Reflections on Salient Features in Clifford Geertz’s Interpretive Approach to
Cultural Analysis
Monika Hirmer
Religions and Philosophies, School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London, UK
hirmer.monika@gmail.com
The concept of culture I espouse…is
essentially a semiotic one. Believing, with
Max Weber, that man is an animal suspended
in webs of significance he himself has spun, I
take culture to be those webs, and the analysis
of it to be therefore not an experimental science
in search of law but an interpretive one in
search of meaning. It is explication I am after,
construing social expressions on their surface
enigmatical.
(Clifford Geertz 1973, p. 5)
within
which
Geertz’s
interpretive
anthropology developed, I provide my own
considerations on the interpretive paradigm;
this will be followed by an assessment of
critiques to the approach raised by Paul
Shankman (with particular reference to his
paper ‘The thick and the thin: On the
interpretive theoretical program of Clifford
Geertz’, 1984) and Michael Martin (with
particular reference to his paper ‘Geertz and the
interpretive approach in anthropology’, 1993).
In those few lines, Clifford Geertz has
condensed the essence of his interpretive
approach. He proposes to redefine the heart of
anthropology as it was practiced until the
1970s, shaking the discipline at its ontological
roots and questioning its epistemological
adequacy in the purview of an ‘enlargement of
the universe of human discourse’ (Geertz 1973,
p. 14). ‘[C]ulture’, he propones, ‘is
not…something to which social events,
behaviours, institutions, or processes can be
causally attributed; it is a context, something
within which they can be intelligibly—that is
thickly—described’ (p. 14, emphasis added).
In this article, I aim to elucidate these
words and their radical impact on the
discipline;1 in order to do so, I will analyse the
concepts of culture and anthropology as Geertz
envisioned them and evaluate their potentials
and weaknesses. After reflecting on the context
The new place of anthropology: A bold
move or mere continuity?
Geertz makes it his mission to free
anthropology from a longstanding quarrel
between
the
Geisteswissenschaften
(humanities) and the Naturwissenschaften
(natural sciences). For many decades, both
approaches to knowledge have been contending
the rights to set the boundaries of the path
anthropology should take. On the one hand, the
humanist approach opted for an idiographic and
descriptive method, which looks at
‘objects…not as instances of universal laws but
as singular events’ (Bruno Bettelheim as cited
in Shankman 1984, p. 264); as such, this
approach cannot form a general theory nor can
it be predicted. On the other hand, the
positivistic-pragmatic standpoint of natural
sciences is nomothetic and emphasises
verification and predictability. Bradd Shore
Even though Geertz’s influence was most felt within
anthropology, the impact of the Interpretive
Approach extends well beyond the discipline,
reaching as far out as agricultural studies, public
relations and environmental studies, amongst others
(William Sewell Jr. 1997, p. 51).
1
SATIS
Volume 1 – Issue 1
(1988) neatly summarises this dichotomy: ‘…a
humanist seeks to demonstrate underlying
complexities and variability in what had
seemed uniform, whereas a scientist would
seek to demonstrate uniformities in what had
appeared diverse’ (p. 21).
Since its beginning in the middle of the
nineteenth century, anthropology struggled to
affirm its position within the realm of the
natural sciences, which at that time were
increasingly gaining prestige. At first, the
discipline followed the footsteps of Darwinian
evolutionism, whereby societies were often
examined in view of their ranking on a
universalised and idealised scale of
progression;
successively,
prominent
anthropologists of the early twentieth century
proposed rather forced analogies with the
natural world, comparing societies to living
organisms. In view of these approaches, the
preferred
and
allegedly
appropriate
methodology was to adopt positivistic norms
and proceed through strict inter-cultural
juxtapositions. Yet, the growing number of
ethnographies that became available during that
period made it evident that humans could
neither be easily encapsulated in a deterministic
evolutionary process, nor could they be put into
the background of mechanistic reified societies;
similarly, comparisons between societies
increasingly appeared inept in rendering the
complexity of differing cognitive systems.
Moreover, the descriptive parsimony and the
separation between ‘subject’ (the researcher)
and ‘object’ (informants) advocated by the
positivistic outlook were clearly inappropriate
for the study of human behaviour. Despite these
evidences, however, on the one side
anthropologists continued in their efforts to
‘bend’ the discipline in such a manner that it
would fit a scientific model (as was the case
with cognitive anthropology, which ended up
applying its componential analysis to very few
spheres of human behavior) and, on the other
side, the scientific framework would ‘concede’
2
methods, such as controlled investigation (as,
alas, one could not subject humans to
controlled experiments), in order to
accommodate the ambiguities inherent in
anthropology.
With many scholars struggling to
overcome anthropology’s fundamental ‘limits’
as a discipline that is hardly quantifiable and
cannot, despite all efforts, overcome the
blurring between object and subject that lies at
its core, it was just a matter of time before
someone would reverse the situation and make
what others saw as impeding factors into
inspiring qualities and virtues. This person was
Clifford Geertz. Geertz is convinced that
anthropology can never succumb to the realm
of hard sciences: he fully embraces the
subjective, humanistic track, and views reality
as a text that is liable to personal interpretations
and originates from forms of agency exercised
at the microscopic level, rather than as a
complex set of rigid, abstract theories,
mistakenly thought capable of describing
human behavior on the macro-level.
By facing the underlying malaise of
anthropology and spelling out the resolution to
this ambiguity so boldly, Geertz takes it upon
himself to champion a new paradigm, thus
becoming also the target of numerous
criticisms. Nevertheless, as Geertz also points
out, he builds his approach upon a long
tradition, which dates back at least to Franz
Boas and Alfred Kroeber, if not to the German
idealist philosophers (Shankman 1984, p. 264).
One can glimpse at the seeds of the tension
lingering at the heart of anthropology already in
the famous quote ‘[a]nthropology is the most
humanistic of the sciences and the most
scientific of humanities’ attributed to Kroeber,
and later in Edward Evans-Pritchard’s
inclination to view anthropology as part of the
humanities. From Evans-Pritchard’s efforts to
understand a foreign culture and translate it into
terms suitable to explain it to one’s own culture
(Thomas Beidelman 1971), to Geertz’s
Hirmer: Reflections on Salient Features
3
‘explicating explications’ (Geertz 1973, p. 9)
runs a subtle, continuous thread.
From this perspective, it is possible to view
the paradigm shift advocated by Geertz as
taking place on a continuum that moves from a
positivistic and pragmatic rationale towards an
increasingly descriptive, subjective and
creative paradigm, which ultimately flows into
the emphasis on relativity and subjectivity so
central to postmodernism.2
It can seem confusing that Geertz, after
declaring his commitment to the interpretive
paradigm and to a semiotic agenda of thick
descriptions, insists on calling his cultural
analysis a ‘science’, even if a ‘strange’ one
(Geertz 1973, p. 29). In order to appreciate
Geertz’s vocabulary, we must keep in mind that
the term ‘science’ can be traced back to
scientia, a word indicating any form of human
knowledge. Failing to do so can lead to
conclusions that remain outside the purview of
Geertz’ main suggestions.3
Interpretive culture: Questioning the
viability of public webs, microscopic
intentions and dense constructions
The first part of the opening quote: ‘The
concept of culture I espouse…is essentially a
semiotic one. Believing, with Max Weber, that
man is an animal suspended in webs of
significance he himself has spun, I take culture
to be those webs…’, gives an idea of the way in
which Geertz conceives culture: for him, it has
a semiotic nature, and as such it is composed of
symbols, which he takes as ‘vehicle[s]
for…conception[s]’ or meanings (1973, p. 91).
Cultural acts and social events are thus
essentially symbols, and cultural patterns are
‘systems or complexes of symbols’ (ibid.). The
nature of these cultural symbols is
multilayered, as different actors and observers
may interpret them differently, in the process of
spinning their ‘webs of significance’ (p. 5). It is
the task of the anthropologist to ‘grasp and then
to render’ (p. 10) these layers of interpretations.
Ethnography, Geertz admits, thus becomes a
second or even third order of constructions and
analyses (the ethnographer relying on his/her
own interpretation of an informant’s
interpretation of what s/he thinks s/he is doing).
This development of course does not affect all areas
of anthropology: it is one of multiple trends visible in
the discipline, coexisting with other scholars’ quest
for increasingly scientific methods—cross-cultural
analysis and the Humans Relations Area Files (HRAF)
project (see http://hraf.yale.edu/), Elizabeth
Colson’s intensive study of small scale communities
(1954), and the more mechanistic and deterministic
approach of Marxist anthropologists, are just a few of
those.
3 Some salient features of the criticisms raised against
Geertz’s approach will be analysed in a later section
of this paper. With regards to the misinterpretation of
the term ‘science’, suffice it here to mention the
example of Shankman (1984) who, despite being
aware of the humanistic connotations of ‘science’
(Geisteswissenschaften), in his critique of Geertz’s
interpretive approach seems oblivious to the term’s
erstwhile meaning. He remains entangled within a
positivistic paradigm, as most of his objections
concern the lack of scientific features such as
objectivity, abstract theory and comparative
methods—from which Geertz has instead actively
and consciously taken leave. While criticisms such as
these could be considered legitimate within the wider
evaluation of the direction anthropology has taken, it
seems inappropriate to blame Geertz for not adopting
those very methods, on the refusal of which he has
built his entire interpretive approach. As will be seen
in more detail in the last sections of this paper, while
Shankman’s concerns with operationalisation and
abstraction mainly go back to the old scientific quest
for the subject-object distinction (which is
incompatible with the interpretive approach), Martin
(1993), in his evaluation of the interpretive approach,
proposes a slightly more constructive critique, which
leaves scope for a development of Geertz’s paradigm
within the purview of its very foundations.
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Drawing from Gilbert Ryle’s distinction
between ‘thick description’—which renders the
full range of meaningful (explicit and implicit)
structures
of
an
entity—and
‘thin
description’—which merely deals with the
phenomenological, explicit aspects of cultural
expressions—, Geertz adopts thick description
as the process through which to ‘read’ a densely
textured reality that abounds in metaphors,
implicit structures and incoherencies. It is only
through thick description that one can do justice
to the complexity of cultural actions and
constructions, and reach their symbolic
dimensions: what Geertz is looking for, is a
dense description that uncovers and interprets
the meanings embedded in social actions, rather
than the discovery of causes and mechanical
laws underlying social behaviors.
A salient aspect of Geertz’s conception of
culture is that it is public: reversing the
cognitivists’ standpoint that culture is within
psychological structures of the mind, Geertz
proposes a culture that is public, defining it as
a composite of symbolic actions that obtain
meaning once they are performed. He notices
that to know, at the level of the individual’s
mind, how to wink does not necessarily
translate into the cultural action of winking, and
that knowing how to steal a sheep does not
imply steeling a sheep—a conclusion to which
a cognitivist approach, according to him, would
lead (1973, p. 12). Nevertheless, based on the
logic of Geertz’s example, it is possible to
argue that, just as the cognitivists’ approach
appears to be one-sided, also the interpretive
approach could seem incomplete. For example,
while it is true that to know how to cook
German food does not mean that one is cooking
German food, this private notion, nevertheless,
is part of what defines one’s cultural
background. This pool of private cultural
notions subsists also in the case one performs a
more public act, such as actually preparing a
dish—for example Italian pasta. While it is true
that the public, shared performance also shapes
4
one’s culture, in this case by enriching it with
Italian elements, the German culture, even
though neither performed nor reinforced
through public sharing, remains present and
meaningful to the subject. On a larger scale, it
can be assumed that private, non-performed
actions are as meaningful to a culture, as its
public, acted and shared elements.
It could be suggested that Geertz posited
the necessity of a public act only at the origin
of a person’s formulation of meanings, and that
these meanings could, after the initial shared
public performance, be perpetuated by the
individual independently of their re-enactment
(the cognitivists, on the other hand,
hypothesised the existence of cognitive
structures that are a priori of any enactment).
Nevertheless, in declaring that ‘[m]an depends
upon symbols and symbol systems with a
dependence so great as to be decisive for his
creatural viability’ (Geertz 1973, p. 99), Geertz
seems to imply a level of interdependence
between symbol and action so strong that there
is little scope for the continuity of symbolic
meanings without their periodic re-enactment,
in a manner similar to the Durkheimian
suggestion that social values and society itself
can be maintained only through repeated
collective activities (Fadwa El Guindi 1977, pp.
10-11). In fact, Geertz postulates that culture is
an absolute prerequisite for the survival of the
human species given that, differently from
other animals, humans lack the intrinsic
information necessary to guide their actions
(1973, p. 80).
The notion of culture as a condition for
human survival, when taken in conjunction
with the concept of double- or even triplelayered interpretations and the guessing at
meanings to which humans are thus bound—
not only as external anthropologists but also as
actors belonging to a same culture given that it
is difficult to prove a common understanding of
shared symbols—sets humans in a remarkably
precarious existential status. One may wonder,
Hirmer: Reflections on Salient Features
then, what are the epistemological and
ontological implications of the interpretive
approach for the viability of humanity itself if,
with Geertz, one embraces the idea that ‘the
aim of anthropology is the enlargement of the
universe of human discourse’ (Geertz 1973, p.
14) yet, at the same time, having declared
humanity’s absolute dependence on culture,
one also deconstructs this very culture and
replaces its certainties with interpretations and
‘fictions’ (p. 15). Will humans, as animals
dependent on culture, be able to survive
‘suspended in webs of significance’ (Geertz
1973, p. 5) that are continuously subjected to
being spun and undone? In a context where
interpretations proliferate, will these webs
grow and become asphyxiatingly dense, or
unsustainably thin? Only Geertz’s redimensioning of the anthropological quest and
its relegation to a ‘microscopic’ (1973, p. 21),
highly contextualised level, can here provide
some amount of relief. Nevertheless, whether
interpretations at the microscopic level can be
satisfying and exhaustive in an increasingly
globalised and interconnected world, where a
person’s meanings and symbols extend beyond
local realities, still remains debatable.
Interpretive Anthropology: An Incomplete
Program?
Having attempted a critical analysis of the
interpretive concept of culture, I now proceed
with an assessment of Geertz’s contribution to
anthropological theory and ethnography. While
there is obviously not an exclusive correlation,
it is predominantly the second part of Geertz’s
opening quote that interests us here: ‘…the
analysis of [culture is] therefore not an
experimental science in search of law but an
interpretive one in search of meaning. It is
explication I am after, construing social
expressions on their surface enigmatical’.
5
In this analysis, I will take as main
discussion points the critiques raised by
Shankman (1984) and Martin (1993). As noted
above, the two critics can be broadly taken as
representatives of those scholars who, on the
one side, as Shankman, do not seem too
comfortable with the blatant abandonment of
objectivity and the implications of such a move
and, on the other side, those scholars who, as
Martin, despite sharing at least some
reservations of similar kind, seem to be ready
to recognise culture-as-text as one of the
approaches through which society can be
analysed.
Since Shankman’s salient criticisms (lack
of
objectivity,
intersubjectivity
and
operationalisation, absence of grand theories
and mechanical laws) are directed at aspects
that are inherent in Geertz’s deliberate refusal
of a positivistic framework—complemented by
a praise of subjectivity, microscopic studies and
dense descriptions—, it results that what are
positive attributes for one scholar, are
necessarily unfavourable attributes for the
other. Where one scholar misses verification
and predictability, the other appreciates
freedom and thick, creative interpretations;
where one scholar finds comfort in the
permanence of laws, the other feels suffocation
and the strain of conceptual manipulation. It
seems that throughout Shankman’s article, and
in several of the responses to it, lingers an
uneasiness to let go, even just for a moment and
hypothetically, of the stronghold represented
by the scientific paradigm; consequently, many
of the criticisms coming from this school of
thought remain essentially at an unproductive
distance from the interpretive paradigm. They
are either not applicable or suggest solutions
that lie outside the interpretive paradigm. This
resistance appears somewhat mitigated in
Martin’s view, as he is ready to evaluate the
interpretive approach within and despite its
limits.
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Where Geertz states that ‘a good
interpretation of anything…takes us into the
heart of that of which it is the interpretation’
(1973, p. 18), and that ‘…interpretive
approaches…escape systematic modes of
assessment. You either grasp an interpretation
or you do not…’ (p. 24), both, Shankman and
Martin lament the absence of criteria for
assessment of what is a good or a bad
interpretation. While this praise of an
apparently subjective and impenetrable
capacity to discern between truth and untruth
can generate some amount of perplexity, Geertz
seems to be resorting to common sense,
considered a quality inherent to humans, as a
means for social and moral guidance. He seems
to ask, if this common sense is applicable to so
many spheres in our lives, why can it not serve
the cause of anthropology? The majority of
people would need to admit to several personal
anecdotes wherein some things make
inherently and seemingly inexplicably more
sense than others, and to the fact that their
understandings of right and wrong are nuanced
and positioned along a spectrum, rather than
conflated at its extremes. It is this complexity
of the human mind, and of humanity in general,
that Geertz seeks to capture through his thick
descriptions, and which cannot be easily
rendered in a nomothetic framework.
When everything starts to make sense in
the light of a specific interpretation, when
inadvertently a reality is filtered through the
lens of that specific framework, then, Geertz
suggests, it is obvious that one has come across
a correct interpretation. If guidance by common
sense is a diffused human phenomenon, then it
is eligible to be at least one of the possible
criteria for judgment, or one of the stages of
analysis. Nonetheless, the range of common
senses is contextual, and one may not be willing
to accept the subjective and unverifiable
conclusions of another interpreter’s common
sense.
Validation,
thus,
remains
a
problematically unresolved issue. Martin
6
attempts to amend this limitation by suggesting
the existence of general statements based upon
inductive reasoning and the assessment of
rivaling hypotheses through criteria of logic.
With regards to the weakness of
theorisation, Shankman asks: ‘[i]f there is no
generalization across cases, then how does
Geertzian theory proceed in terms of
cumulative knowledge?’ (1984, p. 263). He
replies to his rhetorical question by stating that
‘…interpretive theory does not yield much in
the way of theoretical formulations’. However,
I would suggest that it is erroneous to believe
that Geertzian formulations do not yield much;
they only yield at another level, namely at the
microscopic one: ‘…the essential task of theory
building here is not to codify abstract
regularities but to make thick description
possible, not to generalize across cases but to
generalize within them’ (Geertz 1973, p. 26).
Also Martin laments that the scope of cultureas-text is too narrow; however, where
Shankman seems to imply that Geertz asks the
wrong questions, Martin suggests that Geertz
only asks too few questions: ‘[a] reader of a text
might well ask not only what the text means but
also why the text was produced in the first
place, why it takes this form rather than that…’
(Martin 1993, p. 275).
Another aspect considered problematic by
Geertz’s critics is the almost complete absence
of comparative methodologies within the
interpretive approach. However, it has to be
remembered that interpretive anthropology
pursues thick and dense descriptions at a
microscopic level and, as such, aims to satisfy
all its questions within that very context, thus
circumventing the necessity of comparisons.
Also, one could imagine that a comparative
methodology within the interpretive framework
would probably lead to an unstable ground,
rather than promote deep and significant
knowledge. Given that each contextual
description is the construct of multiple
interpretations, if comparisons were to be
Hirmer: Reflections on Salient Features
carried out, the number of interpretations would
instantly multiply; consequently, also the
difficulties inherent in handling several layers
of transmitted meanings would multiply.
Finally, it has to be noticed that there are no
directives with regard to the compatibility of
two (or more) sets of webs of significance
juxtaposed in comparison: the risk is the
generation of an entanglement of multiple nets,
rather than a coherent and effective perspective.
One of the main issues that Martin exposes
with respect to the interpretive framework is the
lack of due credit to causality. For him,
Geertz’s exclusive commitment to the search of
meanings rather than of causes does not seem
to exhaust the scope of thick descriptions;
since, according to Martin, causality is implicit
in Geertz’s interpretations of cultural
performances such as the Balinese cockfight, it
demands to be acknowledged and exhaustively
elaborated.
Conclusion
What emerges from this discussion is that
interpretive anthropology, through its bold
connotation as an idiographic ‘strange science’,
inevitably attracts a number of severe
criticisms. Due to the interpretive paradigm’s
descriptive and subjective nature, objections
from a positivistic angle might not address
much beyond the subjectivity/objectivity clash,
upon which rest also related issues such as lack
of operationalisation, the impossibility of
verification and the neglect of generalisations.
Despite criticisms, the interpretive
paradigm offers invaluable contributions to the
anthropological debate, starting from its appeal
to denser and thicker descriptions capable of
reflecting humanity’s complexities and details.
It is true that from a positivistic perspective
these contributions come at a considerable cost;
yet, rather than discarding them at once along
with the entire interpretive paradigm, it may be
useful to formulate critiques from ideological
7
standpoints that are not completely averse to
idiographic and humanistic foundations, and
can instead elaborate a richer and more
exhaustive interpretive approach.
As I see it, at the cost of distorting Geertz’s
original conception (and, as such, probably
moving away from the interpretive framework,
as this is so inherently linked to its founder), an
increasingly
exhaustive
picture
and
understanding of humanity can arise from
descriptive methods that do not repudiate
cautious abstractions, microscopic accounts
that are not cut off from their wider
connections, and symbols that are the products
of ongoing negotiations between private as well
as public meanings. Questioning Geertz’s
claim about the superiority of the interpretive
approach, I take Martin’s stand that ‘…it is not
the whole story, and that non-interpretive
questions can and should be asked’ (1993, p.
275). If interpretive anthropology fails to
incorporate at least some of the above points, it
may outlive itself and be destined to an end
similar to that of those grande idées that have,
until the advent of the Geertzian approach,
unsatisfactorily modeled the ‘concept of culture
around which the whole discipline of
anthropology arose’ (Geertz 1973, p. 4).
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