Soviet foreign policy towards Latin America in the Cold War

Soviet foreign policy towards Latin America in the Cold War: A rival to the United States hegemony in the region? Bruno Quadros e Quadros1 Unicuritiba Abstract: This paper aims to discuss whether the Soviet foreign policy towards Latin America during the Cold War constituted an antagonist to the traditional American hegemony in the region. The discussion will consist in a factual reconstruction of the subject and an analysis of its regional and global consequences on the balance of power between the two superpowers, centered specially in those events which constituted milestones for the region during the Cold War, such as the Cuban Revolution (1959), the Cuban Missile Crisis (1962), the right-wing military regimes and the revolutionary movements, the Nicaraguan Revolution (1979) and the American invasion of Grenada (1983). The paper will be based in seven steps: first, as an introduction, the gestation of American hegemony in Latin America, the abandonment of Soviet Union’s status as a pariah in the international system and its first diplomatic contacts with the countries in the region will be approached; from this point on, the article will discuss Soviet foreign policy towards Latin America under each of the Kremlin’s leaders: first, Moscow-Latin America diplomatic relationship under Joseph Stalin’s government (1945-1953) will be analyzed; second, it will deal with Kremlin’s diplomatic relations with the region under Nikita Khrushchev’s rule (1953-1964); third, the same subject will be treated under Leonid Brezhnev (1964-1982); fourth, Yuri Andropov (1982-1984) and Konstantin Chernenko’s (1984-1985) foreign policy towards Latin America will be analyzed together, due to the brief period of their rule as General Secretaries of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU); fifth, the international effects of Mikhail Gorbachev’s (1985-1991) perestroika and glasnost’ will be focused with emphasis on the shifts of Moscow’s diplomatic ties with Latin America. Finally, some conclusive comments will be made in order to establish a good pattern of comprehension in a subject that is not so explored in the History and International Relations academic community. Keywords: Soviet Union; Foreign Policy; Latin America; Cold War; United States; Hegemony; Cuba. 1 Undergraduate in International Relations at Centro Universitário Curitiba (Unicuritiba), in Curitiba, Brazil. E-mail: bquadrosequadros@gmail.com. The author thanks the inestimable encouragement and 1 1. Introduction The introduction will consist in some elementary aspects to the comprehension of the Soviet foreign policy towards Latin America in the Cold War. Firstly, the gestation of American hegemony in Latin America will be briefly reconstituted. Secondly, the paper will discuss the international insertion of the Soviet Union during the interwar period and the gradual abandonment of its status as pariah in the international system. Then, Moscow’s first diplomatic contacts with Latin American nations before 1945 will be treated. After this introduction, the paper will approach Soviet foreign policy to Latin America under each of the General Secretaries of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) from 1945 on. Since factual reconstruction is the main goal of this article and due to its chronological and spatial broadness, events mentioned here will not be treated as deeply as they would be in a particular study, while the strictly analytical considerations will be situated in the conclusion. As a study on foreign policy, this paper will emphasize interstate relations between the USSR and Latin American countries, in its political, diplomatic, economic and military dimensions. Hence, the ideological aspects of Marxism-Leninism in Latin America and the role of Communist Parties in the continent will only be dealt when fundamental to a greater comprehension of the Soviet foreign policy to the region during the Cold War2. Latin America was a region of relative low priority to Soviet global foreign policy before the Cuban Revolution (1959). Nicola Miller identifies three great factors for it: (i) the marginal importance given to foreign trade under Stalin, whose economic orientation was guided by autarchic policies; (ii) “geographical fatalism” (as described by Soviet officials), namely, the perception that the proximity with the United States did not augur a closer relationship between the USSR and the Latin American states; and (iii) the anti-communism of expressive portions of Latin American elites3. collaboration of relatives, professors and friends, without whom the elaboration of this paper would not have been possible. 2 This paper will use Gaddis’ periodization of the Cold War, i.e. the period from 1945 to 1991 (GADDIS, John Lewis. História da Guerra Fria. Rio de Janeiro: Nova Fronteira, 2006). 3 MILLER, Nicola. Soviet relations with Latin America (1959-1987). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989. p.5-8. 2 Figures from the CIA show Latin America’s peripheral position inside Soviet diplomacy: the continent received only 5.6% of Soviet aid directed at non-socialist developing countries and less than 2.5% of Kremlin’s military assistance to the Third World between 1954 and 1978. In addition, the region was responsible for less than 1% of Soviet imports and less than 0.25% of Soviet exports between 1975 and 19784. In spite of these numbers, the importance of studying Kremlin’s foreign policy towards Latin America during the Cold War resides in the necessity of comprehending Soviet-Latin American relations in its different fields in order to have a more balanced panorama of the dynamics of power of the Cold War applied to the continent. 1.1. The formation of American hegemony in Latin America The process of formation of American hegemony5, continentally and globally, is commonly divided in two great stages: first, from 1776 to 1898; and second, from 1898 to 19456. Other delimitations go around this one, considering, depending on the author, events like the American Civil War (1861-1865) and First World War (1914-1918) as worthy of its own periodization7. The first stage, from the Independence (1776) on, saw the “[…] construction [and consolidation] of the nation, internal development and expansion”8. The period between 1776 and 1898 was marked by several events, such as the territorial expansion westwards, the Monroe Doctrine (1823), the Civil War, the economic growth and industrialization and, finally, the Spanish-American War (1898). Beyond its territorial annexations, American triumph over Spain favored Washington’s hegemonic position in the continent. This position would be exerted more assertively during the 20th century. 4 Ibid., p.5. This paper will use Arrighi and Silver’s conceptualization, based on Gramsci, by which hegemony means “[…] the additional power which belongs to a dominant group, due to its capacity to conduct the society in a direction that not only serves the interests of this dominant group, but is also perceived by the subaltern groups as serving a more general interest” (Italics by Arrighi and Silver). Thus, hegemony consists in the idea of “power inflation”, which is the ability of the dominant groups to present their domination with credibility to the subordinate groups, showing them that their interests are also being served (Free translation from Portuguese by the author) (ARRIGHI, Giovanni; SILVER, Beverly J. Caos e governabilidade no moderno sistema mundial. Rio de Janeiro: Contraponto/Editora UFRJ, 2001. p.36). 6 PECEQUILO, Cristina Soreanu. A política externa dos Estados Unidos. 2.ed. Porto Alegre: UFRGS Editora, 2005. p.31. 7 See the debate about the periodization of the formation of American hegemony in Ibid., p.31-35. 8 PECEQUILO, 2005, p.31 (Free translation from Portuguese by the author). 5 3 The second stage (1898-1945) was distinguished by the American transition “[...] from the marginal status to the leadership in the international system”9. Specifically regarding Latin America, Washington behaved in the region aiming at protecting its political and economic interests from the opposition movements against the governments supported by the United States. Basically, its action had a double nature: in Central America and the Caribbean, the “immediate periphery”, the US used direct military intervention due to the region’s institutional weakness; in South America, the “distant periphery”, the penetration had a more sophisticated character, through elite co-optation, economic incentives and support to pro-Washington rulers10. Direct interventionism in Latin America had its peak with Theodore Roosevelt’s (1901-1909) Big Stick and William H. Taft (1909-1913). The Platt Amendment (1902) and the installation of the base of Guantánamo (1903) made Cuba virtually an American protectorate. Furthermore, the US instigated Panamanian separatism from Colombia in order to obtain from the new state the concession to build the Panama Canal, what happened in 1903. After direct interventionism, the US adopted the good neighbor policy towards Latin America, in order to contain the rising anti-Americanism of Latin American modernizing elites and, after, to mobilize the countries from the continent against the threat posed by the Fascist totalitarianism in Europe. This policy, whose apex was under Franklin Roosevelt (1933-1945), was based on the promotion of peace between states (despite American isolationism in foreign policy matters), the creation of mutual political consultation mechanisms and the diffusion of American culture, values and principles to Latin America11. It was under this context that took place the cooperation between Latin American states and the Allies during the Second World War (1939-1945). After the Japanese attack at Pearl Harbor (1941), the bulk of them declared war on the Axis 9 Ibid., p.31 (Free translation from Portuguese by the author). PENNAFORTE, Charles. Geopolítica Norte-Americana para a América Latina. IN: TEIXEIRA DA SILVA, Francisco Carlos (coordinator) et alli. Enciclopédia de guerras e revoluções do Século XX: as grandes transformações do mundo contemporâneo. 1.ed. Rio de Janeiro: Elsevier, 2004. p.374-375. 11 SANTOS, Fabio Muruci dos. Política da boa vizinhança. IN: TEIXEIRA DA SILVA, Francisco Carlos (coordinator) et alli. Enciclopédia de guerras e revoluções do Século XX: as grandes transformações do mundo contemporâneo. 1.ed. Rio de Janeiro: Elsevier, 2004. p.691-692. 10 4 powers, without, however, having an effective military engagement, excepting Brazil, which sent about 25,000 soldiers to fight in Italy in 194412. At the end of the war, answering the challenges of a new international order, the US promoted a new institutional arrangement in the continent wishing to reformulate its influence in the region. This arrangement was conceived through the creation of international organizations such as the Organization of American States (OAS) in 1948, and treaties like the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (TIAR) in 1947, which provided for the mutual hemispheric protection in case of a military aggression from any non-American power, constituting a reaction to the Cold War bipolarity. 1.2. International insertion of the Soviet Union In its first years, the USSR, founded in 1922 as a direct product of the October Revolution in 1917, was set apart from the international system. From the Western powers’ point of view, the new regime needed to be contained and isolated from the other nations because the socio-economic order in which the Soviet state was based, antagonist to capitalism, was a potentially subversive force to the workers of Western Europe. Besides that, Moscow refused to pay the Western powers compensations for the nationalizations made after the Revolution and the loans contracted before the First World War13. In fact, the fragile international position of the young state in the twenties and Kremlin’s fear that a “[…] coalition of the ‘capitalist countries’” could be formed against the USSR obliged Soviet leaders to adopt a moderate and cautious foreign policy. This meant the discard of Trotsky’s theses, who wanted the USSR “[…] to come to the aid of the peoples of Europe ‘in the struggle against their oppressors” and the triumph of the more realistic stance of Stalin, whose goal was the “building of socialism in one country”, which, according to Pierre Renouvin, “[…] circumstances had made necessary” 14. In this scenario, it was fundamental to its gradual insertion into the European concert the Soviet-German rapprochement – Germany, as the defeated power in the First World War, was also marginalized. This rapprochement was inspired by 12 See SILVA, Hélio. O Brasil declara guerra ao Eixo (1943-1945). São Paulo: Editora Três, 1998. RENOUVIN, Pierre. War and aftermath (1914-1929). 1.ed. New York: Harper & Row, 1968. p.249261. 14 Ibid., p.260-261. 13 5 converging interests – such as the contention of Poland and the German need to test its prohibited weapons in Soviet territory –, finally published in the Treaty of Rapallo (1922), where the parties normalized their diplomatic relations, withdrew their post1918 territorial and financial claims and expanded their economic links15. In order to neutralize the potential negative effects of the Treaty of Rapallo (namely, the formation of a Soviet-German alliance against the post-Versailles international order) and, specially, motivated by economic interests in the Soviet market, the Western powers (France, United Kingdom and Italy) began to show a greater flexibility towards the Kremlin. This permitted that, by the end of 1924, the USSR was already diplomatically recognized by all great European powers16. Included in the European concert, the USSR needed to be inserted globally, what was done with its accession to the League of Nations in September 1934. At this stage, however, the League was already suffering transgressions from its members, in a context of withdrawal of the Liberal democracies and the rise of the Fascist totalitarian regimes. It was in this background that the USSR, having invaded Finland in November 1939, was expelled from the League of Nations on December 14th of the same year. 1.3. First Soviet diplomatic contacts with Latin America The first Soviet diplomatic contacts with Latin American states in the pre-Cold War period are divided in two distinct phases. In the first one (1922-1941), as a reflex of Soviet international isolation, Moscow had relations with only three countries in the continent: Mexico (1924-1930), Uruguay (1926-1935) and Colombia (1935-1948). Later, Mexico and Uruguay severed ties with the USSR due to accusations of Kremlin’s interference in their internal affairs. According to Miller, this was a result of the Soviet “two-track policy” towards Latin America in the thirties, where coexisted two incompatible practices: on the one hand, the incentive to militancy of the local Communist Parties and the funding of subversive activities domestically and, on the other hand, the maintenance of interstate relations with governments in the region17. The incipient exchange between the Kremlin and Latin American nations in this period is shown by the trade turnover between the USSR and Argentina, which, despite 15 Treaty of Rapallo. Available at: <http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/interwar/rapallo.htm>. Accessed on: 21 out. 2007. 16 RENOUVIN, 1968, p.252-253. 17 MILLER, 1989. p.6-8. 6 not having diplomatic relations with Moscow, was the greatest Latin American trade partner of the Soviets. Between 1923 and 1930, the USSR imported about 360,000 rubles in Argentinean goods, chiefly agricultural products. In contrast, Soviet exports to Argentina totaled only 30,000 rubles, concerning some sporadic orders of machinery18. The second phase (1941-1945) began with the Soviet adhesion to the Allies during World War Two. This event brought about the American initiative to encourage approximation between Latin America and the USSR, which inspired fifteen Latin American countries (among them were Mexico and Uruguay) to initiate or resume their diplomatic relations with Moscow19. The paper will now discuss Soviet foreign policy towards Latin America in the Cold War under each of the Soviet leaders from 1945 on. 2. Joseph Stalin (1945-1953) Despite victorious in World War Two and hefted to superpower status, the USSR suffered devastating human and material losses during the conflict. Immediately after the war, such context obliged Joseph Stalin to put as priorities the reconstruction of the Soviet economy and the establishment of a security zone around the country20, i.e. the formation of satellite regimes or, at least, non-hostile ones in Eastern Europe, in order to avoid a surprise attack like Operation Barbarossa in 1941. However, the clash of interests between the USSR, the USA and the United Kingdom, and the deterioration of the conversations regarding the new global configuration soon unveiled the period known as Cold War. Rapidly, events like the Gouzenko Affair (1945), George Kennan’s Long Telegram (1946), Churchill’s address on the “Iron Curtain” (1946), the Iran crisis (1946) and the Truman Doctrine (1947) attested the new pattern of relationship between the USSR and the Western powers, in which the contest for areas of influence throughout the world began to play a key role. Under Stalin, there was no foreign policy making to Latin America considering Soviet interests and the peculiarities of the region – in this period, Moscow’s action in the continent was eminently made through guidelines to local Communist Parties. This happened due to the Soviet assessment that the continent unquestionably belonged to 18 Ibid., p.150-151. Ibid., p.6. 20 GADDIS, 2006, p.10. 19 7 the American sphere of influence (the so-called “geographical fatalism”)21. It also contributed to this assessment the fact that Europe, rather than the Third World, was the first tension point of the Cold War. In fact, factors such as the Greek Civil War (19461949), the Marshall Plan (1947), the Communist coup d’état in Czechoslovakia and the split with Tito (1948), the Berlin Blockade (1948-1949) and the division of Germany (1949), all of them in Europe, were much more important to Soviet interests and security than the deepening of its ties with Latin American states. Simultaneous to the Cold War tensions in Europe, the anti-communist (and antiSoviet) stance of many Latin American states rose, provoking the rupture of diplomatic relations with Moscow by Brazil and Chile (1947), Colombia (1948) and Cuba and Venezuela (1952)22. In addition, several Communist and left-wing parties were outlawed, such as the Communist Parties of Ecuador (1946), Paraguay (1947) and Brazil and Chile (1948). This scenario of cooling relations between the USSR and Latin America limited the already restricted Moscow’s action in the continent, what is proved by the trade figures. In 1950, for example, there were no Soviet exports to Latin America; Soviet imports from the region, by its turn, totaled only 1.5 million rubles – 0.1 million from Argentina and 1.4 million from Brazil23. 3. Nikita Khrushchev (1953-1964) Domestically, Nikita Khrushchev’s rule was marked by the abandonment of the personality cult to Stalin (de-stalinization) and the high growth rates of the Soviet economy. De-stalinization process began with Khrushchev’s secret speech at the 20th Congress of the CPSU (1956), when he denounced Stalin’s crimes, provoking the alleviation of state control over the Soviet society (the so-called “Khrushchev Thaw”) and an irreversible schism in the Communist international movement. This period was also distinguished by a great optimism in the USSR: in Moscow’s eyes, the launch of Sputnik (1957) expressed Soviet technological superiority; and the fast pace of the 21 MILLER, 1989, p.5-6. Posly Soyuza Sovietskikh Sotsialisticheskikh Respublik v Stranakh Amerikanskogo Regiona. Available at: <http://whp057.narod.ru/rossi-m7.htm>. Accessed on: 07 out. 2007. 23 MILLER, op. cit., p.222. 22 8 Soviet economy led Khrushchev to declare that soon Socialism would “bury” Capitalism24. After Stalin’s death, there was a relative normalization in the relationship between the USSR and the US. However, the international context in the period was marked by the transfer of the Cold War tensions to the Third World, due to the decolonization process which inserted many states in the world arena and turned them into targets of dispute between the two superpowers. Inside the Socialist bloc, the thaw unleashed centrifugal movements like the Hungarian Revolution (1956), crushed by Soviet forces, and the Sino-Soviet split (1960), which divided the Socialist world into two great powers. In Latin America, the reflexes of the Cold War were felt in the American attempts to keep the states of the continent aligned to Washington, through military coups against regimes which were willing to get distant from the US (but not necessarily willing to approach the USSR) and economic incentives such as the Alliance for Progress (1961). It was in this context that Jacobo Arbenz was toppled in Guatemala (1954), who adopted a reform program which threatened interests of American corporations with activities in the country. Under Khrushchev, the Soviet foreign policy towards Latin America can be divided in two phases with their own characteristics. The first one (1953-1959), before the Cuban Revolution, had almost all of the characteristics of the Stalinist foreign policy towards the continent, which was distinguished by the lack of knowledge on the region’s reality and peculiarities and by treating it as a monolithic whole which answers in the same way to foreign stimuli. Concerning this, it is illustrative Khrushchev’s declaration in which he mentions, in a same context, “the tragic fate of Guatemala” and “the heroic but unequal struggle of the Cuban people”25. However, it was the Cuban Revolution who would irreversibly shape Moscow’s Latin American policy. The Revolution, having overthrown the pro-Washington dictatorship of Fulgencio Batista, had in its beginning only a nationalist character, gradually acquiring a Socialist content and approaching the USSR in response to several factors, such as: (i) the resistance of Cuban elites to the social reforms defended by 24 HOBSBAWM, Eric. A era dos extremos: o breve século XX (1914-1991). 2.ed. São Paulo: Companhia das Letras, 1995. p.78. 25 MILLER, 1989, p.10. 9 Fidel Castro, specially land reform; (ii) Washington’s pressure to prevent Cuba from buying weapons from Western Europe26; and (iii) the American partial economic embargo against the island in October 1960, followed by a total embargo in February 1962, promoted in reaction against nationalization of American properties from May 1959 on. The milestone in the Soviet-Cuban relations was the visit of Anastas Mikoyan, First Deputy Premier of the Soviet Union, to Havana in February 1960. Then, the first Soviet-Cuban trade agreement was signed, by which the Soviets agreed to buy five million tons of Cuban sugar in the next five years – 20% of which would be paid in hard currency and the rest in Soviet goods, including six million barrels of oil per year. In addition, Moscow agreed to loan Cuba US$ 100 million at a 2.5% annual interest rate 27. In December 1960, a new agreement was reached, by which the USSR agreed to buy 2.7 million tons of Cuban sugar in 1961 at four cents per pound, along with economic aid and technical assistance to the island28. Thus, according to Miller: By the end of 1962 Castro had sound economic reasons for sustaining Cuban links with the Soviet Union, apart from his security concerns. In 1961 and 1962 the USSR had provided virtually all of Cuba’s oil imports and had purchased just under half of its sugar crop. In addition, the Soviet Union and its East European allies had given large-scale economic aid to Cuban development projects29. This is demonstrated by the growth in Soviet-Cuban trade. In 1960, it reached US$ 176.6 million, representing only 1.6% of Soviet global trade. In 1964, it advanced to US$ 647.4 million, constituting 4.2% of Moscow’s international commerce30. While enhancing ties with the USSR, tensions between Cuba and the US rose considerably, as proved by the bombing of Havana, made by a Florida-based plane piloted by a dissident (October 1959), the unsuccessful Bay of Pigs invasion (April 1961) and the suspension of Cuba from the OAS (January 1962). However, the tensions reached its peak with the Cuban Missile Crisis (October 1962), when the deployment of Soviet nuclear missiles in Cuba led the superpowers to the brink of an atomic war. 26 MILLER, 1989, p.66, 75. Ibid., p.73. 28 Ibid., p.80-81. 29 Ibid., p.90. 30 THEBERGE, James D. The Soviet Presence in Latin America. New York: Crane, Russak & Company, Inc., 1974. p.22. 27 10 Its resolution, by which the Soviets agreed to withdraw their missiles from Cuba, in exchange of Washington’s commitment not to invade the island and to retreat its missiles from Turkey, sensibly deteriorated Soviet-Cuban relations, because Havana had not been consulted about the missiles’ withdrawal – Castro was favorable to their deployment in Cuba31. Another Gordian knot between the USSR and Cuba was their divergence of perceptions about the revolutionary movements in Latin America. Moscow advocated peaceful coexistence with capitalism and the “peaceful road to socialism”, i.e. the formation of left-wing coalitions that would come to power through elections. Conversely, Havana’s position, expressed in the Second Declaration of Havana (1962), overtly urged political and material support to armed struggle as means to seize power32 – such support soured Cuban relations with other Latin American states. Despite these points of conflict, the USSR and Cuba always shared common goals throughout the Cold War, such as: weakening of American position, the diffusion of Socialist ideology, strengthening of Latin American revolutionary movements and building socialism in Cuba33. Their divergence would be on how to implement such objectives, with the USSR emphasizing the “peaceful road to socialism” and Cuba favoring the support to armed struggle. The second phase of the Soviet foreign policy towards Latin America under Khrushchev (1959-1964), after the Cuban Revolution, indicated a substantial change in Kremlin’s perspective regarding the possibilities of expanding its influence in the continent34. In fact, Cuba’s adhesion to the Socialist bloc, just 120 kilometers away from the US, showed the Soviet leaders that it was possible for them to effectively engage in a region historically regarded as of exclusive American influence. From this moment on, the Soviet leaders began to be much better informed to formulate Moscow’s foreign policy to Latin America, because they could count on a newlycreated team of specialized scholars and bureaucrats. Thus, it was not necessary for them to keep on relying only on the reports from local Communist Parties to be informed about Latin America any more, as it happened under Stalin. 31 MILLER, 1989, p.87. THEBERGE, 1974, p.57-58. 33 Ibid., p.56. 34 MILLER, op. cit., p.10. 32 11 The Khrushchev period saw a greater Soviet involvement in Latin America. In the interstate level, the USSR already had diplomatic relations with eight states of the continent when Khrushchev was ousted in October 196435. But Soviet-Latin American trade (except Cuba) remained stable: in 1960, it reached US$ 76 million, being 0.7% of the total Soviet trade, while in 1964 it amassed US$ 84 million, representing 0.5% of Soviet global trade36. 4. Leonid Brezhnev (1964-1982) Leonid Brezhnev’s rule is commonly regarded as an era of economic “stagnation” due to the fading growth rates of the Soviet economy, although it had meant, as Eric Hobsbawm stresses, a period of comfort and welfare for the bulk of Soviet citizens37. Internationally, the time was of détente with the West, but also of Brezhnev Doctrine in the Kremlin, i.e. the defense of Moscow’s hegemony over the Socialist bloc, as demonstrated by the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia (1968), the Sino-Soviet border conflict (1969) and the intervention in Afghanistan (1979), which put détente to an end. Under Brezhnev, Soviet-Latin American relations prospered chiefly because of Moscow’s rising political and economic reach as a superpower and the attempt, by Latin American governments, to diminish their dependence on the US. In the interstate level, this can be proved by the fact that thirteen Latin American states had diplomatically recognized the USSR when Brezhnev died, in 198238. At this stage, as pointed out by Miller, “[...] only pariah regimes such as Pinochet in Chile, Stroessner in Paraguay, Duvalier in Haiti and the Guatemalan military still refused to recognise the Soviet Union […]”39. Commercially, the evolution was also sharp. In 1964, year of Brezhnev’s rise, trade between the USSR and Latin America and the Caribbean (except Cuba) reached 82.8 million rubles, while in 1982 it amassed almost 2.1 billion rubles40. Now the paper will discuss the case of two Latin American rulers that, due to their leftist and anti-imperialist orientation, offered favorable conditions to enhance 35 Posly Soyuza Sovietskikh Sotsialisticheskikh Respublik v Stranakh Amerikanskogo Regiona. Available at: <http://whp057.narod.ru/rossi-m7.htm>. Accessed on: 07 out. 2007. 36 THEBERGE, 1974, p.19. 37 HOBSBAWM, 1995, p.463. 38 Posly Soyuza Sovietskikh Sotsialisticheskikh Respublik v Stranakh Amerikanskogo Regiona. Available at: <http://whp057.narod.ru/rossi-m7.htm>. Accessed on: 07 out. 2007. 39 MILLER, 1989, p.13. 40 Ibid., p.222-225. 12 their countries’ relations with the USSR: General Juan Velasco Alvarado in Peru (19681975) and Salvador Allende in Chile (1970-1973). Both adopted similar political programs, such as the nationalization of strategic sectors of the economy, restriction to foreign investment, land reform and redistributive policies favoring poorer groups of population, and both had similar fates, overthrown by military coups. Soviet involvement in Alvarado’s Peru began in 1969, when the two countries established diplomatic relations and signed their first trade agreement. In 1970, the Soviets gave extensive help to the Peruvians when a terrible earthquake ravaged the country. The following year, Moscow and Lima signed an agreement on economic and technical cooperation to implement projects in the hydroelectric, fishing and metallurgical sectors. At the end of 1973, Peru was the first Latin American state (except Cuba) to receive Soviet military advisers and weapons, such as tanks, fighters, helicopters and artillery41. As states Cole Blasier, “the Peruvians expressed their hope that ties with an industrial state like the Soviet Union would create great opportunities for their national development in many fields”, whose ties with Moscow “[…] cover not only trade but also cultural, economic, technical, financial, and most notably, military cooperation”42. James Theberge is more skeptical about Soviet-Peruvian relations. He contends that the Soviet aid to Peru was much below Alvarado’s expectations, since from 1968 to 1972 the USSR provided Peru with only US$ 28 million – a little sum compared to the US$ 173 million given by Eastern Europe in the same period43. Although already working in the sixties, Soviet-Chilean cooperation only boosted with Salvador Allende for his Marxist stance. In 1971, Chilean foreign minister’s visit to Moscow resulted in an agreement to expand Soviet credits to Chile – that between 1970 and 1973 would total about US$ 260 million – and to cooperate in the civil construction sector. In the same year, it was agreed the Soviet assistance in the fishing and copper-mining sector, very important ones for the Chilean economy. In 1972, year of Allende’s visit to Moscow, the USSR began to provide 3,180 tractors to the Chileans44. Concerning this, figures of Chilean trade with the Socialist bloc are BLASIER, Cole. The Giant’s Rival: the USSR and Latin America. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1987. p.42-43. 42 Ibid., p.42. 43 THEBERGE, 1974, p.86. 44 BLASIER, 1987, p.37-41. 41 13 illustrative: in 1970, it reached only US$ 34.6 million, while in 1973 it jumped to US$ 241 million45. However, as in Peru, Soviet involvement in Chile followed the same framework adopted towards the region (except Cuba), which consists in “[...] generous credits to promote Soviet exports, extensive purchases of the Latin American partner’s traditional exports, technical assistance, and gifts for humanitarian purposes”46. According to Miller, Moscow’s resistance to provide a greater assistance to Chile was based on four factors: (i) the international context of détente, with the superpowers endeavoring to keep a good relationship with each other; (ii) the more pragmatic Brezhnev’s foreign policy; (iii) the lack of complementarity between Soviet and Chilean economies; and (iv) the instability of Allende’s government and his Popular Unity coalition47. Thus, the Soviet aid was not able to prevent the worsening social, political and economic tensions from overthrowing Allende in September 1973. Jimmy Carter’s reaction to the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, boycotting the Olympic Games held in Moscow (1980) and canceling American wheat exports to the USSR, had its reflexes in Moscow’s relationship with Latin America. Ten Latin American countries (beyond Cuba) ignored Carter’s boycott to the Olympic Games and the wheat embargo deepened Soviet trade with Argentina, which began to supply the Soviet grain demand. In fact, the boost in the Soviet-Argentinean trade is noteworthy: in 1979, before the embargo, it was of only 313.5 million rubles; in 1980, it grew to almost 1.2 billion rubles; and in 1981 it reached amazing 2.4 billion rubles48. The Nicaraguan Revolution (1979) and the Salvadoran Civil War (1980) were the most important events to the Soviet foreign policy to Latin America since Allende’s inauguration in Chile49. In both events Communists, directly influenced by Moscow, had a marginal role within the revolutionary movements, what explains Soviet caution in the process50. Cuba, by contrast, had a much greater role in the region since the prerevolutionary period, favoring the union of the guerrilla groups into common fronts 45 MILLER, 1989, p.129. BLASIER, op. cit., p.38. 47 MILLER, op. cit., p.129-133. 48 MILLER, op. cit., p.157. 49 BLASIER, 1987, p.133. 50 Ibid., p.140-141. 46 14 (Sandinista in Nicaragua and Farabundo Martí in El Salvador) and providing them with moral, financial and military support51. However, after the Sandinistas seized power, it took some time for Moscow to politically and economically approach Managua. In 1980, a Nicaraguan delegation visited the USSR and signed a series of agreements on economical and technical cooperation. Soviet-Nicaraguan trade only began to expand from 1981 on, when it totaled 10.4 million rubles, reaching its peak in 1986, when it amassed US$ 284.1 million rubles52. It must be said that the rise in the Soviet and Eastern European economic and military aid to Nicaragua was proportional to the level of deterioration of Managua’s relationship with Washington and to the American support to anti-Sandinista forces (the “Contras”) from 1981 on. This is shown by the figures of foreign aid given to Managua: between 1979 and 1985, the USSR sent about US$ 300 to 400 million, while other countries of the Socialist bloc (East Germany, Bulgaria and Cuba) remitted together approximately US$ 550 million to Nicaragua53. The Falklands War (1982), as the last important event in Latin America in the Brezhnev era, had a double effect in Moscow’s relations with the region. At the same time it was a continental backlash against the US, since Washington had not carried out its TIAR duties, benefiting a non-American power (the United Kingdom), the conflict favored the Soviet position as supporter of the Argentinean claims and as “[...] natural ally of the anticolonialists”. As Robert Leiken remembers, Washington’s omission in the Falklands War “[...] has made U.S. exhortations for ‘collective security’ against Soviet-Cuban expansionism sound hypocritical to Latin ears”54. 5. Yuri Andropov (1982-1984) and Konstantin Chernenko (1984-1985) The event in Latin America which marked the brief period of Yuri Andropov and Konstantin Chernenko as Secretary Generals of the CPSU was the American invasion of Granada (1983). The rise of Maurice Bishop’s New Jewel Movement (NJM) in Grenada, in 1979, once again exposed the contradictions between Moscow and Havana, which were 51 LEIKEN, Robert S. Soviet Strategy in Latin America. New York: Praeger Publishers, 1982. p.ix. BLASIER, op. cit., p.144-146. 53 MILLER, 1989, p.209. 54 LEIKEN, op. cit., p.xi-xii. 52 15 already made clear in Nicaragua. Cuba showed great enthusiasm for the Grenadian regime, helping it with the construction of industries, radio stations and the international airport, along with the formation of a two thousand men army55. Soviet-Grenadian relations also improved, but at a slower pace than Grenada’s ties with Cuba, being restricted to a limited economic aid (US$ 1.4 million in 1982) and party-to-party dialogue between the CPSU and the NJM56. The political struggle between Bishop and Bernard Coard resulted in Bishop’s assassination in October 1983, having its effects in the position of Havana and Moscow. Fidel Castro, a friend of Bishop, got deeply shocked with his execution and vehemently condemned its perpetrators, while the USSR only issued a statement granting its support to Coard57. It was in this context that the American invasion to Grenada happened, overthrowing the revolutionary government which had attempted to approach the Socialist bloc. Soviet-Latin American trade saw a slight decrease between 1982 and 1985. In 1982, it reached around 2.1 billion rubles, while in 1985 it fell to about 2 billion rubles58, dropping in the following years due to the decline of Soviet imports of Argentinean grains in reaction to the successful harvest in the USSR in 1986. 6. Mikhail Gorbachev (1985-1991) The political and economic reforms promoted by glasnost’ and perestroika in the USSR reflected in its foreign policy, which began to be oriented by a conciliatory stance with the West, withdrawing Soviet troops from Afghanistan (1989) and relaxing the control over the satellite states of Eastern Europe. In Latin America, it particularly affected relations with Cuba, since the USSR’s need to rethink its internal and external priorities in order to break with the stagnation of the its economy diminished Kremlin’s will to keep on giving so generous aid to Havana. For example, between 1985 and 1987 the USSR diminished in 7% the price paid for Cuban sugar; at the same period, delays in the supply of machinery from the Socialist bloc hindered the performance of the Cuban economy59. 55 LEIKEN, 1982, p.67-68. BLASIER, 1987, p.45. 57 MILLER, 1989, p.118-119. 58 Ibid., p.225. 59 MILLER, 1989, p.123-124. 56 16 Under Gorbachev, Kremlin’s action was directed to the Latin American great powers, such as Argentina, Brazil and México, seeking to enhance Soviet presence in the continent through commercial agreements and joint projects on economic and technical cooperation. In 1985, the first Soviet-Brazilian cooperation agreement with that scope was signed. In 1986 and 1987, Argentinean delegations visited the USSR, improving political and economic ties between Moscow and Buenos Aires. At the end of 1987, Eduard Shevardnadze, the Soviet foreign minister, paid an unprecedented visit to Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay, showing the Soviet interest in deepening relations with Latin American countries60. Despite these efforts, Soviet-Latin American trade in the period followed the downward trend seen under Andropov and Chernenko, what is explained by the Soviet attempt, in a context of perestroika, to decrease its trade deficit with the continent. In 1987, the trade volume was restricted to 970 million rubles, only half of the turnover in 1985 (almost 2 billion rubles)61. 7. Conclusion Despite the fact that the primary goal of the Soviet foreign policy towards Latin America had been, in a context of Cold War, to decrease American hegemony in the region, encouraging the countries of the continent either to approach Moscow or to adopt an independent, non-aligned and anti-imperialist foreign policy62, it was not possible for the USSR to provide the sufficient means to the consecution of such objective. The explanation to this resides in two great factors. Firstly, the reality of the Soviet economy did not permit Moscow to assume greater engagements (economic, political and military) in the continent, because the aid to Cuba and the great trade deficit with the region, amassed since the sixties63, already bled the country’s budget. Secondly, Soviet penetration in Latin America was in general cautious, in order not to directly confront Washington in its zone of influence and, therefore, not to unbalance 60 Ibid., p.184-187. Ibid., p.225. 62 NICHOL, James P. Soviet Union: Foreign Policy: The Soviet Union and the Third World: Central and South America. Country Studies. Washington: Library of Congress, 1989. Available at: <http://lcweb2.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?frd/cstdy:@field(DOCID+su0303)>. Accessed on: 20 out. 2007. 61 63 MILLER, 1989, p.222-225. 17 the global correlation of forces between the two superpowers, hence Kremlin’s emphasis on the “peaceful road to socialism”. This way, Latin America remained an area of marginal involvement of the Soviet foreign policy, because Moscow had to spend its resources in more immediate global needs, such as the strategic parity with the US and the balance of power in Europe and Asia. The lack of economic complementarity between the USSR and the bulk of Latin American nations – excepting Argentina and Brazil, according to Miller – also discouraged a greater Soviet penetration in the continent64. Latin American states regarded the ties with the USSR as a counterweight to the American hegemony in the continent and as an instrument to preserve their sovereignty, which is, according to Leiken, the goal which guided their stance within the bipolar logic of the Cold War65. This explains why anti-communism can not be considered as a prohibitive force to the Soviet action in Latin America, because the majority of the right-wing military regimes in the area, like Brazil (1964-1985), Argentina (1976-1983) and Uruguay (1976-1984), sustained fair levels of commercial exchange with Moscow66. Thus, taking into account all of the elements exhibited in this paper, it is possible to state that the foreign policy of the Soviet Union towards Latin America during the Cold War constituted a rival to the American hegemony in the region only at the propaganda level. In the real plan, however, it was not possible for the USSR to act more assertively in the continent in order to counterbalance Washington’s influence, because, as exposed above, it was limited by financial constraints and it had more urgent priorities elsewhere. 64 Ibid., p.219. LEIKEN, 1982, p.ix. 66 MILLER, op. cit., p.14. 65 18 REFERENCES ARRIGHI, Giovanni; SILVER, Beverly J. Caos e governabilidade no moderno sistema mundial. Rio de Janeiro: Contraponto/Editora UFRJ, 2001. BLASIER, Cole. The Giant’s Rival: the USSR and Latin America. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1987. GADDIS, John Lewis. História da Guerra Fria. Rio de Janeiro: Nova Fronteira, 2006. HOBSBAWM, Eric. A era dos extremos: o breve século XX (1914-1991). 2.ed. São Paulo: Companhia das Letras, 1995. LEIKEN, Robert S. Soviet Strategy in Latin America. New York: Praeger Publishers, 1982. MILLER, Nicola. Soviet relations with Latin America (1959-1987). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989. 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