FRAMEWORK ( CONCEPTUAL) 44 we assume that we can shift between frameworks with sufficient ease? Relativism about progress beckons. There are three main options to stave it off. One is to question the extent to which observa­ tions are theory-laden. Perhaps there is some kind of observational bedrock after all. The second is to suggest that some of our theories are stable and appropriate, insofar, for example, as they carve the world at its joints. Perhaps we have some innate theories, aligned with the world, for instance. The last option, advocated by Donald Davidson is to "reject the dualism of [ conceptual] scheme and world" (1973: 20). If there are no such conceptual schemes, then the worry about relativism is a non-starter. Davidson's argument is subtle and cannot be fully summarized here. It relies on the depen­ dence of thought on language, among other such controversial claims. One of his key ideas, however, is that one cannot be in a position to recognize that another inhabits a radically differ­ ent theoretical or conceptual space to one's own: "meaningful disagreement ... depends entirely on a foundation-some foundation-in agreement" (Davidson 1973: 19). Grant that we communicate by using sentences, to which we assign truth val­ ues. In order for me to understand you, I must be able to recognize some of the words that you use. And I should take you to be disagreeing with me only if I think that what we mean by several of those words is shared. Bibliography Davidson, D., "On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme," Proceedings andAddresses of theAmerican PhilosophicalAssociation 47: 5-20, 1973. Feyerabend, P.K., "An Attempt at a Realistic Interpretation of Experience," Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 58: 143-170, 1958. ---, "Explanation, Reduction and Empiricism," in H. Feigl and G. Maxwell (eds.), Scientifi-c Explanation, Space and Time, Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. 111, 28-97, Minneapolis, 1962. Kuhn, T.S., "The Function of Dogma in Scientific Research," in A.C. Crombie (ed.), Scientifi-c Change, 347-369, New York, 1961. ---, "Logic of Discovery or Psychology of Research?" in I. Lakatos and A. Musgrave (eds), Criticism and the Growth ofKnowledge, 1-23, Cambridge UK, 1970. ---, The Essential Tension: Selected Studies in Scientifi-c Tradition and Change, Chicago, 1977. ---, The Structure of Scientifi-c Revolutions, Chicago, 1996. Laudan, L., Science and Values, Berkeley, 1986. Popper, K.R., "Normal Science and Its Dangers," in I. Lakatos and A. Musgrave (eds), Criticism and the Growth ofKnowledge, 51-58, Cambridge UK, 1970. ---, The Myth ofthe Framework, London, 1995. Rowbottom, D.P., "Kuhn vs. Popper on Criticism and Dogmatism in Science: A Resolution at the Group Level," Studies in History and Philosophy of Science, 42: 117-124, 2011. ---, "Kuhn vs. Popper on Criticism and Dogmatism in Science, Part 11: Striking the Balance," Studies in History and Philosophy of Science, 44: 161-168, 2013. DARRELL P. ROWBOTTOM Framing The concept of framing is integral to theories of language, communication, and cognition. It implies the intentional shift in the expectation and interpretation of social relations by introduc­ ing modes of verbal or non-verbal communication that go beyond the mere transmission of informa­ tion between sender and receiver. This form of communication, also called meta-communica­ tion, marks the sequences of social interactions as having a different meaning than before, and it provides a further context of interpretation for those who participate in these processes of com­ munication. By introducing a new frame of refer­ ence, framing insinuates a specific understanding of the communicated message and places the transmitted information into the context of social relations. The concept of framing is therefore used to analyze those changes in social interaction and discourse, as introduced by layers of meta­ communication that provide new interpretative contexts and establish a conceptual focus for the organization of social relations. The study of FRAMING these seemingly insignificant shifts in verbal and non-verbal communication is highly relevant for understanding the expectations and interpreta­ tions involved in human interaction with regard to religious practice and discourse. Originating in the field of social psychology and the study of symbolic interaction, the concept of framing was first and foremost elaborated by Gregory Bateson in his study of play and fantasy (1955). Conceiving play and fantasy as forms of meta-communication, Bateson theorizedframe as a marker that changes the meaning and context of social interaction in a way that the messages com­ municated within the frame have a different mean­ ing than those communicated outside of the frame (Handelman 2004; Houseman 2012). Broadening the concept of framing toward the organization of experience in everyday life, Erving Goffman laid the foundation for the theory of framing as a schema of interpretation (1974). Goffman further elaborated the concept of framing to analyz e dif­ ferent layers of verbal and non-verbal communica­ tion in social interaction. He successfully applied his frame analysis to areas such as the study of "interaction ritual" and theatrical performances, as well as to the codes of gender in advertisement and language ideologies. Theories of framing most sustainably impacted the study of religion in the field of ritual studies, where anthropologists and scholars of religion used concepts of framing to distinguish between ritual and theater (Turner 1974; Schechner 1981). Ritual and theater, for example, differ in how theyframe the context of interpretation and what forms of social interaction are expected in the respective situation. Whereas in ritual and the­ ater the forms of social interaction differ in what roles the participants play within the context of social relations, ritual and theater are themselves framed by audible and visible markers (Needham 1967; Rappaport 1999). These markers can be the stage or sacred place, or the costume or dress, which signal the difference in context by employ­ ing culturally established codes. Subsequently, Don Handelman developed the complementary 45 frames of meta-communication in ritual and play, in more systematic terms, as modes of social inter­ action that model and mirror social order (1977; 1990; 2001). Applying the concept of framing to the study of cultural performances, anthropologists as well as scholars of religion and drama used the concept of framing to elaborate on the different social and cultural features in the semiotics of ritual and reli­ gious interaction. In examining the reflexivity in ritual and theatrical performances, Bruce Kapferer focused on those features in ritual framing that revealed an inherent potential for transforma­ tion and change, going beyond representation and meaning (1979; 2004). Bruce Lincoln instead used the concept of marked categories to further elaborate on the concept of framing (2000). Other theorists, in contrast, emphasized the modalities in which meaning is communicated through ritual frames. In this regard, Stanley Tambiah proposed, with his performative approach to ritual, a notion of framing that is modeled on the semiotics of theatrical performances (1981). Subsequently, Handelman enhanced the understanding of the dynamics in ritual framing by introducing Moebius framing as an alternative model to the rigidity of a single ritual frame based on a representational map-territory distinction. He challenged the understanding of framing as lineal and mono­ directional and emphasized its ever-changing and transformational capacities (2004; 2006; 2012). So far, within the academic study of religion, framing has primarily been applied to analyzing ritual and other forms of religious practice. There is, however, a considerably different understand­ ing of the concept of framing which has great potential for the study of religious discourses such as myth, cosmology, and ideology. This other, less broad concept of framing is based on insights from the sociological and political examination of rhet­ oric and language ideology in social movements, journalism, and mass media. Most prominently, Robert D. Benford and David A. Snow conceptu­ alized framing processes as a central dynamic in social movements through which participants, in 46 their opposition to mainstream media coverage, render political events meaningful and effica­ cious. These framing processes function to orga­ nize experiences in such a way that they mobilize potential adherents and guide their political action (2000). In their analysis of Islamic terror­ ist movements, David A. Snow and Scott C. Byrd elaborated the concept of framing processes by arguing against the indifferent use of religious ideology. By viewing framing processes as key dis­ cursive mechanisms, Snow and Byrd examined the articulation of mobilizing ideas associated with Islamic militancy and terrorist movements, ranging from the Iranian revolution of the late 1970s to more recent movements like al-Qaeda. In their attempt to account for ideological variation and flexibility among Islamic oppositional move­ ments, they address the ideological work required to facilitate the mobilization of militants as well as to motivate acts of violence. In the field of journalism, the concept of fram­ ing plays a much more important role in the presentation of political agendas and in the rep­ resentation of marginalized religious groups. In this respect, Adam Shehata analyzed the role of framing of political issues in the news media by examining the dynamics of official dominance and event-driven news from a comparative per­ spective, specifically focusing on the Muhammad cartoons controversy (2007). In a similar vein, Ethan Yorgason and Chiung H. Chen explored the American news magazines and how they used the geopolitical frame as a mode of analysis to por­ tray a branch of Mormonism in the United States (2008). In revealing various processes of framing by distinguishing between different layers in polit­ ical language, these findings show that magazines often represent this type of marginal religion as a homogeneous entity and as a threat to main­ stream society. Despite its theoretical implications and its potential for studying forms of social discourse and practice, the concept of framing is not widely used in the study of religion. In their experimen­ tal study, Mark Chaves and James D. Montgomery argue that some features of human decision- FRAMING making are not adequately described by standard rational choice models of human behavior, requir­ ing the inclusion of framing effects that arise on the basis of religious choices (1996). Furthermore, the implications of various forms of framing in religious discourse and practice are of major importance for cognitive theories of religion. Robert Wuthnow, for example, studied prayer with regard to its cognitive content or cultural framing. Using empirical studies that examine prayers and prayer-related aspects of religion, Wuthnow illu­ minates methods and data for studying cultural content and cognitive framing (2008). Considering that the theoretical connectivity of the various notions of framing at the moment remain largely unexplored in the study of religious practice and discourse, the analytical implica­ tions these notions provide show that the concept of framing has the potential to become a major field of research within the study of religion. The theoretical potential of this concept lies in how it enables scholars of religion to analyze and con­ nect operational forms of religious discourse and practice that are not graspable at first sight. By way of introducing different forms and layers of meta­ communication, framing is a concept that enhances the study of religious practices and discourses by analyzing the various uses of distinctions between map and territory and by considering the introduc­ tion of different layers of abstraction. Bibliography Bateson, G., "A Theory of Play and Fantasy: A Report on Theoretical Aspects of The Project for Study of the Role ofthe Paradoxes of Abstraction in Communication," In American Psychiatric Association (ed.), Approaches to the Study of Human Personality, 39-51, Washington, 1955. Benford, R.D., and D.A. Snow, "Framing Processes and Social Movements: An Overview and Assessment," Annual Review of Sociology 26: 6n-639, 2000. Chaves, M., and J.D. Montgomery, "Rationality and the Framing of Religious Choices," journal for the Scientific Study of Religion 35(2): 128-144, 1996. Goffman, E., Frame Analysis: An Essay on the Organization of Experience, Cambridge MA, 1974. 47 FREEDOM Handelman, D., "Play and Ritual. Complementary Frames of Metacommunication," in AJ. Chapman and Hugh C. Foot (eds.), It's A Funny Thing, Humour, 185-192, London, 1977. ---, Models and Mirrors: Towards an Anthropology of Public Events, Cambridge UK, 1990. ---, "Framing, Braiding, and Killing Play," Focaal: Tijdschriftvoor Antropologie 37: 145-156, 2001. ---, "Re-Framing Ritual," inJ. Kreinath, C. Hartung, and A. Deschner (eds.), The Dynamics of Changing Rituals: The Transformation of Religious Rituals within Their Social and Cultural Context, 9-20, New York, 2004. ---, "Framing," in J. Kreinath, J. Snoek, and M. Stausberg (eds.), Theorizing Rituals: Issues, Topics, Approaches, Concepts, Leiden, 2006. ---, "Postlude: Framing Hierarchically, Framing Moebiusly," journal of Ritual Studies 26(2): 65-77, 2012. Houseman, M., "Pushing Ritual Frames Past Bateson," journal ofRitual Studies 26(2): 1-5, 2012. Kapferer, B., "Introduction: Ritual Process and the Transformation of Context," Social Analysis 1: 3-19, 1979. ---, "Ritual Dynamics and Virtual Practice: Beyond Representation and Meaning," Social Analysis 48(2): 35-54, 2004. Lincoln, B., "On Ritual, Change, and Marked Categories," journal of the American Academy of Religion 68(3): 487-510, 2000. Needham, R., "Percussion and Transition," Man 2: 606614, 1967. Rappaport, RA., Ritual and Religion in the Making of Humanity, Cambridge UK, 1999. Schechner, R., "Performers and Spectators Transported and Transformed," The Kenyon Review 3(4): 83-113, 1981. Shehata, A., "Facing the Muhammad Cartoons: Official Dominance and Event-Driven News in Swedish and American Elite Press;' Harvard International]ournal ofPress-Politics 12(4): 131-153, 2007. Snow, D.A., and S.C. Byrd, "Ideology, Framing Processes, and Islamic Terrorist Movements," Mobilization 12(2): 119-136, 2007. Tambiah, S.J., "A Performative Approach to Ritual," Proceedings of the British Academy 65 (1979): 113-169, 1981. Turner, V.W., "Liminal to Liminoid in Play, Flow, and Ritual: An Essay in Comparative Symbology," Rice University Studies 60(3): 53-92, 1974. Wuthnow, R., "Prayer, Cognition, and Culture," Poetics 36(5-6): 333-337, 2008. Yorgason, E., and C.H. Chen, "'Kingdom Come': Representing Mormonism through a Geopolitical Frame," Political Geography 27(4): 478-500, 2008. JENS KREINATH Freedom This essay will confine itself to the role that free­ dom plays in Judaism, Christianity, and Islam. It is an important tenet of these religions that human beings are free, concerning the very reason why God created such beings and the nature of his rela­ tionship to them. God is supposed to have created human beings so that they would come to know, worship, and obey him, it being implied that they do these things of their own free will. God also desires that they enter into a loving communal relation with him. But, again, it is assumed that they must do so of their own free will, given the personal nature of this relationship. Furthermore, God's role as a judge who rewards the virtuous and punishes the wicked requires that those who are judged did those actions freely for which they are judged. Unfortunately, there are apparent clashes between this required freedom and some of God's essential perfections, in particular his omniscience and sovereignty. There also are apparent clashes between God's freedom and some of his omni­ properties, in particular his omnipotence and essential goodness. Each of these alleged clashes will be discussed in tum. The Clash between God's Omniscience and Human Freedom God is not only omniscient, that is, believing and knowing all and only true propositions, but is essentially omniscient. An individual has a prop­ erty essentially if it is not possible for it to exist without having this property. Boethius ( c. 480524 ), in his De Consolatione Philosophiae argued Vocabulary for the Study of Religion Volume2 F-0 Edited by Robert A. Segal Kocku von Stuckrad BRILL LEIDEN I BOSTON 2015 Table of Contents VOLUME I Introduction ................................................................................................................................................................ vii List of Contributors .................................................................................................................................................. viii List of Articles ............................................................................................................................................................ xvii Articles A-E ................................................................................................................................................................ 1 VOLUME 2 Articles F-O ................................................................................................................................................................ 1 VOLUME 3 Articles P-Z ................................................................................................................................................................. 1 Index ............................................................................................................................................................................. 619