considering that many of them lost their familial ties [cf. Figure 1]). Accordingly, in addition to its intrinsic impact on the children, the stigma is also seen as foiling the children’s access to productive resources and, subsequently, chances of involvement in legitimate economic activities. In turn, as a challenge, “pressure to join the army” appears to be due to the dificulty the children experience in accessing other means of earning a livelihood. Although the children identiied several challenges, it is reasonable to argue that dealing with the problem of stigma would go a long way in addressing the associated challenges of destitution, pressure to join the army and fear of vengeance that the children face. 3.2 Support Strategies for Former Child Soldiers Under this objective, the goal of the study was to establish the support strategies put in place by the community in Northern Uganda to help returnee LRA rebels to cope with civilian life. As such, the respondents were asked to specify the extent to which they felt satisied with the support strategies put in place by the community. The results are summarised in Figure 2. Figure 2: Support strategies put in place by the community Strongly Agree Agree Disagree Strongly Disagree 25 20 15 10 5 0 22 18 17 12 2 1 10 9 7 Provide Farm Provide Inputs Humanitarian Assistance 22 10 14 12 42 9 10 3 4 2 Community Reunite with Provide Counselling Justice and Families Services Reconciliation Measures The results in Figure 2 indicate that the majority of the respondents either “Agreed” or “Strongly Agreed” that the community had put in place support strategies to help them cope with civilian life. These strategies include; provision of farm inputs, provision 138 Journal of Development Studies of humanitarian assistance, provision of counselling services, community justice and reconciliation measures and reuniting them with their families. These indings concur with the reviewed literature. According to Allen and Schomerus (2006), for example, the returnee child soldiers receive medical treatment, “counselling,” preparation for return to families, and transport home”. On the other hand, Akello et al., (2006) afirms that returnees are reunited with their families. They argue that, “the reception centres promote the innocence of the returned youth, stressing to both young people and families that any perpetration of violence was forced upon them and, therefore, not their choice.” The interviewees argued that returnee LRA child soldiers go through community justice and reconciliation measures. One of the interviewees explained that, “Most agencies that receive and reintegrate returnees ensure that the amnesty process also incorporates traditional ceremonies, which are usually performed at the agencies.” Some of the returnees interviewed further hinted that they performed the nyono tong gweno (stepping of eggs) ceremony upon their return. These indings rhyme well with past authors on the subject such as Suarez (2005) and Baines (2007) who detail some of the traditional reconciliation rituals that returnee rebel ighters are taken through as part of their reintegration into their communities. 3.3 Case for Peer Support among Returnee Child Soldiers Examination of the indings on the strategies that have been put in place to support the returnee child soldiers in terms of the challenges that the children cited points to a gap in the strategies. This gap forms the basis for the case for promoting peer support among the children. The children cited three main challenges but all of which were connected to the problem of stigmatisation/ rejection (Figure 1). On the other hand, ive support strategies were identiied (Figure 2). A host of authors (e.g. Suarez, 2005) afirm that these strategies have helped to promote reintegration of the children. Writing about community justice and reconciliation ceremonies such as Mato Oput, Suarez (2005) explains that the impact of these ceremonies has been fairly positive. They create an opportunity for the returnees to witness irsthand acceptance by the community and, indeed, many returnees expressed feelings of acceptance after going through the ceremonies. Most importantly, the ceremonies send a message to the remaining rebels in the “bush” that they will be welcomed and accepted upon return, thus encouraging defection from the LRA. The signiicance of the humanitarian assistance and provision of farm inputs extended to the returnees is also notable (Figure 2). A key gap in these support strategies is that they focus on supporting the returnee child soldiers but ignore the potential of these children to support themselves to surmount 139 Nakaiza: Case for Peer Support in Fighting Stigma against Former Child-Soldiers the stigma imposed on them by their families and communities. As is discernible from the indings shown in Figure 2, the children are not at the forefront of the mechanisms that have been put in place to support their reintegration into their communities. Conversely, related literature (Dallaire 2004), and experiences from South Sudan, the DRC, and Rwanda underline the potential and need for returnee child soldiers to support themselves to face and overcome the stigma imposed on them. Children have a zeal for personal and community peace; former child soldiers understand and know their priorities; and children can ensure each other’s protection, all of which underline the potential of peer support in addressing the stigma that the returnee child soldiers face from their communities. 3.3.1 Children Have a Zeal for Personal and Community Peace In Rwanda, for instance, through using traditional forms of cultural expression, such as, art, dance, drama, music, song and poetry, young people have promoted reconciliation among themselves and other members of the community (Voices of Hope: A Five Year (1998-2003) Journey of Promotion of Reconciliation Among Youths (PRAY) in Rwanda, World Vision Rwanda, October 2003.) Individual children have beneited developmentally and personally from their role as peace builders through peer support. For example, girls and boys have fostered values of respect, tolerance, forgiveness and empathy which bring them hope, healing and better acceptance in communities; they have increased self-esteem and increased skills in communication, negotiation, conlict resolution and peace-building. Children have demonstrated their capacity as agents of peace, mobilising peers and adults to play more active roles in peace-building, supporting and counselling their peers and resolving conlicts within families, schools and communities. Children and young people have a crucial role to play in either taking forward peace or conlict. I can help bring peace in Northern Uganda if only my views are heard and acted upon. I don’t hold a gun anymore; I hold the power of my voice. When visitors come to see us in the centres they normally ask us about our experiences and how we managed to escape… But, they should also be asking us how we can participate in the peace process ourselves because we also fought in the war (Formerly abducted girl associated with rebel group, Northern Uganda, 2004). 3.3.2 Former Child Soldiers Understand Their Priorities Children often relect concerns and challenges grounded in their day-to-day reality rather than more distant fears or worries and how to respond to them. 140 Journal of Development Studies It is increasingly recognised that children have their own very valuable perspectives and priorities which are often very different to those of adults (O’Kane, 2003). During Save the Children’s rapid assessment of child protection concerns in Northern Uganda in 2006, some of the former child soldiers expressed more fear of abuse and harassment faced at the hands of the government army who were meant to protect them than they did of the Lord’s Resistance Army rebel forces. Peers participation can help children to build upon their own resilience and make changes in their lives. ‘It makes you feel useful, you can help others, and you can be an actor’. Meaningful participation and space to come together with their peers, to share their experiences and express their views can give former child soldiers strength and increase their life skills and self-conidence. Participation and association are part of a process that helps children promote their healing, rights and ight for social justice. I stayed alone, with no parents. I used to think about the past. It was dificult to forget what happened to me in the bush. I felt alone. None wanted to stay with me, to share with me. I then joined an association and began to ind peace within myself. My family came back to me. I have friends and I have learned from others. These days, I am ine. I know what to do at the right time and right place. (Formerly abducted child soldier, Northern Uganda, in Mundal and Cave, 2004). Children and young people have emphasised the importance of involving them in peacebuilding. As they know their own situation best, they can best explain how conlict has impacted upon their lives. They have important and unique contributions to make to peace-building and they have the right to be informed and involved in decisions that affect their lives. Children and young people have also articulated how participation in peace-building fosters attitudes, knowledge and behaviours which contribute to peace, forgiveness, respect for others, and inclusion, helping them overcome or transform negative emotions, anger or frustration that could otherwise lead them to engage in revengeful acts, anti-social behaviour, gang violence or other forms of political violence. For instance, in Northern Uganda former child soldiers advocated space to be included in the formal peace talks that were taking place in Juba (South Sudan) and contributed to consultations on agenda 3 of the peace talks on accountability and reconciliation. In particular, they emphasised the importance of forgiveness and reconciliation and making use of traditional forms of justice. 3.3.4 Returnee Child Soldiers Can Ensure Peer Protection In Northern Uganda, the Girl Mothers Club is a peer support group for girl mothers that supports formerly abducted girls in the communities, particularly child mothers. This issue was discussed with the girls and other women of all ages; and it was found 141 Nakaiza: Case for Peer Support in Fighting Stigma against Former Child-Soldiers out that the war hurt all their lives. In addition to great worries about security and basic survival, women were concerned about high levels of violence and breakdown in communication between mothers and daughters – a treasured bond and an important part of Northern Ugandan traditions and way of life. Determined to change their situation, the child mothers formed the club to provide a safe place for former girl soldiers to discuss their problems. The club puts emphasis on life skills. The girls are seen to have many resettlement problems because they have children to care for; and because their communities do not readily accept them. So far, this has given them their own space and a platform to discuss their unique challenges. The club has as well provided psychosocial support and an opportunity to acquire basic skills that they missed learning as children. They also engage in peace promoting songs, traditional dance and drama. There is also another peer support group in Northern Uganda, The Youths’ Peace Team, which consists of students, some of whom are former child soldiers. Together they create plays about village life, abduction by the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA), life with the LRA and the possibilities for reconciliation and reintegration. They promoted peace through performing peace-related drama shows, songs, poems and traditional dances in internally displaced people’s (IDP) camps. Debates, acrobatics, radio talk shows and discussions with people are other avenues used by the young people to promote peace. The focus has been on themes that promote non-violence and reconciliation, sensitise the community about resettling formerly abducted children and educate the public about the Amnesty Act; and the dangers of involving children as child soldiers. Emphasis was also put on messages that promote acceptance and resettlement of child mothers into the community, many of whom have been stigmatised. 4 Conclusion The foregoing discussion suggests that adult protection specialists and donors have worked hard towards the demobilisation and reintegration of child soldiers in Northern Uganda. However despite all these efforts, stigma has persisted. It is suggested that this is due to the fact that demobilisation and reintegration programmes are imposed without irst trying to assess and understand what the former child soldiers think about their own situation, their needs, the coping strategies they are adopting and the support that has been put in place to support the strategies. It is clear that a one-size-its-all approach is not appropriate. This being the case, it is recommended that organisations working to reintegrate returnee child soldiers in the region elicit and integrate the aspect of peer support to conquer stigma. 142 Journal of Development Studies References Akello, G., Richters, A., Reis, R. (2006). Reintegration of former child soldiers in Northern Uganda: Coming to terms with children’s agency and accountability. Intervention: International Journal of Mental Health, Psychosocial Work & Counselling in Areas of Armed Conlict. Vol. 4, 229-243. Allen, T., Schomerus, M. (2006). A hard homecoming: Lessons learned from the reception centre process in Northern Uganda. Washington, DC: USAID and UNICEF. Annan, J., Blattman, C., Carlson, K., Mazurana, D. (2008). The state of the female youth in Northern Uganda: Phase II. Uganda, SWAY. Blattman, C., Annan, J. (in press). The consequences of child soldiering. Review of Economics and Statistics. Catholic Relief Services. (2002). Needs assessment of LRA returnees in Northern Uganda: Report of indings and recommendations. Kampala: Author. Cave, G., Drummond-Mundal, L. (2004): Are children ‘the seeds of peace’? Exploring children`s potential contribution to conlict transformation and peace-building”. Save the Children UK. Corbin, J. (2008). Returning home: Resettlement of formerly abducted children in Northern Uganda. Disasters. Vol. 32, 316-335. Jessica, L. (2004). Armed with Resilience: A study addressing the issues of reintegration and resiliency of formerly abducted girl child soldiers in Northern Uganda and their potential role as peace builders. Unpublished Masters of Science Degree in Humanitarian Relief and Development at the Centre for Development and Emergency Practice. Oxford Brookes University. O’Kane, C. (2003). Children and young people as citizens: Partners for social change. London: Save the Children UK. Paris, P. (2007). Principles and Guidelines on Children Associated with Armed Forces on Armed Groups. February 2007. Romeo D. (2004). Shake Hands with the Devil: The Failure of Humanity in Rwanda: Arrow Books UK Save the Children Norway, ‘Thematic Evaluation of Children’s Participation in Armed Conlict. London: Author. 143 Journal of Development Studies 3 (2) (2013) 145 - 177 Access to Justice among Youths in Post-Conlict Northern Uganda Paul Bukuluki 1, 1 * Faculty of Social Sciences, Makerere University Abstract: This paper is based on a study carried out among young people in Northern Uganda that suffered the violent armed conlict for about two decades. In the daily lives of these young men and women, the distinction between restorative and retributive justice is becoming blurred. They constantly negotiate between the two justice systems depending on what their needs are at a certain time and space. What seems to be emerging is an ingenious hybrid that in a dynamic and creative way seems to combine various aspects of both systems. Youths and other stakeholders in post-conlict settings pragmatically choose to apply aspects of each justice system to serve their goals for peace and justice. In the real life experience of these youths, the two systems are interconnected and interdependent. Keywords: Restorative Justice; Retributive Justice; Negotiation 1 Introduction This paper is based on research carried out in Northern Uganda from November 2008 to May 2009 on the “negotiation between retributive1 and restorative justice2 in conlict transformation”. The indings show that in the daily lives of people, especially the youth who were affected by the conlict in Northern Uganda, restorative and retributive justices are constantly negotiated. The youth and other stakeholders in post-conlict settings pragmatically choose to apply aspects of each justice system to serve their own goals. In the real life experience of these youth, the two systems are interconnected and interdependent. Their boundaries, therefore, seem to be porous; “places of meeting and exchange rather than walls of protection against each other.” (Jordan and Hartling 2002: 8). * E:mail: pbukuluki@gmail.com Bukuluki: Access to Justice among Youth in Post-Conlict Northern Uganda This paper demonstrates that in the daily lives of youths in post-conlict settings, it is just a fallacy to imagine that retributive and restorative justice systems are working independent of each other. In other words, when each system operates independent of the other, it becomes incomplete as an explanatory model for peace and justice in the context of these youths. Using the conceptual lenses of systems theory, one could argue that both retributive and restorative justice systems are part of the whole and since “the whole is bigger than the sum of its parts” (Colbin, 1996, 2003), they need to creatively relate with each other to meet the goals of peace and justice in post-conlict contexts. They need to creatively deal with the inherent antagonistic elements and make use of their complementary aspects. The concepts of hybridity, cosmopolitan localism and the relational cultural theory have been used in this paper to provide useful frameworks for facilitating the process of dislodging one single world-view of justice and moving towards a creatively negotiated discourse of justice. By analysing and relecting on the daily realities of youths who are victims/survivors, perpetrators and those working with agencies directly to engage with people in post-conlict situations, we learn how people affected by conlict use their creativity and agency to negotiate the complementary and contradictory aspects in both retributive and restorative justice systems. Using evidence from the youth and other stakeholders, this paper makes a case for a pluralistic system of justice that combines legal and non-legal elements in a pragmatic way to promote access to justice for the youth and other people in post-conlict settings. This helps to provide a mechanism that responds to complex social needs and transitional justice dynamics that can neither be addressed by a purely restorative nor a retributive system. This paper demonstrates that an ingenious hybrid of retributive and restorative justice can creatively facilitate the achievement of peace and justice. It argues that international justice institutions such as the International Court of Justice (ICJ) need to adopt a pragmatic approach that takes into account contextual variables, which are crucial in facilitating peace and access to justice in post-conlict settings. In the context of Uganda, the paper argues that the ICJ needs to ind creative ways of supporting the government of Uganda’s recently established War Crimes Court. Such measures should aim to develop Uganda’s capacity to administer access to justice in a way that conforms to international standards while at the same time effectively responding to the local and culturally constructed mechanisms of justice that make sense and resonate with the daily realities of the youth and other stakeholders in post-conlict settings. Thus, nurturing a hybrid justice system that creates opportunities for participation and ownership of processes and outcomes by the victims/survivors and perpetrators of atrocities committed during the conlict is crucial for a meaningful transition justice in post-conlict settings. 146 Journal of Development Studies 2 Background 2.1 Human Rights Violations and Atrocities in Northern Uganda The conlict in Northern Uganda has been associated with serious crimes under the International Humanitarian Law and other human rights abuses committed by the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) and the Uganda Peoples’ Defence Forces (UPDF). On the part of the LRA, the crimes comprise wilful killing, rape, mutilation, torture, massacres, intimidation, beatings, large-scale abductions, and forced recruitment of adults and children. Others include sexual violence against girls whereby the LRA assigned them as “wives” or sex slaves to commanders, large-scale looting and destruction of civilian property (Branch 2004). UPDF’s abuses entail inhuman and degrading treatment, arbitrary detention and forced displacement into internally displaced peoples’ (IDPs) camps. Because of the conlict in Northern Uganda, nearly two million civilians were displaced into internally displaced persons camps, where squalid conditions exposed them to disease, exploitation, abuse and malnutrition. Accordingly, these camps were generally described as among the worst in the world with unusually high mortality rates (CSOPNU 2003) and high HIV/AIDS prevalence rates. The protection of internally displaced persons (IDPs) remained precarious, and high levels of sexual and genderbased violence were reported by women and girls. According to indings of a joint government and UNICEF study in Pabbo Camp (the largest camp for IDPs in war-torn Northern Uganda) in Gulu District; at least 60 per cent of women had reported that they had encountered some form of sexual and domestic violence. According to the 2005 Country Report on Human Rights Practices for Uganda, approximately 38,000 children had been abducted by the LRA and forced into roles as soldiers, labourers, and rebel ‘wives’, or used as human shields in combat during the previous 20 years. These children were forced to carry out raids, burn houses, beat and kill civilians, abduct other children, and ight against the UPDF. Al this further isolated the survivors from society and bound them to the LRA (Akhavan, 2005). To survive abduction, approximately 40,000 children sought safety from LRA raids every night, by commuting from their rural homes to urban centres, where they slept on the streets or in bus parks, church grounds, and local factories (Latigo, 2008). Such places were often unguarded and left the children vulnerable to abuse and even rape (Gardner, 2004:24). Many of those living in camps were forcibly moved into these camps by the Ugandan army (Ugandan People’s Defence Forces), on the grounds that the displacement was necessary to combat the LRA and to help distinguish civilians from ighters. While Protocol II to the Geneva Convention2, allows for civilians to be moved if “the security of the civilians so involved or imperative military reasons so demand” 147 Bukuluki: Access to Justice among Youth in Post-Conlict Northern Uganda (article 17), the “forcible displacement in Northern Uganda did not actually improve the security of those moved.” (Maiyo, 2006: 50). Instead, the civilians were left unguarded and continued to be maimed, raped, murdered, and abducted by the LRA (Maiyo, 2006). In February 2004, in one of the most horriic atrocities since the conlict began, the LRA massacred approximately 200 civilians at Barlonyo Camp, revealing serious deiciencies in the government’s capacity to defend the population and defeat the insurgency (Branch, 2005). The UPDF, on the other hand, has also been implicated in rights violations against the civilian population such as arbitrary arrests and beatings of internally displaced persons suspected of collaboration with the LRA (ICG 2005, 11). Unfortunately, even when UPDF abuses were investigated, the processes were often kept internal, which created an impression of impunity, thus undermining public trust in the military or government. The Uganda Human Rights Commission attempted to seek monetary compensation for some of the torture victims, but these attempts were not adequately supported by the government (HRW 2003a, 14). It has been reported that UPDF employed rescued LRA combatants, some of whom were minors (BBC News, 2007) – a clear violation of the 1989 International Convention on the Rights of the Child and the Protocol on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conlict. Indeed, the government has admitted that it was recruiting former abductees and returning them to the battleield. Around 800 of them were recruited and hundreds of whom are believed to be below 18 years of age (BBC News, 2007). The recruits were intended to provide security to local villages, but were reportedly used to ight alongside the Ugandan military (UPDF) against the LRA (HRW, 2003b). The dismal condition, marginalisation and suffering generated at the hands of the LRA for two decades, on the one hand, and the brutal response of the Uganda government, on the other, raise the question of whether justice should take precedence over peace in these circumstances. The application of a known justice system of accountability, in light of the atrocities committed by the LRA, is complicated by the fact that some of the perpetrators in Northern Uganda were often victims of abduction and forcibly turned into perpetrators as a means of enforcing loyalty in the rebel ranks. Similarly, the government’s own UPDF, which should have offered protection to the people, was, in many instances, implicated in gross human rights violations especially failure to offer protection to the population against the LRA attacks. Arguably, given the gravity of the injustices and atrocities suffered by the Acholi people (majority of whom were in their youthful years), perpetrated by both sides of the conlict, a balanced and just process of conlict transformation should prioritise the needs 148 Journal of Development Studies and interests of the victims of the conlict taking into account the contextual factors prevalent in the post-conlict setting. 2.2 Current Conlicts Emerging in the Region Post-conlict Northern Uganda is now characterised by several conlicts. The two major conlicts however, are related to land wrangles and gender-based violence. No week passes without the major newspapers carrying a story on land grabbing or land disputes especially in the Acholi sub-region. For example, an article in The Independent newspaper (May, 4th – 10th, 2012, page 14) cited the Gulu Woman Member of Parliament, Betty Acan, as having said: …land grabbing is worse in areas that are faced with war and displacement…the vice has been more pronounced in Amuru District where people in Apaa Sub-County are being evicted to pave way for a tourism investor…UDDF was surveying 16 square miles land in Agago District and already the Madhivanis [sic] (Sugar factory) have been allocated 40,000 hectares in Amuru…Resettlement has coincided with investors coming to the North with their moneys. The law is not being used in giving out this land. People with money bypass real owners of land. They approach State House and come with eviction orders… Uninhabited land is not free. That land is communally owned and protected under our laws. The fact that my land is not registered does not mean that I do not own it… Interviews with cultural and religious leaders from the region (Gulu and Kitgum) raise issues that seem to resonate positively with what Hon. Betty Acan noted. One of the chiefs in Kitgum noted: …land conlicts are very common. Today we met as chiefs from Kitgum and Lamwo districts to plan to promote peace and reconciliation through mediation in land conlicts… We have developed a work plan for handling land disputes. In addition, an interview with one of the magistrates in the Northern Uganda, based in Gulu District, indicated that land stealing and grabbing is a serious challenge in the region: …the able people have become greedy, and they are trying to grab land from the vulnerable groups such as orphans, widows…most of the claims on land in Northern Uganda are fraudulent and land grabbing cases. They are not about setting boundaries… the problem here is land stealing not land disputes. The issues raised by these key stakeholders demonstrate that there is a huge challenge relating to land conlicts in Northern Uganda. This region may risk sliding back into active violent conlict if culturally-sensitive mechanisms of access to justice are not 149 Bukuluki: Access to Justice among Youth in Post-Conlict Northern Uganda designed and supported to foster conlict transformation in the region. This is particularly of concern to the youth who were either born in the IDP camps or lost their parents during the war and cannot easily track the boundaries of the land left behind by their deceased parents and relatives. 2.3 Survivors’ Negotiations between Retributive and Restorative Justice Systems This paper highlights the indings from the review of documents and interviews with selected informants. It relies more on analysis of data from primary sources and supplements it with data from secondary sources. The paper discusses the meanings, perceptions, and negotiations between retributive and restorative justice by different victims/survivors and the formerly abducted children; now in their youthful years (who were either forced to commit atrocities or who willingly engaged in committing them). This is supplemented by views of representatives of the indigenous justice system, civil society organisations, government, the ICJ, and the LRA. In the case of Northern Uganda, a debate emerged in several forums such as the Juba peace talks between the government of Uganda and the LRA and the Beyond Juba Project workshops organised by the Refugee Law Project and other stakeholders (RLP 2008) concerning the suitability of ‘traditional’, formal and international justice mechanisms in addressing atrocities committed in the course of the protracted conlict. The formal and informal forms of justice mechanisms have been presented as competing rather than complementary in addressing the needs for justice and accountability. As the RLP (2008) puts it, “these debates have created a polarisation between retributive and restorative approaches to justice…” This debate has been heightened by the agreement on “accountability and reconciliation” [Agenda Item No. 3] of the Juba peace talks which recognises “the need for an overarching justice framework’’ as well as the need for “modiications…within the national legal system to ensure more effective and integrated justice and accountability response” (Worden, 2008, 5). This agreement recognises the role of formal and nonformal institutions and measures for ensuring justice and reconciliation. However, the agreement does not detail clear guidelines on how the partnership between formal institutions, which are largely retributive and informal institutions, which are inclined towards the restorative justice mechanism, can work in dispensing of justice. The question to ask then is: How much of retributive or restorative justice is needed to satisfy the demands of the local and the international communities, respectively? This dilemma raises the basic question as to how and when international justice and local justice intersect (RLP 2008). The paper takes a leaf from Gopin, cited in Finnegan (2005, 25), who argues that “in cases of extreme violence such as mass murder or 150 Journal of Development Studies genocide, there are no realistic approaches to ever fully serving justice.” In the analysis of the negotiation between retributive and restorative justice mechanisms, the UN Security Council’s deinition of justice may be referred to: An ideal of accountability and fairness in the protection and vindication of rights and the prevention and punishment of wrongs. Justice implies regard for the rights of the accused, for the interests of victims and for the well-being of society at large. It is a concept rooted in all national cultures and traditions and, while its administration usually implies formal judicial mechanisms, informal ‘traditional’ dispute resolution mechanisms are equally relevant (United Nations, 2004). The UN Security Council’s deinition of justice above is “instructive insofar as it presupposes a range of justice mechanisms for conlict and post-conlict societies, an idea that the same document espouses in its understanding of accountability in times of transition” (Okello, 2007). Inherent in this conception of justice is the need for dialogue/negotiation between restorative and retributive justice mechanisms in serving the interests of the victims, the rights of the perpetrator and communities affected by the conlict. It is only reasonable, therefore, that relevant and workable justice mechanisms, both formal and informal, are created or better supported in addressing the conlict in Northern Uganda. 2.4 Negotiating Justice: Victims/ Survivors’ Perspectives Most of the issues raised about the LRA conlict largely come from the oficial archives of stakeholders such as government, the media and international human rights organisations. Therefore, they have been less focused on giving voice to the victims. This discourse ignores the experiences and meanings of peace and justice of affected populations, which are socially embedded in their daily realities. As argued by Finnstrom (2008, 101), the concept of social embeddedness implies not only including voices of the most inluential agents but more importantly “the interpretations and counter-interpretations of ordinary people with everyday experience of the war”. Additionally, Sahlins (1999, 412) argues that it should not be forgotten that “from their quotidian point of view, it is the global system that is peripheral, not them.” 2.5 Meaning of Peace and Justice for the Youth in Acholiland Peace to an ordinary youth in Acholiland, who has lived in the war situation for their entire life, is hard to deine. This is succinctly captured in the experience shared by a young woman: 151 Bukuluki: Access to Justice among Youth in Post-Conlict Northern Uganda Everyone is coming here, and of course, everyone wants peace. Me, even me, I want peace. We all want peace, but can we deine what peace is? I was only one year [old] when this thing started. I cannot right now even deine what peace is. I don’t know what peace means… And, of course, if we don’t know what peace is, it will just remain a dream which never will come true (18-year-old female youth, Gulu Town — cited in Finnstrom, 2008, 102). As the young female youth quoted above pointed out, even to comprehend what peace means is not easy. As her life long experience has taught her, the many military campaigns have not brought peace and security; they have only increased poverty and an escalating spiral of violence and discrimination (Finnstrom, 2008: 103). Peace to those who have suffered the brunt of the violent insurgency is largely constructed to mean opportunities and possibilities, which were restricted during the armed conlict. Lack of access to opportunities or possibilities represents a disconnection or humiliating exclusion from the promises and expectations associated with peace. The feeling among the study participants was that an environment has not been created for them to fulil their expectations. As Grace Anywar put it; “The Acholi feel rejected. The Acholi feel hated. The Acholi feel unwanted” (quoted in Finnstrom, 2008, 104). By implication, peace means to feel wanted, loved and accepted. Peace also means access to services and a social infrastructure required to meet people’s basic and strategic needs. This view of peace has largely been inluential in shaping the youth’s perception and meaning of justice. To them, you cannot talk of justice when there are no opportunities, possibilities, and services to meet your everyday (basic) needs. Similarly, Finnegan, (2005, 25) establishes that “many ordinary civilians were more interested in restoring their lives and homes, planning for a more hopeful future rather than undergoing expensive, intricate justice tribunals, often advocated by the West.” The frustration with the limited possibilities and current circumstances (mired by poverty and lack of access to basic services) has tended to sway their focus away from the atrocities committed by the LRA. This situation has been exacerbated by statements associated with the top NRM leadership that tend to “ethicise” the conlict in Northern Uganda. It is alleged that President Museveni referred to the Acholi “as grasshoppers in a bottle, where they will eat one another before they ind the way out through the bottleneck” (Finnstrom, 2008, 106). In the view of many Acholi, they are denied many of the most mundane and everyday aspects of life including the provision of certain services like clean water, food, healthcare, and education. The writing on the wall on one of the many huts in Palaro Camp for displaced people read: “for God and My Life” (see Finnstrom 2008, 131), which emphasises the feeling of being severed from the rest of Uganda and from 152 Journal of Development Studies Uganda nationhood, a regression from being in the world to “bare life” (Agamben 1998 cited in Finnstrom 2008, 131). When young people develop such fatalistic attitudes towards self and others, this makes them susceptible to hopelessness and may, out of desperation, resort to violence as a means of coping with their situation. This will skew their perception of justice and accountability. 3 Perceptions of Accountability and Justice A signiicant number of study participants (most of them youths) emphasised that not all those responsible for causing harm should be brought to account, for example through prosecution or some other form of recourse. In this sense, the notion of responsibility was not understood by these youths to mean liability in any legal sense. Rather, responsibility was attributed to those actors who the study participants felt were to blame for having caused the sufferings. Victims/survivors who participated in the focus group discussions identiied a wide range of parties as principally responsible for the harm done to their communities: the LRA and the UPDF together with their respective commanders and local collaborators within the communities. Those who had suffered harm directly often linked issues of accountability with their own personal experience. Their tendency was to choose one or the other of the leaders, but not both, as the most accountable. A formerly abducted Acholi female youth4 explained: For me, it is Kony and Otti whom I hold most accountable for killing our loved ones; sending their men to abduct us and when they take us to the bush; they make us carry so many things beyond our capacity. They tortured us, beat us and forced us to sleep with big men. And it is because of these two main people that we are in this kind of pain, suffering and poverty. Other respondents observed: Kony and Otti [are] responsible for most of the harms inlicted on us. They displaced us into camps, looted our properties and even abducted our children and relatives, depriving us of our rights to a decent life.5 Or, Kony is responsible because he has overall command of the LRA.6 Some respondents described President Museveni as most accountable because his actions had been calculated. Other Acholi respondents emphasised the tribal origins, seniority and the respective education levels in determining accountability. A relative of a murdered victim in Gulu District said: 153 Bukuluki: Access to Justice among Youth in Post-Conlict Northern Uganda Museveni is not one of us Acholi. How do you think he can care for the suffering in this region? But he must be held accountable because as the most learned president, he should not be doing these bad things to the people of the region. Kony has not gone to school, so his actions are those of an illiterate7. Such respondents may have interpreted key questions such as those regarding accountability through a highly personalised lens; this however does not mean they were blind to others’ suffering. Respondents pointed either to the seniority of the individuals concerned or the gravity of the crime they had committed, and sometimes jointly, as the two main criteria used in determining accountability of the parties. It is, therefore, imperative to note that issues of seniority and gravity should be central questions for the most appropriate transitional justice process. In particular, a likely reason that many respondents highlighted seniority when determining accountability was that they regarded many perpetrators as “children of the community” who were abducted and forced to commit atrocities. Consequently, many respondents wished to distance their “sons and daughters” from claims of accountability and to focus instead on the need to hold senior igures accountable. A boy who was formerly abducted from Pader District said: Joseph Kony, the leader of the LRA, should be held accountable for the extreme harm caused to the people in the North. This is because he does not want to honour the Amnesty Act and come out of the bush. This would end the rebellion and the sufferings of the people8. 3.1 Accountability and Justice Linked to Compensation During interviews and focus group discussions, respondents linked accountability strongly to the idea of compensation. Compensation was considered as necessary response to harm, both as a form of accountability for perpetrators and as a means to improving the material conditions of affected communities. One participant explained: …compensation given to those who have suffered losses can restore their hope and reduce grievances they hold toward the perpetrators.9 Another woman noted: I want the government to compensate me for my properties that were destroyed by the rebels. It may not reverse the harm done but it will help me re-establish my life.10 It was common for respondents to argue that it was the government’s responsibility to compensate victims, even if they identiied the LRA as responsible for causing harm. 154 Journal of Development Studies This was due probably largely to the view, as expressed by one Acholi respondent, that “Kony is too poor” to compensate victims of LRA crimes. 3.2 Victims’ Perceptions of Forgiveness During interviews and discussions, many respondents spoke about the need to forgive those returning from abduction for the infractions they may have committed. However, there was no general consensus on the desire or will to extend forgiveness to the LRA. For some, forgiveness is not a choice but is derived out of the reality in which they live. One respondent explained: As for forgiveness, it appears like we have no option but to accept it. This is because we do not have weapons like our brothers in the bush. Since we do not have the weapons, we have no option but to accept11. Another young man in one of the focus group discussions observed: …I have come to speak in support of reconciliation and forgiveness... if we forgive our brothers who are in the bush, they will also respond, and we shall get back peace eventually… we should forgive our brothers who have been forced to commit atrocities against us. They may be our neighbours, or even coming from the same parish. We must not forget that many rebels are getting the courage to come out of the bush because they know they will be forgiven. Forgiveness is the only thing that will give us togetherness, and allow us to live in peace in future… 12 However, it is also true to say that there is widespread support for Kony and senior commanders to either be tried in a court of law, or simply killed or both. Both opinions, while seemingly contradictory, often appeared within the same interview. For instance, when asked what should happen to Kony, one male victim indicated: Kony should be arrested and taken to court because of the many crimes he has committed like killing, maiming and displacing. His crimes are too big for amnesty the Acholi way – that is beyond the Acholi records of crime…However, maybe if he comes out and apologises before people he can be forgiven.13 Some respondents felt that forgiveness for abducted individuals should be unconditional because they had been forced against their will to commit crimes. Respondents stated they are willing to forgive, or have already forgiven, perpetrators because “they are our children.” For many respondents, forgiveness was necessary to rebuild relations within families and to re-establish social cohesion generally. Others felt that forgiveness could only exist once the person had acknowledged his or her responsibility and promised never to repeat the infraction. For some respondents, forgiveness was linked to being 155 Bukuluki: Access to Justice among Youth in Post-Conlict Northern Uganda able to return and reconstruct their homesteads and livelihoods. One woman in one of the focus group discussions stated: …take a look at the camps….am I supposed to forgive from this mass homestead? For me to forgive, I feel we should irst go back home, so that I can forgive the person who hurt me from my own homestead. The various motivations for forgiveness explained above show that for most people who have suffered harm, forgiveness is not habitual but rather a conscious choice shaped by a range of individual and communal factors. The desire and willingness to forgive were often motivated by individual and communal pragmatic concerns, such as the need for forgiveness to ensure social cohesion in the community or a desire for their own relatives to be forgiven of crimes they committed so that they could return home. At the same time, many respondents expressed a simultaneous desire for forgiveness and revenge, showing the breadth and complexity of peoples’ emotional responses to the harm they suffered. Such indings “de-romanticise Northern Uganda, especially Acholi culture, showing that forgiveness is far from an inherent or primordial aspect of society but rather a deliberate, often reluctant, choice” (OHCHR, 2007). 3.3 Survivors’ Perceptions of Reconciliation Victims expressed an immense need for reconciliation in the community. The potential to promote reconciliation does appear to be culturally supported, in that the communal nature of Acholi life emphasises the idea that relations in Acholiland are interconnected and interdependant. This is evidenced in the explanation of one woman, in a focus group discussion in Pajule IDP Camp (Pader District): “They [the rebels] are part of me, you, her and him. So if we do not forgive, we are persecuting our own selves.” Perhaps, the importance of family and clan identity in the Northern Ugandan cultural context explains why respondents considered group reconciliation as most necessary. It is also likely that many respondents emphasised group reconciliation or other broad, general forms because they wished to avoid the fact that, in many cases, their own loved ones were perpetrators. With regard to forgiveness, respondents expressed a range of motivations for their desire for reconciliation. In many areas, respondents longed for the end of the conlict and reconciliation so that they could reunite with their scattered families. However, some respondents also recognised that not all the missing persons would return to the community. Many respondents connected reconciliation with Christian doctrine, arguing that it was their religious duty to reconcile with those who had harmed them. Generally, respondents stated that reconciliation was reliant upon prior public acknowledgement 156 Journal of Development Studies of the crimes and compensation from perpetrators. An internally displaced person from Gulu District argued that “reconciliation can only take place after compensation for lost lives and property”. Many respondents stated that they wanted to see certain personal criteria fulilled before they could consider reconciling with those who had caused them harm. One respondent in Gulu district said that “reconciliation can only take place after compensation for the lost lives and property. Without compensation, there can be no reconciliation”. Many respondents also argued that mediation by local elders, especially cultural and ‘traditional’ leaders, was necessary for reconciliation because only the elders could convince perpetrators to confess their crimes and to compensate their victims. This raises further questions about the popular perception that Northern Ugandans are inherently forgiving and reconciliatory. 3.4 Achieving Justice in the Daily Lives of People in Northern Uganda Discussions with respondents revealed that “minor” infractions in the daily lives of the people are handled by the family and clan members. The police only handle criminal cases. In some cases, except for capital offences, even the formal courts accept settling of some cases such as assault and theft out of court. Focus group discussions also revealed that victims usually use their agency to decide which cases to take to the formal or informal justice structures. In case of a crime, both formal and informal ‘traditional’ justice structures are seen not as antagonistic but rather each as having an important role to play in the daily lives of the people. One of the participants in the focus group discussion14 observed: A case like killing can be handled by both the formal and informal justice structures. Usually if an incident such as suicide occurs, both the police and elders of Ker Kal Kwaro (the Acholi ‘traditional’ institution) come on the scene. The police come because they are supposed to investigate the cause of death. ‘Traditional’ leaders come because they are supposed to cleanse the area in which the death occurred. If it is not a suicide then the ‘traditional’ leaders come to cleanse the area and also to mediate between the two parties and to prevent further reprisals. It was also revealed that that through the ‘traditional’ chiefs, the formal justice structures appreciate the contribution of the ‘traditional’ justice structures. One formerly abducted young woman in Pader District explained: The police can decide to refer some of the cases back to the ‘traditional’ leaders because some of the cases call for the performance of ‘traditional’ rituals and ceremonies. If these rituals are not performed then it means that the two conlicting parties will not relate well. The police are strict for cases such as deilement and rape. But for other cases such 157 Bukuluki: Access to Justice among Youth in Post-Conlict Northern Uganda as ighting, the police may ask the two parties to negotiate between themselves with the help of the ‘traditional’ leaders.15 The involvement of cultural and ‘traditional’ chiefs was considered critical because without their involvement “things can backire at the community and the family level.” For example, “if there is a murder in one clan, even if it is one person who committed the murder, the entire clan contributes to the payment of Culo Kwor (compensation)”. This is a sign of unity of the clan, and an expression of “we are sorry for what happened.” Explaining this further, one male focus group discussion participant in Kitgum noted: When cases are reported to the police, they simply record a statement and then the offender is taken to the court and sentenced. This makes people resort to the cultural leaders because they fear that if the case is not resolved locally then tensions will increase in the community and if ‘traditional’ cleansing rituals are not performed then all the community will be at risk of reprisals from the gods.16 3.5 Perceptions on Retributive and Restorative Justice Systems It was observed that even when cases are reported to police for formal prosecution, the aggrieved party and the perpetrator, often, may decide to withdraw the reported case — in preference for settlement through the informal ‘traditional’ justice structures. Study participants further noted that even “perpetrators who go through the formal justice system are later subjected to ‘traditional’ processes for purposes of healing relationships between the clans.” An elderly man in one of the focus groups discussions pointed out: If a killing occurs and a person is arrested, he or she can be taken to court and imprisoned. But when that person is later released, he or she comes back to the community and the elders organise to have a mato oput ceremony between that person (and his or her clan) and the clan of the victim.112 Interestingly even when a person is sentenced to life imprisonment, by the formal justice structures, cultural rituals are still performed to restore relationships between the victim’s and perpetrator’s clan: “If the person is not released the elders can still go ahead to organise for a mato oput ceremony with the clan of the victim because if mato oput does not take place then it means that there will be no restoration of relationships.” In some instances, victims pursue justice concurrently, through formal and indigenous or ‘traditional’ justice systems. For example: If Okello kills a person the case is taken to the police and then Okello is arrested and imprisoned. However, even after Okello is imprisoned, the elders of the two clans present the case for mediation to Ker Kal Kwaro and then the perpetrator’s clan has to accept 158 Journal of Development Studies responsibility and mobilise resources for the payment of Kwor to the victim’s clan. The ‘traditional’ leaders pursue justice through the ‘traditional’ justice mechanisms even if the offender is taken to the formal courts.18 Some people argued: …the ‘traditional’ justice system should have the irst say, and when the case is not resolved, then the ‘traditional’ leaders can refer [the case] to the formal justice structures. As one community member remarked in one of the focus group discussions held in Padibe Trading Centre, Kitgum District: These two structures can work together to ensure that cases are peacefully resolved. The police can help arrest the culprit and bring them to the ‘traditional’ chiefs (Rwodi). Some cases that overwhelm the ‘traditional’ chiefs should be taken to the formal justice structures.19 The analysis above, therefore, shows that in the daily lives of people, retributive and restorative justice systems are not mutually exclusive. They are complementary and do creatively reinforce each other in the dispensation of justice. 3.6 Victims’ Perceptions of Transitional Justice Options 3.6.1 Amnesty Several respondents expressed wide support for amnesty. Amnesty in this respect was seen, in and of itself, as a form of justice: it has the potential to save lives and allow people’s children to return home. Some expressed support for conditional amnesty, particularly when predicated on perpetrators’ telling the truth about their actions. Respondents were, however, more at ease with the application of amnesty (timo-kica lumuku) to low-level perpetrators. Many respondents said that amnesty should be offered to perpetrators in order to entice them home from the bush and to encourage them to confess their crimes. However, these respondents argued that if the perpetrators remained unrepentant or refused to return, they should be prosecuted. As one respondent noted: “courts work for those who choose to reject the amnesty option and continue to stay in the bush to carry out their operation.”20 A similar view was echoed by another respondent, who argued that: “The irst option should be amnesty and then prosecutions.”21 Interestingly, individuals have found creative ways of balancing the demands of restoration and retribution. For instance, when asked what should happen to Kony, some respondents immediately said that he should be killed. However, when further questioned about how the war should be brought to an end, the majority referred to amnesty and 159 Bukuluki: Access to Justice among Youth in Post-Conlict Northern Uganda some then changed their minds and said that Kony should be granted amnesty if he comes out voluntarily, while others said that he should be prosecuted. Furthermore, many respondents referred to the fact that justice takes time and that decisions about what should happen need to take place in a certain order. A young man in an IDP camp said: I think [Kony] should be given amnesty when he comes out so that he can tell us why he did all this… Then from what he will have said, if we ind that it is not something worthy going to the bush and killing people, then he should be taken to court22. However, the above arguments raise questions of what constitutes and how a “worthy” rebellion can be determined. This scenario also leaves an unanswered question of who should decide the worthiness of the rebellion – questions that are beyond the scope of this study. For example, Finnstrom notes: Amnesty, even if the president accepted it coactively, does not apply to rebels. Amnesty applies to gangsters, robbers, or those kinds of bandits. But to the rebels who…call themselves liberators…they don’t see that they have done anything wrong…I think they were wise to know that the amnesty thing was bogus (Finnstrom 2008, 119). Citizens harbouring such views “had little trust in government measures to end the war, which they say as efforts to downplay the armed conlict as merely Northern issues, peripheral to the rest of the country” (Finnstrom 2008, 119). The above analysis, therefore, shows that for many Northern Ugandans, amnesty is not an automatic response to crimes but rather motivated by various pragmatic considerations, including a desire to see perpetrators, especially local abductees, return from the bush. Some respondents stated that both amnesty and prosecution were necessary responses to the harm they had suffered. The most likely reason for such views is that respondents wished to distinguish between the parties they considered responsible and those accountable for causing harm. On this basis, many respondents distinguish between different levels of perpetrators and crimes, seeing amnesty as appropriate (at least initially) for low-level perpetrators, especially young abductees, and prosecution as appropriate for high-level perpetrators. Granting amnesty, however, raises questions of justice. The international human rights jurisprudence is clearly against the practice of offering amnesty to those who have committed serious or grave human rights violations. The underlying argument is that criminal prosecution of those accused of committing war crimes is a fundamental aspect of a victim’s right to justice; and that amnesties reward impunity and are generally inconsistent with the obligation of states to provide accountability for serious crimes under international law. Nevertheless, it is imperative that in situations of armed conlict 160 Journal of Development Studies where serious violations of the laws of war have been committed on a massive scale, the notion of remedial or retributive justice for victims of war crimes are balanced against the need of the territorial state to deal effectively and progressively with past atrocities and not to provoke or maintain further violence. 3.6.2 Prosecution Even though respondents identiied truth and compensation as the primary beneits they expected from transitional justice mechanisms, none of them claimed that they expected these from domestic courts or the ICC. However, the relationship between amnesty and prosecution permeated the discussions of respondents on the prospects of prosecution holding perpetrators accountable. The respondents pointed out the need to prevent those engaged in violence from continuing to commit crimes through the application of either amnesty or prosecution. Both measures were seen as a way to stop violence by ensuring that combatants put down their arms, either voluntarily (amnesty) or by force (through prosecution). In principle, prosecution was regarded as a viable course of action, speciically with respect to perpetrators who were considered the most accountable in terms of seniority and gravity of harm. For example, one respondent observed: …to some extent, those who committed very serious crimes should be handled by the special commission and court. However, there were those who rejected prosecution and the use of formal justice structures. Concerns for those who dismissed trials as a useful option for accountability were not usually related to prosecution in principle and its virtues, but to its operations and functions. These respondents voiced complaints about the ineffectiveness of current domestic justice institutions – civilian or military. They questioned their legal authority. For example, one respondent observed that “local council courts cannot handle this problem because their mandate is limited”. They also doubted the impartiality of these courts. A young woman who was formerly abducted in Pader District said: All courts, local and national are not effective in bringing to account the perpetrators of the war. They are biased.” Respondents also noted that the formal justice structures are susceptible to corruption and are not well positioned to address the truth about past atrocities and compensation for victims. Many, thus, argued for the need of some form of historical clariication mechanism to produce a public record concerning the harm caused during the conlict. The negative assessment of domestic institutions of justice brought some respondents to consider international justice as a possible alternative. As one young female explained: 161 Bukuluki: Access to Justice among Youth in Post-Conlict Northern Uganda If people who are begged over the radio to return under the amnesty option refuse; they should be forwarded to court. There are always pleas on the radio for Kony and his commanders to come back home so that we can have peace. We have chosen to forgive them and have asked them to forgive us as well. But if they refuse to come, then the case is left to the government. They should be forwarded to the International Criminal Court because our courts are useless.23 Nonetheless, some respondents stated that they knew little of the ICC, its aims and methods of operation. One participant, for example noted: “We have heard of the ICC but we do not understand it properly.”24 Those who had some knowledge of the ICC and its intentions, noted that positive views about international justice achieving just and fair outcomes for accountability were negated by parallel concerns about the lack of eficacy and legitimacy of the ICC. Many respondents accused the ICC as having been responsible for the collapse of the Juba peace talks. Victims in focus groups expressed a feeling of mistrust and disappointment about the ICC and the international community for having failed to deliver on their publicly stated mission to bring the perpetrators to account: I think the ICC cannot help us because Kony will not accept to go to court. I know that the Rwodi have tried on several occasions to meet with Kony and talk to him but he cannot listen to them because of the ICC. Kony respects the Rwodi because they are the representatives of the war-affected population. Kony can accept to have his case mediated by the ‘traditional’ leaders and that is why he has been meeting them during the course of the peace talks. However, we have not yet seen anything positive from the ICC.25 Many respondents also blamed the ICC for not arresting the suspects; which relects a lack of awareness of the function of ICC itself. Like one young man pointed out: I need to know how the ICC works because it is like an empty tin that makes a lot of noise without an impact on justice. The ICC should arrest Kony, try him, arrest UPDF oficers who violated human right in Northern Uganda and try them, too. If the ICC is not doing what I have said, then Kony is only forgiving us at the moment of not coming back here to torture. 26 Others felt that the ICC is ill-equipped to deal with the situation in Northern Uganda: First the ICC did not investigate the situation of Northern Uganda in its totality. Secondly, the ICC is dealing with the LRA, leaving out the UPDF who have committed serious crimes against the people of Northern Uganda. Thirdly, the ICC system does not lead to 162 Journal of Development Studies genuine accountability; hindering reconciliation. At best, it can only lead to polarisation, hatred and disunity.27 According to one respondent in a focus group discussion in Padibe: The ICC is too far to bring justice in Northern Uganda. What we need here is action and reality. ICC works on paper and needs a second party to aid her in arresting suspects. Now, if that second party is weak then this is not possible. If the ICC is interested in bringing justice in Northern Uganda, let them come and be based in Northern Uganda. They should get involved fully in the process of investigation of crimes committed, arrest the culprits, try them and compensate the victims… ICC should work hand-inhand with the religious and cultural leaders to see that victims of human right violations and members of their immediate families or dependants compensated for materials and psychological damage which they suffered as a result of direct violation which should be assessed by religious leaders.28 3.6.3 Local or Traditional Practices Through focus group discussions and interviews, the majority of respondents noted that ‘traditional’ mechanism has an important role to play within the communities. Indeed, some felt it should be given more formal recognition. The restorative potential of ‘traditional’ mechanisms was also widely mentioned, particularly in contrast to the formal (retributive) mechanisms, which were often referred to as ‘divisive’. One respondent explained: Depending on the acceptability by the ethnic group involved in the reconciliation process, we recommend any mechanism that involves reconciliation, such as mato oput in Acholi, kayo cuk in Lango because it can bring forgiveness among the people…this mechanism will be appropriate in bringing community reconciliation to the lower levels and will address the concerns of the victims from such ethnic and cultural backgrounds. ‘Traditional’ justice mechanisms can equally address the concerns of many affected local people because it is the kind of justice system that they are used to compared to the court process.29 Proponents of the use of local rituals often argued that, before perpetrators could be cleansed or reconciled, they irst needed to confess their crimes and show a willingness to compensate victims. As one respondent explained on the use of local rituals: In Acholi here, we also believe that culo kwor , that is, compensation, is one way that harm done can be addressed as the offender pays the other person for the pain caused in any way with money, goats, cows or any other means available.30 163 Bukuluki: Access to Justice among Youth in Post-Conlict Northern Uganda What lies implicit in the respondents’ descriptions linking local practices with truth and compensation is the view that these practices represent important means of accountability for perpetrators. What is problematic, however, is that although some respondents saw compensation as a viable form of punishment, many felt that traditional compensation cannot take place as per tradition because people have been cut off from their indigenous means and separated from their possessions: …the compensation now might not be fair especially in this conlict, because if one killed ten people, it would be dificult to compensate them all. 31 On the other hand, interviews with many of the victims showed that for mato oput32to take place, it is necessary for the people who committed killings, and the people who lost relatives to come together and solve their differences. Culo kwor (compensation) could then take place. According to one participant in the focus group; “I can forgive, and be willing to mato oput. But how can I mato oput with someone I cannot see?33 Those who favoured the traditional justice practices tended to reject imprisonment as the primary form of punishment claiming that it does not allow any reconciliation between the families of the victim and the perpetrator, and that it does not provide any material redress for the victim’s family. In other words, the potential of imprisonment to address wrongs committed and heal the communities affected by errant behaviour is limited, as one respondent noted: Some of the cases call for the performance of traditional rituals and ceremonies. If these rituals are not performed then it means that the two conlicting parties will not relate well. When cases are reported to the police, they simply record a statement and then the offender is taken to court and imprisoned. This makes people resort to the traditional leaders because they fear that if the case is not resolved locally then tensions will increase in the community and if traditional cleansing rituals are not performed, then all the community will be at risk of reprisals from the gods.34 Another respondent noted: The court is disadvantageous because there is no forgiveness. If you are an offender they just come and arrest you and jail you. Or if the court rules that you are supposed to pay a ine then they just come and sell your property without your consent. If you are guilty you are arrested and not even given a chance to say good-bye to your relatives or your family. And then when you are imprisoned you cannot do anything to help your family. If your child is studying then he will have to drop out of school.35 164 Journal of Development Studies As noted earlier, others were more cautious, arguing that local and traditional justice approaches should be reserved for minor crimes. One formerly abducted young man explained: They should be allowed to handle minor cases, before they intensify into serious crimes. Crimes can grow from small to serious ones. They should work very hard to restore broken relationship and reconciling people in order to bring peace in the community.36 The indings presented above show that the victims have found creative ways of balancing the demand for restoration and retribution. Most respondents interpreted issues relating to accountability, reconciliation, and transitional justice through a localised, often individualised, lens, relecting their personal experiences of the conlict. Respondents repeatedly expressed their need to discover the truth about the past, especially to shed light on the identity of the perpetrators and the nature of the acts that have been committed. Focus group discussions also identiied compensation as the primary response to harm, both as a form of accountability for perpetrators and a means to improving the material conditions of affected communities. Many considered it to be the government’s responsibility to compensate victims even where the harm was caused by the LRA. 3.7 Perceptions of Traditional and Other Alternative Justice Options Regarding the favoured transitional justice options to address harm, respondents expressed highly mixed views, describing numerous virtues and pitfalls of amnesty processes, prosecution including before the ICC, and local and traditional practices. Similar to the study by OHCHR (2007), this study found no universal support for, or opposition to, any of the transitional justice options, victims clearly connect the potential use of local practices in transitional justice to facilitating the recovery of truth and delivering compensation; and aiding forgiveness and reconciliation, particularly in cleansing and reintegration of low-level perpetrators. Pragmatic Perception of Amnesty: The study demonstrates that considerable variance exists among respondent victims on the question of whether amnesty is an acceptable response to crimes. Many focus group discussions considered the short-term beneits of the amnesty scheme as an incentive to bring the LRA out of the bush, and thus to bring peace to their communities. Views differed depending on pragmatic considerations such as the desire to have abductees, “our own children”, return and to secure “permanent peace”. The dual identity of many abductees as children of the community and often perpetrators of serious crimes was often presented as a reason for offering amnesty to former LRA elements. 165 Bukuluki: Access to Justice among Youth in Post-Conlict Northern Uganda Discontent with “Unconditional” Amnesty: At the same time, victims voiced widespread discontent with the current amnesty process in its failure to deliver compensation to victims and reintegration packages to combatants who had already returned. Many considered the unconditional amnesty as frustrating their need for truth recovery and historical records. Doubts about the National and International Justice Systems: Respondents expressed deep misgivings about the current capacity of domestic and international institutions of justice to effectively deliver on accountability in a fair and transparent manner. In particular, many focus group discussions underscored the failure of the ICC to follow through on the arrests of the LRA senior leadership. 4 Discussion While developments in international law, human rights and international humanitarian law as well as contemporary political thinking favour accountability for the commission of atrocities, it is also a reality that international criminal justice does not operate in a vacuum. International law is a cultural phenomenon and is shaped by the prevailing customs, treaties, and resolutions by political actors. Like any other cultural phenomenon, international law is dynamic and inluenced by contextual factors. It cannot, therefore, be exercised in total disregard of political considerations and consequences on international and national security, stability, and peace. For the international community and the ICC, in particular, to serve the interests of justice in Northern Uganda, it should seek a redeinition of the interests of international justice that goes beyond retribution and deterrence of impunity to encapsulate issues of reconciliation, promoting the dignity of the victims as well as social and distributive justice. A more comprehensive and holistic concept of justice should be adopted – one that conceives justice as not merely righting the wrongs committed against individuals, but also constituting a home-grown initiative for local and community-based justice and the rectiication of unjust imbalances in society that exacerbate the conlict. As has been demonstrated in this work, a strictly legalistic and judicial pursuit of international law while the conlict remains unresolved or not constructively transformed runs the risk of denying the people of Northern Uganda the very justice it seeks to serve. The Rome Statute establishing the ICC is based on a retributive concept that international justice is best realised by punishing the guilty. By focusing on the immediate expediency of punitive justice, the ICC overlooks societal processes necessary for long-term postconlict social integration, reconstruction, and comprehensive peace-building. While issues of justice and peace are not mutually exclusive, in such an on-going conlict situation, the principal question is about sequencing. As former UN Secretary 166 Journal of Development Studies General, Koi Annan (2004) reiterates, the two are mutually reinforcing imperatives in a post-conlict setting that requires “strategic planning, careful integration and sensible sequencing”. The people of Northern Uganda should not have to choose between peace and justice. Indeed, they can have both, but creative ways are needed to incorporate their interests. Despite attempts at dialogue with local community leaders and civil society groups, the ICC is still viewed as an alien force trampling on and disregarding long-standing efforts of resolving the conlict and negating painful gains made thus far. However, the ICC still has the option to dispel the perception that it is pursuing a fundamentalist approach to international law by exercising the powers granted in Article 53 to halt prosecutions in the interest of justice, in consideration of the views of the victims of the conlict in Northern Uganda. Although the ICC has issued arrest warrants, its implementation can still be put on hold to allow for peace to irst be established before justice takes its course. Such a move would only serve the interests of peace by postponing the prospect of prosecution but does not necessarily amount to condoning impunity. In this regard, Grono and O’Brien, (2008:13) noted that “the potential clash between peace and justice objectives can sometimes be circumvented by pursuing a sequential approach, for example, by getting a peace agreement now, then dealing with justice many years later.” Thus, while the ICC’s search for justice is taking place within a conlict setting where the pursuit of justice affects the interests of peace, it needs to recognise that sometimes, justice is best served by allowing a peace process to move forward unimpeded. In order to avoid the perception of giving in to political pressure and condoning impunity, the ICC can offer to suspend prosecution on condition that it reserves the right to revisit the case at a later date as mandated by the Rome Statute. 37 Still, such an arrangement, coupled with signiicant diplomatic pressure, would create a substantial amount of good will and open a window of opportunities for negotiation. This is because while international justice should not be pursued at any cost, even at the price of peace, it is equally arguable that negotiated peace that fails to secure justice runs the risk of being supericial and deceptive, encouraging impunity and failing the very victims its seeks to serve. The Rome Statute is curiously silent with regard to the possibility of considering other alternatives to criminal prosecution in transitional justice. The ICC is, therefore, not mandated to consider such options as “traditional justice systems, truth commissions, vetting mechanisms, schemes for demobilisation, and reparations, to name a few” (Seils & Wieda 2005, 13 cited in Maiyo 2006, 89). There is credence in Antonio Cassese’s (the irst President of the ICTY) assertion: …the best response to atrocities lies in a prudent and well thought out combination of various approaches, seen, not as alternatives, but as a joint reaction to the appalling 167 Bukuluki: Access to Justice among Youth in Post-Conlict Northern Uganda suffering we are obliged to witness every day, with a deep sense of indignation” (Cassese 2003). A pragmatic and multi-faceted approach is, therefore, necessary, one which could potentially include a combination of Truth and Reconciliation Commissions (TRCs), National War Crime Trials (to satisfy the ICC international standards—Rome Statutory obligations), traditional reconciliation processes, and limited amnesties. Healing and reconciliation is an integral part of transforming such a violent conlict that has left its victims, mostly children, physically and emotionally scarred and traumatised. Such a feat cannot be achieved through mere punitive justice, but by a restitutive and restoratory process. This is perhaps the most powerful case for the creation of a Truth and Reconciliation Commission, or at least some form of grassroots reconciliation process in the manner of Gacaca courts in Rwanda. The case for Gacaca shows that it is feasible to create hybrid mechanisms that combine traditional judicial processes and cleansing rituals with formal national and international judicial features. This pragmatic approach is similar to the theoretical underpinnings of cosmopolitan localism proposed by Dietrich and Sützl (2006, 225) which portends that: Cosmopolitan localism seeks to amplify the richness of a place while keeping in mind the rights of a multi-faceted world. It cherishes a particular place, yet at the same time knows about the relativity of all places. This approach would help to avert criticism that international justice institutions have a detached approach to the societies they purport to assist and marginalise or exclude victims (Waddell and Clark 2008, 11). As Greame (2008) cited in Waddell and Clark (2008: 11) argues: The polarised debates about the court, particularly over supposed incompatibilities between justice and domestic peace, have hampered efforts to consider peace, justice and reconciliation in a more integrated way, and to recognise the potential for these goals to be mutually reinforcing. Therefore, rather than debates focusing on ICC in singular terms, the court should be seen in the context of, and coexisting with, a range of other mechanisms and institutions that can complement one another Clark 2008). Lessons drawn from how the local people live their lives and how they negotiate between restorative and retributive justice systems offer some insights that show that informal and formal justice mechanisms can complement each other to serve the interests of peace and justice, albeit some limitations. Although modern justice institutions like the International Criminal Court, and the national justice systems (inclined towards the 168 Journal of Development Studies British system of Justice) are ideally rooted within the retributive conceptualisation of justice, many people and institutions, especially those in post-conlict Northern Uganda, live within the realities of both the retributive and restorative justice systems. In their daily lives, these systems are not seen as mutually exclusive. Both systems meet and talk to each other in the everyday lives of both the victims and perpetrators. People in post-conlict settings constantly negotiate and renegotiate between these two systems of justice. Like culture, these justice systems are seen as interactive and dynamic. For example, some study participants drew one striking similarity between the two justice systems: “they are in most cases presided over by elders”. It was rare in the formal courts to ind young men or women holding high ranking positions. The same situation prevails in the informal justice institutions. So both justice systems seem to share this attribute of believing in the wisdom and sense of mature judgment of elders. Interactions with victims of atrocities committed by the LRA and the UPDF, demystiied the exaggerated theoretical and politically motivated differences between the restorative and retributive justice systems. The theoretical and political debates seem to portray that these two justice systems are absolutely different, parallel to each other but this is at variance with the experiences of the local people within their context. According to their understanding, retributive and restorative justice systems are seen as complementary. People choose to pragmatically apply one or the other system of justice or combine both systems to deal with atrocities committed in their daily realities. For example, it is clear that for the same case, people take certain components of it to the formal-retributive justice system but for other components they apply the localindigenous justice system. In some cases, people would start off with the informal justice systems but when the perpetrators fail to comply with the decisions of the informal justice system, they are forwarded for prosecution by the formal justice system38. It was clear during interviews that it is only when negotiations through the informal justice mechanisms fail that people choose to pursue what they perceive as “the harder and complicated option of the formal courts”. For example, it was also common to use police summons, police forms such as Form 3 (a form on which a recognised/certiied health worker ills details to prove that deilement or rape took place) as a negotiation tool with the families of the perpetrators. It is made very clear to the family that if they fail to pay compensation to the victim/ victim’s family and to pursue the necessary ritual cleansing, the case would be taken to the formal justice system. In Ugandan law, rape and deilement attract a maximum death sentence. It was also unravelled that even when cases are reported to the police and formal courts, when the traditional justice system handles them adequately, the aggrieved party loses interest in the case and the Director of Public Prosecution does not 169 Bukuluki: Access to Justice among Youth in Post-Conlict Northern Uganda have many alternatives for pursuing a case for which the aggrieved party is not willing to pursue. For example, one of the Criminal Investigation Department (CID) police oficers succinctly noted: …if people who are supposed to come as state witnesses are not willing, what do you do? You may have to compromise and allow them to proceed with the traditional justice arrangements. In other cases, like murder, deilement or even rape, the perpetrator would be prosecuted and punished by the formal retributive courts but on returning to the community after serving their sentence, they would be required by their kinsmen to go through the traditional justice systems for cleansing to avoid misfortune affecting their clan and to heal relationships with the kinsmen of the victim’s family. This is clearly indicated in the remarks made in an interview with one of the CID oficers in Gulu: Even if you are convicted and you serve the sentence, your clan will still pay the culo kwor (compensation associated with cleansing rituals), if you do not pay culo kwor, there will be no good relationship; we shall never eat together, go for burial or share anything together. This, in some cases, obliges perpetrators and their families to comply with the societal expectations. In this case, people apply a pragmatic approach; they apply what is perceived to be the best from each system in respect to getting what they consider as justice done. People are not passive spectators; they make optimal use of their agency to navigate between the walls and structures of both the traditional justice system and the formal retributive justice system to achieve their goals of realising justice but also creating peace through healing of relationships. Thus, although culture and social institutions have a role in regulating responses to grievances, it is fascinating to see the concept of agency working in real life experiences of people seeking peace and justice. People are not spectators but are seen to be active agents. People ind ways of navigating and manipulating their structures to achieve their goals for justice. This also implies that formal systems are driven to some extent by the informal dynamics and the context in which they operate. Briggs and Peat (1999, 8) have argued in their analysis of the chaos and system’s theory that “chaotic systems lie beyond all our attempts to predict, manipulate and control them”. Therefore, the perception that there are pure and sacred justice systems may be largely misplaced. What is perceived as Western culture-oriented formal justice systems, or even non-Western culture traditional justice systems, may not be purely so. One can ind interconnectedness in both judicial 170 Journal of Development Studies cultures in the way they respond to the same phenomenon. The difference might be in the form and packaging but not in the content, as relected in daily life experiences. 5 Conclusion The foregoing discussion and analysis of issues from the literature and interviews with a range of stakeholders, especially the youth are inclined towards complementarities of the restorative and retributive justice systems rather than seeing them as totally different and opposed to each other. These systems seem to have a lot in common and can work together to achieve the goals of peace and justice. The synergistic effects of these systems working together would minimise the weaknesses of each system and consolidate the strengths of each system. In many cases, the differences and disconnection between the two strands of justice are over-exaggerated while the possibilities for inding common grounds and values are marginalised. Thus, the theoretical debate introduced by Olaniyan (cited in Norval 1997) on the profaneness of culture and identity as relective of the madness of culture and the eventedness of every identity, as well as the conception of culture as “a complicated articulation of mutually contradictory and antagonistic elements”, becomes relevant to this discussion. The conception of justice systems as “absolute, closed and impenetrable” (Norval 1997, 7-8) seems to be at variance with most of the evidence in the literature and primary data generated during this study. The evidence seems to be inclined to the pro-hybridity arguments made by Norval that cultural identity cannot be seen as closed and positive but it “exists as fragile and vulnerable — as a hybrid and non-pure” (Norval 1997, 7-8). Profane, which is synonymous with non-purity and/or hybridity allows both the restorative and retributive justice systems to meet, converse and talk to each other through different actors at different levels, thereby fostering peace and justice. Hybridity and/or hybridism, therefore, create room for conversation and negotiation between cultures and/or justice systems. Both retributive and restorative justice systems are incomplete as explanatory models of peace and justice in the daily lives of those in conlict and post-conlict settings. They need to creatively complement each other and deal with the inherent and antagonistic elements. 171 Bukuluki: Access to Justice among Youth in Post-Conlict Northern Uganda References Agamben, G. (1998). Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life. Stanford, California: Stanford University Press. BBC (2007). LRA Rebels Want Ugandan Justice. Available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/ africa/7074471.stm (Accessed April 12 2009). Branch, A. (2005). Neither Peace nor Justice: Political Violence and the Peasantry in Northern Uganda, 1986-1998. African Studies Quarterly. Volume 8, Issue 2. Available at http://web. africa.ul.edu/asq/v8/v8i2a1.htm (Accessed November 19 2008). Branch, A. (2004). International Justice, Local Injustice: The International Criminal Court in Northern Uganda. Dissent, Summer 2004. Briggs, J., Peat, D. (1999). Seven Life Lessons of Chaos: Spiritual Wisdom from the Science of Change. New York: Harper Perennial, a Division of Harper Collins Publishers. Cassese, A. 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(2008). One Among Many: The ICC as a Tool of Justice during Transition. In Waddell N., Clark, P. (Eds.). Courting Conlict? Justice, Peace and ICC in Africa. Pp. 7379. London: The Royal African Society School of Oriental and African Studies. Nick G., Adam, O. (2008). Justice in Conlict? The ICC and Peace Process. In Waddell N., Clark, P. (Eds.). Courting Conlict? Justice, Peace and ICC in Africa. Pp. 13-20. London: The Royal African Society School of Oriental and African Studies. HRW (2003a). Uganda: No Amnesty for Atrocities. Human Rights News. Available at http:// hrw.org/english/docs/2006/07/27/uganda13863.htm (Accessed 29 November 2008). HRW (2003b). Abducted and Abused: Renewed Conlict in Northern Uganda. New York: Human Rights Watch. ICG (2005). Building a Comprehensive Peace Strategy for Northern Uganda. Africa Brieing. No. 27, 23 June 2005. Available at http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index. cfm?id=3523&l=1 (Accessed on 28th July 2011). Jordan, J., Hartling, L. (2002). New Developments in Relational-Cultural Theory. In M. Ballou & L. Brown (Eds.). Rethinking Mental Health and Disorder. New York: Guilford Press. Latigo, J. O. (2008). Northern Uganda: Traditional-Based Practices in the Acholi Region. In Luc Huyse and Mark Salter (Eds.). Traditional Justice and Reconciliation after Violent Conlict: Learning from African Experiences. Stockholm: International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance. Maiyo, J. (2006). Justice in Conlict—the Suitability of International Justice in Conlict Resolution: The international Criminal Court in Northern Uganda. Unpublished Master Thesis. University of Amsterdam. Marshall, T. (1999). Restorative Justice: An Overview. Available at http://www.homeofice.gov. uk/rds/pdfs/occ-resjus.pdf (Accessed 12th January 2008) Norval, A. (1999). ‘Hybridization’: The Impurity of the Political. In Edkins, Persram, and PinFat (Eds). Sovereignty and Subjectivity. Pp. 99-116. London: Leine Reiner Publishers. OHCHR (2007). Making Peace our Own: Victims’ Perceptions of Accountability, Reconciliation and Transitional Justice in Northern Uganda. New York: United Nations Ofice of the High Commissioner for Human Rights. http://www.ohchr.org/english/docs/northern_Uganda_ august2007.pdf (Accessed on 12 April 2009). Okello, M., C. (2007). The False Polarisation of Peace and Justice in Uganda. Presentation at the International Conference on Peace and Justice 25th -27th June 2007 Nuremberg, Germany. RLP (2008). Alternative Justice Mechanisms Research Abstract. Available at: http://www. beyondjuba.org/alt_justice.php (Accessed 19 Febraury.2008) UNICEF (2005). Suffering in Silence: A Study of Sexual and Gender Based Violence (SGBV) in Pabbo Camp, Gulu District, Northern Uganda. Kampala: UNICEF. United Nations (2004). Report of the Secretary General on The rule of law and transitional justice in conlict and post-conlict societies, UN SC S/2004/616, General 23 August 2004. 173 Bukuluki: Access to Justice among Youth in Post-Conlict Northern Uganda Worden, Scott (2008). The Justice Dilemma in Uganda. USI Peace Brieing. United States Institute for Peace. Available at http://www.usip.org/iles/resources/1_3.PDF (Accessed February 12 2009). Notes 1 Retributive justice emphasizes individual responsibility and accountability for crimes committed. It adheres to the moral notion of peace which emphasizes peace out of justice very close to revenge. As Maiese noted, retributive justice protagonists insist that: “those who break the rules deserve to be punished…people need to be treated in the same way that they treat others…punishment is warranted as a response to a past event of injustice or wrong doing. It acts to reinforce rules that have been broken and balance the scales of justice” (Maiese 2003:1). 2 Restorative justice is a growing movement that strives to achieve reconciliation between crime victims and the persons who have harmed them through the use of various forms of mediation and nonviolent conlict resolution. Under the restorative justice process: “all the parties with a stake in a particular offense come together to resolve collectively how to deal with the aftermath of the offense and its implications for the future” (Marshall 1999:5). See Protocols additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, International Committee of the Red Cross, Geneva, 1977, pp.89-101. This protocol relates to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conlicts (Protocol II), came into force on 8 June 1977. 3 Interview with a formerly Abducted young Female, Kitgum Matidi IDP Camp, 17 April 2009 4 Focus group discussion with 6 male youths, Obyem Decongested Camp, Kitgum District, 22 April 2009 5 Interview with formerly abducted male youth, Pajule IDP Camp, Pader District, 27 March 2009 6 7 Interview with relative of a murder victim [male youth], Gulu District 29 April 2009 Interview with formerly abducted male youth, Padibe trading centre, Kitgum district, 18 April 2009 8 Focus group discussion with victims of violence, Obyem Decongested Camp, Kitgum District, 22 April 2009 9 10 Interview with a female victim of violence, Kitgum Matidi IDP Camp, Kitgum District 17 April 2009 11 Interview with female youth, Obyem Decongested Camp, Kitgum District , 22 April 2009 174 Journal of Development Studies 12 Interview with male youth, Kitgum Matidi IDP Camp, Kitgum District, 17 April 2009 Focus group discussion with victims of violence, Obyem Decongested Camp, Kitgum District, 22 April 2009 13 Focus group discussion with 6 male youths, Obyem Decongested Camp, Kitgum District, 22 April 2009 14 15 Interview with young woman , Pajule IDP Camp, Pader District, 27 March 2009 Focus group discussion with male youth, Kitgum Matidi IDP Camp, Kitgum District, 17 April 2009 16 Focus group discussion with male youth, Kitgum Matidi IDP Camp, Kitgum District, 17 April 2009 17 18 Interview with elder, Obyem Decongested Camp, Kitgum District, 22 April 2009 Focus group Discussion with Local people , Padibe Trading Centre, Kitgum District 18th April 2009 19 20 21 22 Focus group discussion with male victims, Padibe, Kitgum District, 19 April 2009 Focus group discussion with male victims, Padibe, Kitgum District, 19 April 2009 Interview with male youth, Kitgum Matidi IDP Camp, Kitgum District, 17 April 2009 Female participant, Focus group discussion, Obyem Decongested Camp, Kitgum District , 22nd April 2009 23 24 Interview with female victim, Kitgum Matidi IDP Camp, 17 April 2009 Focus group discussions with Formerly Abducted Persons, Pajule IDP Camp, Pader District, 27th March 2009 25 26 Interview with male victim, Kitgum Matidi IDP Camp, Kitgum District, 17th April 2009 Focus group discussion with victims of violence, Obyem Decongested Camp, Kitgum District, 22 April 2009 27 Focus group discussion with male youths, Obyem Decongested Camp, Kitgum District, 22 April 2009 28 Key Informant Interview with oficial from the Acholi Religious Peace Initiative, 29 April, 2009. 29 30 Interview with male victim, Kitgum Matidi IDP Camp, Kitgum District, 17 April 2009 Focus group discussions with formerly abducted persons, Padibe, Kitgum District, 19 April 2009 31 32 Mato oput (drinking the bitter herb or root) is traditionally used to resolve inter-clan disputes, such as the killing of one clan member by a person of another clan (Latigo 2008). Mato oput is “both a process and a ritual ceremony to restore relationships between clans in 175 Bukuluki: Access to Justice among Youth in Post-Conlict Northern Uganda the case of intentional murder or an accidental killing” (Latigo 2008, 103-104). It represents “a long and sophisticated process that begins by separating the affected clans, mediation to establish the ‘truth’ and payment of compensation according to by-laws” (Liu Institute for Global Issues and Gulu District NGO Forum 2005, 54). The mato oput ceremony itself is an elaborate ritual beginning with the symbolic beating of a stick, signifying acceptance of guilt by the perpetrator for the killing (see Liu Institute for Global Issues and Gulu District NGO Forum 2005, 57-58). Each clan provides an animal for slaughter, traditionally a sheep and a goat representing the two parties to the conlict (Latigo 2008). The animals are slaughtered and mixed together to symbolize the coming together of the two parties. The parties, or representatives thereof, then partake of symbolic food and drink in an elaborate sequence of events, including drinking of the bitter root (Latigo 2008; Finnstrom 2003). 33 Interview with relative of a murder victim, Kitgum Matidi IDP Camp, 17 April 2009 Interview with formerly abducted male youth, Pajule IDP Camp, Pader District, 27 March 2009 34 Focus group discussions with Formerly abducted persons, Padibe, Kitgum District, 19 April 2009 35 36 Interview with formerly abducted male youth, Gulu District 29 April 2009 Article 53 (4) states that “the Prosecutor may, at any time, reconsider a decision whether to initiate an investigation or prosecution based on new facts or information.” 37 38 Non compliance of perpetrators to the informal justice may be attributed to the reality that the system does not have structured mechanisms for enforcing compliance. It relies more on the willingness of perpetrators to comply. The assumption is that perpetrators believe in the norms and beliefs that constitute and sustain the traditional and or informal justice systems. 176 Journal of Development Studies 3 (2) (2013) 177 - 196 Youth Unemployment and Post-Conlict Recovery in the Acholi Sub-Region1 Charles Okello Ayai Abstract: This paper reports the indings of a study that delved into the experience of youths in Northern Uganda with post-conlict reconstruction. Speciic attention was paid to the experience of the youths in the labour market; and to their involvement in peacebuilding efforts and government programmes. The paper reports a mutually reinforcing relationship between youth unemployment and conlict. It notes that in as much as conlict hurts economic production and exacerbates youth unemployment, unemployed youths are particularly disposed to involvement in various forms of insurgency. The paper also notes gaps in the involvement of youths in peace-building efforts and government promoted reconstruction programmes. The paper suggests recommendations towards alleviation of the youth unemployment problem. Keywords: Youth Unemployment; Labour Market Analysis; Reconstruction 1 Introduction Since 2006, the Acholi sub-region of Uganda and the surrounding districts have been relatively peaceful after experiencing extremely violent activities as a result of the conlict between the Lord Resistance Army (LRA) and the government Uganda People’s Defence Forces (UPDF).2 Violent conlict led to unspeciied number of deaths; 38,000 children were abducted; and more than two million people lived in squalid internally displaced people’s camps (IDPs) (Angucia 2010; Baines, et al 2006; Branch 2008; Gersony 1997; Pham 2007; UNICEF 2006). The challenges which young people face in the Acholi sub-region are daunting. Unemployment is prominent in the Acholi sub-region.3 Youth unemployment rate in Uganda is estimated at 83 per cent (MFPED 2011). Many youths in the Acholi subregion missed education opportunities, hence, are not competitive in the job markets Akullo: Using University Education to Rehabilitate Former Child-Soldiers (MFPED 2011; Ayai 2009). Despite youth potential in the Acholi sub-region, they are unable to effectively contribute to the recovery and the socioeconomic development of the Acholi sub-region as many of them are unemployed (UNDP 2009). While in the IDP camps, the youth could not engage actively in agriculture (Angucia 2010; UNICEF 2006; MFPED 2008). The youth were forced to depend on aid from humanitarian agencies such as the World Food Programme (WFP) to sustain their lives. The government of Uganda has embarked on a number of programmes to reconstruct the war-ravaged Acholi sub-region and other war-affected areas (MFPED, 2009). One of such programmes is the Peace, Recovery and Development Plan (PRDP).4 The PRDP was approved by cabinet in 2007 and became effective in 2009; it is concerned with resettlement, reconciliation, rehabilitation and restoration of livelihoods (a shift from humanitarian assistance to development and peace-building).5 In addition, the recovery period has also drawn in other players such as national and international civil society organisations as well as multi and bilateral cooperation agencies, participating in areas of food security, infrastructure development, education, health and water.6 These on-going programmes, have not substantially changed people’s lives, and more needs to be done (OPM 2011). For example, youth labour market needs to be reintegrated with the recovery process and this remains a challenge. Despite these recovery efforts, the Acholi sub-region has the worst development indicators compared to other regions of the country (UNICEF 2006; MFED 2011). Land conlicts are rampant and youth are getting entangled with adverse consequences on their wellbeing (Odong 2012; MercyCorps 2011; Deininger and Castagnini 2004; Mwebaza 1999; CSOPNU 2004). 2 Related Literature and Objectives Labour markets for youth perform poorly in most post-conlict countries, resulting in high unemployment rates (Merito et al. 2009; Dorsey and Opeitum 2002; Mroz and Savage 2003; Bean and Mckibben 2009; Ayai 2009). In the Acholi sub-region, for example, the youth are inding it increasingly dificult to ind job opportunities (MFEDP 2011). Some writers argue that the high unemployment may have grave implications for lasting peace (Agucia 2010; Bean and Mckibben 2009; Ayai 2009; Kabani and Kothari 2006). Other critics also see that in the current recovery programmes, youths are not being mainstreamed and are not actively participating in peace-building – leaving them without sustainable livelihoods (Agucia 2010; Bean and Mckibben, 2009; OPM, 2011). Conlict affects labour supply as well as demand (Collier and Hoefler, 2006). Conlict normally has a drastic impact on human capital formation as the education infrastructure gets destroyed during conlict. For example, most of the unemployment 178 Journal of Development Studies among the youth in Acholi sub-region can be attributed to lack of human capital and conlict. The link between unemployment and conlict has been recognised. Collier and Hoefler (2000) note that conlict contributes negatively to employment as well as economic growth/recovery. Collier and Hoefler (2000) further argue that in the immediate aftermath of conlict, the risk of renewed conlict may be as high as 40-50 per cent and the probability of renewed conlict falls both with time. Immediately after conlict ends, the probability of conlict starting again is high (about 70 per cent), but the probability of renewed conlict falls due to rising standards of living. After ive years of peace, the probability of renewed conlict falls thirty percentage points. However, it is indeterminate whether the probability of inding gainful work among youth also rises. Therefore, job creation by any means, for example, through promotion of economic growth becomes an essential element of stability and peace-building. Investments in the recovery process from the private and public sectors or development partners can stimulate the demand for labour. Whilst the problem of youth unemployment could be blamed on the government’s inability to provide the requisite environment for the employment of its youths, it happens to be that most youths in the country also do not possess the necessary skills to be gainfully employed due to lack of skills that could help them be innovative and enterprising. The World Bank’s (2008) report refers to the nature of Africa’s youth demographics and recommends policies to give the continent’s youth access to stable employment. It argues that creating viable jobs for young people is a pre-condition for Africa’s poverty eradication, sustainable development, and peace; and in countries emerging from conlict, access to employment for the youth is integral to peace-building processes. Merito et al (2009) state that the labour market is an important transmission mechanism which determines overall youth’s welfare. It is the primary source of income for the youth and, therefore, a source of livelihoods and stability. A number of studies (for example, Merito, 2009 and Kapos, 2011) argue that youth unemployment is a challenge to a country’s national development. Youth unemployment can impact negatively, resulting in threats to security and apparently disturbance to the social c-existence of the people in the country. Youth gainful employment, reduces poverty and makes it less likely that conlict will reoccur. The probability of conlict falls rapidly and may be less of a concern in rich economies or in situations where peacekeeping forces are abundant. Rapid recovery of employment and livelihoods helps reduce the probability of conlict and saves on security expenditure on crime prevention. Unemployed youths get exposed to illegal and criminal activities which are not conducive to development. High rates of youth unemployment and underemployment 179 Akullo: Using University Education to Rehabilitate Former Child-Soldiers have social ramiications. Some youths with few job prospects and little hope of future advancement may see little alternative to criminal activities or joining armed conlicts as was evident in the early 1990s when Uganda saw mass recruitment of unemployed youths into various ighting factions (e.g. Allied Democratic Forces [ADF], Lord’s Resistance Army [LRA] and West Nile Bank Front [WNBF]). Recovery strategies, besides promoting development, can offer opportunities to youth through employment creation, reduction of violence, increasing security and improving the environment for a stable society. Among other goals, government programmes and private sector activities in post-conlict communities aim at building a peace economy, thus avoiding further conlict and stimulating labour participation in the development process.7 International communities, through monetary and technical assistance, can assist government to inance post-conlict recovery. As peace and security are re-established and the peace economy begins to emerge, employment opportunities among the youth increase. It is with this cognizance that this study delved into the experience of the youth in Northern Uganda in the labour market; the experience of the youth in Northern Uganda with peace-building; the experience of the youth in Northern Uganda with government programming; and the implications of the youth’s experience in the labour market for post-conlict recovery of the region. 3 Youth Experience in the Labour Market There is a high incidence of unemployment in the Acholi sub-region and the youths are grappling with a growing sense of frustration and stress. Up to 83 per cent of the respondents who are currently not enrolled in full-time education stated that they were jobless in the last one year. The incidence of unemployment among the female respondents is 51 per cent compared to 49 per cent of the male respondents. Most (78 per cent) of the youths are employed in the informal sector. Only 23.8 per cent of respondents are in self-employment. The youth sometimes earn as low as 2,000/= a day, having worked for long hours without any job security. The ive indicators of youth labour market performance included in the research tool are:8 Unemployment rate; Duration of unemployment; Underemployment; Earning level; and Conditions of work. These indicators are traditional tools in labour market analysis (Kapsos 2011; Merito et al. 2009). They are policy-loaded and they can inform policy discussion, especially monitoring and evaluation of interventions. 180 Journal of Development Studies 3.1 Unemployment Rate As mentioned above, when respondents were asked: Did you have a job in the last one year? 83.36 per cent of the respondents who are not in full-time education reported that they were jobless, only 16.64 per cent were in employment (see Figure 1). Figure 1: Percentage of Unemployment among Respondents 16.64% Employed 83.36% Unemployed 20% 0% 40% 60% 80% 100% The key issue that emerged from the study is unemployment; and respondents who are not in full-time education clearly stated that they need jobs.9 Although the problem of unemployment has received signiicant attention, and much is being done in response, the problem still persists. The inding provides a grim picture of the unemployment problem in the Acholi sub-region. It reveals high unemployment incidence, indicating that there is a large number of unemployed youths.10 The unemployment incidences between male and female make the inequities more apparent. Youth unemployment in the Acholi sub-region poses grave economic and social problems and this remains a crucial policy challenge for the government (UNDP 2011, Ayai 2006, MFEDP) 2011). This unemployment incidence is not signiicantly different from the national unemployment rate (83 per cent) (MFEDP 2011).11 Although unemployment rate is a very important indicator, it is aggregative. Figure 2 provides unemployment incidence by gender. Figure 2: Percentage of Unemployed Youths by Gender 47.06% 50.57% Female Unemployed Employed 52.94% 49.43% Male 0% 20% 40% 60% 181 80% 100% Akullo: Using University Education to Rehabilitate Former Child-Soldiers The tendency for young females to have higher incidences of unemployment igures may be due to the impact of cultural norms that prioritise male to female education. Since female youths have less formal educational attainment levels than male youths, the former have limited prospects in employment in the formal sector as compared to the male youths. They are also burdened by unpaid domestic work and children bearing which keep them out of the formal labour market. Figure 3 provides a disaggregation of the unemployment rate by district.12 Figure 3: Rate of Unemployment by District 14.80% 13.60% 25.30% Lamwo Pader Agago 31.10% 27% 29% Kitgum Nwoya Amuru 34.10% Gulu 20% 0% 60% 40% 80% 100% Figure 4 shows the incidence of unemployment by district, gender and age group. Figure 4: Rate of unemployed by district, gender and age group Lamwo 33.30% Lamwo Female 27.00% Female Agago Amuru Gulu Male Kitgum 47.20% Female 41.70% 15.00% 9.70% 15.00% 12.20% 7.30% 39.00% Age 15 - 18 Age 19 - 25 26.70% Female 12.90% 45.00% 41.50% Male 8.10% 5.50% 54.80% 25.00% 1.10% 13.90% 59.50% 22.60% Male 13.90% 60% 33.30% 11.10% 13.30% 48.90% Age 26 - 30 34.10% 34.10% Male 11.40% 27.00% 51.40% Female 30.80% Male Female Male 0% 54.50% 30.30% 48.50% 20% 40% 20.50% 19.20% 15.20% 60% Age 31 - 35 13.50% 8.10% 12.80% 35.90% 35.30% 20.50% 80% 9.10% 6.10% 100% In the study, the youth were divided into four age groups; namely, 15-18, 19-25, 2630 and 31-35.13 The age groups 15-18 and 19-25 comprise mainly of students who are generally not part of the labour force. However, it is interesting to note that the unemployment incidence for both male and female youths in the age group 15-18 and 19-25 are high, indicating that there are young people without experience or probably 182 Journal of Development Studies without formal education in the labour market. This could be those who left school early – probably because of the armed conlict. This means that the unemployed youths are likely to be school drop-outs, returnees, ex-combatants, girl child mothers, orphans and others. 3.2 Duration of Unemployment The duration of unemployment is another important indicator of the labour market. It can be either short- or long-term. According to the ILO report (2011), short-term unemployment is when one is unemployed for less than a year, whereas long-term unemployment is for a year or more. There was a large number of respondents who were not in full-time education and did not have a job for more than one year. Up to 65 per cent of the respondents stated they had been without employment for more than one year. Importantly, long-term unemployment increases the dificulty of re-entry into the workforce, especially in the formal sector (Merito et al. 2009; Kapos 2011). Because early work experience is very important and yields high returns, lack of access to work for long a long period reduces human capital accumulation. 3.3 Underemployment Underemployment is another indicator of labour market performance. Underemployment means doing work for which one is over- or under-qualiied (Merito 2009). In the survey, only 35.5 per cent of the respondents reported that they have the right skills for the job they are doing, 45.7 per cent of the respondents are under-qualiied and 11.7 per cent of the respondents are over-qualiied with 6.9 per cent of the respondents with no formal skills at all. The challenge of underemployment featured in the FGD with unemployed graduates who live in Gulu Town:14 Sometimes I do the work of a doctor(A nurse at Awach Health Centre). I have a degree in Bachelor of Business Administration (BBA), but now I am working as a driver (FGD with unemployed graduate in Gulu Town). Literature indicates that under-qualiied youths are unproductive, ineficient or ineffective (Merito, 2009; Kabani and Kothari, 2005). Underemployment reduces productivity of the youth and increases redundancy when one does a job for which one is not qualiied. The loss of human capital that occurs when graduates take lower skilled employment is enormous — loss of relevant work experience, lower wages, and delay in upward climb (Khan, 2009). This is erosion to labour market potential — low productivity, lower earnings, lower output, and displacement of low skilled with less education (Elwood, 1982). Low wages delay return for further education for which many youths are yearning. 183 Akullo: Using University Education to Rehabilitate Former Child-Soldiers 3.4 Level of Earnings The level of earning is an important indicator in the labour market performance. The inding is that youths, especially those working in the informal sector, are being paid ridiculously low salaries/wages. The survey shows that most Acholi youths are being exploited through low pay and long hours of work. 99.7 per cent of respondents earn less than Shs.500,000/= per month. Earnings must be commensurate with the level of education and work done to avoid exploitation. 3.4.1 Contract Contract is an indicator of labour market performance. Job insecurity is the situation where one can lose a job instantly without fair hearing, especially when a worker does not have a contract (Merito et al 2009; Elwood 1982). The study reveals that young people, especially those working in the informal sector do not know their rights as they often work without contracts and under very low pay and poor work conditions. Overall, 51.5 per cent of female respondents said yes and 48.5 per cent of male said no when asked whether they know they should have contract or not. In addition, only 6.3 per cent had contract and 93.75 per cent were without contract. A higher percentage of female respondents (61.8 per cent) compared to 48.2 per cent of male respondents did not have a contract. Young people working in the informal sector did not seem to be fully aware of their labour rights as deined in existing labour legislation and rules and, therefore, are not likely to pursue legal action against their employers. Likewise, employers did not appear to be aware of the existing guidelines for operating their business. Employees did not have access to information on their labour rights as speciied by these guidelines. 3.4.2 Risks Many youths in the FGD stated that they were frustrated, stressed and demoralised after failing to secure employment. Most of them had resigned from productive life and turned to alcoholism, drug abuse and prostitution. It is common to ind youths in urban and preurban areas playing cards or drinking alcohol instead of being in gainful employment.15 Idleness, alcoholism, prostitutions and other criminal activities are evident among some youths. Among young female, lack of employment opportunities have encouraged prostitution as a means of survival.16 Many people blame this on poverty and the twodecade civil war that saw millions herded in IDP camps – leading to moral decadence and cultural interruption.17 The youth are being exploited as they work for long hours of work from 8:00 am to midnight. Another related typical example is the sexual exploitation of barmaids. 184 Journal of Development Studies Most youths work without contracts especially in the informal sector. For example, some youths who trained in the construction sector decry cheating contractors that do not even pay them for jobs done and justice does not come their way. They are bitter and have lost motivation in their jobs. 3.5 Drivers of Unemployment The drivers of unemployment are explored in this section; namely, lack of education/ skills, lack of opportunities, rural-urban migration, slow growth of the economy, and youth’s attitudes toward agriculture and self-employment. 3.5.1 Lack of Education A key determinant of unemployment in the labour market is education; it enhances employment (Merito, 2009, Merito, et al., 2009; Kapsos, 2011; LMIS, 2006; Ali, 2011; Muir 2003). Low quality and inappropriate formal education, coupled with high dropouts, low access to education and failure to orient education to the needs of the labour markets have disadvantaged Acholi youths (Angucia, 2010). A rapidly increasing informal sector has become the avenue for absorbing formally uneducated and educated youth as well. FGDs indicated that many youths have left school early either because of lack of school fees or conlict and they have to work and fend for themselves.18 Figure 5 indicates more unemployment among the lowly qualiied youth. Figure 5: Percentage of Respondents Unemployed by Level of Education 4.20% University 0.40% Diploma 5.50% A level 31.80% O level 54.10% Primary 4.00% Vocational 0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100% Most jobs in the country typically require at least a secondary (‘O’ and ‘A’ level) or university level degree.19 There is a very high correlation of 0.82 per cent. Although it is beyond the scope of this paper, it would be of interest to rigorously test the hypothesis that those with little formal education have remote chances of being employed using regression analysis. In the survey, 65 per cent of respondents (currently in education) reported that they are not satisied with the quality of education. The truth is that the youth are not receiving 185 Akullo: Using University Education to Rehabilitate Former Child-Soldiers useful labour market skills to access the limited jobs available and worst still there are inappropriate school curricula, resulting in poor education quality.20 In sum, the human capital base of the youth in Acholi is low and this has resulted into high unemployment rate and they are mainly employed in low-skilled and low-paying jobs available in the informal sector. 3.5.2 Lack of Opportunities Most youths who are unemployed are being held back by lack of opportunities rather than by the lack of desire to work: “We want to work but cannot ind employment.” (FGD with male youths). Real job opportunities can only come from the growth of the economy which is currently not enough to offset the excess supply in the labour market. Unfortunately, the prospect of job creation remains bleak. High population growth rate (3.2 per cent per annum), slow growth of the economy (6 per cent on average), and excess supply of labour relative to demand, limited job creation capacity in the private, public and NGO sectors and rapid rural-urban migration reduce opportunities in the labour market. 3.5.3 Rural-urban Migration Rural-urban migration is the driver for urban unemployment. A good number of those who migrate, end up in the informal sector in urban areas, thus swelling urban unemployment. Characteristics of the urban informal sector include, low skill, low productivity, selfemployment, petty economic activities such as roadside sales. Migration increases supply of unskilled labour in the urban areas where demand is limited in the formal sector.21 I moved to Gulu ive years ago to look for employment, but I have not found one yet. I do odd jobs here and there when available. We sit by the roadside to wait for someone to pick us up. (FGD with male youths in Cereleno, Gulu Town) Conlict, more than employment, was responsible for the migration: 28.1 per cent of respondents stated that they migrated to town to seek employment; 33.6 per cent of the respondents ran away from conlict; and 10.2 per cent of the respondents migrated to enjoy amenities available in towns. Other reasons for migration mentioned included loss of land or loss of access to other livelihood resources. 186 Journal of Development Studies 3.6 Policy Responses to Unemployment 3.6.1 Formal Education FGDs revealed that education is a critical driver of employment, but often out of reach for some youths in Acholi.22 This conirms the role of education in employability of the youth. International evidence shows that job seekers rarely receive useful market skills (Elwood 1982; Merito et al., 2009). Despite the recognition of low education as a key barrier to access jobs, none of these categories of youths has signiicant improvement in formal education. In the survey, 60 per cent of respondents were not satisied with the quality of education they were receiving. The government should, therefore, offer quality education to respond to labour market needs. 3.6.2 Self-Employment I am on my own, but things are not easy. I would not abandon my welding business to look for another job. I cannot expand my business because I lack money, tools and the space is not enough. (FGD with male youths in Kitgum) Government should help us with money to start or expand our business. (FGD with male business owners in Gulu) One way to empower the youth is through entrepreneurship. The challenge is that only a small percentage of youth are in self-employment and they are mainly the formally uneducated youths. The survey discovered that self-employment is not a very popular choice of occupation among Acholi youths, where only a 23.8 per cent of respondents are self-employed. A comparison of self-employment by gender is more or less equal among male and female youths – 23.7 per cent and 22.4 per cent respondents, respectively. Self-employment is a last resort for most youths when they fail to get jobs elsewhere (68 per cent of respondents). Youth preference is for paid employment rather than selfemployment. But there is high readiness for youths to take on self-employment sector, provided there is some assistance from government. Although a number of youths expressed the desire to do business rather than wait for jobs which do not exist, they face several constraints in self-employment. Lack of capital has been singled out as the most important obstacle (19.8 per cent of respondents), followed by lack of business skills (5.72 per cent of the respondents), and high interest rate (3.21 per cent of the respondents). The government has taken steps to address the problem of lack of capital. For example, in the 2011/2012 national budget, government set up the Youth Venture Capital Fund of Shs.25.5 billion as loan for the youth. The loan, however, comes with 187 Akullo: Using University Education to Rehabilitate Former Child-Soldiers conditions. For example, intended beneiciaries should have “O” level certiicate, undergone some form of business training and must be below 30 years old. The youth member of parliament for Northern Uganda indicated that the loan was discriminatory as only formally educated youths would access it. It is important to note the gender dynamics in self-employment. With the limited opportunities in the formal sector, the majority of young females are employed in the informal sector as petty traders in the market and along the streets, house helpers, hairdressers, shop attendants and dressmakers. Women income has implications as they are the one who contribute to family welfare. Female youths should be targeted when formulating policies for self-employment. Creation of market facilities is necessary since most female youths are traders. 3.6.3 Vocational Training Most uneducated youths expressed the need for vocational training. The Director of Youth Affairs in the Ministry of Gender, Labour and Social Development stated that, “Vocational institutions should move away from traditional courses such as brick-laying to electronics such as computer repairs.” The Director raised interesting issues: labour market saturation and competiveness. 3.6.4 Agriculture Agriculture is the main employer of youths. Almost 90 per cent of the respondents who were employed were involved in agriculture. The survey indicates that agriculture is the occupational choice of youths – 76 per cent of the female respondents compared to 52.2 per cent of the male respondents. In contrast, the distribution of youths in other occupations is as follows: NGOs/CBOs 2.7 per cent of male respondents compared to 2.1 per cent of female respondents; security forces 4.2 per cent of male respondents compared to 3.7per cent of female respondents; and non-professional/casual sector, 18.7 per cent of male respondents compared to 18.6 per cent of female respondents. Notably, there is more involvement of female youths in agriculture. Government and other stakeholders must scale-up effort to respond to agriculture. Despite the increasing role of agriculture as the employer of youth, youths are experiencing several constraints in their pursuit of agriculture; this is being undermined by many factors such as land wrangles, lack of tools, poor quality seeds, inadequate storage facilities, distant markets and poor roads. In the survey, 90 per cent of respondents stated that they use hand hoes. Productivity must be increased, as youths demanded in FGDs, through the use of tractors and other inputs.23 The LC V Chairperson of Gulu District lamented: 188 Journal of Development Studies Policy makers should make agriculture attractive. It is regarded as occupation for the uneducated and for those who have failed in life. Even those who specialise in agriculture prefer to work in ofices rather than in the ields. The prospect of food insecurity looms high as youths leave the villages for towns. Government has taken agricultural development initiative through the National Agricultural Advisory Services (NAADS) beneiting some youths. 4 Youth and Peace-building An indicator used for the assessment of youth involvement in peace-building is membership of youth associations/clubs. When respondents were asked: Are you a member of any peace club? The inding shows that very few youths belong to peace clubs. The percentage of male membership to youth organisations (45.8 per cent) is higher than the female one (25.6 per cent). Youths who are not involved in any youth association/clubs by district are thus represented: Agago 61.5 per cent, Amuru 65.2 per cent, Gulu 64.4 per cent, Kitgum 59.6 per cent, Lamwo, 72.3 per cent, Nwoya 61.4 per cent, and Pader, 65.8 per cent. The survey found out that only 18.6 per cent of male respondents and 38.6 per cent of female respondents are actively involved in youth organisations hence female youths are more represented probably because of afirmative action that favours them during postconlict situations. Peace-building is a broad term but essentially it should be understood as interaction between processes of building human security, justice and development, especially after a conlict situation (Kabahesi 2009).24 A FGD with female students at Kitgum High School indicated that peace-building clubs have great potential in schools. “Without trust, how can the broken social fabrics be mended? The society needs love, respect, truthfulness, peacefulness, caring, justice, reconciliation, forgiveness, good neighbourliness and humility,” noted a student. Social capital is needed for social, economic and political transformation. 189 Akullo: Using University Education to Rehabilitate Former Child-Soldiers Not involved in youth associations/clubs Figure 6: Percentage of Respondents not involved in Associations 61.50% Agago Pader 65.80% Nwoya 61.40% Lamwo 72.30% Kitgum 59.60% Gulu 64.40% 65.20% Amuru 0% 40% 20% 60% 80% 100% Being in the social network is important since through social networks one can build social capital. Lack of social capital has been exacerbated by war. As a result of their participation and/ or victimisation in the war, the youths may be suspicious and have grudges that may keep them from socialising with others. At the moment, Acholi subregion is a less supportive environment for the creation of social capital as there is limited societal cohesiveness. When youths do not participate in youth associations, it means that they are missing social capital–an important ingredient of development–and it makes them vulnerable. There are over 100 youth organisations registered in Gulu District, but they are inactive. They are strategically formed to tap inancial resources from funding agencies (Gulu LC V Chairman). Most of the over 100 youth organisations in Gulu District alone, which are now redundant, were geared towards peace-building and their intentions, missions and visions were good. These were registered organisations but have closed down. One can only conclude that they were being driven by possible monetary gain. Consequently, very few youths belong to associations, clubs or youth organisations as the indings have indicated. 5 Youth and Government Programming Only 40.7 per cent of male respondents are involved in the development planning meetings compared to 71.2 per cent of female respondents, hence female participation is higher than that of male. Figure 7 provides the percentage of attendance of development planning meetings by district. 190 Journal of Development Studies Figure 7: Respondents attending development planning meetings Attendance of development planning meetings Agago 37.20% 50.60% Pader 48.20% Nwoya Lamwo 45.80% Kitgum 43.60% Gulu 41.50% Amuru 39.60% 0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100% The indicator used to assess youth involvement in government programming is the attendance of development planning meetings. The indings indicate that relatively few Acholi youths attend development planning meetings. Accordingly, they miss the opportunity to improve their welfare and, in the long-term, they may be vulnerable, since they exclude themselves from decision-making. The youths cited the following reasons for shunning the development planning meetings: Attending meetings is a waste of time, there is nothing good that comes out of it (FGD female youths, Pader Town Council). I do not see any results from the parish development meetings I have been attending and I have stopped attending. (Male youth in Alero, Nwoya District) Engaging the youth in development planning meetings is important since they are proactive change drivers. Such meetings help to enhance security in the early part of the recovery period; build capacity through technical; and inancial support; and to monitor government development programmes and their effective implementation. In Acholi, there are development planning meetings such as parish development meetings and youth participation in them is crucial.25 The activity of development planning meetings is directly linked to lack of progress in society which may engender poverty, unemployment and unhealthy living environment, including family instability. The Acholi sub-region is in dire need for development planning. 191 Akullo: Using University Education to Rehabilitate Former Child-Soldiers 6 Implications of Youth Unemployment for Post-Conlict Recovery Any labour market with the above attributes can be described as distressful and can have grave implications to recovery some of which are discussed below: 1. 2. 3. 4. As the inding shows, in a post-conlict setting such as in the Acholi sub-region, targeting the youth labour market has generally not been the highest priority, at least in the immediate phase. In fact, in the post-conlict situation, the immediate concern has been the restoration of security rather than employment creation. The labour market is now sending the signal of violence, crimes and other anti-social behaviours which are not conducive for the recovery process. The youth labour market has not generated conidence in the youth to pursue peacebuilding as a crucial ingredient of recovery. How can the labour market conditions be improved to provide youth with opportunities to engage in peace-building? This is a crucial question for peace-building practitioners that seek innovative avenues for promoting peace. It is also a key concern for development practitioners that ind themselves operating in the midst or aftermath of conlict. Notably, sensitisation on peace is missing, although security has been emphasised. The funding for peace initiatives should be streamlined and targeting vulnerable groups such as the youth and women. Broadcasting peace- and reconciliation-related issues, including amnesty on the local radios in the local languages will ensure that the local communities clearly internalise the issues, support, and own them. Distressful labour market such as the one in the Acholi sub-region requires positive interventions in term of employment policies. Notably, the PRDP is not youthspeciic and government and other stakeholders must scale-up efforts to respond to youth dynamics in order to maximise the potential of the youth in the reconstruction of the region by improving the eficiency of the youth labour market through the public programmes. Good programming must be based on the needs of the labour market, involving job training, job creation, political participation, sports and recreation, education, leadership and health training.26 Government programming should normally be seen as a means of empowering the youth. Currently, the youth feel they are deliberately excluded from government programmes such as NAADS and NUSAF; pinpointing corruption, nepotism and political afiliations as the factors for exclusion. These issues interfere with labour market performance. Therefore, issues such as corruption should be addressed urgently if the youth are to beneit from government programming. The labour market has failed to provide the means of livelihoods to the youth. Access to livelihood is one of the most important approaches to recovery and fostering sustainable development. Efforts by the government, local and international NGOs 192 Journal of Development Studies to assist youth in peace-building work, access to livelihoods and sustainable development have tended to be opportunistic, uncoordinated, ad hoc and less effective. References Angucia, M. (2010). Broken Citizenship: Formerly abducted children and their social reintegration in Northern Uganda. Amsterdam: Roenberg Publishers, The Netherlands. Ayai, O. C. (2006). Uganda Economy. Kampala: Ugacol Publications. Ayai, O. C. (2009). Causes of the Northern Uganda armed conlict: A probity analysis. Africa Peace and Conlict Journal. Vol. 2. No.2. 72-85. Bean, J., Gareth, M. (2009). Labour market analysis: Amuru, Gulu, Kitgum and Pader. Gulu and Kampala. Kampala: IOM. Branch, A. (2008). Gulu Town in war and Peace? Displacement, Humanitarianism and PostWar Crisis. London: DESTIN Development Studies Institute. Civil Society for Peace in Northern Uganda (2004). Land Matters in Displacement: The Importance of Land Rights in Acholiland and What Threatens Them. Civil Society for Peace in Northern Uganda/Land and Equity Movement. Kampala: Author. Dorsey, J., Steven, O. (2002). The net economic cost of the conlict in Acholiland sub-region of Uganda. Unpublished study commissioned by the Civil Society for Peace in Northern Uganda. Gersony, R. (1997). The anguish of northern Uganda: Results of a ield-based assessment of the civil conlict in northern Uganda. Unpublished report for USAID, Kampala. International Labour Organisation (2006). Youth Employment Programmes. Geneva: ILO. Kabahesi, P. (2009). An exploration of peace-building challenges faced by Acholi women in Gulu, Northern Uganda. Unpublished Masters dissertation. Nelson Mandela Metropolitan University. Kabani, N., Ektha, K. (2005). Youth employment in the MENA region. SP Discussion Paper No. 0354. Washington. DC: World Bank. Mercy Corps (2011). Land disputes in Acholiland: A conlict and Market Assessment. Author. Mercy Corps (2004). Incidence and impact of land conlict in Uganda. Unpublished World Bank Policy Research Working Paper. Merito, G. et al. (2009). Youth in Africa’s labour market. Washington D.C. The World Bank. Ministry of Finance and Economic Development (2010). Poverty Eradication Action Plan. Entebbe: Uganda Government Printer. Ministry of Finance and Economic Development (2010). Background to the Budget Speech. Entebbe: Uganda Government Printer. Mroz, T. A., Timothy, H. S. (2003). The long-term effect of youth unemployment. Unpublished thesis. Department of economics, University of North Carolina. 193 Akullo: Using University Education to Rehabilitate Former Child-Soldiers Mwebaza, R. (1999). How to Integrate Statutory and Customary Tenure? The Uganda Case. Paper presented at the DFID workshop on Land Rights and Sustainable Development in sub-Saharan Africa at Sunning dale Park Conference Centre, Berkshire, UK on 16th –19th February 1999. Odong, J. (2012). Land conlicts in the new districts of Acholi sub-region. Unpublished. Pham, P. et al. (2007). When the war ends: A population-based survey on attitudes about peace, justice and social reconstruction in Northern Uganda. San Francisco: Centre for international development and human rights, University of California. Uganda Bureau of Statistics. (2011). Statistical Abstract. Entebbe: Uganda Government Printer. Uganda AIDS Commission (2000). The national strategic framework for HIV/AIDS activities in Uganda. Entebbe: Uganda Government Printer. United Nations Development Programmes (2006). Youth and violent conlict: Society and Development Crisis. New York: UNDP. UNICEF (2006). The state of youth and youth protection in Uganda. New York: UNDP. World Bank (2008). Youth and Unemployment in Africa: The Potential, the Problem, the Promise. Washington DC: World Bank. Notes 1 This paper comes out of a broader Research Project that I conducted with a colleague, Stephen Langole, under the auspices of United Nations Resident Coordinator Ofice in Gulu. My colleague and I beneited from having worked closely with many other people whom I am unable to mention by name. I sincerely thank United Nations Development Programmes for inancing the project. I particularly wish to pay tribute to the anonymous person who reviewed the irst draft of this paper for a job well done. Any error of omissions or commissions is solely my responsibility. This conlict was started in 1986 when Yoweri Museveni, the current President of Uganda, who forcefully took power. Since that time various groups emerged to ight against the government including the LRA. 2 3 It is however hard to put a igure on the unemployment rate in the Acholi sub-region. During the conlict before 2007, other programmes implemented included NUSAF 1, PEAP, NURP, however they were not effective. 4 5 During the war humanitarian assistance was the main activity, providing food aid. 6 A lot of NGOs and development wings of various governments such as JICA, USAID, DFID are implementing various programmes in the region. 7 See PRDP 194 Journal of Development Studies 8 See, for example, Morito Gracius, et al 2009. 9 An extensive literature analyses youth labour market in developing countries (Merito et al, 2009; Kapsos, 2011; LMNS, 2006; Ali, 2011; Muir, 2003; Ayai, 2005). All these authors address issues of employment and unemployment in developing countries like Uganda. 10 A crude comparison of our unemployment situation in Acholi can be made with Liberia which has experienced war and is implementing recovery programmes like in Acholi. According to the study by a group of economists from the World Bank Liberia has youth unemployment rate of 68% of youth between 15-24 years out of the population of about 3 million people. The way unemployment rate is measured is quite different from the quantitative results of the potential unemployment based on the perception of only surveyed vulnerable youth. 11 12 In the study, districts were broken further into urban, rural urbanizing centres and preurban areas. For example, in the pre-urban areas, in the age group 31-35, 17% male 24% female; 26-30, 14% male and 19% female; 19-25, 40% male, 45% female and 15-18 29% male and 22% female. Furthermore, within each age group the unemployment rate can be broken down by gender. For example, the female unemployment incidence is higher than male unemployment in some age groups especially age groups 15-18 and 19-25. The highest rate of female unemployment is in the age group 19-26 and the lowest in the age group 31-35. For male youth the highest unemployment incidence is also in the same age group 19-26 and the lowest in the age group 31-35 as well. 13 14 The underemployment challenge has also been recognised by many labour economists such as Merito et al, 2009; Kapsos, 2011; Lmis, 2006; Ali, 2011; Muir, 2003; Ayai, 2005). 15 This is from personal observations and discussion with the district leadership. 16 Others think that police should put curfew in places where sex trade lourishes. 17 Some people suggest that the elders should do more to impart acceptable cultural traditions and norms to check immorality. Early entry means you are below the statutory age of 18 years and you are not considered to be a member of the labour force. 18 Many labour economists (Merito, et al 2009; Kapsos, 2011; Lmis, 2006, Ali, 2011, Muir, 2003) further conirm the role of education in the employment of youth in Sub-Saharan Africa. There is normally a strong correlation between employment and education or human capital. 19 So commentators have complained about the quality of education in the country especially in the UPE schools. 20 21 See Michael. P. Todaro. 2005. Economics of Developing countries, London: McMillan. 195 Akullo: Using University Education to Rehabilitate Former Child-Soldiers See Merito Garcia, et al. 2008. Youth in Africa’s labour market. Washington DC: The World Bank. 22 23 Commercialization is the strategy being used to make agriculture attractive. See Veronique Dudouet. 2012. “From combatants to peace builders: A case for inclusive, participatory, and holistic security transitions” A policy report. Berghof Foundation, 24 25 See Development Plans for various districts. 26 Many papers argue that programming should be multi-faceted. 196 Journal of Development Studies 3 (2) (2013) 197 - 214 Using University Education to Capture Opportunities Lost through Child Soldiering Eunice Akullo Abstract: This study delves into the involvement of children in war as soldiers and ways in which higher education programmes are being used to rehabilitate former child soldiers and help them to redeem opportunities that they lost due to their involvement in war. Speciic attention is paid to the career paths that these children choose and the challenges that their experience as soldiers impose on these choices. Using the case of Nkumba University, the study demonstrates that higher education programmes can be used to help former child soldiers to redeem opportunities that they lost due to their involvement in war. However, it adds that for higher education institutions to help former child soldiers to redeem opportunities that they lost due to their involvement in war, they need to ensure that the former child soldiers are given career guidance and counselling services – aimed at meeting their psychosocial needs. Keywords: Child Soldiers; Rehabilitation; Higher Education 1 Introduction One of the main issues in most protracted civil wars in Africa has been the involvement of children in combat. Boys and girls are recruited by both governments and rebel forces during wars. They are recruited either voluntarily or forcefully to serve in the military of state or non-state actors (Coalition to stop the use of child soldiers, 2004). Olara Otunnu, a former UN special representative of the UN Secretary General for children in armed conlict reported in an interview with African Recovery (Oct, 2001) that despite the condemnation of the use of children in war by the United Nations, a number of them are recruited because of ideological reasons, the absence of viable alternatives with a collapsed socioeconomic context where education and family are disrupted. Akullo: Using University Education to Rehabilitate Former Child-Soldiers The region of Northern Uganda and her neighbours who have been affected by armed conlict such as South Sudan and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) can attest to the recruitment and use of child soldiers. These wars have had cross-border spill-over effects in terms of displacement and in some cases militias have had partial support and bases on the neighbouring side of the borders of their countries of origin, thus leading to the recruitment of children among the communities of the host country. Literature on child soldiers shows that most of such children are conscripted when they are as young as seven years of age. According to Africa Recovery (Oct, 2001), this is a period in their life when they are supposed to be pursuing basic primary and secondary education. Nkumba University is located in Wakiso District (Uganda). The university offers a number of courses in business, social sciences, sciences, art and law. There are a number of international students enrolled in various courses at the university. Some of the international students are former child soldiers. Understanding what such children make out of ‘lost opportunities’ and how they strive to redeem the losses is vital for the reconstruction and peace-building processes so as to prevent re-recruitment as well as enable the personal development of this category of students. Their successful reintegration into the society ensures that they participate along with other community members in post-conlict reconstruction of their communities. Given the weak or absence of career development opportunities in some of the waraffected countries in Africa, options for career choice and development are generally limited for most ordinary children. They are even far less for the former child soldiers in light of their soldiering experience. This research explains how former child soldiers make use of higher education as a way of redeeming lost opportunities with the aim that life after education will be a better one and enable them to compete equally with their counterparts who did not go through similar experiences. The methodology adopted an exploratory design and used a qualitative research method. Phenomenology (adapted from constructivist perspective and inductive approach to reasoning) was the basis of the study design given the nature of the research that sought to capture the lived experiences and meanings constructed by the respondents (Groenewald; April, 2004). Semi-structured questionnaires were distributed and completed by those who were not willing to be interviewed. Those interviewed provided the information based on questions that appeared in the questionnaire. The researcher identiied possible respondents. Having an idea of a few of them, snowball sampling was adapted; the few respondents who were identiied in class were used to identify and incorporate other qualifying respondents into the study. The researcher targeted prospective respondents from countries that had witnessed the use of child soldiers in 198 Journal of Development Studies armed conlicts and where child soldiers have been used; these included South Sudan, Rwanda, the DRC, Uganda and Burundi. However, 1 Ugandan and 13 South Sudanese were identiied as the prospective respondents to constitute the sample that was used in the study. This does not mean that there are totally no other former child soldiers from these other countries. It may actually mean that in case they are at the university, they are for one reason or another not easily identiied as former child soldiers. Only 11 out of the 14 identiied participated in the research. The sample size was, therefore, small because of the total number that could be reached. This may imply that of the many former child soldiers that have continued with education, many of them have either not continued to university or few have done so in South Sudan and neighbouring countries. The objectives of the study were to: 1) establish whether former child soldiers use university education to achieve their full potential despite lost opportunities through soldiering; and 2) ind out if university education serves as an avenue through which the needs of former child soldiers are met. 2 History and Meaning of Child Soldiers The use of child soldiers in Africa appears to be a very modern post-colonial practice. Pre-colonial African societies ushered children into adulthood through various cultural rights and no child was allowed to become a warrior (Furley 1995). Perceptions of who qualiies to be a child and who does not, is also very controversial. This creates a paradox between legal qualiications and traditional/cultural qualiications of childhood. Depending on who qualiies to be considered as a child, participation in combat for one reason or another becomes acceptable or otherwise. In 1998, the UN Security Council condemned the use and abuse of children in armed conlicts and yet the practice has continued in many armed conlict areas. In 2000, a United Nations Security Council Resolution S/2000/201 was passed and it deined a child soldier as: Any person under 18 years of age who forms part of an armed force in any capacity and those accompanying such groups, other than purely as family members, as well as girls recruited for sexual purposes and forced marriage. Concern, therefore, arises as to where the challenge in successfully implementing the various legislative provisions lies. There are a number of legislative provisions that are in existence to protect the recruitment and use of children in war. Some of the legislative provisions that condemn the use of child soldiers include the II Optional Protocol to the Geneva Convention (Articles 1, 2 and 4[3.c]); the International Labour Organisation Convention 182 (Article.3 [a]); the UN Security Council Resolutions 1261 and 1314, the 199 Akullo: Using University Education to Rehabilitate Former Child-Soldiers OAU/AU Charter (Articles 2, 15[1] and 22[2]); and the Maputo Declaration (Articles 1and 6). These provisions elaborate on all prohibited actions against children from recruitment to involvement in war. These are known and yet the use of children in war has continued with the spread of armed conlicts. 2.1 Involvement of Children as Child Soldiers and Life after War Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers (2004), categorises three different means of recruitment, through which people become members of armed forces or armed groups: compulsory, voluntary, and forcible (or forced).The fact remains that despite the form of recruitment, the children are deprived of their rights as children since they are made to perform tasks that are unsuited for their age among the armed forces. Somasundaram (2000) categorises the reasons for recruitment into push-and-pull factors – push factors being conditions within society that prompt children to join armed forces such as poverty, insecurity, broken families and social structures among others. Pull factors, on the other hand, are characteristically those factors that are existent on the side of the armed forces that pull the children such as a hope of survival, a hope for community, or a possible place of refuge. Brett and Specht (2004) have also explained the recruitment and use of child soldier by force or voluntarily. Following the end of conlict, it is necessary that former child soldiers become part and parcel of reconstruction and rehabilitation programmes. Many former combatants undergo DDR processes before they can embark on civilian life. This is according to Odeh and Sullivan (no date provided). Singer (2005) notes that the aftermath of the war on children needs to be dealt with partly as a way of laying groundwork to avert future conlicts in society and reduce chances of future recruitment. He further observes that: The worst legacy of the child soldier experience is that it never ends, shaping the child’s development and later childhood. As such, the inal element in any reintegration programme must be sustained follow-up activities… [there] should be a programme to collect systematic data about the circumstances and conditions of the ex-child soldier, which will be useful to both future policy and research. As part of rehabilitation of former combatants, Africa Recovery (Oct, 2001) points out that the provision of education and an opportunity for income are the best ways in which a child can be supported. Brett and Specht (2004) also argue that education is expected to lead to employment or provide other economically productive activities. They emphasise the need for interventions that are backed by activities that encourage trust and development of a society that has healthy social values. 200 Journal of Development Studies Rehabilitation of former child soldiers includes providing psycho-social as well as material support to them in preparation for re-integration into society. Rehabilitation is then followed by the reintegration of these children into their former communities and uniting them with family/kin. It is at this point that the former child soldiers can then choose what form of life and career they want to pursue. Some may continue with military-related careers whereas others may opt for careers that have nothing to do with a life that reminds them of the life experiences they endured as child soldiers. 2.2 Rationale for Education As a Means of Post-Conlict Rehabilitation and Reconstruction One of the approaches to human development is the basic needs approach. It emphasises the need for meeting people’s basic needs if they are to achieve their full potential. Education is one of the needs that human beings have that is vital for the attainment of the highest human potential. When this need is met, it is possible for the beneiciary to use education to engage in many other employable opportunities. Education offers knowledge and skills, which would eventually lead to the attainment of other needs like better standards of living. From a human development perspective, this study picks education/literacy as an indicator that is suitable for the achievement of a better standard of living and the possibility of expanded people’s choices following their graduation. Education and vocational training offers the beneiciaries with knowledge and skills that they can make use of to engage in various livelihoods with the aim of living a descent life and meeting their human needs. Becker (2002) advocates alternatives to military service for former combatants and notes that the lack of access to education or vocational training leads to higher chances of children returning to military service. The perspective, therefore, presumes that such education or vocational training will alter the career paths and options for livelihoods for the former child soldiers and prevent recourse to the life that they previously lived. The Australian Learning and Teaching Council -ALTC (June 2009) deines career development as: …the overarching term pertaining to deliberate activities that goes toward the improvement of an individual’s career, including securing effective transitions from higher education into work life beyond university. - In conceptualising career development, the above article notes that in 1959, John Holland also developed the career typology which relates career choice to needs and job satisfaction. Two major theories comprise this typology: the trait-factor theory in which people are believed to pick careers/jobs that match their personality traits; and the social learning theory that asserts that career choice is linked to people’s experiences with 201 Akullo: Using University Education to Rehabilitate Former Child-Soldiers other people, events and institutions. This research was premised on the social learning because the researcher aimed at establishing how former child soldiers at the university are using education to tow career paths that will enable them to meet their current needs that are partly linked to lost opportunities from child soldiering. Generally, career choice and development is not a one-time event in as much as it involves more than work. It is a process that requires continuous evaluation and re-evaluation. Using a reductionist methodology, Brett and Specht (2004) study why young soldiers chose to ight. The study, which included the aspect of formal and vocational education, was conducted in South Africa and Northern Ireland. Education is looked at in light of facilitating or mitigating conlicts through its curricula activities, language and employment opportunities it offers thereafter. They argue that schools are often battlegrounds for hearts and minds of the next generation. They also note that education needs to be responsive to the demands of the labour market. According to these authors, all countries emerging from conlict always ind it a challenge to adjust their education and vocational training to the new demands. Graduates are demotivated and frustrated by the lack of employment after education. They acknowledge the support that these former soldiers require to make use of schooling. This requires quality education and the need to take note of current and future prospects Annan and Blattman’s (2006) study on Northern Uganda compares former child soldiers with their peers who were not associated with ighting forces, and found out that there is an inevitable gap in education which widens further with the length of years that the former would have spent ighting. The process of bridging the gap (catching-up) in education, following DDR, requires deliberate efforts by the concerned stakeholders, particularly government which has the highest mandate in guaranteeing the success of DDR and preventing future recruitment. Such efforts that offer vital career guidance and counselling would prepare them for various career opportunities that they can pursue as they start new lives. In the case of countries like South Sudan where the education system was greatly disrupted with the decades of war, the condition may be similar to or worse than that of Northern Uganda. Heartland Alliance International (2012) highlights a number of psycho-social and economic challenges that ex-soldiers continue to face when they leave the forces. The experience of these ex-soldiers is similar to what many other child soldiers face. A partnership was created between the Professional Psychological Counselling Centre (PPCC) of Batticaloa Heartland in eastern Sri Lanka, which implements a 3-year vocational training programme for former child soldiers. Educational training needs to be tailored in a manner that addresses the psycho-social effects of the former child 202 Journal of Development Studies soldiers. This would enable them cope with their new lives and avoid recourse to the military. Singer (2005) explains that the beginning of any rehabilitation process involves building an understanding of the situations children have been placed in (in a sense gaining a better idea of the “clients” of the process). This research postulates that a number of former combatants study courses at university with the aim of pursuing careers after schooling and in one way or another be able to address the lost opportunities through soldiering. However, their lived experiences may cause them to shun or opt for certain career paths. Meaningful post-conlict rehabilitation of former child soldiers necessitates that we understand their interpretation of their lived experiences and how that affects their current and prospective options in life. 3 Recruitment into and Exit from Child Soldiering By the time of the research, the majority of the respondents were in their second and third years of study and were between the ages of twenty-two to thirty-three. This is different from the average university entrance to undergraduate programmes, which is normally between eighteen and twenty years. The difference is that the unique experience of these former child soldiers may sometimes pose some learning challenges to them that their younger counterparts do not face. They were asked for the age at which they were recruited as child soldiers and when they left the life of a combatant. It was observed that they mainly joined between the aged of 8 and 14 years. This attests to the observations of Olara Otunnu in African Recovery (Oct, 2001) and it was a clear breach of their rights as children, given the UN Security Council Resolution No S/2000/201 of February 2000, which deines a child as anyone 18 years and below. For some respondents, recruitment was possible due to the breakdown in the social and institutional fabric of society. Some of the explanations given include the following: There was forced recruitment in the army that Sudan People’s Liberation Army pronounced through the commander-in-chief, that all boys from 10 years old must go and attend military training in Bilpam in Ethiopia. (30-year-old South Sudanese) When I was in Gulu, in St. Joseph Layibi, the LRA stormed our school. It was in 1998, on a Saturday by 12 am. They abducted most of our students. I happened to be one of them. (32-year-old Ugandan) There was no head of the family and this made us vulnerable to forceful conscription into the forces. And because schools had been closed and people had been displaced from 203 Akullo: Using University Education to Rehabilitate Former Child-Soldiers the towns to the villages, there was no place to turn to for shelter. This made it easy for children to be recruited. (22–year-old South Sudanese) While the majority of these respondents were forcefully conscripted, there were two cases of those who acknowledged voluntary entry into the armed forces. One of them explained that he was certain that he would at one point eventually be recruited given the fact that schools had stopped operating and yet he had no family to fall back to. For him, joining the forces was something that would not be avoided. He, therefore, opted to join voluntarily rather than wait to be forced later on. Another respondent said that having realised at 14 years that his father had been killed in the war, he joined with the sole aim of avenging his father’s death. All the above experiences conirm the literature already presented on how children become child soldiers For 9 of the 11 respondents, the ight against the Sudan forces had caused families to willingly offer their children for recruitment or negligently accept the recruitment of these children to ight a civil war with the aim of breaking away from Sudan. The respondents considered this a positive reward for their efforts in the forces. In response to the question of how they left the life of a child soldier, some of the other detailed reports of their exit from soldiering comprise: When we attacked Pajok in Acholiland of Magwi County in Eastern Equatorial State, the Sudanese Peoples’ Liberation Army intercepted and overran our forces. I happened to be one of the prisoners of war (POW) and we were taken to Juba. From there, we got clearance from the Ugandan government; we were airlifted to Uganda. (32-year-old Ugandan) I was shot in my legs in one of the ierce battles in Karmuk in eastern Sudan. The ield was overtaken by the Sudan Armed Forces who came and took all the causalities to Khartoum for medical check-up and treatment. After that, I went to Cairo in Egypt and got a visa to travel to Australia (30-year-old South Sudanese). My uncle came to our maskara (our unit) and took me with him back home. This was after the then commander in charge of operations, Salva Kiir, signed a memorandum with UNICEF to let go of all the child soldiers in their ranks. (22-year-old South Sudanese) I remember the 1997 Yei crisis. After the capture of Yei I proceeded to Juba. Then a certain NGO sent experts to negotiate with our commander to release those below 14 years to go home and I was one of them. (26-year-old South Sudanese) 204 Journal of Development Studies After I sustained an injury on my right leg, I was then transferred to Uganda in 1996 for treatment until I reported back in 2000 at a military barracks in Yei. (27-year-old South Sudanese) I got out through an organisation called Save the Children which later reunited me with my family in 2002. It was this organisation which negotiated with my commander for my release from the army. (24-year-old South Sudanese) I was rescued by the Uganda government and taken back to my parents. (23-year-old South Sudanese) I escaped as a refuge to Uganda, and received education under UN. I am trying to recover after serious losses in the army. (32-year-old South Sudanese) I was released as part of RED ARMY to go to school oficially. RED ARMY refers to young soldiers. (23-year-old South Sudanese) Indeed both state and non-state actors have important roles to play, for example, stopping the recruitment of children in war, and facilitating their disarmament, rehabilitation and reintegration into civilian life. The respondents gave tribute to the peace talks that led to the signing of the CPA (2005) after which the SPLA was persuaded, through various pressure groups such as UNICEF, to free all child soldiers. There were also accounts of those who sought refuge in Uganda, for one reason or another, and that was their point of escape. They were able to beneit from the UNHCR, which had them enrolled into the Ugandan education system where they have continued to study up to university. Following the end of life as child soldiers, the majority of these underwent formal DDR. Those who could locate their families, needed to locate their nearest kin for reuniication. Where this was not possible, their comrades in the army became the families that they knew, worked and lived with. Formal secondary education had to be pursued as a prerequisite for them to acquire admission to university. 3.1 Losses Attributed to Child Soldiering Häggström (2000) expounds on the various the effects of war on child-soldiers, what the researcher refers to here as losses. The research conducted inquired from the respondents about the losses they attribute to child soldiering and the responses given included: psycho-social losses such as; loss of friends, family, and touch with others, culture and cultural norms, education, social life as well as social services like good healthcare. They also mentioned psychological imbalance due to torture and acts of violence including participation in or witnessing the killings; loss of hope; or inability to reason quickly. From a career development perspective, the social learning theory explains that choice of career for many people relates to their social environment. Unfortunately for these, 205 Akullo: Using University Education to Rehabilitate Former Child-Soldiers such a social environment was not a normal one. The dysfunctional/disrupted social relationships to which they were attached inevitably had an impact on their life and career choice. Some of these losses have even gone further to affect their social relations with other students within the educational institution. Some of the respondents noted that: [Due to] the traumatic experiences both in the training camps and battleields… I hate seeing blood up to now. When I see it, it reminds me of the massacre that I saw. (30-yearold South Sudanese) Aspects of my cultural heritage such as respect for elders, being able to speak my mother tongue were lost. We mainly spoke Arabic in the forces. I also got addicted to social vices such as taking marijuana, sexual violence to celebrate victory. We would also resort to robbery when we had no food or alcohol. (27-year-old South Sudanese) I lost most of my friends in Owiny Kibul in South Sudan, Mwagi County of Acholi subregion in Eastern Equatorial State…I lost hope of coming back home but by the grace of God I survived when we attacked Pajok and the SPLA defeated our forces and rescued us. I had lost hope of pursuing my studies. (32-year-old Ugandan) I was denied the right to education and freedom to share other aspects of my life through socialisation with my peers who were not recruited as child soldiers like I was. (26-yearold South Sudanese) I lost quick mental reasoning, because of frequent exposure to death and torture in the army. I lost education, good health and moral development. (32-year-old South Sudanese) I lost opportunities to attend school. Opportunities to contribute to the welfare of family. (36-year-old South Sudanese). When someone is being mistreated or when a child is being punished by a parent, I feel like I need to intervene because I experienced and saw mistreatment and punishment. (26-year-old South Sudanese). I have lost mental support and actually I have developed the idea of being alone. I suffered mental torture as a result of being a child soldier. (24-year-old South Sudanese). The link between me and my siblings was hard to build since I was a total stranger to them, and the messages the dead child soldiers left with me when they departed still haunt me. (22-year-old South Sudanese). 206 Journal of Development Studies My heart is dead. It no longer thinks about love but crises and refugee problems in wartorn areas. I do not feel like I am loved and I do not feel like loving. (26-year-old South Sudanese). The above remarks give a general picture of perceptions of psycho-social losses (effects). Any remedies that seek to address the plights of such people need to address these needs. About 3 students reported that they never underwent any former psycho-social support to help them deal with the above challenges after leaving the armed forces. 3.2 Career Paths Chosen According to Stephanie et al., (March, 2009), various countries adopt different rehabilitation and reintegration models that are designed to enable those referred to as age-over students to catch-up with their peers. Such models are designed to enable students move quickly through the missed years and re-join their peers in formal schooling. There are several models designed to retain over-age students and sometimes help them attain similar standards with their peers, depending on their age, the level of schooling they completed prior to the disruption in their education, and the duration of this disruption. This could be adopted by stakeholders involved in the rehabilitation of former child soldiers, particularly, those involved in education programmes. After quitting the military, these students decided to resume school, some of them were motivated by peers who had survived recruitment and seemed to have a future with better prospects; there was also a case of one who said that the war had robbed him of all his nuclear family. He, therefore, needed to resume school so that he could start a new life, having no one to depend on. Education would create for him and his children a better future than the one he had. The other reason that was given was the availability of education bursaries that enabled them to re-join primary school and continue on with secondary education. This research reveals that even after DDR, the previous military training and exposure that the former combatants went through, shapes their thinking and career paths; this leads to a desire for a career path that is very much related to their past experience. Seven of the participants in the study were pursuing a career in disciplines that relate in one way or another to militarism (security/international relations/politics). They believe in being able to change situations that they fought for through the careers that they are now poised to acquire. Others aspired for business-related courses. However, it is important to note that for one of the students enrolled on a business programme, his ultimate goal is to return to a military career. Some of them expressed interest in continuing with military/defence/strategic studies which they would pursue, for example, in Israel. One international relations student expressed interest in learning 207 Akullo: Using University Education to Rehabilitate Former Child-Soldiers piloting so that he would serve in the army as a pilot. There were others who want to continue as politicians/diplomats in the future. In the last category were those who wanted to continue with education and human resource management. The SPLA/M was credited for providing scholarships/bursaries to most of them. One of them, however, expressed concern over the fact that some of their former comrades in the forces have never been paid off after leaving the forces. 4 Education for Rehabilitation Given the lost opportunities that were mentioned in the earlier section, respondents were asked whether their present educational pursuits would assist them in redeeming some of the lost aspects of their lives through their lived soldiering experience as children. Seven out of the eleven noted that their careers would be useful for redeeming those lost aspects of life and gave the following reasons for such redemption: The course (International Relations and Diplomacy) is making me learn how to forgive those who made me join the army and I have also made peace with myself. I have tried so hard to become familiar with my relatives, speak the native language and know my family roots. (22-year-old South Sudanese). I have learnt through my Public Administration course that the issue of power in administration is almost similar to power in the armed forces. The only difference is that in the army, there is some element of force to control people and is not the case with public administration. In both careers some individuals hold positions from which they control and coordinate the activities of others in the interest of the organisation. (24-yearold South Sudanese). I believe in peace and negotiation. You can ight but you cannot defeat all the armies of the world. So peace and coexistence is required. (26-year-old South Sudanese). Whereas Stephanie et al., (March, 2009), highlight a number of studies that have been carried out in relation to education for reintegration of child soldiers, which indicates a negative implication of the soldiering experience on educational and economic outcomes, this research indings indicate that these particular former child soldiers, see a positive link between their soldiering experience and the career path they are now taking with prospects of living a life that will enable them achieve their full potential. The respondents recognised the ability to consult with academic and administrative staff members at the university as well as the inancial support that they obtain from SPLA/M in being able to meet some of their needs. The study has established that for these former child soldiers to be able to realise their career dreams, several needs sometimes hinder their goals. The following were some of challenges they encountered 208 Journal of Development Studies while pursuing various career ambitions that result into unmet needs: health challenges; lack of skills in conlict resolution and management; insuficient funds to cater for various inancial requirements; need for career guidance; counselling as well as rehabilitation; lack of opportunities to get exposure with practice; and the need to have contact with mentors who can help them realise their dreams. A 32 year old respondent was of the view that the government [GoSS] seems unconcerned about their plight. Those they call families are unable to meet their needs. Given their various career needs, the following were raised as particular needs that these people would like institutions of higher learning to address: 1. The unfairness regarding and treating them like normal students; 2. Insensitivity in dealing with them when they are inancially constrained and cannot satisfy the institutional inancial dues; 3. Provision be made on the application form to enable the university to identify former child soldiers and plan for them; and 4. Counselling and provision of special subjects that can help them work on their social life. A question was posed to each of them, seeking their opinions regarding the need to treat former child soldiers within institutions of higher learning as a special category, given their past lived experiences. More than half of the respondents (seven out of eleven) said there was a need for such special treatment. A 32 year old respondent from South Sudan was of the view that former child soldiers lost a lot in the ield of social behaviour and that needs a lot of counselling. It is in view of this challenge that their social shortcomings need to be excused as they are also assisted with ways in which they can best cooperate with the rest of society. I would propose that a university should come up with policies that should consider how best they should deal with these students because most of them have psychological problems in one way or another. They should know before being exposed to harsh treatment. (30 year-old South Sudanese) Child soldiers need to be recognised and treated as a special category of students because they were brought up in a harsh environment, and missed family love and the luxurious life compared with the other students. (24-year-old South Sudanese) Because they tend to have a lot of problems involving their personal lives, they need some rehabilitation not directly, but in some hidden form. (22-year-old South Sudanese) When we are recognised and treated with special care, and when we are counselled, we shall be able to cope with society. Where possible, there is a need for special lessons and games to help us cope with life after child soldiering (32- year-old South Sudanese) 209 Akullo: Using University Education to Rehabilitate Former Child-Soldiers 4.1 Adapting to Challenges of Career Development Posed by Soldiering Experiences The following were identiied as challenges that are still being faced by these students as they build a career and move on with their lives: Since 1997 up to now, I feel some changes in my social style. Particularly I can associate. Sometimes when I remember my lost friends, I feel like a devil inside me and I isolate myself from others. (26 year-old South Sudanese) There is inadequate support from the government, not enough freedom. This is because they still call me for duties when I am at school. (26-year-old South Sudanese). I feel left behind by my age groups (isolation) in education and other social developments. I have dificulties with home responsibilities and school. (32-year-old South Sudanese) Relection on past events such as killing, alcohol etc.; military life; and isolation have dominated my daily life which is disastrous. My talk cannot align with those of others. (27-year-old South Sudanese) I have psychological problems with women, especially when my iancée connived with my superior oficer to kill me, I decided to shoot her but she survived. I failed and my friend rescued me when they tried to kill me. I also face a problem with accepting anybody to talk ill about my people as long as I have some voice, I will be forced to say at least some things. (30-year-old South Sudanese) I still love guns and go for shooting lessons when I am in Sudan. I have lived to undermine any authority because I ind my solutions as the best always, which is not fair. I have problems receiving constant advice since I believe that I matured into a man at a young age; and my quietness as a result of military discipline has scared many, including my parents. (22-year-old South Sudanese) I have been used to restricted life but now am inding it dificult to freely interact with other people. Also, whenever I see children being punished, I do not perceive it as a form of correction, but just take it as mistreatment. (24-year-old South Sudanese) The following were some of the ways in which they said that they are adjusting to life so as to be able to work towards their life goals: I have coped with the above challenges through guidance and counselling. I got some volunteers who helped counsel me when I joined this institution. (26 year-old South Sudanese) Keeping quiet and not disclosing my former life although sometimes I hear ill statements being made about my people in Northern Uganda. (32-year-old Ugandan) 210 Journal of Development Studies To confront the dilemma of stigma by having self-esteem and remain focused on my goals. (23-year-old South Sudanese) Yes, I have coped with the above challenges such that I do not struggle with thoughts about past events such as killings and resorting to alcoholism so as to forget about my problems. I no longer isolate myself but I can discuss or interact but not so much. (27-year-old South Sudanese) At the moment, since I decided to shoot my iancée when I was in Ethiopia up to now, I do not have a girl lover because I have a negative attitude towards women. I have chosen to read and always keep myself busy whenever I am idle. I like running and playing football to divert my mind from some of these challenges. (30-year-old South Sudanese) I try to talk more of the harm caused by the guns than the superiority I feel when I am holding it to my siblings and friends. I try really hard to be patient and listen to other people and concede defeat when necessary and of late, I try to be as approachable as possible. I came up with a verbal confrontational approach as an alternative. (22-year-old South Sudanese) Interacting with people is no more a challenge; this is because of the group work and sporting events which have made it easy for me to interact freely with whoever comes my way. (24-year-old South Sudanese) There is a general appreciation of adjustment mechanisms that rely on internal will as well as external help from other persons and structures in society. 4.2 Contribution of Institutions of Higher Learning towards Rehabilitation The last part of the research inquired from the respondents about the ways in which institutions of higher learning can be of support to them so that they are able to adjust to challenges faced and be able to pursue their career paths chosen. The responses given include: Institutions should establish a special counselling committee to deal with such people with care. Counselling processes will assist us in focusing on the future, not the past and present. I am saying the “FUTURE”. (26-year old South Sudanese) They should introduce a topic/course relating to child soldiering; spelling out the dangers and challenges of child soldiering. (26-year-old South Sudanese) We need to be encouraged to continue our education. Where possible, institutions can provide scholarships, proper moral guidance and help us deal with stress and frustrations. (32-year-old South Sudanese) 211 Akullo: Using University Education to Rehabilitate Former Child-Soldiers We need to be encouraged to learn and cope with civilian lifestyle so that we can move away from conducting ourselves according to militaristic tendencies that we have learned through child soldiering. (27-year-old South Sudanese) Institutions of higher learning need to develop systems in which they take note of us as a special category. This can be done maybe during admissions. Having special recognition would enable them to understand us and be able to adequately address our shortcomings (30-year-old South Sudanese). The institutions should hold conferences at least once a year for former child soldiers to attend and discuss their challenges and strengths. Guidance and counselling services should be provided as well as funds to facilitate any club that brings together ex-soldiers (22-year-old South Sudanese). 5 Conclusions and Recommendations Machel (2001) recommends that all phases of emergency and reconstruction assistance programmes include psycho-social considerations. She elaborates on the various contents that reconstruction programmes need to embrace, one of them being schooling. Governments, donors, and relief organisations should prevent the institutionalisation of children. Soldiering experience costs former child soldiers a number of psycho-social opportunities. These comprise: the love and affection of family and relatives, education opportunities and a normal life of socialisation with peers. They also witness many people die and others actually participate in the killing. This together with other forms of torture has a toll on their psychological wellbeing. Despite counselling undergone by most during DDR, there is a general desire for continued counselling to address any remaining Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD). In order for this to happen, the students requested that university structures and other institutions of higher learning recognise them as a special category of students and deliberately provide counselling and psycho-social support to them. The other assistance requested for relates to designing courses on child-soldiers or incorporation of issues relating to child soldiers in the current curriculum so as to create awareness about their plight. The students acknowledge the important role that university structures (academic and administrative staff) play in helping them adjust to their civilian lives and pursue their career needs without being subject to unfair/insensitive treatment. It is undeniable that such lived experiences necessitate their special consideration in order to enable them to compete favourably with their counterparts who were not subject to similar experiences. 212 Journal of Development Studies They clearly explain in their own words, the various strategies that have been adopted to cope with various challenges. Some of these include personal choices to remain positive and adopt a high self-esteem. Others said that they continually get counselling. There are also those who have chosen to take advantage of university academic and cocurricular activities to interact with others and demystify the “stigma” they generally think society has towards them. They also acknowledge the role of their government in meeting their inancial needs. Since all these students are studying in Uganda and interact with other youths within the country, indings from this research can be applied to relevant peace-building programmes that are working with ex-child soldiers who participated in the LRA conlict. The researcher believes that this research is pertinent for relevant stakeholders involved in the rehabilitation to provide support to former child soldiers in postconlict environments. Institutions of higher learning are also able to beneit as much as other educational institutions at lower levels (especially those that deal with former combatants). The study recommends the following: 1. Non-Governmental and Governmental organisations involved in the rehabilitation of former child soldiers need to take deliberate efforts to ensure that former child soldiers are given career guidance as they are taken through the rehabilitation and reconstruction programmes. 2. Institutions of higher learning need to appreciate the need for appropriate training and counselling of former combatants so as to meet, in particular, their psychosocial needs. 3. Lastly, there is need for more research into higher education and former child soldiers, particularly regarding the role that such education plays in helping them achieve their full potential. References Africa Recovery. (2001). The road from soldier back to child Demobilisation and rehabilitation are only the irst steps. Available at http://www.un.org/ecosocdev/geninfo/afrec/ vol15no3/153chil2.htm. (Accessed October, 2001). Australian Learning and Teaching Council (2009). Career development learning: maximizing the contribution of work-integrated learning to student experience. Available at www. nagcas.org.au/uploads/ile/ALTC%20Report%20July.pdf. Becker, J. (2002). Children as Weapons of War. In Barth, E. F. (Ed.). Peace as Disappointment: The Reintegration of Female Soldiers in Post-Conlict Societies: A Comparative Study from Africa. Oslo: International Peace Research Institute. Brett, R., Specht, I. (2004). Young Soldiers: Why they choose to Fight. London: Lynne Reiner Publishers. 213 Akullo: Using University Education to Rehabilitate Former Child-Soldiers Brett, R. (2003). Adolescents volunteering for armed forces or armed groups. International Committee of the Red Cross. Vol. 85, No. 852, pp. 857-866. Brewer, E., et al. (2009). High Hopes, Grim Reality: Reintegration and the Education of Former Child Soldiers in Sierra Leone. Available at http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/ PMC2662600/. Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers (2004). Child Soldiers: Global Report 2004. London: Author. Furley, O. (1995). Child Soldiers and Youth in African Conlicts: International Reactions. Journal of African Studies Centre. Coventry Occasional paper No.1. 1995. Groenewald, T. (2004). A phenomenological research design illustrated. International Journal of Qualitative Methods. Vol. 3 No. 1. Häggström, H. (2000). Stop the use of child soldiers. Journal of the medical association for the prevention of war. Available at http://www.mapw.org.au/iles/downloads/Henrik%20 H%C3%A4ggstr%C3%B6m%20-%20Stop%20The%20Use%20of%20Child%20Soldiers. pdf. Heartland Alliance International (2012). Sri Lanka: Enhancing Livelihood Opportunities for former Child soldiers. Available at http://www.heartlandalliance.org/international/ wherewework/project-pages/sri-lanka-child-soldiers.html. Machel, G. et al. (2001). The Impact of War on Children. London: Hurst Odeh, M., Sullivan, C. (Nd). Recent Developments in International Rehabilitation of Child Soldiers. A paper published by Youth Advocacy Programme International. Available at http://www.yapi.org/rpchildsoldierrehab.pdf. Singer, P. W. (2005). Children at War. London: Pantheon Books. Somasundaram, D. (2002). Child Soldiers: Understanding the Context. Available at virtualhabitats.com/CareerCounselorWebquest/Overview%20of%20Career%20Dev.pdf. 214 Journal of Development Studies 3 (2) (2013) 215 - 227 University Education for Youth Entrepreneurship: The Case of Midlands State University, Zimbabwe Jephias Matunhu * Midlands State University Abstract: Prior to the political independence of Zimbabwe, education for entrepreneurship was a preserve of the White minority at the expense of the Black majority. An attempt to introduce entrepreneurship in education for the Black youths was when in the 1960s the Native Education Department introduced a ‘watered down’ vocational education curriculum called F2 system, which taught woodwork, metalwork, fashion and fabrics in urban secondary schools and agriculture, home economics and building in rural secondary schools. In 1980, Robert Mugabe’s political administration replaced the F2 system with a purely academic curricular. Not all the youths were able to get employment upon leaving school; the economy did not create enough job opportunities for the school leavers. The need for entrepreneurial education became a matter of concern in the country. The study investigates how Midlands State University (MSU) has re-engineered its curriculum to produce entrepreneurs9. Keywords: Zimbabwe; Youth Entrepreneurship; Education for Development 1 Introduction Zimbabwe inherited an education system that promoted Whites domination of the economic and political order. Formal education was organised to support and perpetuate White supremacy in the country. Blacks, especially youths1, received education that was inferior to that of Whites so that they did not compete with Whites on the job market. Robert Mugabe’s government committed itself to remove the economic bottlenecks imposed on Black youths by Whites. Mugabe’s intentions and aspirations * E-mail: jephiasmatunhu@yahoo.com Matunhu: University Education for Youth Entrepreneurship concurred with those of Nyerere (1974) who argued: “I desire to build a society in which all members have equal rights, and equal opportunities.” No longer was formal education in Zimbabwe supposed to advance the economic interests of Whites alone (Hopper 2000). Blacks, in general, and youths, in particular, require a type of education (entrepreneurial education) to increase their chances of climbing up the economic ladder. By its very nature, entrepreneurial education aims to open new avenues and new consciousness in youths (Chimhowu, Manjengwa & Feresu 2010; Gumbo 2008; Van Wykv 2005). Entrepreneurship education2 empowers youths to open their pathways to self-actualisation3. Entrepreneurial education constitutes all those processes of learning which enable youths to acquire skills, behaviours, values, and knowledge which society considers necessary to live a happy and successful life (Barker 1996). Entrepreneurship is concerned with issues of human rights, dignity, self-reliance and social justice in an economic order. Little is known about what universities in Zimbabwe are doing to improve the economic status of youths in Zimbabwe. The need for this study is underscored by a study by UNESCO (1997), which reported that in most African universities, many youths graduate with degrees that are not relevant to the economic needs of their societies and, therefore, end up joining thousands of unsuccessful job applicants (Mohamedbhai, 2008). Entrepreneurial education helps to avoid what Obanya (2004) describes as university education for a ‘world of unemployment’. 1.1 Conceptual and Theoretical Framework Entrepreneurs are people who can see economic beneit in resources. In terms of character, entrepreneurs see resources that can be utilised in more proitable ways than they are being used now. In line with the idea above, Zimbabwean youths should always be driven by the desire to improve their economic performance. According to Macmillan (2010), youths tend to punish themselves with enormous debt by seeking instant gratiication. The other distinct attribute of entrepreneurs is that they are creative. Without creativity, entrepreneurs would not be able to bring on the market new goods and services. Entrepreneurs are risk takers. Notably, the goal of entrepreneurs is to add value to society by providing goods and services that society wants or needs. In the process of trying to meet this goal, entrepreneurs achieve two main objectives: 1) They make money, which is essential to development; and 2) They change the needs and wants of their society. The United Nations’ Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Article 26.2 conceptualises entrepreneurial education as all learning that is directed to the full development of the human personality and to the strengthening of respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms. 216 Journal of Development Studies 1.2 The Midlands State University (MSU) The Midlands State University is one of the 12 state universities in Zimbabwe. It was established in 1999 through an act of Parliament of Zimbabwe. State universities carry 69 000 students of which 17 000 students are enrolled at the MSU. The student population is predominantly Black. In 2010, the MSU was rated the fastest growing university in the country. In 2011, the Chancellor of the University, President Mugabe, described the growth as titanic. In 2010, 2011 and 2012, respectively, the Vice Chancellor of the University, Prof. Bhebe, won the Zimbabwe Institute of Management Manager of the Year Award in the Public Sector Category; the award is bestowed on a leader with a demonstratable excellence in serving the nation through exemplary public service. 2 Research Methodology The research design is interpretive case study. The epistemological foundation of the design is that social reality is constructed by social actors, and so the researcher aimed at collecting textural meanings of the phenomenon under investigation. Forty people participated in the study; three of them were key informants from the MSU. Three key informants were from rural communities in and around the country. In each of these rural communities, there were MSU students on work-related learning4 (WRL). Ten Level 4.1 students (these had spent one year at WRL also participated in this study. Five entrepreneurs who graduated from the university were interviewed. Semi-structured data gathering instruments were used. The advantage of such data mining instruments is that they allow the researcher to probe the respondents unlike the structured research instruments which lock the respondents into predetermined responses (Creswell 2009). According to Polkinghorne (1989), a number of respondents between 5 and 25 are many enough for interpretive research. Data were also collected from reports, MSU Year Book, and ield observations. Non-probability sampling techniques (snowballing, and judgmental sampling) were used to sample out the respondents. Electronic recording devices like audio tapes and video recorders were used to capture ield data. The data were analysed thematically. Notably, the research indings and recommendations are not generalisable. The researcher explained to all the participants of the potential beneit of the study to them and to society. No respondent was coerced to participate in this study. The researcher informed the respondents that it was their right to pull out of the research at any point should they wish to do so. No participant pulled out of the study. No respondents were exposed to any undue physical harm or psychological harm such as embarrassment, physical and emotional stress, low self-esteem, invasion of privacy, damage of personal dignity, or loss of employment. The researcher was honest, respectful and sympathetic 217 Matunhu: University Education for Youth Entrepreneurship towards all the participants. The research protected the identity of the respondents; no names were used in this study. 3 Research Findings The indings of this study are presented in two broad themes: 1) curriculum reengineering, and 2) effects of curriculum engineering at MSU. The discussion is informed by the notion that entrepreneurial education by universities is the panacea to economic poverty among the youths in Zimbabwe. In the same vein, APEID-UNESCO (2006) reports that higher education is a carte blanche 5 for moving up the echelons of society (Mohamedbhai 2008). According to the key informants, a survey was carried out to establish employability of the MSU graduates. It was conirmed that the shrinkage of foreign investor conidence in Zimbabwe was responsible for high unemployment rate of 80 per cent. The apparent lack of job opportunities for university graduates necessitated the university’s decision to declare Entrepreneurial Module compulsory to all students. Entrepreneurship education became increasingly important as Level 3 students failed to secure places for WRL because of the continued shrinkage of the Zimbabwean economy. The entrepreneurship module, therefore, prepared students to venture into poultry, banana farming, printing, horticulture, garment making, interior décor, information technology, retailing and so on. The university allowed student entrepreneurs to attach themselves on WRL at their businesses for a period of up to 12 months during their third year of study. 3.1 Curriculum Re-Engineering In 2002, the MSU noted that gender discrimination was one of the issues that made it dificult for youths to venture into business. Dealing with gender-related challenges to youth empowerment became the university’s priority areas. Notably, youths constitute over 56 per cent of the population in Zimbabwe, and yet absolute economic poverty6 is most rampant among them. The university’s decision to deal with gender issues gained strength from the Cocoyoc Declaration of 1974. The declaration observed that the evils of material poverty among youths are compounded by their lack of participation in national and global economies. With no economic power, the youths are denied economic freedom7. In that regard, the MSU introduced an examinable compulsory module called Gender Studies in 2004. The purpose of the module is twofold: irstly, it was designed to bring about a sense of worth among female youths; and secondly, it was meant to educate male youths that female youths are just as good as male youths and that gender discrimination was unfair and unjust. Prior to independence in 1980, the school system emphasised the supremacy of males over females. The education curriculum was tailored 218 Journal of Development Studies to produce females who would be ‘hewers of wood and drawers of water’ for their male masters. According to Maphosa et al. (2007), the curriculum was based on Aristotle’s philosophy of a ‘slave education’ that emphasised the teaching of basic menial skills. Gender studies form a bedrock on which to build sustainable entrepreneurial spirit among youths and society, in general. An evaluation of the impact of the MSU Gender Policy and Module on Senga community revealed that females were more assertive and ready to defend their rights in a society that was male-dominated. The study was sponsored by the Southern African Development Community (SADC). 3.2 Effects of Curriculum Re-Engineering The Ofice of the Dean of Students in collaboration with the MSU Fundraising Committee was mandated to allocate kiosks to deserving youths (who are students of the university) irrespective of their gender. These retail outlets sell groceries to the university community. Many youths (students) have been able to raise money for their fees and upkeep. One former student of the university summarised her experience with kiosks as: I enrolled at the MSU from a very weak economic background. I was lucky to have an opportunity to run a kiosk in partnership with three other students. I and my colleagues were able to earn a stable income out of the business venture. I am very grateful to the university. My interest in entrepreneurship did not end at MSU. I graduated in 2011. I did not look for employment; rather I went straight into business. Today, I am a proud proprietor of a promising general dealer at a Growth Point in Masvingo Province. My ambition is to expand my business empire to major cities in the country. According to my strategic plan, I should be able to diversify into large-scale poultry by 2015. In my view, this is what all the youths in the country should be able to do. The university encouraged youths to register their businesses with the Zimbabwe Registrar of Companies. The advantages of registering businesses are: 1. Business that is not registered is a signal to potential customers and partners that an entrepreneur is not serious. 2. Big government tenders and dealing with many big companies will often demand that entrepreneurs are able to produce their company registration papers. 3. Most corporates do not pay in cash. In fact some big customers do not consider entrepreneurs without looking at their banking history. 4. This is important for tax-related issues and value-added tax (VAT). It will prove important should an entrepreneur end up in court to defend their rights. And 5. Registration helps to protect brands. Entrepreneurs could invest signiicantly into building a name and reputation, only to watch someone else legally enjoy all the beneits because they have started a competing business and they own an entrepreneur’s name! 219 Matunhu: University Education for Youth Entrepreneurship The respondents were worried about the cost and time taken to register companies. In the eyes of the respondents, the business licensing process is bureaucratic, which promotes corruption while stiling entrepreneurship. The GoZ has since eased the process of registering companies. It is presumed that removal of bottlenecks for youth entrepreneurs will uplift the lives of millions of people in Africa (Okolie, 2003; Vilakazi, 2000). Youth empowerment/entrepreneurship was endorsed by Dr Washington Mbizvo, the Zimbabwe Permanent Secretary for Higher and Tertiary Education, who said: I believe that the road being pursued by the government, of entrepreneurial education, is the way to go. Gone are the days when youths came out of school with the intention of hunting for a job. Focus should be on training our people to be entrepreneurs, not hammering into them that their role in Zimbabwe is to be workers. . . It deies logic that one expects foreigners to come and create one million jobs in Zimbabwe when their countries are also facing the same problem of unemployment. In this regard, a former student (youth) of MSU said: In 2008, I and a couple of other students suffered lack of funds for fees and upkeep. We had no idea of how to heave ourselves out of the economic woes. It was only after studying entrepreneurship that I teamed up with three other students to register a laundry company. The university subcontracted us. We worked very hard to balance demands for our schooling and that of keeping the business rolling on. We were able to raise enough money for fees and upkeep while at college. Later in life, our company diversiied into tyre services. We were lucky to get a contract from our university. In about six months, we were able to open a shop in town. In September 2009, our company suffered liquidity challenges. I think it was a result of our failure to manage the business. Some students are involved in catering. A group of students started a catering irm. The university advanced them with a loan of US$300.00. With the money, the students, who are studying for an Honours in Hotel and Tourism, opened a cafeteria in Harare. The students’ records show that they are making good proit. In fact, they were able to repay the loan in less than three months. A group of students reading for an Honours in Music and Musicology started a music band. They have since recorded two albums. Records at the university show that the band is performing well. However, there are several youth business ventures that have collapsed. In 2010, the university instituted an inquiry into why some business ventures by students failed. The study revealed that lack of entrepreneurial skills and knowledge was responsible for a high failure rate of business ventures by students. The university offers a compulsory examinable module called ‘entrepreneurship’. The module is offered to all 220 Journal of Development Studies Level 2.1 students. In the meantime, the university continues to encourage students to be creators of employment rather than employment seekers. Finance is one of the challenges faced by the youths in the country; this purely as an outcome of the isolation of the country by the international community. Zimbabwe is under economic sanctions that were imposed by the West following President Mugabe’s seizure of White-owned farms for the beneit of the indigenous Black Africans. The liquidity problem has been felt in all sectors of the economy, including universities. The liquidity challenge in universities in the country is neither new nor unique to Zimbabwe. According to Ajayi et al. (1996), funds available to run universities in Africa are grossly inadequate – making them subsist on a ‘starvation diet’. Alternative ways of securing funding to support entrepreneurial education by the university are required, without which many youths will remain in income poverty. Presently, the MSU runs entrepreneurship short courses (non-degree courses) for entrepreneurs in and around the country. Several youths in farming, manufacturing, retailing, and hospitality industry have passed through these training courses. The entrepreneurs are lectured in areas like; business ethics, business proposal writing, inancial management, cooperative work, marketing, business law, and so on. Follow-up assessments of youths who have attended these courses have indicated that entrepreneurs are beneiting tremendously from the empowerment course. Most of the respondents claimed that they were now better inancial managers and their proits were improving. This is a welcome development in a country whose economy is suffering viability challenges. The university has also managed to reach out to many youths under the Student in Free Enterprise programme (SIFE). This helped the MSU-SIFE team to win the irst prize at the national competitions of 2012. The team travelled to the United States of America to compete at international level. The team came out third. The MSU enrols a three-year ‘Visiting degree programme’, which allows youths to pursue their studies while at work. One of the most successful female entrepreneurs in the country is a former part-time student of the university. She graduated in 2011 with an Honours Degree in Business Studies. She is a founding director of a security company. The company has branches in all major cities in Zimbabwe. One of the most prominent entrepreneurs in the Midlands Province is also a former student of the university. He runs chalets, lodges, farms and supermarkets. The entrepreneur shared his experience with the researcher: I was an ordinary business person when I joined the university for my undergraduate degree programme. The university sharpened my entrepreneurship skills. Since then, I 221 Matunhu: University Education for Youth Entrepreneurship have steered my business to dizzy heights; I have won several awards for best business practice. I am very grateful to the university’s youth empowerment programmes. I am contemplating opening branches in several countries in the SADC region. I am strongly convinced that entrepreneurial education for the youth is what Zimbabwe needs. Without it, unemployment will continue to deface our country. China and India have encouraged entrepreneurship; the countries are doing well in poverty reduction. The university established that the HIV/AIDS pandemic is a setback to youth economic empowerment. The challenge with the disease is that there is no known cure for it. The pandemic has its highest toll amongst youths. According to one of the key informants, youths are the most productive and reproductive members of our society. Society’s failure to invest generously in HIV/AIDS programmes is counterproductive in the longrun (Matunhu 2012). The above view was supported by one of the university employees, who said: HIV/AIDS is a challenge particularly during these hard economic times. Some youths come to university from desperate economic backgrounds, which force them to prostitute for income. Sugar daddies and sugar mummies take advantage of these students. Unfortunately, poor students lack the power and voice to negotiate safe sex. They are vulnerable to HIV/AIDS infections. In response to the HIV/AIDS pandemic, the university is introducing a compulsory module on HIV/AIDS prevention. The major thrust of the module is prevention and management of the pandemic. The MSU has several anti-HIV/AIDS programmes on campus. Condom use, abstinence, talk shows, and male circumcision are some of the strategies that the university is employing in the ight for an HIV/AIDS-free generation. There is evidence to suggest that male circumcision reduces the spread of HIV. In 2012, the university opened male circumcision clinics at two of its campuses – MSU is the irst university to offer this service to its students and to the neighbourhood. A study by Matunhu and Matunhu (2012) sponsored by SADC through the National University of Lesotho revealed that male circumcision at the university is very popular. The study also found out that female youths are actively encouraging their male friends to be circumcised. The clinics also offers voluntary HIV counselling and testing (VCT) services to their clients. 4 Discussion The Universal Declaration of Human Rights proclaimed by the General Assembly of the United Nations in Paris on 10 December 1948 is a manifesto for youth economic development. Agreeably, the manifesto has nothing to say about speciic economic, 222 Journal of Development Studies trade or environmental measures that youths can beneit from. However, the manifesto outlines those features of world society that are indispensable for progress towards justice and peace in the world. Inherent in the declaration is the call for gender equity and youth economic empowerment. A sustainable entrepreneurial education for youths in Zimbabwe is, therefore, driven by a desire to promote social progress and better standards of life for all people. The above idea forms the basis for all work on gender equality and egalitarianism8 in the country. In line with the above view, the Centre for Human Rights (1989:1) proclaims: …the establishment of human rights provides the foundation upon which rests the political structure of human freedom; the achievement of human freedoms generate the will as well as the capacity for economic and social progress; the social progress provides the basis for true peace . . . Denying youths entrepreneurial education is to deny them an opportunity to participate in economic development of the nation. Youth entrepreneurs in the country could beneit from capital from the Youth Empowerment Fund. In the past two years, the Central Africa Building Society (CABS) youth empowerment fund administered US$4million to support 3477 youth projects, the Stanbic Wealth Creation Fund disbursed US$5 million to 300 youths; while the Central Bank of Zimbabwe (CBZ) disbursed, US$745900 to over 500 youths. The fund is too little to meet the needs of all the youths in the country. The respondents also claimed that the amount was spread thinly, making it dificult for the youths to have enough capital to meet their businesses start-ups. The government of Zimbabwe is also encouraging partnerships with local irms in trying to raise capital and resources to kick-start production by female youths. For those female entrepreneurs who are interested in farming, the Zimbabwe Women Farmers’ Land and Agriculture Trust (ZWFLAT) is partnering with Nestle Zimbabwe in a programme that is likely to boost the dairy sector through making heifers available to female farmers (see www.women.govt.zw). The Youth Empowerment programme by the Ministry of Youth Development, Indigenisation and Empowerment9 is also available to provide capital to youths in the country – most students at MSU are still in their youthful ages. One way of increasing availability of capital for the youth entrepreneurs is for the GoZ to allow youths to hold shares in parastatals10 like the National Railways of Zimbabwe, Zimbabwe United Passenger Company, Grain Marketing Board, Cotton Marketing Board, Air Zimbabwe, and many others. There seems to great wealth locked in these business entities. 223 Matunhu: University Education for Youth Entrepreneurship Legislation is also required to encourage privately owned companies to partner with emerging youth entrepreneurs. Companies that fail to implement the requirement may not qualify to do business with government and parastatals. In Zimbabwe, government is one of the largest business consumers. Therefore, most established companies are likely to keep a good business record with the GoZ. Zimbabwe is currently implementing its Indigenisation and Economic Empowerment (IEE) Act. The act is about transferring 51 per cent stake in White-owned corporations into the hands of indigenous Blacks. This is an opportunity for youths (students) entrepreneurs to acquire shares in established companies. Acquiring equity or stake in traditionally White-owned businesses will see Zimbabwean youth entrepreneurs beneiting from skills, economies of scale and access to markets. However, the Act fails to stipulate quotas for youths. The policy should have allocated at least 10 per cent of foreign-owned stake to the youths. Presently, an insigniicant number of youth entrepreneurs participate in the mining sector. In line with this observation, the MSU has moved to introduce a Faculty of Mining Engineering. According a key informant, this is an opportunity for the youths in the country to acquire skills needed in mining. Armed with such skills, the youths would be expected to venture into this lucrative industry (see www.women.govt.zw) which earns revenue exceeding two billion US dollars annually. The university’s agenda for youth economic empowerment is based on the principle of social justice that addresses youth’s livelihood needs in terms of their access to and control over economic resources. However, youths have to understand that being a creative entrepreneur means being a non-conformist.11 Non-conformists refuse to accept that the way things are is the way they should be or are going to be in the future. Zimbabwean youths have to brace themselves to face the turbulent economic waters. For instance, the Zimbabwean economy is facing serious economic and inancial crisis. The youths have to understand that this is a passing phase; economic booms are usually preceded by economic crisis. It would be better for the youths to establish themselves during economic crisis so that they beneit from the coming economic boom. Without brevity and determination, Zimbabwean youths are likely to fail to rise to the level of prominence in economic circles. Entrepreneurship education puts emphasis on character building. Successful entrepreneurs such as Kuch Brothers, Michael Jackson, Bill Gates and Oprah Winfery and many others have or had a strong character. An understanding of business law is an important component of entrepreneurial education for youth economic empowerment. Without law, many entrepreneurs will ind themselves operating against the law, which could be harmful to society. Bill Gates, 224 Journal of Development Studies Sir Richard Branson and Howard Hughes all had lawyers in the family to assist them. Entrepreneurs should have a general understanding of the legal implications of failing to honour inancial obligations. Failure to honour inancial obligations affects the credit rating of a business. A low credit rating makes it dificult for entrepreneurs to borrow money from inancial institutions, which will in turn affect the proitability of a irm. This will also affect future prospects of a irm to attract share capital when needed. Besides, entrepreneurial education for youth economic empowerment in Zimbabwe should guard against corruption; at the same time promoting the industrialisation of many youths. References Ajayi et al. (1996). The African Experience with higher Education. Ohio: Ohio University Press. Barker, E. (1996). Education and Related Concepts. Harare: College Press. Chimhowu, A. et al. (2010). Moving Forward in Zimbabwe: Reducing poverty and Promoting Growth. 2nd edition. Harare: Institute of Environmental Studies, University of Zimbabwe. Council of Europe (1988). North–South: One future, a common Task. Strasburg: Council of Europe. Gumbo, T. (2008). Indigenizing the curriculum in institutions of higher learning. Paper presented at the Second African Conference on Curriculum Development in Higher Education, Kempton Park, Johannesburg, South Africa. 16 –18 September 2008. Hoppers, C. A. (2000). African Voices in Education: Retrieving the Past, Engaging the Present and Shaping the Future. In P. Higgs, N. C. G. Vakalisa, T. V. Mda, N. T. Assie-Lumumba (Eds.). African Voices in Education. Cape Town: Juta, 1-11. Maphosa, F., Kujinga, K., Chiparange, D. (2007). Zimbabwe’s Development Experiences since 1980: Challenges and Prospects for the Future. Harare: OSSREA Zimbabwe Chapter. Macmillan, A. (2010). Be a great Entrepreneur. Milton Park: Book Point. Matunhu, J. (2012). Rural Development: Putting Agriculture First in South Africa. Gweru: Mambo Press and Booklove Publishers. Mohamedbhai, C. (2008). The effects of Massiication on Higher Education in Africa. Accra: Association of African Universities Obanya, P. (2004). Educating for the Knowledge Economy. Ibadan: Mosuro Publishers. Okolie, A. C. (2003). Producing Knowledge for Sustainable Development in Africa: Implications for Higher Education. Higher Education, Vol. 46. Number 2, 235-260. Osler, A. (1994). Development Education: Global Perspectives in the Curriculum. London: Council of Europe. Nyerere, J. (1974). Man and Development. Dar es Salaam: Oxford University Press. 225 Matunhu: University Education for Youth Entrepreneurship Pauli, L. (2000). Women’s Empowerment and Economic Justice: Relecting on Experience in Latin America and the Caribbean. New York: United Nations Development Fund for Women. Robb, C. M. (2002). Can the Poor inluence Policy? Participatory Poverty Assessments in the Developing World. Washington DC: World Bank. UNESCO-BREDA (1997). Report on the State of Education in Africa: Challenges and Reconstruction: UNESCO Regional Ofice for Education in Africa (BREDA): Dakar: Author. Van Wyk, B. (2005). Higher Education and the Market: Inluence and Responses. Acta Academica. Vol. 37. No. 3. 41-64. Vilakazi, H. W. (2000). The Problem of Education in Africa. In Higgs P. et al (Ed.). African Voices in Education. Cape Town: Juta. Notes In Zimbabwe, ‘youth’ refers to persons who aged 19 to 34. According to the 2012 national census, Zimbabwe has 4.8 million youths, which is 53 percent of the country’s population. 1 The World Economic Forum meeting in Cape Town, South Africa, a few weeks ago emphasised the issue of entrepreneurial education as the only way to solve unemployment all over the world. 2 3 Achieving the highest level of one’s potential. Very many people die before they have actualised themselves. Deprivation of opportunity by stringent rules, lack of economic resources and opportunity to experiment with ideas and resources prevents most people from achieving self-actualisation. It is a requirement that students at MSU spend a full year attached to a work environment. This is called work-related learning (WRL). During this period students are expected to put into practice the theory they will have acquired at university before coming for WRL. 4 5 Entrepreneurial education is an instrument for human capital development, and for sustaining economic growth. 6 This is a state of being deprived from meeting one’s legal needs and wants. The human needs and wants are enshrined in the 1948 United Nations Declaration of Universal Human Rights (Starky in Osler 1994). 7 Economic freedom entails individuals’ (youths) freedom to decide how they would develop and use their productive abilities, trade in goods and services with others, and keep the fruits of their labour. 226 Journal of Development Studies The term is derived from the French term egal meaning equal. Egalitarianism is a political doctrine that holds that all people are equal and so must have the same economic, legal, political and social rights (Erdal and Whiten, 1996). 8 9 The vision of the Ministry to achieve true empowerment of Zimbabwean youths. The overall mandate of the Ministry is, inter alia, to formulate, review and execute policy on youth development and empowerment of indigenous citizens; and monitor and evaluate compliance with the National Indigenization and Empowerment Act. 10 This a public owned irm. In Zimbabwe, most of these companies are under performing. 11 Non-conformists are continuously searching for the new products and new ways of succeeding. 227 ISSN 2079-4843 Volume 3 Number 2 August 2013 Journal of Development Studies Contents 1 Jude Ssempebwa, Editorial 5 Robert Senath Esuruku, Youth Identity, National Unity and Development in Uganda: Prospects and Options Ngozi M. Nwakeze, Youth Bulge and Demographic Dividend in the Context of Africa: What Do We Really Know? Jimmy Spire Ssentongo, Youth, Social Heritage, Political Manipulation and Pluralism in Kibaale District, Uganda Lino Owor Ogora, Youth and Cultural Identity in Post-Conlict Northern Uganda Louis Oyaro Olanya, Youth Reconciliation and Political Participation: The Case of Northern Uganda David N. Tshimba, Narratives of the Youth in Post-War Kitgum, Northern Uganda Eric Awich Ochen, Engendering Social Rejection among formerly Abducted Young Women in Northern Uganda Jacqueline Nakaiza, Potential of Peer Support to Fight Stigma against Former Child Soldiers in Northern Uganda Paul Bukuluki, Access to Justice among Youth in Post-Conlict Northern Uganda Charles Okello Ayai, Youth Unemployment and Post-Conlict Recovery in the Acholi Sub-Region Eunice Akullo, Using University Education to Capture Opportunities Lost through Child Soldiering Jephias Matunhu, University Education for Youths Entrepreneurship: The Case of Midlands State University, Zimbabwe 21 33 63 77 97 115 133 145 177 197 215 Institute of Ethics and Development Studies Uganda Martyrs University P. O. Box 5498, Kampala, Uganda Tel: +256 (0) 382 410611 Fax: +256 (0) 382 410100 E-mail: ieds@umu.ac.ug http://www.umu.ac.ug Journal of Development Studies Endnotes 1 United Nations, 2010.World Programme for Youth report in Youth and the United Nations, New York: United Nations. 2 A country incurs a youth bulge when the population group under the age of 24 is larger than all other age groups. 3 Chabane, Collins Ohm, 2011. Putting Young Africans to Work: Addressing Africa’s Youth Unemployment Crisis, Johannesburg: The Brenthurst Foundation. 4 Ibid. 5 CSOPNU 2004. The Need for National Reconciliation: Perceptions of Ugandans on National Identity, Kampala, Uganda: CSOPNU/JAYAK. 6 Latigo, James Ojera 2008. Northern Uganda: Tradition-based Practices in the Acholi Region. In Traditional Justice and Reconciliation after Violent Conlict: Learning from African Experiences, Stockholm: International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance. 7 International Alert 2010. International Alert Uganda Three Year Programme Strategic Plan 2011-2013, Kampala: International Alert. 8 International Alert 2012. Unlocking Opportunities for War-affected Youth in Northern Uganda, Kampala: ACCS Report 9 World Bank, 2006. World Development Report 2007: Development and the Next Generation. Washington, D.C.: The World Bank. 10 Organisation of African Youth, 2012, Putting Young People at the Heart of Regional Development, African Youth Conference on Post-2015 Development Agenda, Nairobi: January 2013. 11 Chigunta, Francis, 2002, The Socio economic Situation of Youth in Africa: Problem, Prospects and Options www.yesweb.org/gkr/res/bg.africa.reg.doc. Assessed 12th January 20123. 12 This is in line with 2006 African Union youth charter and Uganda government’s very recent eligibility criteria for youth venture capital fund. 13 POPSEC, 2012. The State of Uganda Population Report 2012, Kampala: POPSEC/ UNFPA. 14 Population Action International, 2010, The Effects of a Very Young Age Structure in Uganda, Washington DC: PAI 15 African Union. 2011. Decisions Adopted during the 17th African Union Summit, 23 June–1 July, 2011, Malabo: African Union. 230 Journal of Development Studies 16 Agbor, Julius, Taiwo Olumide & Smith Jessica. 2012. Sub-Saharan Africa’s Youth Bulge: Demographic Dividend Or Disaster? http:// www.brookings.edu /~/media/research/ iles/reports/2012/1/ priorities% 20foresight% 20africa/ 01_youth_bulge_agbor_taiwo_ smith.pdf. Accessed 5th January 2013. 17 Abbink , Jon. 2005. Being young in Africa: The politics of despair and renewal, Leiden: Leiden University. 18 One of the most powerful appointed advisers of the Kabaka, he is in charge of the kingdom’s administrative and judicial systems, effectively serving as both prime minister and chief justice. 19 Kabaka is the title of the king of the Kingdom of Buganda. 20 International Crisis Group, 2012. Uganda: No Resolution to Growing Tensions, Africa Report N°187, Nairobi/Brussels: International Crisis Group. 21 Lübeck, Media Docks. 2004. Youth and the Job Market: Prepared for Each Other? http://www.ilo.org/public/english/employment/yen/downloads/events/1lc/youth_ dialogue_1708.pdf. Accessed on 14th January 2013. 22 Dumisani Muleya, Editor‘s Memo: Mugabe speech dramatic irony writ large, Zimbabwe Independent, August 19th 2012. 23 Okojie, Christiana E.E. 2003. Employment Creation for Youth in Africa: The Gender Dimension, paper presented during Expert Group Meeting on Jobs for Youth: National Strategies for Employment Promotion, 15-16 January, 2003, Geneva, Switzerland. 24 Government of Uganda. 2012. Draft Uganda Vision 2040: Accelerating Uganda’s Socioeconomic Transformation, Kampala: National Development authority. 25 Uganda Bureau of Statistics, 2010. Uganda National Household Survey-2009/2010: Socio-Economic Module, Kampala: UBOS. 26 Young Leaders Think Tank for Policy Alternatives N/A. The Challenges of Youth (Un) Employment in Uganda, http://www.kas.de/wf/doc/kas_29017-1522-2-30. pdf?111020125918. Accessed on 3rd January 2013. 27 To further lend credibility to these indings, in the 2011/2012 budget of Uganda, the Minister of Finance recognised that because of the high levels of unemployment, the Ugandan economy can only absorb 20% of its youth (MoFPED, 2011). 28 International Youth Foundation, 2011. Navigating Challenges, Charting Hope: A Cross-Sector Situational Analysis on Youth in Uganda, Kampala: International Youth Foundation/Youth Map Uganda. 29 International Alert, 2012. Youth Perceptions on Economic Opportunity in Northern Uganda: Findings from Acholi and Lango, Kampala: International Alert (Coming soon). 231 Journal of Development Studies 30 Bryan, Shari. 2010. The Youth Bulge in Africa: Opportunities for Constructive Engagement in the Political Process. www.ndi.org/iles/Youth_Bulge_Africa_102710. pdf. Accessed on 5th January 2013. 31 Swanson, Dalene M. 2007 Ubuntu: An African Contribution to (re)search for/with a Humble Togetherness. Journal of Contemporary Issues in Education 2(2): 53-67. 32 Nabudere, Dani Wadada N/A. Ubuntu Philosophy: Memory and Reconciliation, http:// www.grandslacs.net/ doc/ 3621. pdf. Accessed on 28th September 2012. 33 Nabudere, Dani Wadada N/A. Ubuntu Philosophy: Memory and Reconciliation, http:// www.grandslacs.net/ doc/ 3621. pdf. Accessed on 8th January 2013. 34 Villa-Vicencio, C. 2009. Walk with Us and Listen: Political Reconciliation in Africa, Washington DC: Georgetown University Press. 35 Argenti, N. 2002, ‘Youth in Africa: A Major Resource for Change’, in A. de Waal & N. Argenti (Eds.), Young Africa: Realising the Rights of Children and Youth, Trenton/ Asmara: Africa World Press. 36 Abbink , Jon. 2005. Being young in Africa: The politics of despair and renewal, Leiden: Leiden University. 37 Kanneworff, Anna Besty. 2008. “These Dread-Locked Gangsters” The Mungiki as Dramatic Actors in Kenya’s Public Arena: From Political Protest to Political Participation? In Abbink, Jon & Dokkum, André van eds., Dilemmas of Development: Conlicts of Interest and their Resolutions in Modernising Africa, Leiden: African Studies Centre. 38 Abbink, Jon. 2005. Being young in Africa: The politics of Despair and Renewal, In Abbink, J. & Kessel, W. M. J. van eds., Vanguard or Vandals: Youth, Politics and Conlict in Africa, Leiden: African Studies Centre. 39 Musana, Paddy. 2012. The Effects of the Pentecostal Movement in Uganda: Changing Perceptions of Pentecostalism, In Understand Uganda: 50 Years of Independence 9th October 1962 - 9th October 2012, Kampala: Daily Monitor. 40 Vision Group. 2012. Uganda: Building of A Nation, Kampala: Vision Group 41 Nsubuga, Aldrine, 2012. When the nation Wept, Saturday Vision, October 20, 2012. 42 John De Coninck, 2011. Pluralism: what relevance for Uganda? http://www. opendemocracy.net/john-de-coninck/pluralism-what-relevance-for-uganda. Accessed 23rd January 2013. 43 The wider PhD research investigates spaces for pluralism in ethnically sensitive communities with speciic reference to Kibaale District. 232 Journal of Development Studies 44 Kiwanuka (1968) contends that it was more for strategic reasons than for appreciating Buganda that the counties were annexed to the latter. He argues that, the British having appreciated the administrative structure of Buganda, they wanted to take advantage of it in Bunyoro as well and to curb further resistance to their rule. 45 The number of counties actually given by the British to Buganda is still contested. Contrary to the popular account of six (or seven) counties, Kiwanuka (1968) and (Samwiri 2007) argue that only two counties (Buyaga and Bugangaizi) were extended to Buganda, the rest had already been conquered by Buganda. 46 This is the highest position at District level within Uganda’s decentralised framework. It is also referred to as Local Council Five (LC 5) as the highest of the ive local government councils. LC 4 is the County, LC 3 the Sub-county, LC 2 the Parish while LC 1 is the village. 47 National Resistance Movement, which is the ruling party. 48 The creation of a constituency goes with creation of other sub-units there under such as LC III. Leadership of these is also through elections. 49 Rukiga is the language for the Bakiga. 50 Issues to do with youths are reserved for the National Youth Policy. The Constitution of Uganda is totally silent about the category of youths. 51 Rational choice theory explains ethnicity as driven by calculations for group and individual beneit. People’s identiication with ethnic groups is here viewed as a strategising point for some beneit. 52 Culture is here deined as “a system of beliefs and practices in terms of which a group of human beings understand, regulate and structure their individual and collective life” (Parekh 2000, p.143). This deinition would also encompass religions as cultures, but, for this study, they are excluded from the deinition of ethnicity. 53 Kasirivu Atooki, as of 2009. 54 The Land Fund was instituted as an initiative to buy off land from the absentee landlords, return the land titles to the Uganda Land Commission, and then give the land to the current occupants/ squatters. 55 The expression ‘every goat on its peg’ is used to mean that people should rally behind ‘tribe-mates’ when it comes to elections. 56 I refer to it as anachronistic because it belongs to the era when knowledge was mainly gathered through experience. Thus the older one was the more the experiences they had and, therefore, the knowledge collected. The youths would accordingly not be expected to know much due to their limited life experience. 57 The researcher only visited one school (Kagadi Senior Secondary School) in Kibaale District. The indings from the school may not be representative of all the schools in the district but helped provide some insight into youth inter-ethnic relations due to the school’s multi-ethnic composition. 233 Journal of Development Studies 58 The oficial language of Uganda is English. It is thus the oficial medium of instruction in schools. The other languages are mainly used for communication in informal settings. The dominance of any of these other languages in a social setting often goes with numerical dominance of the ethnic group to which the language is associated and, in most cases, it is the indigenous group. 59 For example see reports by Human Rights Watch (The Scars of Death) and Sverker Finnstrom, Living with bad surroundings. 60 Earlier attempts included negotiations by Betty Bigombe and the Acholi Religious Leaders’ Peace Initiative between 1994 and 2000 61 These include; The Protocols to Accountability and Reconciliation, Cessation of Hostilities Agreement, Agreement on Accountability and Reconciliation, Annexure to the Agreement on Accountability and Reconciliation, Implementation Protocols, and Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration. 62 Among other requirements, agenda item three did not clearly provide immunity for Joseph Kony and his top commanders from indictment by the ICC, a factor which proved critical in inluencing his decision not to sign the inal peace agreement 63 For more information please see Roco Wat I Acholi. 64 It was easier to distribute food through women other than men as it was a way of ensuring that food actually reached the children. It was also an easy avenue of dealing with polygamous families as it would not appear that one man was receiving more than one ratio of food. 65 Uganda Bureau of Statistics (UBOS) Report, 2006 66 Interview with an Acholi Elder 67 UNICEF Uganda Annual Report 2006 &2007 68 Child/Youth as Peace builders (CAP) Survey 2011 69 International Crisis Group, Northern Uganda; Seizing the Opportunity for Peace, 2007 70 Cessation of Hostilities Agreement between the Government of Uganda and the Lord’s Resistance Army/Movement, Juba, Sudan, available at http:/www.northernuganda. usypp.gov 71 United Nations, Uganda Humanitarian Proile, 2011, available at http:/www.ochadms. unog.ch. 72 The Social Development Advisor, Uganda- Youth Participation and Development, a guide to development partners 73 Amnesty International (2007)- “Doubly traumatized: Lack of access to justice for female victims of sexual and gender-based violence in Northern Uganda. Available at: http://www.amnestyusa.org. 234 Journal of Development Studies 74 Interview with an expert on traditional justice and youth issues in Northern Uganda 75 Interview with a youth in Kitgum 76 Interview with a senior mobiliser, youth analyst and former president of UYD 77 Interview with a member of the Ker kal kwaro Acholi 78 Interview with a youth in Agago district 79 Interview with a senior youth mobiliser 80 Interview with a youth in Pader district 81 Interview with a group of youth in Amuru 82 Interview with a group of youth in Agago district 83 Interview with a youth in Agago district 84 New Vision of Tuesday May 29th 2012 page 3. (the Amnesty Act expired on 25th May 2012) 85 Interview with a formerly abducted female youth 86 Interview with a formerly abducted female youth 87 FGD with male youths 88 FGD with male youths 89 Interview with a Male youth 90 Interview with a district oficial. 91 The big disparity could be a result of methods used in the estimation of the number. It should be noted here that data gathering and management in Uganda, especially by local and central government authorities, is rather weak. 92 At the height of the insurgency in Teso, the camps were under a virtual curfew with regulations of movements of people controlled by the army. 93 The Paris Commitment to Protect Children from Unlawful Recruitment or Use by Armed Forces or Armed Groups, February 2007 94 It should be noted that traditional cultural practice (using traditional conlict resolution and cleansing rituals) as a way of redressing the wrongs committed by the rebels against the community has recently been advocated by a number of stakeholders, especially during the process of the Juba Peace Talks between the government of Uganda and the LRA rebels. While the Acholi community has cultural provisions for handling heinous crimes including killing, the society had never before dealt with the current level of intra and inter communal violence, many a time involving children against own families at the behest of rebel commanders. 235 Journal of Development Studies 95 This is the period when a young person who returned from rebel captivity has been reunited with her family. 96 Retributive justice emphasizes individual responsibility and accountability for crimes committed. It adheres to the moral notion of peace which emphasizes peace out of justice very close to revenge. As Maiese noted, retributive justice protagonists insist that: “those who break the rules deserve to be punished…people need to be treated in the same way that they treat others…punishment is warranted as a response to a past event of injustice or wrong doing. It acts to reinforce rules that have been broken and balance the scales of justice” (Maiese 2003:1). 97 Restorative justice is a growing movement that strives to achieve reconciliation between crime victims and the persons who have harmed them through the use of various forms of mediation and nonviolent conlict resolution. Under the restorative justice process: “all the parties with a stake in a particular offense come together to resolve collectively how to deal with the aftermath of the offense and its implications for the future” (Marshall 1999:5). 98 See Protocols additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, International Committee of the Red Cross, Geneva, 1977, pp.89-101. This protocol relates to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conlicts (Protocol II), came into force on 8 June 1977. 99 Interview with a formerly Abducted young Female, Kitgum Matidi IDP Camp, 17 April 2009 100 Focus group discussion with 6 male youths, Obyem Decongested Camp, Kitgum District, 22 April 2009 101 Interview with formerly abducted male youth, Pajule IDP Camp, Pader District, 27 March 2009 102 Interview with relative of a murder victim [male youth], Gulu District 29 April 2009 103 Interview with formerly abducted male youth, Padibe trading centre, Kitgum district, 18 April 2009 104 Focus group discussion with victims of violence, Obyem Decongested Camp, Kitgum District, 22 April 2009 105 Interview with a female victim of violence, Kitgum Matidi IDP Camp, Kitgum District 17 April 2009 106 Interview with female youth, Obyem Decongested Camp, Kitgum District , 22 April 2009 107 Interview with male youth, Kitgum Matidi IDP Camp, Kitgum District, 17 April 2009 108 Focus group discussion with victims of violence, Obyem Decongested Camp, Kitgum District, 22 April 2009 236 Journal of Development Studies 109 Focus group discussion with 6 male youths, Obyem Decongested Camp, Kitgum District, 22 April 2009 110 Interview with young woman , Pajule IDP Camp, Pader District, 27 March 2009 111 Focus group discussion with male youth, Kitgum Matidi IDP Camp, Kitgum District, 17 April 2009 112 Focus group discussion with male youth, Kitgum Matidi IDP Camp, Kitgum District, 17 April 2009 113 Interview with elder, Obyem Decongested Camp, Kitgum District, 22 April 2009 114 Focus group Discussion with Local people , Padibe Trading Centre, Kitgum District 18th April 2009 115 Focus group discussion with male victims, Padibe, Kitgum District, 19 April 2009 116 Focus group discussion with male victims, Padibe, Kitgum District, 19 April 2009 117 Interview with male youth, Kitgum Matidi IDP Camp, Kitgum District, 17 April 2009 118 Female participant, Focus group discussion, Obyem Decongested Camp, Kitgum District , 22nd April 2009 119 Interview with female victim, Kitgum Matidi IDP Camp, 17 April 2009 120 Focus group discussions with Formerly Abducted Persons, Pajule IDP Camp, Pader District, 27th March 2009 121 Interview with male victim, Kitgum Matidi IDP Camp, Kitgum District, 17th April 2009 122 Focus group discussion with victims of violence, Obyem Decongested Camp, Kitgum District, 22 April 2009 123 Focus group discussion with male youths, Obyem Decongested Camp, Kitgum District, 22 April 2009 124 Key Informant Interview with oficial from the Acholi Religious Peace Initiative, 29 April, 2009. 125 Interview with male victim, Kitgum Matidi IDP Camp, Kitgum District, 17 April 2009 126 Focus group discussions with formerly abducted persons, Padibe, Kitgum District, 19 April 2009 127 Mato oput (drinking the bitter herb or root) is traditionally used to resolve inter-clan disputes, such as the killing of one clan member by a person of another clan (Latigo 2008). Mato oput is “both a process and a ritual ceremony to restore relationships between clans in the case of intentional murder or an accidental killing” (Latigo 2008, 103-104). It represents “a long and sophisticated process that begins by separating the affected clans, mediation to establish the ‘truth’ and payment of compensation according to by-laws” (Liu Institute for Global Issues and Gulu District NGO Forum 2005, 54). The 237 Journal of Development Studies mato oput ceremony itself is an elaborate ritual beginning with the symbolic beating of a stick, signifying acceptance of guilt by the perpetrator for the killing (see Liu Institute for Global Issues and Gulu District NGO Forum 2005, 57-58). Each clan provides an animal for slaughter, traditionally a sheep and a goat representing the two parties to the conlict (Latigo 2008). The animals are slaughtered and mixed together to symbolize the coming together of the two parties. The parties, or representatives thereof, then partake of symbolic food and drink in an elaborate sequence of events, including drinking of the bitter root (Latigo 2008; Finnstrom 2003). 128 Interview with relative of a murder victim, Kitgum Matidi IDP Camp, 17 April 2009 129 Interview with formerly abducted male youth, Pajule IDP Camp, Pader District, 27 March 2009 130 Focus group discussions with Formerly abducted persons, Padibe, Kitgum District, 19 April 2009 131 Interview with formerly abducted male youth, Gulu District 29 April 2009 132 Article 53 (4) states that “the Prosecutor may, at any time, reconsider a decision whether to initiate an investigation or prosecution based on new facts or information.” 133 Non compliance of perpetrators to the informal justice may be attributed to the reality that the system does not have structured mechanisms for enforcing compliance. It relies more on the willingness of perpetrators to comply. The assumption is that perpetrators believe in the norms and beliefs that constitute and sustain the traditional and or informal justice systems. 134 This paper comes out of a broader Research Project that I conducted with a colleague, Stephen Langole, under the auspices of United Nations Resident Coordinator Ofice in Gulu. My colleague and I beneited from having worked closely with many other people whom I am unable to mention by name. I sincerely thank United Nations Development Programmes for inancing the project. I particularly wish to pay tribute to the anonymous person who reviewed the irst draft of this paper for a job well done. Any error of omissions or commissions is solely my responsibility. 135 This conlict was started in 1986 when Yoweri Museveni, the current President of Uganda, who forcefully took power. Since that time various groups emerged to ight against the government including the LRA. 136 It is however hard to put a igure on the unemployment rate in the Acholi sub-region. 137 During the conlict before 2007, other programmes implemented included NUSAF 1, PEAP, NURP, however they were not effective. 138 During the war humanitarian assistance was the main activity, providing food aid. 139 A lot of NGOs and development wings of various governments such as JICA, USAID, DFID are implementing various programmes in the region. 238 Journal of Development Studies 140 See PRDP 141 See, for example, Morito Gracius, et al 2009. 142 An extensive literature analyses youth labour market in developing countries (Merito et al, 2009; Kapsos, 2011; LMNS, 2006; Ali, 2011; Muir, 2003; Ayai, 2005). All these authors address issues of employment and unemployment in developing countries like Uganda. 143 A crude comparison of our unemployment situation in Acholi can be made with Liberia which has experienced war and is implementing recovery programmes like in Acholi. According to the study by a group of economists from the World Bank Liberia has youth unemployment rate of 68% of youth between 15-24 years out of the population of about 3 million people. 144 The way unemployment rate is measured is quite different from the quantitative results of the potential unemployment based on the perception of only surveyed vulnerable youth. 145 In the study, districts were broken further into urban, rural urbanizing centres and preurban areas. For example, in the pre-urban areas, in the age group 31-35, 17% male 24% female; 26-30, 14% male and 19% female; 19-25, 40% male, 45% female and 15-18 29% male and 22% female. 146 Furthermore, within each age group the unemployment rate can be broken down by gender. For example, the female unemployment incidence is higher than male unemployment in some age groups especially age groups 15-18 and 19-25. The highest rate of female unemployment is in the age group 19-26 and the lowest in the age group 31-35. For male youth the highest unemployment incidence is also in the same age group 19-26 and the lowest in the age group 31-35 as well. 147 The underemployment challenge has also been recognised by many labour economists such as Merito et al, 2009; Kapsos, 2011; Lmis, 2006; Ali, 2011; Muir, 2003; Ayai, 2005). 148 This is from personal observations and discussion with the district leadership. 149 Others think that police should put curfew in places where sex trade lourishes. 150 Some people suggest that the elders should do more to impart acceptable cultural traditions and norms to check immorality. 151 Early entry means you are below the statutory age of 18 years and you are not considered to be a member of the labour force. 152 Many labour economists (Merito, et al 2009; Kapsos, 2011; Lmis, 2006, Ali, 2011, Muir, 2003) further conirm the role of education in the employment of youth in Sub-Saharan Africa. There is normally a strong correlation between employment and education or human capital. 239 Journal of Development Studies 153 So commentators have complained about the quality of education in the country especially in the UPE schools. 154 See Michael. P. Todaro. 2005. Economics of Developing countries, London: McMillan. 155 See Merito Garcia, et al. 2008. Youth in Africa’s labour market. Washington DC: The World Bank. 156 Commercialization is the strategy being used to make agriculture attractive. 157 See Veronique Dudouet. 2012. “From combatants to peace builders: A case for inclusive, participatory, and holistic security transitions” A policy report. Berghof Foundation, 158 See Development Plans for various districts. 159 Many papers argue that programming should be multi-faceted. 160 In Zimbabwe, ‘youth’ refers to persons who aged 19 to 34. According to the 2012 national census, Zimbabwe has 4.8 million youths, which is 53 percent of the country’s population. 161 The World Economic Forum meeting in Cape Town, South Africa, a few weeks ago emphasised the issue of entrepreneurial education as the only way to solve unemployment all over the world. 162 Achieving the highest level of one’s potential. Very many people die before they have actualised themselves. Deprivation of opportunity by stringent rules, lack of economic resources and opportunity to experiment with ideas and resources prevents most people from achieving self-actualisation. 163 It is a requirement that students at MSU spend a full year attached to a work environment. This is called work-related learning (WRL). During this period students are expected to put into practice the theory they will have acquired at university before coming for WRL. 164 Entrepreneurial education is an instrument for human capital development, and for sustaining economic growth. 165 This is a state of being deprived from meeting one’s legal needs and wants. The human needs and wants are enshrined in the 1948 United Nations Declaration of Universal Human Rights (Starky in Osler 1994). 166 Economic freedom entails individuals’ (youths) freedom to decide how they would develop and use their productive abilities, trade in goods and services with others, and keep the fruits of their labour. 167 The term is derived from the French term egal meaning equal. Egalitarianism is a political doctrine that holds that all people are equal and so must have the same economic, legal, political and social rights (Erdal and Whiten, 1996). 240 Journal of Development Studies 168 The vision of the Ministry to achieve true empowerment of Zimbabwean youths. The overall mandate of the Ministry is, inter alia, to formulate, review and execute policy on youth development and empowerment of indigenous citizens; and monitor and evaluate compliance with the National Indigenization and Empowerment Act. 169 This a public owned irm. In Zimbabwe, most of these companies are under performing. 170 Non-conformists are continuously searching for the new products and new ways of succeeding. 241