MICRO-DISARMAMENT: THE CONSEQUENCES FOR
PUBLIC SAFETY AND HUMAN RIGHTS
David B. Kopel, * Paul Gallant ** & Joanne D. Eisen ***
INTRODUCTION
“Micro-disarmament” is a term of art in the small arms prohibition
community, referring to the disarmament of the civilian population in a particular
country. Advocates of micro-disarmament argue that the success of microdisarmament in particular countries demonstrates that reducing or eliminating the
prevalence of firearms reduces violence. Micro-disarmament successes are touted
as proof of the desirability of ever-broader campaigns to disarm civilian
populations worldwide. This article examines six case studies of microdisarmament: Cambodia, Bougainville, Albania, Panama, Guatemala, and Mali.
In each of these six countries, we argue, micro-disarmament has failed or
has not been nearly as successful as firearms prohibitionists have claimed. We
suggest that the emphasis on disarming civilians as the key to peace is mistaken,
because, as these six case studies demonstrate, true and lasting peace must be
based on protection of human rights. When human rights are secure, violence
will diminish; conversely, when human rights are denied, many people will
refuse to surrender the tools necessary to defend their lives and liberties. 1
*
Research Director, Independence Institute, Golden, Colorado, at http://www.davekopel.org.
Author of The Samurai, the Mountie, and the Cowboy: Should America Adopt the Gun Controls of
Other Democracies? (Prometheus Books 1992). Co-author of Gun Control and Gun Rights (NYU
Pr. 2002). Editor-in-Chief of the Journal on Firearms & Public Policy.
The authors gratefully acknowledge the generous advice and comments of Lawrence Doczy,
Programme Manager for the SSSR Project of the United Nations Development Programme
(UNDP) in Albania; and Geofrey Mugumya, formerly Project Leader of the Weapons for
Development Project of the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (“UNIDIR”) in
Geneva, and currently Director, Peace and Security for the African Union. We especially
emphasize that the opinions expressed in this article are the authors’ alone, as are any errors.
**
Senior Fellow, Independence Institute, at http://www.independenceinstitute.org.
***
Senior Fellow, Independence Institute, at http://www.independenceinstitute.org. Co-author
(with Kopel and Gallant) of numerous articles on international gun policy in publications including
the S.A.I.S. Review, Texas Review of Law & Politics, National Review Online, and Brown Journal
of World Affairs.
1
For example, in the Ivory Coast, the cause of the October 2002 rebellion against government was
laws that disenfranchised 30 percent of the populace. See Restoring Peace to Ivory Coast, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 17, 2003, at A26. See also Positive Signs at Ivory Coast Talks, BBC NEWS, Jan. 19,
2003, available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/low/world/africa/2672435.stm.
In the summer of 2004, Ivory Coast President Gbagbo agreed at a summit in Accra, Ghana, to
revise Article 35 of his country’s Constitution in order to return rights to its disenfranchised
population. However, the peace process stalled and UN Security Council President Ambassador
Juan Antonio Yañez-Barnuevo spoke on behalf of the Security Council, calling on Gbagbo “to do
everything in his power to ensure the revision of Article 35 of the Constitution, as he committed
himself in Accra.” Security Council Urges Côte d’Ivoire Leader Gbagbo to Act on Peace Pledges,
UN NEWS SERVICE, Sept. 27, 2004. The Security Council also “exhorted the [opposition] Forces
Nouvelles to start as soon as possible before 15 October, and without preconditions, the
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I. HUMAN RIGHTS AND DISARMAMENT
The United Nations has recognized that the preservation of fundamental
human rights is essential to avoiding armed conflict. According to the preamble
of the UN’s Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted in 1948, “Whereas
it is essential, if man is not to be compelled to have recourse, as a last resort, to
rebellion against tyranny and oppression, that human rights should be protected
by the rule of law.” 2 According to Article 8 of the Universal Declaration,
“Everyone has the right to an effective remedy.” 3
Thus, the Declaration recognizes that when a government destroys human
rights and all other remedies have failed, the people are “compelled to have
recourse, as a last resort, to rebellion against tyranny and oppression.” 4 Because
“[e]veryone has the right to an effective remedy,” the people necessarily have the
right to possess and use arms to resist tyranny, if arms use is the only remaining
“effective remedy.” 5
demobilization, disarmament and reintegration process to which they committed themselves in
Accra.” Id. (emphasis added).
But because the government refused to implement the promised re-enfranchisement, the rebels
refused to disarm. President Laurent Gbagbo has not restored civil rights, human rights, or land
ownership rights to the disenfranchised population. Extrajudicial murders by the government
continue. Ivory Coast Rejects ‘Death Squad’ Claims, BBC NEWS, Feb. 6, 2003, available at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/2731599.stm. See Côte d’Ivoire Peace Process Still Mired in
Stalemate – Report to UN, UN NEWS SERVICE, Oct. 19, 2004, available at
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/news/2004/10/mil-041019-unnews03.htm; Restoring
Peace to Ivory Coast, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 17, 2003 at A26.
Although the rebels were supposed to disarm on October 15, Guillaume Soro, the rebel leader,
explained, “Nothing is going to happen on 15 October. We are still armed, the country is divided
and parliament has not voted through the reforms . . . So long as there is not a minimum level of
confidence . . . we are not going to talk about DDR (disarmament, demobilization and
rehabilitation).” See Côte d’Ivoire: Government Appeals for Calm as Disarmament Fails to Start,
UN INTEGRATED REGIONAL INFORMATION NETWORKS, Oct. 15, 2004 (parenthetical in original);
The Ivoirian government’s failure to hold the militias and security forces accountable
for these abuses has only strengthened their impunity in Abidjan and the rural areas.
On Nov. 7, Gbagbo appealed to the militias to return home. But the next morning, his
political pundits were back on state radio and the boys were back on the streets. If
Gbagbo won’t control the militias, the UN peacekeepers must step in to protect
civilians.
Corinne Dufka, Now, Protect Ivoirian Civilians, THE INTERNATIONAL HERALD-TRIBUNE, Nov. 16,
2004, available at http://www.hrw.org/english/docs/2004/11/17/cotedi9688.htm (Dufka is a West
Africa Researcher with Human Rights Watch).
2
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A (III), U.N. GAOR (1948), available at
http://www.un.org/Overview/rights.html [hereinafter Human Rights Declaration].
3
Id.
4
Id.
5
It seems clear from the Declaration’s Articles 1-3 that all the protected rights, including the right
to armed self-defense as a last-resort defense of other rights, belong to individuals:
Article 1. All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights. They are
endowed with reason and conscience and should act towards one another in a spirit
of brotherhood.
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MICRO-DISARMAMENT
3
The Universal Declaration followed the same logic as did William
Blackstone in his Commentaries, the most influential legal treatise written in
English, which has had enormous influence in every nation which has adopted
the Common Law. In detailing the Common Law’s protection of human rights,
Blackstone first set forth the three primary rights: personal security, personal
liberty, and private property. 6
Blackstone then turned to the auxiliary rights, such as the right to petition
the government for redress of grievances, which protected the primary rights.
The fifth and last auxiliary right of the subject, that I shall at present mention,
is that of having arms for their defence suitable to their condition and degree,
and such as are allowed by law. . . . [A]nd it is indeed a public allowance,
under due restrictions, of the natural right of resistance and self preservation,
when the sanctions of society and laws are found insufficient to restrain the
violence of oppression. 7
So according to Blackstone, humans have “the natural right of resistance
and self preservation, when the sanctions of society and laws are found
insufficient to restrain the violence of oppression.” 8 Likewise, the Universal
Declaration affirms the right, as “a last resort, to rebellion against tyranny and
oppression.” 9
In 2001, the UN pointed to a practical application of the Universal
Declaration’s right to rebellion against oppression: the decades-long war fought
by the African National Congress and other violent groups against the apartheid
regime in South Africa. 10
Although arms possession as “a last resort” protection for human rights is
implied by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the United Nations has,
oddly, begun promoting disarmament, even in countries where arms possession is
the last resort available to protect human rights.
Article 2. Everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in this
Declaration, without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language,
religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other
status. Furthermore, no distinction shall be made on the basis of the political,
jurisdictional or international status of the country or territory to which a person
belongs, whether it be independent, trust, non-self-governing or under any other
limitation of sovereignty.
Article 3. Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of person.
Id.
1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *125 (1765).
Id. at *139.
8
Id.
9
Human Rights Declaration, supra note 5, at pmbl.
10
Declaration, 2001 World Conference Against Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and
Related Intolerance, Agenda item 9 U.N. Doc. A/CONF.189/12 (Durban South Africa, Sept, 8,
2001) (“Drawing inspiration from the heroic struggle of the people of South Africa against the
institutionalized
system
of
apartheid
.
.
.
.”),
available
at
http://www.unhchr.ch/huridocda/huridoca.nsf/(Symbol)/A.Conf.189.12.En?Opendocument.
6
7
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Following the Cold War, the UN turned its attention away from nuclear
disarmament and toward the issue of small arms and light weapons (“SALW”).
In 1992, then-Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali coined the term “microdisarmament,” explaining, “[b]y this I mean practical disarmament in the context
of the conflicts the United Nations is actually dealing with and of the weapons,
most of them light weapons, that are killing people in the hundreds of
thousands.” 11 He also acknowledged that the solution to conflict “lies in
commitment to human rights with a special sensitivity to those of minorities,
whether ethnic, religious, social or linguistic.” 12
The United Nations is not really composed of “nations,” but is instead
composed of members of the governments of various nations. The “nation” and
the “government” are not necessarily synonymous. Few people would argue the
Pol Pot regime represented the Cambodian people, that Saddam Hussein
represented the people of Iraq, or that the Duvalier regimes represented the
people of Haiti. Almost all governments, especially dictatorial governments, are
concerned foremost with their own political stability. Hence, the governmentcentric United Nations manifests an instinctive bias in favor of controlling
insurgencies by controlling the arms of the insurgents, rather than by addressing
the oppressive conditions that created the insurgencies. 13
According to UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan, “[o]ver the past decade,
the destabilizing accumulation of illicit small arms and light weapons has
emerged as a major concern of the international community . . . . These arms
fuel, intensify and contribute to the prolongation of conflicts.” 14 When Annan
and other disarmament advocates complain about destabilization, they are in
effect advocating for the status quo of existing dictatorships.
Annan has recognized that government abuse of human rights is a major,
direct cause of armed conflict: “Efforts to prevent armed conflict should promote
11
Supplement to an Agenda for Peace: Position Paper of the Secretary-General on the Occasion
of the Fiftieth Anniversary of the United Nations, U.N. Doc. A/50/60-S/1995/1, at ¶ 60 (1995)
(“Micro-disarmament” and “practical disarmament” are used interchangeably by the disarmament
community.), available at http://www.un.org/Docs/SG/agsupp.html#DISARM.
12
An Agenda for Peace, Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peace-Keeping, Report of the
Secretary General, U.N. Doc. A/47/277-S/2411, at ¶18 (1992), available at
http:www.un.org/Docs.SG.agpeace.html.
13
Andrew Latham, Assistant Professor at Macalester College and member of the Canadian
delegation to the “Inhumane Weapons Convention” (1994/95), perfectly articulated the U.N.
perspective, “The ready availability of weapons makes it far too easy for substate groups to seek
remedy for grievances through the application of violence.” Andrew Latham, Light Weapons and
Human Security – A Conceptual Overview, in SMALL ARMS CONTROL: OLD WEAPONS, NEW ISSUES
13-14 (Jayantha Dhanapala et al., eds. 1999). See also Sami Faltas, Weapons Collection
Programmes: Questions to Answer and Challenges to Face, at ¶ 3 (Bonn International Center for
Conversion, 1998) (“Ultimately, the ownership of arms should not be left to the personal choice of
individuals. The state needs to preserve its monopoly of the legitimate use of force. So sanctions
against the illegal possession and use of arms are necessary and should be imposed.”), available at
http://www.iansa.org/documents/2003/weapons_collections.htm. Sami Faltas is the researcher in
charge of the Bonn International Center for Conversion’s Surplus Weapons program.
14
Small Arms, Report of the Secretary-General, U.N. SCOR, U.N. Doc. S/2002/1053, at Summary
(2002).
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MICRO-DISARMAMENT
5
a broad range of human rights, including not only civil and political rights but
also economic, social and cultural rights, including the right to development.”15
But what Annan elides is the fact that the “last resort” that forces a government
to stop human rights abuses is the ability of the victim population to use arms to
protect itself from the government. To deprive the victims of their defensive
arms would deny them “the right to an effective remedy,” as guaranteed by the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights. 16
Arms prohibitionists claim that arms possession leads to human rights
abuses. Peter Herby, a legal specialist with the International Committee of the
Red Cross, writes, “as highly lethal arms become diffused throughout a
population, the conditions for violations of humanitarian law increase.” 17
Prohibitionists argue that arms possession causes not only apolitical violent
crime, but also civil conflict. The greater the number of weapons in the hands of
“non-state actors” (the prohibitionists’ term for anyone not deemed politically
reliable by the government), the greater the destabilization. 18
However, the prohibitionists have misunderstood the issue of causation. 19
The confusion between association and causality is rampant throughout the
disarmament literature. Despite the premise behind the name of the United
Nations Trust Fund for the Consolidation of Peace through Practical
15
Prevention of Armed Conflict, Report of the Secretary-General, U.N. GAOR, 55th Sess., Agenda
Item 10, at ¶ 94, U.N. Doc. A/55/985-S/2001/574 (2001), available at
http://www.reliefweb.int/library/documents/2001/un-conflprev-07jun.htm.
16
Human Rights Declaration, supra note 5, at art. 9.
17
See Peter Herby, Arms Transfers, Humanitarian Assistance, and Humanitarian Law, in 32 INT’L
REVIEW
OF
THE
RED
CROSS
685-91
(Dec.
12,
1998),
available
at
http://www.icrc.org/Web/Eng/siteeng0.nsf/iwpList74/74822A52FE2DE60FC1256B66005C6CCD.
18
The “weapons effect” hypothesis suggests that guns can psychologically control people and
cause them to be violent. Although the “weapons effect” hypothesis permeates the disarmament
literature, social science research does not support the hypothesis. See Paul Gallant & Joanne D.
Eisen, Trigger-Happy: Re-thinking the ‘Weapons Effect’, 14 J. ON FIREARMS & PUB. POL’Y 89
(2002), available at http://www.saf.org/jfpp/jfpp14.pdf.
19
See JANE L. GARB, UNDERSTANDING MEDICAL RESEARCH 53 (1996):
Once spurious association (bias and confounding) and chance have been ruled out as
explanations for an association between a risk factor and an outcome in a study,
several criteria should be considered in order to establish that the association is causal
(i.e., that the risk factor caused the outcome.) The presence of strength, consistency,
biological plausibility, temporal correctness, or specificity gives evidence of a causal
association. Although it is not necessary that all five elements exist to establish
causality, the more that are present, the greater the likelihood that an association is
causal.
Id.
For a thorough discussion of causality and the reason why bad arguments are sometimes
convincing, see JERRY CEDERBLOM & DAVID W. PAULSEN, CRITICAL REASONING ch. 6 (1990). See
also Don B. Kates & Daniel D. Polsby, Long-Term Nonrelationship of Widespread and Increasing
Firearm Availability to Homicide in the United States, 4 HOMICIDE STUD. 185 (2000) (discussion of
causality with regard to violence and weapons); Gary Kleck & David J. Bordua, The Factual
Foundation for Certain Key Assumptions of Gun Control, 5 L. & POL’Y Q. 271 (1983).
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Disarmament, 20 weapons do not cause conflict; hence, reducing the number of
weapons does not necessarily reduce conflict. As this Article details, voluntary
weapons collection programs have often failed to disarm the perpetrators of
violence and to bring peace. Indeed, a typical result is increased violence.
II. CAMBODIA
When Cambodia was a French colony, from 1863 to 1953, the French rulers
passed many laws to prevent the Cambodian peasants from arming. 21 On April
17, 1975, a revolutionary war brought the Cambodian communist party to power,
and the state of Democratic Kampuchea came into existence. The new
government of Pol Pot and his Khmer Rouge perpetrated a reign of terror against
unarmed civilians, resulting in the deaths of at least one million people. 22
On December 25, 1978, an invasion by Vietnam ended Pol Pot’s regime. A
period of internecine factional fighting ended on October 23, 1991, when the four
warring factions 23 signed the Paris Peace Agreements 24 and invited the UN to
help restore peace and normalcy and to supervise free elections in the country. 25
20
See Graciela Uribe de Lozano, The United Nations and the Control of Light Weapons, in LIGHT
WEAPONS AND CIVIL CONFLICT 161-71 (Jeffrey Bortwell & Michael T. Klare eds. 1999) (history of
UN disarmament programs). See also Assistance to States for Curbing the Illicit Traffic in Small
Arms and Collecting Them: Report of the Secretary-General, U.N. Res. 182, U.N. GAOR, 56th
Sess., U.N. Doc A/56/182 (2001) (origin of the United Nations Trust Fund for the Consolidation of
Peace through Practical Disarmament and the objectives of the Fund); General and Complete
Disarmament, U.N. Res. 75, U.N. GAOR, 49th Sess., at Part G, U.N. Doc. A/RES/49/75 (1994);
Assistance to States for Curbing the Illicit Traffic in Small Arms and Collecting Them, U.N. Res.
33, U.N. GAOR, 55th Sess., at Part F, U.N. Doc. A/RES/55/33 (2000).
For UN recognition of the difficulty of forcible disarmament, see Jane Boulden, Rules of
Engagement, Force Structure and Composition in United Nations Disarmament Operations, in
MANAGING ARMS IN PEACE PROCESSES: THE ISSUES 135, 167 (UN Institute for Disarmament
Research 1996) (“Disarmament without consent is effectively a combat situation.”); John Hillen,
BLUE HELMETS: THE STRATEGY OF UN MILITARY OPERATIONS 217-19 (2000).
21
Measures included the Royal Ordinance of 27 January 1920, Royal Ordinance of 8 July 1927,
Royal Ordinance of 26 April 1929, and Royal Ordinance of 1 July 1935. The most comprehensive
was Royal Ordinance No. 55 of 28 March 1938, which provided for a licensing system. See JAY
SIMKIN, AARON ZELMAN & ALAN M. RICE, LETHAL LAWS 305 (1994). Royal Ordinance No. 55 was
expanded on May 29, 1953.
22
See SIMKIN, ZELMAN & RICE, supra note 21, at 14; Ben Kiernan, Introduction: Conflict in
Cambodia, 1945-2002, 34 CRITICAL ASIAN STUD. 483, 493 (2002) (estimating that the genocide
claimed 1.7 million lives).
23
These were the Cambodian People’s Armed Forces (“CPAF”), the National Army of Democratic
Kampuchea (“NADK”, the armed forces of the PDK or Khmer Rouge), the Armée Nationale pour
un Kampuchea Indépendent (“ANKI”), and the Khmer People’s National Liberation Armed Forces
(“KPNLAF”). See JIANWEI WANG, MANAGING ARMS IN PEACE PROCESSES: CAMBODIA 35, Table 1
(UN Institute for Disarmament Research 1996).
24
These were formally known as the “Agreements on a Comprehensive Political Settlement of the
Cambodian Conflict.” See GRANT CURTIS, TRANSITION TO WHAT? CAMBODIA, UNTAC AND THE
PEACE PROCESS 11 (UN Research Institute for Social Development 1993).
25
See STEVEN R. RATNER, THE NEW UN PEACEKEEPING 140-48 (1995).
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MICRO-DISARMAMENT
7
The Paris Agreements gave the UN a broad mandate to disarm and demilitarize
the warring factions, and to improve human rights. 26 UNTAC, the United
Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia, was created. 27
The terms of the Paris Agreements stipulated that troops from all four
factions would be disarmed and demobilized by the UN. This meant collecting
more than 300,000 conventional weapons from an estimated 425,000 combatants
(203,300 regular army and 220,290 militia). 28 In theory, when this goal was
reached, there would be peace and a “neutral security environment as a prelude to
activities aimed at creating a neutral political environment,” 29 thereby enabling
Cambodians to vote in national elections without coercion. This would represent
a major step toward democratization and a humanitarian climate.
However the Khmer Rouge (“PDK”), refused to disarm from the start and
the remaining factions grew reluctant to proceed with their own disarmament.
One cannot fault the response of the remaining factions, because only the PDK
would benefit from a unilateral disarmament. The phenomenon of “decaying
consent” has occurred before in disarmament programs. 30 Leaders of warring
factions may sign an agreement, but ground forces may refuse to adhere to those
agreements when doing so appears detrimental to their own survival. U.S.
criminologist Franklin Zimring posed the question “[i]f unilateral disarmament is
26
As Roberts noted, “The UN operation in Cambodia was the largest ever conducted by the
international organization, lasting from November 1991 to September 1993.” David Roberts,
Democratization, Elite Transition, and Violence in Cambodia, 1991-1999, 34 CRITICAL ASIAN
STUD. 520, 523 (2002).
27
UN Security Council Res. 745 (1992) established UNTAC, which became operational on March
15
of
that
year.
S.C.
Res.
745,
U.N.
SCOR
(1992),
available
at
http://www.un.org/documents/sc/res/1992/scres92.htm (last visited May 20, 2005). UNTAC
consisted of four distinct components: The Military Component, The Electoral Component, the
Civil Administration Component, and the Repatriation Component. See CURTIS, supra note 24, at
12-13.
28
See WANG, supra note 23, at 35, Table 1.
29
Id. at 34.
30
Decaying consent is defined by the UN as “a pulling back from willingness to abide by an
agreement because circumstances are not working out as hoped or envisioned.” Donald C. F.
Daniel, Is There a Middle Option in Peace Support Operations? Implications for Crisis
Containment and Disarmament, in MANAGING ARMS IN PEACE PROCESSES: THE ISSUES 60 (UN
Institute for Disarmament Research 1996). For a general discussion about varieties of consent as
part of the peace process, see id. at 60-61; RATNER, supra note 25, at 2 (“the consent of the parties
to the UN’s presence. This consent is the first principle of all peacekeeping . . . .”);
The operation risks almost immediate paralysis if it interprets consent so strictly as to
freeze or retrench after minor infractions by a party and then pin its hope on
negotiation for compliance to resume . . . . At this early stage of the new
peacekeeping, it would appear that the international community is prepared to
characterize an operation as peacekeeping [as opposed to the more aggressive process
of peace enforcement] and continue with its implementation as long as most of the
principal actors within the affected states voice their commitment to the process and
do not so interfere with it as to render it a mere farce.
Id at 37-41.
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rational, why do people not give up their guns voluntarily . . . ?” 31 The answer is
simple: unilateral disarmament is contrary to the survival instinct and, as
UNTAC discovered, the instinct is overcome only with great difficulty.
The UNTAC program is the only known instance in which there was an
attempt to record empirical data using weapon injuries as an outcome measure
after micro-disarmament. David Meddings and Stephanie O’Connor compared
the incidence of weapon injuries before and after the UNTAC disarmament. 32
They estimated that “around 25-50%” of Cambodia’s combatants were “believed
to have been disarmed” during the peacekeeping operation, and although a stable
government was left in place at the time of departure of the UN, “[t]he annual
incidence of weapon injuries was higher than the rate observed before the
peacekeeping operation.” 33 If weapons cause violence, then at least some
decrease in violence should have resulted from removal of 25-50% of the
weapons.
A great deal has been written about UNTAC, and it is generally agreed that
the disarmament process was a failure. 34 We believe that, in terms of
disarmament, 25-50% is quite an accomplishment. What UNTAC actually
achieved, however, was the creation of more victims.
Because of continued violence, the UN issued another disarmament
imperative just prior to the 1993 election. Yasushi Akashi, the Secretary-
31
Franklin E. Zimring, Gun Control, CRIME FILE STUDY GUIDE (U.S. Dept. of Justice, National
Inst. of Justice, 1985) (NCJ 97224). Although Zimring was referring to American gun-owners,
weapons possession as a means to survival may be a universal instinct. See, e.g., WANG, supra note
23, at 75 (“An interview with journalists, soldiers, policemen, schoolboys, women and doctors
found that nobody thought the elimination of guns was a good idea. . . . This was also a necessity
under constant military and bandit attack. Most homes had at least one weapon.”)
32
David R. Meddings & Stephanie M. O’Connor, Circumstances Around Weapon Injury in
Cambodia after Departure of a Peacekeeping Force: Prospective Cohort Study, 319 BRIT. MED. J.
412, 412-13 (1999).
Meddings and O’Connor used data from the International Committee of the Red Crosssupported Mongkol Borei hospital in northwestern Cambodia. Land mine and other weapon
injuries, in addition to firearm injuries, were included in the study. Approximately one-third of the
victims were injured in non-combat situations, and of that category, civilian intentional firearmrelated injuries comprised the largest category. Id.
33
The authors found:
30% of weapon injuries occurred in contexts other than interfactional combat. Most
commonly these were firearm injuries inflicted intentionally on civilians. Civilians
accounted for 71% of those with non-combat injuries, 42% of those with combat
related injuries, and 51% of those with weapon injuries of either type. . . . The
incidence of weapon injuries remained high when the disarmament component of a
peacekeeping operation achieved only limited success. Furthermore, injuries
occurring outside the context of interfactional combat accounted for a substantial
proportion of all weapon injuries, were experienced disproportionately by civilians,
and were most likely to entail the intentional use of a firearm against a civilian.
Id. at 412.
34
E.g., WANG, supra note 23, at 4 (UNTAC failed one of its major tasks: disarming and
demobilizing the warring parties).
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MICRO-DISARMAMENT
9
General’s Special Representative to Cambodia, issued a directive that rendered
unlicensed civilian weapon possession illegal, as of March 18, 1993, although the
Paris Agreements had given UNTAC no legal authority to issue such a decree.
Penalties for violation of the UN directive included confiscation of the weapon
and imprisonment for a period of six months to three years. 35
Five years after the UN imposed gun licensing law, violent crime was still
rising in Cambodia. 36 Gun-rights advocates often argue that gun licensing or
registration laws can set the stage for gun confiscation, since the government will
know where to find all legally-owned guns. In Cambodia, gun confiscation did
follow the UN’s gun-licensing fiat. In 1999, the Cambodian government, with
UN support, banned all firearms, blaming the nation’s crime problem on “the
large number of guns in circulation, thought to be about half a million . . . .” 37
Eventually, the BBC News reported, there would be house-to-house searches and
a ban on all weapons, including firearms previously registered and even arms
carried by off-duty police and soldiers. 38
At the 2001 UN Conference on the Illegal Trade in Small Arms and Light
Weapons in All its Aspects, Sar Kheng, Cambodian Minister of the Interior, said
that “illegally held arms” (i.e., all non-government arms) were “major obstacles
to efforts to reconstruct and rehabilitate the country and to the building of
democracy and respect for human rights.” 39 He explained:
The Government of Cambodia has designated management of all arms and
explosives as its major task, and has instituted several measures, such as
collecting and confiscating all arms, explosives and ammunition left by the
war; instituting practical measures to reduce the reckless use of arms; and
35
Id. at 75-76.
[T]here would be a three-week grace period to allow people either to surrender their
weapons or to get their papers in order. Gun holders were supposed to surrender their
arms at the local UNTAC, CIVPOL, or military contingent where they would be
given a receipt for their weapon and would face no legal action. Those who wished to
retain their weapons could apply to the police force of the relevant authorities for a
firearm licence.
Id.
36
See Sitra Sivaraman, Violent Crime Thrives in Wounded Society, INTER PRESS SERVICE, Aug. 25,
1998 (quoting Mouen Chhean Nariddh: “While the world focuses on the human rights and political
situation in Cambodia, silent but steady violent crime is emerging as one of the country’s biggest
killers.”).
37
See UN Ban Starts in Cambodia, BBC NEWS, Apr. 7, 1999; SMALL ARMS SURVEY 2002:
COUNTING THE HUMAN COST 296 (2002) (“Three decades of internal armed conflict have left
Cambodia with a huge number of small arms and light weapons: anywhere from 500,000 to one
million, according to most estimates, with a very large proportion in civilian hands.”).
38
See UN Ban Starts in Cambodia, supra note 40.
39
Press Release, United Nations Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms, Small Arms
Conference Hears Call For Stepped-Up Control Of Illicit Trade: But Several States Insist on Right
to Acquire Arms for Security Purposes ( U.N. Doc. DC/2787, July 10, 2001) (3d meeting),
available at http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2001/dc2787.doc.htm.
10
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[Vol. 73:4
strengthening the management of weapons registration. Those who possessed
weapons during the civil war wish to continue possessing them for selfprotection. On the other hand, criminals have no intention of giving up their
weapons, because they need them to carry out their criminal offences.
However, with assistance from the European Union and from nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), there has been some success in raising
the awareness of the problem among a majority of Cambodians. 40
As of February 2002, 112,562 of Cambodia’s SALW had reportedly been
confiscated. 41
Although the current Cambodian government is not engaged in genocide, it
nevertheless has a poor human rights record and is attempting to eliminate the
political opposition with threats of violence. 42 The UN/European Union (EU)
gun surrender programs could be seen as another neo-colonial assault on the
sovereignty of the people of Cambodia, carried out, as most neo-colonial
programs are, with the connivance of a local élite which holds power by force of
arms.
Today in Cambodia, about 3 percent of rural families are mired in land
disputes against public officials and the military. 43 The root of these disputes
traces back to the communist regime when all land became state property. 44
Oxfam’s Song Vannsin described the current situation: “[d]isputes over land
arising from abuse of power and the absence of a map-based land titling system
are clogging up the courts and causing widespread civil unrest.” 45 According to
40
Id.
See SMALL ARMS SURVEY 2002, supra note 37, at 296; Working Group for Weapons Reduction
(“WGWR”),
Small
Arms
Reduction
and
Management,
at
http://www.ngoforum.org.kh/Development/Docs/ngo_2002/36.htm. See also Neil Wilford, World
View:
Clearing Away the Weapons, Campaign Against Arms Trade (2002), at
http://www.caat.org.uk/information/magazine/1102/cambodia.php (“58,000 weapons have been
destroyed by burning since 2001 in ceremonies called Flames of Peace which provide spectacular
symbols of the shift to a culture of peace, raising local, national and international awareness.”).
42
See Human Rights Watch, Cambodia: Freedom of Expression Under Attack (Feb. 11, 2003), at
http://www.hrw.org/press/2003/02/cambodia021103.htm; Human Rights Watch, Cambodia:
Prosecute
Perpetrators
of
Political
Violence
(May
1,
2002),
at
http://hrw.org/press/2002/05/cambodia0501.htm; Human Rights Watch, Human Rights Watch
World Report 2002: Cambodia, at http://www.hrw.org/wr2k2/asia3.html.
43
NGO FORUM ON CAMBODIA, NGO STATEMENT, 2000 CONSULTATIVE GROUP MEETING ON
CAMBODIA,
LAND
REFORM
UPDATE
at
#7,
at
http://www.ngoforum.org.kh/Development/Docs/ngo_statement_2000/land_reform.htm.
44
CURTIS, supra note 24, at 6 (“Under Khmer Rouge rule most of the country’s economic and
social infrastructure was dismantled. Private property was confiscated. Factories, vehicles,
industrial equipment and goods were destroyed. All economic activity became part of the state
apparatus.”)
45
Song Vannsin, Recent Experience of Oxfam GB-Cambodia Land Study Project in the Land
Reform in Cambodia (presented at the International Conference on Access to Land: Innovative
Agrarian Reforms for Sustainability and Poverty Reduction (Mar. 19-23, 2001)) (emphasis added).
See also Human Rights Watch, Human Rights Watch World Report 2001: Cambodia: Landmark
41
2005]
MICRO-DISARMAMENT
11
opposition leader Sam Rainsy, land confiscation is “a potentially explosive issue
that affects no less than 10,000 families.” 46 Continued civil unrest is ensured by
government policies that try to squelch protest against continuing land theft.
Ironically, the government has complained that the act of protesting land theft
“can affect security and order.” 47
Abusive, criminal behavior of the Cambodian regime is not limited to
property confiscation. 48 As the UN admitted in its International Drug Control
Programme report, Cambodia has become a center for “illicit drug production
and trafficking, smuggling and exploitation of human beings, kidnappings,
prostitution, illegal gambling, arms trafficking and extortion,” and much of this
criminal behavior is “protected by Cambodian officials.” 49 The government’s
involvement in the international crime of the trafficking of women for sexual
exploitation is an extreme violation of human rights. 50
Although the French were fairly successful in disarming the colonial
Cambodian civilian population, several factors have changed. Despite UNTAC’s
shortcomings, the UN “did manage to create an awareness of human rights that
had hitherto been non-existent. . . .” 51 Thus, the people were sensitized to the
Indigenous Land Rights Case to be Heard in Ratanakiri Provincial Court: Background Briefing
Memo, at http://www.hrw.org/backgrounder/asia/landrights-bck.htm (“Using fraud and forgery of
official documents, district officials in Ratanakiri province and intermediaries of Royal Cambodian
Armed Forces Gen. Nuon Phea are attempting to force nearly one thousand indigenous minority
villagers to give up rights to 1,250 hectares of land that their families have lived on for
generations.”); Im Chhun Lim, Land Issues: Results to Date and Proposed Future Strategies of the
Royal Government, Consultative Group Meeting, Tokyo Jun. 11-13, 2001 (analysis by Minister of
Land Management, Urban Planning and Construction); Bertil Lintner, Building a Future is Hard to
Do, FAR E. ECON. REV., May 25, 2000 (“influential people are forcibly evicting farmers from their
land.”) Although the Universal Declaration of Human Rights affirms that everyone has a right to an
effective remedy, the Cambodian judicial system does not provide such remedies for peasants
whose land has been stolen by the government. See Human Rights Watch World Report 2002:
Cambodia, supra note 46 (“Cambodia’s judicial system remained weak and far from independent,
with numerous court decisions influenced by corruption or apparent political influence.”)
46
See Opposition to Go Ahead with Land-Dispute Rally, CAMBODIA DAILY, Oct. 2-4, 1999,
available at http://cambodia.ahrchk.net/mainfile.php/news199910/233/?print=yes.
47
Id.
48
David Roberts, Democratization, Elite Transition, and Violence in Cambodia, 1991-1999, 34
CRITICAL ASIAN STUD. 520, 520 (2002) (“various elites, dominated by Hun Sen in particular, have
viewed the legitimacy of opposition in a political culture characterized by elite authoritarianism,
narrow vested interests, and deeply entrenched systems of patronage and clientelism.”).
49
Bertil Lintner, Drugs and Politics, FAR E. ECON. REV., Feb. 7, 2002; Craig Skehan, Thais Run
Huge Arms Trade, SYDNEY MORNING HERALD, Aug. 14, 1999 (“smuggling is largely controlled by
corrupt military officers”).
50
E.g., Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and
Children, Supplementing the United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime,
G.A. Res. 25, Annex II, U.N. GAOR, 55th Sess., Supp. No. 49, at 60, U.N. Doc. A/45/49 (2001).
51
P.F. Wynnyk, The UN Intervention in Cambodia: A Glass Half Empty or a Glass Half Full?
(2001) (Research Paper Prepared for the Advanced Military Studies Course #4, Canadian Forces
College, Oct. 29, 2001). See also International Crisis Group, Cambodia: The Elusive Peace
Dividend (Aug. 11, 2000), available at http://www.wccpd.org/news/news67.html (“Economic
inequalities are increasing, and are being met more frequently with public protests . . . .”).
12
UMKC LAW REVIEW
[Vol. 73:4
illegitimacy of abusive treatment. The Cambodian people have suffered decades
of political and criminal violence. Many Cambodians have personally learned
how to use arms for protection against criminals, including government
criminals. It seems doubtful that disarmament plans, even those enforced by
government coercion, will persuade the populace to surrender all their
weapons. 52 As the Working Group for Weapons Reduction in Cambodia
(“WGWR”) survey recently noted, “it is increasingly common in Cambodian
society for people to believe that weapons are needed to protect businesses and
homes.” 53 And weapons are widely available and relatively cheap. 54
Even while the Cambodian government refuses to improve its treatment of
its own citizens, the government begs for funds from donor countries, not to aid
the people, but to disarm them. 55 The same Cambodian government promotes
pedophile tourism in their country. 56 As long as foreigners in Cambodia may
52
Faltas, supra note 16 ¶ 2.3 (“It is rarely possible to collect all weapons that one would like to
retrieve.”).
53
See Bonn International Center for Conversion, Help Desk for Practical Disarmament:
Cambodia, at http://www.bicc.de/helpdesk/stories/cambodia.html; UN Ban Starts in Cambodia,
supra note 41 (“many Cambodians remain skeptical, saying they keep weapons precisely because
they have little faith in the public institutions that are meant to maintain law and order.”)
54
See SMALL ARMS SURVEY 2002, supra note 37, at 66, Table 2.1 (the black-market price of an
AK-47 in Cambodia was approximately $40 US in 2001).
55
Mao Chandara, Director of Staff Department of the Cambodian National Police, in a 2003 speech
to potential donors in Bonn, Germany, stated that Cambodia:
[I]n 1998 decided to launch a national campaign against the widespread possession of
small arms and to work towards a weapons-free society. The same year it
strengthened the legal basis for this campaign by issuing Sub-Decree 38, which
effectively made the possession of weapons by private citizens illegal. Searches took
place and checkpoints were set up. Illegal weapons found on people and in cars and
houses were confiscated.
Mao Chandara, Peace-Building in Cambodia: Experiences on the Way to a Weapons Free Society
2, available at http://www.eu-asac.org/media_library/speeches/ maoChandaraApril2003.pdf.
Chandara also bragged that in symbolic “Flames of Peace Ceremonies,” more than 105,000
weapons were destroyed between May 1999 and April 2003. Id. at 3.
56
See Kritaya Archavanitkul, Combating the Trafficking in Children and their Exploitation in
Prostitution and Other Intolerable Forms of Child Labour in Mekong Basin Countries, Appendix
E, The Case of Cambodia §V (Thailand: Inst. for Population and Social Research 1998), available
at http://www.seameo.org/vl/combat/appendixe.htm:
[T]he report stated that there is another, uglier reason for the flourishing sex trade. . . .
The authorities cannot help stop the trade because they are involved. Too many
people are making too much money for it to stop. . . . In 1998 the Cambodia Daily
news stated, “Many civil servants are involved in trafficking . . . . Some police—not
all, but some—are involved with the traffickers. Police are often protectors and
enforcers for the brothels. And there is increasing evidence that they are involved in
buying and selling kidnapped girls, or at least willing to turn a blind eye.”
Id. See also Donna M. Hughes, Laura Joy Sporcic, Nadine Z. Mendelsohn & Vanessa Chirgwin,
Factbook on Global Sexual Exploitation, Cambodia—Facts on Trafficking and Prostitution,
(Coalition
Against
Trafficking
in
Women),
available
at
http://www.uri.edu/artsci/wms/hughes/cambodia.htm (last visited May 20, 2005).
2005]
MICRO-DISARMAMENT
13
purchase the right to commit government-sanctioned atrocities upon Cambodian
children, it is wrong for international agencies to deprive families of the firearms
which may be the only practical means of preventing the girls in the family from
being abducted and forced into a life of daily rape. The authors of Small Arms
Survey 2002 admitted, “Most people, while broadly supportive of the weapons
collection process, remain reluctant to participate in it themselves so long as the
rule of law is not fully established in the country and there is a lack of public
trust in the security forces.” 57
As John Locke explained, the foundation of the people’s political
sovereignty is their God-given property right to their own bodies. 58 Accordingly,
when Cambodians choose to retain their arms so that they may defend
themselves and their families against programs of commercial rape and other
government-sanctioned violent crimes, the Cambodian people are, in effect,
choosing to retain their sovereignty. The root of the crime problem in Cambodia
is the criminal government that steals land from peasants, cooperates with
organized crime, and enriches itself by participating in the sex-trade enslavement
of women and children. It is entirely reasonable for the Cambodian people to
want firearms to protect their families from government criminals, and to
guard against the recurrence of a genocide like the one that took place the last
time the Cambodian people were disarmed. 59
Sadly, yet another disarmament program is being instituted in Cambodia.
On January 13, 2003, the Japanese government announced it would provide up to
$3.6 million (US) to implement the euphemistically-named “Peace Building and
Comprehensive Small Arms Management Program in Cambodia.” 60 The new
Prostituted girls, most of them aged 15 to 18 years of age, are found in the Svay Pak
red-light district of Cambodia. Many girls are much younger. Most of them are
smuggled in from Vietnam . . . .
....
A trafficking network, operating under protection from local authorities, was
discovered by human rights workers in Cambodia.
Id. See also Cambodia—Child Prostitution (Australian Broadcasting Corp. News Television
Broadcast Sept. 18, 2002), available at http://www.abc.net.au/foreign/stories/s675196.htm (“[T]he
police who are meant to be closing down the brothels are not only corrupt—they’re on the
payroll.”).
57
SMALL ARMS SURVEY 2002, supra note 37, at 296. The Small Arms Survey may have been naïve
in concluding that most Cambodians support the weapons collection program in theory; when
speaking to foreigners or in public, Cambodians may be reluctant to go on record contradicting the
government. It would not be unreasonable to fear that voicing disagreement with the weapons
confiscation program would be a quick way to have one’s home put at the top of the list for
searching by the government.
58
JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT (Cambridge, England: Cambridge Univ. Pr.,
1963) (1690).
59
For a detailed account of how the Khmer Rouge thoroughly disarmed the Cambodian people
before beginning the genocide, and how such disarmament almost always is completed before
genocide begins, see AARON ZELMAN & RICHARD W. STEVENS, DEATH BY “GUN CONTROL”: THE
HUMAN COST OF VICTIM DISARMAMENT (2001). See also David B. Kopel, Book Review: Lethal
Laws, 15 N.Y.L. SCH. J.INT’L & COMP. L. 355 (1995).
60
Japan Provides Aid to Help Cambodia’s Small Arms Management, WorldSources, Inc., Jan. 13,
2003,
available
at
14
UMKC LAW REVIEW
[Vol. 73:4
disarmament program, in the Bakan district, pays for public works construction
of medical clinics, schools, roads, or bridges, if the locals surrender a sufficient
number of firearms. 61 In other words, if a community does not surrender its only
practical means of protecting itself from genocide, common criminals, and
government-sponsored criminals, the government will not build any schools,
clinics, roads, or bridges.
The rationale for the latest disarmament program is that “small arms have
been sometimes used for criminal objectives, which severely harm the security
and social stability of Cambodia, and thus the reduction of arms has been
considered as one of the first prioritized social actions toward sustainable peace
in Cambodia.” 62
To the contrary, the reduction of civilian arms in Cambodia was the sine
qua non for the Khmer Rouge genocide, 63 and continuing efforts to disarm
Cambodia’s citizens have contributed to the continuing criminal victimization of
the Cambodian people by the Cambodian government. The international
disarmament programs in Cambodia are not just failures at attempts to do good;
the programs have been actively harmful to the Cambodian people.
III. BOUGAINVILLE
On the Pacific island of Bougainville, the people had no arms until they
were driven to rebellion by many years of human rights abuses perpetrated by the
kleptocratic colonial government of Papua New Guinea. 64 The Bougainville
http://static.highbeam.com/x/xinhuachina/january132003/japanprovidesaidtohelpcambodiassmallar
msmanagement/index.html. This program evolved into Japan Assistance Team for Small Arms
Management in Cambodia (“JSAC”) in April 2003. See generally JSAC website,
http://www.bigpond.com.kh/users/adm.jsac/jsacENG.html.
61
Press Release, Embassy of Japan, Japanese ODA News, Signing of Grant Contracts for the
Japanese Grant Assistance for Grass-roots Projects (HUSANONE) (Mar. 16, 2001), available at
http://www.bigpond.com.kh/users/eojc/pressrelease/p010315z.htm. See also Senior Minister HOR
Namhong Signs Exchange of Notes with Japanese Ambassador, Kingdom of Cambodia, Ministry of
Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation; JSAC Achievement as of September 2004
62
Japan Provides Aid to Help Cambodia’s Small Arms Management, supra note 64.
63
See supra note 59.
64
Among the rights violated were: Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 17, Human Rights
Declaration, supra note 5, at art. 17 (“Everyone has the right to own property alone as well as in
association with others. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his property.”); International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No.
16, at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966) [hereinafter International Covenant] (“All peoples may, for
their own ends, freely dispose of their natural wealth and resources without prejudice to any
obligations arising out of international economic co-operation, based upon the principle of mutual
benefit, and international law. In no case may a people be deprived of its own means of
subsistence.”); Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources, G.A. Res. 1803 (XVII), U.N.
GAOR, 17th Sess., Supp. No.17, at 15, U.N. Doc. A/5217 (1962). Not only was the people’s
property (their mineral reserves) stolen by the PNG government, but the island suffered immense
environmental degradation from the mining.
2005]
MICRO-DISARMAMENT
15
Revolutionary Army (“BRA”) brought the PNG government to a standstill with
homemade weapons and battlefield acquisitions. 65
The Bougainville Peace Agreement 66 was signed on August 30, 2001. The
Agreement ended formal hostilities, provided for the establishment of an
autonomous Bougainville government, and promised a referendum on full
independence from PNG to be held within 10 to 15 years. Yet, rather than
moving forward expeditiously with a referendum on independence, the UN is
obsessing with its intricate, failing weapons disposal program. 67
After the signing of the peace agreement, a total of 1,639 weapons were
registered and placed into locked containers; but, when it became obvious that
the PNG government would not obey the peace agreement, at least two break-ins
occurred where the sequestered weapons were stored.68 The first time, 110
weapons were removed. After the second break-in an additional 360 were
discovered missing. As Philip Alpers and Conor Twyford pointed out, “With so
much energy being directed at weapons disposal, potential existed for
During the civil war, the government of PNG instituted a total blockade of the island, which
impacted on the civilian non-combatants, depriving them of humanitarian aid, food, and medicine.
In addition, the expressed desire of the people for self-determination was denied.
After World War II, Bougainville was placed under Australian control as a United Nations
Trust territory. When Papua New Guinea gained independence from Australia in 1975,
Bougainville was given to PNG as a colony, against the wishes of its people, who are closer to the
Solomon Islanders culturally, ethnically, and geographically. See Moses Havini & Rikha Havini,
Bougainville—The Long Struggle for Freedom (1995), available at http://www.ecoaction.org/dt/bvstory.html. Fifteen days before PNG gained independence, Bougainville declared
itself the independent Republic of the North Solomons. See Parliament of Australia, Joint Standing
Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade, Bougainville: The Peace Process and Beyond,
ch. 2 ¶ 2.11 (1999), available at http://www.aph.gov.au/house/committee/jfadt/
bougainville/bv_chap2.htm. Forcing the people of Bougainville to unwillingly become subjects of
the alien PNG state may have been a violation of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
Article 15, Human Rights Declaration, supra note 5, at art. 15 (“(1) Everyone has the right to a
nationality. (2) No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his nationality nor denied the right to change
his nationality.”).
65
See Dave Kopel, Paul Gallant & Joanne Eisen, Little Island that Roared, NAT’L REV. ONLINE,
Feb. 6, 2002, at http://www.nationalreview.com/kopel/kopel020602.shtml.
66
Bougainville Peace Agreement, signed at Arawa Aug. 30, 2001, available at
http://www.unpo.org/Downloads/BougainvillePeaceAgreement29Aug01.pdf.
67
See Philip Alpers & Conor Twyford, Small Arms in the Pacific, SMALL ARMS SURVEY
OCCASIONAL PAPER NO. 8 83-85 (Mar. 2003). The Rotakas Record of May 3, 2001, was one of the
key portions of the Bougainville Peace Agreement; it laid out the stages for a “weapons disposal”
plan for the complete disarmament of the BRA.
68
See Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Political Office in Bougainville, UN
Security
Council,
U.N.
SCOR
S/2003/345,
¶
16
(2003),
available
at
http://www.un.dk/doc/s2003345.pdf (“The predecessor of the Bougainville Peace Agreement, the
Lincoln Agreement, did call for rehabilitation and reintegration, but this aspect has not kept pace
with weapons disposal.”); PMG Out, POST-COURIER, July 1, 2003 (promised funds for Bougainville
development were not provided); Tanis: Gov’t is Not Serious, POST-COURIER, Feb. 24, 2004 (“the
autonomous Bougainville government establishment grant had been used for purposes other than
the one it was meant for”).
16
UMKC LAW REVIEW
[Vol. 73:4
community-wide resentment to develop as other needs were not met, or were met
more slowly than expected.” 69 That is exactly what came to pass. 70
It has become clear that both the Australian and the PNG governments are
loathe to hold the promised referendum on the future of the islanders. This is a
violation of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which requires that,
“The will of the people shall be the basis of the authority of government; this will
shall be expressed in periodic and genuine elections which shall be by universal
and equal suffrage and shall be held by secret vote or by equivalent free voting
procedures.” 71 The kleptocracy’s theft of the resources of the Bougainvilleans,
and consequent impoverishment of the people, appears to violate Article 25 of
the Universal Declaration:
(1) Everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the health and
well-being of himself and of his family, including food, clothing, housing and
medical care and necessary social services, and the right to security in the
event of unemployment, sickness, disability, widowhood, old age or other
lack of livelihood in circumstances beyond his control. (2) Motherhood and
childhood are entitled to special care and assistance. All children, whether
born in or out of wedlock, shall enjoy the same social protection. 72
Unfortunately, the collection of weapons—rather than the restoration of
human rights, or attention to basic human needs—is the first priority of the UN
mission on Bougainville. As actually administered, the current “peace” program
in Bougainville, like its predecessors, is relentlessly focused on removing
weapons from the hands of civilians and is indifferent to improving the lives of
former combatants and the rest of the population, including women and
children. 73
69
Alpers & Twyford, supra note 67, at 87.
See B’ville Restoration not Moving Ahead, POST-COURIER, May 29, 2003; Services Collapse in
Bougainville, POST-COURIER, May 30, 2003.
71
Human Rights Declaration, supra note 5, art. 21 ¶3.
72
Id. art 25. See also International Covenant, supra note 58 arts. 1 & 25 (“the inherent right of all
peoples to enjoy and utilize fully and freely their natural wealth and resources”).
73
See Disarmament Through Peaceful Means, Practical Skills and a Community Participatory
Process, World Vision Bougainville Sustainable Livelihood Project, IANSA NEWSLETTER, July
2002, at 29, available at http://www.iansa.org/oldsite/mission/newsletter/july_newsletter/
World%20Vision%20Bougainville.pdf (“The disarmament program “is a top-down time and
resource-consuming process which may continue to breed uncertainty, mistrust and fear, and it is
tightly bound around political agendas.”). The IANSA authors still supported disarmament, noting,
The health and well-being of people and the very essential need to live in a peaceful
environment are at the heart of this mission. We believe that it could create a positive
impact on the political, economical, social and cultural life of the Bougainville
community as it links with the ongoing Government-initiated Disarmament
Programme.
Id. at 29. But how could a “peaceful environment” develop when the government creates
“uncertainty, mistrust and fear”? See id.
70
2005]
MICRO-DISARMAMENT
17
IV. ALBANIA
One of the most dramatic illicit gun transfers in recent history occurred in
Albania during March 1997. The transfers were caused by the collapse of several
elaborate pyramid schemes in November and December 1996, which
impoverished the Albanian people, many of whom lost their entire life savings. 74
The result was widespread anarchy and the toppling of the Sali Berisha
administration. 75 During the anarchy, “virtually all inmates escaped from the
Albanian prisons.” 76 The combination of a sudden upsurge in violence 77 and
78
79
mistrust of government caused civilians to loot 1,300 armories, removing
74
Berisha and Nano:
Albania’s Rivals, BBC NEWS, Sept. 13, 1998, available at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/170543.stm (“An estimated 90% of Albania’s population
invested around $2bn in the get-rich-quick schemes, and lost the best part of their money—often
their life savings—when the crisis came.”); See also Alexander Koliandre, Slovakia Falls Prey to
Investment
Scam,
BBC
NEWS,
Mar.
1,
2002,
available
at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/business/1846516.stm (general discussion of the Balkan pyramid
schemes).
75
Albanian Pyramid Scheme Boss Arrested, BBC NEWS, Apr. 29, 1998; Picking up the Pieces in
Albania, BBC NEWS, May 6, 2000, available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/
europe/85645.stm. See also Pyramid Power, Online NewsHour, (PBS Television Broadcast, Mar.
10, 1997), available at http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/europe/jan-june97/albania_3-10.html.
For the past week Albania, western Europe’s poorest country, has been under a state
of emergency. It’s [sic] southern half has been seized by opposition groups, spurned
on by a populace who have lost their life savings in failed pyramid schemes. Albania,
still emerging from years as the most isolated and autocratic nations on the continent,
became a democracy in 1991, but has seen that advance slide in the past few years.
Id.
76
Georgios A. Antonopoulos, Albanian Organized Crime: A View from Greece, CRIME & JUST.
INT’L, Nov./Dec. 2003, at 7.
77
Jolyon Naegele, Albania: Weapons-Collection Program Meets with Mixed Results, Radio Free
Europe
Radio
Liberty
(2001),
available
at
http://www.rferl.org/nca/features/
2001/10/10102001111812.asp (an increase in accidental shootings was also reported).
78
See Arban Hasani, Legal Process Against State Corruption in Pyramid Firms to Begin Soon—
TEL.
AGENCY,
Sept.
2,
1997,
at
3,
available
at
Minister,
ALBANIAN
http://www.hri.org/news/balkans/ata/1997/97-09-02.ata.html (quoting Albanian Minister of
Finance Arben Malaj about “state corruption in pyramid firms”).
79
See Support to Security Secort Reform (SSSR)—The United Nations Development Programme
(UNDP), Albania, Background, § 1, available at http://www.undp.org.al/salwc/?background (last
visited May 20, 2005). We note that the weapons stolen during the Albanian upheaval were stored
in government armories, not in civilian homes and closets; thus, the stolen weapons had been
secured under what the disarmament community would consider “safe-storage” conditions.
The claim is often made by firearm-prohibitionists that civilian gun stocks serve as “piggybanks” for criminals, and therefore restrictive legislation concerning civilian ownership and use of
firearms is necessary to prevent criminal acquisition from civilian sources. For example, Canadian
prohibition advocate Wendy Cukier has stated, “Diversion of civilian held small arms also fuels the
illicit supply.” Wendy Cukier, Small Arms and Light Weapons: A Public Health Approach, 9
BROWN J. WORLD AFF. 261, 272 (2002).
Concerns about the civilian gun stock being used as a depot of firearms just waiting for
criminals to carry them off should be placed into proper perspective. Incidents abound in which
18
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more than 550,000 weapons and millions of rounds of ammunition, as well as
However, both the
explosives, according to government estimates. 80
International Monetary Fund and the British Broadcasting Corporation reported
that the figure was closer to one million weapons; the Organization for Security
and Cooperation in Europe reported that 1.5 million weapons were looted by
civilians. 81
Although 75,548 weapons were quickly recovered by government agents in
1997, 82 in February 1998 the Albanian government deemed it necessary to
request aid from the UN to retrieve the balance of the missing weapons.
corrupt government officials have provided weapons to civilians and civilian criminals for financial
gain, even weapons formerly confiscated during “disarmament” programs. For example, UNsponsored disarmament in Uganda was undermined by government employees participating in the
arms trade. See, e.g., Government Forces Accused of Involvement in Arms Trade, UN INTEGRATED
REGIONAL INFORMATION NETWORKS, Feb. 18, 2002, http://allafrica.com/stories/200202180494.html
(“The Ugandan government has defended itself against criticisms by Amnesty International to the
effect that the Ugandan police and army are linked to a flourishing illegal arms trade in the
country.”); Will Ross, Guns and Drought in Karamoja, BBC NEWS, Feb. 18, 2003, available at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/2777059.stm (“In December 2001 the Ugandan
Government started to disarm the Karamojong . . . [One Karamojong] warrior, carrying his tiny
wooden stool or ekicolong, accused the Ugandan army of selling the guns back to the population . .
. .”). See generally Dave Kopel, Paul Gallant & Joanne Eisen, Disarming Uganda, NAT’L REV.
ONLINE, Dec. 11, 2002, http://www.nationalreview.com/kopel/kopel121102.asp.
80
See Afrim Krasniqi, Demilitarizing Communities in Albania, CHOICES, Dec. 2002, at 14,
available at http://www.undp.org/dpa/choices/2002/december/Pages14-15.pdf.
81
See Christopher Jarvis, The Rise and Fall of Albania’s Pyramid Schemes, 37 FIN. & DEV. 46, 48
(Mar.
2000),
available
at
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/2000/03/jarvis.htm
(International Monetary Fund quarterly reports, “By March 1997, Albania was in chaos . . . Many
in the army and police force had deserted, and 1 million weapons had been looted from the
26,
2003,
available at
armories.”);
Timeline:
Albania, BBC NEWS, Mar.
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/1004984.stm (“Up to a million weapons are looted from
army stores as angry mobs take to the streets.”); Chris Smith, Illegal Arms in Albania and
European Security, Speech at Seminar on Contemporary Arms Control and Disarmament, Geneva,
Switzerland,
Sept.
16,
1998,
available
at
http://www.genevaforum.org/Reports/salw_vol1/19980916.pdf (Between January 1997 and March 1997, “an
estimated 750,000 – 1 million light weapons were stolen from government armories (the OSCE
[Organization for Security and Co-Operation in Europe] estimates a figure of 1.5 million). The state
lost approximately 80 per cent of its weaponry stock, in addition to 1.5 billion pieces of
ammunition.”); Frank Viviano, Kosovo War Leaves Drug, Arms Traffic Up for Grabs, S.F. CHRON.,
May 11, 1999 (“In the free-for-all that ensued, looters carried off an estimated 2 million pounds of
explosives and 750,000 to 1,000,000 Kalashnikov rifles. The Albanian government says that fewer
than 10 percent of the looted weapons have been recovered.”); Analysis: The Second Coming in
Albania, UNITED PRESS INT’L, Nov. 19, 2001 (“Mobs looted 700,000 guns from the armories of the
army and the police and went on a rampage, in bloody scenes replete with warlords, crime and
1,500 dead.”).
Even the above figures may be a significant underestimate; we were told by a former weapons
trafficker, who wished to remain anonymous, that the total of looted weapons could have been
between two and four million firearms.
82
E-mail from Lawrence Doczy, SSSR Programme Manager, to Paul Gallant (Sept. 6, 2003) (on
file with author).
2005]
MICRO-DISARMAMENT
19
Jayantha Dhanapala, Under-Secretary-General for Disarmament Affairs, led a
fact-finding mission in Albania in mid-June 1998. The two initial proposals
were: (1) the creation of a paramilitary force that would carry out house-tohouse searches and confiscation, or (2) a compensated gun surrender program,
which the UN expected would create an increase in black market gun trafficking
into the region. 83
Instead, the innovative solution was a voluntary weapons collection
program that would be linked to building community development projects such
as roads, schools, and communications systems, and strengthening the
capabilities of local police in order to improve security. This program was
similar to the Japanese program currently being implemented in Cambodia. 84
There would also be an intense public information and education campaign,
including TV and radio spots, posters, T-shirts, and musical concerts. 85 The pilot
project would not use coercion, but would support the government’s new law on
weapons collection. 86 It would be located in Gramsh, 87 one of Albania’s thirtysix districts, where officials estimated that ten thousand weapons could be
collected. 88
The UN was extremely pleased with the results of the Gramsh voluntary
disarmament program. UN Under-Secretary-General for Disarmament Affairs
Dhanapala declared, “The project was considered a success: some 6,000
weapons and 137 tons of ammunition were collected, and the number of violent
crimes involving the use of small arms fell dramatically.” 89 Secretary-General
83
Jan Wahlberg, Weapons for Development: The Economic, Social and Political Context [article
on file with authors].
84
UNDP, Gramsh Pilot Programme, Weapons in Exchange for Development, Progress Report,
Feb. 23, 1999 (copy on file with the authors). For the Japanese program, see text at notes XX.
85
UNDP, Gramsh Pilot Programme, supra note 88.
86
See Ylli Pata, Parliament Approves Law on Weapons Collection, Ammunition, ALBANIAN TEL.
AGENCY, June 29, 2003, at 9, available at http://www.hri.org/news/balkans/ata/1998/98-0805.ata.html. See generally Weapons for Development, Report of the UNDP Mission for an Arms
Collection Pilot Programme in the Gramsh District – Albania, Sept. 4, 1998, available at
http://www.iansa.org/documents/development/weapons_for_dev.htm.
87
See Weapons for Development, supra note 90, ¶ 3 (“The Gramsh district consists of 1
municipality (Gramsh), 9 communes and 91 villages. The total population is about 56,000 (10,000
families) of which 40% is located in and around Gramsh municipality.”). See also Albania: Short
Mission Report, South Eastern Europe Clearinghouse for the Control of Small Arms and Light
Weapons, June 27-29, 2002, available at http://www.seesac.org/target/Albania.pdf. The Gramsh
Pilot Project evolved into the Weapons in Exchange for Development (“WED”) Project in Elbasan
and Dibra, and later into the Small Arms and Light Weapons Control Project (“SALWC”).
88
UNICEF, Call to Action: Weapons Collection Programmes, Taking Aim at Small Arms:
Defending
Children’s
Rights,
available
at
http://www.volumesquared.com/unicef/smallArms/html/sa05/weapons.html (last visited May 20,
2005).
89
Jayantha Dhanapala, Making Peace Last: Disarmament as an Essential Element, NGO
Committee on Disarmament, Peace and Security Workshop, DPI/NGO Conference, Sept. 10, 2002,
available at http://disarmament2.un.org/speech/10sept2002.htm. See also Jayantha Dhanapala,
Remarks to DPI/NGO Conference, Session on “Demobilizing the War Machines: Making Peace
20
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Annan was even more enthusiastic, “In spite of the relatively modest quantity of
weapons collected . . . Gramsh had been declared a weapon-free area, with no
reports of illegal or criminal activities involving weapons in the district for the
last 15 months.” 90
Did the weapons collection cause the drop in crime? A social scientist
would classify the Gramsh data as an “interrupted time series study.” In such a
study, the scientist looks at the rate of some variable before the “interruption”,
and then at the rate of the variable after the interruption.
The problem with drawing social science conclusions from Gramsh is that
we have only two data points. The first data point (before the interruption)
comes from 1997, a point when the violence rate was artificially elevated
because of the worst political and social instability that Albania had suffered for
decades. 91 No prior information is available to indicate whether the decline of
crime from 1997 was simply a return to normal levels, following the end of the
pyramid schemes crimes. There is no further information beyond the fact that
crime diminished. It may well be that the crime decline was long-lasting, but
without more data, we do not know. 92
The other great challenge in conducting an interrupted time series study is
excluding the effect of other variables. Imagine, for example, that a social
scientist wishes to test the hypothesis that tobacco consumption makes people
violent. Since tobacco consumption declined after New York City significantly
raised its tobacco taxes in 2002, the scientist conducts an interrupted time series
study of homicide rates in New York City. His two data points are 2001 and
2003. He collects the data, and finds that homicide in New York City was much
lower in 2003 than in 2001. Has the social scientist proven that reduced tobacco
consumption leads to reduced homicide?
Of course not. The scientist failed to account for other variables that
changed between 2001 and 2003. Most significantly, in 2001, New York City
suffered many homicides as the result of terrorism; in 2003, New York City
suffered no such homicides. The change in the uncontrolled variable (terrorism
Last,”
DPI/NGO
Conference,
Sept.
11,
2002,
available
at
http://www.un.org/dpi/ngosection/dhanapala.pdf (“The project resulted in the collection of
thousands of arms and rounds of ammunition, and registered a noticeable decline in armed conflict
and other armed violence in the district.”).
90
Assistance to States for Curbing the Illicit Traffic in Small Arms and Collecting Them, supra note
23, ¶ 11.
91
See Small Arms and Light Weapons Control Programme, South Eastern Europe Clearinghouse
for the Control of Small Arms and Light Weapons, Albania, United Nations Development
Programme, Sustainable Human Development, available at http://www.seesac.org/about/alb2.htm
(“[C]rime rose dramatically. The end of 1997 left behind more than 1600 people killed by gunrelated violence.”) [article on file with authors.]
See also UNDP Albania, Small Arms and Light Weapons Control Project,
Background, at http://undp.org.al/salwc/?background (last visited May 20, 2005) (“Over 1,500
murders occurred in 1997 (down to 208 in 2001).”).
92
See Wahlberg, supra note 87 (“The crime rate has gone down considerably, but for how long?”).
2005]
MICRO-DISARMAMENT
21
prevalence) overwhelmed whatever change might be attributed to the variable
(homicide) which the social scientist was studying. 93
In Gramsh, Albania, while the weapons collection program was going on,
there was a great improvement in the standard of living. 94 The UN Pilot Project
brought one million dollars into the district of Gramsh. 95 The funds were used to
create local infrastructure and to give jobs to the local populace to build needed
roads and bridges, schools, and telephone lines. 96 The effect on crime rates from
variables such as employment-generating projects, improved infrastructure, and
last, but not least, helpful attention paid to peoples’ problems by government and
UN officials, appears to have been overlooked. We are unaware of any
acknowledgement in UN-sponsored literature that these variables might account
for much, or all, of the decline in violence that the UN credits to the weapons
collection program. U.S. criminologist Gary Kleck explains:
Univariate interrupted time series studies of crime, which merely note shifts
in the level of crime at a particular point in time, are worthless for judging
why the crime rate changed. It is impossible to say whether the crime rate in
Albania would have declined anyway, even in the absence of the arms
collection program. And given that many other things changed at the same
time as the program, it is impossible to tell whether the arms collection
93
See GARB, supra note 19, at 42 (“Confounding is present when a third factor (confounder) is
related to both the risk factor and the outcome and thereby biases the degree or direction of the
association between the risk factor and the outcome.”); GARY KLECK, TARGETING GUNS 352 (1997)
(Interrupted time series study can be flawed by “the failure to adequately establish ceteris paribus
conditions, i.e. to control for other variables that can affect violence rates . . .”).
94
In the 1990s, Albania was in economic decline, with large scale unemployment. See UNICEF,
Call to Action: Weapons Collection Programmes, Taking Aim at Small Arms: Defending
Children’s Rights, at http://www.unicef.org/smallarms/exhibit/html/sa05/weapons.html (last visited
May 20, 2005). Because of poverty and a lack of job opportunities, many Albanians were forced to
emigrate. See Lotte Jorgensen, Giving Up Arms for Progress, CHOICES (Dec. 1999), available at
http://www.undp.org/dpa/choices/december99/arms.htm. (magazine of the United Nations
Development Programme). See also UNDP, Light Weapons and the Proliferation of Armed
Conflicts, available at http://www.undp.org/bcpr/archives/brochures/small_arms/small_arms.pdf
(last visited May 20, 2005).
95
According to UNDP’s public awareness information officer, Nora Kushti, “$1 million were
invested in Gramsh’s roads, bridges, street lighting, and telephone lines.” See Naegele, supra note
77.
96
“Most projects [in Gramsh] are labour-intensive infrastructural repairs, which help generate
employment in the local area . . . .” See Light Weapons and the Proliferation of Armed Conflicts,
supra note 98, at 5. Dhanapala described the “community-based employment-creating and incomegenerating development incentives, particularly for the youth,” and “upgraded community
infrastructure and service, such as better lighting and telecommunications system, renovated post
office and new roads and bridges.” Jayantha Dhanapala, Keynote Address at the Regional Seminar,
International Security Issues: A Call for Regional Cooperation, Dec. 14, 2001.
Comment [ GW1] : See Comment
GW24 accompanying FN 92
Comment [ GW2] : No web site found
for the keynote speech
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[Vol. 73:4
program had any effect at all, above and beyond the effects of those other
factors. 97
We are not denying that the arms collection in Gramsh may have been one
of the reasons why the crime rate declined; our point is that the evidence does not
support the claim that the arms collection was definitely a cause of all, or a
significant part of, the change in the crime rate—particularly because focusing
only on the arms collection ignores dramatic improvements in the job situation
and other social needs. The UN deserves credit in Gramsh, but attributing all the
credit for the change in the crime rate to the weapons collection program does not
seem supportable.
Because of the success of the Gramsh Pilot Project, the Weapons in
Exchange for Development (“WED”) programs in the districts of Elbasan and
Dibra were undertaken in 2000. 98 We know that the WED program was
considered a success because it led to the Small Arms and Light Weapons
Control (“SALWC”) Project in 2002. 99 However, we are unaware of any claims
made of a reduction in violence in Elbasan or Dibra.
Concomitant with the UN’s Weapons in Exchange for Development
program in 2000, the Albanian government created a task force of 250 police, to
visit every household in the country and request the surrender of weapons. 100
During the visit, the head of the family would be expected to hand over all arms.
He would sign a document that his home was weapons-free. If he were later
found to possess arms or ammunition, he would be subject to arrest, prosecution,
and incarceration for up to seven years. 101
Lawrence Doczy was Manager of the SALWC project and later of the
SSSR (Support to Security Sector Reform) Programme, which introduced
community-based policing in five pilot communities. Doczy estimated that
approximately 200,000 weapons were recovered by the Albanian government
between 1997 and the Spring of 2003; of these, 25,000 were recovered with help
97
E-mail from Gary Kleck, Professor of Criminology, Florida State University, to Paul Gallant
(June 29, 2003) (on file with author).
98
Assistance to States for Curbing the Illicit Traffic in Small Arms and Collecting Them, supra note
23, ¶¶ 11-12 (2001).
99
See Albania: Background, supra note 83.
100
U.N. Arms Control of a Different Type Gets Promising Results in Albania, ASSOCIATED PRESS,
Aug. 31, 2002, available at http://209.157.64.200/focus/f-news/742498/posts (“‘Up until 1999,
only 16,000 weapons were collected,’ said Todi Grazhdani, who oversaw a nationwide weaponscollection effort that at one point involved 250 officers.”)
101
ERIC ROMAN FILIPINK, SALW ISSUES AND OSCE FIELD MISSIONS: THE EXPERIENCE OF THE
PRESENCE IN ALBANIA (Joint Azerbaijani-Swiss Workshop, 21-22 June 2001), at
http://www.isn.ethz.ch/pfpdc/documents/2001/06-01_baku/filipink.htm; U.N. Arms Control of a
Different Type Gets Promising Results in Albania, supra note 104. It is clear that, despite the
intimidation factor of police officers visiting homes to ensure they were firearm-free, and the police
program’s success in collecting weapons relative to the WED program, many weapons still
remained in civilian homes. That is, a large number of civilians disobeyed the law and took the risk
of severe punishment for unlawful possession.
2005]
MICRO-DISARMAMENT
23
from the UN weapons collection programs. 102 Doczy explained, “It is widely
believed that [of the originally looted government estimate of 550,000 weapons]
approximately 150,000 had been trafficked out of the country during the Kosovo
crisis and the unrest in Macedonia, leaving an estimated 200,000 still in the
hands of the civilians.” 103 He added, “I think that the full disarmament of the
population is a myth. It will NEVER happen . . . Our plan from the beginning
was to try to skim off all that we can and subsequently recommend to the
government to modify the law and go for the registration of the remaining
weapons to bring them under control.” 104
The Weapons in Exchange for Development (“WED”) program expired in
July 2002, as did the amnesty period for voluntary surrender of weapons. Yet an
estimated 200,000 weapons were still unaccounted-for among the civilian
population. 105 So a few months before WED was set to expire, the Albanian
government enthusiastically embraced another weapons collection program aided
by the UN. On March 12, 2002, the United Nations Development Programme
(“UNDP”) approved the new Small Arms and Light Weapons Control
(“SALWC”) program. Targeting eighteen districts, or about half the country, the
program aimed for “the surrender and collection of the greatest number of
weapons.” 106 Due to a shortage of funding, the SALWC project tried to foster
competition in weapons surrenders; only the locales most successful in collecting
weapons would earn public works projects. A new feature of SALWC was
“development and establishment of a pilot database project as the basis for a
centralized, government-operated weapons control system.” 107
Johan Buwalda, program manager for UNDP’s Weapons in Exchange for
Development Program, commented, “It is not only weapons collection. It is also
102
E-Mail from Lawrence Doczy, Manager of the Support to Security Sector Reform Programme,
to Paul Gallant (July 15, 2003) (on file with author).
103
E-Mail from Lawrence Doczy, Manager of the Support to Security Sector Reform Programme,
to Paul Gallant (Sept. 6, 2003) (on file with author). See also U.N. Arms Control of a Different
Type Gets Promising Results in Albania, supra note 104:
As many as 150,000 weapons are believed to have been spirited out of Albania and
into the hands of ethnic Albanian militants fighting in neighboring Kosovo and
Macedonia. Although Albania’s government has collected about 200,000 weapons
and significant amounts of other ordnance, police say at least 200,000 other weapons
and countless rounds of ammunition remain in private hands.
Id.
104
E-Mail from Lawrence Doczy, Manager of the Support to Security Sector Reform Programme,
to Paul Gallant (July 16, 2003) (on file with author) (emphasis in original). See also Paul Henley,
Albania’s Gun Culture Proves Hard to Shift, BBC NEWS, Jan. 15, 2003, available at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/2660853.stm.
105
As of August 4, 2002, the government admitted that “200,000 weapons still remain in hands of
civilians.” UNDP: Albania, SALWC 2002-2003, Results and Current Situation, Situation after 4
Aug 2002, available at http://undp.org.al/salwc/?salwc (last visited June 29, 2003).
106
Albania: Background, supra note 83, at 6.
107
Id.
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[Vol. 73:4
weapons control. So we will assist the police in setting up a database, storing
these data, managing the data. . . .” 108
The prior UN role in weapons collection in Albania, SALWC, evolved into
the current SSSR (Support to Security Sector Reform) and was expected to
extend until the end of 2005. 109 The stated objective was gradually to cease
direct support for weapons collection and to introduce community-based policing
in five pilot communities, in order to improve safety and security for the
populace and to improve police accountability. In addition, a component of the
program will computerize the handwritten gun registration system. 110 The UN
hopes that, as the people in Albania become more secure and more trusting of
their police, they will register their weapons.
Alfred Moisiu, President of Albania, observed that many Albanians were
reluctant to disarm, noting, “Most people are not agreeing to hand over the arms,
the weapons, because the situation is still not secure here in our country.” Moisiu
acknowledged that his countrymen believed that unilateral disarmament
endangered law-abiding citizens who surrendered their weapons, because
criminals always will be able to acquire weapons. 111
Citizens may be reluctant to participate in the UN-sponsored gun
registration program because laws later could be changed to prohibit possession
of those registered weapons. 112 After all, in Cambodia, the UN-mandated gun
licensing program was followed a few years later by a UN-supported gun
confiscation program. 113
It is not unreasonable for Albanians to be skeptical about trusting the
government. As Human Rights Watch reported, in Albania, there is “impunity
108
Naegele, supra note 77.
UNDP, Support to Security Sector Reform Programme, Quarterly Report No. 2, April-June
2004, § 1.5, available at http://www.sssr.undp.org.al/download/reports/qr/2004/2.pdf.
110
Id.
111
Naegele, supra note 77. See also Socio-Economic Analysis and Impact Assessment, SALWC
Project, Centre for Rural Studies, at 26, available at http://undp.org.al/salwc/?reports (last visited
Sept. 23, 2003) (“The main reason for having a weapon is self/family protection for more than
73.7% of the respondents. . . .”) The researchers explained that although many Albanians said they
would be willing to disarm, “many of them would like to keep one weapon (with the reason to
protect himself and his family and business) as the others still have weapons.” Id.
112
Hughes-Wilson and Wilkinson readily acknowledged the UN’s intentions concerning civilian
firearm ownership. See John Hughes-Wilson and Adrian Wilkinson, Safe and Efficient Small Arms
Collection and Destruction Programmes: A Proposal for Practical Technical Measures, UNDP
(May
2001),
at
16,
¶
4.1.2,
available
at
http://www.undp.org/bcpr/smallarms/docs/sa_prac_meas.pdf:
It may be possible to start a programme of weapon registration as a first step towards
the physical collection phase. . . . The advantage to the local community is that they
can retain their weapons until they feel that the security environment is sufficiently
safe to allow for weapons surrender. . . . Assurances must be provided, and met, that
the process of registration will not lead to immediate weapons seizures by security
forces.
Id. (emphasis added).
113
See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
109
2005]
MICRO-DISARMAMENT
25
for police abuse, failures of various government branches to uphold the rule of
law, trafficking in human beings, and widespread violations of children’s rights .
. . .” 114 Organized crime syndicates have trafficked more than 20,000 Albanian
women to Greece for sexual exploitation. Albanian children are also trafficked
for what amounts to de facto slavery for the crime syndicates, “to be used in
labour, to beg in public places or clear car windows at traffic lights. In other
cases, Albanian criminal networks have trafficked babies, which according to the
police authorities are sold for US $200.” 115 To state the obvious, government
complicity in human trafficking is a major violation of human rights and
international law. 116
Even in Canada, a wealthy country where people do trust their government,
firearms registration has been an abysmal waste of resources; the program was
supposed to cost two million dollars (Canadian), but is well over one billion, and
on its way to two billion. 117 Now Canada is a country where spending eightyfive million dollars, or a great deal more, on an unproductive government
program will still leave a great deal of money for the government to spend on
social needs. But wasting even a few million dollars in Albania 118 can mean that
very urgent public needs will go unmet.
114
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, ALBANIA, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH WORLD REPORT 2003, at
http://www.hrw.org/wr2k3/europe1.html. It may take many years before that trustworthiness of
Albania’s police is established sufficiently for the populace to choose to register their weapons.
One author (J.D.E.) still recalls tales by her grandfather of arbitrary police abuses, and arrests by
secret police in the middle of the night, that took place more than a century ago in Hungary.
115
Antonopoulos, supra note 76, at 6.
116
See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
117
Auditor General of Canada, Costs of Implementing the Canadian Firearms Program (2002),
available at http://www.oag-bvg.gc.ca/domino/reports.nsf/html/20021210ce.htm; Gary A. Mauser,
The Failed Experiment: Gun Control and Public Safety in Canada, Australia, England and Wales,
71
PUB.
POL’Y
SOURCES
4
(2003),
available
at
http://www.fraserinstitute.ca/admin/books/files/FailedExperiment.pdf (“The final costs are
unknown but, if the costs of enforcement are included, the total cost could easily reach $3
billion.”); Jason Fekete, Redirect Gun Registry Funds, THE OTTAWA CITIZEN, July 8, 2003,
available at http://lufa.ca/news/news_item.asp?NewsID=2226 (“The federal government should
abolish the $2-billion firearms registry for long guns and redirect the tax dollars to municipalities,
health care, education and law enforcement, says a report to be presented to a city committee.”).
118
We note optimistically that the UN is proceeding in a slow and careful manner in the Albanian
gun registration project. Lawrence Doczy told us:
We have now purchased the equipment and software and have put these at the
disposal of the Ministry of Public Order computer people who have received the
necessary training and have developed the initial software for this purpose. The initial
step will be the inputting of the data of all weapons currently in the custody of the
MoPO (police). We have installed the equipment at HQ in Tirana and also in one of
the Police Directorates in Tirana to test the replicability and communication between
the centre and a satellite. Once debugged we will present a plan for the entire country
and go back to the donors for funding.
E-Mail from Lawrence Doczy, Manager of the Support to Security Sector Reform Programme, to
Paul Gallant (July 16, 2003) (on file with author).
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[Vol. 73:4
Nevertheless, the Albanian population can look forward to more attempts at
weapons control. There was yet to be another amnesty. 119 The Albanian
government’s disarmament programs likely will continue, although UN funding
may be running out. 120 The Albanian government faces the task of confiscating
or registering the remaining weapons—at least 200,000, but perhaps as many as
700,000. 121
Rather than persisting in a futile attempt to disarm the public, it would be
more effective for government to control police abuses, to pay better attention to
fundamental human rights, to spend its resources on required infrastructure, and
to reduce the civilian need for arms by protecting the people against slave
traffickers.
V. PANAMA
A typical voluntary weapons collection program (“VWCP”) occurred in the
city of San Miguelito, Panama, during 1998. 122 William Godnick’s thorough
119
See Albania: Background, supra note 83. at 15:
In stressing the date of 4 August as the deadline for the voluntary surrender of
weapons, the PAI [educational component] activities are faced with the fact that the
Government had extended the deadline twice in the past and the population expects
another extension. Consequently the challenge of the PAI activities is to convince the
population that this time the Government is serious and will not grant another
extension.
Id. See also United Nations Development Programme, Evolving from Small Arms and Light
Weapons Control Project to Support to Security Sector Reform Programme in Albania,available at
http://www.undp.org.al/salwc; United Nations Development Programme, Hundreds of People Give
in Their Weapons—UNDP Small Arms and Light Weapons Control Paved the Way to a Weapons
Free Society, NEWS AND EVENTS, Apr. 5, 2004, available at http://www.undp.org.al/?news,0,46:
Following the expiration of the amnesty law on 4 August 2002, the SALWC
project staff worked relentlessly with the government to ensure the
reestablishment of and [sic] amnesty law, the necessary legal framework, to
allow for weapons collection activities to resume. A new law was in fact
established in March 2003 . . . .
Id.
120
Support to Security Sector Reform Programme, supra note 113 ¶ 2.7.1 (“The Albanian
Government is serious with respect to the continuation of weapons collection activities. . . .
However at this point SSSR is no longer supporting directly the weapons collection and is not
obtaining WC figures, mainly due to lack of funding.”).
121
The figure depends on the various estimates of the number of weapons looted from government
armories, the number of weapons sold outside the country, the number of weapons recovered, and
the number of weapons originally in civilian hands. Accounts vary; see supra at notes 85, 107.
122
WILLIAM H. GODNICK, VOLUNTARY WEAPONS COLLECTION IN PANAMA: THE ARMS EXCHANGE
PROGRAM IN SAN MIGUELITO § I (Program for Arms Control, Disarmament and Conversion,
Monterey
Institute
of
International
Studies,
January
1999),
available
at
http://sand.miis.edu/research/1999/jan1999/panama.PDF. San Miguelito is located at the edge of
Panama City. “It was one of the areas within Panama where the greatest quantities of arms were
distributed leading up to the United States military invasion of Panama in 1989 (Operation Just
Cause).” Id. at § II.
2005]
MICRO-DISARMAMENT
27
discussion of the 1998 program sets forth the assumptions of the disarmament
community: there is a causal relationship between violence and the number of
arms in the hands of the public (even in non-criminal hands); further, “[t]here is a
wide consensus among supporters of VWCP that the symbolism of collecting and
destroying the tools of violence provides enormous intangible benefits to postwar society.” 123 Despite the the program’s potential intangible benefits, Godnick
recognized that the challenge “is to find tangible and quantifiable evidence that
these programs improve social wellbeing.” 124
In San Miguelito, a community of 300,000 poor people, the Arms Exchange
program offered people a choice of food, construction materials, small
appliances, or employment opportunities, in exchange for guns. The program
also included increased police enforcement in a crime-ridden area where police
presence formerly had been minimal. The program collected 108 illegal firearms
during 1998; additionally, the National Police (PN) collected another 97 firearms,
for a total of 205. The total cost per weapon was averaged at $200 (US). 125
Godnick noted, “According to San Migueltio Mayor Cano Gonzalez the violent
crime rate has been reduced by 75% since the implementation of Arms
Exchange.” 126
As in Gramsh, Albania, 127 social conditions significantly improved after the
implementation of the arms collection program. Was the collection of arms the
main cause of the improvements?
Perhaps not. Mayor Gonzalez acknowledged that youths in certain hotspots
committed 60% of San Miguelito’s crimes. 128 Mayor Gonzalez offered
employment opportunities to these youths, in exchange for the surrender of their
weapons. In other words, the San Miguelito program did not just get guns off the
streets; it got the criminals off the streets, and into jobs. As Godnick stated, “the
focus of providing employment opportunities in the individual’s home
community is worth re-examining.” 129
Godnick acknowledged that a dramatic decrease in crime, due to the
removal of only 205 weapons, might be implausible. 130 Godnick’s caution is
bolstered by the observation of Under-Secretary-General for Disarmament
Affairs, Jayantha Dhanapala, that, in Central America, for every firearm collected
123
Id. at § I.
Id.
125
Id. at § V.
126
Id. at § III.
127
See supra Part IV.
128
GODNICK, supra note 122, at § II.
129
Id.
130
Id. at § VI.
The organizers of the Arms Exchange program claim that the violent crime rate has
decreased by 75% since implementation. I have no reason to doubt this claim, but as a
policy analyst by trade, I realize that statistics can be interpreted in any variety of
ways. Political oppositions will question program success when the implementing
institution is closely affiliated with its evaluators.
Id.
124
28
UMKC LAW REVIEW
[Vol. 73:4
by a disarmament program, one hundred weapons remain in circulation. 131 Even
if the San Miguelito program removed 10% of the guns (instead of just 1%), their
removal might be expected to be less significant than the removal of the
criminals responsible for 60% of the crime. And perhaps the willingness of the
youthful criminals to get real jobs, and give up their guns, was significantly
enhanced by the much-increased police presence.
Godnick posed the question, “Is the program cost of US $200 per firearm
turned in a good social investment? The answer is clearly yes.” 132 He is clearly
right, regarding the guns surrendered by the criminals. But the broader
implication of the San Miguelito success is not that crime can be stopped by
spending $200 per gun for gun surrender programs. Rather, the evidence
suggests that crime can be stopped by much more expensive programs:
significantly increased police, and a jobs program for unemployed youths. The
$200 per gun program was built on top of these expensive, and worthwhile,
investments. The San Miguelito story does not offer evidence that $200 per gun,
in isolation, would have succeeded.
San Miguelito does, however, prove that UN-affiliated micro-disarmament
programs do not necessarily have to foster violations of human rights. No matter
how one parcels out the credit to the various elements of the San Miguelito
program, the program was a success at improving the lives of the people of San
Miguelito. The San Miguelito program did not foster the violation of human
rights—unlike the harmful micro-disarmament programs in Cambodia, in
Bougainville, and in Albania (after the initial success in Gramsh). San Miguelito
offers at least the hope that all of the UN’s disarmament resources might
eventually be used only for projects that do not harm human rights.
VI. GUATEMALA
The Mayan Indians of Guatemala have suffered a long history of de facto
slavery, starting with their conquest by the Spanish in 1524. 133 Guatemala
remained under Spanish rule until 1821 when the Spanish withdrew, and the
country became a republic in 1839. Its history has been replete with political
turmoil.
131
Dhanapala, supra note 93 (“In Central America it was estimated that for every 1,000 weapons
collected some 100,000 remained in unaccounted circulation.”).
132
GODNICK, supra note 122, at § V.
133
See SIMKIN, ZELMAN & RICE, supra note 21, at 231; GLOBAL EXCHANGE, GUATEMALA: A BRIEF
HISTORY, available at http://www.globalexchange.org/countries/americas/guatemala/history.html
(last visited May 21, 2005).
The Mayans have not accepted their fate lightly. A study of their history shows
that in every generation since the invasion of the Spaniards, the Mayans have
risen up in rebellion, armed only with rocks and machetes. Every generation,
these slave revolts have been quickly crushed by the well armed forces of the
oligarchy.
Id.
2005]
MICRO-DISARMAMENT
29
The country’s first major restrictive gun law, Decree Number 36, was
enacted in 1871. Many more gun laws followed. 134 These regulations rendered
lawful firearm acquisition and possession beyond the financial means of the
average Guatemalan.
When the Mayan Indians, generally unarmed, 135 became more active in
political affairs in 1960, the response of government was violent suppression.
The result was a thirty-six-year-long civil war, the longest in Latin American
history, 136 that claimed approximately 200,000 lives, in what some have labeled a
genocide. 137
Although small bands of armed insurgents were active, most of the Mayan
population did not have arms, and therefore did not involve itself in the
insurrection. The government was so determined to crush the insurrection that
there appeared to be no limits on killing anyone; according to the BBC News, the
zeal of the army to eliminate just one small group of only 100 insurgents in 1966
resulted in the deaths of 10,000 people. 138
The Mexico Accord, signed on April 26, 1991, emphasized human rights
and the rights of indigenous people. It was followed by the Comprehensive
Agreement on Human Rights, of March 29, 1994, which paved the way for
establishment of a UN presence in Guatemala, called MINUGUA (United
Nations Observer Mission in Guatemala). 139
134
SIMKIN, ZELMAN & RICE, supra note 21, at 230-33.
EDWARD J. LAURANCE AND WILLIAM H. GODNICK, WEAPONS COLLECTION IN CENTRAL AMERICA:
EL
SALVADOR
AND
GUATEMALA
(2000),
at
23,
available
at
http://sand.miis.edu/research/2000/jan2000/bicc_elsgua.pdf.
136
INFOPLEASE ONLINE ALMANACS, Guatemala, at http://www.infoplease.com/ipa/A0107596.html.
137
Guatemala Mayans Still ‘Wronged’, BBC NEWS, Sept. 12, 2002, available at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/americas/2253273.stm (“Left-wing Mayan guerillas waged a 36year-long civil war in which about 200,000 people were killed in what the UN has described as
genocide.”); Guatemala ‘Genocide’ Probe Blames State, BBC NEWS, Feb. 25, 1999, available at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/americas/286402.stm; Victoria Sanford, The Inter-American
Court Condemns Guatemalan Government for 1982 massacre and for the First Time in its History
Condemns a Member State for Genocide, Genocide Watch website, available at
http://www.genocidewatch.org/GuatemalaCourtCondemnsStateforGenocide23july2004.htm (last
visited May 21, 2005).
138
Guatemala ‘Genocide’ Probe Blames State, supra note 140. For an elaborate discussion on why
armed conflicts, especially guerrilla conflicts, result in the intentional deaths of large numbers of
non-combatant civilians, see Benjamin Valentino, Paul Huth, and Dylan Balch-Lindsay, Draining
the Sea: Mass Killing, Genocide, and Guerilla Warfare, unpublished paper available from Prof.
Valentino at the Center for International Security and Cooperation, Stanford University. See also
PATRICK BALL, PAUL KOBRAK, AND HERBERT F. SPIRER, STATE VIOLENCE IN GUATEMALA, 19601996:
A
QUANTITATIVE
REFLECTION,
available
at
http://shr.aaas.org/guatemala/ciidh/qr/english/part1.html (“During Guatemala’s 36-year armed
conflict, the State killed hundreds of thousands of citizens and displaced a million more.”) (Ball is
Deputy Director of the Science and Human Rights Program for the American Association for the
Advancement of Science.).
139
STEPHEN BARANYI, THE CHALLENGE IN GUATEMALA: VERIFYING HUMAN RIGHTS,
STRENGTHENING NATIONAL INSTITUTIONS AND ENHANCING AN INTEGRATED UN APPROACH TO
PEACE (The Centre for the Study of Global Governance, London School of Economics 1995) (copy
on file with the authors).
135
30
UMKC LAW REVIEW
[Vol. 73:4
MINUGUA was a peacekeeping mission created by the Security Council in
1997 “to verify agreement on the definitive ceasefire between the Government of
Guatemala and the Unidad Revolucionaria Nacional Guatemalteca
(“URNG”).” 140 Among its objectives was the demobilization and disarmament
of URNG combatants. 141
But the disarmament was incomplete. Godnick stated, “It is recognized that
United Nations sponsored disarmament programs have not been able to recover a
fraction of the weapons in circulation. The 1,800 weapons collected from the
guerrillas in Guatemala after the conclusion of more than three decades of
conflict is a prime example of this.” 142 In addition, 642 URNG combatants did
not comply with the program. 143
The Guatemalan government did not continue with the disarmament
process and did not institute formal civilian weapons collection programs at that
time. 144 Despite the surrender of 1,800 URNG weapons, observers noted that
“Guatemala is experiencing increased crime and violence. . . .” 145
Laurance and Godnick, who also observed the increase in violence after the
ceasefire and weapons collection, 146 pointed out that the increased violence
occurred in the cities, rather than in the Mayan-populated countryside. 147 And,
140
United Nations Peacekeeping Operations, United Nations Verification Mission in Guatemala:
MINUGUA, Mission Profile, available at http://www.un.org/Depts/DPKO/Missions/minugua.htm.
141
See United Nations Verification Mission in Guatemala: MINUGUA, available at
http://www.un.org/Depts/dpa/prev_dip/americas_europe/guatemala/fr_guatemala_background.htm;
MINIGUA’s 9th and Final Report on Fulfillment of the Peace Accords in Guatemala, Aug. 30,
2004, available at http://www.nisgua.org/articles/minugua_Final_Report_Aug2004.htm; Mission
Profile, supra note 143.
142
WILLIAM H. GODNICK, ILLICIT ARMS IN CENTRAL AMERICA (Program for Arms Control,
Disarmament and Conversion at the Monterey Institute of International Studies 1998) (Prepared for
an international workshop of the British American Security Information Council (“BASIC”),
“Small Arms and Light Weapons: An Issue for the OSCE,” Vienna, November 9-10, 1998),
available at http://sand.miis.edu/research/documents/gnick-osce.pdf.
143
See LAURANCE & GODNICK, supra note 135, at 26.
144
Alexander Chloros, et al., Breaking the Cycle of Violence: Light Weapons Destruction in
Central America, Basic Papers, Number 4 (Dec. 1997) (“Weapons collection programs have not
formed a part of the Guatemalan government’s reconstruction process, although the police have
been carrying out raids to confiscate weapons which are not registered under the Interior Ministry’s
new more restrictive ownership laws.”).
145
Id.
146
LAURANCE & GODNICK, supra note 135, at 23. See generally CAROLINE MOSER & CATHY
MCILWAINE, VIOLENCE IN A POST-CONFLICT CONTEXT: URBAN POOR PERCEPTIONS FROM
GUATEMALA 41 (2001) (quoting a group of women from Sacuma, Huehuetenango, “instead of
signing peace, they signed violence.”).
147
LAURANCE & GODNICK, supra note 135, at 23. Some vigilantism has occurred in the Mayanpopulated rural areas, with 176 lynchings between 1996 and 2000. It does appear that the Mayan
community is attempting to control criminal activities, in an extra-judicial manner. See William
Godnick, et. al., Stray Bullets: The Impact of Small Arms Misuse in Central America, Small Arms
Survey,
Occasional
Paper
No.
5
(Oct.
2002),
at
19,
available
at
http://www.basicint.org/pubs/Papers/BP24.htm; Human Rights Watch, Human Rights Watch World
2005]
MICRO-DISARMAMENT
31
they further acknowledged that, in general, the Mayan people still remain
unarmed. 148
Could the remaining weapons be the cause of all this violence? Could 642
armed, URNG ex-combatants have migrated to the city and been responsible for
the crime wave? 149
Although there is no dispute over the fact of increased violence in the cities,
there is question about the number of weapons present in Guatemala. Godnick
and Vázquez report 181,051 legally registered weapons, and 1.5 million illegal
weapons, making Guatemala “the most highly armed country in the subregion.” 150
The present Guatemalan government is part of the problem. There is
rampant government corruption 151 and a continuing pattern of human rights
abuses 152 and social inequality. 153 Human Rights Watch reported, “Charges of
government corruption produced violent reprisals in several instances. . . . In
February, a witness in one high-profile corruption case, César Augusto Rodas
Furlán, was shot dead in Guatemala City.” 154 Human Rights Watch documented
many acts of intimidation against human rights defenders. The perpetrators
possessed the kind of information that “had traditionally been the domain of
military intelligence.” 155
Report
1999:
Guatemala:
Human
Rights
Developments,
at
http://www.hrw.org/worldreport99/americas/guatemala.html:
[T]he failure to curb common crime prompted many citizens to take justice into
their own hands. MINUGUA calculated that between March 27, 1996, and
April 1, 1998 there was an average of more than one lynching per week.
According to MINUGUA, most lynchings occurred in rural areas with little
police presence . . . .
Id.
148
LAURANCE & GODNICK, supra note 135, at 23.
149
Chloros, et al., supra note 144 (“Guatemala is experiencing increased crime and violence
resulting from internal security threats and the presence of surplus weapons.”); Camilla Waszink,
Small Arms and Violence in Guatemala, SAND Brief: Guatemala (May 2000), available at
http://sand.miis.edu/research/2000/may2000/guatebrief.pdf (“The proliferation of small arms has an
adverse impact on Guatemalan society. The abundance of weapons has created a ‘culture of
violence’ . . .”)
150
See William Godnick & Helena Vázquez, Small Arms Control in Central America, Latin
America Series No. 2 (English Version) (June 2003), at 22, available at
http://www.iansa.org/regions/camerica/documents/iaca_eng.pdf. Earlier, Godnick had written,
“Scholars and researchers estimate that up to 2 million military weapons remain in Central
America.” GODNICK, supra note 145. Obviously the high end of the Guatemala figure (2 million)
and the total Central America estimate of two million cannot both be correct.
151
See Godnick, et al., supra note 150, at 34; Populist President Takes Over in Guatemala, BBC
NEWS, Jan. 14, 2000, available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/americas/604184.stm.
152
Guatemala Mayans Still ‘Wronged’, supra note 140; Guatemala Rights Urged, BBC NEWS, July
5, 2001, available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/americas/1424371.stm.
153
See Godnick, et. al., supra note 150, at 34.
154
Human Rights Watch, Human Rights Watch World Report 2003, Guatemala, at
http://hrw.org/wr2k3/americas6.html.
155
Id.
32
UMKC LAW REVIEW
[Vol. 73:4
Guatemalans do not believe that criminals will be dealt justice. 156 It is no
wonder, since government is so busy defending its own power structure and
protecting itself from the “destabilizing” effects of those who seek legitimate
redress of civil rights grievances.
According to Waszink, “The maras [delinquent drug gangs] are responsible
for assaults on buses and other criminal acts. In Guatemala City each major bus
company experiences an average of 3-4 assaults daily.” 157 With crime increasing
in the cities, and with assault and kidnapping for ransom an everyday
occurrence, 158 it is not surprising that Guatemalans are arming for self-defense,
or that private security is a growth industry. Although the constitution of
Guatemala guarantees the human right of civilians to possess weapons, 159 the
bureaucratic requirements to own firearms can disarm some people whose lives
may be in danger, and push some of them into the black market. 160
156
INSTITUTE FOR TEACHING SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT, SMALL ARMS IN GUATEMALA (2003), at
6, available at http://www.iepades.org/docs/SmallArms.pdf. “The increase of violence and
criminal rate, the availability of arms and ammunitions, the lack of reaction on the part of the State,
have pushed the population to acquire arms to protect themselves and their families.” Id. at 4.
157
See Waszink, supra note 152.
158
See Godnick & Vázquez, supra note 150, at 12.
159
CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DE LA REPÚBLICA DE GUATEMALA, art. 38 (1985, with the reforms of
1993):
ARTICULO 38.- Tenencia y portación de armas. Se reconoce el derecho de tenencia
de armas de uso personal, no prohibidas por la ley, en el lugar de habitación. No habrá
obligación de entregarlas, salvo en los casos que fuera ordenado por el juez
competente. Se reconoce el derecho de portación de armas, regulado por la ley.
(Article 38. - Possession and carrying of arms. The right of possession of arms for
personal use not prohibited by the law, is recognized, in the home. There will be no
obligation to surrender them, except in cases which are ordered by a competent judge.
The right of carrying of arms is recognized, regulated by the law.)
Id. (authors’ translation).
160
GUATEMALA,
OVERVIEW,
available
at
http://www.research.ryerson.ca/SAFERNet/regions/Americas/Gua_MY03.html (last modified May 16, 2003).
Article 38 of the Constitution provides protection for the right to possess firearms in
the home. Specific issues are dealt with by the Law of Arms and Ammunition (Decree
38-89), the Reform Decree (74/90), and the Statute of Law and Ammunition (16 July
1991). The Department of Arms and Ammunition Control of the Ministry of Defence
(DECAM) is responsible for all issues related to firearms including regulation and the
granting of permits.
Licencing Requirements: Licences to carry a firearm may be issued for sporting,
collection, and defensive purposes to persons 25 and over. Permissible defensive arms
include revolvers, semi-automatic pistols of any calibre, pump shotguns, and rear- and
side-loaded semi-automatics, with barrels not more than 56 cm (Art. 5, Decree
339/89). Licences can apply to a maximum of 3 firearms and are generally valid for 1
year. 3-year licences may be granted to holders who have not committed a crime or
violation for 3 years.
Comment [ GW3] : Rule 5.4 p 47 says
to keep the paragraph structure for quotes
longer than 50 words.
2005]
MICRO-DISARMAMENT
33
The crime problem has provoked some Guatemalans to argue against more
stringent weapons control and collection laws. One pro-gun civilian group, the
Guardianes del Vecindario, used billboards around the country to advertise
messages such as “Thieves and Murderers Prefer Unarmed Victims.” 161 Another
group, the Association for the Constitutional Right to Bear Arms, protested with
newspaper advertisements against new regulations and against international
interference with Guatemalans’ natural right to self-defense.162
Guatemala has a multitude of problems that might tend to foster a culture of
violence. Furthermore, the country is geographically situated to function as a
conduit for smuggling drugs and other contraband. After the settlement of the
civil war, it appears that about three-fourths of the rebels obeyed the
disarmament agreement.
There is still widespread lawlessness; in 2003, local media reported that
“murders, assaults and kidnappings increased by more than 150%.” 163 Perhaps
the reason is that, according to Secretary-General Kofi Annan, “There are wideranging social inequalities. Discrimination across ethnic, cultural and linguistic
lines remains disturbingly prevalent. And Guatemala has fallen short of its
obligations to pay reparations to war victims and to substantially increase tax
revenues to pay for much-needed social investments.” 164
Although the United Nations Verification Mission has completed its job
and is leaving Guatemala, the UN and Guatemala have agreed on the opening of
Article 73 of Statute Governing Accord 424/91 states that purchasers of firearms must
present the seller with:
a legal photocopy of the identification card;
a certification of no prior arrests;
proof of employment and/or certification of income.
The seller must then send this documentation to the DECAM, and if the sale is
authorized, the seller will present the relevant receipt.
Registration Requirements: Article 74 of Statute 424/91 states that the buyer must
register with DECAM within 3 days of purchase, and:
present firearms;
present property title;
and submit two bullets for a ballistics test.
Id. In particular, the age requirement of 25, and the requirement that a gun licensee have a job may
put young people and poor people at risk of being unable to protect themselves from violent
criminals.
161
See LAURANCE & GODNICK, supra note 135, at 29.
162
Id. (“At the same time, another pro-firearm group the Association for the Constitutional Right to
Bear Arms (ACEPTAR) published a full page newspaper advertisement condemning proposed
reforms to the law on arms and munitions and criticizing MINUGUA [United Nations Observer
Mission in Guatemala] and other international institutions for meddling in sovereign domestic
affairs.”).
163
See UN to Help Guatemala Fight Crime, BBC NEWS, Jan. 8, 2004, available at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/3378739.stm.
164
Kiernan Prendergast, Under-Secretary-General, Secretary-General’s Message to the Closing
Ceremony of the United Nations Verification Mission in Guatemala (MINUGUA) (Nov. 15, 2004),
available at http://www.un.org/apps/sg/sgstats.asp?nid=1179.
34
UMKC LAW REVIEW
[Vol. 73:4
“an Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights and for the creation of a
special body to investigate clandestine groups.” 165
As a public relations response to the continuing problem of violent crime,
the government of Guatemala has implemented a goods-for-guns program.
According to the BBC News, Guatemalan President Oscar Berger acknowledged,
“It would not produce major results in the short term . . . but together we will
resolve, little by little, the problems of violence in Guatemala.” 166
VII. MALI
Mali has been touted by the disarmament community as a showcase
success. But the events in Mali do not support such claims.
Mali, an inland country in West Africa, is among the world’s ten poorest
nations. 167 Mali attained independence from France in 1960 and is twice the size
of modern-day France. Ten percent of the Malian population live as nomads in
the country’s northern desert, which accounts for seventy percent of Mali’s total
The country’s southern inhabitants are more agriculturally
territory. 168
inclined. 169
Among the minority groups in Mali are the Tuareg, whose current
population is estimated at approximately 500,000. 170 They live not only in the
north of Mali, but also in Algeria, Libya, Niger, and Burkina Faso. 171 Severe
droughts of the late 1960s through the mid-1970s, and again between 1980 and
1985, destroyed the social fabric and the economy of the north. 172
165
Id.
Guatemala Swaps Guns for Bicycles, BBC NEWS, July 10, 2004, available at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/americas/3883023.stm.
167
Mali Election: Candidates and Issues, GLOBAL NEWS WIRE – ASIA AFRICA INTELLIGENCE WIRE,
Apr. 27, 2002; Gaoussou Traore, Malians Prepare to Elect New President Sunday, PANAFRICAN
NEWS AGENCY (PANA) DAILY NEWSWIRE, Apr. 26, 2002.
168
Stefan Sperl, International Refugee Aid and Social Change in Northern Mali, THE J. OF
HUMANITARIAN
ASSISTANCE,
Working
Paper
No.
22
(2001),
available
at
http://www.jha.ac/articles/u022.htm.
169
Kalifa Keita, Conflict and Conflict Resolution in the Sahel: The Tuareg Insurgency in Mali
(1998), at 2, 5, available at http://www.carlisle.army.mil/ssi/pdffiles/PUB200.pdf.
170
See Survival International, Desert Dwellers Fight On, available at http://www.survivalinternational.org/pdf/tuaregbg.pdf (“Estimates of the total number of Tuareg vary . . . and probably
half a million in Mali.”); Cf. Keita, at 6 (Tuareg population of Mali may be in excess of 600,000).
171
See Survival International, Desert Dwellers Fight On, available at http://www.survivalinternational.org/pdf/tuaregbg.pdf.
172
Keita, supra note 169, at 12. See also ROBIN-EDWARD POULTON & IBRAHIM AG YOUSSOUF, A
PEACE OF TIMBUKTU 43 (1998):
Many Touareg chiefs lost their herds and were forced into exile. Those who stayed
found that they were weakened in their moral authority. Society began to disintegrate.
In this “culture of controlled violence” where every man carries a sword and owns a
gun with which to protect his herd, his honour and his family, social controls began to
fail.
Id.
166
2005]
MICRO-DISARMAMENT
35
But the national capital in Bamako did not offer aid or relief; the entrenched
culture of central government kleptocracy was unchanged. 173 As a result of the
droughts and the economic upheaval, many young men were forced to emigrate,
and many of them were welcomed into Muammar Khaddafi’s Libyan army. Not
only were they trained and armed, but they were exposed to the religious, social,
political, and economic ideas in Khaddafi’s Green Book. 174
The series of uprisings in Mali that occurred during the early 1990s were
almost inevitable; they were led by only about 3,000 angry young men with guns
and fueled by government paralysis and by atrocities committed by an
incompetent and abusive Malian army. 175
Poulton and Youssouf described many incidents where the army failed to
accept the rule of law. In one incident, Tuareg leaders called to negotiations in
Léré were murdered. 176 In October 1994, the Swiss Consul met a similar fate.177
Although Alpha Oumar Konaré, the president democratically elected in 1992,
had earnest intentions of ending the civil strife that had plagued northern Mali,
peace was not forthcoming until 1995. In late 1994, the government gained
control of its army. Colonel Siraman Keita was brought in as Chief of the
General Staff of the Malian army, and Boubacar Sada Sy was installed as
Minister of Defence. The military in the north, which had been guilty of
excessive use of force and abuse of the civilian population, was withdrawn and
sent south. In effect, the war against the people of Mali was ended by the Konaré
government and by the new leadership of the army, terminating their policy of
violence against civilians.
There was much more to the peacemaking than just the withdrawal of a
renegade army. Another factor that led to peace was a series of meetings that
were held in 1994-95, 178 led by Kare Lode, a representative of Norwegian
Church Aid (“AEN”). 179 The armed ex-combatants became convinced that the
173
Id.
International aid destined for the hungry population of the North was stolen by army
colonels to build luxurious villas in Bamako, known as ‘the castles of drought.’ It is
sometimes said that the sons and brothers of those who starved to death in Kidal and
Boureissa in 1974, returned in 1990 to take their revenge on Moussa Traore.
Id. at 26.
174
MU’AMMAR AL-QADHAFI, THE GREEN BOOK (Tripoli, Libya: Public Establishment for
Publishing, Advertising and Distribution) (3 vols.) English translation available at
http://www.qadhafi.org/the_green_book.html.
175
For an extensive discussion of the intricate political turmoil, see generally POULTON &
YOUSSOUF, supra note 175.
176
Id. at 62.
177
Id. at 74.
178
In the summer of 1994, a series of conferences (called Regional Concertations) produced “a
national consensus in favour of equal treatment for all the populations of the North, which
reinforced the Government’s position and opened the way for northern peacemakers to begin the
process of consulting, and then of mobilizing civil society.” POULTON & YOUSSOUF, supra note
175, at 75.
179
Id. at 117.
36
UMKC LAW REVIEW
[Vol. 73:4
peace effort was in earnest. Lode said, “Even the organizing of the meeting was
a positive factor: in may [sic] cases armed robbery in the area had stopped
completely by the time the meetings were held, and the local market reopened
immediately afterwards.” 180
At the end of this process, disarmament finally began. 181 The process for
the “cantonment” of arms was not implemented until November 15, 1995.
According to Poulton and Youssouf, “At first there was barely a trickle of
candidates, larger numbers arrived later as confidence was built.” 182
Although the cantonment process was expected to last four weeks, it was
extended until January 10, 1996. A total of 10,000 ex-combatants surrendered,
3,000 of whom gave up their weapons. 183 Those 3,000 weapons were burned on
March 27, 1996, in the dramatic ceremony now known as the Flame of Peace. 184
Lt. Col. Kalifa Keita of the Army of the Republic of Mali estimated that
some 3,000 Tuareg combatants 185 had been successfully and productively
integrated directly into the army and other government positions. Poulton and
Youssouf reported that a total of 1,479 ex-combatants were integrated into the
uniformed forces, with an additional 149 placed in civilian administrative
positions. 186 Sophie Boukhari, a UNESCO Courier journalist, reported in 2000
that “[a]bout 2,400 ex-combatants were absorbed into the army and the civil
service.” 187 Kouca and Ecawell reported the “integration of 2,540 ex-combatants
within the army, the gendarmerie, the frontier guards, the customs, the forestry
and the civil administration.” 188 Alhassane reported “Some 2,390 ex-combatants
180
POULTON & YOUSSOUF, supra note 175, at 117.
As Garb points out, “temporal correctness” is essential to determining causality. See GARB,
supra note 19, at 53. If B occurs after A, then it is illogical to say that B caused A. The claims that
disarmament in Mali caused peace in Mali are temporally incorrect, and therefore illogical. In Mali,
peace came first, and disarmament followed.
182
POULTON & YOUSSOUF, supra note 175, at 117.
183
Id. at 116.
184
Id. at 77, 120. Poulton and Youssouf further noted, “The Flame of Peace became a defining
moment in Malian history. It has burned into the mythology of peace-making across Africa. Far
more valuable than the financial cost of the weapons, is the symbol of national cleansing which the
Flame represents.”
185
Keita, supra note 169, at 18 (“As of early 1998, some 3000 Tuareg combatants—probably more
than ever were in the field as rebels at any one time—have been integrated into the various Malian
security forces and civil service.”). See also id. at 34, Table 4, Integration into the Civil Service,
October 1996, which lists 120 ex-combatants. Since 120 of the ex-combatants would enter civil
service and not require weapons to carry out their duties, according to Keita’s figures, 2,880 excombatants would soon be re-armed.
186
POULTON & YOUSSOUF, supra note 175, at 119. According to Poulton and Youssouf, 1,479
combatants would soon be re-armed.
187
Sophie Boukhari, Mali: A Flickering Flame, THE UNESCO COURIER, Jan. 2000, 26-28,
available at http://www.unesco.org/courier/2000_01/uk/dossier/txt06.htm.
188
Bintou Snana Kouca and Sicave Ag Ecawell, A History of Armed Conflict, in COMPREHENDING
AND MASTERING AFRICAN CONFLICTS 213 (Adebayo Adedeji ed., 1999). Because 150 of the excombatants would enter civil service and not require weapons to carry out their duties, according to
Kouca and Ecawell, 2,390 ex-combatants would soon be re-armed.
181
2005]
MICRO-DISARMAMENT
37
in all the movements have been integrated into the armed forces of the State and
150 into the public service.” 189
In 1996, the UN implemented another program, PAREM (Programme
d’Appui à la Réinsertion socio-économique des Ex-combatants du nord Mali),
for the re-integration of ex-combatants who had not been given government jobs
in the military or in another position.190 As Poulton and Youssouf noted:
“there are tricky political matters of judgement concerning ‘who is an excombatant’ . . . The Government decided to be flexible . . . In any case, who
cares if they are getting a little bit extra? Songhoy, Fulani, Bozo, Arab or
Tamacheq [minority groups in Mali], they all deserve a better start in life
than has been possible during the past 5 years of insecurity, following 25
years of drought and 100 years of repression.” 191
The central government kept its word about decentralization. The Konaré
government recognized the legal authority of 682 villages in the North (there
were only 19 legally-recognized villages prior to decentralization), which would
now control how their own funding would be spent. 192
UN authors Poulton and Youssouf admit that the weapons are not all gone
from Mali and can be easily replaced:
While nobody believes that we are rid of every illicit gun in Mali, making a
start on disarmament mattered enormously. The number and quality of the
weapons are unimportant: anyone can obtain another weapon, for guns are
all too easily available from nearby flash-points like Chad and Liberia. The
important thing is that the Flame of Peace symbolizes the end of ethnic
189
Aghatam Alhassane, Democracy and the Peace Process, in COMPREHENDING AND MASTERING
AFRICAN CONFLICTS, at 217. According to Alhassane’s figures, 2,390 ex-combatants were
integrated into the military.
190
POULTON & YOUSSOUF, supra note 175, at 123.
191
Id. at 124-25. See also Trickle Up to Develop 1,000 Microenterprises, and Start 40 New
Revolving Savings Groups, Trickle Up Program Press Release, Sept. 4, 2003, available at
http://www.trickleup.org/pubmedia_nr_detail.asp?ID=25. While PAREM-style programs are still
present, donor funding is limited; the Trickle Up Program has available only $100,000 for its first
year of support for Northern Mali.
192
Boukhari, supra note 190, at 27. See also Alhassane, supra note 192, at 219:
The take-off of the decentralization programme and institutional reforms in Mali is, in
fact, a great attempt through which the authorities of the third republic wish to put up
a societal project of a new dimension which adapts itself to Malian realities . . . In the
wake of the crises of the north, culminating in the signing of the National Pact [April
11, 1992], decentralization proved to be the best political solution to the special status
provision of the northern region.
See also POULTON & YOUSSOUF, supra note 175, at 103 (“Unlike the tentative measures seen in
some countries—which resemble rather the ‘deconcentration’ of administrative power—the Malian
government appears to be serious about the transfer of power in 1998 to 682 locally elected rural
Communes and 19 urban Communes. . . .”)
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UMKC LAW REVIEW
[Vol. 73:4
violence in Mali . . . a[n] island of peacemaking in the continent of civil
disturbance. 193
Mali is the shining example of the success of micro-disarmament, according
to the international gun prohibition community. But the prohibitionists have
forgotten what actually happened in Mali. Peace broke out in Mali in 1995
because the central government completely reformed its policies. The first, and
essential, policy in Mali that President Konaré implemented was a change in the
oppressive nature of Mali’s central government, along with greater respect for the
human rights of Mali’s citizens. This was manifested in President Konaré’s
willingness to “destabilize” his own government by changing and devolving the
existing power structure. Unlike so many leaders in Africa and other places
where tyranny flourishes, President Konaré realized that his nation would enjoy
greater stability in the long run if the government became the ally of the people,
rather than their cruel master.
The surrender of 3,000 weapons began at the end of 1995, after the Konaré
government had been proving for months that it really was serious about human
rights reform. Before the disarmament began, government aid for schools, jobs,
animal re-stocking programs, and other programs already had replaced
government repression. The surrender of the weapons and the decision of many
rebels to join the military, or to accept another government job, was the result of
the peace that broke out in 1995, not a cause of the peace.
The people of Mali certainly had every right to enjoy the Flames of Peace
as a symbol of the newly peaceful conditions in their nation. But it was not the
burning of the guns that brought peace; it was peace that created the conditions
that made people willing to give up their guns.
There is an additional lesson that Mali illustrates: sometimes armed
rebellions are justified, and sometimes those armed rebellions succeed. The
kleptocracy of the old central government in Mali literally starved Northerners to
death. The Northerners had a right, “as a last resort, to rebellion against tyranny
and oppression.” 194 And the rebellion succeeded. The government in Bamako
did not decide to start treating the Northerners like human beings because the
government, after a century of oppression, suddenly developed a conscience. To
the contrary, the Northerners fought a war for five years that the central
government plainly could not win. The central government was wise enough to
change its policies and to begin respecting human rights. And, once human
rights were respected, the problem of weapons disappeared.
In November 1999, Konaré announced he would not seek re-election in
2002. Toumani Touré was elected president of Mali in 2002. There are
indications that Malian government reforms have not been sustained. World
Bank data from 2002 suggest that extensive corruption and financial crimes are
193
194
POULTON & YOUSSOUF, supra note 175, at 121.
Human Rights Declaration, supra note 2, pmbl.
2005]
MICRO-DISARMAMENT
39
raking off over ten million dollars of government revenue every year. 195
Reporting on the 2002 Presidential election, the Associated Press wrote, “Amid a
chaotic and disputed presidential vote count this month . . . many were left
fearing that Mali, West Africa’s model, had become only the latest promising
young African democracy to slide back into old, corrupt ways.” 196
Mali’s UN delegation touted the supposed benefits of disarmament. 197
Mali’s government is accepting aid from a European Union program to disarm
the people of Mali and to implement a moratorium on the import of weapons into
the region. 198 But as Mugumya acknowledged, the people of Mali still retain
their weapons for defensive purposes. 199 The weapons helped the tribes of
195
Traore, supra note 170 (supplying figure of 6.5 billion FCFA). “FCFA” is an acronym for
“Franc de la Communauté française africaine.” Based on exchange rates from the summer of 2004,
it took 656 FCFA to buy one Euro, and 545 FCFA to buy one U.S. dollar.
196
Ellen Knickmeyer, After Decade of Promising Start, Some Young African Democracies Sliding
PRESS,
May
6,
2002,
available
at
Back
to
Old
Ways,
ASSOCIATED
http://www.globalpolicy.org/nations/launder/regions/2002/0502mali.htm.
197
See GEOFREY MUGUMYA, PRACTICAL DISARMAMENT FOR ENHANCING HUMAN SECURITY,
PARTICIPATORY ASSESSMENT OF WEAPONS COLLECTION: A SUMMARY OF THE LESSONS LEARNED
FROM UNIDIR’S WEAPONS FOR DEVELOPMENT PROJECT (Mali Case Study, paper presented at the
First Biennial conference of the United Nations Programme of Action on Small Arms, N.Y., July 9,
2003); Amadou Toumani Touré, Preface, in GEOFREY MUGUMYA, EXCHANGING WEAPONS FOR
DEVELOPMENT IN MALI: WEAPON COLLECTION PROGRAMMES ASSESSED BY LOCAL PEOPLE (United
Nations Institute for Disarmament Research 2004), at ix:
Because of these weapons’ [SALW] devastating effects on people’s livelihood and on
the communties’ abilities to build peace and pursue development, durable solutions to
curbing the problem are urgently needed. Increasingly, the international community
has favoured weapon collection programmes as a means of alleviating the world’s
most conflict-embroiled regions of the tools used to perpetuate armed violence.
Id.
198
See Joseph P. Smaldone, Mali and the West African Light Weapons Moratorium, in LIGHT
WEAPONS AND CIVIL CONFLICT, supra note 23, ch. 7; The Chronicle Interview: Ibrahima E. Sall,
NATIONS
CHRONICLE
ONLINE
EDITION,
2003,
at
UNITED
http://www.un.org/Pubs/chronicle/2003/issue2/0203p57.html; West African Arms Moratorium,
NISAT Projects, available at http://nisat.org/west%20africa/african.htm; West African arms
moratorium, Oct. 31, 1998 (official text from ECOWAS, the Economic Community of West
Africa, an international organization of sixteen West African states), available at
http://www.nisat.org/west%20africa/news%20from%20the%20region/ecowas%20ministers%20co
ntract.htm.
199
MUGUMYA, supra note 197, at 34-35:
Armed burglary had become a daily activity, particularly in urban centres. This led
those people targeted by armed robbery to acquire guns as well, in order to protect
their lives and property. At the same time, communities located in the interior of the
country were forced to acquire weapons because of the failure of the government to
provide them adequate security . . . Mali is one of the largest countries in Africa, and
shares borders with several countries. The National Guard and Gendarmerie possess
insufficient capacity to protect all of Mali’s borders; the country has virtually no
control over its northern frontier.
Id.
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UMKC LAW REVIEW
[Vol. 73:4
northern Mali assert their human rights in the early 1990s. Who can foresee the
future so clearly as to assure the Malians that they will never again need to
exercise their right “as a last resort, to rebellion against tyranny and oppression”?
The UN, as well as the entire disarmament community, has trumpeted Mali
as a disarmament success story. But it is becoming increasingly clear that
disarmament has had nothing to do with any of the successes achieved in Mali.
The gun-burning at the Flames for Peace was symbolically important, but the
reason that Mali became peaceful was that the government began respecting
human rights. Voluntary disarmament of the Tuareg was a result, not a cause, of
the changed human rights situation in Mali. Indeed, the cause of the
government’s human rights reforms was the fact that the Tuaregs were armed and
were conducting a successful war against the government which had been
violating their human rights, sometimes by starving them, for a century. Mali
vindicates the teaching of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights that
rebellion is the last resort against tyranny and oppression.
CONCLUSION
Greg Puley, a disarmament project coordinator in Central America, set forth
the proper standard for judging disarmament programs, “[T]he only way to
measure progress—the only way—is to ask ourselves, ‘have we made people
Puley’s approach is much superior to the claims of some
safer?’” 200
disarmament advocates that success can be judged merely by counting
weapons. 201
We have examined six nations, including the crown jewels of the
international gun prohibition movement. In each of the six nations, disarmament
programs did succeed in collecting some weapons, sometimes a large number of
weapons. In each of these six countries, evidence suggests that there are still
many weapons in the hands of citizens, and that citizens are refusing to surrender
Although violence has greatly diminished, Mali is still not a crime-free nation, and selfpreservation with the best tools available is a universal desire. See Sophie Boukhari, Mali: A
Flickering Flame, THE UNESCO COURIER, Jan. 2000, at 26, available at
http://www.unesco.org/courier/2000_01/uk/dossier/txt06.htm (“Malian President Alpha Oumar
Konaré is committed to a culture of peace. But crime has been rising in Mali for several years now
and the political climate is getting worse.”).
200
Greg Puley, Towards the Elaboration of an International Convention on International Arms
Transfers?, Address before the International Action Network on Small Arms (“IANSA”) and
Réseau d’action international sur les armes légères (“RAIAL”) Conference (Oct. 5-6, 2001),
available at http://www.grip.org/bdg/g1866.html.
201
See, e.g, , Dr. Paul Gallant & Dr. Joanne Eisen, The “Fix” Is In For a Failure (April 2001),
available at http://keepandbeararms.com/information/XcIBPrintItem.asp?ID=2011 (quoting
Michael Geary & Nick Miller, Critics Blast Gun Logic in Wake of Shootings, MORDIALLOCCHELSEA NEWS (Victoria), Aug. 24, 1998 (“The [Australian] Federal Government has admitted it is
not measuring the results of its $342 million gun buy-back scheme. Kevin Donnellan, spokesman
for Justice Minister Senator Amanda Vanstone, said the success of the scheme was measured by the
number of guns handed in—about 640,000 across Australia—and not whether gun-related deaths
have fallen.”)).
2005]
MICRO-DISARMAMENT
41
the firearms that they view as necessary for their protection against common
criminals or criminal governments. In none of the six countries are firearms
difficult to obtain on the black market. Citizens seem determined to possess
firearms, notwithstanding the risk of extreme penalties, because firearms
possession is literally a matter of life and death.
The disarmament programs in Gramsh, Albania; San Miguelito, Panama;
and Mali were accompanied by positive results. The evidence suggests that the
positive results had a great deal to do with government attention to social needs
(such as jobs and infrastructure) and better government treatment of the public,
and fairly little to do with the removal of weapons. 202 To tout disarmament as
the primary cause of these success stories is inconsistent with the evidence.
The disarmament program in rural Guatemala was followed by an urban
crime wave. Although there does not appear to be evidence that the disarmament
made people safer, neither does the evidence suggest that the disarmament
caused the crime wave, or deprived people of arms for lawful self-defense.
The expanded disarmament program in Albania, the disarmament program
in Cambodia, and especially the disarmament program in Bougainville appear to
have harmed human rights. In Albania, the UN is attempting to deprive people
of their only means of defense against criminal gangs. 203 In Bougainville, the
UN actively interfered with the people’s national self-defense against an
illegitimate, anti-democratic, and oppressive colonial power. 204 In Cambodia,
the UN failed in the 1970s to protect the people from genocide; in the 1990s, a
UN official imposed gun licensing by bureaucratic fiat, and a few years later, the
UN used the licensing forms to find guns to confiscate, thereby rendering the
Cambodian people defenseless against sex-trade kidnappers who operate with
government support, and also defenseless against the risk of another round of
Khmer Rouge genocide. 205 The sad stories of Albania, Bougainville, and
Cambodia are the A-B-Cs of UN-sponsored gun confiscation turning into a direct
assault on human rights. The confiscation programs violate Article 3 of the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which affirms, “Everyone has the right
to life, liberty and security of person.” 206
The coercive disarmament programs, such as military-style house-to-house
search-and-seizure, are a further assault on human rights. They are characteristic
202
See text at notes XX.
See text at notes XX.
204
See text at notes XX.
205
Human Rights Declaration,, supra note 5, at art. 3.
206
Id. See also International Covenant, supra note 58, art. 6, ¶ 1 (“Every human being has the
inherent right to life.”), art 8 (“1. No one shall be held in slavery; slavery and the slave-trade in all
their forms shall be prohibited. 2. No one shall be held in servitude. 3. (a) No one shall be required
to perform forced or compulsory labour.”); art. 9, ¶ 1 (“Everyone has the right to liberty and
security of person. No one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest or detention. No one shall be
deprived of his liberty except on such grounds and in accordance with such procedure as are
established by law.”).
203
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UMKC LAW REVIEW
[Vol. 73:4
207
of a police state and have sometimes been precursors of genocide.
Such
house-to-house military invasions violate Article 12 of the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights, which states, “No one shall be subjected to arbitrary
interference with his privacy, family, [or] home . . . Everyone has the right to the
protection of the law against such interference or attacks.” 208
Less coercive programs, such as community-arms surrenders, are also, in
many cases, contrary to the Universal Declaration. A corrupt government that
profits from the kidnapping of teenage girls for slavery in the sex trade is
grotesquely violating the Universal Declaration, including Article 4 (“No one
shall be held in slavery or servitude; slavery and the slave trade shall be
prohibited in all their forms.”); Article 9 (“No one shall be subjected to arbitrary
arrest, detention or exile.); Article 13 (“Everyone has the right to freedom of
movement and residence within the borders of each state.”); Article 16 (“The
family is the natural and fundamental group unit of society and is entitled to
protection by society and the State.”); and Article 23 (“Everyone has the right . . .
to free choice of employment . . . Everyone who works has the right to just and
favourable remuneration ensuring for himself and his family an existence worthy
of human dignity”). 209
In community gun-surrender programs, wealthy foreign organizations tell
people, in effect, “We will build you a bridge—if you give up your ability to
protect your daughters from sex-trade kidnappers,” or “if you give up your
ability to protect your families against the genocide and tyranny that occurred
here not too long ago.” It is difficult to see how offering such choices is
consistent with respect for human rights.
Even if one adopted the perverse value system that taking guns away from
people was more important than protecting their explicit rights under the
Universal Declaration (not to mention the Declaration’s implicit right to arms for
protection against tyranny and oppression), it is difficult to claim that
disarmament is really successful. As Godnick acknowledged:
The jury is still out as to whether or not weapons collection programs in any
context contribute to tangible, measurable reductions in the illegal
proliferation and misuse of small arms. In fact, it is very difficult to isolate
207
As Kates has noted, “The case of the Cambodian genocide illustrates how encouraging
governments to limit small arms ownership can have terrible consequences. As the killing began,
Cambodian soldiers undertook an extraordinary house-to-house search to confiscate weapons
people could have used to defend themselves. A witness recounts that the soldiers would:
knock on the doors and ask the people who answered if they had any weapons. “We
are here now to protect you,” the soldiers said, “and no one has a need for a weapon
any more.” People who said that they kept no weapons were [nevertheless] forced to
stand aside and allow the soldiers to look for themselves.
Don B. Kates, Democide and Disarmament, 23 SAIS REV. 305, 305 (2003) (quoting Alec
Wilkinson, A Changed Vision of God, NEW YORKER, Jan. 24, 1994, at 54-55.)
208
Human Rights Declaration, supra note 2.
209
Id. For other international human rights documents pertaining to sex trafficking, see notes XX.
2005]
MICRO-DISARMAMENT
43
the variables to measure their effectiveness, even in the United States where
years of historical data is available. 210
Although the United States experience differs in many ways from the
countries discussed in this article, the U.S. data also suggest that gun surrender
programs meet with poor results. 211
There is rarely a shortage of excuses for failed disarmament programs; the
program did not have enough money, or the program in one country was
thwarted by the lack of strong inter-regional and international controls. 212 But it
210
WILLIAM GODNICK, THE ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES AND THE 2001 UNITED NATIONS
CONFERENCE ON THE ILLICIT TRADE IN SMALL ARMS AND LIGHT WEAPONS IN ALL ITS ASPECTS:
TACKLING THE ILLICIT TRADE IN SMALL ARMS AND LIGHT WEAPONS 15 (Jan. 2002), available at
http://www.international-alert.org/pdf/pubsec/Oas-eng.pdf. See also GODNICK, supra note 125, at
VI (“measuring the impact of a weapons collection program is challenging if not impossible.”).
211
See Robin Yurk, et al., Educating the Community about Violence Through a Gun Turn-In
Program, 26 J. OF COMMUNITY HEALTH 331, 332 (2001) (“Gun Turn-In programs have been
developed and implemented in many communities, but have demonstrated very little impact on
other community indicators such as firearm injuries, deaths, and crimes.”), available at
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=11554497
&dopt=Abstract; Peter Slavin, Buying Back Safer Streets?, WASH. POST, May 19, 2000:
‘Buybacks remove generally no more than 1 or 2 percent of the guns estimated to be
in the community,’ said Garen Wintemute, director of the Violence Prevention
Research Program at the University of California at Davis. ‘The guns that are
removed from the community do not resemble the guns used in crimes in that
community. There has never been any effect on crime results seen.’
Id.; Few Objections Over End of Gun-Buyback Program, JOIN TOGETHER ONLINE, Aug. 8, 2001
(Violence Policy Center executive director Josh “Sugarmann said that gun owners would often turn
in broken firearms and use the funds to purchase new and better guns.”), available at
http://www.jointogether.org/gv/news/summaries/reader/0%2C1030%2C545201%2C00.html.
212
See, e.g., BASIC PUBLICATIONS, BASIC PAPERS, AFRICA: THE CHALLENGE OF LIGHT WEAPONS
DESTRUCTION
DURING
PEACEKEEPING
OPERATIONS
(1997),
available
at
http://www.basicint.org/pubs/Papers/BP23.htm.
[I]n most cases, the actual disarming of combatants has been at best half-hearted.
....
[T]he collection and destruction of light weapons have not been sufficiently
prioritized . . . collection and destruction of weapons, particularly vital for sustainable
peace, has often been overlooked or carried out unsystematically.
....
Regional and international support can be enhanced, especially in the following areas:
Controlling arms transfers to the country and/or region of conflict through
sanctions, moratoria or other means;
Blocking illicit light weapons to the country and/or region of conflict through
international border and customs co-operation
....
Controlling the production and transfer of ammunition . . . monitoring of crossborder arms trafficking, and interdiction of grey and black market weapons
traffickers.
Id.
44
UMKC LAW REVIEW
[Vol. 73:4
might make sense to also ask if too many disarmament programs are built on
false premises.
In all the countries studied in this article, civilians refused to disarm
because they were unwilling to trust in government for their safety and wellbeing and to thereby leave themselves vulnerable to violence in an uncertain and
unstable world.
In an Albanian survey conducted as part of the UN disarmament project in
2002, “self/family protection” was cited by 73.7 % of total respondents as their
primary reason for owning a weapon. 213 As Lawrence Doczy reported:
You can imagine yourself as a villager, isolated in the mountains, out of sight
of the nearest house . . . . If you’re in trouble, threatened, and the police can’t
come to help you because they don’t have a vehicle, then you can’t really be
blamed for wanting to hang on to a weapon for your own protection. 214
In Guatemala, the ladino community uses arms to defend itself because the
central government will not defend it. 215
Even in Mali, where political peace ensued (at least for several years), the
people refused to surrender all their weapons because they wanted to protect life
and property. In a UN book summarizing the micro-disarmament experience in
Mali, Geofrey Mugumya observed, “If the state is unable to offer security to its
people, then citizens will use their own means to protect themselves and their
property.” 216 Mugumya explained that among the factors hindering weapons
collection was that “persistent fear from past experiences may cause people to be
reluctant in coming forward to turn in their weapons.” 217
The Mali experience, especially, clearly demonstrates that armed rebels
may force a government to seek peace terms that end the abuse of human rights.
Although the gun prohibition movement attempts to invoke Mali as its great
example, the real story of Mali is that justice leads to peace, and peace leads to
the abandonment of weapons. The firearms necessary to start a war for justice
may become unnecessary once the warriors succeed.
Bougainville also shows that using arms to fight for national selfdetermination may be effective in forcing colonial governments and their
international allies to take at least preliminary steps toward respecting a people’s
right to govern themselves and to control their natural resources.
213
SALWC PROJECT: SOCIO-ECONOMIC IMPACT SURVEY, UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT
PROGRAMME
(UNDP)
ALBANIA
(2002),
available
at
http://undp.org.al/salwc/download/reports/socsurv.zip.
214
Henley, supra note 108.
215
See MOSER & MCILWAINE, supra note 146, at 7. Ladinos are people of a mixed European and
native descent.
216
MUGUMYA, supra note 202, at 43-44.
217
See id. at 106; POULTON & YOUSSOUF, supra note 175, at 100 (“‘We have to realize that the
Flame of Peace is only the start of the peace process’, ICRC Representative Suzanne Hofstetter told
us in March 1996, ‘If the refugees return to poverty and destitution, they may want to take up arms
again to steal what they cannot earn.’”).
2005]
MICRO-DISARMAMENT
45
Disarming both sides at the end of a civil war is not a bad idea. Disarming
ordinary citizens to prevent them from being able to resist criminal gangs or
criminal governments is a terrible idea. It is all very well to pay for t-shirts, radio
advertisements, and famous musicians at the national gun-burning ceremony.
But the fact is, many people will not burn their own guns, because they will
never surrender their sovereign, inherent, God-given right and duty to protect
their families.
Imagine a world in which every government obeyed the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights. People do not form governments in order to
destroy their own individual human rights. Governments that violate human
rights are, therefore, inherently unstable; such governments are often adamantly
opposed to firearms possession by ordinary citizens. As the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights acknowledges, as long as “tyranny and oppression”
persist, then life-saving arms will be “a last resort.” 218
Too often, the international gun prohibition community fails to
acknowledge that firearms “in the hands of non-state actors” can contribute part
of the solution to violations of human rights, may sometimes be necessary for
ending the false “peace” of tyranny, and can therefore help build the only kind of
peace that can really endure. 219 As the Universal Declaration affirms,
“recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all
members of the human family is the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in
the world.” 220
218
Human Rights Declaration, supra note 5, at pmbl.
See, e.g., United Nations, Economic and Social Council, U.N. Sub-Commission on Prevention
of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, Siracusa Principles on the Limitation and
Derogation of Provisions in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Annex, UN
Doc E/CN.4/1985/4 ¶ 32 (1985) (“The systematic violation of human rights undermines true
national security and may jeopardize international peace and security.”).
220
Human Rights Declaration, supra note 5, at pmbl.
219