Africa in Search of Democracy and Good Governance: Ghana’s Case Vladimir Antwi-Danso (PhD) The paper takes a panoramic view of the concept of democracy and its concomitant product of good governance, asserting that the two concepts are not synonymous, the latter involving a wider spectrum of variables than the former. The paper concedes though that the former may be a prerequisite for attaining, in good measure, the principles of the latter. It is the contention of the paper that, even though the basic pr inciples of democracy are universal, their application is contextual and that any attempt to universalize the application of the principles of democracy would stand in conflict with socio-historical and cultural relativities. Through the lenses of the concepts so established, the paper then measures Ghana’s current situation, asserting that the basic principles of democracy, as per established parameters, may be said to be present. The paper is however emphatic about the absence of good governance in the practice of democracy in Ghana, the basic culprit being the overly reliance on the patronage system. The result is that accountability is lost, indiscipline and corruption are rife, and democracy is hiccupping badly in Ghana. The paper recommends that only constitutionalism (total respect for the constitutional order – the social contract) and institutionalism (the neutrality of and rule by institutions of state) can prop up democracy and good governance in Ghana. Introduction Africa is noted to have produced most of the grotesquely predatory governments that the world has ever known. Governance is at best neo-patrimonial and at worst, clientilist, prebendalist or simply, predatory. Since independence, a syndrome of civil/military cycles has created a legacy of stagnation, decay, and decline in all spheres of human endeavour. Africa is the least developed continent; out of the 43 Least Developed Countries (LDCs) as designated by the World Bank, 32 are in sub-Saharan Africa. Africa’s share of global trade is a mere 2%. Average life expectancy is only 54 years. Infrastructural development, entrepreneurial capacity, trade and industry are all badly hiccupping in Africa. Disease, poverty, hunger, and strife are the signal posts of Africa’s landscape. We may attribute these to several causes, but the ultimate is the democratic deficit, itself engendered by ineffective governance systems. The ‘Africa Rising’ mantra seems to establish a sense of false complacency, with about seventeen countries being touted as making progress through a mixture of prudent economic management and effective democratic governance. Ghana is one of such countries however, a deeper reflection of happenings in Ghana would reveal that democracy is at best, very much hiccupping. 1 Effective Governance: Definition and Context It is usually difficult to have a water-tight definition of concepts, especially those whose universal application is still debatable. The World Bank gives a rather workable definition of ‘governance’. “Conceptually, governance (as opposed to “good” governance) can be defined as the rule of the rulers, typically within a given set of rules. One might conclude that governance is the process – by which authority is conferred on rulers, by which they make the rules, and by which those rules are enforced and modified. Thus, understanding governance requires an identification of both the rulers and the rules, as well as the various processes by which they are selected, defined, and linked together and with the society generally. Nonetheless, within this concept of governance, the obvious second question is: What is good governance? Again, the debate on the quality of governance has been clouded by a slew of slightly differing definitions and understanding of what is actually meant by the term. Typically, it is defined in terms of the mechanisms thought to be needed to promote it. For example, in various places, good governance has been associated with democracy and good civil rights, with transparency, with the rule of law, and with efficient public services.” 1 In the opinion of others, the definition of good governance goes further than mechanisms and they propose that good governance be equated with specific outcomes.2 For example, the UNDP notes that: “Good governance is, among other things, participatory, transparent and accountable. It is also effective and equitable. And it promotes the rule of law. Good governance ensures that political, social and economic priorities are based on broad consensus in society and that the voices of the poorest and the most vulnerable are heard in decision-making over the allocation of development resources.”3 In basic terms, ‘Good governance’ is characterized by participation, transparency, accountability, rule of law, effectiveness, equity, etc. Contextually therefore, Good governance refers to the management of government in a manner that is essentially free of abuse and corruption, and with due regard for the rule of law to obtain development objectives. Democracy and Good Governance The oft accepted definition of democracy is that given by Abraham Lincoln as “government of the people, for the people and by the people”. The genesis of this definition is the period of juxtaposition between Athenian democracy and Spartan oligarchy/despotism. Time would not allow us to go into the details of the epoch. But today, democracy has been equated to good governance and leadership. But they may not refer to the same things. World Bank, (1994), Governance: The World Bank’s Experience, World Bank: Washington DC. This is in the Rawlsian sense of assuring that everyone, irrespective of social or economic status, has a voice in governing and receives just, fair, equitable treatment. 3 http://magnet.undp.org/ 1 2 2 There is generally a consensus, and especially in Africa, today that the concept of ‘democracy’ is intrinsically linked with “governance”, which of late has been given a normative tag ‘good’. Contemporary understanding of governance as a system of organizing society takes into account the relationship to democracy, development, state effectiveness, and the market. From this perspective, “governance” can be defined in terms of state-society relations and internal structures and processes within government as a principal organ of the state. In this sense, democracy becomes a sub-set of governance. The Idea of Democracy The idea of democracy is problematic in many ways. Many are those who argue that a right to democracy does not exist. No-one though contests the fact that democracy has instrumental value and utility; i.e., it is good to the extent that it promotes good outcomes. In this context one may not contest the position of Richard Arneson that the supposed right to democracy is an example of a ‘procedural right’, and ‘procedural rights are merely instruments for securing morally desirable outcomes’.4 We may therefore, distinguish between democracy as means and democracy as goals. According to Ali Mazrui, the most fundamental of the goals of democracy are probably four in number. First is to make the rulers accountable and answerable for their actions and policies. Second is to make the citizens effective participants in choosing those rulers and in regulating their actions. Thirdly, to make the society as open and the economy as transparent as possible; and fourthly to make the social order fundamentally just and equitable to the greatest number possible. ‘Accountable rulers, actively participating citizens, open society and social justice – those are the four fundamental ends of democracy’5 How to achieve these goals has elicited different means. It must be noted however, that it is precisely this line of thinking that lends justification for constitutional constraints on majority rule. Democracy then becomes a kind of contractual system with underlying moral obligations, where the authority of the state is based on the consent of the people, what is often noted in the literature as the ‘social contract’. The social 4 Arneson, Richard J., Democratic Rights at National and Workplace Levels, in David Copp, Jean Hampton, and John E. Roemer, (eds), The Idea of Democracy, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1995, pp118 -148 5 Mazrui, Ali, Who Killed Democracy in Africa: Clues of the Past, Concerns for the Future, http://igcs.binghamton.edu/igcs_site/dirton9.html, accessed, April 12, 2011 3 contract then merely spells out the means for achieving the goals of democracy. This is because socio-cultural and historical relativities shape the means for achieving the goals of democracy. Mazrui demonstrates this by comparing democratic practices in Great Britain and the United States of America. ‘In making the rulers more accountable some democracies (like the United States) have chosen separation of powers and checks and balances, while other democracies (like the United Kingdom) have chosen the more concentrated notion of sovereignty of parliament. These are different means towards making the executive branch more accountable and answerable in its use of power. On the open society, freedom of the press and speech, there is also a difference in how the United States and Great Britain regulate it. The United States has a highly permissive legal system on freedom of speech, but more restrictive public opinion. The United Kingdom has a more restrictive legal system on freedom of the press, but a more tolerant public opinion’.6 What Mazrui worries about is also our worry here: ‘If the goals of democracy are the same while the means for achieving them differ, are there African means of achieving those same four goals of accountability of rulers, participation of the citizens, openness of the society, and greater social justice? That is the challenge facing constitution makers in Africa – how to keep the democratic goals constant while looking for democratic means more appropriate to Africa’.7 What are the values intrinsic to African democracy? African communalism, love for the family, love for children, yearnings for inclusiveness – we discard these at our own peril. What is Good Governance? The parameters for measuring good governance are mixed and difficult to universalize. Often times we equate democracy to good governance. But are they the same? The difficulty lies in socio-cultural and historical relativities. Usually, universal adult suffrage and/or constant elections, the presence of a constitution and institutions of governance, are the quickest pointers to democracy and good governance. But these mean nothing, if these parameters have not been steeped in socio-cultural and historical specificities, and especially if they are not intended for some specific goals. We may here refer again to Mazrui’s comparison of British and American experiences on public space and public opinion. Take also, for instance, the collegiate electoral system in the US; take also the British system, where the Prime 6 7 ibid Mazrui, Ali, op.cit. 4 Minister is not elected by popular vote; take most parts of the Arab world, where women have no voting rights, and you would realize that there is something wrong when trying to universalize the principle of universal suffrage. But as already indicated above such universal application of the principles of democracy is, in large measure, the cause of mis-governance in Africa. In my own humble estimation, democracy has often been confused with good governance. While, the sphere of democracy would include a contract (constitution) that defines and ensures separation of powers, institutions of governance, freedoms, and change and continuity (i.e., frequent elections), ‘good governance’ goes far beyond such a realm. Beyond what has been described here as offering democracy, good governance must involve good, visionary leadership; institutionalism; prudence in economic management (including the provision of the basic needs of the people – driving down poverty; probity and accountability; dialogue, transparency and inclusiveness; and adherence to global best practices. DEMOCRACY  Constitution  Separation of Powers Institutions of Governance Freedoms and rights (of speech, association, etc) Frequent Elections    GOOD GOVERNANCE The Presence of Democracy PLUS         Good, visionary Leadership Institutionalism Prudence in Economic governance Probity and accountability Dialogue and Transparency Participation in the process by the socio-economic partners in development Provision of basic needs of the people Adherence to global best practices Source: Author’s own Clearly and by our matrix above, the domain of good governance is wider than that of democracy. There is the possibility of having all the ingredients of democracy and yet good governance may not ensue. It is only in such understanding that space may be made for socio-cultural and historical specificities. Good governance is inseparable from good leadership and the active participation of the socio-economic partners in development. In short, ‘Good governance’ is the effective exercise of power and authority by government in a 5 manner that serves to improve the quality of life of the population at large. This includes using state power to create a society in which the full development of individuals and of their capacity to control their lives is possible. A ruling class that sees the state solely as a means of expropriating the nation's limited resources (as we have here indicated is mostly the case in the African setting) is simply incapable of good governance. Going by the World Bank definition, earlier given, it is clear that while governance (or democracy as a form of it) is concerned with the ‘ruler and the rules’, good governance is about the ruler, the rules, and the mechanisms needed to achieve developmental ends. The Ruler The Rules Mechanisms Source: Author’s own Africa is making significant progress in promoting good governance in all its dimensions.8 This progress is not limited to violent conflicts which are being tackled effectively; but the continent’s economic growth rates in recent years have also surpassed the global average. And this is what has brought about the ‘Africa rising’ mantra. Despite these giant strides, the enormity of the challenges faced by Africa in its new determination to accelerate the momentum of development points to a difficult and daunting task. Africa is, perhaps, the only region where poverty in increasing. The continent is also is not on track to meet the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). 8 These i clude collecti e efforts such as the Ne Part ership for Africa’s De elop e t (NEPAD) and its concomitant African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM); several protocols on democracy and good governance; intensification of efforts at regionalism; 6 The Triad: Democracy, Stability, and Development The nexus between governance and development has been explicitly identified by the World Bank. In the 1992 report entitled “Governance and Development”, the World Bank set out its definition of good governance. This term is defined as “the manner in which power is exercised in the management of a country’s economic and social resources for development”.9 One other big issue about the system of governance and democracy in Africa concerns its relationship to development. The crucial question that always comes to mind where there is talk about democracy and development has been the issue whether Africa is underdeveloped because it is primarily undemocratic or Africa is undemocratic because it is primarily underdeveloped? Which is cause and which is effect? There is yet another dimension: stability. Stability is a socio-political precondition for both sustainable development and durable democracy. Africa’s three greatest needs therefore, are democracy, stability, and development, the two being the basic canvass for crafting the contours of the latter. At the base is democracy which ensures stability, upon which development may be forthcoming. The kind of development a country achieves is intrinsically linked with the amount of stability as generated by the viability of the democratic practice. Alternatively, we may represent the Triad as shown below, to depict the fact that these variables move in concert, each acting as a catalyst for the others, although, as has been said above, the first two (democracy and stability) would always be a prerequisite for development to ensure sustainably. The Triad Development Democracy Stability Source: Author’s own 9 World Bank Report 1992 7 And this is only achievable, if the basic stakeholders play their respective roles; the government, Institutions of state, the Private sector, and civil Society, each within the remit offered by the constitution. It is only in this way that democratic consolidation is possible. Development PS Democracy (Good Governance) G = Government I = Institutions CS = Civil Society PS = Private Sector CS G I Stability Source: Author’s own The paramountcy of good governance in the achievement of development goals, including the MDGs, has been recognized in the 2001 AU/NEPAD Foundation Document on Conditions for Sustainable Development in Africa, which clearly states, among others thus: ‘Good governance involves the creation of the conducive socio-economic, legal, political and institutional environments to foster the state’s material strength; to free people from the evils of abject poverty, preventable diseases, ignorance, squalor and idleness; to provide the citizenry with the voice to choose those who rule over them, to hold those in power accountable when they do not work for the greater good, to demand transparent structures and to fight down socially regressive policies, and to treat every citizen equal without regard to gender, race, ethnicity, religion, and creed.’10 The African Setting In the African setting, governance problems have been the main bane in stability and development. According to Julius Ihonbvere, governance in Africa has been at best neopatrimonial and at worst clientilist and predatory. True, Africa has produced some of the most grotesquely predatory leaders the world has ever known. Nationalist leaders who 10 AU/NEPAD Foundation Document on Conditions for Sustainable Development in Africa, 2001 8 ushered Africa into independence did not change the neo-patrimonial pattern of colonial rule – a government-led discriminatory economic development that avoids the growth of local entrepreneurial capacity. They also pursued clientilist policies that assured continued support for their rule. Dictatorship was the order, while in later years, mere predation – imprudence in economic governance, including massive corruption, profligacy, and theft11 – symbolized Africa’s governance style. It is against this background that Africa has seen lots of civilmilitary cycles and a host of civil wars, some of which are yet to abate. Indeed, the failure of democracy and economic development in Africa are due, in large part, to the scramble for wealth by predator elites who have dominated African politics since independence. They see the state as a source of personal wealth accumulation. There is high premium on the control of the state, which is the biggest and most easily accessible source of wealth accumulation. The people in power and those who seek power use all means to attain their goal. This includes fostering ethnic sectarianism and political repression. Competition for control of the state, whether between the military and civilian classes or between civilian political parties, is invariably ferocious and generates instability. Incidentally, the patronage system is so entrenched that every political party would want to maintain the status quo. While in opposition, they are first to point at the ills of the patronage, clientilist system, promising to eliminate such and consolidate democracy. But when in power, they would need to sustain the system in order to maximize the spoils of victory. Larry Diamond sums up the problem thus: ‘The common root cause of economic decay, state collapse, ethnic violence, civil war, and humanitarian disaster in Africa is bad, abusive governance. Because most states lack any semblance of a rule of law and norms of accountability that bind the conduct of those in government, their societies have fallen prey to massive corruption, nepotism, and the personal whims of a tiny ruling elite. In such circumstances, every political clique and ethnic group struggles for control of a stagnant or diminishing stock of wealth. There are no institutions to facilitate trust, cooperation, or confidence in the future. Every competing faction tries to grab what it can for the moment while excluding other groups’.12 The cycle thus continues and democracy hiccups badly, because constitutionalism and institutionalism are lost. Imprudence in economic governance then results, since the government would need to be profligate in order to sustain the patronage system. Many of the apparently senseless civil conflicts in Africa are due to the battle for the spoils of power. Incidentally, at the slightest semblance of democracy in any part of Africa, the international 11 The image that comes to mind is of kleptomaniacs and megalomaniacs like Mobutu Sese Seko (of the D.R Congo, formerly Zaire) Jean-Bedel Bokassa (of the Central Africa Republic), and Sani Abacha (of Nigeria). 12 Larry Diamond, (1998), Building a Democratic Africa, Hoover Digest, No. 3 9 community, led especially by the Western media, is quick to shower praise.13 Certainly, an underlying cause of many of the manifestations of bad, ineffective governance in Africa, including political repression, corruption, ethnic sectarianism and inefficient management of the economy, is the endeavour by the ruling classes to be and remain part of the global elite despite their nations’ poverty. As earlier indicated, good and effective governance involves the management of government in a manner that is essentially free of abuse and corruption, and with due regard for the rule of law to obtain development objectives. And this is attainable only with good and effective leadership; leadership that is visionary, selfless, dedicated, transformational, and above all, accountable (especially, social accountability, an approach that relies on civic engagement, i.e., in which it is ordinary citizens and/or civil society organizations who participates directly or indirectly in exacting accountability). “In leadership roles, accountability is the acknowledgment and assumption of responsibility for actions, products, decisions, and policies including the administration, governance, and implementation within the scope of the role or employment position and encompassing the obligation to report, explain and be answerable for resulting consequences.” 14 With emphasis, one can say that this is conspicuously missing from Africa. Impact on Socio-Economic Development The role of the state is critical in economic development. Improving and sustaining growth in developing countries is a challenge not only because economic policies to promote and sustain growth are difficult, but more because these need to be supported by governance capabilities, which in African countries are correspondingly weak. The experience of successful developers suggests that growth-promoting governance was important.15 Generally, states in Africa are incapacitated as instruments of development because ruling classes, including people in and outside of government, are motivated by objectives that have little to do with the common good. 13 Nigeria under Obasanjo, Niger under Tanja, Senegal under Abdulai Wade, and Algeria under Bouteflika were all touted as democracies, worth emulating. In actual fact, nothing resembling democracy may be said to have been established by any of the aforementioned leaders. Ghana is being praised for democratic stability, but as shall be shown presently, the so-called democratic gain is fragile. 14 Williams, Reyes (2006), Leadership Accountability in a Globalizing World. London: Palgrave Macmillan. 15 Reference here is to the Asian Tigers 10 Therefore, the governance capabilities, which describe the areas in which a particular state can intervene and its effectiveness, clearly matter for development outcomes. Scholars and practitioners such as Joseph Stiglitz and Amartya Sen, have presented intricate arguments demonstrating the causal connections between governance and democracy on growth and development.16 Bad, ineffective governance, even if it does not lead to instability, may create economic dislocations: corruption, high inflationary trends, fiscal deficits, high unemployment rates, poverty etc., which in turn may foster political upheavals. Such political upheavals cause a reduction in state capacities, especially in growth. According to one influential study, civil wars reduce GDP per capita at an annual rate of 2.2 percent relative to estimates of the trend likely in the absence of conflict.17 Liberia, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Kenya, Zimbabwe, La Cote d’Ivoire, Guinea, and Mali have shown varying degrees of economic deterioration as a result of the absence of democratic governance at various points in time. The economic impact of mis-governance leading to instability is not limited to the country in question. Adjoining countries, apart from suffering from the influx of refugees, may also experience economic de-stabilization. For instance, when political and economic problems started in Côte d’Ivoire in the late 1990s, the spillovers turned progressively negative to the West African countries that had positively benefited from their economic links with the country. Cross-country empirical econometric analysis has it that on average being a neighbor of a failing state at peace - meaning a state which is not experiencing outright civil war - reduces the growth rate by 0.6 percentage points per year.18 This average effect may be exacerbated in cases where the economic interdependence between countries is high, as is the case between Côte d’Ivoire and several West African countries. Collier and O’Connell have equally indicated that the negative neighbourhood effect of mis-governance and instability is stronger than the positive one. A country’s growth rate increases by 0.4% if all its neighbors 16 See Stiglitz, J. “More Instruments and Broader Goals: Moving Toward the Post-Washington Consensus”. The 1998 WIDER Annual Lecture Helsinki, Finland: http://www.wider.unu.edu/publications/annuallectures/ annual-lecture-1998.pdf; Sen, A. “Development as Freedom”. Anchor Books, New York 2000. 17 Paul Collier, On the Economic Consequences of Civil War, Oxford Economic Papers 51 (1999), 168–83. http://www.worldbank.org/research/conflict/papers/cw-consq.pdf, accessed April 13, 2013 18 Chauvet, Lisa; Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, 2007, The Cost of failing States and the Limits of Sovereignty, UNU-WIDER Research Paper N0. 2007/30. Also at http://www.wider.unu.edu/stc/repec/pdfs/rp2007/rp2007-30.pdf, accessed April 13, 2013 11 grow by 1%.19 But the costs of instability add up over time and spread beyond the bounds of the failing state. For instance, since instability in Côte d’Ivoire started in the late 1990s, the effects have extended to the entire Western Africa Economic Monetary Union (WAEMU). The cumulative trade losses for intra-WAEMU trade are estimated at close to $9 billion. Thus, without instability in Côte d’Ivoire, intra-WAEMU trade could have been 60 percent higher than it actually was. In effect, growth prospects are determined by whether governments use good policies to leverage growth opportunities and avoid running down their states into instability. The Farce of Democracy in Africa Beginning with the fall of Communism in Eastern Europe, a new wave of democratization seemed to have started blowing in Africa. By 1995 more than 30 African countries had drawn constitutions and had ushered themselves into some form or other of democratic governance. But by 1998 however, and into the beginning of the 21st Century, many countries had relapsed into chaos. This democratic backsliding was because the wave did not allow for institutional renewal and capacity building. Besides, most of the Generals only turned themselves into new cloaks. Constitutional changes could easily be made to allow incumbents to continue to contest elections. A new crop of African leaders had given hope for democratic renewal.20 But the nature of democracy was such that African leaders were merely satisfying basics that they knew would meet the expectations of the world at large. Elections were fought on tribal, ethnic, and/or religious lines. Incumbency is always exploited to the full; state institutions become party institutions etc. This was the case in Kenya, Zimbabwe, and Ivory Coast. Indeed, in many African countries, elections are being fought, using tools like incumbency, the tribe, religion, and money. In many instances, politics is so heavily monetized that ordinarily genuine people may hardly enter into politics. Africa’s Dysfunctional Political Systems The political crises in several African countries, exemplified by the crises in the Ivory Coast, Kenya (2007), Zimbabwe (2008 and ongoing) and North Africa (the Arab Spring) must be seen in the broader context of the democratic deficit in Africa. Democracy in Africa is badly hiccupping, because of the socio-historical and cultural specificities of the continent. Collier and O’Connell, 2008 These included Presidents J.A Kufour of Ghana, Olusegun Obasanjo of Nigeria, Thabo Mbeki of South Africa, and Abdulai Wade of Senegal. 19 20 12 Contemporary African states are poorly functioning hybrids of indigenous cultures and customs mixed with Arab and European models of governance that arrived with invasions, colonialism, migration, and globalization. These have been compounded by some global imperatives. In such a setting, one would expect visionary leadership to be able to chart new contours, taking into cognizance Africa’s socio-historical relativities for the development of their countries. Political leadership is a function of the socio-cultural and historical set up of a given society. Political leadership in Africa has been shaped by Africa’s socio-cultural as well as historical specificities. Unfortunately, instead of looking at democracy as a process, African leaders view it as an event; and instead of institutional renewal, there is the personal and/or the individual (‘big politics’). One basic problem in African governance, therefore, is the fixation on the personal failings of leaders. This obscures the deeper problem: a fundamental disjuncture between Africa’s modern political institutions and its ethnic communities and traditional institutions. Africa’s governance crises are firmly rooted in its dysfunctional political systems. This disjuncture, so well reflected in many of the crises (Ivory Coast, Kenya, Zimbabwe, etc.) is at the heart of the continent’s governance crisis. It is at this point that the contextual nature of democracy becomes real. It is against this background that sinking the roots of democracy in Africa has been no easy a task. Many African rulers still equate peaceful opposition with treachery. Too often, African bigwigs (and incidentally supported by the international community) think it best, after a shabby election, such as those in Kenya in late 2007 and in Zimbabwe in 2008, to let bad losers stay on in paralytic governments of national unity, bringing temporary calm, by giving the main miscreants a chance to keep their snouts in the trough. Ghana’s Experience Ghana has had a very chequered history of civil/military cycles. Governance has at best been neo-patrimonial and at worst dictatorial and predatory. Ghana has experienced in her governance history denial of civil liberties, imposition of dogma, exclusivism, and clientilism. She has equally experienced short periods of democratic experimentations. It is this kind of warped contours that informed the choice of canvass for the 1992 Constitution, a framework that genuinely attempts to achieve what the contractualists hope for in a democracy. We have had six successful elections, albeit with some jolts. These (the jolts) are to be expected in any democracy. The most important thing is the availability of viable 13 institutional props that could at any time withstand such shocks. But after all, even the advanced democracies have always had jolts! The beauty of democracy is that it is a never-ending process and not an event. As a process it creates its own dynamics and logic and, therefore grows in a self-correcting spiral. In this sense, there is always change and continuity. We have a constitution that sets out the framework for governance and development of the country in clear unambiguous terms. First, the Preamble vests all power in the people. The Constitution also sets the framework of governance in clear separation of powers and duties and obligation of powers. It also establishes institutions of state, clearly spelling out their remits and/or powers and functions. It has a whole chapter on Freedoms, what can aptly pass for a Bill of Rights. Above all, the 1992 Constitution of Ghana sets out the parameters and/or direction for socio-economic development (Chapter Six).21 Ours, therefore, is a harmonious blend of the historical path trodden so far, the imperatives of today, and a focus on tomorrow. It is within this context that governance in Ghana should have had the most peaceful of trends. What are we aiming to achieve in governance? What is the goal toward which we are heading? These, remember, were the concerns of Ali Mazrui. The answer to good democratic governance was given by Robespierre in a famous speech to the Convention in France, way back in 1794, during the French Revolution. “What is the goal toward which we are heading? The peaceful enjoyment of liberty and equality; the reign of that eternal justice whose laws have been inscribed, not in marble and stone, but in the hearts of all men, even in that of the slave who forgets them and in that of the tyrant who denies them. We seek an order of things in which all the base and cruel passions are enchained, all the beneficent and generous passions are awakened by the laws; where ambition becomes the desire to merit glory and to serve our country; where distinctions are born only of equality itself; where the citizen is subject to the magistrate, the magistrate to the people, and the people to justice; where our country assures the well-being of each individual, and where each individual proudly enjoys our country's prosperity and glory; where every soul grows greater through the continual flow of republican sentiments, and by the need of deserving the esteem of a great people; where the arts are the adornments of the liberty which ennobles them and commerce the source of public wealth rather than solely the monstrous opulence of a few families.” 22 21 22 Chapter Six of the 1992 Constitution of Ghana – The Directive Principles of State Policy Robespierre’s speech on Political Morality delivered to the Convention, February 5, 1794. http://chnm.gmu.edu/revolution/d/413/ Accessed Sept. 15, 2010 14 The contractualist inclination in Robespierre is never in doubt here. And so is Ghana’s constitution also drawn in the contractualist spirit. Unfortunately, those who have obligation to ensure “the peaceful enjoyment of liberty and equality; the reign of that eternal justice…” whose laws have been inscribed in the constitution, are rather those, whose ambitions undermine the “general will”; whose passions are awakened not by the laws, but by parochial unmeritorious glory; and whose actions, therefore deny the people the pride and flow of constitutional sentiments. The picture therefore, in Ghana today is that there is a beautiful constitution, but there is no constitutionalism. For constitutionalism to thrive and for democracy to function effectively, the need for tolerance and accommodation cannot be overemphasized. Reference ought to always be made only to the constitution. The generality of the people must be aware of their civic duties and rights. They must understand the state, its functions, its institutions, and its general direction. Above all, they must be part of the making of the state. A people, divorced from the state and its institutions are doomed. Ignorance becomes their lot; they become gullible, uninspired, neglected, and unimportant in nation-building efforts. They become a hot magma from where irrationality explodes; they become raw deposits of unreasonable, worthless cadre corps, from which unmerited radicalism is mined. Deterring Democracy Ghana has been widely touted as the best in terms of democracy on the continent. It had gone through successive elections (six of them), without any serious hitches. There is much applause for Ghana’s seeming stability. Incidentally, Ghana is systematically nurturing all the vices and/or negative tendencies enumerated above. As already indicated, even though there is a constitution, there is no constitutionalism. The importance of state institutions is gradually diminishing as they are subjected to unnecessary intimidation and ridicule. In most parts, they are belted under the hypnosis, whims, and caprices of the incumbent government at any given time. They would be at the beck and call of the incumbent government, instead of being subject only to the constitution, as demanded by the contractualist understanding of democracy. Parliament has equally been reduced to a House of Clubs, each club seeking strategies to undermine the other, instead of designing pathways to greater growth, where, as Robespierre rightly put it, “each individual proudly enjoys our country's prosperity and glory; where every soul grows greater through the continual flow of republican sentiments.” Nor have we spared our Judiciary. They are mocked, intimidated, subjected to public ridicule, and are made to feel important only in so far as they do our bidding. And what of the Presidency 15 itself? On the one hand, the presidency has been turned into a fortress, where no wrong is done, no sin is committed, and where no one ever working there could ever sin. On the other hand, the presidency is disrespected and reduced to mockery. Of great worry is the patronage system, which the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) describes as the root cause for deterring democracy in Ghana. In its 2011 Report on ‘Democracy and Governance Assessment in Ghana’,23 USAID observes that both main parties largely agree on the purpose of the political game: to capture the patronage networks that make continued political success more likely. This explains the hyper-aggressive, winner-takes-all nature of elections in Ghana. Incidentally, the Report laments that the likelihood of changing the political game from the current winner-takes-all patronage system to one in which politics is a means of promoting the collective good seems low at this point. It is a well-known fact that the patronage system breeds clientilism, corruption, and polarization; ingredients which lay the foundation not only for deterring democracy but also for preparing towards civil upheavals. If all that is being described here are a reality, then it is democracy that is seriously being undermined and/or deterred. Ours is a democracy that is badly hiccupping. And it is precisely so because the role, expected of three very important props to democracy is not adequately being played. Incidentally, in most instances, they are rather to blame for the hiccupping nature of our nascent democracy. I am here referring to the role of the Politicians, the Media, and Civil society. Democracy The politician Intercourse Dialogue Public Choice The Public Civil Society The Media Source: Author’s own 23 USAID, Ghana, Ghana: Democracy and Governance Assessment, Accra, August 2011. 16 Politicians Politicians have reneged on their role (as custodians of the general will of the people) by their insipid desire just to undo each other both in and outside of parliament, in the media, and in general discourses on the future direction of this dear country of ours. In most parts, politics has become a conduit for personal glorification; a path towards life and living; indeed, a profit-oriented profession. In such a setting, the compromises that are needed, the imperative of tolerance, the temperament for designing and fulfilling the national good or will, and the observance of the general political morality, essentially needed for democracy and development, are all thrown to the wind. This is precisely also because we are having a system of historical and cultic cleavages with ideological roots, whereas modern liberalism requires contestation and choice in ideas. As argued forcefully by Lipset: "where a number of historic cleavages intermix and create the basis for ideological elite politics, democracy will be unstable and weak, for by definition such politics does not include the concept of tolerance"24 Let us note that it was this senseless cleavages that created the condition for intractable animosity among the political elite in Rwanda, and aided by a gullible public and an irresponsible media the country almost imploded. Mention here may be made of the (in)famous role played by Ackayesu, (a well-known and respected Hutu politician who consistently appealed to his followers to rise against the Tutsis) in engineering the genocide. What is more worrisome is that this situation has created a tendency for the polarization of society. The political elite have by their conduct been using all tools in the political tool-box in an attempt to undo each other. There are several pockets of conflicts in Ghana, which have been exacerbated by politics.25 Another area where the Ghanaian politician is deterring democracy is the insipid display of intolerance through arrogance and intemperate language. Threats, intimidation, lack of décor, vituperative attacks on opponents, refusing to talk to issues, show of vindictiveness, exclusivism – all these have created a sense of “us versus them” syndrome. Mutual loathing and mistrust, using indecent language, and the seeming criminalization of opposition is the mosaic of our political landscape. Interestingly, criminality is even seen in political colours and politics itself is being criminalized. Politics is thus reduced to a zero-sum game by politicians. As a zero-sum game politicians would even want to use state institutions and at times violence to do their bidding. Today, religion 24 Lipset 1960: 74. The intractable conflicts in Dagbon, Wa, Winneba, Bawku, have all been noted to have started as mere Chieftaincy and/or land disputes but been exacerbated by political interference. The unfolding drama in the YaNa (Overlord of Dagbon) murder trials, where the Bench is being politicised, is a case in point. 25 17 and the tribe have become tools for political contestation. This has engendered a situation where intolerance degenerates into instability. Indeed, this is the socio-psychological canopy that roofs Ghana’s nascent democracy today. Perhaps Gibson is damn right when he said emphatically that ‘political elites cannot be counted on to be the guardians of democracy and tolerance’.26 Can we then count on the Media and/or Civil society? Incidentally, some politicians have succeeded in courting the media; they use the media for propaganda and dirty politics against each other. The Media Alexis de Tocqueville was among the first political thinkers to recognize the importance of the media as a powerful force for the promotion of democracy. “The press causes political life to circulate through all parts of that vast territory. Its eye is constantly open to detect the secret springs of political designs and to summon the leaders of all parties in turn to the bar of public opinion. It rallies the interest of the community round certain principles and draws up the creed of every party; for it affords a means of intercourse between those who hear and address each other without ever coming into immediate contact.”27 Effectively therefore, democracy requires an active citizenry who invariably depend on the media to supply them with the information they need in order to participate meaningfully in socio-economic and political development.28 At today’s historical juncture, media culture everywhere has arguably become the most dominant force defining the sense of self, driving our understanding of the ‘Other,’ and providing “symbols, myths and resources” for generating a common culture. The guardian of the social compact; the medium through which the tenets of the social compact is disseminated; the vessel which carries public opinion across socio-political divides; the mixer which ferments and distills public choice; the teacher who informs, educates, and directs public discourse is the media. 26 Gibson, G.L The Western Political Quarterly, 1992 De Tocqueville A, Liberty of the Press in the United States, 1984 (1835), pp. 94-95 28 This notion of citizen and media roles in a democracy has been de-bunked though, by Doris Graber who questions whether the roles expected of citizens and the media are appropriate. She believes that democracy can persist despite citizens’ wisdom and media excellence. To her what is important is political culture. But can political culture be created without the citizens’ wisdom nor the functional role of the media? See her work: The Media and Democracy: Beyond Myths and Stereotypes, Annual Review of Political Science, 2003, vol. 6, pp139-160. 27 18 It is very clear from the foregoing that a media that fails to perform its function effectively drives society into chaos. It is in this vein that, if democracy is to work, then the media should be the first to understand and preach tolerance and accommodation. History is replete with instances of media irresponsibility that culminated in instability, derailment of democracy, and eventually war. Of recent recall is the Rwanda genocide. The media organs in Rwanda, through their journalists, broadcasters and media executives, played an instrumental role in laying the groundwork for genocide, and even actively participated in the extermination campaign. For a considerable period before the genocide took place, various media houses allied themselves to opposing political elite, and through hate propaganda, lies, intrigues, and intemperate exchanges, created a state of intolerance and societal noncohesion. The media were then used as proxies in the struggle for power. In its 2003 verdict in the ‘Media Trial’ of executives from the RTLM and Kangura, the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) confirmed the undoubted role of Rwanda’s hate media in laying the foundation for, and participating in the genocide. “The newspaper and the radio explicitly and repeatedly, in fact relentlessly, targeted the Tutsi population for destruction. Demonizing the Tutsis as having inherently evil qualities, equating the ethnic group with ‘the enemy’ and portraying its women as seductive enemy agents, the media called for the extermination of the Tutsi ethnic group As a response to the political threat that they associate with Tutsi ethnicity” (ICTR 2003: para.72) In Ghana today, the media has arrogated to itself the right to create what I call a dichotomization syndrome, where every public discourse is shaped by the idiosyncrasies of the two leading political parties in the country – the National Democratic Congress (NDC) and the New Patriotic Party (NPP). Eventually, they (the media) have themselves been ‘dichotomized’ into NPP and/or NDC. The media landscape is inundated with non-issues presented in savage, intemperate language. The media has virtually ceased to be the custodian of the social compact; they have ceased to be the information conduit, and have forgotten their role as the distillers of public opinion and directors of the road to public choice. They are themselves intemperate and seem more comfortable with sensationalism, intrigues, and at times insipid lies. In such a setting political tolerance and accommodation are sacrificed, faith in constitutionalism is lost, and the rule of law is thrown to the wind. The country is the ultimate loser. 19 Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) The visibility and vitality of the concept of civil society in contemporary global socioeconomic and political discourses is most tellingly suggested by its presence in the rhetoric of political figures, especially internationally. There is much plea for greater engagement of civil society organizations in the delivery of social services, once deemed the primary responsibility of the state. The involvement of business, churches, private charities, and others in health care, education, etc., is based on the belief that such engagement not only benefits the common good but may actually improve the quality and efficiency of public services. Of late, multi-lateral global institutions and/or organizations (such as the United Nations, the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, the Commonwealth and others) have demanded active participation of CSOs in development. Indeed, it is in the sphere of international politics that civil society has made its biggest splash. Caused by the assumption that a vibrant and robust civil society is a prerequisite for successful democratization, in recent years civil society has become the focus of efforts by multi-lateral institutions/organizations to promote democracy, transparency, and prudence in economic governance throughout the world. Such efforts have entailed providing support to ‘non-state actors’ to champion the cause of freedom and democratic governance as well as act as watchdogs for prudence and transparency in economic governance. It is true that a vibrant, robust civil society exists in Ghana today. It is through the agitation of civil society that Ghana has returned to civil and democratic rule. Civil Society organizations are robustly engaged in Ghana’s socio-economic development and have been instrumental and vocal in the political and socio-economic direction of the nation. The most positive have been those ‘think-tanks’ eg., the Institute of Economic Affairs (IEA), the Centre for Democratic Governance (CDD), the Institute of Democratic Governance (IDEG), etc., etc., some churches and/or religious bodies, and other development CSOs. Indeed, the IEA and others have, since the inception of the Fourth Republican Constitution, demonstrated that civil society have an important role to play in setting the agenda for national discourse and public choice. It is however, disheartening to also observe that some parts of civil society in Ghana are abusing the democratic canvass from where they draw their strength. There are several mushrooming organizations that are more political agitators or are doing the bidding of one party or the other, and in the process are only helping in polarizing society. It is at 20 times heart-renting to see civil society organizations trying hard to undo each other, through press conferences, radio effusions, name-calling, threats etc. These are a mark of intolerance, the very thing, civil society is billed to avoid. Incidentally, in all these, the media is an acquiescent accomplice, and the politician the director of the orchestra and benefactor. Conclusion A virtuous political culture most often associated with democratic consolidation is the visible presence of political tolerance and trust. According to Larry diamond, democracy is the most widely admired type of political system but also perhaps the most difficult to sustain. 29 He stresses further that the successful practice of democracy demonstrates the value of participation, tolerance and compromise – indeed, the efficacy and intrinsic desirability of democracy itself.30 Democracy must therefore uphold the virtues that sustain it. Therefore, any meaningful adherence to the values associated with "liberal" democracy, must start from tolerance, governmental accountability, and respect for human rights. Although this understanding of democratic values is heavily moulded by democratic theory, it does not seem to hold in Ghana. Indeed, a reasonable hypothesis is that as political tolerance increases, the likelihood of successfully sustaining democracy increases; and as democracy is sustained, so would development and national progress be assured. Democracy requires tolerance to function, because tolerance provides the socio-psychological bases for compromise, such as the willingness to accept the outcome of an election, even if it favours a party one opposes. The requirement of tolerance is embedded in the intrinsic nature of democracy – democracy is a process and not an event. As a process it creates its own immutable dynamic of change and continuity. If a people see democracy as a system and/or process of change and continuity, then they would develop an understanding of its dynamics and appreciate them through trust, tolerance, and compromise. It must be noted that where there is a confrontation between the tolerant and compromising demands of democracy and the absolute politics of intolerance, it is the former that is subject to stagnation, decline, and/or total decay. Ghana is relatively calm, has all the necessary conditions for democracy to thrive – less harsh environment; abundance of natural resources; a very resourceful, hospitable population; a 29 Diamond, Larry Jay. Three Paradoxes of Democracy, Journal of Democracy - Volume 1, Number 3, Summer 1990, pp. 48-60 30 Diamond Larry J. Journal of Democracy, 2008 21 rich history and cultural heritage; a very workable constitution; viable institutions; and above all, a resilient economy. Unfortunately, those who have a vested interest in keeping the props to democracy constantly firm are those who incidentally are keeping them wobbling. It must be noted that to sustain the tolerant character of the socio-political domain, the greatest responsibility lies with the politician, the journalist, and the civil society activist. They hold the key to ensuring that various classes of people (playing different political roles) have fairly aggregate levels of political tolerance. Indeed, empirical findings suggest that those with the greatest responsibility have greater commitment to the norms and to the desire to maintain and/or sustain the ‘rules of the game’31 In this sense, one would have thought that the Ghanaian politician, the Ghanaian journalist, and the Ghanaian civil society activist would be committed to the norm and by implication work towards sustaining tolerance. It must be noted that when stagnation, decay and decline set in to a democratic dispensation and/or process, no amount of witchery or prayers can turn the clock back. There is need for a resolve to allow for a culture of tolerance and accommodation. But this may happen when Ghana changes from the current winner-takes-all patronage system to one in which politics is a means of promoting the collective good. Bibliography Austin, Dennis (1978), Politics in Africa, Manchester, Manchester University Press. Chauvet, Lisa; Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, (2007), The Cost of Failing States and the Limits of Sovereignty, UNU-WIDER Research Paper N0. 2007/30 Clapham, Christopher (1996), Africa and the International System: The Politics of State Survival, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. Copp, David; Jean Hampton, and John E. Roemer, (eds), (1995), The Idea of Democracy, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. Diamond, Larry, (1998), Building a Democratic Africa, Hoover Digest, N0. 3 Mazrui, Ali, Who Killed Democracy in Africa: Clues of the Past, Concerns for the Future, Sen, A. (2000 ), Development as Freedom, Anchor Books, New York. Stiglitz, J. “More Instruments and Broader Goals: Moving Toward the Post-Washington Consensus”, The 1998 WIDER Annual Lecture Helsinki, Finland 31 For an in-depth analysis of political tolerance in a democracy, see:John S Sullivan, George E Marcus, Stanley Feldman, James Piereson, Sources of Political tolerance: A Multivariate Analysis, in The American Political Science Review, vol. 1 (March, 1981), pp92 - 106 22 Williams, Reyes (2006), Leadership Accountability in a Globalizing World. London: Palgrave Macmillan. World Bank, (1994), Governance: The World Bank’s Experience, World Bank: Washington DC. 23