Compare: A Journal of Comparative and International Education
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How are the ‘losers’ of the school accountability system
constructed in Chile, the USA and England?
Journal: Compare: A Journal of Comparative and International Education
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Manuscript ID CCOM-2019-0215.R5
Manuscript Type: Original Article
er
Keywords:
School accountability, high-stakes testing, performance-based
accountability, failing schools, disadvantaged communities
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vie
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Performance-based accountability systems that rank schools based on
their effectiveness produce ‘winners’ and ‘losers’. Substantial evidence
has pointed to the (side)effects of these classifications, particularly in the
most disadvantaged communities. Whilst previous studies have
compared schools under different effectiveness categories within and
between countries, this qualitative study takes a cross-case comparison
approach to analyse education policies, grey literature and previous
research evidence to explore the mechanisms that construct ‘failing’
Abstract:
schools in three notable high-stakes accountability systems worldwide:
Chile, the USA and England. After describing (1) the identification and
classification of ‘failing’ schools; (2) the instruments used to justify these
classifications; and (3) who make these judgements, we conclude that
the construction of ‘failing’ schools serves the competition and
differentiation required for maintaining neoliberal hierarchical and
unequal market-oriented regimes. Instead of disciplining only ‘failing’
schools, these labels also provide a caution for the whole school system.
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How are the ‘losers’ of the school accountability system constructed in Chile, the USA
and England?
Keywords
High-stakes testing, school accountability, performance-based accountability, failing schools,
disadvantaged communities
Abstract
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Performance-based accountability systems that rank schools based on their effectiveness
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produce ‘winners’ and ‘losers’. Substantial evidence has pointed to the (side)effects of these
classifications, particularly in the most disadvantaged communities. Whilst previous studies
rR
have compared schools under different effectiveness categories within and between countries,
this qualitative study takes a cross-case comparison approach to analyse education policies,
ev
grey literature and previous research evidence to explore the mechanisms that construct
‘failing’ schools in three notable high-stakes accountability systems worldwide: Chile, the
iew
USA and England. After describing (1) the identification and classification of ‘failing’
schools; (2) the instruments used to justify these classifications; and (3) who make these
judgements, we conclude that the construction of ‘failing’ schools serves the competition and
On
differentiation required for maintaining neoliberal hierarchical and unequal market-oriented
regimes. Instead of disciplining only ‘failing’ schools, these labels also provide a caution for
the whole school system.
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Introduction
During the last decade performance-based/high-stakes accountability systems have
proliferated around the world (OECD 2013; Falabella 2020). Most countries across Europe
and many others worldwide with growing decentralised market-oriented educational systems
have developed their own frameworks intending to promote school change, improvement and
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Compare: A Journal of Comparative and International Education
innovation specifically (Ehren and Shackleton 2016), and support evidence-based governance
and accountability more generally (Altrichter and Kemethofer 2015). Despite the
pervasiveness of these systems, results of their effects on school outcomes are mixed. Studies
of various inspection categories have frequently reported no effects or improvements in
compulsory core subjects measured by standardised tests for sub-groups of students (Shaw et
al. 2003; Rosenthal 2004; Luginbuhl, Webbink, and de Wolf 2009; Ehren and Shackleton
2016). Moreover, research has increasingly suggested that these systems ‘come at a cost, as
different side effects may occur’ (Penninckx et al. 2016, 335).
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Whilst their scope, methods, standards, data and instruments vary greatly from one
governance system to another (Faubert 2009), each system develops a different strategy when
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dealing with ‘failing’ schools. Although not all systems label schools as ‘failing’, each one
uses deficit terminology (such as underperforming, inadequate or very weak) to refer to
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schools that score below expected standards and are positioned at the bottom of the hierarchy.
Moreover, the overall discourse around these schools blames them for their own failure.
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Thus, by implementing accountability systems that judge and rank schools on the basis of
their effectiveness, winners and losers are produced (Schagen and Schagen 2003; Greany and
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Higham 2018). The losers of the accountability game ‘get represented in ways that mystify
power relations and often create individuals responsible for their ‘failures’, drawing attention
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away from the structures that create unequal outcomes’ (Bacchi 2000, 46). Meanwhile, the
structural inequities of the system and the working conditions within these institutions remain
invisible (Falabella 2014).
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Whilst the majority of studies conducted in the last few decades in the field of school
effectiveness and improvement focus on effective schools or the what works agenda (Munter,
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Cobb and Shekell 2016), a comparatively rare and limited number has addressed schools
positioned at the bottom of the pile (Chapman and Harris 2004). The need to describe how
different accountability systems construct the weakest schools is necessary for many reasons.
The first one derives from distributive and recognitional dimensions of social justice, as these
systems produce unequal distribution of knowledge and stigmatisation of schools serving
vulnerable students (Flórez and Rozas 2020). For instance, in England high-stakes
consequences for those schools that are classified as ‘failing’ are negatively affecting the
population that tends to be the most disadvantaged (Hutchinson 2016; Greany and Higham
2018). The second reason is conceptual, as school failure is a relative term defined in relation
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to an expected norm (Barber 2002). If the threshold changes, the nature and magnitude of the
problem also changes. The third reason is policy-oriented: because school failure appears as
an impossible issue to solve, by comparing different systems, the problem can be redefined.
Therefore this paper is timely, as previous studies have compared schools under different
effectiveness categories within a given country (Penninckx et al. 2016) or between countries
(Ehren et al. 2015), but no previous study has explored the way in which a similar
phenomenon is created in three notable high-stakes school accountability systems (Falabella
and De La Vega 2016): Chile, the USA and England. We argue that despite policy
variations—resulting from each country’s specific contexts and history—shared trends can be
identified.
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Literature review
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To situate the discussion of the losers of the accountability game within its wider context, we
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will shed light on the performative shift in governance specifically, and neoliberal marketoriented reforms that nurtured its emergence generally. In this scenario, the performing
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school is configured by a market- and state-accountability model where practitioners (school
leaders and teachers) need to continuously perform successfully within a predominantly
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competition-based framework (Gleeson and Husbands 2001; Maroy 2009; Falabella 2014).
This performance-based accountability system relies on the implementation of high-stakes
testing, which is then used to hold school staff accountable for their institutional outcomes
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and to determine potential consequences in terms of rewards and sanctions according to their
attainment level. Falabella (2020, 24) explains that ‘this policy approach is based on the use
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of quantifiable indicators, systems of comparison, and external dis/incentives on the
expectation that these measures will positively encourage school staff to continuously
promote educational quality for all’.
Closely aligned, neoliberal market-oriented reforms produce decontextualized and apparently
objective indicators on the basis of which schools’ performance is classified and compared. A
particular type of data-based knowledge governance grounded in choice and competition—
the two principles on which neoliberal market-oriented reforms rely—are made possible and
manageable (Ozga 2016). Meanwhile, a wake-up call stressing the detrimental effects that
these reforms are having on educational systems, particularly from social justice perspectives
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Compare: A Journal of Comparative and International Education
concerned with the social goals of education, equity and social cohesion (Levin 2018), has
increasingly been articulated (Falabella 2014; Flórez and Rozas 2020). Despite neoliberal
market-oriented reforms driving some productive efficiencies reflected in increases in
average student achievement scores (Rouse et al. 2013; Saw et al. 2017), they tend to be
coupled with disastrous consequences in terms of unequal opportunities and stigmatisation of
disadvantaged school communities. Over time fewer educational opportunities for the most
disadvantaged students are afforded and high levels of socio-economic segregation become
entrenched (OECD 2013).
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Some scholars, taking a post-critical sociological framework (Falabella 2020), argue that it is
misleading to interpret these effects as secondary or unintended, as they are the expected
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outcomes of the neoliberal policy regime (Harvey 2005; Ozga 2016; Falabella 2014, 2020;
Flórez and Rozas 2020). Thus, classifying and labelling schools as ‘failing’ in the name of
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transparency turns into a powerful social control practice oriented to discipline disadvantaged
groups (Ozga 2016). ‘The key point is that the model is based on a competitive rationale,
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which accepts, and moreover, requires the existence of a hierarchical unequal field with
institutions that are differently positioned (…) If all schools were to attain the same
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benchmark, the model would not work’ (Falabella 2014, 12).
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The call for moving away from performance-based accountability has also been posed by
researchers documenting the handicaps derived from the use of big data in general, and
standardised tests in particular. By revealing spurious past correlations between educational
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variables, standardised tests neglect small data, understood as the details that make the
difference in schools: how good quality teaching leads to better learning. In this view, schoolbased and formative assessments are much more likely to improve the quality of education
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because they capture in their narratives the richness and complexity of the details and
relationships that matter at school (Sahlberg and Hasak 2017).
During the last decade attention has also been paid to the ways in which accountability
systems affect schools differently within a country. That is, the impact an accountability
system has on a given school partly depends on the overall judgement of its effectiveness
(Penninckx et al. 2014) or its place in the vertical hierarchy (Falabella 2014). There is
evidence that ‘differential degrees of “accountability pressure”’ on school leaders (Altrichter
and Kemethofer 2015, 32) and teachers (Penninckx et al. 2016) are a result of inspections and
assessments. Schools deemed to be ‘failing’ usually receive greater levels of pressure
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(Falabella 2014) and embark on differing patterns of improvement of student performance
after inspection, depending on whether the school is judged to be weak, average or strong
(Matthews and Sammons 2005). ‘Failing’ schools tend to narrow the curriculum, teach to the
test and avoid innovation, which in turn worsen teaching and learning (Flórez and Rozas
2020).
Materials and Methods
Study Design
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We explored the mechanisms that construct ‘failing’ schools in three jurisdictions that
feature high-stakes accountability systems (Falabella and De La Vega 2016):Chile, the USA
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and England. As Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland have their own accountability systems
that are not necessarily considered high-stakes, we focus on England rather than the UK.
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Similarly, given the diversity among state systems across the USA, we draw on Virginia as a
relatively representative example of state system. Our qualitative exploratory study was
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framed by the following research questions:
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1. Who makes the decision about ‘failing’ schools and at what level are decision-makers
located?
2. What is the process of identifying ‘failing’ schools?
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3. What instruments are used to identify ‘failing’ schools?
We adopted a cross-case comparison design to develop thick descriptions of each case and
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subsequently compare them to identify cross-case patterns (Miles, Huberman and Saldaña
2014). A cross-case comparison design affords a deep investigation of a single phenomenon
(i.e., how ‘failing’ schools are constructed by accountability systems) in two or more cases,
retaining holistic and meaningful characteristics of each studied case while also leading to
tentative generalisations through their comparison (Rihoux and Bojana 2009).
Data sources and analysis
This comparative qualitative study analyses secondary data. More specifically, we conducted
desk-based research oriented to examine source documents, such as external evaluation and
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Compare: A Journal of Comparative and International Education
inspection guidelines, frameworks, handbooks, policy documents and legislation, and
relevant academic literature on each of the three studied jurisdictions (examined documents,
reports and papers are marked with * in the Reference section). To explore the ways in which
each accountability system constructed ‘failing’ schools, we developed a two-step analytical
process: within-case analysis and cross-case comparisons (Miles, Huberman and Saldaña
2014). Regarding within-case analysis, authors answered each research question focusing on
the jurisdiction where s/he had the most expertise by selecting, reading and coding documents
in order to identify themes referring to accountability in underperforming schools that allow
the production of a focused, thick case description.
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Second, the cross-case comparisons examined the data across the three jurisdictions in order
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to reveal commonalities and differences (Brooks Hall 2017). For that purpose, extensive
discussions were maintained between the authors through two face-to-face meetings between
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the first and second author, fourteen video calls between all authors, and many email
exchanges to discuss the findings.
Results
‘Failing’ schools in Chile
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Within-case analysis
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Chile has established a decentralised education system configured as a market grounded on
parental choice and privatisation, where funding is provided by the state to municipal and
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private school administrators through a voucher based on students’ attendance (Bellei and
Vanni 2015). Additionally, the Chilean system introduced test-based/high-stakes
accountability to address quality assurance and school improvement (Ahumada, Montecinos
and González 2012). Since the 1980s, schools’ performance is assessed by the central
government through SIMCE, a census-based standardised test that annually appraises
students’ learning in all types of schools according to national curriculum standards (Meckes
and Carrasco 2010).
The core of current school improvement policy is contained in two legal documents. First,
law Nº 20,248 from 2008 sets a Preferential School Subsidy (SEP) or adjusted voucher for
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students from disadvantaged families attending state-funded schools (MINEDUC 2008a). As
a condition to receive this additional funding, schools must design a four-year School
Improvement Plan and are accountable for disadvantaged students’ performance in SIMCE
(MINEDUC 2008b). Second, law Nº 20,529 from 2011 sets up the National System of
Quality Assurance of Education (SAC), which introduced two new government agencies: The
Superintendence of Education, which audits schools’ and their administrators’ compliance
with legislation; and the Education Quality Agency (ACE), which evaluates schools’
performance and carries out inspection visits targeting low-performing schools.
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The structure of the quality assurance system (SAC) is depicted in Figure 1.
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Who makes the decision about ‘failing’ schools in Chile and at what level are decision-
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makers located? Within the institutional arrangement of SAC, the mission of ACE is to
evaluate, guide and inform the educational system to focus on improving the quality and
equity of educational opportunities (ACE 2017). In terms of evaluation, ACE manages a set
of national assessment instruments of academic and non-academic educational outcomes, in
addition to coordinating the participation of Chile in international assessments such as PISA
(Programme for International Student Assessment).. Regarding guidance, ACE develops
inspection visits to provide feedback to low-performing schools about their teaching and
management processes. Finally, in terms of information, ACE promotes schools’ use of
assessment data to inform their improvement processes, as well as informing parents and
guardians about the attainment of students in a given school.
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ACE is a functionally decentralised and autonomous state institution, endowed with its own
assets, acting in coordination with the Ministry of Education (MINEDUC). It is headed by an
executive secretary and a specially appointed council that oversees its strategic planning. To
achieve its mission, ACE is internally organised into five divisions (assessment, guidance,
studies, information, and administration), and territorially into five macrozones (north,
centre-north, centre-south, south and austral) in order to coordinate its activities with schools
across the country.
What is the process of identifying ‘failing’ schools in Chile? All types of schools are sorted
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into four Performance Categories: High (students perform above expected), Medium
(students perform as expected), Medium-Low (students perform below expectations), and
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Insufficient (students perform significantly below expected) (ACE 2017). The Performance
Category is the result of the yearly evaluation of schools’ performance, allowing ACE and
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MINEDUC to determine possible sanctions in addition to identifying the level of support and
guidance for each school. The Performance Category is assigned according to an Index of
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Results (see figure 2), which is based on students’ learning (67%) and other academic and
non-academic outcomes (33%) and is then adjusted according to students’ and schools’ social
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characteristics (socioeconomic status, rurality). Based on this adjusted index, schools are
classified into the corresponding Performance Category.
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Figure 2: Classification of Schools into Performance Categories
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According to data published by ACE, of the 5,675 primary and 2,837 secondary schools
evaluated in 20191, 343 (6%) and 169 (6%) respectively were assigned to the Insufficient
category. The number of schools in this category has been decreasing since the first
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evaluation of primary schools’ performance in 2016 (633, 11%) and of secondary schools in
2017 (338, 12%). However, 120 primary (2%) and 107 secondary (3%) schools have
remained in the Insufficient performance category.
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This system of classification has high-stakes consequences as it determines rewards and
sanctions related with the degree of autonomy, intervention and support for schools. Schools
classified with Insufficient performance are subject to external intervention programmes from
MINEDUC delivered by their supervisors in key curriculum areas (e.g., Reading and
Mathematics), and Evaluation and Performance Guidance Visits by ACE evaluators who
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Primary schools with data for less than 30 students (27%) and without information (1%)
were excluded.
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assess schools’ processes and provide suggestions. ACE targeted inspection visits aim to
strengthen the internal capacity of schools by offering guidance for their improvement plan
(ACE 2017).
What instruments are used to identify ‘failing’ schools in Chile? As mentioned above,
students’ learning and other academic and non-academic outcome data are employed by ACE
to calculate an Index of Results to assign schools into Performance Categories. Students’
learning data are obtained from schools’ SIMCE results. The 2016-2020 national evaluation
plan (MINEDUC 2015) indicates that students sit for SIMCE tests in years four, six, eight
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(primary) and ten (secondary) in reading comprehension, writing, mathematics, science,
history, geography and social studies, and English. Instead of providing information about
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individual students’ scores, SIMCE reports the average score of the tested grade group
(Meckes and Carrasco 2010). The Index of Results takes into account SIMCE scores in the
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three latest evaluations, and the distribution of the students in Learning Standards in the latest
measurement. Learning Standards describe what students should know and be able to do to
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demonstrate they meet the learning objectives stipulated in the curriculum for a given grade
and subject, and comprise three levels of learning: Insufficient, Elementary and Adequate
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(ACE 2016a). This information represents 67% of the Index of Results for a given school.
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Regarding other academic and non-academic outcomes, the Index of Results also considers
data from the latest SIMCE score and the progress made in the past three years in reading and
mathematics for each tested grade (ACE 2016b), in addition to a set of Indicators of Personal
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and Social Development (IDPS) for each school. The IDPS include aspects that go beyond
the domain of academic knowledge and are measured together with the SIMCE test through
self-administered questionnaires for students, teachers, principals and families (ACE 2016c).
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These instruments collect information about the following topics: school climate and
convivencia (social relations among school community members: students, teachers, parents,
etc.); participation and citizen education; academic self-esteem and motivation; and healthy
life habits. Additionally, non-academic outcomes consider schools’ student attendance,
dropout rates, gender equality, and vocational schools’ graduation rates. This information
represents 33% of the Index of Results for a given school.
‘Failing’ schools in the USA
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The American education system balances federal or national oversight with local state control
to implement policies intended to improve the nation’s lowest-performing schools (Mintrop
and Trujillo 2005). Federal policies and initiatives have waxed and waned in intensity for 20
years, but throughout this time the system has remained mostly decentralised. That is, the
federal government makes educational policy that state education agencies (SEAs) interpret
and enact with varying degrees of fidelity, and then, even within states, local education
agencies further vary in how they interpret and enact policy (Manna, 2010).
Public Law 107-110 or more commonly, the No Child Left Behind Act of 2001 (NCLB
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2002), was a federally prescriptive law that set expectations for schools, especially those
lagging, to improve student achievement scores by requiring states to set minimum
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proficiency standards in mathematics and reading (Ballou and Springer 2017). States most
frequently identified ‘failing’ schools as those with the lowest percentage of students scoring
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proficient on assessments, although states had considerable autonomy in determining
proficiency standards (Balfanz et al. 2007). Thus, the notion of what made a ‘failing’ school
varied widely by state.
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While NCLB was still law, the Obama administration responded to a recession in part by
signing into law the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (Pub. Law 111-5) in
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which billions of U.S. dollars were designated for Race to the Top and School Improvement
Grants (SIG) initiatives (Dragoset et al. 2016; 2017). Both initiatives were designed to
rapidly improve, or turn around, the lowest performing schools in the country. By its
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conclusion, the SIG initiative alone was a 7 billion U.S. dollar policy investment (Emma
2015). The identification of SIG eligible schools was more nuanced than NCLB parameters,
but still relied primarily upon student achievement outcomes. The U.S. Department of
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Education clearly communicated an expectation for SEAs to identify their lowest 5% of
schools overall, as well as lowest 5% of secondary or high schools, although each SEA
determined how the lowest 5% would be calculated (Hurlburt et al. 2011). In the initial
rollout, 1,107 (7.2%) of schools nationwide were identified as SIG-eligible in Tier I, and
another 1,034 high schools (6.8% of all schools) in Tier II. The funding of SIG-eligible
schools was disproportionally dispensed to urban schools (52.5% funded but representative of
only 26.0% of all schools), lower income students (68.4% versus 44.7%) and racial/ethnic
minority students (73.5% versus 45.0%).
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Who makes the decision about ‘failing’ schools in the USA and at what level are decisionmakers located? Like NCLB before it, the Every Student Succeeds Act of 2015 (ESSA)
(Public Law 114-95) is a reauthorization of the 1,965 Elementary and Secondary Education
Act (ESEA). Much of the core of the law remains, including annual standardised testing and
an emphasis on external assessment, but further transitions federal accountability provisions
to states (Penuel, Meyer and Valladares 2016), resulting in an even more decentralised
system, although the core of the education system structure remains relatively the same.
Figure 3 provides a simplified overview of the system as it pertains to Comprehensive
Support and Improvement (CSI) schools, which is the current nomenclature for ‘failing’
schools.
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Figure 3: System that classifies CSI schools
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U.S. Department of Education
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Office of the Secretary and Deputy Secretary
Office of Elementary and Secondary Education
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Virginia Department of Education
State Superintendent of Public Instruction
Division of School Quality, Instruction, and Performance: Deputy Superintendent and Chief of Staff
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Department of Student Assessment, Accountability, and ESEA Programs
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Office of Student Assessment
Office of School Quality
Office of ESEA Programs
School Division
Primary and Secondary Schools
Figure 3 depicts a system in which initial policy is developed at the federal level. The
enactment of the policy rests in the Office of the Secretary, with primary responsibility for
identifying and improving the lowest-performing schools residing with the Deputy Secretary.
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Among the many offices reporting to the Deputy Secretary, the stated mission of the Office
of Elementary and Secondary Education (2020) is to ‘empower States, districts, and other
organizations to meet the diverse needs of every student by providing leadership, technical
assistance and financial support’ (para. 1) on all matters K-12 public education with a vision
of ‘excellence and equity for all students’ (para. 2). Within it, the Office of State Support is
critical to coordinating all of the various ESEA-related programmes to groups of state
education agencies (United States Department of Education 2020). Each SEA is then
responsible for interpreting and responding to federal policy. The state of Virginia, which is a
relatively representative example of state system despite the diversity among state systems
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across the country (VanGronigen & Meyers 2019), has a division dedicated to issues of
school quality and equity that coordinates with and responds to federal policy and reviews.
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This division makes many of the state-level decisions about how to measure school
performance, provide and/or oversee technical assistance, and review improvement efforts
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(Virginia Department of Education 2018).
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What is the process of identifying ‘failing’ schools in the USA? ESSA’s transition to more
state-level autonomy is a significant recent policy shift that further decentralises the
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identification of ‘failing’ schools in the USA (Rentner, Kober and Frizzell 2017). Although
the federal government continues to provide similar levels of funding for the lowest-
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performing schools, it has considerably less oversight of the improvement processes enacted
locally. Unlike NCLB, ‘ESSA leaves it to states to determine how to measure school progress
within certain parameters’ (Rentner et al. 2017, 1). The SEA is still responsible for
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identifying its lowest 5% of schools and any high school with a graduation rate of less than
67%, now labelled ‘Comprehensive Support and Improvement (CSI) Schools’ (McGuinn
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2016). The identification process must be conducted at least every three years and made
publicly available (Penuel et al. 2016). The processes of school identification and public
notification are typically conducted by offices of state-level accountability within SEAs.
In Virginia, for example, the state department identifies CSI schools through the following
steps:
Identify Title I schools that did not meet the interim measure of progress for English
(reading), mathematics, and FGI (federal graduation index) and are in the lowest two
quartiles for academic growth in English (reading) and mathematics.
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Of those schools identified in Step 1, identify schools that did not meet the interim
measure for English learner progress and are in the lowest two quartiles for English
learning progress.
Of those schools identified in Step 1 through 2, identify schools that did not meet the
interim measure of progress for chronic absenteeism and have an SOA (Standards of
Accreditation) rating of Accredited with Conditions or Accredited Denied. Rank those
schools by the rate of chronic absenteeism and identify a number equal to 5% of Title
I schools for comprehensive support and improvement (Virginia Department of
Education 2018).
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These identification procedures and any like them in other states are approved and monitored
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by the U.S. Department of Education (McGuinn 2016).
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What instruments are used to identify ‘failing’ schools in the USA? SEAs also currently
have much more autonomy in how they determine which schools are the lowest-performing
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and if they are improving. SEAs must include at least four indicators in school ratings, three
of which should be academic. Measures of student achievement, including proficiency on
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standardised tests in English/language arts and mathematics continue to be a central
component focus, although no longer the sole one (Smith and Wright 2017). In addition to
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English/language arts and mathematics proficiency scores on standardized tests, states are
required to incorporate additional academic indicators and non-academic indicators of
‘substantial weight’ (Penuel et al. 2016). In terms of other academic indicators, states must
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include English-language proficiency and have typically elected to include student growth in
test scores as third one (McGuin 2016). This is an important distinction because traditionally
low-performing schools typically have many students that can increase performance but
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perhaps not immediately achieve proficiency. Moreover, some states also distinguish student
growth by student performance (i.e., measuring the difference in growth between higher- and
lower-achieving students). In addition, the identification of high schools must incorporate
graduation rates.
States must also identify at least one non-academic indicator. Frequently, states have included
a measure of school climate, teacher engagement, or opportunity to learn for both students
and teachers as a proxy of school quality because of their links to student outcomes such as
academic achievement and social-emotional development (Penuel et al. 2016). ‘States also
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Page 14 of 32
Page 15 of 32
get to decide how to weight the individual indicators in their accountability systems though
the law stipulates that academic factors have to count “much” more collectively than the
others’ (McGuinn 2016, 406).
‘Failing’ schools in England
English educational policies in the last decade have developed around the notion of the selfimproving school system (Ofsted 2017). This policy encompasses academization, promotion
of MATs (Multi-Academy Trusts), diminishing of local authority control of schools, and the
development of school-to-school support mechanisms such as the formation of system
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leaders by Teaching School Alliances (Greany and Higham 2018). The greater autonomy and
flexibility that the self-improving school system has is expected to foster innovation and
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improve educational outcomes (DfE 2016) but has also meant making the school solely
responsible for its performance: what Greany and Higham (2018, 16) called ‘coercive
autonomy’.
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Who makes the decision about ‘failing’ schools in England and at what level are decisionmakers located? To monitor the quality of education, schools are inspected periodically by
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The Office for Standards in Education, Children's Services and Skills (Ofsted). Ofsted is a
non-ministerial department of the UK government that reports to Parliament (Ofsted
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website). Since its inception in 1992, Ofsted inspection process has been revised frequently,
with the latest framework introduced in September 2019. The new framework aims to better
address the quality of learning and avoid unintended consequences, such as off-rolling,
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anxiety and stress, and curriculum narrowing (Ofsted 2019).
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What is the process of identifying ‘failing’ schools in England? Ofsted inspects the overall
effectiveness of schools by using ‘all the available evidence to evaluate what it is like to be a
learner in the provision’ (Ofsted 2019, 8). The overall judgement focuses on four graded
areas: (1) Quality of education (Ambitious intended curriculum for all students; Coherent,
planned, sequenced and full intended curriculum; Support of teachers’ subject knowledge;
Use assessment effectively; Good and clear subject knowledge; Effective use of formative
assessment and feedback; Teach to expand long term memory; Create effective environment
for learning; and Implement a rigorous approach to the teaching of reading); (2) Behaviour
and attitudes (Positive and respectful environment for learning; High, consistent, fair
expectations on behaviour and conduct; Positive attitude to learning; High attendance); (3)
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Personal development (The curriculum enhances learners’ broader development; Support
learners’ character development; Support learners’ psychical and mental health; Prepare
learners for future success; Prepare learners for life in modern Britain) and (4) Leadership
and management (Clear, ambitious, high-quality and inclusive school vision; Improve staff’s
subject, pedagogical and pedagogical content knowledge; Effective community engagement;
Effective and constructive staff management; Governors hold leaders to account, and
Safeguarding) (Ofsted 2019).
Table 1: Ofsted overall effectiveness judgements of primary and secondary schools over the
last decade
2015/
16
2,468
2014/
15
3,655
2013/ 2012/
14
13
4,823 5,847
2011/
12
4,636
2010/
11
4,250
2009/
10
5,037
2008/
09
5,323
19%
72%
8%
1%
900
19%
71%
9%
1%
666
18%
67%
14%
1%
870
17%
64%
16%
2%
1,048
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17%
61%
19%
2%
1,334
18%
51%
29%
2%
926
8%
47%
40%
5%
894
15%
49%
30%
6%
1,169
16%
52%
29%
3%
1,071
23%
56%
15%
6%
22%
56%
17%
5%
21%
53%
21%
5%
21%
49%
23%
6%
23%
48%
24%
5%
26%
40%
30%
3%
14%
38%
40%
8%
19%
41%
31%
8%
22%
41%
31%
6%
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2016/
17
4,120
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Primary
schools
Outstanding
Good
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Inadequate
Secondary
schools
Outstanding
Good
RI
Inadequate
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Source: Created by the authors from figures reported by Annual Ofsted Inspection Reports
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Table 1 shows the distribution of schools according to Ofsted judgements. In 2016/17, 1% of
primary and 6% of secondary schools were classified as ‘Inadequate’. Although this
proportion has lessened considerably over the last decade, particularly in primary education,
the association between schools’ disadvantage contexts and students’ educational outcomes
remains worryingly strong and plays a key role when understanding ‘failing’ schools
(Hutchinson 2016). If schools that are judged as Inadequate do not meet minimum standards
after receiving a notice to improve, they can be closed down. In the cases of inadequacy, that
action can be conversion or re-brokering a ‘failing’ school into an academy (Ofsted 2017).
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What instruments are used to identify ‘failing’ schools in England? School Performance
Category ‘Inadequate’ is based on inspectors’ professional judgement of the school overall
effectiveness. This judgement is informed by primary data collected by inspectors through
inspection visits and second data analysis of academic performance (attainment and
progress), and school and pupil contextual information summarised in the Inspection Data
Summary Report (IDSR). The IDSR is a PDF file showing official national data for Ofsted
inspectors to use when preparing for and during inspection. It aims to trigger inspectors’
initial discussion with schools. The 2019 IDSR includes detailed information on pupils’
academic performance (attainment and progress) as well as other critical measures (such as
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absences and exclusions). This statistical summary report also includes information regarding
the context at the school level (such as percentage of Free School Meals, ethnicity,
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workforce, local area deprivation) Multi Academy Trust/Local Authority level (Ofsted grades
profile), and year group level (attainment, context, progress trends). The aim of the IDSR is
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to support inspectors’ professional judgement on the quality of a school by putting school
data into context (i.e., highlighting quantitative trends and differences from national data),
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and supporting their interpretation through sentences called ‘areas of interest’ which describe
qualitatively schools’ historical data (DfE 2020). Therefore, inspectors judge the
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effectiveness of a school based on the analysis of secondary data, and data collected through
inspection visits following the inspection framework. What remains implicit in this process is
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the weight that inspectors give to the different sources of evidence.
Cross-case comparison
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The process of evaluating and constructing ‘failing’ schools as a result of accountability
systems in Chile, the USA and England vary greatly. In line with Faubert’s (2009)
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conclusions, we found that the methods, standards, data and instruments differ from system to
system. However, the application of tools to measure the quality of education in the three
countries identifies more and less effective schools, which in turn produces winners and
losers in an accountability game. Thus, the current regulatory regimes make failure not only
inevitable (Lefstein 2013), but also apparently desirable (Falabella 2020), as the three
accountability systems align with the neoliberal market-oriented reforms previously
described. This is further reflected in the fact that the three countries routinely implement
naming and shaming strategies through public identification of ‘failing’ schools. Although
many scholars have contested that these strategies lead to a spiral of decline following a
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school being judged based on its performance on a narrow set of indicators, particularly for
those schools positioned at the bottom of the pile (Stoll and Myers 2002; Perryman 2010),
their voices tend to be ignored when assessing the impact of these policies.
Regarding who makes the decision about ‘failing’ schools and the system level each is
located, key similarities emerged between Chile and England. Both rely on a powerful
national institution that is autonomous from the central educational authority (ACE and
Ofsted) to identify and classify ‘failing’ schools. The federal and state levels of the
institutions that perform the same tasks in the USA, however, afford much more variation.
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Whilst the accountability systems converge at a national level in Chile and England, a more
divergent and autonomous system is implemented in the USA.
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Additionally, each system develops a different strategy when dealing with ‘failing’ schools.
Whilst Chile and the USA contemplate a sequence of evaluation and support strategies
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oriented to enhance school improvement, England has progressively moved away from this
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model. Instead, ‘Ofsted exists to be a force for improvement through intelligent, responsible
and focused inspection and regulation’ (Ofsted 2019, 4) that is expected to ‘act as a trigger to
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others to take action’ (Op. cit, 5). Unlike the cases of Chile and the USA, the English system
is making clear that institutions other than Ofsted are responsible for implementing school
improvement strategies.
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Focusing on the instruments used to identify ‘failing’ schools, the three systems combine
students’ academic standardised tests with other non-academic indicators associated with
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school improvement. However, whilst England relies heavily on school inspection
implemented by external inspectors before judging schools’ effectiveness, targeted inspection
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visits are implemented only after the ‘failing’ school has been identified in Chile, relying
exclusively on off-site analysis of secondary attainment and outcome data. In the USA, the
extent to which inspections are conducted varies widely across states. Whilst the three
systems consider schools’ contextual factors, including location and student background
characteristics, all mainly assign responsibility to schools for their low levels of student
achievement (Bacchi 2000). Thus, little attention is given to the structures that create unequal
starting points and subsequent outcomes. This seems to continue despite research stressing
that differences in performance alone are incomplete reflections of school quality: factors
such as regional, spatial, socioeconomic and other inequalities matter (Munoz-Chereau and
Thomas 2016).
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Discussion
Despite system differences, we conclude that the scope of the accountability mechanisms in
place in the three cases is similar, as ‘failing’ schools are a by-product of neoliberal marketoriented reforms. The effects of the fabrication of losers in the accountability game is a very
serious matter from social justice, conceptual and policy-oriented perspectives. Contrary to
the expected policy theory, the labelling of schools fails to deliver on the promise of equal
opportunities and non-discrimination of marginalised groups. For instance, the construction
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of ‘failing’ schools in the three accountability systems analysed above has seen increased
segregation and inequality of opportunity between low-income and high-income students,
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hindering the distributive dimension of social justice (Flórez and Rozas 2020).
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The emphasis on students’ attainment and standardised educational outcomes ignores the
social and cultural diversity of school communities, stigmatising schools serving more
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disadvantaged communities regardless of context (Gewirtz 2006). For accountability systems
to seriously commit to distributional and recognitional dimensions of social justice would
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require a transition from standardisation to account for schools’ context before attempting
any meaningful comparisons between schools. By recognising that the relative influence of
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any school is by far smaller in magnitude than the relative importance of pupil intake and
school context, the discussion would move towards the recognition of the challenges and
strategies developed by schools working in challenging circumstances to deliver quality
education (Tikly and Barrett 2011).
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Focusing on the conceptual distinction, unless the judgement of school effectiveness is
radically reconceptualised, schools positioned at the bottom of the pile will continue facing
growing challenges and tough penalties, which in turn will exacerbate segregation and
educational inequalities (Flórez and Rozas 2020). Moving away from deficit terminology by
replacing it with the language of diversity and solidarity could impact positively the way
these schools value and define themselves. However, although ‘failing’ schools are a
minority in the three analysed accountability systems, they cannot be regarded as separate
entities. Thus, it is not enough to conceptually change the label provided to the least effective
schools, but to stop pretending that labelling them as ‘failing’ is a fair and valid practice.
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Compare: A Journal of Comparative and International Education
Finally, whilst Chile, the USA and England’s ‘failing’ schools represent a minority (less than
10%), they embody a powerful symbolic function for policy and all other schools. As Jones
and Tymms (2014) explain, these schools represent ‘the wrong side of the inspection
thresholds’ (322). If these schools share their common institutional struggles and ways in
which learning and teaching respond to challenging contexts, a different positionality would
emerge. By not being at the bottom, but at the top of their own game, the whole system could
learn from their agency and empowerment, which in turn could impact positively their
subjectivities and performance. These changes in policy would mean that instead of making
individual schools responsible for their performance, responsibility would be shared at a local
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and national level which would allow to address the social inequalities that are strongly
impacting the education delivered in schools.
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Table 1: Ofsted overall effectiveness judgements of primary and secondary schools over the
last decade
2015/
16
2,468
2014/
15
3,655
2013/ 2012/
14
13
4,823 5,847
2011/
12
4,636
2010/
11
4,250
2009/
10
5,037
2008/
09
5,323
19%
72%
8%
1%
900
19%
71%
9%
1%
666
18%
67%
14%
1%
870
17%
64%
16%
2%
1,048
17%
61%
19%
2%
1,334
18%
51%
29%
2%
926
8%
47%
40%
5%
894
15%
49%
30%
6%
1,169
16%
52%
29%
3%
1,071
23%
56%
15%
6%
22%
56%
17%
5%
21%
53%
21%
5%
21%
49%
23%
6%
23%
48%
24%
5%
26%
40%
30%
3%
14%
38%
40%
8%
19%
41%
31%
8%
22%
41%
31%
6%
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Primary
schools
Outstanding
Good
RI
Inadequate
Secondary
schools
Outstanding
Good
RI
Inadequate
2016/
17
4,120
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Source: Created by the authors from figures reported by Annual Ofsted Inspection Reports
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Figure 1: Chilean Quality Assurance System (SAC)
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Figure 2: Classification of Schools into Performance Categories
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Figure 3: System that classifies CSI schools
U.S. Department of Education
Office of the Secretary and Deputy Secretary
Office of Elementary and Secondary Education
r
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Virginia Department of Education
State Superintendent of Public Instruction
Division of School Quality, Instruction, and Performance: Deputy Superintendent and Chief of Staff
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Department of Student Assessment, Accountability, and ESEA Programs
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Office of Student Assessment
Office of School Quality
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Office of ESEA Programs
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School Division
Primary and Secondary Schools
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