LA DELEUZIANA – ONLINE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY – ISSN 2421-3098
N. 11/2020 – DIFFERENTIAL HETEROGENESIS
The Inhuman Overhang: On Differential Heterogenesis and
Multi-Scalar Modeling
by EKIN ERKAN
Abstract
As a philosophical paradigm, differential heterogenesis offers us a novel descriptive vantage with
which to inscribe Deleuze’s virtuality within the terrain of “differential becoming,” conjugating “pure
saliences” so as to parse economies, microhistories, insurgencies, and epistemological evolutionary
processes that can be conceived of independently from their representational form. Unlike Gestalt
theory’s oppositional constructions, the advantage of this aperture is that it posits a dynamic context
to both media and its analysis, rendering them functionally tractable and set in relation to other objects, rather than as sedentary identities. Surveying the genealogy of differential heterogenesis with
particular interest in the legacy of Lautman’s dialectic, I make the case for a reading of the Deleuzean
virtual that departs from an event-oriented approach, galvanizing Sarti and Citti’s dynamic a priori
vis-à-vis Deleuze’s philosophy of difference. Specifically, I posit differential heterogenesis as frame
with which to examine our contemporaneous epistemic shift as it relates to multi-scalar computational modeling while paying particular attention to neuro-inferential modes of inductive learning
and homologous cognitive architecture. Carving a bricolage between Mark Wilson’s work on the
“greediness of scales” and Deleuze’s “scales of reality”, this project threads between static ecologies
and active externalism vis-à-vis endocentric frames of reference and syntactical scaffolding.
Introduction: Inheriting Lautman’s Differential
Twentieth-century French philosopher of mathematics Albert Lautman (1908–1944)
contended that topology, class field theory, abstract algebra, and analytic number theory had
a philosophical backdrop that revealed a latent dialectical structure of which previous mathematical developments were bereft. Lautman’s dialectical interest in comprehending the
passage from essence to existence concerns ordering the logical reconstruction of genesis
within mathematics, where there is an “intimate bond between the transcendence of ideas
and the immanence of the logical structure of the solution to a problem within” (Lautman
2011: 206). Invoking Heidegger’s concept of disclosure (Erschlossenheit), Lautman’s “synthesis of the real” accords the extra-propositional meaning of mathematics within the processual unfolding of its imperative “attachment” to metaphysics (2011: 31-42, 200). Thus,
the determination of Lautman’s Platonism is that of the superordinate dialectic, where couplets (e.g., unity/multiplicity, local/global, continuity/discontinuity) comprise that which is
202
LA DELEUZIANA – ONLINE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY – ISSN 2421-3098
N. 11/2020 – DIFFERENTIAL HETEROGENESIS
eternally inaccessible to us by making Ideas “incarnate”. Following Lautman, the ontological
anteriority of the “physical real” is transcribed through mathematical life and nurtured via a
series of “gestures”—material reality as inchoate matter is shaped and surpassed through
non-material forms. According to Lautman’s Platonism, “ideal reality” is not found in the objects of mathematical theories but the notions that the development of these theories invoke.
These ideas translate a “non-sensible reality” from which mathematical theories are taken
in order to “describe and duplicate an ideal reality” (Reynolds 2010: 226). With Lautman’s
dialectic construction we see the edifice of two limit conditions: (i) the time of the real, where
we can have physical processes which are generated (and, thus, are akin to chronologies);
(ii) Platonic Ideas outside of time, which flow in an immanent mode.1
Lautman was somewhat dissatisfied with Plato’s dialectical conception of relation between Ideas and the material reality through which they are realized, augmenting Plato via
Heidegger. Lautman’s ultimate claim is that a mathematical entity’s ontological status does
not depend upon the existence of “apparently arbitrary decisions to explore some sets of
axioms but not others”—rather, it is the case that “mathematicians create new mathematical
structures in the course of answering questions latent in the underlying extra-mathematical
dialectical order” (Larvor 2011: 199). Thus, a kind of primordial mathematical creation
emerges through the dialectical division and definition of differences, the unfolding of the
ontological vis-à-vis the concrete (or ontic).2
Upending the hierarchical relationship of the infinitesimal dialectic as a dyadic relationship that directly determines the contingency between form and matter (or local and global),
Deleuze’s renderings of Lautman’s dialectic repurpose this relation as a scalar problem.
Thus, this demonstrates the legacy and influence of Lautman’s asymptotic approximation
upon Deleuze’s conception of undetermined differentials, or “infinitesimals”. Akin to the
Heideggerian interpretation of Aletheia (ἀλήθεια), or “unconcealedness”—whereby the revealing of Being is a dynamic differential process—Lautman’s rejection of truth as end-osmosis (final resemblance), in refusing the adequacy of the Idea to the real, engages in a process of de-substantialization. Thus and so, displacement becomes the foundational metaphysical relationship to binding multiplicitous of form with matter; Lautman’s diagrammatic
“phase space” of rigorous structural appropriation, where energetic possibilities govern collective behavior, portends Deleuze’s fully immanent “virtual multiplicities”.
1
2
These Platonic Ideas are conditions for the genesis of temporal processes, which we can say process mathematics but are determined by Ideas outside of history.
Lautman refers to Heidegger’s 1928 treatise on ontological distinction, On the Essence of Ground (originally
published in 1929), in order to articulate an interest in the difference between the “ontic” concepts employed in the sciences and the underlying “ontological” concepts disclosed by phenomenology. That is,
“Lautman appeals to Heidegger in order to explain the relation between dialectics and mathematics. The
whole point of On the Essence of Ground is to insist on the ontological difference, that is, on the distinction
between the ontological and the ontic. The division of labour between the scientist and the philosopher
depends on this distinction. The scientist uses ontic concepts to establish ontic truths; the philosopher reveals the corresponding ontology” (Larvor 2011: 199).
203
LA DELEUZIANA – ONLINE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY – ISSN 2421-3098
N. 11/2020 – DIFFERENTIAL HETEROGENESIS
As perhaps made most explicitly clear by Deleuze’s disjunctive synthesis, this “phase
space” invokes the possibilities of a system that cannot be reduced to its “vector field”.3 That
is, these “virtual multiplicities” are akin to concrete universals rather than the Aristotelian
scenography of “essences” (i.e., abstract archetypes). Just as it is incorrect to reduce “virtual
multiplicities” to the “possible”, so too the “virtual”:
[…] can be distinguished from the ‘possible’ from at least two points of view. From a certain point of view, in fact, the possible is the opposite of the real, it is opposed to the real;
but, in quite a different opposition, the virtual is opposed to the actual [….] The possible
has no reality (although it may have an actuality); conversely, the virtual is not actual,
but as such possesses a reality [….] Here again Proust’s formula best defines the states of
virtuality: ‘real without being actual, ideal without being abstract.’ (Deleuze 1991: 96)
Deleuze thus distinguishes the virtual from the possible as what is irreducible to the actual
but, nonetheless, is granted the privileged status of “immateriality” while, simultaneously,
being fully real. These virtual multiplicities are crucial to our conception of differential heterogenesis, shining a light on the non-observable relation between differential elements, a
relation signifying lines of individuation. These singularities serve as points of attraction for
a system, which are themselves never actualized—as ideal singularities, they “enjoy an ‘immaterial’ status insofar as they define the tendencies composing a vector field without being
themselves ever actualized, functioning thus as the intensive ‘differentiator’ responsible for
spatio-temporal individuation” (Sacilotto 2020: 38). The “attractive” facet of these singularities serves as warning to not confuse Deleuze’s disjunctive synthesis with Heraclitean eternal flux, where world-order (kosmos) is caught in constant and significant change. Further
distinguishing Deleuze’s virtual as a twofold of body and desire, we see that it is immersed
within the active unity of interior change, with its unconscious “factory” steeped in the (dialectical) process of both being the ground for generation and being generated, itself (Deleuze
1990: 90).4 However, considering the aforementioned gradient of difference between possibility and actuality, there is a necessary active difference in kind between virtuality and
3
4
This disjunctive synthesis, which follows the connective synthesis and is followed by the conjunctive synthesis (or the “third synthesis”), illuminates “recording”, “registration”, and “inscription”.
We ought to be very prudent with how we attribute the use of the term “dialectical” to Deleuze. While the
virtual can be bifurcated within a twofold dialectic logic qua its relational structure, this can not be extended
to Deleuze’s machine ontology. Consider, for instance, Deleuze’s fundamental assertion in Two Regimes of
Madness—that everything is a machine, whether it is “real, contrived or imaginary” (Deleuze 2006a: 17).
This demonstrates that the machinic assemblage is infrastructural—wherefore it does not exercise a hierarchical circuitry of linealities and supervenience—but here we must note that Deleuze’s invocation of “mechanic” does not describe a mechanical domain that is set in opposition to an “organic” (or “non-mechanical”) domain. Similarly, when considering Deleuze’s machine ontology, the “organic” domain ought not be
set within a dialectic relation to the “non-organic” machine. Thus, the Deleuzean machine ontology is one
set within immanent “univocity, meaning that there is no biosphere or noosphere but everywhere the same
Mechanosphere” (Deleuze & Guattari 2005: 69).
204
LA DELEUZIANA – ONLINE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY – ISSN 2421-3098
N. 11/2020 – DIFFERENTIAL HETEROGENESIS
actuality. Therefore, any machine encounter’s “plurality of forces acting and being affected”
occurs at a “distance, distance being the differential element included in each force and by
which each is related to others” (Deleuze 2006b: 208).
Such is the foundational semblance of differential heterogenesis, where the becoming of
the a priori is linked to a pluralized mathematical description of the emergence and creation
of forms. Without any need for stabilization, differential heterogenesis offers a “first referring system” for heterogenic flow that, in turn, allows the emergence of the semiotic function
from dynamic evolution without the need of any stabilization; as applied to fields such as
semantics, this allows for a methodology opposite to the classical case of structural morphodynamics (Sarti et al. 2018: 2-3). Accordingly, conditions are not given, a priori, within a definitive set of possibilities, allowing for us to take account of the historical variation of “phase
space” and the set of all possible trajectories. Rather than being limited to mapping already
possible trajectories, all machines-cum-rhizomes are irreducible entities where any “homogenous system” is necessarily “already affected by a regulated, continuous, immanent process of
variation” that, in the last instance, contracts virtuality into a differential relation of manifestation (Deleuze and Guattari 1983: 103).
The Differential’s Processual Development
Lautman’s dialectic is extended in two-part form via the concrete genesis of reality and
immanent Ideas according to Levi R. Bryant’s externality thesis, as, for Deleuze, “[e]very object is double without it being the case that the two halves resemble one another” (Bryant
2011: 66). Exacting a further partition, for Arjen Kleinherenbrink, this “double” is, itself,
“doubled” once more, resulting in a “fourfold”. Accordingly, this “fourfold” world consists of
a twofold virtual depth and a twofold actual surface, where distinction is carved along “unity
of the multiple” in the “objective sense” and, on the other end, a “multiplicity ‘of’ one and a
unity ‘of’ the multiple, but now in a subjective sense” (Deleuze 1994: 145). The virtual, irreducible, or “objective” aspect of every entity is, thus, one and multiple at the same time; contra the ontological structure of the actual, the (two) aspects of the virtual concern themselves
with the non-relational being of a machine. If it is from Spinoza that Deleuze inherits Oneness
(albeit sans Spinoza’s divine connection) and from Leibniz that Deleuze becomes heir to the
thesis of the multiple, then it is by way of Husserl that Deleuze finds himself working with
qualitative distinction re: objects that are demarcated from their semblance via subjective,
relational, or actual encounters, events, or experiences (i.e., “distinguishing this from that”;
Kleinherenbrink 2019: 39).
Grounding individual entities within processes, for Deleuze these processes are not determined as continuous universals or understood via an underlying event existing “in addition to machines” (40). Deleuze’s conception of process is tripartite: first, there is no
205
LA DELEUZIANA – ONLINE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY – ISSN 2421-3098
N. 11/2020 – DIFFERENTIAL HETEROGENESIS
transcendent factor that connects machines and, second, there is no distinction between man
and nature; what both these factors demonstrate is that “process” evinces how machinic being “happens everywhere”; the most important aspect of the Deleuzean machinic process is
that the process, itself, is not an “end in itself, nor must it be confused with an infinite perpetuation of itself” (Deleuze & Guattari 1983: 15). This evidences that the schizo-process is
not a continuous, universal, or underlying event that exists in addition to machinology. In
both Bryant and Kleinherenbrink’s formulation, Deleuze’s externality thesis states that all
entities have an extra-relational aspect, a residue of excess and superfluity. Devoid of a universal background, externality is necessarily composed of a processes that consists of breaks
and stops/cuts, whereby permanence, emergence, production, generation, and change
emerge as passive syntheses of time:
[t]hey describe how one entity relates to another (connection), how it manages to do so
while remaining irreducible (disjunction), and how new entities are created (conjunction). They are ‘temporal’ because they account for how things happen; ‘passive’ because
they are independent of memory, understanding will, recognition and consciousness;
‘productive’ because they account for the forging of relations; ‘registrative’ because they
account for the alteration of individual essences; and ‘consumptive because they account
for the birth and death of entities. These syntheses are not successive, but always ‘overlap’[….] A human spotting a friend is a case of the three syntheses, but so is a meteor
striking the moon, or my finger striking my keyboard. (Kleinherenbrink 2019: 41)
Recall that, according to Deleuze’s philosophical system, the “actual” indicates assemblages as they are experienced by other machines while, conversely, the “virtual” denotes
the extra-relational (or non-relational) reality of machines. Kleinherenbrink’s fourfold system is the result of a further qualification resulting from the bifurcation of the actual/virtual
with the One/multiple; as it concerns the non-relational unity of what Deleuze calls “the
body”, we are thus particularly interested in what remains external to relations between machines. Accordingly, “[a]s everything is a machine, so everything is a body” (Kleinherenbrink
2019: 87). That is, we are not to understand bodies as physical, biological, psychic, social, or
verbal machines (despite these systems do all have bodies) but, instead, understand that externality demands that all entities are formally identical in their having a body, where by
“body” we mean “a transcendental unity, irreducible to relational dimensions such as history, possibilities, composition, empirical qualities, users, and functions” (87). It is precisely
due to the impossibility of full integration that these machines are “bodies without organs”
(BwO). This guarantees that no machine can become fully integrated in any one relation but
that every machine, instead, is a site of protest, or “anti-production” (Deleuze and Guattari
1983: 19). As Jacques Rancière comments on Deleuze’s machinic process, it is by isolating
the figure that we prevent it from becoming networked as an element within a circuit or
206
LA DELEUZIANA – ONLINE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY – ISSN 2421-3098
N. 11/2020 – DIFFERENTIAL HETEROGENESIS
serving as an idempotent and indexical resemblance of something other than an object
(Rancière 1998: 525-536).
The virtual body, for Deleuze, is never pronounced in actual relations, which is to say that
it cannot be integrated into manifestations qua relations and, therefore, it is the virtual that
is enveloped by its relations. Despite bodies are irreducible to relational manifestations, these
relations, nevertheless, transpire vis-à-vis appearance. Therefore, despite being a “closed
vessel”, the virtual twofold is not immune to the evental nature of the world (Kleinherenbrink 2019: 97). Thus, on the one hand there are the “the virtuals that define the immanence
of the transcendental field” and, on the other, “the possible forms that actualize them and
transform them into something transcendent” (Deleuze 2005: 32). The process of
differential actualization thus follows the plane of the virtual, which gives assemblages their
particular reality.
Deleuze plucks genetic encoding for his case study whereby such “differential relations”
unfold and through which virtual multiplicities are subsequently composed into unique actualities. Accordingly, the axes of the non-algebraic differential tensors “are incarnated at
once in a species and the organic parts of which it [morphogenesis] is composed” (Deleuze
1994: 206). Similarly, Sarti and Citti’s model of differential heterogenesis provides us with a
mathematical description of the emergence and creation of (particular) forms, whereby a
priori conditions are not definitively predetermined but, instead, akin to the interference of
two wave packet “colliding” during quantum superposition.5 Hence, differential heterogenesis allows us to consider the becoming process of the a priori without committing to the
Kantian transcendental decision which contends that substance is a stable but uncontended
and unreachable a priori category of mind that is imposed on the chaotic manifold of movement into form. Instead, while differential morphogenesis does, indeed, retain the “boundary
concept” of the Kantian noumena—after all, we must infer the pre-conceptual differential
space’s existence and, thus, it remains as a “thought-object” (ens rationis)—it is freed from
Kant’s apophatic/negative and regulative use. This is akin to protein encoding in DNA, where
DNA and RNA nucleotide sequences "translate" the amino acids that they represent. Like the
possibility space of genetic encoding, differential heterogenic composition grants lays the
conditions for immanent fixity, the dynamic space of possibility producing “the differential
5
According to the superposition state of quantum theory constituent particles exist in different states simultaneously and are thus superposed (as intact/decayed) at the same time. This is reified in the Schrödinger’s
cat thought experiment and the Everett many-worlds interpretation of quantum theory, which posits the
real existence of parallel physical worlds (therein suggesting that there exists an innumerable and unlimited
multiverse). Accordingly, as soon as a quantum system is observed, there is a reduction of the wave packet
and this quantum system performs a measurement-induced reduction—i.e., decoherence of the “superposition”. This operation is invoked by Sarti and Citti’s description of the Deleuzean assemblage’s evolution in
relation to the emergence of the semiotic function by way of E/C and heterogenetic flow without the need
of any stabilization: “[t]ogether with a morphogenesis in the space, we have also a morphogenesis of the
space, since assemblages are continuously evolving” (Sarti et al. 2019: 3). François Laruelle’s recent literature is also privy to conceiving of the real qua quantum superposition.
207
LA DELEUZIANA – ONLINE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY – ISSN 2421-3098
N. 11/2020 – DIFFERENTIAL HETEROGENESIS
constraints [that] determine the universality of laws and the nomological character of differential models” in antecedent fashion (Sarti et al. 2019: 6).
The Differential’s Processual Relations
For Deleuze, the transcendental illusion is generated in the behaviour through which objects relate to one another and, consequentially, how “the states ‘experienced’ by a system
are treated as other objects themselves, rather than system-specific entities generated by
the organization of the object itself” (Bryant 2011: 102). According to this construction, entities “have their manifestations in relations to others, plus their non-relational interior constitution” (42). This relation, which Bryant terms an “onto-cartography”, is formulated
around the relational appearance of entities vis-à-vis other relations, as opposed to their private (virtual) being (Bryant 2008). Bryant’s reading of Deleuze emphasizes Deleuze’s critique of presence—the belief that the experience of an entity is identical to its Being—by
showing how Deleuze disentangles presentist (or event-oriented) philosophical positions
that reduce reality to the thoughts concerning it.
Following Lautman, Kleinherenbrink, and Bryant, we can contextualize Deleuze’s differential entity as a means of characterizing machinic manifestation while prioritizing relation,
itself.6 By invoking Sarti and Citti, we can further note that differential heterogenesis as such
does not position or present the “thing-in-manifestation” as reducible to subject-object internal conditions (e.g., the perceptual experience of an object and its qualities). Rather, the
manifestation of an entity is never a single, homogenous milieu or phenomenon but (differentially) split between qualitative rhythms/processes—nested within its agentive material
dimension—and the content of its experience (Bryant 2014: 96). This bifurcation delineates
“the qualities characterizing an experience on the one hand, and on the other hand the unified thing—immanent to the relation—of which they are qualities” (Kleinherenbrink 2019:
45).
What then, is to be said of the non-relational or private interior of entities? In accordance
with Deleuze’s terms, the interior being of a machine is necessarily unified with its multiplicity, preventing continuity. The diverse world of experience is thus regarded not as a single,
continuous, or homogenous mass but an antecedent. In short, externality evinces a strict discontinuity between interior being qua immediacy and interior being qua exigency.
6
As of 2016, Bryant has renounced the object-oriented externality thesis where entities are withdrawn from
each other and considered as irreducible to relations. As he remarks in “For an Ethics of the Fold”, the “folding-transformation” affirms that that which is discrete is but a “fold” within a wider field; here, Bryant now
underscores knots of locality along a single integrated continuum (i.e., the dynamic dimension and the ongoing activity of the “pleat”). Bryant thus remarks that “[b]odies are not discrete, but continuous with their
worlds" which shows that, if the externality holds, “then entities are split between relational manifestations
and their private being” (Kleinherenbrink 2019: 47).
208
LA DELEUZIANA – ONLINE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY – ISSN 2421-3098
N. 11/2020 – DIFFERENTIAL HETEROGENESIS
Deleuze’s model of differential virtuality upturns causal relations as lateral or horizontal
processes between objects whereby actual terms can be reduced to an apparent transcendental illusion. As Bryant remarks, the “virtual works vertically from the implicate to the explicate” (2011: 64). Similarly, Deleuze’s conceptualization of genes, which are linked together in interdependent and complex reticulations and interdependencies—an “endostructure”— underscores how virtuality shapes the conditions that the form of the organism
of becoming will take, where differential “becoming” in no way resembles the organism (with
organism as a metonym for “actualization”).
As Deleuze remarks in Difference and Repetition, “[t]he virtual is opposed not to the real
but to the actual. The virtual is fully real in so far as it is virtual” (1994: 208). This fundamental tenant of virtuality demonstrates that the differential is coordinated by a manifold of
points and nodes, channeled within processes “yielding a variety of actual entities with very
different metric properties” (De Landa, in Duffy 2006: 246).7 Moving beyond topology, we
can also note that rather than the macro-political rigid terrain (of Marx and Durkheim),
Deleuze’s differential micro-sociology probes insurrectional political zones of indiscernibly,
such as the “subrepresentative” realm of the “masses and the quantum flows of belief” and
the “desire and fear that govern them” (Holland, in Somers-Hall et al. 2018: 173). In short,
Deleuze’s “body without organs” denotes the non-relational unity of a machine, whether it
concerns surface structure or sociologically-considered political behavior.
If, then, it is not actualities that figure into distinction, how do we distinguish this body
from that body? This “desire” is what renders relational manifestations and, therefore, it is
defined in terms of power; “desire” is the virtual latent content empowering the manifest
content of actuality—thus, Deleuze’s conception of the machine is as a “desiring-machine”
(Deleuze 1977: 132). The machine’s “desire” is its private reality, which cannot be directly
experienced by anything else and is not empirically available; nor is it encountered and,
therefore, it is transcendental—machinic desire is what gives actuality to a machine without,
itself, being such an actuality.
This conception of “desire”, much like the body without organs, belongs to the virtual aspect of entities and indexes the unconscious relation of physics/physical relations through
the aperture of internal matter (Deleuze 1994: 106). For, if the externality thesis holds, it
means that there is necessarily something about entities outside of such relations—i.e., an
internality, which Deleuze defines as “[s]ubmolecular, unformed matter” (Deleuze & Guattari
2005: 503). The virtual corresponds to puissance, a particular articulation of power that is
non-relational and can be experienced and described indirectly—for Aristotle, this comprised a (secondary) understanding of the potentiality of the many which, unlike the
7
Culling visual instantiations of such distributed topological nodes of singularity, Manuel de Landa harvests
images of dynamic curvature: “soap bubbles, crystals of a variety of shapes, light rays and, indeed, certain
mathematical objects”, such as those comprising Poincaré’s non-linear geometry—dips, nodes, focal points,
centres (de Landa, in Duffy 2006: 240, 246).
209
LA DELEUZIANA – ONLINE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY – ISSN 2421-3098
N. 11/2020 – DIFFERENTIAL HETEROGENESIS
potentiality of the one, comprises internal diversity as well as being at the heart of the entire
spectrum of its actualizations. Drawing from Gilbert Simondon’s notion of pre-individuality,
which is neither reducible to chronology nor history—though not disparate from either—
and directing this study towards topological space, rather than extensive space, Deleuze’s
differential conception of the virtual is necessarily as it is set in relation to the entity in-itself,
or as a meta-stable system of non-personal and a-conceptual singularities (Kleinherenbrink
2019: 156). That is, “desire” is pre-individual because it is populated with intensive “singularities”, “code”, “desire”, or an “Idea”, rather than with the objects of experience. In particular, when Deleuze calls this potentiality the “Idea”—a pure virtuality that does not resemble
its own actualizations—it is because he is describing “the real with becoming actual, differentiated without being differentiated, and complete without being entire” (Deleuze 1994:
214). Due to this externality thesis, relations are external to terms and every machine has an
excess that seeks, or “desires”, an extra-relational “beyond”—therefore, excess is differentiated, as Deleuze’s system is not one of machinic univocity but one where every machine is a
multiplicity: “singular without being a unit of something and diverse without being a diversity of things [….] Desire is the private reality of entities and in this sense [….] internal reality
is a machine’s matter, its substance, and its essence” (Kleinherenbrink 2019: 165).
As Deleuze’s virtual is necessarily defined as a strict part of the real object, its “desire”
stitches together essence, substance, and matter.8 For Deleuze, following Husserl once more,
essence refers not to a simple object of experience but to the body’s internal reality, distinct
from “sensible things” and, thus, is “morphological”, “nomadic”, and “vagabond” (Deleuze &
Guattari 1983: 167).
Much like the non-localizable nature of observation as it relates to differential heterogenesis, there is a peculiar vagabond nature to the virtual’s twofold property of “being and not
being where they are, wherever they go” (Deleuze 1997: 126). It is designated as such because the virtual is intensive, while an actuality is always extensive and, thus, articulated
through precisely where and when it is, encountered in relations and nowhere else—“[m]y
keyboard is beneath my hand and on my desk. A song is in a room. An organ is in an organism.
Soldiers fight in wars and drones hover over weddings” (Kleinherenbrink 2019: 169-170).
Drawing from Deleuze, our transcendental (i.e., the transcendental of differential
8
Here, we significantly depart from Manuel de Landa’s assertion that Deleuze is not a realist about essences.
As we shall show, in some sense de Landa takes Kleinherenbrink’s reading of Deleuze to the extreme; Kleinherenbrink, reading Deleuze as an object-oriented philosopher, makes the case that we should avoid designating Deleuze’s ontology (or, more specifically, circumscribing the virtual) from the perspective of the metaphysics proposed in Difference and Repetition because Deleuze, rather than “positing supra-individual virtual structures” migrates essences “into the interior of machines and shows why essence is malleable rather
than fixed”, which is how Deleuze unburdens himself from the “classical” conception of eternal essences
(Kleinherenbrink 2019:179). As we shall show, however, de Landa takes this logic even further, overdetermining the “prepatterning of a possible successive stratification”, such that de Landa’s assemblage theory
is no longer compatible with differential heterogenesis, as it disrobes the externality thesis for the full tyranny of internality, rendering correlative compatibility impossible (Sarti et al. 2019: 18).
210
LA DELEUZIANA – ONLINE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY – ISSN 2421-3098
N. 11/2020 – DIFFERENTIAL HETEROGENESIS
heterogenesis) is not that of the Kantian subject or the Husserlian ego but understood as the
virtual aspect of a machine, itself.
Thus, no relation, human or non-human—including perception, description, art, science,
myth, or mathematics—can attain the complex internal distribution of singularities or flow
of desire that is immanent to a machine. Instead, these relations solely produce that which
“generates a machine, that which a machine generates, or the actual qualities that it manifests” (Kleinherenbrink 2019: 173). This is all to say that the schizophrenia of reality is that
everything is a machine that has its own internal reality (that is, an “essence”) irreducible to
its manifestations in relations, an extra-relational non-being that is indexed by the machine’s
having a body (otherwise termed a “problem”, “figure”, or “vessel”) with powers (“desire”,
“singularities”, “Idea”, or “code”). Notably, while the “technical” and “social” aspect of machines concerns their actuality, “desire” is “molecular” and, therefore, it is opposed to social
and technical machines, which are “molar”. Due to the diffracted partiality of machinization,
every machine is a “desiring-machine in one sense”, but, also, an organic, technical, or social
machine in another sense; in turn, “these are the same machines under determinate conditions” (Deleuze & Guattari 1983: 387).
Differential Heterogenesis vs. de Landa’s Internalist Ontology
With “[l]anguage as [necessarily] situated” and a product of the intensive dimension of
becoming, the Deleuze of differential heterogenesis is posed along the fulcrum of interactivity (Sarti et al. 2019: 7). How does the Deleuze of differential heterogenesis depart from the
Deleuze utilized by contemporary Deleuzeans, or “post-Deleuzeans”, a ragtag amalgam of
philosophers whom we will soon unravel?
First and foremost, despite we retain a naturalized internal reference system and, thus,
sail with a zephyr of scientific rationalism, our Deleuze is, indeed, quite alien from how Manuel de Landa’s “assemblage theory” renders Deleuze. De Landa outpouches essence and denies that assemblages are reducible to their parts and environments, such that entities are
always external to their relations (de Landa 2013: 4, 10). De Landa denies that internal essences (or the virtual) exist(s) while insisting upon irreducible individual entities (or assemblages) that exist at all scales of reality. Emphasizing “dispositions”, or the fully real, albeit
contingent, “tendencies” and “capacities” of an assemblage, de Landa’s realist and internalist
ontology seeks to determine how no entity can be reduced to its virtual relations (or “diagram”) with other beings, as the “ontological status of any assemblage, inorganic, organic, or
social, is that of a unique, singular, historically contingent individual” (10, 40). Purely nominal in difference, by “tendencies”, de Landa means that which allows an assemblage to
change what it is doing (e.g., water freezing into ice as temperature drops) and by “capacities”, he is referring to that which allows for novel actualization (e.g. a plant’s leaves
211
LA DELEUZIANA – ONLINE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY – ISSN 2421-3098
N. 11/2020 – DIFFERENTIAL HETEROGENESIS
becoming poisonous after one chews them). By reducing the virtual to structure, de Landa’s
system hinges on the critical threshold of finite spaces of possibilities or material "tendencies”, prodding the once indeterminate “phase space” (of Lautman) towards various modes
of stability (“steady, cyclic, turbulent”); for example, the virtual, as such, gives direction to:
[…] critical thresholds of melting and vaporisation, which has a reality beyond the actual.
These critical thresholds are one example of a distribution of singularities, the term ‘singular’ meaning remarkable or non-ordinary, a special event in which a change in quantity
becomes a change in quality. (de Landa 2015: 19)
Antithetical to any type of essentialism, de Landa counters the Aristotelian taxonomy that
essentializes species and genera as, for de Landa, an assemblage is defined by the full history
of all that has featured its constitution, with a species understood as an “individual entity as
unique and singular as the organisms that compose it, but larger in spatiotemporal scale [….]
individual organisms are the component parts of a larger individual whole, not the particular
members of a general category or natural kind” (de Landa 2013: 28). For de Landa, the “diagram” is never actualized and there is nothing that makes one “diagram” distinct from another aside from the part-to-whole relations, for the “diagram” is comprised of universal singularities that we can scale up or down as we see fit (i.e., from the small local bodega to the
transnational circuits of trade). De Landa’s conception of the “diagram” is a stable virtual
structure and, thus, there are solely sets of universal singularities that (over)determine all
possibilities. This is why, for de Landa, there can never truly be bodies without organs—
bodies are always already tethered to their organs, this just takes some measuring, testing,
and experimenting to reveal. This is also why Kleinherenbrink is rather justified in his charge
that de Landa conflates epistemological heuristics for ontological realities, inadvertently reintroducing a “Platonic heaven” of essences through the ideally continuous cosmic virtual
plane that breaks into segments, despite being deprived of any theory of identity or origination. As Kleinherenbrink notes:
De Landa also claims that, for example, hunter-gatherer societies always already contained a prefigured state in their possibility space. But if the cosmic plane already contains all possibilities and if it is how the world ‘first’ begins, then why did everything not
just come into existence from the get-go? Or why in this order and not in another? And
why is it experiencing itself as if it is discrete identities? (Kleinherenbrink 2019: 181)
Admittedly, de Landa’s assemblage posits a realism for all entities regardless of
type/scale, grants assemblages an initial and real causal efficacy, roots assemblages in historical production (rather than transcendent structures), retains that assemblages have
mind-independent reality, and regards human-object relations as ontologically equal to object-object relations (de Landa 2016). However, in order to avoid conceiving of assemblages
212
LA DELEUZIANA – ONLINE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY – ISSN 2421-3098
N. 11/2020 – DIFFERENTIAL HETEROGENESIS
as illusory perspectives produced by and located on an intensive virtual realm that exists in
a wholly unified and continuous form, which is, itself, further situated within a supervenient
and immanent eternal present, we must rectify our externality thesis. This is what differential heterogenesis qua Deleuze’s machine ontology grants us, which de Landa’s internalist
ontology of continuity vide the assemblage does not.
§ The Differential Further Considered
Parallel to Sarti and Citti, Simon Duffy, and Anna Longo is latticework of contemporary
“speculative realist” philosophers—including but not limited to Bryant, Kleinherenbrink,
and de Landa—who provide for the arachnean cast of Deleuze’s differential shadow, the
fixture of which prompts imploring Deleuze’s oeuvre between functionalist and eliminativist
foundations, or materialist and rationalist persuasions. For both Bryant and de Landa, for
instance, discrete entities are designated as internal to larger continuous domains, whereby
the virtual is relegated to purely productive forces—“chaos itself, or anything else”
(Kleinherenbrink 2019: 295). We might add to this motley cast of post-Deleuzean thinkers
David Lapoujade as well as neorationalists such as Ray Brassier and Reza Negarestani.
Lapoujade’s rendering of Deleuze’s aberrant Bergsonianism endeavors to couple Deleuze’s
syntheses with memory (e.g., “contraction-memory” as the connective first synthesis, which
is explained by "innumerable vibrations of matter"; “recollection-memory” alongside the
disjunctive synthesis; “spirit-memory” as the vitalist rumble of the conjunctive synthesis;
2018). On the other hand, Negarestani’s turn towards transcendental computationalism,
emphasizing sapience and the logical inference of language, unwittingly reveals its hidden
Deleuzian sympathies when describing anisotropic processes of collectivization and
depathologization (as it applies to the environmentally embedded individual and AGI). In
Ray Brassier’s Sellarsian scientific formulation, reality exists independently from human
experience and/or thought, despite it can be grasped through the application of privileged
procedures (if this is indicated by kenotypic signs-cum-mathematics for Quentin
Meillassoux, for Brassier it is relegated to the realm of natural sciences). Following another
philosophical trail is Yuk Hui, who, as a student of Bernard Stiegler’s, has significantly
departed from Stiegler’s Derridean influence, striking a balance between Deleuze’s
“transcendental empiricism”, Leibniz’ alignment of mathematics (with the mathematical
infinitesimal), and Schelling’s description of nature as a self-organizing system, adjudicating
a tripartite mold of speculation, imagination, and integration.
Differential Deleuzianism’s “overflowing becomings” have widespread implications: in biology, it points us towards phylogenetic evolutionary pathways and autopoiesis (Varela &
Maturana 1992); in semiotics, it directs us towards the morphogenesis of being (Petitot
2004); in political life, it illuminates the cyclic emergence of insurrectional technical flows as
213
LA DELEUZIANA – ONLINE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY – ISSN 2421-3098
N. 11/2020 – DIFFERENTIAL HETEROGENESIS
supervening upon proletarianization (Stiegler 2019); for new media theory and software
studies, the differential provides us with a point of entry so as to examine newfound incomputable infinities, such as in the case of the Halting probability problem (Parisi 2013; Fazi
2018). In philosophy of physics, this conception of the differential allows us to examine the
issue of multiscalar analysis in modern computational modeling techniques, helping us recognize the distortions and vagaries in theory-as-approximation (i.e., describing materials
that reveal large amounts of significant structure at intermediate size scales; Wilson 2018).
There are, indeed, a number of shared (albeit uniquely stratified) concerns by these contemporary posthumanist thinkers, wherein the goal of recasting aesthetic questions is conjured by the frame of epistemology while knowledge is subsumed under the category of speculative (and, often, non-human) naturalism.9 Stiegler’s conception of exteriorized hypomnemata (media mnemonics) and epiphylogenesis (the mutually constitutive relation between
technics and organism) is circumscribed to the exteriorized interiority of the individual in
an anthropic framework (exosomatization).10 Here, metastable distribution is lineally
fielded across nested retentional hierarchies and mereological protentional resonances—
Stiegler conceives of Deleuze’s virtuality as the point of singularity (or a “minimum”) through
a manifold series of metric properties that unfold historically. Hui orients this in a unique
direction, by demonstrating how Kant’s Critique of Judgment (1790) is the first philosophical
work to made the organism explicit and paradigmatic as, for Kant, mechanical laws are not
sufficient to explain contingency and the teleology of nature. By co-opting Schelling’s conception of freedom as the improbable, or absolute contingency, Hui recapitulates nature as
neither something inside us nor outside of us but, instead, as it actively abolishes subject-
9
10
We will try to show how, as in Negarestani’s computational transcendentalism, this “aesthetic question” is
inextricably bound to the conditions of perception, whereby the tyranny of scalar optics is existentially
determinate; thus, the “discrete” is an inflected ontological feature that recasts commitments to antimaterialism upon human finitude (recalling Gödel’s notion of absolute truth). From Carnap’s predictive
interference learning machine to Solomonoff’s low-level optical feature detectors, Marcus Flutter’s
compression of general intelligence, and Eliezer Yudkowsky’s Bayesian program of rational AGI, inductivist
models of ampliative intelligence do not account for truth-preserving and nondemonstrative inference.
Insisting upon the fruits of the human experiential-cognitive terrain whereby, irrespective of their biases,
all models of AGI are built on implicit models of rationality, Negarestani’s project is to upend the post-human
conception that extends Humean induction to AGI. This is pursued by way of the “geistig intelligence” of
“possible worlds”. Differential heterogenesis upholds the network-coherence of such non-linear
architectures, which understand structure minimally via the explanatory function of elements and their
relations (e.g., semantic structures).
By “interiority”, we mean what Friedrich Kittler termed the “old thesis” of media theory, which, for Kittler,
was circumscribed to McLuhan but also appears in André Leroi-Gourhan’s concept of “exosomatization”
and, consequently, in Stiegler. Kittler rejected this notion that media function as “extensions” of the “human
senses” or as “prostheses” of organs (admittedly, for Leroi-Gourhan, as for Derrida, media also functioned
as archival tools for memory). Kittler vigorously refused this “old thesis”, which, according to him,
“amounted to saying, in the beginning was the body, then came the glasses, then suddenly television, the
computer”; Kittler preferred a more interventive relationship between media and organism, whereby “tools
establish culture, because they participate in the rapport existing between hand and brain”. (Kittler et al.
1996: 738; Kittler, in Ernst Kapp 2018: 111).
214
LA DELEUZIANA – ONLINE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY – ISSN 2421-3098
N. 11/2020 – DIFFERENTIAL HETEROGENESIS
object dualism(s). Hui plucks Schelling’s system to proffer recursivity as a “self-contained
whole” (Hui 2019: 55). This marks the philosophical crux of organicism as a foundation for
thinking of an open system through meta-scalar self-organization, anticipating biological
models such as Ilya Prigogine’s dissipative system and Francisco Varela and Humberto
Maturana’s autopoiesis. Schelling’s philosophy of nature also informs Hui’s organismic conception of spatiality, where each organism is understood as “self-contained” but also always
“influenced by other organisms, so such an ‘internal finality’ affirms a structural ‘external
finality’” (163). Through Schelling, Hui destabilizes the conception of our world as a closed
and static material system.11
Hui has recently taken interest in the positive use of the Absolute in Meillassoux as articulated in the “inhuman” as an “affirmation of a nonhuman way of production of knowledge
and systematization” through reiteration, with this reaching towards the potential of infinitude (as exemplified by mathematical practice; 263). For Meillassoux, the kenotype is pure
identity and indexes that which is outside of the field of sensible repetition. Hui demonstrates how Meillassoux’s reiteration—the ontology of empty signs—in fact affirms computationalism. Bolstered by Gödel, Hui’s conception of the inhuman attempts to transcend systematization, rather than reaffirm it, with contradiction as the undecidable rather than that
which is overcome in (historical-temporal) reality. It is with the looming overhang of preformation that the inhuman –Hui’s cosmological arrangement–finds it collective closure with
differential heterogenesis’ abstract morphologies devoid of corporeal value, i.e., pure saliencies (Sarti & Barbieri 2018: 56).
If Lautman’s penetration of the real by intelligence diffused differential geometry as a cosmological vector, Jean Petitot’s philosophical interest in mathematization vis-à-vis the critico-phenomenological tradition permits us to go beyond a biological understanding of morphogenesis. This is why Sarti, Citti, and Piotrowski, contra Saussure’s initial impulse to dismiss “the sound” as “gnoseological obstruction”, recompose phenomenology into the becoming of meaning (Sarti et al. 2019: 15). Similarly, directing the real along mathematical
11
If Schelling’s Naturphilosophie is a precursor to biological organicism, for Hui it is Hegel’s dialectical logic
that anticipates the machinic organicism of cybernetics—second order cybernetics to be specific. Where
Hegel’s nature is an object of observing reason from the outset, for Schelling nature is pre-consciously
sensed and detected prior to becoming an object of reflection. Unlike Schelling’s emphasis on an external
force’s giving form to the nature’s production, Hegel’s departure from preformation towards immanent negativity re-introduces contingency into the system of nature. We can map this onto second-order cybernetics
quite neatly as, for Hegel, there are two forms of recursion: 1) chaotic nature 2) the logical category (of
being). Hui also illuminates the recursive relation between the whole and the reflective judgment through
the subjective speculative process of reason. This “speculative whole” is critical to Kant’s central methodology and directly influenced Georges Canguilhem, who coined the term “general organology”. Reading Kant
as a philosopher of technology, Canguilhem conceives of intelligence as the act of “geometrizing matter” that
recursively constructs its artifactual scaffolding, stilted on “duration and extension” (160). Additionally, is
through Bergson’s work on integrative evolution that Canguilhem’s “general organology” becomes that
which infinitizes the finite and ecologically reintegrates the inorganic into an organized whole—the organic
is irreducible to the mechanical, which is merely a particular instantiation of the organic.
215
LA DELEUZIANA – ONLINE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY – ISSN 2421-3098
N. 11/2020 – DIFFERENTIAL HETEROGENESIS
morphogenesis, Petitot’s work on the superimposition of receptive fields echoes reconceives
of the differential as a media mnemonic with which we are allowed “to test” the real (1987:
20). Petitot’s most recent work with eigenvalues uses Alan Turing’s “reaction-diffusion differential equations” to parse Newtonian mechanics alongside kinetic chemical information;
according to Petitot, scalar sets demystify the differential’s ability to evoke the “breakdown
of symmetry and homogeneity” (2012: 22). Petitot’s writing on morphogenetic substances
also demonstrates how there exist many homologies of organization between different biological species that are determined along histological patterns, fortifying Sarti and Citti’s Simondonian-biological conception of organology-formation qua differential heterogenesis.
Fielding Sarti and Citti’s terrain of becoming-differential and the computational linkages
between geometries, symmetries, and geodesics central to understanding the physical
world, one may consider Simondon’s “intraperceptive image”, the pre-condition to perception, and Deleuze’s “Aionic” temporality of the third synthesis of time.12 Aside from selftouching haptic conceptions of the self, such differentials are also linked to self-reflective
mental portraiture on the “infraceptive” scale, or that which is sensuously “seized within”
(kinesthetic/proprioceptive), where the fold touches upon itself, providing the differential
with a breakage point within the ubiquity of universality such that it can locate itself. From
nano-technologies to the subjective experiences that emerge out of the differential, such linkages may provide an imprint of experience that pertain to making sense out of what were
once regarded as provisional “invariances”.13
12
13
For Deleuze, the Aion is the continuous tense of becoming, pitted against the Chronos of the hegemonic political order. Thus, while this paper does not take aim at the political insurgencies of the differential, this
could be a viable point of entry. Nonetheless, the operational logic of Deleuze’s continuous tense of becoming is recalled in Citti’s recent research on building a Poisson kernel that starts from the knowledge of a
smooth fundamental solution so as to contract the problem of “whole space” while eliminating any use of
the Fourier transform in the full rank case (Baldi et al. 2019).
For Robert Nozick, consciousness functions as a sort of “zoom lens" with which an organism can attune its
behavior with its environment (Nozick 2003: 180-190). Such “zooming(s)” supplements Deleuze’s “passive
synthesis” qua Simondon’s unconscious process of becoming-produced through multi-generational assemblages and circuits, facilitating transindividuation (which is societal and intergenerational). According to
Stiegler and Yuk Hui, who build on such a conception of synthesis, media objects supplement transindividual memory with “invariance” (and, according to Hui’s cosmotechnics, “human freedom”) as it transits
across generational attenuation, engaging within the cross-generational social sphere of non-verbal/nongraspable recursive encoding (to accomplish this, Hui recalls Gödel’s criticism of materialism; Hui 2019:
236). Musing on the non-graspable, one may consider Thomas Nagel’s oft-quoted paper on “bat consciousness”, which asserts subjectivity’s ambient spectral vagaries of “unknowingness”, where simply knowing a
theory doesn’t make the theory true of or for the knower. Nagel’s epiphenomenalist argument asserts that,
no matter how well we describe the bat’s use of echolocation extrinsically/informationally, we are still
barred access from “the notion of what it is like to be a bat” (Nagel 1974: 438; emphasis added). In response,
Paul Churchland notes that “[t]he proper test of that scientific/physical/objective theory of bat-style cognition is whether, when that theory happens to be genuinely true of some given creature, then the creature
actually has the subjective experiences of a bat” (2011: 19). Churchland’s criticism of Nagel’s use of “qualitative simples” is that it confounds what it is to know something with what it is to actually be something
(ontology), such that this problem is one of translation. Bringing this back to Hui’s idealism, one may say
that the “positive inhuman” is only out of comprehensive reach insofar as it is not translated properly.
216
LA DELEUZIANA – ONLINE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY – ISSN 2421-3098
N. 11/2020 – DIFFERENTIAL HETEROGENESIS
Anisotropic Materials & Multi-Scalar Media Modeling
The infinitesimal is not simply a topological question of division in Euclidean space, perception, and observation but, as Sarti and Citti note, concerns how neurogeometries—such
as Petitot’s sub-Riemannian geometry— demonstrate “differential constraints” that are not
necessarily deduced from more sophisticated structures (2019: 11).14 Just as semantic
meaning is always produced as a pragmatic experimentation of singular transformation but
never given, differential neurogeometry enumerates how a mathematical description for the
emergence and creation of conditional forms is not configured as an a priori given within a
set (Sauvagnargues 2018: 17). Petitot’s work on vision and image processing, which builds
upon David Mumford's geometrical formatting of visual input, exhibits how neurogeometry
testifies that “phase space” is a “pure intuition” that is non-conceptual, antepredicative, and
a prejudicative. Homologous to how Sarti and Citti’s differential heterogenesis provides us
with a mathematical description of the dynamic production of a priori “phase space”, neurogeometries are specified by a cognitive corollary to virtual-actual becoming, where the key
role is that of scale:
Perceptual geometry results from the integration of local detections by receptive fields
which have a certain width and so occurs at a certain scale, i.e. with a certain resolution.
Perceptual differential geometry must therefore be multiscale, while conventional differential geometry corresponds to the idealization of infinite resolution. (Petitot 2008:
13; emphasis added)
To best articulate this problem, let us take into consideration a simple steel beam. At the
highest size scales—following Hookean first-order linear approximation—steel stretches
and compresses down to approximately 10μm. At 10μm, the grain structure within steel becomes highly pertinent, as these grain structures and their components begin to stretch and
compress according to a more complex set of rules than larger-scale steel. Within each of
these component grains there are a number of “laminate layers which rub against one another in complicated ways [….] until we reach the tiny crystal lattices of the molecular level,
whose orderly patterns are interrupted by higher-scale-irregularities called dislocations”
(Wilson 2018: 202-203). It is here that the differential equations that regulate behaviors
nominally occurring in the “infinitesimal” level become central. The specifications relevant
for the differential equations within physics are generally obtained by scaling higher-level
behaviors downwards, until some simpler infinitesimal level is reached.15 Steel, however,
presents a problem to such benchmark scaling assumptions, as its behaviours stop scaling at
14
15
The illusory contours of sub-Riemannian geometry, defined along planar curves, demonstrates how spatial
representations have neural origins related to wavelet analysis and are immanent to visual perception (Petitot 2017: 304).
This is well codified by the apothegm that “physics is simpler in the small”.
217
LA DELEUZIANA – ONLINE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY – ISSN 2421-3098
N. 11/2020 – DIFFERENTIAL HETEROGENESIS
the cutoff of ~10μm. While small sections of steel behave more or less identically at all scale
lengths above this level, to capture the component grain behaviours after 10μm accurately,
we are required to model it in a more laminate-based manner.
What, exactly, then is the “greediness of scales”? While Representative Volume Element
(RVE)16 sub-models can be examined on account of contemporary scientific observationalmeasurement tools (and, in particular, advances in computer simulation that attempt to
overcome descriptive clashes), it is the problem of data amalgamation that prevents “practitioners from profiting from this collective knowledge in a straightforward way” (203)17.
This is because, using RVE scale-focused modelling via differential equations in bottomdown fashion (i.e., reaching towards the infinitesimal), amalgamation presents a conflict regarding the direct descriptive incompatibilities that arise when we use the same vocabulary
with respects to properties that a material (such as steel) displays on small-scale levels.18
The “greediness of scales” summons the central concerns of differential heterogenesis,
producing a collective closure between the semantic and the topological concerns that Sarti
and Citti elude to. The central problem arises on the differential terrain: differential equations that are appropriate to two levels of sub-modelling necessitate that the narrowly-constrained rules concerning stretching and compression must remain applicable down to the
zero-length scale. Hence, the “greediness of scales” conflict is born due to syntactic disharmony: the differential equation model must account for all the lower-size scales available to
reach the infinitesimal level, which is where differential equations articulate their stipulations. However, due to the syntactical discordance concerning the material’s behaviour beyond a cutoff level, we have to content with inconsistent claims concerning the very same
part of a material, media, or object. This may remind the reader of Sellars’ “pink cube” problem, where an ice cube’s colour is observed as ultimately homogenous because its “manifest
image” presents itself to us as a “pink continuum” in “all the regions of which, however small,
are pink” (Sellars 1966: 26). The concept of “pink”, however, demands that its applications
scale continuously downwards to the infinitesimal level, wherein this “manifest image”, or the
image of as it is plainly conceived of to the naked eye, is set in contrast to what we know
through scientific measurement or, in Sellars’ parlance, “the scientific image”. Despite Wilson
16
17
18
Representative Volume Element (RVE) denotes the descriptive depiction linked to a set of target-events in
terms of the characteristic size-scale of an object during which those events unfold.
This means that two scientists who model different select scale levels (of steel) can not simply posit their
combined research results because it will result in syntactic inconsistencies where differential equation requirements overlap.
With crystalline materials, for example, at low-level scales we observe segments of perfect lattice configurations bonded together around arbitrarily oriented boundaries. At scale levels above this point (10μm), RVE
behaviours around the level of conglomerations are generally isotropic (the material responds to the same
rules regardless of which direction it is being pulled). Higher-scale responses support modelling where
compression and stretching behaviours are governed by Young’s modulus of elasticity (E or Y) with the
shear modulus 0μm; however the small slivers of crystal within these conglomerates do not stretch and
compress in this simple manner. Thus, RVE modellings “appropriate to these tiny structures require five or
six elastic modalities to capture their anisotropic behaviors” (Wilson: 203; emphasis added).
218
LA DELEUZIANA – ONLINE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY – ISSN 2421-3098
N. 11/2020 – DIFFERENTIAL HETEROGENESIS
is concerned with continuum physics and the stipulations behind a scale’s executing a bottom-down monopoly—specifically as it concerns requirements of mass and stress—there is
a homology here with Sellars’ “clash between images”.19
Engineer J.T. Oden has described this tyranny of scales problem by remarking that all simulation methods produced until the beginning of the twenty-first century were valid solely
for:
[L]imited ranges of spatial and temporal scales. Those conventional methods, however,
cannot cope with physical phenomena operating across large ranges of scale—12 orders
of magnitude in time scales, such as in the modelling of protein folding or 10 orders of
magnitude in spatial scales, such as in the design of advanced materials. At those ranges,
the power of the tyranny of scales renders useless virtually all conventional methods.
(Oden 2006: §3.1)
As eluded to earlier, in the last two decades we have developed advanced modelling
schemes to resolve such discrepancies by allowing RVE sub-modelling layers to circumscribe
their descriptive agenda to localized and semi-autonomous “strata”, or what Robert Batterman (co-opting the term from physicist Robert Laughlin) calls a “protectorate”.20 These
semi-enclosed strata/protectorates are set into communication with one-another through
those “coded messages” called homogenizations, dividing linguistic labour and moulding
novel explanatory architecture. Such a homogenization policy shows an internally linked
equilibrium by aping the physical manner in which “relatively simple forms of dominating
behaviour, characterized by a limited set of descriptive parameters, emerge at higher scales
from their large, lower-scale underpinning” (Wilson 2018: 219). Differential heterogenesis
can, thus, be used as a technical tool to produce equilibrium homogeneity.
Given the standard tools of Euclidean geometry, there are considerable difficulties in capturing the “natural” notion of a dominant behaviour in precise terms that we have attempted
to counteract. What of the semantic terrain? Like syntactical structure, the topological charge
of any gradient field is a problem of scales, but in both examples a crucial consideration is
19
20
For Sellars, this “relocation story” is not “simply a solution to the problem posed by mathematical physics.
It is also an account of how we could come to be able to think about sense impressions in the first place. We
come to be able to think about sense-impressions of pink cubes by first thinking about volumes of pink that
we seem to see, and then recasting the manifest pinkness as properties of perceptual states of ourselves”
(Rosenthal 2016: 153). Sellars’ relocation picture necessitates that we conceive of sense-impressions as
automatically conscious, whereby mental states’ being conscious is distinct from the individual’s being conscious. For Sellars, the central question of the “grain problem” was whether it could, in principle, be possible
without a neurophysiological conceptual framework that defines states according to intrinsic character but
proffers to epiphenomena. Wilson, on the other hand, is not interested in the homogeneity constraints satisfied by conscious presentational content but syntactical overdetermination.
“The crystalline state is the simplest known example of a quantum protectorate, a stable state of matter
whose generic low-energy properties are determined by a higher organizing principle and nothing else”
(Laughlin & Pines 2000: 29). The “protectorate” is a domain of physics where behaviour is independent of
the microdetails found at small size scales (Batterman 2010).
219
LA DELEUZIANA – ONLINE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY – ISSN 2421-3098
N. 11/2020 – DIFFERENTIAL HETEROGENESIS
the problem of modelling. As elaborated in “the greediness of scales” problem, scale-focused
modelling must utilize differential equations while contending with the descriptive demands
of reaching down to the infinitesimal level. A differential equation model must monopolize
all of the lower-size scales available to reach the infinitesimal level at which these equations
articulate their stipulations. This description of differential equations gets to the core of
Deleuzian heterogeneity and the difficultly of applying an ontology to amalgamation.21 Instead, we need a hybrid category that articulates the compossibility of passive synthesis (microstates and their microeffects) and differential retention (mnemonic integration and redistribution).
Wilson’s project, broadly speaking, outlines the working architectures of modern multiscalar modelling techniques to help us recognize the distortions and vagaries in “Theory T
thinking”, or theory-as-approximation. Moving forward, we will focus upon the difficulties
involved in describing materials that reveal large amounts of significant structure at intermediate size-scales (e.g., the structural features that distinguish one igneous rock from another, or the out-of-equilibrium formations that blacksmiths fold and beat into steels). Consider, for instance, the diamond’s long-lasting range of “frozen order”, wherein there exist
strong energetic barriers within the diamond that prevent it from returning to low-pressure
graphite, such that it has a long relaxation time. Similarly, most solid materials display very
little inclination for maximizing their entropies.
If cognitive architecture involves tacit adjustments in contextual registers, what does this
mean for the representational structure of the syntactic demands in question? Sarti and Citti
give us an answer concerning the co-constitution of assembly via meaning and sensibility,
but we very well might consider another approach, beginning with the question of compressive schemas. Let us take the example of two standard pictorial modes—TIFF and JPEG formats—wherein the JPEG image is comprised of far less data-points than the TIFF image. With
the TIFF image, we see that data is encoded on a pixel-by-pixel basis (with each pixel encoded
independently of one another). In the JPEG image, every pixel’s front-end registration governs a fixed span of back-end determinacy, as if the individual pixels of the TIFF had dissolved, forming an assemblage based on large-scale (colour-determinate) hierarchies. Parsing the mold of the JPEG image’s compressive scheme, we can construct an enactive scaffolding by exploiting contextual registers; this begin with a broad metric, Q1, followed up by finer
grained metrics, Q2, which rely upon the response to Q1. This process follows through a
nested array of further queries, Q3, Q4, and so on. Such interdependencies unfold within a
segregated front-end register (Q1, Q2, Q3,..), followed by an enumeration on their respective
21
This has traditionally been framed by mathematicians such as Errico Presutti so as to inadvertently prod
the problem into the realm of epistemological constraints by focusing on the phenomenology of perception/awareness, suggesting that the hierarchies that emerge in characteristic scales reflects epistemic limitations regarding our representational capacities. Wilson rejects this by stressing “the direct correspondence of dominant behaviours to objective issues of energetic transfer and degradation”, thus making this an
ontological issue concerning Quinean commitments (Wilson 2018: 213).
220
LA DELEUZIANA – ONLINE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY – ISSN 2421-3098
N. 11/2020 – DIFFERENTIAL HETEROGENESIS
answers (A1, A2, A3,..). These representational tactics are termed multiple register schemes,
where syntactic complexity is reduced through scope restrictions via policies of contextual
localization.
Thus, Wilson remarks that “[p]resent-day philosophy of language could become more
supple if its practitioners more warmly appreciated the substantive reductions in syntactic
complexity achievable through various policies of contextual localization” (9). A conception
of computational pragmatics as such is privy to responses to the registrations of linguistic
capacities with respect to data and reasoning qua compression.
The “greediness of scales” problem demonstrates that hysteresis, the microscopic migration of dislocations that eventually results in material cracks (i.e., lower-scale damage inflicted by upper-scale punishment), can not be illustrated with conventional computational
modelling through single-level descriptive methods. While we cannot give an account of hysteresis by working upwards from the molecular scale in this mode, the multi-scalar model
evades such computational barriers by enforcing a cooperative division of descriptive labour
amongst a hierarchy of RVE-centred sub-models, each of which is tasked with capturing
dominant behaviours that arise within its purview. Thus and so, “each local RVE sub-model
directly responds only to its local environment, rather than to events that arise within distant
sectors or upon alternative size scales” (Wilson 2018: 222); by stepping through the mathematical filter of homogenization, we readjust local parameters within each RVE unit until the
cascade of inter-scalar reports is rendered self-consistent.
Wilson’s adaptive approach also emphasizes how the use of “wandering words” such as
“force” or “use” precede firm referential semantics; only after applicational enclosures are
set can they attach to moorings suited for novel modelling environments (Wilson 2006).
Thus, Wilson does not agree with Jerry Fodor’s anti-pragmatic approach to meaning (Fodor’s
a priori assurance suppresses adaptive behaviours by compounding variegated facets of language-learning). Fodor and fellow anti-pragmatists such as Susan Stebbing argue that semantic scenarios inherently anticipate altered adjustments, claiming that terms such as
“force” are “first assigned, strong, referentially determinate core meanings before the pragmatic influences of applicational context can begin their work” (Wilson 2018: 30).
Terms such as “force”, “temperature”, or “cause” are granted enlarged descriptive utilities
and, therefore, coherence strategies when they are developed within local adaptations,
whereby such arrangements are protected by “homogenization barriers”. Within the multiscale model, structural portioning into segregated patching abets swift processes of adaption—“[t]he homogenization barriers that block direct cross-scalar syntactic amalgamation
in a multiscalar scheme serve as essential ingredients within the remarkable descriptive efficiencies they offer” (Wilson 2018: 195). It is precisely the “ready reprogrammability” of any
multiple-register language’s format that facilitates the adaptive plasticity of its conceptual
practice. Thus, the descriptive focus of terms such as “force”, “temperature”, “strain energy”,
221
LA DELEUZIANA – ONLINE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY – ISSN 2421-3098
N. 11/2020 – DIFFERENTIAL HETEROGENESIS
etc. is contingent upon scale-level application, where “arrangements facilitate the reassignment of old computational routines to novel applicational purposes” (30; emphasis added).22
Deleuze and Scales
According to Deleuze, the assemblage has “only itself, in connection with other assemblages and in relation to other bodies without organs” (Deleuze and Guattari 1983: 4). Despite the relations that any media object may have with its semblance, for instance, these
relations are demanded by externality and no such connections to other entities fully designate its “being”. This is a theme that we may term poetically term “solitude”, which becomes
pellucid in Deleuze’s books on cinema—such “solicitude” is manifest when we consider the
structuration of cinematic moving images. In the “movement-image”, or the pre-World War
II cinematic image, “vehicles or moving bodies” are understood as thoroughly relational—
that is, they include actions, perceptions, and affections that hint at externality (or autonomy
and materiality) but do not embrace it fully (Deleuze 1986: 23). In the works of Hitchcock,
for example, Deleuze recognizes that relations are always designated along external terms
that constantly refuse their full implication. In the post-war “time-image”, we see the enveloping of incompatible images, disjunct sounds, and, consequently, incompossible worlds that
are—through editing—brought in-common, suggesting the possibly of “an outside more distant than an exterior, and that of an inside deeper than any interior” (Deleuze 1989; Kleinherenbrink 2019: 54). It is this very incommensurability, the inextricable Outside from
which emerges cinematic malaise, that we see inaugurated the possibility of the impossible,
the “false image” which makes manifest a “private reality” or the “virtuality of time” (Galloway 2016: 68). In Deleuze’s work on cinema, the screen’s moving images are but metonyms
for exocentric frames of visual reference, evincing that perception, which is indivisible, offers
time in a “pure state” (Deleuze 1983: 21; Deleuze 2005: 96).23
22
23
There is a curious parallel between Wilson’s cyclic description of our regenerative linguistic formulations,
“condemned to wobble between seasons of brash inferential extension and epochs of qualified retrenchment later on” and André Leroi-Gourhan’s notion of the evolutional chaîne opératoire (Wilson 2018: 32).
According to Leroi-Gourhan, “[f]or each species a cycle is established between its technical ability (its body)
and its ability to organize itself (its brain). Within this cycle, through economy of design, a way opens up
toward increasingly pertinent selective adaptation” (Leroi-Gourhan 1993: 60).
Thus, the differential can also be identified with the process of watching cinema, whereby Bergson’s élan
vital is reproduced during a medial becoming that, phenomenologically, cannot be infinitely divided or regarded as an aggregation; a “differential difference” emerges between the temporality inscribed on a film
reel (the material artefact of recorded time) and its perceptual undertaking. For Deleuze, perception’s schematic hold foments the central category with which to understanding moving images, not as a representation but as an epiphenomenal account of time understood in the manner of Bergson’s conception of (pure)
duration. As we see in Deleuze’s Bergsonian account of cinema, moving images are not “images of movement” or “images of any thing, object, or model” but, instead, “movement-images grasped as blocks of sensation that free the image from its dependence on the archetype or the eternal pose” (Baumbach 2018: 133).
In Difference and Repetition, Cinema 1: The Movement Image, and Cinema 2: The Time-Image, Deleuze
222
LA DELEUZIANA – ONLINE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY – ISSN 2421-3098
N. 11/2020 – DIFFERENTIAL HETEROGENESIS
This inextricable Outside, as a functor of the externality thesis, transpires most markedly
in observations from lived experience, where the relation of signs-to-denotata is processed
through the “sensory motor schema” as something akin to the causally-connected filmic
script of the movement-image, or “cine-thinking” (Alliez 2000). To inscribe this lesson once
more, we can turn to those examples in visual art that actively engage with the plane of
presentation and exigent construction as, for example, in Marcel Duchamp’s “Fountain” readymade, which:
does not need its ‘R. Mutt’ signature in order to exist, nor does L.H/O.O.Q. need the moustache added
to Mona Lisa. The parts of an entity are always somewhat redundant, a complex notion [..., which]
reveal(s) that objects have no natural place, function, or meaning. There is nothing external constituting their essence. (Kleinherenbrink 2019: 57)
What does this have to do with multi-scalar modelling? Deleuze’s overall theory of machines is fundamentally flat, discontinuous, and infrastructural, as Deleuzean externality is
premised upon irreducibility. Similarly, Wilson demonstrates the tyranny of reduction,
whether it be an ontology (“Theory T thinking”), modelling (the hyperbolic notions of evolutionary modelling), or semantics (the inferential expectations moored to words like “cause”).
In opposition to Platonism, or internalism—which results from the private depth of machines being irreducible to and unique in kind from their actualizations—our fundamental
error of thinking, according to Deleuze, is to conflate the contiguity, identity, and resemblance characterizing actuality as also characterizing “things-in-themselves”. Therefore,
“every entity is itself a machine, in the sense of being a causally effective agent that makes its
own difference in the world” where each entity has its own unique “complex inner working”
(Kleinherenbrink 2019: 7).
For Deleuze, machines can have actualizations that are not themselves machines but instead translations or scalar measurements of the being of a machine into the experiential
content of another machine. Consider, for instance, how Duchamp’s readymade teaches us
that entities are obstinate assemblages and that all entities are, consequently, irreducible
machines that can function smoothly with others (if the proper operations are exacted). That
is, the “natural condition”, which is pre-observational, is that of the straited space; it is the
necessity imposition of a scientific system and/or systematic scale/measurement that
mends any and all aforementioned entities together within scientific unity. Nonetheless, this
irreducibility does not necessitate an ultimate hierarchy or end-point—for were this the
case, all entities would be self-identical and, thus, reducible to themselves. Deleuze’s ecology
of the assemblage, a synonym for “machine”, designates how any system emerges from relations between heterogenous parts. Deleuze’s world of externality is one in which “no two
instates Bergson’s account of “emotion”, which configures the central logic of Deleuze’s differential aesthetics of representation. Deleuze’s differential aesthetics develops an image of thought that attempts to overcome the binary separation between matter and spirit, or mind and body.
223
LA DELEUZIANA – ONLINE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY – ISSN 2421-3098
N. 11/2020 – DIFFERENTIAL HETEROGENESIS
grains of dust are absolutely identical, no two hands have the same distinctive points, no two
typewriters have the same strike, no two revolvers score their bullets in the same manner”
(Deleuze 1994: 26). This absolute refusal of internality necessitates that there be no principle frontier of passage between universal and particulars (Deleuze 1990: 132). This also necessitates that there be a difference in kind between metaphysical surfaces and physical surfaces of each entity, such that all entities are spatially, temporally, and mereologically irreducible. Therefore, primary and secondary qualities, parts, functions, wholes, and predicates
are brought into an ecology of relational aspect-hood, which always implies other entities’
necessity.
As Sarti and Barbieri comment on sensory cortices’ receptive profiles, signification processes are grouped by conditioning and reinforced value systems, hereby holding a candle
to how we articulate the progressive construction between seeing, feeling, knowing, and signifying as the relational capture of elastic moduli. Similarly, as seen in the corrective process
of homogenization—neither purely bottom-up nor top-down in its descriptive policies—
multiscalar modelling commits to running through successive stages (macroscopic estimationàmicroscopic correction) as needed until an overall descriptive accord is reached.
Bringing Wilson’s description of scalar overdetermination together with Deleuze’s demonstrates that the simple descriptive modelling assignment of “togetherness” is insufficient
when relying on empirical observation, i.e., when describing generative disharmony at the
level of the differential.
Conclusion: Our Place in the World
How does Deleuze’s thought concern the human, which it would evidently appear to never
privilege beyond the machinic “greediness of scales” and conjunctive synthesis? Deleuze’s
machine ontology accords a method of transcendental empiricism. This system begins with
a recollection of the Kantian “boundary concept” of rationality’s regulative use; according to
Deleuze’s account of “empiricism”, human finitude designates encounters as a sign or manifestation of other entities and not such entities in and of themselves. The “transcendental”
portion is what allows us to assume that there is also a virtual side to machines, which can
allow us to move beyond the pretention of negative use. In his early account of “transcendental empiricism”, Deleuze’s materialist transvaluation of the Kantian account of transcendental subjectivity imparts how impersonal, inhuman thinking does not merely represent
the natural world but is directly productive of forms (e.g., space and time). Distinguishing
reiterative subtraction vis-à-vis the body qua belonging from the formula of the dialectic, in
an early essay concerning Difference and Repetition, my mentor Reza Negarestani notes that
ontology is “ultimately a differential between these two forms of cruelty”, i.e. binding the
living to the dead, or sadism, and mandating reconsummation, or masochism, “with the void,
224
LA DELEUZIANA – ONLINE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY – ISSN 2421-3098
N. 11/2020 – DIFFERENTIAL HETEROGENESIS
each with its own mechanisms of torture, atrocious creativities, rules and problems” (Negarestani 2009: 78). However, as Deleuze’s system matures, it further accounts for a supplementary account of subjectification, wherein an appeal to the “encounter” ensures the
“measure of fit” between transcendental empiricism as a constructivist mathematism of concepts and the world of intensive, actual difference.
Deleuze’s transcendental empiricism of inscribed difference thus offers a positive value,
rather than abiding by the earlier “law of the negative”, or “negative determination of the
body qua belonging which is imposed by the Ideal” (Negarestani 2009: 78-79). It frees difference from its (historical) subordination to the indeterminate homogeneity of the Platonic
composition of identity, whereby the parts of a whole are established and identified as the
whole, itself, a priori. Thus, the Deleuzian differential is based on difference “in itself”
(Deleuze 1994: 28).
Consequently, the Deleuzean correlative of the a priori of form and substance becomes
phenomenologically cross-constituted by the envisages of a body and its embedded world.
As a result, both respond to the uncertain solicitations of a milieu that instructs its rhythms,
behaviors, and sensitive qualities. Following Deleuze, the co-constitution of sensible qualities are, by construction, not those of sensation (as affect theory would have us believe) but
intrinsic signification.24 The sensible, from the very beginning, is provided with a meaning,
which is assigned by the corporeal matrix which institutes it (rather than its specific sign).
Beyond navigating the differential qua coherence vis-à-vis behavioural fidelity to layer
orientation and interface-limited hierarchical behavioural dependencies, by gleaning Wilson
we have surreptitiously also tried to create a bricolage with Deleuze’s machine ontology and
ontological commitments of the Quinean ilk which are also demarcated by the possibility of
re-alignment. I argue that this is not a misreading of Deleuze’s machine ontology, for Deleuze
denies the possibility of an ultimate Mechanosphere that captures all relations; Deleuze’s
externality necessarily cannot be reduced into exhaustive organic or biological relations, as
external entities are not self-caused or reducible to anything else. Deleuzean externality is
premised upon irreducibility. Wilson’s ontology contends with the Quinean thesis that our
“ontological commitments” should be determined by assembling our various worldly claims
into a unified theory (much like the machine ontology) but surveys any amalgamated corpus
for varied existential claims—sentences of the form (∃x)α—that, meanwhile, relationally
adapts.
Let us briefly remark on relational adaptation of media and behavioral use. Stiegler’s work
on technics and time introduces the tertiary retention to Husserlian phenomenology by remarking upon how the media artefact bears a transcendental responsibility within our “general organology”. This “lost limb” is a supplement in the Derridean sense: both an
24
Jean-Louis Schefer, whose writing (on cinema, in particular) greatly influenced Deleuze, describes such affects as “urgently invisible, non-represented, and unformulated”, producing a “criminal pleasure”, whereby
“signification, words and images no longer represent anyone” (Schefer 2016: 196).
225
LA DELEUZIANA – ONLINE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY – ISSN 2421-3098
N. 11/2020 – DIFFERENTIAL HETEROGENESIS
enhancement and a substitute, irreducibly redistributed along the materiality of supplementation and inclusion (bi-directional, cyclic). Stiegler here recalls Simondon’s allagmatic architecture of technical operation, which is also scalar—individuation is bound up in both the
individual and their milieu, with technesis forming part of an individual and their transductive reality. Neither a substantial being nor an element in a rapport, the individual is first and
foremost the reality of a “metastable relation” (Simondon 2006: 79-80). Media and man are
caught within a constructive process, as the individual is bound up in a progressively conditioned and supra-organic artefactual technosphere of recomposition; the a priori is revealed
not as absolute, but relative to the local process of compromise between organism and world
(i.e., “absolute movement”; Deleuze 1989: 40).
As the description of topological stimuli-responsiveness demonstrates, technicity is also
a cognitive process that begins with cephalization and neuralization, climbing a naturalized
scaffold with the evolution of tool-use and language, inaugurating new cognitive technologies. This is precisely why in Stanley Kubrick’s 2001: A Space Odyssey, the black monolith
appears at every new level of technicity, indexing historical change ineliminable to the development of mankind. As Negarestani remarks in Intelligence and Spirit, our cognitive scaffolding is bolstered by two poles, each dealing with significant problems of computation: i)
the qualitative compression and stabilization of information necessary for the communal establishment of knowledge and its augmentation (e.g., the bone-wielding ape); ii) the coordination for understanding and action (e.g., the apes shrieking in unison, suggesting the eventual construction of language; Negarestani 2018: 491).
In turn, the teleologically determined nature of Intelligence is revealed: how, absent a contrasting index for differentiating itself (from its food, environment, or technics) does the organism (which risks autophagy) differentiate itself from space? One answer has been historically tethered to the development and extension of our (central and autonomic) nervous
system, which provides us with the prowess to designate spatial differentiation through
“perspectival pure positional awareness of items-in-relation-to-one-another” (Rosenberg
1993: 111; Moynihan 2019). Another is with language. Both deal with the making-discrete
in cyclical logic.
Deleuze’s introduction of dynamicity foregrounds the intermilieux and transobjective
process of virtualization as a presignifying rhythm, a faculty of transcoding that has become
integral for considering discretization (as it applies to both technics and language). This, too,
has dialectical roots: Lautman’s dialectic instantiation of analysis subordinated to topology
involved structural schemas designated along a striated hierarchy in which there was an inscribed “upper” logical level consisting of a “more simple and universal” assembly: “local/global, intrinsic/extrinsic, discrete/continuous” (Lautman 2006: xxvii). It is from
Lautman that Deleuze inherits the conception of the eternal return of the “not-yet-present”
226
LA DELEUZIANA – ONLINE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY – ISSN 2421-3098
N. 11/2020 – DIFFERENTIAL HETEROGENESIS
and “passive synthesis” as a topographic genesis of environmental embedding (which lies in
between environment and context, thus existing as a differential marker).25
As perhaps best demarcated in Carl Boyer’s The History of the Calculus and its Conceptual
Development, the differential can be understood as a “point of view”, or as perceptually-navigating infinitesimal difference between the consecutive values of a continuously diminishing quantity, as in Zeno’s paradox (Boyer 1939: 2). Simon Duffy describes the becoming-derivative as an infinite process of determining the “vanishing quantity” (Duffy 2016: 119). In
Deleuze’s work on aesthetics and Francis Bacon’s paintings, we see the finitude of individuality understood through the framework of this “vanishing point” (point de fuite), the “second
direction of exchange” that orients the virtual’s dissipation into material (and thus “functioning as a prosthesis-organ”; Deleuze 1987: 17-18).
Lautman work on the transfinite proved to be the historical nexus for differential heterogenesis as a theoretical fulcrum and marks the beginning of Deleuze’s mereological awakening, whereby “[t]he concept of the infinitely small as vanishing quantities allows the determination of relations independently of their terms” (Duffy 2006: 120). Following Lautman,
the penetration of topological methods into differential geometry responds to relations between the “local and the global”, or “the whole and the part”, where the outlining of schemata
involves the passage between material realizations through a formal system (Cavaillès and
Lautman 1939). Therefore, our Deleuzean study of differential heterogenesis is invariably
concerned with the reduction of the extrinsic properties of a situation to intrinsic structural
properties: this calculus of variation determines the existence of meta-linguistic artefactwielding beings who, ourselves, are entangled within the evolutionary development of becoming-discrete. Lautman’s dialectic, which concerns the transformative prowess of inverse
reciprocity, thus infects the vagaries of Intelligence, whether it be the description of objects
or our boot-strapping.
§ Appendix (On Causality)
However we approach it, the kinematics informing Deleuzean differential heterogenesis
define the virtual as strictly a part of the real object—virtuality is necessarily relational. What
else, then, is to be said of our differential positioning, caught in virtual-actual objective becoming(s)? If the endocentric (or egocentric) frame of self-centered reference allows for differentiation between environment, object, language, and self, it is the exocentric dynamicity
of the differential frame that challenges the ego’s fixity by suggesting post-anthropic spatial
relations (i.e., contracting into larger assemblages and becoming a language-speaker, tool25
Accordingly, for Deleuze the first synthesis of time is the time of habitudes, the Humean time of materialized
logical relations; the second synthesis of time is the active and passive synthesis of memory; the third synthesis of time is the repetition “by excess, the repetition of the future as eternal return” (Deleuze 1994: 90).
227
LA DELEUZIANA – ONLINE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY – ISSN 2421-3098
N. 11/2020 – DIFFERENTIAL HETEROGENESIS
wielder, computer-programmer, and so on).26 This always observationally appears to be
causally construed. As René Thom’s work on topological structural stability indicates, we, as
predators situatedness in space, are constrained to an allocentric view of embeddedness that
we relate to through causality—"we believe in causality because we have been conditioned
phylogenetically to do so by the regularity with which phenomena succeed one another in
the physical world” (Thom 1990: 7).
In Sarti and Citti’s work on the intersection on “non-vanishing sums”, matter is situated
outside the realm of knowledge, “simply because knowledge is concerned only with the relations of ‘cohesion,’” while, simultaneously, “matter is nonetheless conceptualizable, for, being therefore liable to ‘receive’ forms, it must indeed have qualities that ensure its reception”
(Sarti et al. 2019: 16-17).27 As in cinema voyeurism and multiscalar modelling, differential
Deleuzianism allows us to readily conceive of that which is devoid of form or homogeneous
reference in bottom-up or top-down direction, scaling its way not only out of knowledge but
out of any referential/observational purview (i.e., “out of sight”) until homogenized. In turn,
differential heterogenesis allows us to resituate the contingent-becoming of the a priori,
which was provincially occluded by Kant’s understanding of the self-substantiating and already-present “at hand” analytic.
Sarti and Citti’s analysis of progressive polarization in heterogenetic flows invigorates a
kind of dynamic evolution where a virtual topos is revealed to underly the configuration of
the virtual. Thus, the virtual is abducted by the noumenal real, where it finds itself anchored
by an ontogenetic identity-relation. No longer are we circumscribed to the province of real
numbers and the stable conditions of cognition, as in Kant’s system of pure intuiting. Instead,
differential heterogenesis galvanizes Solomon Maïmon’s criticism of Kant for being unable
to provide for any account of how genesis facilitates the conditions of knowledge.
Mathematicians such as Bernard Teissier, Giuseppe Longo and Jean Petitot have examined
phylogenetically-conditioned causality as it concerns continuous computation (returning to
the problems riddling Turing’s continuous state-machine). For instance, in Teissier’s work
on “Protomathematics, Perception and the Meaning of Mathematical Objects” (1996), we see
how it may be possible to claim that the evolution of our perceptual systems has created an
isomorphism between the visual line and the vestibular line. This (geodesic) mark of the
discrete demonstrates the stronghold of internalist-representationalist habituation, where
functionally-unmoored causality seems to impart us with imagining the non-human, a
terrain that creeps beyond “[t]he regularity with which phenomena succeed one another in
26
27
Thus, the (central and autonomic) nervous system is inextricably bound to teleological activity, where media-prostheses and stimuli-responsiveness are affixed within a closed loop related to the problem of selfpreservation.
Sarti and Citti define an assemblage operator as based on the intersection of two sets: (Bp0 , Fp0) ⋂ (Bp1 , Fp1).
The pair demonstrate that, much like a corollary to vibration, “differential becoming is the flow” of the solution’s integrate operator; the “axes of cohesion” produce a genesis of semiotic functioning where the plastic composition of assemblages reveals that “flux is at the base” of harmonic embedding (Sarti et al. 2019:
16-19).
228
LA DELEUZIANA – ONLINE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY – ISSN 2421-3098
N. 11/2020 – DIFFERENTIAL HETEROGENESIS
the physical world” (Thom 1990: 7). We can create a bricolage here if, for instance, we do
not accept that any phenomena’s “being caused” by certain stimuli is equipollent to
constituting phenomenal characters (e.g., colour experiences).28 What, then, if we apply
differential heterogenesis to abduct the principles of human cognition and transmogrify
them so as to produce a proto-perceptual theory of retroactive observation, considering
what Ned Block terms “mental paint” in order to schematically imagine the differential in
terms of quantum computing/computing in continua. Is there any relation, then, between
the feed-forward adequation of deep learning and non-accessible (and non-phenomenal)
properties behind externalism (i.e., what Ned Block terms “mental oil”)?29 Such problems
bear further consideration.
This differential consideration of truth-contingency gives us a computational corollary for
challenging paradigms of causality. According to Lev Manovich, it is the causal narrative that,
as a cultural object, foregrounds the logical perturbations underlying algorithms, web indexes, computer storage, CD-ROM’s, web sites, and other new media objects which are “organized as databases” (Manovich 1999: 85). Manovich’s model of causality considers the
“storage-and-retrieval” modality as our epochal archetype, for “the computer age brought
with it a new cultural algorithm: reality à media à data à database” (85). However, today’s
machines are not characterized by linear causality but stochastic elasticity—consider Predictive Processing algorithms, approximate Bayes optimality, Markov chains, Hopfield Networks, Boltzmann machines, and so on.30
A short survey of cybernetic history designates the classical Church-Turing thesis’ “computable reals” and first-order cybernetics’ treatment of information as stilted on the closed
loop of “storage-and-retrieval”. In both instances, autopoiesis takes on a radical
28
29
30
Consider the following description: “[t]he functionalist can appeal to temporary differences. Erisa will say
‘The wall is now the same color that adorned the table a second ago,’ and ‘For one second, the floor matched
the sofa.’ But these beliefs are fleeting, so how can they constitute the abiding differences between the phenomenal character of her experience of red and green? The differences between these phenomenal characters stay the same (for us) from moment to moment, day to day, and there is no reason to suppose that the
same cannot be true for Erisa. The point of the thought experiment is to make it plausible that color experiences can remain just as vivid and the differences between them just as permanent as they are for us even
if the functional differences between them attenuate to nothing that could plausibly constitute those differences. Of course, there is one abiding difference in functional role between the experience of red and the
experience of green—the properties of the stimuli. Since we are talking about internalist representationism,
the stimuli will have to be, e.g. light hitting the retina rather than colored surfaces. But these differences in
the stimuli are what cause the differences in the phenomenal character of experience, not what constitutes
those phenomenal differences. I don’t expect diehard functionalists to recant in response to this point, but
I really don’t see how anyone with an open mind could take the being caused by certain stimuli as constituting phenomenal characters of color experiences” (Block 2003: 168).
That is, can we attend to the phenomenal character of experience so as to distinguish mental properties of
experience? These properties are involved in orgasm-experience, pain, and other bodily sensations but
might differential heterogenesis provide us a novel “border concept” with which to theorize the “mental oil”
with which we “paint” the redness of the tomato?
These are predicated, in their computative development, upon principles such as Helmholtzian interference,
noise reduction, and the Shannon-Ashby Law of Requisite Variety.
229
LA DELEUZIANA – ONLINE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY – ISSN 2421-3098
N. 11/2020 – DIFFERENTIAL HETEROGENESIS
constructivist rule (of perception), denying the existence of an externalist representational
reality that affects a system vis-à-vis exocentric indices of “information”. However, a critical
rift in physics and computation soon necessitated a critical revision, with newfound relativity and thermodynamics directing the “Church–Turing–Deutsch principle” to account for
holographic boundaries and the entropic interference characterizing Bolzmann-Bekenstein
limits. Following second-order cybernetics (or observer-oriented cybernetics), the reparameterization of the system and allocentric regulation took precedent over recursion.
Contemporaneous research in neural computation and theoretical computer science
demonstrates that the heterogenetic flow of spatial differentiation in deposing of inferencebased classification systems is by no means termed along the striated database’s “storageand-retrieval” modality. Inductive neural network modelling stresses precise node-localization and statistical estimation techniques: from elastic bunch graph-matching in biometric
protocol, such as facial recognition and fingerprint matching software, to derivative-free
computational optimization in actuarial insurance AGIs and Unmanned Aerial Vehicles
(UAVs), signal-to-noise azimuthal performance coordinates and multiple differential phaseof-arrival measures make use of filtering-and-tracking algorithms that account for the convergence of precision performance with complex coefficient wave-variation. Differential
elasticity’s predictive processing power has outstripped the database model’s lamina, such
that the causal network of computational states shows functional organization as multiply
realizable; accordingly, there is a level of organization above the level of physiology (viz.,
“mental” or “computational”) that determines narrow intentional content.
Concomitant to convolutional “neural networking” and deep learning, our media paradigm-shift has divulged that machines are, in fact, agents determinately bound within a field
of “pathologically distorted” techniques and part of a network of relations, indexing how economic calculations convert the machinic function “from mechanical-technical to perceptualeconomic” as in the example of cinematic performance capture (which, much like in Andy
Serkis’ infamous roles, uses predictive motion capture that infers to simulated digital environments in real-time; Koch 2019: 7; Erkan 2019: 228).
Traditionally, the causal terms of “machine learning” have not been adequate to describe
exactly how organisms are world-models, themselves, as function-modelling research in cortical conductor-based generative neural networks delineates (Hinton et al. 2011; Mountcastle 1997; Jaeger 2001). As computer scientists such as Joscha Bach have demonstrated via
“cortical conductor theory”, any notion of “organic” autonoetic cognition is a transcendental
illusion, “a cavern within which an inverted image of the real holds sway, one that prevents
us from penetrating to the imperceptible conditions of perception (the virtual)” (Brassier in
Somers-Hall 2018: 264). Despite our experiences are directed outwards, they exist beforehand in a primordial dream-like assemblage—phenomenal consciousness “is the reconstruction of a dream generated [by] more than fifty brain areas, reflected in the protocol of a
single region” (Bach 2018: 5). Our cognitive processes combine visual objects, para-linguistic
230
LA DELEUZIANA – ONLINE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY – ISSN 2421-3098
N. 11/2020 – DIFFERENTIAL HETEROGENESIS
maps, and procedural dynamics into a “persistent dynamic simulation, which can be used to
continuously predict perceptual patterns at our systemic interface to the environment”
(Bach 2018: 4). As in Predictive Processing, the processing stream of bottom-up cuing of
perceptual hypotheses (such as objects or situations) is matched by a “topdown verification”
of these hypotheses (through the simulative capacity of the neocortex), where the “binding
of the features” is cohesively modelled. Research concerning our neural cortical columns
shows that it here that we model compositional approximation and reward distribution, as
is the case with inductive machine learning, but our brain can still perform most of its functions without the presence of the conductor (Bodovitz 2008, Safavi 2014, Del Cul 2009).31
Severed from our cortical conductors, the functor between our neuroplasticity and machine
learning’s processual input, “we are sleep walkers”, capable of coordinated perceptual and
motor action, but without central coherence and reflection (Bach 2018: 4).
Bayesian interpretations of cognition suggest that, as we contract events and repetitions,
we are simultaneously optimizing our predictive model; at the infinitesimal scale, Bach’s
“cortical conductor theory” evinces that the formal-computational reformulation of inductive reasoning can persist beyond the stronghold of prior probability metrics. Differential
heterogenesis thus provides us with a dialectical method to contract these ideas into virtual
relation and a naturalized “scientific image”. Further considerations, which we do not possess the prolixity to attend to at this time but which my dear colleagues have prudently endeavored over with their incisive philosophical scalpels, are elaborately examined in this issue of La Deleuziana. For instance, one would be wise to turn to “Escaping the Network”,
where Anna Longo takes up evolutionary game theory as a framework to move beyond the
biological modelling of populations, considering the “network society” vide complexification
through technologically-tethered normative schemes of action.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Alliez, É. (2000). “Midday, Midnight: The Emergence of Cine-Thinking”. In G. Flaxman, The
Brain is The Screen. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota. 293-303.
Bach, J. (2018). “The Cortical Conductor Theory: Towards Addressing Consciousness in AI
Models”. Postproceedings of BICA 2018.
Batterman, R. (2010). “Emergence in Physics”. In Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Abingdon: Taylor and Francis.
Baumbach, N. (2018). Cinema/Politics/Philosophy. New York: Columbia University.
31 In fact,
cortical conductor’s “reward-based” mechanist modelling is exactly how Google Deepmind’s AlphaGo
AI was constructed.
231
LA DELEUZIANA – ONLINE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY – ISSN 2421-3098
N. 11/2020 – DIFFERENTIAL HETEROGENESIS
Bailly, F., & Longo, G. (2011). “Mathematics and the Natural Sciences: The Physical
Singularity of Life”. Advances in Computer Science and Engineering Texts 7. London and
Hackensack, N.J.: Imperial College Press.
Bergson, H. (1946). The Creative Mind. New York: The Philosophical Library.
Bergson, H. (1975). Mind-Energy. Westport-London: Greenwood.
Bergson, H. (2005). The Creative Evolution. New York: Cosimo.
Bergson, H. (2007). Matter and Memory. New York: Cosimo.
Block, N. (2003). “Mental Paint.” In M. Hahn & B. Ramberg (eds.), Reflections and Replies:
Essays on the Philosophy of Tyler Burge. Cambridge, MA: MIT, 165-200.
Bodovitz, S. (2008). “The neural correlate of consciousness”. Journal for Theoretical Biology,
254, 3. 594-8.
Boyer, C. (1959). The History of the Calculus and Its Conceptual Development. Mineola: Dover.
Bryant, L. R. (2008). Difference and Givenness—Deleuze’s Transcendental Empiricism and the
Ontology of Immanence. Evanston: Northwestern University.
Bryant, L. R. (2011). The Democracy of Objects. London: Open Humanities Press.
Bryant, L. R. (2014). Onto-Cartography—An Ontology of Machines and Media. Edinburgh:
Edinburgh University.
Churchland, P. (2011). Consciousness and the Introspection of ‘Qualitative Simples’. Eeidos, 15.
12-47.
Annalisa B., Citti, G., & Cupini, G. (2019). “Schauder estimates at the boundary for sublaplacians in Carnot groups”. Calculus of Variations and Partial Differential Equations, 58,
6. 1-43.
Del Cul, A., et al. (2009). “Causal role of prefrontal cortex in the threshold for access to
consciousness”. Brain, 132, 9. 2531-2540.
De Landa, M. (2013). A New Philosophy of Society—Assemblage Theory and Social Complexity.
London: Bloomsbury.
De Landa, M. (2015). “The New Materiality”. Architectural Design, 85, 5. 16-21.
De Landa, M. (2016). Assemblage Theory. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University.
Deleuze, G. (1986). Cinema 1: The Movement Image. Trans. H. Tomlinson and B. Habberjam.
Minneapolis: University of Minnesota.
Deleuze, G. (1989). Cinema 2: The Time-Image. Trans. H. Tomlinson and R. Galeta.
Minneapolis: University of Minnesota.
Deleuze, G. (1990). The Logic of Sense. Trans. M. Lester and C. Stivale. London: Athlone.
Deleuze, G. (1991). Bergsonism. Trans. H. Tomlinson and B. Habberjam. New York: Zone
Books.
Deleuze, G. (1993). The Fold—Leibniz and the Baroque. Trans. T. Conley. London: Continuum.
Deleuze, G. (1994). Difference and Repetition. Trans. P. Patton. London: Athlone.
Deleuze, G. ([1990] 1995). “Postscript on Control Societies”. In G. Deleuze, Negotiations,
1972–1990. Trans. M. Joughin. New York: Columbia University, 177-182.
232
LA DELEUZIANA – ONLINE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY – ISSN 2421-3098
N. 11/2020 – DIFFERENTIAL HETEROGENESIS
Deleuze, G. (2003). Francis Bacon: The Logic of Sensation. New York: Continuum.
Deleuze, G. (2005). Pure Immanence: Essays on a Life. Trans. A. Boyman. Brooklyn: Zone
Books.
Deleuze, G. (2006a). Two Regimes of Madness—Texts and Interviews 1975 – 1995. Trans. A.
Hodges and M. Taormina. New York: Semiotext(e).
Deleuze, G. (2006b). Nietzsche and Philosophy. Trans. H. Tomlinson. New York: Columbia
University.
Deleuze, G., & Guattari, F. (1977). “Balance Sheet Program for Desiring-Machines”.
Semiotext(e), 2, 3. 117-135.
Deleuze, G., & Guattari, F. (1983). Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia. Trans, R.
Hurley, M. Seem, and H. R. Lane. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota.
Deleuze, G., & Guattari, F. (2005). A Thousand Plateaus. Trans. B. Massumi. Minneapolis:
University of Minnesota.
Duffy, S. (2013). Deleuze and the History of Mathematics – in Defense of the New. London:
Bloomsbury.
Duffy, S. (2006). Virtual Mathematics. London: Clinamen.
Erkan, E. (2019). “Psychopower and Ordinary Madness: Reticulated Dividuals in Cognitive
Capitalism”. Cosmos and History: The Journal of Natural and Social Philosophy, 15, 1, 214241.
Fazi, M. B. (2018). Computation Abstraction: Experience, and Indeterminacy in Computational
Aesthetics. New York: Rowman and Littlefield.
Galloway, A. (2016). Laruelle: Against the Digital. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota.
Hadamard, J. (2018). Lectures on Cauchy's Problem in Linear Partial Differential Equations.
London: Forgotten Books.
Heidegger, M. (1998). On the Essence of Ground. Trans. W. McNeil. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge
University.
Hinton, G. et al. (2011). “Transforming Auto-encoders”. International Conference on Artificial
Neural Networks. Springer: Berlin.
Hui, Y. (2019). Recursivity and Contingency. New York: Rowman and Littlefield.
Jaeger, H. (2001). “The “echo state” approach”. German National Research Center for
Information Technology. GMD Technical Report, 148, 34. 13.
Kapp, E. (2018). Elements of a Philosophy of Technology. Trans. L. K. Wolfe, ed. by J. W.
Kirkwood and L. Weatherby. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota.
Kittler, F. et al. (1996). “Technologies of Writing”. New Literary History, 27, 4, 738.
Kleinherenbrink, A. (2019). Against Continuity: Gilles Deleuze’s Speculative Realism.
Edinburgh: Edinburgh University.
Koch, G. (2019). “Animation of the Technical and the Quest for Beauty”. In G. Bachmann, T.
Beyes, M. Bunz, W. Chun (eds), Machine. Lüneberg: Meson. 17-39.
233
LA DELEUZIANA – ONLINE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY – ISSN 2421-3098
N. 11/2020 – DIFFERENTIAL HETEROGENESIS
Larvor, B. (2011). “Albert Lautman: Dialectics in Mathematics”. In K. François, B. Löwe, T.
Müller, B. Van Kerkhove (eds.). Foundations of the Formal Sciences VII, Bringing Together
Philosophy and Sociology of Science. London: College Publications, 185-204.
Laughlin, R., & Pines, D. (2000). “The Theory of Everything”. In Proceedings of the National
Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, 97, 1. 28-31.
Lautman, A. (2011). Mathematics, Ideas and the Physical Real. Trans. S. Duffy. New York:
Continuum.
Lautman, A., & Cavaillès J. (1994). « La Pensée Mathématique ». In Oeuvres Complètes de
Philosophie des Sciences. Trans. R. MacKay. Falmouth: Urbanomic. 593-630.
Leibniz, G. L. (1989). Leibniz: Philosophical Essays. Trans. R. Ariew and D. Garber.
Indianapolis: Hackett.
Leroi-Gourhan, A. (1993). Gesture and Speech. Cambridge: MA, MIT.
Longo, A. (Forthcoming). “Escaping the Network”.
Longo, G., & Montévil, M. (2014). Perspectives on Organisms: Biological Time, Symmetries and
Singularities, Lecture Notes in Morphogenesis. Berlin and Heidelberg: Springer.
Maïmon, S. (2010). Essay on Transcendental Philosophy. London and New York: Continuum.
Manovich, L. (1999). “Database as symbolic form”. Convergence: The International Journal of
Research into New Media Technologies, 5, 2. 80-99.
Maturana, H.R. and Varela, F.J. (1992). The tree of knowledge: The biological roots of human
understanding (rev. edition). Boston: Shambhala.
Mountcastle, V. B. (1997). “The columnar organization of the neocortex”. Brain, 20, 4. 701722.
Moynihan, T. (2019). Spinal Catastrophism. Falmouth: Urbanomic.
Nagel, T. (1974). “What Is It like to Be a Bat?”. The Philosophical Review, 83, 4. 435-50.
Negarestani, R. (2009). “Differential cruelty: a critique of ontological reason in light of the
philosophy of cruelty”. Angelaki, 14, 3. 69-84.
Negarestani, R. (2018). Intelligence and Spirit. Falmouth: Urbanomic.
Nozick, R. (2003). Invariances: The Structure of the Objective World. Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University.
Oden, J.T. (2008). “The Tyranny of Scales: The Challenge of Multiscale Modeling and
Simulation”. Simulation-Based Engineering Science, 5. Washington, DC: NSF.
Parisi, L. (2013). Contagious Architecture: Computation, Aesthetics, and Space. Cambridge:
MIT.
Petitot, J. (2004). Morphogenesis of meaning. Trans. F. Manjali. New York: Peter Lang.
Presutti, E. (2009). Scaling Limits in Statistical Mechanics and Microstructures in Continuum
Mechanics. Dordrecht: Springer.
Rancière, J. (1998). “Existe-t-il une esthétique deleuzienne?”. In E. Alliez (ed.), Gilles Deleuze,
une vie philosophique. Le Plessis-Robinson: Institut Synthélabo. 525-536.
234
LA DELEUZIANA – ONLINE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY – ISSN 2421-3098
N. 11/2020 – DIFFERENTIAL HETEROGENESIS
Reynolds J. et al. (2010). Postanalytic and Metacontinental: Crossing Philosophical Divides.
New York: Continuum.
Rosenberg, J. (1986). The Thinking Self. Philadelphia: Temple University.
Rosenthal, D. (2016). “Quality Spaces, Relocation, and Grain”. In J. R. O’Shea (ed.), Sellars and
His Legacy. Oxford: Oxford University.
Russell, B. (1913). “On the Notion of ‘Cause’”. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, New
Series, 13, 23.
Sacilotto, D. (2020). Saving the Noumenon: An Essay on the Foundations of Ontology. Ed. N.
Brown. Manuscript in preparation.
Safavi, S. et al. (2014). “Is the frontal lobe involved in conscious perception?”. Frontiers in
Psychology, 5, 1063. 1-2.
Sarti, A., Citti, G., & Piotrowski, D. (2019). “Differential heterogenesis and the emergence of
semiotic function”. Semiotica, 230. 1-34.
Sarti, A., & Barbieri, D. (2018). “Neuromorphology of Meaning”. In Quantitative Semiotic
Analysis. New York: Springer.
Sauvagnargues, A. (2018). “Proust According to Deleuze. An Ecology of Literature”. La
Deleuziana, 7. 10-26.
Schefer. J. L. (2016). The Ordinary Man of Cinema. South Pasadena: Semiotext(e).
Simondon, G. (2006). On the Mode of Existence of Technical Objects. Trans. C. Malaspina and
J. Rogove. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota.
Stiegler, B. (2019). The Age of Disruption: Technology and Madness in Computational
Capitalism. London: Polity.
Teissier, B. (2007). Géométrie et cognition: l’exemple du continu dans Ouvrir la logique au
monde. Ed. J. B. Joinet and S. Tronçon. Paris: Hermann. (Original Translation)
Thom, R. (1990). Semio Physics: A Sketch, The Advanced Book Program. Redwood City:
Addison-Wesley.
Turing, A. (1950). “Computing machinery and intelligence”. Mind, 59. 433-460.
Wilson, M. (2006). Wandering Significance. Oxford: Oxford University.
Wilson, M. (2018). Physics Avoidance and other essays in conceptual strategy. Oxford: Oxford
University.
235