IMMIGRATION
BRIEFINGS
L
From the Publisher of INTERPRETER RELEASES
Practical Analysis of Immigration and Nationality Issues
FAMILY AS A SOCIAL CONSTRUCT IN
EL SALVADOR, HONDURAS, AND
GUATEMALA: VISIBILITY AND
VULNERABILITY OF FAMILY
MEMBERS OF INDIVIDUALS
TARGETED BY ORGANIZED CRIMINAL
GROUPS
by Dr. Thomas
Boerman*
Family is the most prominent and basic unit of society in Central
America – recognized as such by the constitutions, churches, and
anyone remotely familiar with the region.1
Across the broadest possible range of stakeholders in El Salvador,
Honduras, and Guatemala (the Northern Triangle countries of
Central America), it is universally agreed that family is the most
recognizable social institution in the Northern Triangle societies; in
fact it is considered to be the most fundamentally important social
construct in the region. Ironically, while there is a relatively robust
anthropological and sociological literature related to various dimensions of intra-familial dynamics and family functioning in the
Northern Triangle, there is a dearth of research regarding the actual
social constructs around family itself and its visibility in society.
The absence of such a literature may reflect the fact that these
concepts are so fundamental, so elementary, and so commonly
understood that among researchers, academics, governmental
personnel, representatives of non-governmental organizations, and
IN THIS ISSUE:
THE CENTRALITY OF FAMILY AS A
SOCIAL CONSTRUCT .......................
2
DEMOGRAPHIC APPROACH
VERSUS GENEALOGICAL
METHODOLOGY OF DEFINING
FAMILY ...............................................
4
SOCIAL CONSTRUCTS AND
PERSPECTIVES OF FAMILY ............
5
ECONOMICS, POVERTY, THE
ABSENCE OF STATE AND THE
EFFECT ON FAMILIES ......................
6
A NOTE ABOUT THE TERM
“GENERALIZED VIOLENCE” ...........
7
MIGRATION AND INTERNAL
DISPLACEMENT: IMPLICATIONS
FOR FAMILY CONFIGURATION,
FUNCTIONING, AND VISIBILITY ......
7
GENDER AND INTERNAL
RELOCATION ....................................
9
FAMILY COMPOSITION AND THE
VISIBILITY AND VULNERABILITY
OF UNPROTECTED CHILDREN AND
YOUTH ...............................................
9
COERCED SERVICE TO GANGS:
MODERN-DAY SLAVERY ..................
9
GANG CULTURE AND MENTALITY:
IMPLICATIONS FOR TARGETED
INDIVIDUALS .....................................
10
KINSHIP TIES AND RISK TO
FAMILY MEMBERS ............................
11
GANG CULTURE, VIOLENCE
AGAINST FEMALES AND THEIR
FAMILY MEMBERS ............................
14
CONCLUSION ....................................
16
*Thomas Boerman holds a Ph.D. in Special Education. His academic and research focus involved the relationship between special
education and/or psychiatric disabilities and involvement in antisocial and criminal behavior with an emphasis on the personal and ecological variables that underlie the initiation, maintenance, and cessation of gang activity; the culture and psychology of gangs; and the development of ecologically valid individual and community gang intervention protocols.
Dr. Boerman has worked as a consultant to numerous governmental and non-governmental organizations addressing the gang phenomenon in El Salvador, Honduras, Guatemala, Panama, and Mexico and authored or contributed to over a dozen reports and articles on
organized criminal activity and gender-based violence in El Salvador, Honduras, Guatemala, and Mexico. Since 1995, he has presented on a
range of issues related to gangs and organized criminal activity at approximately 150 events throughout the U.S. and serves as the Executive
Director of the newly forming Central American Research & Dissemination Institute.
Since 2006, Dr. Boerman has served as an expert witness in over 1,000 American-Mexican gang, organized crime, gender-based
and/or sexual orientation immigration matters in U.S. and Canadian immigration courts, provided expert testimony in over 500 of those
cases, and facilitated numerous trainings to a broad range of immigration professionals throughout the U.S.
Mat #42492860
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IMMIGRATION BRIEFINGS
the public at-large there is simply no perceived need to
research or document them.
In Honduras, Article 6 of the Código de la Familia
(family code) states:
The centrality of family is such an essential element
of the societal fabric that it is actually enshrined in the
constitutions in the Northern Triangle. The Salvadoran
Constitution states:
The application, interpretation and regulation of this
Code shall be inspired by the unity and strengthening
of the family, the interest of children and minors, equal
rights and obligations of spouses, as well as the other
principles (contained in) the Fundamentals of Family
Law.4
The Constitution of the Republic recognizes the family
as the fundamental basis of society and imposes the
duty to enact the necessary legislation for its protection, integration, welfare and social, cultural and economic development.2
According to Article 2, the family is defined as:
The permanent social group, constituted by marriage,
non-matrimonial union, or kinship.
Similarly, Article 47 of the Guatemalan Constitution
states:
. . . Marriage is considered in Guatemalan law as a
social institution, especially protected because the family is established from it, and from this the State.3
Article 48 of the Constitution acknowledges nonmatrimonial unions:
The State recognizes the de facto union and the law
will prescribe everything related to it.
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2
THE CENTRALITY OF FAMILY AS A
SOCIAL CONSTRUCT
There are multiple and overlapping factors that give
rise to the fundamental importance of family as a social
construct in the Northern Triangle and which differentiate it from the U.S. and many other industrialized societies. First, for a host of social, cultural and
economic reasons, inter-generational kinship ties are
key to personal and collective identity as well as physical, emotional, and economic survival. This pattern is
particularly prominent within the low- and lowerincome sectors of the region where, due to longstanding cultural patterns and socioeconomic pressures, virtually every dimension of daily life involves
integration and cooperation within and between
families.
The networks of life are the social fabric where solidarity and mutual support guarantee collective wellbeing.5
Multiple generations routinely live in the same
households, family compounds, neighborhoods, and
small communities. Adult, adolescent, and child family members often work together in both the formal
and informal economies and play active and coordinated roles to address every dimension of the family’s
needs, including income sharing. The parent or parents
may work to provide for the family’s most basic needs,
leaving other kinship group members to earn additional income to cover other essentials, such as the
costs associated with children’s schooling, medical
care, special occasions, car and home repairs, investment in home-based businesses, and unexpected
expenses. Even young children often contribute to the
family income whether through selling inexpensive
products on the streets, doing menial labor outside the
home, and/or, in situations of extreme impoverishment, begging.
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In addition to income generating and sharing, from
the time people are old to enough to contribute until
they are too elderly or unhealthy to do so, the day-today work of maintaining the family is shared across
generations. While such activities as child rearing and
elder care occur within the home and out of public
view, others put family members into contact with
residents of the community, thereby increasing the
degree to which the family or kinship group as a whole
is recognized. For example, a grandparent may walk
his or her grandchildren to and from school every day
and in the process become known or recognized by
street vendors, shop owners, teachers, and other school
staff.
Economic survival strategies also frequently contribute to the recognizability of families. For instance,
for many families, critical supplemental income—and
oftentimes the sole income—is derived from work in
the home (e.g., food vending, small store fronts, auto
repair, altering or fabricating clothing, hair styling,
etc.), which literally puts local residents on the family’s
property and even into merchants’ homes. Rooms
within houses, yards, patios, and front stoops serve as
bases for small-scale commerce and corresponding
social interaction.
Across the region there are thousands of homebased pulperias (small stores that sell drinks, snacks,
etc.), pupusarias (small eateries that produce and sell
pupusas, a sort of stuffed tortilla) and other food producers, mechanics who work out of their yards, sastres
(tailors) who alter and make clothing their homes, and
women and their daughters who run home-based hair
and nail salons. These home-based merchants may
draw dozens of people to their homes or property every
day, which results in social interaction and recognition
of the family unit and, oftentimes, knowledge of the
details of their personal lives.
Adding further to social recognizability is the fact
that home and family-based ventures often involve
multiple members of the family, each fulfilling different roles to support the process, which further increases
the family’s visibility among members of the
community. For example, in the case of a family
involved in home-based food production and sales, the
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woman may be responsible for the actual food preparation while her domestic partner and/or their children
or grandchildren gather supplies from vendors in the
community, serve customers, sell products on the
street, and make deliveries.
Each of these patterns is distinct from the U.S.,
where these types of highly integrated, collaborative,
life- and family-sustaining intergenerational linkages
are no longer a defining feature in today’s culture.
Generally speaking, multiple generations of a family
in the U.S. do not live in the same households, family
compounds, or neighborhoods, and by early adulthood
people have either left for college or begun the process
of forming their own family units that in terms of physical and economic survival are largely independent
from their parents, siblings, grandparents, and other
extended family members.
This relative independence creates a social space
between family members so that people are less likely
to be strongly identified based on their membership in
a family or kinship group and in fact are frequently not
associated with any family unit at all. There are exceptions to this, of course, but in cases in which members
of a clan are dispersed within and between different
cities, states, and even countries—a pattern that is
common in the U.S.—people are not so commonly
known based on their kinship ties or in many cases
even connected to a particular family unit or kinship
group.
The relative lack of social mobility is also critical in
the Northern Triangle as the majority of people live in
same neighborhoods, small communities, and rural areas for the entirety of their lives. They live in the same
places where they, their parents, and often their grandparents were born. And when people do move away,
the distances tend to be relatively short, and they
maintain frequent contact with their family members
who remain in the area and with others in their community of origin.
Another crucial factor that gives rise to the recognizability of family units and kinship groups is a hypervigilance as to who is in the social environment. In
part, these levels of awareness are a product of social
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and cultural norms while in part they are a function of
self-protection; people, particularly those in the lowand lower-income areas where violence is most heavily concentrated, are acutely aware of who is in the
environment because this knowledge is crucial in the
ongoing process of assessing risk.
As an illustration of this, a long-term legal resident
of the U.S. reported:
I went to visit my mother in Honduras but I wanted it
to be a surprise, so I didn’t tell her I was coming. I
stopped to eat at a restaurant about 45 minutes from
where she lives and by the time I got to her house, she
had gotten three phone calls from people telling her
that they had seen me; one of them told her what I had
for lunch.6
According to a U.S. citizen who married into a Guatemalan family:
The first question people ask when they meet someone
new is, “Which nuclear family, or branch of an extended family, are you from?” When I became part of a
Guatemalan family through marriage and added my
husband’s last name to mine, the first thing people tried
to ascertain upon meeting me was which branch of the
family we were part of, the ones from Guatemala City
or the ones from Eastern Guatemala; the ones related
to the person who was a General in the military, or the
ones related to the school teacher hero who was killed
as part of a student demonstration in the overthrow of
the dictatorship in 1944.7
Certainly, if an individual or family moves into a
new neighborhood in the U.S. or another industrialized country, they will be recognized as newcomers,
but their arrival is unlikely to initiate a swirl of concern
about who they are, where they are from, and whether
they pose a danger. Nor is news of their presence likely
to be conveyed back to their previous community
through social interaction or criminal networks as
frequently occurs when people in the Northern Triangle
relocate to new areas—oftentimes within hours or
days.
This hyper-vigilance as to who is in the social
environment is critical in the case of those internally
displaced by violence as it makes it highly likely, and,
depending on circumstances, a virtual foregone conclusion, that those they are fleeing will learn of their
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IMMIGRATION BRIEFINGS
whereabouts. As an illustration, the author is familiar
with a Salvadoran family that relocated five times in
hopes of escaping threats from the Mara Salvatrucha
(MS13) and in each case was located; in another case,
the gang located the family within 24 hours after
relocating to a community in another part of the
country.
The issue of social visibility is critical in the case of
people who have fled the country and are later forced
by circumstances to return. If they return to the same
community that they fled, which for reasons of economics and lack of social capital is common, everyone
knows that they are back, including those who pose an
imminent danger. Alternatively, for reasons previously
described, if they relocate to a new area, it is highly
likely that those who pose a risk will learn of their
whereabouts and either travel to that area or mobilize
their criminal associates in the new community to
renew and carry out threats against the individual or
family.
DEMOGRAPHIC APPROACH
VERSUS GENEALOGICAL
METHODOLOGY OF DEFINING
FAMILY
From both a legal and sociological perspective,
definitions and constructs of family are reflections of
the approach taken to assess it; most commonly these
involve a demographic versus a genealogical approach.
The demographic approach is based on census data
whereas the genealogical approach involves methodologies that result in the collection of data not easily
gathered or assessed through government surveys.
In terms of a legal standard in the U.S., the demographic approach is taken in which “family” is defined
by the United States Census Bureau as:
A group of two people or more (one of whom is the
householder) related by birth, marriage, or adoption
and residing together.8
The second half of this definition has obvious
implications in that it severely restricts the definition
of family by limiting it to persons related through
blood, marriage, or adoption and who, with limited
exceptions (e.g., children in college, the military,
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IMMIGRATION BRIEFINGS
engaged in short-term travel, etc.) reside under the
same roof.9 In this model, other than these types of
exceptions, people who might otherwise be considered
family from a social perspective are not included in
the legal definition because they do not live in the same
household.
As opposed to the demographic approach, the genealogical method provides for a more expansive definition which includes kinship ties that link ancestors and
dependents.10 The genealogical approach also allows
for a definition of family that includes parents and children as well as other subfamily groupings but is not
tethered to shared residence and that encompasses patterns that shift in response to crisis and hardship in
which kin move across households in ways that cannot
be captured through a static census-based approach.
Stated differently, the genealogical approach is more
accommodating of relationships and living patterns
that do not fit squarely in the demographic model of
family and that more accurately reflect the complex
and shifting realities of El Salvador, Honduras, and
Guatemala.
SOCIAL CONSTRUCTS AND
PERSPECTIVES OF FAMILY
Although the word “family” is one of the most commonly used terms in the vernacular of any society, as
well as within the research literature across multiple
disciplines, its meaning and the social constructs
around it are not always clear or a matter of consensus.
In part, the confusion arises from the fact that the word
may refer to multiple forms of relatedness and connections which, while clearly understood, recognized, and
accepted in one social or cultural context, may be
distinct from, and even in conflict with, the defining
constructs in another.
At the most basic level there is significant confusion
around what distinguishes a “family” from a “household” as well as what differentiates a “family” or
“household” from a “kinship group.” “Family” is generally recognized as the most restrictive construct
because it typically applies only to individuals linked
through blood, marriage, or adoption and who, with
limited exceptions noted previously, reside together.
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Conversely, the concepts of “households” and “kinship groups” can reflect a diverse range of linkages
and forms of connectedness that may or may not be
based on blood, marriage or adoption, or shared living
arrangements.11
These constructs become even more malleable and
arbitrary when considered from a cross-cultural
perspective. Within the Northern Triangle for instance,
if the half-brother of a householder’s cousin is strongly
linked to that household (e.g., provides support to the
family, visits frequently, attends church, works with
the householder or members of their family, etc.), the
social constructs are such that he will likely be perceived as part of the family or kinship group despite
that fact that he is not related by blood, marriage, or
adoption and does not live in the home. Similarly, the
stepson of a householder’s niece may reside in the
home because the child’s parents are living outside the
country or had been internally displaced, and the
stepson may be perceived as part of the family despite
the fact that there is no relationship based on blood,
marriage, or adoption and he is only in the household
in response to an urgent situation.
From a cross-cultural perspective, “domestic
unions” can also be a confusing term for which there is
lack of consensus. Even the term “marriage,” which is
recognized as one of the most basic of social institutions, can engender uncertainty. For instance, commonlaw marriage is legally recognized in each of the
Northern Triangle countries and is not seen as socially
or culturally distinct from formal marriage, particularly
in the low- and lower-income sectors. Within the U.S.,
however, the constructs around common-law marriage
raise questions in terms of its legal, social, and cultural
validity; the privileges, rights, and responsibilities that
accrue to each of the parties; and even the degree to
which people in this type of union are recognized as
family versus involved in transitory relationships of
convenience.
Irrespective of setting, social constructs around human relatedness tend to be oversimplified and mask
their true complexity and fluidity. This includes Central
America, where concepts of the stereotypical family
built around a mother, father, and children living under
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the same roof and operating as a unified economy no
longer conform to social reality.12 As opposed to this
traditional model, according to a study on the family
in El Salvador, what actually exists are multiple forms,
structures, and organizations that vary significantly
from profiles of the “typical” family.13
Although some characteristics of the nuclear and
extended families are still present, new elements and
arrangements are incorporated today to make up an infinite range of combinations.14
ECONOMICS, POVERTY, THE
ABSENCE OF STATE AND THE
EFFECT ON FAMILIES
Before discussing additional dimensions of family
composition, visibility, and vulnerability, it is important to describe the relationship between violence and
poverty as the intersecting point between the two has
direct implications for at-risk families. In contrast to
the common misperception in the U.S. that violence is
ubiquitous throughout El Salvador, Honduras, and
Guatemala and affects everyone, access to financial resources affords one the opportunity to situate himself
or herself and their family and kinship group members
in more secure areas, to craft lives in which, generally
speaking, they are shielded from violence and are reasonably assured of access to functional justice system
mechanisms if they do find themselves at risk or being
victimized.
For those in the lower-income sector, however, the
protective buffer available through financial resources
does not exist, meaning that, for at least two reasons,
economics and violence are deeply intertwined. First,
those most chronically exposed to risk almost invariably live in the low-income sector where violence is
concentrated and where governments are largely
absent in terms of an appropriate and effective civil
and security presence. Second, because those in the
low-income sector lack the financial resources and/or
social capital necessary to relocate to more secure areas, they are trapped in violent environments in which
those at particularized risk are frequently forced into a
binary choice: Stay home and die, or flee.
According to a United Nations representative in the
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region, when assessing cases in which people are
forced to flee:
Almost none has a predominant factor: either only
because of violence, or only because of economics. It’s
almost always multicausal.15
The absence of an effective and protective state is
crucial in its effects on human mobility as it results in
the at-risk population in the lower economic sector being largely—and, in many instances, entirely—
abandoned by their governments. According to an official of a United Nations program in the Northern
Triangle region that works with vulnerable
populations:
People are so accustomed to the non-presence of state
that when you ask what they expect from their governments they say, “Nothing, we don’t expect anything”
. . . they are already so accustomed to it (being abandoned by the state) that they don’t expect anything
from the government.16
The term “absence of state” does not imply that
Northern Triangle countries are failed states as each
has established legal frameworks, functioning ministries and institutions, and other elements of functional
states. Rather, what exists is a dynamic better characterized by clientized relationships between state and
non-state actors, both legal and illicit, that allow clients
or interest groups to access and leverage the resources
of the state—legitimate as well as corrupt. Interest
groups, or clients, include political allies, the economically advantaged, large-scale business interests, and
gangs and other criminal groups that operate in collusion with corrupt government and private sector actors.
Through these clientized relationships with government actors, interest group members enjoy the benefits
of political influence and support, the space to operate
in pursuit of their objectives, and, of critical concern,
security and justice system access—which, in a practical sense are privileges, or commodities, available to
some rather than a right guaranteed to all and enshrined
in policy and practice.
Alternatively, the at-risk population in the lowerincome sector, which is excluded from these types of
clientized relationships, has been effectively abandoned by the governments of the region as it relates to
functioning justice system institutions, physical secuK 2019 Thomson Reuters
IMMIGRATION BRIEFINGS
rity, social services, and other essential services.
Together, between 2015 and October 2018, the Northern Triangle countries accounted for 54,752 murders
in a geographical context roughly half the size of the
France,17 the vast majority of which occurred in the
low-income sector. Within this context of almost
unimaginable violence, the consensus within the general public and a broad array of governmental and nongovernmental personnel and other experts is that the
Northern Triangle states are absent in any meaningful
sense. In fact, the social construct that defines public
security as a fundamental responsibility of government
is not deeply enshrined in policy or practice.
The state increasingly is conceived as being owned by
an exclusive class or group, with all others pushed
aside. The social contract that binds inhabitants to an
overarching polity becomes breached. Various sets of
citizens cease trusting the state.18
As an example of the differential access to governmental services across sectors of society based on economic status, there have been high-profile instances
where members of the upper-middle class have been
targeted for kidnapping for ransom in which governments responded in a swift, decisive, and effective
manner to investigate and prosecute. Conversely,
thousands of people in the low-income sector vanish
every year and are never seen nor heard from again,
and governments take little or no meaningful action.
In fact, historically, Northern Triangle states have not
even had meaningful structures in place to investigate
these disappearances. To illustrate, according to El
Salvador’s Attorney General, between January and
July 2019, 1,811 people were reported as disappeared,
and, of that total, less than 30% were later found alive,
and the rest are presumed dead and buried in clandestine cemeteries. Gangs are believed responsible for the
majority of the disappearances.19 Despite the fact that
rates of disappearance have remained consistent for
several years, it was not until July 2019 that the Attorney General announced the formation of a unit
specifically to respond to these cases.20
A NOTE ABOUT THE TERM
“GENERALIZED VIOLENCE”
The term “generalized violence” has been employed
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recently as a means of describing conditions in the
Northern Triangle. While it has applicability and is relevant in a certain sense, there are a number of points to
bear in mind regarding the term: (1) it implies that
violence is ubiquitous throughout the region when in
fact it is highly concentrated in the low-income sectors, (2) population in areas characterized by generalized violence is not homogenous in terms of their
exposure to risk, and (3) those who have been particularly targeted by gangs are at exponentially higher risk
than the general population in that same area.
Certainly, anyone living in a context of generalized
violence is at potential risk, but it is commonly recognized that, generally speaking, people displaced by
violence flee in response to threats that are particular
to them versus risks that affect the population at large
within that area. Stated differently, there tend to be
discernable differences between those exposed to
generalized violence as compared to those within the
same environment facing particularized threats, and it
is those exposed to particularized threats that confront
the binary choice of remaining in their homes and dying or fleeing.
MIGRATION AND INTERNAL
DISPLACEMENT: IMPLICATIONS
FOR FAMILY CONFIGURATION,
FUNCTIONING, AND VISIBILITY
Faced with this crisis, Central American families and
women are regrouping in a number of different ways:
They are in an accelerated process of adjusting, restructuring and reformulating the traditional patterns of
constituting and shaping the family as well as its functions as a unit of biological reproduction, production,
accumulation, consumption and socialization, and as
an entity of power.21
Since the 1990s, mass migration and forced internal
displacement has had profound effects on the social
constructs around family and its configuration, functioning, and visibility in the Northern Triangle, but the
drivers of human movement have changed over time.
In the 1980s and 1990s, it was fueled primarily by
populations fleeing civil conflict and/or people seeking
economic opportunity, primarily males. Today the
dynamics are more complex, migrants and the internally displaced are more likely to be women, children,
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and, at times, entire families, and the decision to flee is
more often driven by the cumulative effect of particularized risks associated with (1) gangs, other organized
criminal groups, gender-based and/or state-sponsored
violence, (2) absent governments and unresponsive,
overwhelmed, and failing justice system institutions,
and (3) the constraining effects of poverty as it relates
to the response choices available to those facing
threat.22
Although there are many instances in which entire
families flee their community or country, it also often
is the case that only one person, or a subset of a family,
migrates externally. There are a number of reasons for
this: (1) families frequently lack the resources for
everyone to make the journey to the U.S. as human
smugglers charge thousands of dollars per person, so
families are forced to prioritize those most at risk, (2)
depending on age, gender, and health considerations,
the trip may be too arduous and dangerous for many,
and (3) some members of the family or kinship group
may be forced to remain behind to care for ill or elderly
parents, children with disabilities, family property,
and/or small businesses.
In cases of forced internal displacement, social
capital is a critical issue. For those in the lower economic sector—essentially the totality of the forcibly
displaced—the proposition that an entire family can
relocate to a new community in which they lack a supportive and protective family network is widely regarded as a fallacy; social, cultural, and economic factors make this all but impossible in most cases.
Consequently, assuming that they have a kinship
network, internally displaced persons (IDP) are forced
to relocate to areas in which they have family members
able and willing to take them in. Oftentimes however,
those who house the displaced are only able to accommodate one person, or a small subset of the family,
forcing other members of the family or kinship group
to remain behind or scatter to the homes of others willing to accommodate them.
Whether through external migration or internal
displacement, the fragmentation of families results in
increased social visibility and risk to those who remain.
When an individual or subset of a family or kinship
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IMMIGRATION BRIEFINGS
group leaves, others in the community notice that they
are suddenly gone. Typically, there are no good-bye
parties during which those who are leaving share their
plans with friends and neighbors and make their
goodbyes; rather most often they leave in secret in an
attempt to be as invisible as possible and to minimize
the attention that their departure brings to their loved
ones who remain behind.
According to a representative of the Office of International Migration in Honduras:
From our work in communities and in cases of displacement, much of what keeps the phenomenon invisible is
that people are moving in a drop by drop dynamic . . .
they are not leaving en masse, not collectively as we
have seen in recent months (with the caravans). People
leave anonymously, without saying anything about
why there are doing it or reporting to authorities. One
reason is because they do not trust in the authorities
and the protection mechanisms exist in the government,
and second, because they want to remain anonymous,
not saying where they are going.23
Concerns about those left behind are particularly
crucial if (1) the departed left due to danger from gangs
or other violent actors as their loved ones are likely to
be at risk of being targeted as proxies and/or (2) those
who remain behind are women and children who now
lack a protective male presence in the home and would
be perceived as defenseless and therefore open to
predation.
Complicating the situation further is the fact that
internally displaced persons (IDPs) cannot simply
move into the homes of any family member able and
willing to take them in as they must be mindful of
where those family members live. For example, if one
is fleeing the Mara Salvatrucha (MS13), they cannot
relocate to another MS13-controlled area, which, by
definition, may involve moving to a Barrio 18 (aka
Mara 18) controlled zone. Like MS13, however, Barrio 18 members are obsessed with knowing who is in
their territory and predictably confront and victimize
strangers (and oftentimes those who harbor them)
criminally or harm or kill them simply because they
are unknown entities and do not belong in the territory.
Due to their social visibility, IDPs are often forced
to live as virtual prisoners in the home because they
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still fear being located by those whom they fled, plus
they are likely to be at risk from gangs and/or other violent actors that operate in the area where they are now
living. As a result, both for their own safety as well as
the safety of the family members who are harboring
them—whose social visibility increases as a result of
taking them in—IDP adults are often unable to work,
and children are unable to attend school because doing
so involves venturing out into the new community, further increasing their visibility and vulnerability.
People from all three NTCA (Northern Triangle of
Central America) countries who moved internally prior
to leaving the country said that they had experienced
the same problems and insecurity after their internal
relocation – and that this had resulted in their subsequent external migration.24
GENDER AND INTERNAL
RELOCATION
There are particular concerns as it relates to females
forced to relocate internally and their recognizability
and visibility. As an overarching concern, unless a
woman has a supportive, protective family network
able and willing to take her in, the notion that she can
relocate to a new area is widely regarded as a fiction, a
reflection of a profound lack of understanding of the
multiple political, social, cultural, economic, and
gender factors at play across the Northern Triangle.
Women forced to relocate to an area where they do
not have a supportive and protective family network
would be immediately recognized as unprotected and
would be at high and predictable risk from gang
members, sexual predators, abusive police, and labor
market abusers because they are seen as defenseless,
lacking male defenders, and therefore vulnerable to
predation with virtual assurances of impunity. Additionally, due to social and cultural factors, women
relocating to areas in which they lack an intact family
network typically find that doors of opportunity are
closed to them in terms of employment, access to
credit, and even housing.25
The dangers and constraints that women encounter
when attempting to escape danger by relocating to an
area in which they lack a supportive and protective
family network are so grave and predictable that for all
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practical purposes, one can say that they simply do not
do so.
FAMILY COMPOSITION AND THE
VISIBILITY AND VULNERABILITY
OF UNPROTECTED CHILDREN
AND YOUTH
The family composition and social visibility of children and youth who lack adequate adult protection is
crucial. There are essentially four groups of unprotected young people, including (1) children and youth
in female-headed households or who are under the care
of either young or elderly family members who are not
perceived as representing a protective presence, (2)
those from toxic, male-dominated households characterized by emotional, physical, sexual, and/or drug or
alcohol abuse, (3) children forced to live on the streets,
and (4) young people that have reached the age of majority but, due to a host of social, cultural, and economic factors, are unable to attend to their own most
basic needs without a supportive and protective family
network.
Unprotected young people are recognizable to the
public in general and to gang members in particular
within their neighborhoods and small communities. As
in the case of unprotected females, they are recognized
as defenseless, without defenders, and subject to
predation with expectations of impunity. Simultaneously, once children and youth have been identified as
unprotected and targeted for victimization or actually
subjected to it, it also puts other members of their family at increased risk. In essence, what exists is a feedback loop in which their family status and corresponding visibility makes unprotected children and youth
vulnerable to predation by gangs, and, once targeted,
other members of their family are vulnerable due to
their familial relationship to the victim.
COERCED SERVICE TO GANGS:
MODERN-DAY SLAVERY
A particular risk to unprotected young people and
their families involves coerced service to gangs. As
opposed to membership, which entails expectations of
reward (e.g., money, protection, camaraderie, power,
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etc.), coerced service is more accurately characterized
as modern-day slavery.
The U.S. State Department in El Salvador states:
Gangs actively recruit, train, arm, and subject children
to forced labor in illicit activities – including assassinations, extortion, and drug trafficking – and force
women and children to provide sexual services and
childcare for gang members’ children.26
In Honduras, the U.S. Embassy reports:
NGOs (non-governmental organizations) report that
gangs and criminal organizations exploit girls in sex
trafficking, and coerce and threaten young males in
urban areas to transport drugs, engage in extortion, or
to be hit men.27
The U.S. State Department in Guatemala reports:
Criminal organizations, including gangs, exploit girls
in sex trafficking and coerce young males in urban areas to sell or transport drugs or commit extortion.28
According to the United Nations Special Rapporteur
on Contemporary Forms of Slavery:
These practices constitute, prima facie, contemporary
forms of slavery and are prohibited by international
human rights law.29
Case Profile: Jaysson
Jaysson was left in the care of an uncle after his
mother migrated to the U.S. His mother was sending
money to the uncle, but he was squandering it and not
only failing to care for Jaysson but also abusing him
and periodically throwing him out of the house and
forcing him to live on the street.30
MS13 members began offering Jaysson food and a
place to stay in return for doing simple favors for them.
They later began subjecting him to beatings and
demanding that he engage in criminal activity on
behalf of the gang, telling him that they “owned him.”
After he learned of MS13’s involvement in serious
crime, including the murder of a police officer, members of the gang began monitoring Jaysson constantly
and warning him that if he disclosed information about
their activities, they would kill him.
Jaysson was eventually taken in by missionaries and
cut all ties to MS13, but members of the gang encoun10
IMMIGRATION BRIEFINGS
tered him later and demanded that he repay his “debt”
for the care that they had provided him in the past.
Specifically, they demanded that he sell drugs to
students in the school that he was attending; provide
intelligence on the Barrio 18, which controlled the
area around the school; and assist in the extortion of
school staff. Jaysson refused, and members of the gang
told him that he would always be “MS13 property”
and if he refused, he would be killed. With assistance
from the missionaries who had taken him in, Jaysson
fled the country but states that he knows that MS13
will kill him if he ever returns and is located.
In Jaysson’s case, the singular factor in the gang’s
decision to target him arose from his visibility as a
member of his family; specifically, the fact that his
mother had left the community and that his uncle, his
guardian, was abusing him. Together, these resulted in
his recognizability in the colonia (neighborhood),
which in turn led directly to his experience of predation by the gang.
GANG CULTURE AND MENTALITY:
IMPLICATIONS FOR TARGETED
INDIVIDUALS
Assessing the danger that gangs pose to people
based on their familial relationships to targeted individuals involves an understanding of the strategy of
terror through which they establish and maintain
control over physical territory, criminal markets, and
the population itself. While moving through gangcontrolled areas one commonly sees the words Ver,
Oir, Callar (watch, listen, and keep quiet) painted on
walls; this is one of the ways in which gangs communicate that they hold sway over everything that happens in territories under their control, including life
and death.
Actions that challenge or thwart gangs’ objectives,
such as rebuffing demands for extortion, coerced service, or exploitative male-female relationships; espousing anti-gang political sentiments; participating in
community, church, or school-based gang prevention
or intervention activities; or cooperating with police,
prosecutors, or courts are perceived as challenges,
“insults,” and acts of “disrespect” that demand a violent, punitive, and publicly visible response.
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There are a number of critical sub-points associated
with gang mentality that once must also understand.
First, once targeted, the gravity of the threat toward an
individual typically does not diminish across time,
oftentimes even over the course of years. At times,
threats are acted on immediately whereas in other instances, there may be a passage of time—even a significant amount of time—before the targeted individual is subjected to harm. There are many internal and
external variables that may affect the timing of a
gang’s decision to act on threats. Those factors are
unlikely to be known to those outside the gang, but the
passage of time without harm cannot be taken to mean
that the risk no longer exists; this would violate the
most fundamental tenets of gang culture and mentality.
In fact, failure to subject people to harm once they have
fallen into disfavor would not only erode the respect
and reputation that is so important to gangs and gang
members, but it would also undermine the very strategy upon which gangs operate because it would convey
a message that if enough time passes, the threat will
dissipate and the gang will let you go on with your life.
Second, gangs are defined by a group identity and
an institutional memory and operate with a sense of
solidarity wherein members are almost unconditionally willing to act violently on behalf of those with
whom they share favorable relationships, such as other
gang members, family members, and friends. This
means that, in addition to being at risk from any particular gang member, targeted individuals and their
loved ones are likely to be at risk from the gang as a
whole, or other clicas (individual gang cells) associated with that gang. Because gangs operate with an
institutional memory, even if the members through
whom the threat originated are now in prison, dead,
out of the area, or no longer involved with the gang,
the targeted individuals and their family members
would typically remain at risk.
Third, the act of fleeing or going into hiding to avoid
gangs’ demands and risk of harm is perceived as a
challenge and antagonistic act, so if one flees and is
forced by circumstances to return to the area or relocates and is later found, the level of risk that he or she
encounters is likely to be substantially higher than at
the time of his or her departure. Beyond a desire to
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punish the individual who fled, the intent is to convey
a message to the larger community that attempting to
escape by fleeing will result in even more serious
reprisals.
The act of fleeing may also result in risk to the family members left behind as gangs routinely seek them
out to coerce information on the person who fled:
In many cases, the gangs continue to target family
members of individuals who fled the country in order
to exert pressure on the individuals, or to coerce the
family members into providing information on the
whereabouts of the main targets.31
KINSHIP TIES AND RISK TO
FAMILY MEMBERS
While family constitutes a fundamentally important
social construct in virtually every society, for at least
two reasons gangs and other organized criminal groups
make the Northern Triangle unique in this respect.
Specifically, around the world there are precious few
examples in which (1) gangs and other organized criminal groups control and/or indirectly influence virtually every dimension of day-to-day life, including
government policy and practice, to the degree that they
do in El Salvador, Honduras, and Guatemala and (2)
the victimization of family members of targeted individuals represents a central element in a strategy of
terror through which organized criminal groups establish and maintain control over physical territory, criminal markets, and the population itself and come to exert such an outsized influence over government policy
and practice. Across both of these measures, there are
few comparators.
Because of its centrality as a social unit, targeting or
threatening family members is an effective way for
gangs to force their primary target to comply with their
demands, or to punish or terrorize them.32
The implications of this strategy are overwhelming
not only in terms of the sheer number of people who
are victimized solely as a result of their membership in
their nuclear and/or extended family but also in terms
of its contribution to gangs’ level of control over communities and the psychological maladies of the
population.
This strategy of terror has not been adopted simply
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to facilitate criminal activity. Rather, it is part of a
larger political agenda, as gangs (1) are frequently
acknowledged by officials of the Northern Triangle
governments and the public as de facto authorities in
areas under their control, (2) routinely engage in activities normally associated with governance (e.g., imposing and enforcing curfews; erecting traffic checkpoints;
forcing evictions from private residences; imposing
“taxes” for use of public infrastructure, living in one’s
home, and operating a business, church, or school; and
frequently collaborating with elected officials or political candidates to influence elections),33 (3) at times
negotiate with governmental and non-governmental
representatives to determine, directly or indirectly,
governmental and non-governmental policies and
practices, and (4) operate in direct collusion with corrupt state officials across multiple levels of
government. Without a political agenda and the means
to operationalize that agenda, gangs simply could not
function at the level that they do.
Throughout the dictatorships of the twentieth century,
human rights abusers in Latin America threatened,
tortured, raped, and killed family members of their
victims as a means to force them into complying with
demands to provide information, confess to alleged
crimes, or to spy on the opposition. Central America
gangs and organized crime groups have drawn upon
this history of targeting family members to advance
their goals of psychologically torturing victims into
paying extortion; participating in criminal activities;
not testifying or otherwise providing evidence of
crimes to the authorities; or even leaving the country.34
In order to operationalize the dimension of their
strategy that involves the targeting of family members,
it is absolutely essential that gangs are cognizant of
who is connected to whom through kinship ties in communities under their control, changes in family composition, who has family in the U.S. or other countries,
etc.; without this, they would be unable to implement
this fundamental component of their strategy.
The generalization of threat is not limited to members of an individual’s nuclear family but often affects
members of the extended family as well. As described
previously, family is defined in much broader terms in
the Northern Triangle than is typically the case in the
U.S., and in fact, depending on the nature of the link12
IMMIGRATION BRIEFINGS
ages and interactions between members of the kinship
group, there may not be any clear distinction between
nuclear and extended family:
The family, indeed the extended family, is a highly visible unit in Central American and Latin American
society. As such, when one member is targeted by a
gang such as MS13 or the Barrio 18, it is quite common for other members of that extended family to be
targeted and also in danger of harm.35
In the case of El Salvador, this perception of the risk
to family members goes beyond one of common
societal recognition and has been affirmed as a matter
of law. In a 2018 case involving 33 members of eight
family groups, the Supreme Court of El Salvador ruled
that threats by gangs against one member of a family
constituted threats against the extended family and that
the government is obligated to enact mechanisms to
protect those at risk.36
An additional concern relates to the family members
of individuals forced to flee due to gang threats and
violence as gang members predictably harass, threaten,
harm, and kill them in an attempt to coerce information on the location of the targeted individual or to
harm the family members as proxies for the targeted
person. Oftentimes the threat to other family members
is greater than to the initial target, and it often involves
pursuing loved ones after the targeted individual has
been murdered, an attempt to “punish them in the
grave”:
In cases in which the gangs have killed their intended
targets, they often attack the wakes and funerals held
by their relatives.37
Family members who remain may be at risk of being used as leverage points for gang’s efforts to
criminally victimize the target’s loved ones as well.
Case Profile: The Juarez Mendocino Children
Arnulfo, Rogelio, and Kassey’s parents left Guatemala for Mexico to take employment on a large finca
(ranch) and were sending money to the children’s
grandparents to attend to their care. It soon became
common knowledge that they were working in Mexico,
and Barrio 18 members approached the grandparents
saying that the parents would have to pay a monthly
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fee to ensure the children’s safety. For several months
the parents complied, but the demanded sums soon
exceeded their earnings, and they were unable to make
the payments.
came when members of the gang threatened to rape
Mario and shot at him and his mother, which forced
both of them to migrate because they had no internal
relocation options.
Recognizing the danger, the grandparents withdrew
the children from school and kept them on virtual lockdown in the house. Barrio 18 responded by threatening to kill the children if the parents didn’t resume the
extortion payments. After initiating efforts to protect
them, the gang members menaced the family outside
the home, savagely beat one of the boys and abducted,
raped, and impregnated Kassey. The children were all
forced to flee Guatemala. Following their departure,
Barrio 18 members attempted to locate the children
and told the grandparents that they would be killed if
they returned because they had thwarted the gang’s
attempts to extort the parents.
In Mario’s case, the nature of community life and
intolerant social attitudes toward persons of nonconforming sexual orientation resulted in Julian’s
sexuality becoming common knowledge, and gang
members, who as a group tend to be among the most
homophobic members of society, turned their outrage
on Mario and his mother as proxies for Julian.
In the case of the Juarez Mendocino children, they
found themselves trapped between their parents, who
were the victims of the extortion demands, and the
gang. The Barrio 18 leveraged the fact that the parents’
presence in Mexico, and that they were sending remittances to the grandparents, was commonly known in
the community, which resulted in direct risk and
extreme harm to the children.
Those who remain behind may also be caught up in
violent dynamics between their family members who
fled and the gang members who forced their departure.
Case Profile: Mario
For over a year, members of the Barrio 18 harassed,
threatened, and beat Mario’s older brother, Julian,
because it was known in the community that he was
gay. Following a beating that required significant
medical attention, Julian fled the country. After Julian
left, the gang members began demanding that Mario
provide information on his whereabouts, and when he
said that he didn’t know where Julian had gone and
was not in contact with him, Barrio 18 members told
him that he “would pay” for his brother’s homosexuality and escape. Over the next several months, the gang
beat Mario on multiple occasions, one of which required hospitalization, and said that he would “take
it” for his “maricon” (gay) brother. The tipping point
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Others at risk due to their familial relationships can
include the children of police officers, local political
officials, clergy members, and/or others who have
taken an actual or perceived anti-gang stance within
the community or are affiliated with institutions that
take a pro-rule-of-law position. In these instances,
gangs essentially impose a multa (fine, penalty) upon
the parents as a result of their pro-rule-of-law, antigang social, political and/or moral values by laying
claim to their children. In addition to punishing, terrorizing, and controlling the parents, coercing these youth
may also reflect a gang’s desire to strike a strategic
and/or symbolic blow against the institutions that the
parents represent.
Case Profile: Jose Luis
Jose Luis’ father was a pastor involved in outreach
to at-risk youth, including young people at early stages
of gang involvement. At one point, MS13 demanded
that Jose Luis transport drugs on their behalf as
“punishment” over his father’s actions. He refused,
but the following morning, a member of the gang
confronted him as he walked to school, gave him a
backpack, and told him to deliver it to another student,
whom Jose Luis knew to be a gang member. This went
on for several weeks, but Jose Luis never told his
parents because he felt so guilty. MS13 then demanded
that Jose Luis start selling small amounts of marijuana
to other youth from the church. He told them that none
of his friends would buy or use drugs, but gang members forced him to take the marijuana and told him
that he was responsible for selling it and delivering the
money to them. Jose Luis threw the marijuana away
and used money that he had saved from his part-time
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job to pay off the gang. Shortly thereafter, gang members told Jose Luis that he needed to provide information on young people who were participating in his
father’s youth group and recruit other religious youth
into service to MS13.
Jose Luis eventually told his father about the situation, and his parents arranged for him to leave the
country, knowing that they had no internal relocation
options and that MS13 would kill him if he remained
in the community. Following Jose Luis’ departure, the
gang began threatening members of his family, forcing
them to make significant alterations in their lives to
minimize the danger. Meanwhile, members of the gang
continued to confront Jose Luis’ family members, saying that they would kill him if he returns.
In Jose Luis’ case, what developed was a circular
pattern of threat in which MS13’s animosity toward
his father was generalized to him, then the gang
members’ ire with Jose Luis for defying them and fleeing the country generalized back to the members of his
family.
The risk to family members is so great that hundreds
of thousands have been forcibly displaced. In a 2015
study of 20 municipalities, a Honduran government
commission concluded that 41,000 homes—approximately 175,000 people—had been forced to internally
relocate and roughly 70% reported that threats and
violence were the single factor.38 By December 2018,
the figure had risen to 190,000.39 In El Salvador, according to a 2014 study, approximately 280,000 people
had been displaced, primarily due to violence over the
previous several years, and that by 2016 the figure had
risen to 325,000.40
GANG CULTURE, VIOLENCE
AGAINST FEMALES AND THEIR
FAMILY MEMBERS
When a gang says, “This is my territory,” they are talking about everything, the houses, the businesses, the
people, and specifically the women and girls.41
A particularly dire concern relates to gang culture
and violence against females in terms of the implications not only for the victims but also for their families.
In patriarchal societies such as the Northern Triangle,
14
IMMIGRATION BRIEFINGS
it is critical that gang members ensure that they will be
perceived as dominant over females whether an intimate partner or a member of the community; to do
otherwise would be ruinous to their self-image and
standing with other gang members. Stated differently,
in a region with some of the highest rates of genderbased violence in the world, gang members tend to be
the most hyper-masculinized of the hypermasculinized, and arguably the most violent, which
puts women at a significantly higher risk than is typically the case with non-gang-involved offenders.42
Gangs employ sexual and gender-based violence
(SGBV) against women to (1) assert their general dominance over females, (2) punish those that have fallen
into disfavor, (3) indirectly punish males that have
fallen into disfavor by harming the women they care
about, and (4) convey a message to the community atlarge that there is no limit to gangs’ audacity and
willingness to engage in barbarism. Stated differently,
violence against females is a central element of gangs’
strategy of terror, and females are particularly targeted
for reasons that advance that strategy.43
To this last point, beyond simply being perceived as
extreme individual expressions of misogyny, it is essential to recognize that violence against females is
also a direct manifestation of this strategy of terror and
a means by which gangs advance their political agenda:
Gang members have raped and tortured girls and left
their mutilated and dismembered bodies in public
places to demonstrate their dominance of the area and
instill fear in the community.44
The presence of a robust male in an adolescent or
adult female’s life represents a powerful protective factor whereas the absence of such a protective male presence represents an equally powerful risk factor. As
such, status as an unprotected female predicts gangrelated violence against them, making it difficult to
differentiate between the criminal victimization that
they experience, or are at risk of, and their status as an
unprotected female.45
It is not only targeted females that are at risk but
also members of their families:
Failure to comply (with gang members’ demands) is
reportedly met with severe reprisals, including homi-
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cides of the girl’s or woman’s entire family or the threat
of such violence.46
I am familiar with numerous situations in which
young girls had been abducted by gang members and
held captive in which their parents essentially sacrificed their daughter to the gang because they feared
that seeking police assistance would have put the other
children—or the entire family—at risk of reprisals. In
one emblematic case, a young girl had been abducted
by a gang as a “birthday present” for the clica leader
and ended up being held in sexual slavery and domestic servitude. When asked if the parents had reported
the incident to police, the father responded, “Well, no
. . . she is his [the gang leader’s] now, and I can’t risk
my other children.”47
Once gang members have threatened or subjected a
young girl or woman to physical and/or sexual violence, she and members of her family are at exponentially higher risk of future victimization as compared
to other females with no such history of threats or
abuse. The risk of future victimization arises from
gang members’ perceptions that women are “property”
of the individual member or, at times, the gang as a
whole. This notion of “property” is conveyed through
the terms “Jaina” and “Morra,” gang colloquialisms
that reflect gang members’ sense of ownership over
females as human beings and their lack of any personal
agency, authenticity, or rights and, by extension, to
members of their families.48
In her 2016 report on Contemporary Forms of
Slavery in El Salvador, the United Nations Special
Rapporteur noted gangs’ practices of enslaving females, including “instances in which gang members
had physically invaded the homes of women, evicted
or killed male members of the household and forced
the women to work in domestic and sexual
servitude.”49
The Special Rapporteur went on to say:
The most common form of extreme extortion of sexual
and other services described by the interlocutors
involves forcing them to provide sexual services to
gang members in prisons. Gang members reportedly
threaten women and their families with violence or
death in order to force them to repeatedly make conjugal visits to gang leaders and members in prisons.50
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Case Profile: Carolina
Carolina was known in the community as living with
only her elderly grandmother. At the age of 15, MS13
members abducted her, held her captive, and forced
her into sexual slavery and domestic servitude. The
gang demanded that she tell her grandmother that she
was moving in with a new boyfriend and threatened to
kill the grandmother if Carolina disclosed the situation to her. After several months in captivity, Carolina
pleaded with the clica leader to allow her to visit her
grandmother. He granted her occasional visits, but the
supposed boyfriend went with her to ensure that she
did not advise her grandmother of her captivity or attempt to escape.
During the time she was held captive, Carolina
reported that she was raped by over a dozen members
of the gang and, after turning 18, was forced to
smuggle contraband into a prison. During this time,
the clica leader continually reiterated the threat to kill
her grandmother if Carolina refused to comply or attempted to escape.
Carolina eventually escaped and went into hiding in
another community, but the gang located her and forcibly took her back to the home where she had been held
captive. She was beaten to the point that she was unable to function for several days, and the clica leader
told her that if she attempted another escape, they
would kill not only her grandmother but also her baby,
who was born of rape and who lived with the
grandmother. When the leader was arrested and key
members of the gang were killed, it created an opportunity for Carolina to flee the country; the grandmother and the baby were also forced to flee as MS13
would almost certainly have killed both of them to
“punish” Carolina for her actions.
The fear associated with reporting gang-related
SGBV and threats of SGBV is so overwhelming that
the majority of victims, those at risk, and their families
choose not to seek police or other government assistance, particularly when coupled with the conditioned
belief that doing so is futile:
When victims of sexual and gender-based violence live
in gang-controlled areas or when perpetrators have
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gang affiliations, crimes are even more likely to result
in impunity. Many victims do not report violence
because they do not trust authorities or because they
know that doing so will put them, and their families, at
greater risk of retaliation by gangs. Those few who do
report violence confront the unwillingness or inability
of the state to provide either protection or justice.51
CONCLUSION
The social constructs around family, its centrality as
the most important social institution in the Northern
Triangle, and its social visibility in the region are
universally recognized by the broadest possible range
of stakeholders and are considered so fundamental as
to be beyond question or need for analysis. Equally
well recognized is the fact that the targeting of family
members of individuals who have fallen into disfavor
with gangs and other organized criminal groups, or
who are otherwise targeted by them, is a central element in the strategy of terror through which they establish and maintain control over physical territory,
criminal markets, and the population itself and come
to exert a perverse and outsize influence over government policy and practice.
The nature of life in El Salvador, Honduras, and
Guatemala is such that within the low-income sectors,
one cannot escape being identified as part of a family
or kinship group, which in the case of individuals and
families facing particularized and life-threatening
dangers often represents a virtual death sentence unless individuals are able to defy the odds and internally
relocate successfully or to flee the country.
ENDNOTES:
IMMIGRATION BRIEFINGS
opinion/2017/08/05/familia-es-la-comunidad-que-te-c
uida.
6
Author interview (Sept. 16, 2014).
7
Dr. Norma Chinchilla, Professor Emeritus of Sociology and Women’s, Gender and Sexuality Studies
(Sept. 23, 2019) (written communication on file with
author).
8
United States Census Bureau, Glossary, available
at https://www.census.gov/en.html.
9
P.C. Glick, American Families (1957).
10
K.R. Smith and G.P. Mineau, Genealogical Records, in Encyclopedia of Population (Paul Demeny
and Geoffrey McNicholl ed., 2003).
11
These and other related constructs have been
exhaustively documented by researchers from various
disciplines, including from the fields of anthropology,
sociology, psychology, medicine, education, criminology, geography, feminist studies, linguistics, and
international development.
12
Central America’s Family and Women: What
Does Reality Say? Envio: Información sobre Nicaragua y Centroamérica, No. 168 (July 1995).
13
Id.
14
Id.
15
Author interview, San Pedro Sula, Honduras
(Jan. 2019). Source requested anonymity.
16
Author interview, Tegucigalpa, Honduras (Jan.
2019). Source requested anonymity.
17
Evolución Anual de la Tasa de Homicidios en Los
Países del Norte de Centroamérica, U.S. Agency for
International Development and the United Nations
Development Program (Oct. 25, 2018), available at
https://www.infosegura.org/2018/10/25/evolucion-anu
al-de-la-tasa-de-homicidios-en-los-paises-del-norte-d
e-centroamerica-2 (accessed May 2, 2019).
18
1
Richard Jones, Senior Technical Advisor Latin
America & Caribbean, Catholic Relief Services (Sept.
23, 2019) (written communication on file with author).
2
Código de Familia Decreto °677 (1993).
3
Corte de Constitucionalidad Constitución Polítca
de la Repubica de Guatemala. August 2002.
4
Código de Familia, http://www.poderjudicial.go
b.hn/CEDIJ/Leyes/Documents/CodigoDeFamilia-Oct
2017.pdf.
5
Familia es la comunidad que te cuida, El Peridico
(Aug. 5, 2017), available at https://elperiodico.com.gt/
16
Id.
19
Fiscalía Registra 1,811 Desaparecidos en Este
Año, ElSalvador.com (July 16, 2019), available at
https://www.elsalvador.com/noticias/nacional/fiscaliaregistra-1811-desaparecidos-en-este-ano/621744/2019
(accessed September 25, 2019).
20
La Fiscalía Creará Unidad Especial para Investigar Casos de Personas Desaparecidas en El Salvador, ElSalvador.com (July 8, 2019), available at
https://www.elsalvador.com/noticias/nacional/fiscaliacreara-unidad-para-investigar-casos-de-personas-desa
parecidas/619273/2019 (accessed Oct. 5, 2019).
K 2019 Thomson Reuters
IMMIGRATION BRIEFINGS
21
Central America’s Family and Women: What
Does Reality Say? Envio: Información dobre Nicaragua y Centroamérica, No. 168 (July 1995).
22
Natural disasters and the effects of climate
change also contribute to migration and forced displacement and in certain areas may contribute more
significantly than does violence.
23
Author interview, International Migration, San
Pedro Sula, Honduras (Jan. 31, 2019). Source requested anonymity.
24
Factors Influencing Decision Making by People
Fleeing Central America, Forced Migration Review
(Oct. 2017), https://www.fmreview.org/latinamerica-c
aribbean/knox (accessed Apr. 25, 2019).
25
Author interview with Salvadoran Judge Amelia
Velazquez (Aug. 7, 2018). Although this interview was
focused on females in El Salvador, according to my
own direct experience and the observations of numerous professional colleagues in Guatemala and Honduras, unaccompanied females would encounter the same
obstacles in those countries.
26
U.S. State Department, El Salvador, 2018 Trafficking in Persons Report (June 28, 2018), available at
https://www.state.gov/reports/2018-trafficking-in-pers
ons-report/el-salvador.
27
U.S. Embassy Honduras, Trafficking in Persons
2014, available at https://hn.usembassy.gov/our-relatio
nship/policy-history/current-issues/issconc_trafficking
(accessed Aug. 5, 2019).
28
U.S. State Department, Guatemala, 2018 Trafficking in Persons Report (June 28, 2018), available at
https://www.state.gov/reports/2018-trafficking-in-pers
ons-report/guatemala.
29
U.N. Special Rapporteur on Contemporary
Forms of Slavery, Rep. of the Special Rapporteur on
Contemporary Forms of Slavery, Including Its Causes
and Consequences, on Her Mission to El Salvador,
¶ 13, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/33/46/Add.1 (Aug. 3, 2016),
available at https://ap.ohchr.org/documents/dpage_e.a
spx?si=A/HRC/33/46/Add.1.
30
As with each of the case profiles, the names have
been changed and the facts altered to a slight degree to
ensure confidentiality. The experiences described,
however, are reflective of the actual situation and
emblematic of the experiences of young people.
31
Lawrence M. Ladutke, Ph. D., Freedom of Expression in El Salvador: The Struggle for Human
Rights and Democracy (2004).
32
Tommie Sue Montgomery, Ph.D., Revolution in
K 2019 Thomson Reuters
DECEMBER 2019 | ISSUE 19-12
El Salvador (2d ed., 1995).
33
These activities and gangs’ status as political actors have been documented by the Salvadoran, Honduran, Guatemalan, and U.S. governments, the United
Nations, the Organization of American States, numerous governmental and non-governmental international
development organizations, Central American and
international human rights monitors, and the Central
American and international media.
34
Lawrence M. Ladutke, Ph. D., Freedom of Expression in El Salvador: The Struggle for Human
Rights and Democracy (2004).
35
Dr. Harry Vanden, Professor Emeritus, Political
Science, University of South Florida (Sept. 23, 2019)
(written communication on file with author).
36
Corte Suprema de Justicia de El Salvador [Supreme Court of Justice of El Salvador] July 13, 2018,
Amparo No. 411-2017, available at http://www.csj.go
b.sv/Comunicaciones/2018/07_JULIO/COMUNICA
DOS/Amp.%20411-2017%20Sentencia%20desplaza
miento_7MZT.pdf (accessed Nov. 6, 2019).
37
Dr. Harry Vanden, Professor Emeritus, Political
Science, University of South Florida (Sept. 23, 2019)
(written communication on file with author).
38
Comisión Interinstitucional para la Protección de
Personas Desplazados por la Violencia, Caracterización del Desplazamiento Interno en Honduras
(Nov. 2015).
39
Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, http://
www.internal-displacement.org/countries/honduras.
40
Latin America Working Group, No Life Here:
Internal Displacement in El Salvador (Feb. 18, 2016),
available at http://lawg.org/action-center/lawg-blog/
69-general/1588-no-life-here-internal-displacement-i
n-el-salvador.
41
Kids in Need of Defense, Neither Security nor
Justice: Sexual and Gender-Based and Gang Violence
in El Salvador, Honduras and Guatemala 3 (2018),
available at https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/file
s/resources/Neither-Security-nor-Justice_SGBV-Gan
g-Report-FINAL_0.pdf.
42
For a review of gang culture and violence against
females, see Boerman and Knapp, Gang Culture and
Violence Against Women in El Salvador, Honduras,
Guatemala,17-03 Immigration Briefings 1 (Mar.
2017).
43
Boerman interview, as cited in Kids in Need of
Defense, Neither Security nor Justice: Sexual and
Gender-Based and Gang Violence in El Salvador,
17
DECEMBER 2019 | ISSUE 19-12
Honduras and Guatemala (2018), available at https://r
eliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/NeitherSecurity-nor-Justice_SGBV-Gang-Report-FINAL_0.
pdf.
44
Kids in Need of Defense, Neither Security nor
Justice: Sexual and Gender-Based and Gang Violence
in El Salvador, Honduras and Guatemala 5 (2018),
available at https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/file
s/resources/Neither-Security-nor-Justice_SGBV-Gan
g-Report-FINAL_0.pdf.
45
This opinion was upheld in Alvarez Lagos v.
Barr, 927 F.3d 236, 250 (4th Cir. 2019).
46
U.N. Special Rapporteur on Contemporary
Forms of Slavery, Rep. of the Special Rapporteur on
Contemporary Forms of Slavery, Including Its Causes
and Consequences, on Her Mission to El Salvador,
¶ 33, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/33/46/Add.1 (Aug. 3, 2016),
available at https://ap.ohchr.org/documents/dpage_e.a
spx?si=A/HRC/33/46/Add.1. Although this report
focused on El Salvador, the principles and findings apply equally to Guatemala.
47
Author interview (Mar. 16, 2018).
18
IMMIGRATION BRIEFINGS
48
Information on females claimed as Jainas or
Morras has been gathered through hundreds of interviews that I have conducted with girls and young
women in El Salvador, Honduras, and Guatemala,
including dozens who have been claimed as property,
as well as representatives of governmental and nongovernmental organizations, including police, human
rights ombudsman, and women’s rights advocates.
49
U.N. Special Rapporteur on Contemporary
Forms of Slavery, Rep. of the Special Rapporteur on
Contemporary Forms of Slavery, Including Its Causes
and Consequences, on Her Mission to El Salvador,
¶ 34, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/33/46/Add.1 (Aug. 3, 2016),
available at https://ap.ohchr.org/documents/dpage_e.a
spx?si=A/HRC/33/46/Add.1.
50
Id. at ¶ 33.
51
Quoted in Kids in Need of Defense, Neither Security nor Justice: Sexual and Gender-Based and
Gang Violence in El Salvador, Honduras and Guatemala
3
(2018),
available
at
https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Neither-Secu
K 2019 Thomson Reuters
NOTES:
Readers who are interested in contributing an article or ideas for a future Briefing,
please contact: Melissa Funk, Trisha Gabriel or Andrew Pritchard
Telephone: (651) 687-3463, (651) 687-7094, (651) 848-5708
Email: melissa.funk@tr.com, trishia.gabriel@tr.com or andrew.pritchard@tr.com
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Eagan, MN 55123