Anomalous Alliances:
Spinoza and Abolition
Alejo Stark
University of Michigan
Abstract
What effects are produced in an encounter between what Gilles Deleuze
calls Spinoza’s ‘practical philosophy’ and abolition? Closely following
Deleuze’s account of Spinoza, this essay moves from the reifying and
weakening punitive moralism of carceral state thought towards a joyful
materialist abolitionist ethic. It starts with the three theses for which,
Deleuze argues, Spinoza was denounced in his own lifetime: materialism
(devaluation of consciousness), immoralism (devaluation of all values)
and atheism (devaluation of the sad passions). From these three,
it derives three parallel abolitionist theses: (1) Spinozan materialism
undermines the reifications of carceral state thought; (2) Spinozan ethics
undermines the punitivism of the carceral state; and (3) Spinozan joy is
inversely proportional to the power of the carceral state. While Spinoza’s
corpus may not give us an adequate account of the complex dynamics
of the carceral state and racial capitalism today, this essay argues that in
the infinite streams of the Ethics we nonetheless find some vital strategies
through which we might compose an anomalous alliance between this
condemned philosopher and abolition.
Keywords: Spinoza, Deleuze, abolition, state thought, Ethics
What follows is not an attempt to show that Spinoza was an abolitionist
avant la lettre. Nor is it a reconstruction of the philosopher’s theory
of the state nor of his conception of punishment. Rather, it is an
experimental encounter between what Gilles Deleuze calls Spinoza’s
‘practical philosophy’ and abolition.1
Deleuze and Guattari Studies 16.2 (2022): 308–330
DOI: 10.3366/dlgs.2022.0479
© Edinburgh University Press
www.euppublishing.com/dlgs
Anomalous Alliances: Spinoza and Abolition
309
Abolition here refers to a specific set of theoretical and political
practices that actively undermine the hold that police and prisons
have on our lives. As long-time abolitionist Ruth Wilson Gilmore
(2007: 5) might put it: abolition undermines the carceral state’s
apparatus of capture ‘catch-all solution’ to social problems. But it
does so by actively producing and reproducing abolitionist geographies
beyond the organised violence and organised abandonment of the
carceral state.2 And we might say, with Spinoza, that the carceral state –
its moralisms, laws, judges, prosecutors, police, prisons and so on – have
become a ‘catch-all solution’ to bad encounters, to decompositions, to
sad passions.3
Abolition also evokes the long struggle for self-determination and selfpreservation of enslaved Africans in the Americas. Abolition therefore
also points to the active refusal of chattel slavery’s apparatus of capture
through the compositions of anomalous alliances, motley crews, crowds,
swarms and perhaps even multitudos. Such is the activity of certain
runaway slave communities, or maroons. Perhaps, repressed within
Spinoza’s ‘practical philosophy’, we might also find such fugitive figures,
figures that – now evoking Deleuze’s creative citation of the fugitive
thought of imprisoned Black Panther George Jackson – are actively
fighting even as they flee.4 In Spinoza’s imagination we find repressed
dreams of fugitive freedoms and in the infinite streams of the Ethics we
encounter an abolitionist current.
In the fifth chapter of Toni Negri’s powerful book on Spinoza, The
Savage Anomaly: The Power of Spinoza’s Metaphysics and Politics
(1999) – a book written in those moments of time stolen from the
rhythms of prison time – the incarcerated communist evokes one of
Spinoza’s dreams. The dream is recorded in letter number 17, dated
from 20 July 1664. This is a letter Spinoza sends just before the famous
‘Letters on Evil’ (letters 18–24 and 27) addressed to ‘the very learned
and prudent Pieter Balling’. In letter 17, Spinoza writes,
When one morning just at dawn I awoke from a very deep dream, the images
which had come to me in the dream were present before my eyes as vividly
as if they had been real things, in particular the image of a black, scabby
Brazilian [cujusdam niegri & scabiosi Brasiliani] whom I had never seen
before. This image disappeared for the most part when, to make a diversion,
I fixed my gaze on a book or some other object; but as soon as I again turned
my eyes away from such an object while gazing at nothing in particular,
the same image of the same Ethiopian kept appearing with the same
vividness again and again until it gradually disappeared from sight. (Spinoza
2002: 803)
310 Alejo Stark
Spinoza attempts ‘to make a diversion’. He struggles to look away
from the image of this spectral figure of a Black ‘scabby Brazilian’ or
‘Ethiopian’ but this image insists on returning. Negri reads Spinoza’s
vivid dream, the eruption of this ‘black Brazilian/Ethiopian’ in Spinoza’s
imagination, and relates this figure to the ‘complex character’ of Caliban
and thereby to what the communist philosopher calls ‘the Caliban
problem’, namely ‘the problem of the liberatory force of the natural
imagination’ (1999 :86)
James Edward Ford III’s essay ‘Interrupting the System: Spinoza and
Maroon Thought’ initially welcomes Negri’s affirmation that ‘Caliban
is our contemporary hero’ but then argues that this figure is not
adequate to Negri’s own hypothesis about the role of the imagination
in Spinoza. Rather, Ford suggests, it is the figure of the maroon, not
of Caliban, that best ‘complements Spinoza’s rebellious philosophical
practice’. Ford argues that ‘the Caliban symbolizes individual acts of the
subordinated that remain mired in what Frantz Fanon calls ressentiment
or what Spinoza called “melancholy”’; in contrast, ‘[t]he Maroon
actively attempts to overcome the ressentiment’ (Ford 2018: 174). The
Maroon actively refuses this weakening passion.
Is what ‘returns’ in Spinoza’s dream not also repeated in Deleuze
and Guattari’s consistent ‘performative citation’ of George Jackson?
Michelle Koerner (2011) argues that Deleuze’s ‘encounter with George
Jackson’ is haunted by a consistent absence. Time and again, Koerner
finds, Jackson’s name is found alongside some iteration of the
aforementioned slogan (‘actively fighting even as they flee’) but not cited.
In another recent critical essay, titled ‘Left Out: Notes on Absence,
Nothingness and the Black Prisoner Theorist’, Taija McDougall (2019)
inhabits and thinks from this ‘empty space’ that George Jackson
occupies in Deleuze and Guattari’s corpus. McDougall distinctively
argues that this absence cannot be a mere oversight – an omission –
nor a ‘performative gesture’. Rather, thinking within an Afro-pessimist
problematic, McDougall argues that this absence – either a conscious or
unconscious disavowal – points to a certain affinity with the plantationprison logic that enforces the ‘nothingness that is Black life’ (2019: 7).
Without eliding this problem, what follows is an experiment – perhaps
a risky one – of thinking vital anomalous alliances whose effect is to
undermine this plantation-prison logic (its reifications, its moralisms and
its sad passions). But the result of this experiment cannot be settled in
these pages. The question remains open as to the effects produced by
these compositions and anomalous alliances which are perhaps always
subject to certain refrains.
Anomalous Alliances: Spinoza and Abolition
311
Let me return to Spinoza’s dream. As Warren Montag argues in
Bodies, Masses, Power: Spinoza and His Contemporaries, beyond the
associations made between Spinoza’s image and either the figure of
Caliban or the figure of the maroon, he seems to be singularly haunted
by his relationship to the ‘outcast’, the maroon, the multitudo. For
Montag, Spinoza’s singularity, if not his anomaly, is the place that ‘the
multitude’ or ‘the masses’ – ‘that collectivity beyond any law except the
law immanent in its actions’ – has in his writings (1999: 89). Montag
writes:
It is finally not clear whether the rebel slave, the mangy Brazilian/Ethiopian,
was an image in Spinoza’s dream or whether Spinoza himself, his words and
his works, was the dream of a rebel slave, the dream of all those, slaves,
labourers, women, at the moment they turned away from servitude and began
to fight for liberation. (Montag 1999: 89)
Montag therefore reads these ‘outcast’ figures immanently. The
‘Maroon’ or the ‘Caliban’ are not external figures that come from
without to resemble the image in Spinoza’s dream, but rather, these
figures can be read immanently in Spinoza’s very own words and works.
For Montag, Spinoza is not so much an anomaly as he is a heretic who
dares to think that which haunts away all of his ‘contemporaries’ such
as Hobbes and Locke. That is, Spinoza dares to think ‘the absent center
of their political projects’ (Montag 1999: 89). Spinoza dares to think
the ‘outcast’, the maroon, the multitudo. Montag also relates Spinoza’s
dream to his excommunication – that is, to Spinoza’s day of Judgement,
to his day of punishment.
One of the elders of the Jewish community who sat in judgement of
Spinoza during his excommunication was a man called Isaac Aboab.
Aboab was one of Spinoza’s teachers who, two years before the
philosopher’s excommunication, had been the Chief Rabbi of the Dutch
colony of Pernambuco, in Brazil. The Chief Rabbi reluctantly left Brazil
in 1654 as the Portuguese ‘mobilized slaves against their Dutch masters’
(Montag 1999: 88). As has been well documented, even before the
Portuguese reconquest of the Dutch colony, Pernambuco had been
a target of attacks from neighbouring maroon communities. Montag
writes that ‘Aboab remained in Pernambuco to the bitter end’ and
provides another characterisation of Spinoza’s dream by provocatively
asking:
Did Spinoza’s dream, ten years later, express the anxiety of a ‘projective
identification’? Was the image that lingered before him, even after he awoke,
the image that the gaze of his judges reflected back to him as they pronounced
312 Alejo Stark
his perpetual exclusion from the community, the mangy slave whose rebellion
destroyed their authority? (Montag 1999: 88)
Spinoza’s dream, that which perhaps haunts him the most, is the
possibility of an anomalous alliance with such outcast – an alliance,
Montag suggests, which might be read immanently in the philosopher’s
corpus. It is this, Montag writes: ‘What haunts Spinoza, and the conflicts
internal to his work attest to this, is precisely his kinship with this
outcast, the fact that they are “objective allies” in a common struggle’
(1999: 88) – a haunting that, as Ford argues, might also tell us about
how ‘race informs Spinoza’s philosophy’ (Ford 2018: 175).
Beyond facile analogies or ruses, it is vital at this point to also
recall that many of Spinoza’s friends, comrades and teachers were
imprisoned and executed. What relation might be traced between these
instances of punishment and Spinoza’s heresies? As Michael L. Morgan
argues, Spinoza’s 1657 exile would ‘intensify’ his relations with radical
figures such as Adriaen Koerbagh and Franciscus Van den Enden
(Spinoza 2002: 2). Both of them faced their deaths under conditions of
punishment.
Adriaen Koerbagh died on 15 October 1669, while imprisoned in
Rasphuis. Rasphuis was an Amsterdam jail in which prisoners were
subjected to a labour regime which involved shaving wood from the
brazilwood tree, otherwise known as Pernambuco wood. In Discipline
and Punish, referring to the ‘great models of punitive imprisonment’
Foucault argues that Amsterdam’s Rasphuis jail ‘more or less inspired
all the others’ in this early period of reforms (1995: 120). It is likely
that Spinoza published the Theological-Political Treatise in response to
his friend’s death (Nadler 2018: 312–14). Similarly, Spinoza’s beloved
teacher, Franciscus Van den Enden – a radical critic of slavery and
someone with whom Spinoza shared many study groups and probably
even lived with at a time – was incarcerated in the Bastille, tried,
and eventually hanged in Paris in 1674 for fomenting insurrection in
Normandy (Israel 2001: 180–4).
As such, there might be a relation – a certain parallelism, or
equivalence even – between Spinoza’s metaphysics, his practical
philosophy and these affections, these instances of punishment. This
is how this singular philosopher ‘started’. Spinoza started ‘from the
middle’, as it were, of such affections.5 What follows is therefore an
attempt – following Deleuze’s Spinoza: Practical Philosophy – ‘to try to
perceive and to understand Spinoza by way of the middle’ (1988: 122).
Which is to say, not from first principles, but from a common plane of
Anomalous Alliances: Spinoza and Abolition
313
immanence, ‘from a mode of living, from a way of life’ (ibid.). It is from
there that we trace a strong resonance between Spinozism and abolition
as well as the political and theoretical practice of ‘transformative justice’.
It is also in Spinoza: Practical Philosophy where Deleuze mentions
that ‘[n]o philosopher was ever more worthy, but neither was
any philosopher more maligned and hated’ (1988: 17). The French
philosopher goes on to argue that to ‘grasp the reason’ of this ‘we must
start from the practical theses that made Spinozism an object of scandal’.
Deleuze writes that these practical theses – theses for which Spinoza
was denounced in his own lifetime – ‘imply a triple denunciation: of
“consciousness,” of “values,” and of “sad passions”’ (ibid.). These
are the reasons, Deleuze argues, for which Spinoza was accused,
respectively, of materialism, immoralism and atheism. Moving, as it
were, from morality to an ethics, in what follows we will start with these
denunciations, these judgements, to then derive, in a parallel fashion,
three abolitionist theses. These abolitionist theses are as follows:
Thesis 1: Spinozan materialism undermines the reifications of carceral
state thought.
Thesis 2: Spinozan ethics undermines the punitivism of the carceral
state.
Thesis 3: Spinozan joy is inversely proportional to the power of the
carceral state.
What follows below will develop these abolitionist theses from Deleuze’s
own three theses about Spinoza’s excommunication. Let me begin with
the first.
I. Spinozan Materialism Undermines the Reifications of
Carceral State Thought
Risking oversimplification, we can say that for Spinoza everything that
exists – whether it is called infinite substance, ‘God’ or ‘Nature’ –
explains itself in relation to itself. There is nothing that is outside of or
‘transcendent’ to Nature and its complex causal nexus. This infinite web
of material causal relations, which includes everything from a cell, to the
carceral, to the cosmos, is obviously complex but can nonetheless still be
understood. As finite beings, humans have access to two ‘attributes’ of
this infinite substance: thought and extension (mind and body).6
It is in the ‘middle’ of the Ethics that Deleuze finds what he calls
Spinoza’s ‘new model’ for philosophy, namely, that of the materialism
314 Alejo Stark
of ‘the body’. Spinoza’s proposition states that ‘[t]he body cannot
determine the mind to thinking, and the mind cannot determine the
body to motion, to rest, or to anything else (if there is anything else)’
(Spinoza 1985: 494). This implies that an action or a passion in the
mind ‘parallels’ – is ‘equivalent’ with, as Jaquet (2019) suggests – an
action or a passion in the body. There is no hierarchy between the mind
and the body nor is there a primacy of one over the other. For Deleuze,
this is one of Spinoza’s main ‘theoretical theses’ and it goes by the name
of ‘parallelism’.7
Deleuze goes on to elaborate the ‘practical significance’ of this
theoretical thesis. He is concerned with Spinoza’s ‘provocation’. In the
Scholium to the aforementioned proposition, Spinoza writes:
Again, no one knows how, or by what means, the mind moves the body, nor
how many degrees of motion it can give the body, nor with what speed it
can move it. So it follows that when men say that this or that action of the
body arises from the mind, which has dominion over the body, they do not
know what they are saying, and they do nothing but confess, in fine-sounding
words, that they are ignorant of the true cause of that action, and that they
do not wonder at it. (Spinoza 1985: 495)
For Deleuze, this ‘declaration of ignorance’ by Spinoza is a direct
provocation to those who speak of the ‘dominion’ of the mind over
the body and of ‘free will’ and ‘consciousness’ as if they knew
what they were saying. Even today – after decades of advancements
in artificial intelligence and cognitive science – can it be said that
the true causes of the actions of the body and the mind are
known?
This ‘declaration of ignorance’ also points to a repressed potential that
lies beyond our supposed knowledge of the body and the ‘consciousness’
of the mind. It is through the aforementioned proposition in the Ethics
that Deleuze argues that Spinoza’s materialism entails ‘a discovery of
the unconscious, of an unconscious of thought just as profound as the
unknown of the body’ (Deleuze 1988: 19). The ‘practical significance’ of
this for Deleuze, then, is as follows: Spinoza’s materialism is an attempt
to ‘discover’ in ‘a parallel fashion’ the powers of thought that ‘elude
consciousness’ and the powers of the body that ‘elude knowledge’ of the
body. In so doing, Spinoza’s provocation displaces all the ‘fine-sounding
words’ such as ‘free will’ and ‘consciousness’. Hence Deleuze’s first
thesis: ‘A devaluation of consciousness (in favour of thought). Spinoza
the materialist’ (Deleuze 1988: 17).
Anomalous Alliances: Spinoza and Abolition
315
But why is Deleuze’s Spinoza so concerned with consciousness? The
problem is that the nature of consciousness is to ‘register effects’ and
not causes. Thought far surpasses whatever consciousness can capture
as effects. Consciousness can therefore claim nothing about the order of
causes. For Spinoza, the ‘order of causes’ is defined by the composition
and decomposition of ideas with other ideas and the composition and
decomposition of bodies with other bodies. This order is such that in
an encounter between a body with another body or between an idea
with another idea these might combine ‘to form a powerful whole’ or
they might decompose by ‘destroying the cohesion of its parts’ (Deleuze
1988: 17). The complex laws of compositions and decompositions of
relations in these encounters are beyond the limits of consciousness.
Consciousness merely registers the effects of these compositions or
decompositions. For example, consciousness registers the effect of ‘joy’
or ‘sadness’ when a body or idea composes or decomposes, respectively,
its relations with another body or idea. The thesis of Spinozan joy and
the passions will be discussed more thoroughly in what follows. What
is important for now is that consciousness condemns thought to what
Spinoza calls ‘inadequate ideas’.
Deleuze describes Spinoza’s concept of inadequate ideas in the
following manner: ‘the conditions under which we know things and are
conscious of ourselves condemn us to have only inadequate ideas, ideas
that are confused and mutilated, effects separated from their real causes’
(Deleuze 1988: 17). Inadequate ideas, then, are those that separate
causes from effects and thereby mutilate the causal relations in the
order of compositions and decompositions of bodies and ideas. They
mutilate such relations. The problem with valuing consciousness is that
it condemns thought to a world of mangled relations.
If we follow Deleuze’s point about the ‘practical significance’ of
Spinoza’s materialism, then one task is to take on the ‘charlatans’
that speak of the ‘will’ and of ‘consciousness’ and thereby condemn
thought to register effects separated from causes. These inadequate
ideas parallel those that condemn thought to a fetish – a mutilation
of relations and a mangled world cut off from the determinations
that constitute what another materialist, Karl Marx, calls the social
ensemble.8
The concept of fetish, as developed by Marx in the first volume of
Capital (1990), entails a mechanism whereby the ensemble of social
relations is represented as a thing. However, for Marx, the fetish –
the social mechanism that transforms relations into objects – cannot be
merely overcome in and by thought. The fetish is an objective effect of a
316 Alejo Stark
given social formation. In Difference and Repetition, Deleuze gives the
following account:
according to Marx, fetishism is indeed an absurdity, an illusion of social
consciousness, so long as we understand by this not a subjective illusion but
an objective or transcendental illusion born out of the conditions of social
consciousness in the course of its actualization. (Deleuze 1994: 208)
As Jason Read helpfully points out, what is at stake for Deleuze here
is that fetishism for Marx entails ‘a new understanding on the limits of
thought’ and not ‘the empirical limits of error, or even the transcendental
condition of illusions hard wired into subjectivity, but the socially
produced limits that transform relations into objects’ (Read 2009: 82).
So, once again, this mechanism of fetishism cannot simply be ‘dispelled’
in thought alone. Rather, it requires a change in social relations. It
requires ‘revolution’ (Deleuze 1994: 208).
Here is an iteration of Spinoza’s parallelism: the materiality of social
relations of the fetish finds its parallel in a model of thought that
represents those relations. This is what Deleuze and Guattari call ‘state
thought’. In short, state thought is a mode of the model of consciousness.
State thought produces inadequate ideas: representations that reify the
ensemble of social relations.9 Note that this strongly implies that we are
not dealing with some sort of ‘false consciousness’, or a consciousness
that is somehow ‘deluding’ itself. Rather, this is an objective illusion
constitutive of consciousness as such. It is an effect of a material cause.
It is an effect of the complex causal nexus of relations in a given social
ensemble.
For Spinoza, this mangled world of inadequate ideas produces a
certain anguish, a certain anxiety that must be calmed. ‘How does
consciousness calm its anguish?’ Deleuze provocatively asks (1988: 20).
Answer: through the aforementioned illusion. Although Deleuze gives
an account of three illusions, he ends up reducing these to two (ibid. 20,
60). The two that concern us here are the ‘illusion of final causes’ and
‘the psychological illusion of freedom’. The latter entails ‘considering
only effects whose causes it is essentially ignorant of, consciousness can
believe itself free, attributing to the mind an imaginary power over the
body, although it does not even know what a body can do in terms of
the causes that actually move it to act’ (ibid. 60). To illustrate this, let
us focus on an instance of state thought – carceral state thought – to
then derive yet another ‘practical consequence’ of Spinoza’s materialism
in resonance with abolition.
Anomalous Alliances: Spinoza and Abolition
317
Let me first consider consciousness’s ‘illusion of freedom’. If we know
neither ‘what a body can do’ nor what a ‘mind can do’ then how
is legal culpability to be established by invoking some sense of ‘will’
or ‘consciousness’? Penal codes necessarily found themselves on some
sense of ‘consciousness’ to determine guilt. Could there ever be a penal
code which is able to think? Which is to say, could there ever be a
‘code’ that does not merely judge by evoking ‘fine-sounding words’,
such as ‘will’ and ‘consciousness’, but rather attempts to understand?
And by ‘understand’ Spinoza means something very specific: namely,
grasping our missed encounters – violence, harm and so on – through
the causal nexus of relations that compose the social ensemble and
its determinations. That is, understanding involves opening thought to
the materiality concerned with the composition and decompositions
of bodies and ideas: the complex causal chain that produces helpful
or harmful effects. We begin to sense that Spinoza’s materialism
undermines carceral state thought’s reified legal subject and all the ‘finesounding words’ secreted by its penal code.
In this sense, as Warren Montag has suggested, Spinoza’s materialism
anticipates Nietzsche’s own genealogy of morality (Nietzsche 1998) and
undermines the entire tradition of punishment and guilt that goes from
the doctrine of original sin to utilitarianism’s doctrine of ‘incentives’
and ‘deterrences’ (Montag 1999: 37).10 The society-effect through which
subject-individuals are determined by their capacity to be ‘free to choose’
is a linchpin of contemporary state thought which suppresses the effects
of the social ensemble as well as explanations of racial capitalism and the
racialised outputs of social death of the carceral machine. A materialist
account of such relations devalues such illusion of consciousness
whose inadequate ideas confuse effects for causes and transforms
relations into things. Here we reach the second illusion: the illusion of
final causes.
Let’s consider two examples to think these objective illusions.
Consider Brett Story’s abolitionist materialist documentary film The
Prison in Twelve Landscapes. This is a film about prison in which the
prison – as object, as enclosed site – makes a brief appearance only
in the last frames of the film. The prison is the ‘absent center’ around
which the entire film revolves. The prison is a site out of sight and yet
everywhere. How does the film account for this immanent causality of
the carceral? The film makes the prison sensible in its multiple ‘centers’:
as an archipelago embedded within a vast carceral geography. In each
of its twelve landscapes, the film connects the sites of prisons with the
broader ensemble of social relations. Through its cartography it works
318 Alejo Stark
to subvert the reifications of carceral consciousness. It transforms what
objectively appears as an isolated object – a given prison site – into a
relation. And it works to reverse what appears as a cause to a mere effect.
As the film shows, the carceral boom in the United States – implicitly
periodised as a reaction to the urban uprisings in cities such as Detroit in
1967, the shifting dynamics of racial capitalism, as well as the mutation
from the ‘welfare state’ to the ‘warfare state’ (Gilmore 2007: 79) – has
itself produced the prison as an isolated site.
But the representation of the prison as an isolated site is an
inadequate idea of the carceral. Undermining the reifying representations
of carceral state thought, The Prison in Twelve Landscapes weaves
together the many sites of the vast carceral geographies in which prisons
dot the territorial tapestry. A certain montage of sounds and images
demonstrates the necessary causal links across frames and geographies.
Proper names like Detroit, Baltimore and Appalachia situate relations
and flows of all sorts – of buses, commodities and human bodies – across
vast carceral landscapes. The cause of the carceral everywhere becomes
sensible through its effects.
On a street corner of Times Square a crowd of Black women gather
to catch a bus to a prison site in upstate New York to visit their loved
ones. In a road that cuts through the hills of southern California, a truck
full of firefighter-prisoners makes its way to the front lines of forest fires.
In some awkward plateaus of Appalachia, hill tops flattened by the coal
industry prepare the grounds for the foundations of a federal prison.
In air space everywhere, radio-wave packets of electromagnetic energy
carry audio messages to loved ones behind prison walls. In streets and
highways, commodities flow into the carceral compounds that dot the
carceral geography. Brett Story’s abolitionist audio-visual tapestry of the
carceral undermines the reifications of carceral state thought by weaving
together these instances – connecting cause with effect and devaluing the
objective illusions that reproduce carceral society.11
Another example of this constitutive illusion of ‘consciousness’ that
Deleuze calls the illusion of final causes is carceral state thought’s
representation of ‘crime’ as the cause of the carceral state.12 As
abolitionist geographer Ruth Wilson Gilmore writes about in relation to
the largest prison state, the ‘Golden gulag’ of California, ‘In its briefest
form, the dominant explanation for prison growth goes like this: crime
went up; we cracked down; crime came down’ (Gilmore 2007: 17).
But Gilmore’s geographical-historical materialist analysis suggests that
a more adequate account of the prison boom is as follows: ‘crime went
up; crime came down; we cracked down’, and, she continues: ‘If the
Anomalous Alliances: Spinoza and Abolition
319
order is different, then so are the causes’ (Gilmore 2007: 17). Crime is an
effect of the carceral state, not its cause. Carceral state thought reverses
the order. Attempting to calm its anguish and confusing everything even
further, it races ahead and claims itself to be the ‘solution’ to our missed
encounters, which it calls ‘crime’.
It is through these objective illusions that carceral state thought
functions as a reification machine: confusing cause and effect and
mutilating relations through inadequate ideas. But it is also thus
that an abolitionist materialism – in resonance with Spinozism –
actively undermines these reifications. Hence the first thesis that follows
from Spinoza’s condemnation as a ‘materialist’: Spinozan materialism
undermines the reifications of carceral state thought.
II. Spinozan Ethics Undermines the Punitivism of
the Carceral State
Deleuze’s second practical thesis concerns Spinoza’s denunciation of
values, an immoralism, which is to say, an ethics. ‘Spinoza the
immoralist’ affirms ‘A devaluation of all values, and of good and
evil in particular in favor of “good” and “bad”’ (Deleuze 1988: 22).
Therefore, this second thesis follows from the first one: ‘[t]he illusion of
values is indistinguishable from the illusion of consciousness’ (ibid. 23).
The mangled world of consciousness which judges all but understands
nothing attempts to make up for its inadequate ideas through the values
of Good and Evil. Unable to explain anything, carceral state thought
moralises. Failing to understand, consciousness charges ahead with the
moral illusion of the imperative: ‘Thou shalt’. Deleuze recalls Spinoza’s
reading of the Bible’s original sin story to exemplify this point.
In the correspondence with Blyenbergh, also known as the ‘letters
on Evil’, Spinoza comments on what the ‘ignorant’ Adam hears from
God: ‘Thou shalt not eat the fruit.’ In the (human, all too human)
voice of God, Adam hears a command. In contrast to this moralist tale
which says that God prohibited Adam from eating the fruit, Spinoza
emphasises that God did not issue a prohibitive command at all. Rather,
God merely ‘informed’ Adam that the encounter between his body and
the body of the fruit will be a ‘bad’ encounter. That is, it will be an
encounter that will decompose Adam’s body and its relations. As such,
all of that which ‘we group under the heading of Evil, illness, and
death’ are merely ‘bad encounters, poisoning, intoxication, relational
decomposition’ (Deleuze 1988: 22). So devaluing the moralism of Good
and Evil does not necessarily devalue the distinction between good and
320 Alejo Stark
bad. Herein lies the Spinozan difference between a morality and an
ethics.
For Spinoza, the encounter of bodies (ideas), in the order of causes,
can be either (1) ‘good’ by entering into composition with another
body (idea) or (2) ‘bad’ insofar as it decomposes those relations. As
mentioned previously, in the order of effects, consciousness experiences
joy in the case of the ‘good’ encounter or sadness in the case of
the ‘bad’ encounter.13 As such, consciousness seems content to stay
within the order of effects (not causes). Now we find another way
through which consciousness calms its anguish: moralising. That is, by
misunderstanding what are merely ‘bad’ encounters and judging them
as ‘Evil’. Deleuze writes, ‘all that one needs in order to moralize is
to fail to understand’ (Deleuze 1988: 23). And understanding requires
grasping things through the order of causes. In contrast, to moralise is
to appeal to some transcendent principle. It is a call to obedience that
does not provide us with any knowledge at all. ‘Law,’ Deleuze writes,
‘whether moral or social, does not provide us with any knowledge; it
makes nothing known’ (ibid. 24).
Again we ask: does the current criminal justice system judge or does
it understand? Is the intervention of a police officer ever an effort to
understand? Does a parole board that demands a prisoner narrate their
redemption story in exchange for freedom an attempt to understand?
Do prosecutors understand? Today in the United States more than 95
per cent of all cases in court are decided in plea bargains. That is, fewer
than 5 per cent of cases go to trial. That is, after waiting for your trial for
weeks or months on end (either in jail or in your house, depending on
whether you can afford bail or you become indebted to pay for it) you
face a prosecutor who offers you what seems like a bargain: plead guilty
and save the state the time and money of a trial (in exchange for some
time behind bars) or spend the rest of your life in prison. It seems as if
life under the carceral state is just one degree of separation from being
captured by debt, by prisons, by police. The carceral state understands
nothing. It mutilates everything. This is a fatal symptom of that mass
punitive apparatus of capture and its ‘catch-all’ solutions to our bad
encounters. Punitivism is a moralism.
But punitivism is not just found in the practice of police, prosecutors,
prison guards and politicians. It is not ‘out there’, nor simply
imposed from ‘above’. Abolitionist theoretical and political practice
of building community safety without relying on police and prisons
actively undermines this weakening moralism. In a recently published
collection of essays, Beyond Survival: Strategies and Stories from the
Anomalous Alliances: Spinoza and Abolition
321
Transformative Justice Movement (Dixon and Piepzna-Samarasinha
2020), we find a constellation of abolitionist ‘transformative justice’
practices that provide a way of recomposing our decompositions,
our bad encounters, our sad passions, without resorting to the
disempowering hold of the carceral state and its moralism.
In a powerful essay published in Beyond Survival titled ‘Building
Community Safety: Practical Steps Toward Liberatory Transformation’,
Ejeris Dixon – long-time abolitionist organiser in Black queer and trans
communities – provides an account of how ‘bold, small experiments’ of
transformative justice and community accountability practices provide
ways of addressing harm and violence ‘without relying on police and
prisons’ (Dixon 2020: 16–20). This is a practice that for Dixon and
her family was always immanent to its community and its power. As
with other communities differentially more vulnerable to police violence,
calling the cops was not a solution to resolving bad encounters. For
Dixon, vital to her transformative justice and community accountability
practices is the ‘knowledge’ that ‘instant expertise runs contrary to
our liberatory values’. ‘Safety is not a product that we can package
and market’, because at stake is ‘our lives’ (Dixon 2020: 21). Safety
is here redefined by Dixon as an active transformation of immediate
social relations in our proximate communities through practices such as
‘deescalating violence, planning for safety, resolving conflicts, holding
community accountability processes, or navigating consent’. As such,
Dixon emphasises that ‘[b]y practicing in slow, measurable, and
deliberate ways, we build the knowledge we need to diffuse and address
conflict in our communities’ (ibid. 21). Abolitionist practice, therefore,
entails a careful, cautious –in other words, prudent – production of
knowledge. That is, it entails understanding how certain encounters
can compose and decompose our relations, and how we can intervene
without resorting to the apparatus of capture of the carceral state.
This abolitionist notion of safety stands in stark contrast to the
mangled representation of security of the carceral state and thereby
involves a compositional power. At stake is the problem and experiment
of building ‘trust’. But, Dixon writes, ‘When we make judgment into
one of our primary organizing strategies, we reduce the trust needed
to create safety.’ Abolitionist understanding therefore goes beyond
judgement. Building ‘trust’ implies a devaluing of judgement in favour
of understanding. Dixon goes on to recount the following encounter:
One day, while I was working at the Audre Lorde Project, I received an
email that deeply upset me. We had recently attended a march organized
322 Alejo Stark
by a mother whose gay son had been horrifically murdered. This mother
had organized the march to raise awareness about her son’s murder and
was also passing out flyers that asked people to report information to the
police. In response, I received this message from a critic: ‘I can’t believe that
you would support state based responses. Can you tell us about how this
is in line with your politics?’ I was incensed by the email. While I didn’t
believe that the state would bring justice in this case, I believe in supporting
Black mothers. I particularly believe in supporting Black mothers who are
brave, proud and resilient enough to organize against homophobic violence
in the face of devastating loss. I do not need to believe in or even dictate
what strategies surviving family members should use. Instead, I find ways to
support them that are in line with my politics because I know that just as
punishment does not transform behavior, neither does judgment . . . (Dixon
2020: 23–4, my emphasis)
This devaluing of judgement and moralism entails an understanding
of the complex chain of causal relations that make up the mother’s
desperate call, instead of resorting to judging the ‘Good’ ones and those
‘Evil’ ones (and their strategies for responding to harm, violence and
generational trauma). Dixon continues:
I believe that when people of color and particularly Black people make the
choice to call emergency services, it is an inherent negotiation. We come from
generations of state violence. Many of us have family members in prison.
Most of us have either directly experienced police violence or intimately
know people who have. These are not flippant decisions. Yet when we create
a culture of judgment so thick that we make it impossible for people to
admit that when they have called emergency services or needed to, there
are critical impacts . . . I believe that we can practice transformative justice
while simultaneously reducing the harm from the state. Remembering that
one of the primary goals of our work is relationship building, we must ask
ourselves who wins when we shame survivors for using the options available,
when all the options left are violent? . . . As a practical step I would suggest
examining when and why we use judgment in our conversations with each
other and whether we’re seeking to educate or support. We can reframe both
education and support in nonjudgmental ways. For instance, education can
include sharing tools for de-escalating conflict that a person can try to use
before calling 911. We can achieve compassion without judgment when we
focus on making sure that people feel heard, understood and not isolated.
(Dixon 2020: 24)
Abolitionism swerves away from the moralisms of Judgement which,
in failing to understand, can merely end up drawing a line between
Good and Evil. In contrast, abolitionist ethics is experimental and
compositional. As Deleuze writes, ‘experimentation’ is the ‘the contrary
Anomalous Alliances: Spinoza and Abolition
323
of a Judgment’ (Deleuze 1988: 40–1). To moralise is to appeal to
some transcendent principle (‘Good and Evil’) that turns us against
life. And when our lives are at stake, abolitionists do not turn to the
guns of the state for a vital strategy of survival, and neither do they
turn to moralising and isolating those whose strategies of survival still
rely on the carceral state. Rather, in actively devaluing the moralism
of punitivism that reproduces the reifying sadness of the carceral state
in its judgements, abolition turns towards understanding compositions
and decompositions (an ethics). Abolition understands that moralising
– that punitivism – can do nothing to resolve our problems. Hence,
the second thesis: a Spinozan ethics undermines the punitivism of the
carceral state.
III. Spinozan Joy Is Inversely Proportional to the
Power of the Carceral State
About the third thesis – ‘Spinoza the atheist’ – Deleuze writes: ‘A
devaluation of all the “sad passions” (in favor of joy)’ (Deleuze
1988: 25). As just demonstrated, a Spinozan devaluation of morality
entails an affirmation of ethics. It is an attempt to understand that by
devaluating the moralism of ‘Good’ and ‘Evil’ all we are left with is the
materiality of ‘good’ or ‘bad’ encounters. Deleuze finds that in Spinoza’s
displacement of morality and its transcendent values (‘atheism’ also
involves a devaluation of transcendence) there is also a critique of the
sad passions in favour of joy. As such, this thesis (Spinozan joy) follows
from the previous thesis (Spinozan immoralism).
In Deleuze’s reading of the Ethics we find a critique of the sad passions
that is derived from Spinoza’s theory of the affections. ‘An individual,’
Deleuze writes, ‘is first of all a singular essence, which is to say, a degree
of power’ (Deleuze 1988: 28).14 In this sense, an ‘individual’ is already
quite a multitude. Its degree of power corresponds to ‘a certain capacity
for being affected’. In turn, it is the affections that ‘fill’ the capacity for
being affected. We can distinguish between two sorts of ‘affections’ in
the Ethics: actions and passions.15
Actions are explained in relation to the ‘singular essence’ in question
and are therefore considered to be active affections. In contrast, the
passions are always explained in relation to some ‘external’ body.
The passions come, as it were, from ‘without’ the singular essence in
question. As such, they refer to the power of being acted upon and are
therefore considered to be passive affections. Spinoza also distinguishes
between two kinds of passions: the sad passions which can block or
324 Alejo Stark
diminish the singular essence’s power of acting, and the joyful passions
which can add to or increase the singular essence’s power of acting.16
Deleuze helpfully notes that the joyful passions are nonetheless still
a passion (that is, the power of being acted upon) and so while the
singular essence being considered is still separated from its power of
acting, its power of acting is nonetheless increased. In contrast, it is
in the encounters in which the affection is that of a sad passion –
bad encounters, decompositions – in which the singular essence is most
separated from its power of acting and in which it feels the most
impotent. With this, we can conclude that the Ethics’ theory of affections
posits that the power of acting is inversely proportional to the power of
being acted upon but that certain passions (joyful ones) can nonetheless
increase the power of acting. As such, a political reading of the Ethics
makes ethics a question of organising our encounters in such a way
that our power is increased. Let’s agree to call this ‘Spinozan joy’.
Furthermore, I must add with Deleuze, this sense of ‘organising’ is
always an experiment (without guarantees).
‘Spinozan joy’ entails a devaluation of the sad passions. It is an active
flight-fight from what Deleuze, following Spinoza, refers to as the hold
of the tyrant: ‘The tyrant needs sad spirits in order to succeed, just as
sad spirits need a tyrant in order to be content and to multiply’ (Deleuze
1988: 25). As such, the practical consequence of the devaluation of the
sad passions is the necessity to actively flee (while fighting) the hold of
the tyrant. The tyrant needs the sad passions and exploits them for his
own power. Deleuze writes:
Spinoza traces, step by step, the dreadful concatenation of sad passions;
first, sadness itself, then hatred, aversion, mockery, fear, despair, morsus
conscientiae, pity, indignation, envy, humility, repentance, self-abasement,
shame, regret, anger, vengeance, cruelty . . . His analysis goes so far that
even in hatred and security he is able to find that grain of sadness. (Deleuze
1988: 26)
Even in ‘hatred’ and ‘security’ there is sadness. For Deleuze’s Spinoza,
it is by surrendering to the weakening of the sad passions that we turn
to the tyrant’s ‘security’ to ‘save us’. It is ultimately a deeply saddening
morality that disparages and turns us away from our own power, from
life. In the sad passions of ‘security’, Deleuze tells us, ‘we can only think
of how to keep from dying, and our whole life is a death worship’ (ibid.).
The carceral state is such a machinery of premature death – the antidote
to which are the many practices of ‘survival pending abolition’, as Ruth
Anomalous Alliances: Spinoza and Abolition
325
Wilson Gilmore put it in an interview with Rustbelt Abolition Radio
(2020).
An abolitionist ethic is not enticed by ‘the magic’ of the carceral
state, by its saddening-weakening ‘solutions’ to our bad encounters.
Abolitionists, in particular, are not enticed by carceral state thought’s
conflation between ‘safety’ and ‘security’. As incarcerated abolitionist
thinker Stevie Wilson writes:
As an incarcerated penal abolitionist, I’m often asked by other prisoners: what
do we do about murderers and rapists? When this happens, I acknowledge the
fears that people convicted of these crimes might harm others, but I ask the
questioner what their real concern is. Invariably and resoundingly, it’s safety
– for themselves and their loved ones. They don’t want to be harmed. I ask
if they believe the present system of policing and imprisonment make them,
their families or their communities safer. Again, the answer is no. It’s at this
point that I encourage the questioner to think about what they want, safety,
and what they often get, security. I remind them that as prisoners, we live
in a very secure environment. But security doesn’t mean safety. There are
barbed-wired fences, concrete walls, locked doors, cameras, gun towers and
officers with riot gear, shock shields, tear gas and metal batons. But are we
safe? (Wilson 2019)
Stevie Wilson’s question is a provocation. It is a provocation to the
tyrants and its sad subjects: are we safe with the carceral state’s ‘catchall’ solutions? It is this ‘fatal coupling’ between those who passively
affirm the sad passions, those who are always asking for more walls
and cages for themselves and for others – and those who exploit them –
through which a paradoxical ‘punitive desire’ is constituted. The hold
of the tyrant is the hold of the carceral state on our lives. It is the
passive affirmation of powerlessness. It is here that Spinoza’s theory
of the affections finds a strong resonance with the abolitionist axiom:
‘strong communities make police and prisons obsolete’. Hence, the third
thesis: Spinozan joy is inversely proportional to the power of the carceral
state.
IV. Abolition Here and Now
Abolition is no utopia. Abolition is an experiment – here and now – that
actively undermines the power that prisons and police (and prosecutors,
and property, and so forth) have in our lives. It does so not by moralising
but by understanding how bad encounters decompose our relations. It
is through that active refusal that abolitionist practices respond to harm
326 Alejo Stark
by resorting to our immanent power rather than by submitting to the
apparatuses of capture of the carceral state. And it is through a broad
range of compositional experiments and their revolutionary becomings
that abolitionists actively redefine ideas of ‘safety’ and ‘harm’ – forms of
‘survival pending abolition’. Abolitionists provocatively ask: rather than
appealing to the moralising punitivism of the carceral state (which does
nothing but multiply our bad encounters), why not desire something else
for ourselves? Why continue to empower the apparatus of capture that
multiplies our bad encounters? Why continue to desire not just fascism
for others, but fascism for ourselves?
Abolition is not just a matter of putting police, prosecutors, prison
guards and so forth on trial. That is, it is not merely a matter of pitting
one morality against another morality. No, this would be but a moral
denunciation of a sad militant that finds comfort in their wretched
condition of impotence. To continuously succumb to the carceral state as
a solution to our bad encounters is to make a virtue out of weakness – to
make sadness our only passion. Rather, what is at stake in an abolitionist
ethics is the interruption of something as paradoxical as punitive desire.
The problem of punitive desire is that of the passive affirmation of
sad passions.17 As such, the abolitionist desire for experimentation with
forms of ‘transformative justice’ is a desire that overflows the walls and
cages that continuously attempt to contain us. Abolition is the active
refusal of the carceral state’s apparatus of capture’s attempt to become
the ‘catch-all solution’ to social problems. The ‘catch-all’ solution to bad
encounters.
Abolition makes no theological promises of a world of Justice nor
of some transcendent ideal world beyond this one in which there
will be neither violence nor harm nor pain. There is no such world.
‘Transformative justice’ is here and now. Spinozan materialism invites
us to face the materiality of this world: its bodies and ideas and their
respective compositions and decompositions. Understanding this entails
connecting the order of effects with the order of causes. Furthermore,
Spinozan immoralism (Spinozan ethics) wards off moralising judgements
from our bad encounters, and instead invites us to actively renounce the
saddening passions and the tyrant’s hold. Certainly, Spinoza does not
give us an adequate account of the dynamics of racial capitalism and the
carceral state today. Nonetheless, in the infinite streams of the Ethics we
find elements to compose an anomalous alliance between this punished
philosopher and abolition. In this sense, Spinoza’s concepts – and the
problems which they think – are active and vital today.
Anomalous Alliances: Spinoza and Abolition
327
Notes
1. This is a revised and expanded iteration of a paper presented at the Third Annual
Boston Area Deleuze Conference on October 2019 that was jointly organised
by Geoff Pfeifer and Ed McGushin. I would like to thank the organisers for
putting together this wonderful conference as well as Samantha Bankston for the
invitation. I am particularly grateful for my joyful encounters and conversations
with Geoff Pfeifer, Gil Morejón, Eric Aldieri, Ed Kazarian and Samantha
Bankston. I also express my gratitude to my abolitionist comrades of Rustbelt
Abolition Radio and Michigan Abolition and Prisoner Solidarity as well as the
compas of Vitrina Dystópica, all of whom have potentialised this anomalous
alliance between Spinozism and abolition. Lastly, I would like to thank the
anonymous referee for their generous engagement with an earlier version of this
text and for their thoughtful feedback.
2. Gilmore (2007) provides a geographical-historical materialist analysis that traces
the emergence of the carceral state in California as a kind of ‘spatial fix’ to
the recurring crises of racial capitalism. More specifically: ‘prisons are partial
geographical solutions to political economic crises, organized by the state, which
is itself in crisis. Crisis means instability that can be fixed only through radical
measures, which include developing new relationships and new or renovated
institutions out of what already exists’ (Gilmore 2007: 26). Concerning the
concept of ‘abolition geographies’, see Gilmore 2017.
3. In a short text titled ‘H.M.’s letters’ – referring to letters from a gay inmate
incarcerated in France who corresponded with the GIP (Groupe d’information
sur les prisons) – Deleuze provocatively asks: ‘for whom and for which problem
is prison a “solution”? A precise system comprised of police officers, criminal
records, and parole officers lowers the chances of escaping a first conviction;
these young people are destined to return to prison almost as soon as they leave.
One conviction after another gets them labeled “hardened criminals”’ (Deleuze
2004: 244). For more on Deleuze’s involvement with the GIP, see Toscano 2013
and references therein.
4. ‘To leave, to escape, is to trace a line . . . But to flee is not to renounce action:
nothing is more active than a flight. It is the opposite of the imaginary. It is also
to put to flight – not necessarily others, but to put something to flight, to put a
system to flight as one bursts a tube. George Jackson wrote from prison: “It may
be that I am fleeing, but throughout my flight, I am searching for a weapon”’
(Deleuze 1997: 36). And again in A Thousand Plateaus, ‘There is nothing
more active than a line of flight, among animals or humans. Even History is
forced to take that route rather than proceeding by “signifying breaks.” What
is escaping in a society at a given moment? It is on lines of flight that new
weapons are invented, to be turned against the heavy arms of the State. “I may
be running, but I’m looking for a gun as I go” (George Jackson)’ (Deleuze and
Guattari 1987: 204). Lastly, Deleuze also evokes George Jackson in a short essay
titled ‘H.M.’s letters’ published in Desert Islands: ‘Community-flights, where the
“community” is defined in opposition to “little hippy societies that do nothing
but imitate our fascist society.” Or active flights, in the political sense, like
Jackson, where one flees while looking for a weapon, while attacking’ (Deleuze
2004: 245). As shown later on in the introduction to this essay, both Koerner
(2011) and McDougall (2019) grapple with the non-citational encounter – or
missed encounter –between Deleuze and Jackson. See Jackson 1970, 1990.
5. Spinoza’s singularity, in part, resides in that ‘[w]hile it sometimes happens
that a philosopher ends up on trial, rarely does a philosopher begin with an
excommunication and an attempt on his life’ (Deleuze 1988: 7).
328 Alejo Stark
6. See EIp11 as well as EIIp1 EIIp2. Throughout, the commonly used citation
format for the Ethics is used – in which the part is given roman capitals followed
by the proposition number.
7. Although Deleuze follows a certain tradition in the history of philosophy that
names this mind–body relation (or non-relation) ‘parallelism’, recent scholarship
suggests that this is misleading, in part because Spinoza never uses such a
concept. More specifically, Jaquet (2019: 12–19) convincingly argues that it
is misleading to think the relation between mind and body in Spinoza as a
‘parallelism’ and instead proposes to replace it with ‘equivalence’ or ‘equality’.
This has direct consequences for Deleuze’s account of expressionism in Spinoza.
While I cannot elaborate this further, in what follows, ‘materialism’ will come
to name such posited ‘equality’ in the precise sense elaborated by Jaquet while
prioritising the proximate causal nexus that Marx calls the social ensemble. In
that sense, materialism here also comes to name a certain excess to or outside to
thought. As such, materialism involves at least two conditions: (1) the thesis
of equality (mind – body are two aspects of the same thing), and (2) the
thesis of excess (the complex causal nexus that lies beyond the equivalence: the
unconscious which overflows consciousness, the unknown of the body which
overflows the known of the body). Furthermore, beyond this quick clarification,
the materialist philosophical position I am concerned with here is focused on the
‘practical consequences’ of that which – in a very precise sense as elaborated in
the three theses – overflows or exceeds the containing apparatus of the carceral
state and carceral state thought. In this sense, a materialist position names such
an openness of thought to its excesses– a primacy of that which overflows it.
This practical element adds yet a third condition to the definition of materialism:
(3) the thesis of emancipation (or of composition with that which exceeds the
equivalence to produce emancipatory effects and diminish the power of external
causes). Given this, since Spinoza (and Marx), materialism affirms equality,
excess and emancipation.
8. On this point about Marx’s use of ‘ensemble’, see Balibar 2017: 29.
9. Read (2009) relates Deleuze’s critique of the image of thought with Marx’s
critique of commodity fetishism.
10. Montag (1999: 37) adequately calls this tendency in philosophy a ‘hangman’s
metaphysics’.
11. For an excellent conversation on the documentary, see Story 2018. Story has
also recently published an academic book which offers a geographical-historical
materialist account of the carceral state in the United States, titled Prison Land:
Mapping Carceral Power across Neoliberal America (2019).
12. Meaning that consciousness, in its desperate attempt to calm its anguish, ends
up putting effects before causes.
13. See EIVp39: ‘Those things are good which bring about the preservation of the
proportion of motion and rest the human Body’s parts have to one another; on
the other hand, those things are evil which bring it about that the parts of the
human Body have a different proportion of motion and rest to one another.’
14. See the general definition of the two sorts of passions in EIII.
15. See EIIId2.
16. As per E3p11sch. See also E3p13sch.
17. Desire is one of the three basic passions/affects: joy (pleasure), sadness (pain) and
desire. In Spinoza, desire is associated with his doctrine of the conatus (EIIIp58):
‘by conatus we understand desire’ (EIIIp9Sch). ‘Therefore desire is also related
to us in so far as we understand in so far as we act’ (E3p1). And EIIIp9sch,
‘When this conatus is related to mind alone, it is called Will (voluntas); when
it is related to mind and body together, it is called Appetite (appetitus), which
Anomalous Alliances: Spinoza and Abolition
329
is therefore nothing else but man’s essence . . . Further, there is no difference
between appetite and Desire (cupiditas) except that desire is usually related to
men in so far as they are conscious of their appetite.’ But then, in the Definition
of the Affects (EIII) Spinoza writes: ‘I also warned that I really recognize no
difference between human appetite and desire. For whether a man is conscious
of his appetite or not, the appetite still remains one and the same.’
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