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In his recent book 'Experiencing time' (OUP), Simon Prosser discusses a wide variety of topics relating to temporal experience, in a way that is accessible both to those steeped in the philosophy of mind, and to those more familiar with the philosophy of time. He forcefully argues for the conclusion that the B-theorist of time can account for the temporal appearances. In this article, I offer a chapter by chapter response.
Forthcoming in "Inquiry" in a symposium on Prosser's 2016 book "Experiencing Time". Discusses the question of whether experience provides support for views in the metaphysics of time, and Prosser's functionalist intentionalist view of temporal experience.
2019 •
After reviewing the highly valuable contents of the book, I sketch two arguments in favor of the view that the passage of time is not, as the author claims, a mere byproduct of our experience. The first criticism involves the meaning of causation. The second Prosser's explanation of why it seems to us that time really passes, appealing to the distinction between endurantism and perdurantism. By suggesting the possibility that this distinction is not metaphysically genuine, I question the soundness of his explanatio
2014 •
In my thesis I have tried to develop a phenomenological account of temporality based upon a reading of Husserl’s work and I defend this against the criticism that is directed at Husserl under the heading of a metaphysics of presence. Initially, I offer two models of this absolute consciousness that I find to be in consistent. First, the Hua X, Text No. 54 model describes absolute consciousness as functioning through two types of intentionality: horizontal intentionality, which constitutes the unity of the flow of consciousness, i.e. its self-appearance, and transverse intentionality, which constitutes the unity of the object-point throughout its flowing-away. Because consciousness is intentional there is a difference between the constituting and the constituted. Since Husserl moreover believes that only intentionality can be carried over into intentionality, the self-constitution of this primal consciousness requires that there is an ultimate consciousness that is an unconscious consciousness. The second model, L III, describes the primal presentation as the fulfilment of a protention. Consequently, we can describe immanent time as being constituted on the basis of a retentional and protentional tendency. These flick over at what is called the culmination-point, the point of maximal fulfilment. There is no longer a now-point in this model. With these two models in mind I discuss the criticism of Derrida and Heidegger. Derrida bases his criticism on an understanding of time-consciousness that relies on the conceptual basicness of the primal impression. Derrida argues that since we can only become conscious of what is given through concrete perception, i.e. retention and primal impression, that the primal impression is invested with non-originarity. I show against this reading that the L III model does not succumb to this criticism since it does not rely on a primal impression as source of originarity. Instead, with Rodemeyer I speak here of the zone of originarity, a temporal field as it were, that is constituted by the retentional and protentional tendencies and characterized by a matter of degree, that might have a culmination-point, but which we do not understand as the source of originarity. Heidegger’s critique aims at the supposed preference of immanence over transcendence and of the present albeit in a broad sense over the farther past and future. I argue that his critique is rooted in the epistemological orientation that Heidegger criticizes Husserl on, particularly in his treatment of the phenomenon as being split into that which appears and the appearing. I show however that the notion of pre-consciousness that we discover in the C-manuscripts can be understood as a primordial transcendence, which calls for the epochē. Thus, I show on the one hand that Husserl does recognize the priority of transcendence and on the other hand, I justify his “epistemological” prioritization of the present over the past and future from the necessity of the epochē that I believe the discovery of pre-consciousness gives motivation to.
In the detailed analyses of his Time-Lectures of 1905, Husserl meets the insidious problem of the infinite regress: self-constituting means for a consciousness to be conscious of the process of self-constitution, and this being-conscious recalls in turn a consciousness which is conscious of its own being-conscious, of its being-consciousness, and so forth. Is the phenomenology fated to lose itself in the fatal reference game represented by the classic problem of the regressus in infinitum? To avoid this question and free the phenomenology from the aporias of self-multiplying of consciousness, Husserl elaborates the notion of horizontal intentionality of retention (Längsintentionalität), which allows the consciousness not only to come back to itself, but also to constitute itself just by this coming back. The preservation – retention – of each single phase produces the unity of the whole of consciousness. It is valuable to join to this basic notion of consciousness another concept, which Husserl introduces almost thirty years after the Lectures, in his latest manuscripts on time-constitution, namely the one of double present. This concept describes the co-presence within the same present moment of the current perception and of the retentions of what is just-now elapsed. The duplicity derives from the capacity of the present moment (Gegenwärtigung) to transcend itself into the dimension of the de-presentation (EntGegenwärtigung), which on its part refers directly to this fleeting actuality from which it originates, hence assuming again the form – albeit a new form – of the present (Ver-Gegenwärtigung). The aim of the article is first of all to stress the inner coherence of the Husserlian thinking: though it doesn’t deal with the problem of the infinite regress, the notion of double present concerns what occurs in that short-lived interweave between impression and retention and for this reason it represents the structural condition of the self-constitution of the flow. Secondarily, I aspire to show the basically relational trait of the intentional consciousness, which lives by means of the continuous and uninterrupted interconnection of its own temporal moments.
Epistemology, Archaeology, Ethics : Current Investigations of Husserl’s Corpus
A Positive Account of Protention and its Implications for Internal Time-ConsciousnessPraxis Filosóica Nueva serie, No. 37, julio-diciembre 2013: 209 - 229
The Protention-Retention Aymmetry In Husserl's Conception Of Time ConsciousnessIn Experiencing Time, Simon Prosser takes critical stock of the issue of what our experience of time is like, and what it tells us about the metaphysics of time. He makes it clear that he is not neutral on the issue. He wants to challenge the popular assumption that experience supports the A-theory of time; the view that time, somehow, passes from future to present and into the past. Prosser argues that we do not experience temporal passage, and that this removes the only plausible reason there ever was for believing in the A-theory. Furthermore, he argues that the B-theory of time can explain why time appears to be in some ways dynamic even though in reality it is static, which removes an important objection to the B-theory, the view that all times exist in parity standing in relations of earlier and later than to each other. Consequently, we have little reason to endorse the A-theory, and every reason to endorse the B-theory. As you can tell, we are dealing with a strongly opinionated book. Indeed, as a presentist I find a lot to disagree with, and yet I thoroughly enjoy the challenge it poses. It is the most ambitious attempt I know of to explain how the B-theory of time can account for the dynamic features of experience. In my view, the book does a good job of presenting what the issue is, and introduces interesting new perspectives to it, but there remain serious question marks about the conclusion that we have no reason to believe the A-theory. It is a book that is sure to stimulate discussion on the subject, which makes it all the more interesting.
One of the most problematic issues with regard to Husserl’s phenomenology of time concerns the definition of the relationship between the time of the intentional acts and the absolute pre-phenomenal flow of time constituting consciousness. In this regard, Brough distinguishes between the intentional acts (such as perception and recollection) and the specific dimension of the absolute flow of time-consciousness in terms of a distinction between two different levels. In the book Self-awareness and Alterity, Zahavi questions the validity of this distinction: the inner time-consciousness should not be regarded as an additional flow aware of the intentional act, but it is nothing but the pre-reflective self-awareness of the act. Despite essential differences, a common presupposition characterizes both of the above mentioned interpretations of the absolute time-constituting flow: the absolute flow is indifferent to the acts; it always flows in the same way, automatically; the form of the absolute flow is unchangeable. In my essay I will challenge the validity of this thesis from two different angles: (1) I will show the essential ambiguity of Husserl’s configuration of the absolute flow not only in the context of the Zeitvorlesungen 1905, but also in relation to the Bernauer Manuskripte. (2) I will take into consideration Husserl’s analyses of specific temporal experiences: the time of the unclear Phantasia and the experience of the radically new.
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