8
Jewish Perspectives on Restorative Justice
Eliezer Segal
Judaism is a 'traditional' religion in that its revealed scriptures
are mediated and interpreted by a historical tradition, known as
the 'oral Torah.' The word 'Torah' means 'instruction' and is applied
narrowly to the first five books of the Bible. Although the Jewish
Bible includes all the books of the standard Christian 'Old Testament,' the books of the Torah are considered more important and
authoritative than the others. Indeed, the other books of the Hebrew
Bible are perceived by Jews primarily as exhortations and object
lessons aimed at strengthening their devotion to the Torah.! At the
core of the Torah is a variegated collection of commandments which,
according to the normative Jewish belief, were revealed directly by
God through Moses, greatest of the prophets, to the assembled people of Israel at Mount Sinai. Study and observance of these precepts
forms the supreme measure of piety. Thus, spirituality is related
more to adherence to the divine law than to acceptance of doctrinal
truth or to the attainment of a mystical state. The legal component
of Jewish religious discourse is known in Hebrew as "halakhah"
(literally: 'walking'), as distinct from the more theoretical realms of
"aggadah" ('talking'), which is normally not considered binding or
normative. 2
Assuredly, the Bible presents us with several fundamental aggadic
value-concepts that form the foundation ofthe Torah way of life. Some
beliefs that have a bearing on the current topic include: the "divine
image" that bestows value and dignity upon each person (Genesis
1:26); the common origin of all humanity (Genesis 5:1); peace (e.g.,
Psalms 34:13); love for one's fellow human being (Leviticus 19:18);
lRl
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Eliezer Segal
liberty (e.g., Jeremiah 61:15-17); the dialectical interplay of justice
and mercy; and the freedom of will that allows sinners to turn from
evil. Nevertheless, Jewish tradition has translated these general
ideals into very specific rules and laws to guide the actions of the
individual and the community.
The Torah's capacity to respond to the fluid nuances of the
human situation is enhanced by the belief in the oral Torah, which
both complements and interprets the written Torah. It is said to
contain additional teachings revealed divinely through Moses, as
well as authoritative interpretations of the written scriptures, and
new regulations enacted in response to changing historical conditions. Through this interplay between Scripture and unwritten
teaching, Judaism has continued to evolve since biblical times and
remains a vibrant religion that encompasses diverse forms. In
examining Jewish teaching about the judicial process and the punishment of wrongdoers, we must keep in mind that we are not
required to extrapolate practical applications from general moral
principles. Nor, in fact, are we permitted to do so once the tradition
itself has already formulated specific rules and regulations. Once
an opinion has been accepted as codified law it is difficult-though
not necessarily impossible-to alter it. 3
The most authoritative post-biblical compendia of Jewish legal
teachings include: The Mishnah (completed in Palestine, early third
century); the Babylonian Talmud (an encyclopedic record of debates
and interpretations on the Mishnah, completed around the sixth
century); Rabbi Moses Maimonides'Mishneh Torah (twelfth-century
Egypt); and Rabbi Joseph Caro's Shulhan 'Arukh (sixteenth-century
Palestine).4
For all its practical orientation, there is a markedly theoretical
dimension to the Jewish treatment of criminal law. This follows
from the fact that, through virtually all the formative eras of their
legal traditions, Jews have lived under foreign rule. Medieval halakhic authorities were conscious that the sanctions that stood at
their disposal for the enforcement of the law differed significantly
from those delineated in the authoritative literary sources. Though
modern Jewish denominations have been less bound to historical
precedent and authority, they have not undertaken to perpetuate a
separate Jewish judicial system. The contemporary State of Israel
is a secular democracy whose legal system derives from British
common law and which restricts the authority of religious courts to
matters of family law and personal status. At present there seem to
be no opportunities within the Jewish religious tradition to apply
Jewish Perspectives on Restorative Justice
183
principles of Restorative Justice to actual cases of legal or correctional procedure.
The Torah rarely draws lines between such ostensibly diverse
realms as moral principles, cultic rituals, social welfare, and norms
of civil litigation, seeing all the precepts as deriving from one source
and intertwined in a single unity.5 Nevertheless, the Jewish sages
of the Talmudic era did develop a rudimentary conceptual vocabulary in order to facilitate discourse, comparison, and analysis of
their sacred laws without thereby denying the integral connections
that exist between the different realms. Thus, Rabbinic sources draw
discrete distinctions: between monetary and capital cases' humandivine and interpersonal matters; civil law and ritual prohibitions'
between financial recompense [reparative] and punitive payment
HォGョ。セI[
「セエキ・ ョ
:he 'line of the, law' as enforced by the judiciary,
and wzthm the lme of the law, or acting according to higher or
more compassionate standards than the law can demand. 7 The need
セッイ N、セヲ ・イ ョエゥ。 ッョウ
between the civil, criminal, moral, and narrowly
relIgIOus realms does not contradict the fundamental fact that in
many areas of biblical and Rabbinic laws the realms operate in an
intricate counterpoint whose ultimate goal is to achieve a harmony
among persons and with God.
The guidelines that govern individual behavior, or dealings
can differ from what is expected of a court;
between private ー・イウッセ
セ・カ イエィ ャ ウ L
the domaIns can overlap in some intriguing ways. To
・エiセ
one exmnple, a fundmnental Jewish belief proclaims the possibilIty of repentance, of escaping the momentum of past misdeeds and
turning over a new leaf. As systematized by Maimonides Ht・ウィセカ。
2:2), full repentance involves stages of confession remorse and a
ゥョセャオ、 ァ
determination to improve one's future conduct. iョ、ゥセオ。ャウL
those who have been wronged, are encouraged to treat the reformed
sinner with compassion, forgiving the sins of the past. As we shall
observe, however, even the most earnest repentance does not exempt
the セッオイエ
ヲイッセ
the ッセャゥァ。エ ッョ
to punish the sinner. On the contrary,
pumshment IS perceIved as a crucial stage in the atonement process,
so that a judge who avoids passing sentence is evading his sacred
responsibility.
The character of the Jewish judicial system differs from the
familiar Western model in several ways that bear upon a discussion
of the restorative dimension of justice. Proponents of Restorative
Justice, for example, have lamented the prevailing Western courtroom procedure. in which debate between disinterested attorneys
supplants meamngful encounters between the criminal and victim.
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Eliezer Segal
For the most part, Jewish courts follow an ゥョアオ ウゥセッイ 。ャ
セッ、 ャL
where the judge is in charge of investigating the claIms; thIS dIStinguishes them from the accusatorial or 。、カセイウ。 ゥ ャ
procedures
that are standard in our own courts. TalmudIc sages, of course,
were very familiar with the adversarial char?cter セヲ エセ・N
Roman
courtroom which provided much of the dramatic homIletic Imagery
its ウケョ・ァッイセウ
for rabbinic portrayals of the 'Heavenly Court' セエィ
(defense attorney) and kategoros (prosecutor): JewIsh law ィ。セ
エセiᆳ
cally frowned upon the employment of ーイッヲセ ウiッョ。ャ
attorneys: ュsiウエセ
ing on direct confrontation between the ャゥエiセ。ョ ウ
and the jオセァ・ウN
Court procedure usually insists on 、ゥイ・セエ
エ・Nウ ャiセッョケ
before. ・セ
Judge
and the other litigant.9 Nonetheless an mstitution of 'rabbiIDc ᆳ、。セャ
ers' has arisen in recent years, particularly in Israel, where religious
courts have been incorporated into the general judiciary for matters
related to family law and personal status. IO Victims, however, playa
particular role in cases dealing with property and persons. ..
Lacking the bureaucratic resources that are a ーイ・セッョiャo
for
our full-time police forces and state attorney offices, JUdICIal proceedings related to property or persons are normally initiated by
the victims. Thus, several acts that we would consider criminal
'offenses against society' (e.g., theft) are adjudicated in Jewish law
as civil suits. Significantly, incarceration is not known as a form ?f
punishment in classical Jewish law, though it was employed m
some medieval communities. ll
Questions of restitution, punishment and atonement all playa
role in the laws of robbery as set out in Leviticus 5:20-26. The Torah
treats the crime on at least three levels: 1) restoration to its rightful owner of the stolen object; 2) an additional punitive payment to
the victim probably deterrent in purpose, consisting in this case of
one fifth of the total; 3) atonement for the trespass against God, to
be administered by a priest, through the bringing of an "asham"
sacrifice, the so-called guilt-offering. The Jewish oral tradition ィセウ
of course studied expounded, and expanded each element of this
structure in ュ・エゥセオャッ ウ
detail. Let me share with you some insights
that appear in Rabbinic texts.
Restoration
That misappropriation or destruction of property requires the
restoration of the stolen object or its equivalent value is a clear
premise of biblical law. We find this set forth, for example, in the
Jewish Perspectives on Restorative Justice
185
laws of theft (Exodus 22:3), damage caused by one's chattels
(Exodus 22:5), arson, loss of a bailment (Exodus 22:12), killing someone's animal (Leviticus 24:21). It was clear to the Jewish sages that
atonement, understood as the effecting of divine forgiveness, was
conditional upon the criminal's repairing the damage caused to the
victim. 12 To expect expiation while the effects of the damage have
not been removed is, according to the Talmudic proverb, analogous
to immersing oneself in purifying waters while still grasping the
defiling carcass of the "creeping thing."13 Significantly, the Jewish
sages tried to create circumstances in which it would be easier for a
repentant robber to make amends. Thus, if the misappropriated
object has been lost or destroyed, the criminal can appease the victim by restoring its monetary value. The following citation from
the Mishnah (Baba Qamma 9:5) illustrates the seriousness with
which the requirement of restoration was regarded:
One who robbed his fellow and submitted to an oath must
carry it to him all the way to Media. It is not allowed to hand
it to the victim's child or agent, though it may be turned over
to a court-appointed bailiff. 14
An instructive exception to the above stringency is the case of
a person who used a stolen beam in order to construct a building. It
was understood that the law of the Torah demanded that the building be dismantled, if necessary, so that the original beam could be
restored to its legal owner. However, the sages of Israel determined
that the resulting financial loss would be so burdensome upon the
culprits that it might impede repentance. And repentance, of course,
was the overriding purpose of the judicial structures in the first
place. Therefore they enacted that financial compensation would
suffice in such circumstances. 15
This ruling invites an illuminating comparison with the ostensibly similar ruling in Roman law. The Romans, however, had an
eminently pragmatic reason for this rule: "to avoid the necessity of
having buildings pulled down."16 Unlike the Jewish jurists, the
Roman courts were disinterested in repentance. In the same spirit,
the rabbis encouraged victims to forego their claims to restitution
where that would facilitate the rehabilitation of the criminal. Thus
we learn in the Talmud (TB Baba Qamma 94b):
Our rabbis taught: When robbers or usurers come to
make restitution, one should not accept it from them; and
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Eliezer Segal
the spirit ofthe sages is not pleased with one who does accept
it from them.
Said Rabbi Yohanan: This teaching was expounded during the days of Rabbi [Judah the Prince], because of what
was taught:
It once happened that a certain man wished to repent.
His wife said to him: "Idiot! If you were to make full amends,
then even your belt is not your own!" Consequently, he
refrained from repenting.
It was at that point that they declared: When robbers
or usurers come to make restitution, one should not accept
it from them; and the spirit of the sages is not pleased with
one who does accept it from them.
Maimonides paraphrases this rule in his code of Jewish law (Laws
of Robbery 1:13) as follows:
Whoever robs their fellow of even the value of a penny, it is
as if they had taken their soul ... Nevertheless, ifthe stolen
item was no longer in existence and the robber wished to
repent, and came of his own volition to repay the value of
the stolen goods, the sages have enacted that we should not
accept the paYment from him. 17 Instead we assist him, and
forego the claim in order to bring the straight path closer to
the penitents. And as for anyone who does accept restitution for the robbery, the spirit of the sages is not pleased
with such a person.
In dealing with the repaYment of a theft, Exodus 22:3 observes
that "if he [the thief] have nothing, then he shall be sold for his
theft." As expounded in the Jewish oral tradition, this was the
basis of the institution of the "Hebrew bondman" whose duties and
privileges are outlined in Exodus 21:1-6 and elsewhere. Underlying
the law is the recognition that most thieves steal out of economic
distress. By ordering the thief to become the victim's servant, the
Torah satisfies the demand for restoration of the misappropriated
property, while at the same time removing the root cause of the
crime by providing honest emplOYment for the criminal. 18 That the
servitude was perceived primarily as an act of benevolence to the
thief is confirmed by several regulations: the obligation to provide
Jewish Perspectives on Restorative Justice
187
for the servant's entire family; the requirement that the master
provide the servant with a generous stipend upon the conclusion of
his term; the expectation (though severely discouraged) that many
servants would prefer to continue their indentures beyond the sixyear maximum. The matter is aptly summarized in the following
Talmudic tradition: 19
"And if thy brother ... be sold unto thee" (Deuteronomy 15:12)-You must treat him in a brotherly manner ...
[cf. Ben-Sira 33:35-36].
"Thou shalt not compel him to serve as a slave" (Leviticus 25:39)-That he should not walk behind you carrying a
litter, nor should he walk before you carrying your clothes
to the bathhouse ...
"[And it shall be, if he say unto thee, I will not go away
from thee; because he loveth thee and thine house,] because
he is well with thee" (Deuteronomy 15:16)-''With thee" in
food and "with thee" in drink. That you should not be eating quality bread while he is eating coarse bread, you
should not be drinking wine while he is drinking new wine,
you should not be sleeping upon a mattress while he sleeps
on straw. For this reason they have declared that whoever
acquires a Hebrew servant is as if he has acquired a master.
Punishment
The precise purpose of this payment in the biblical law of robbery is not specified. It fits the classic definition of a 'k'nas'
described above, in that it causes the criminal's payment to exceed
the amount of the actual damage. In other cases of 'k'nas' payments
the oral tradition declared that perpetrators can be exempted ヲイッセ
this penalty if they confess to their crimes, rather than being sentenced by the court. While this strikes our modern minds as akin to
plea-bargaining, or else as a pragmatic incentive for cooperation
with the judicial system, it is not construed that way in any of the
traditional sources. 20
The one-fifth additional payment for a robbery is paid only if
the robber confessed to the crime, not if he was convicted on the
testimony of witnesses. 21 This indicates that the penalty was
regarded as having an atoning power analogous to that of confes-
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Eliezer Segal
sion; for this reason it was unwarranted where there was no confession to demonstrate a sincere desire to make amends.
Aside from the imposition of financial penalties, the range セヲ
nitive measures mentioned in the traditional Jewish sources IS
yャ 。」ゥウセ「
limited to the following options: 」。ーゥエセ
ーセョゥウィュ・ エL
ヲゥセ・ウL
exile, corporal punishment, and atonement. 22 SIgnIficantly, the eye
for an eye' stipulations of Exodus 21:22-24 were expounded by the
rabbis to furnish the source for a sophisticated system of compensation for injuries, ineluding payments for medical ・クー セウ・N L
suffering, lost work time, humiliation, and permanent deprecIatIon.
Capital punishment, which also in.eludes セオー・イョ。Zャケ
L・クセᆳ
cuted punishments, is most often assOCIated WIth specIfically イセャiᆳ
gious' and cuitic violations. Out of its reverence for human lIfe,
early Rabbinic law effectively ゥョエ・イー セ
the death penalty out セヲ
existence by insisting on unreasonably dIfficult standards of エ・ウセiᆳ
mony. (It insisted, for example, that the witnesses must have ・クーャセ」ᆳ
itly warned the culprit of the criminal status of the act and ItS
penalty; and that the 」オセーイゥエ
mus: ィ。カセ
stated .that he or ウセ・
was
going to commit the crIme despIte this warnmg). The MIshnah
(Makkot 7a) teaches:
A Sanhedrin that passes the death penalty once in seven
years is called a murderous court.
Rabbi Eleazar ben Azariah says that this is true of a
court that passes such sentence even once in seventy years.
Rabbi Tarfon and Rabbi Akiva say: Had we been members of the Sanhedrin, no one would have been executed.
This approach was formulated during times when Jews, living
under foreign occupation, did not administer their own criminal
justice system. There were at any rate 、ゥウ ・ョエゥセァ
voices among エセ・
rabbis, such as that of the Patriarch Rabban SImeon ben GamalIel
who countered the previous dicta with the charge that, through
their reluctance to enforce capital punishment, "they would have
caused a proliferation of murderers in Israel."23 The execution of
the death penalty was viewed by the rabbis as an important stage
in the atonement process for the gravest of sins. Hence, it was to be
accompanied by a confession (Mishnah Sanhedrin 6.:2). The 、・ウエイセ」ᆳ
tion of the Second Temple and the ensuing abrogatIOn of the sacnficial cult and capital punishment were initially perceived as a terrible
crisis that deprived the Jews of the opportunity for atonement,
Jewish Perspectives on Restorative Justice
189
thus leading the rabbis of those generations to posit various substitute means of atonement; e.g., death or physical suffering.24
Exile is a special case in point. According to the 'Ibrah (Numbers 6:9-29) a "blood-avenger" can pursue anyone guilty of unintentional manslaughter unless the latter succeeds in escaping to a
city of refuge. Rabbinical interpretation effectively transformed
this institution into a court-administered exile to the sanctuary
city. Here one might mention as well the venerable Jewish judicial
sanction of the ban of excommunication, a form of social and economic
ostracism with strong religious overtones. During the medieval era
when Jewish communities had little authority to impose ーオョゥウィセ
ments on their members, the ban came into frequent use and was
identified with Jewish judicial autonomy. Its use was normally not
punitive in nature, so much as a means of enforcing the law.
Corporal punishment has detailed prescriptions. For example,
the administration of lashes, mandated by the Torah (Deuteronomy 25:1-3), was strictly regulated in light of the criminal's health
and at any rate was never to exceed thirty-nine strokes. It キ。セ
viewed primarily as a means of atonement. "Lashes are precious,
for they atone for sins ...".25 Or again, "For all who are liable to
the penalty of karet [divinely executed premature death], if they
have been subjected to lashes, they are exempted from their penalty
of karet, for it states '[Forty stripes he may give him, and not
exceed: lest, if he should exceed, and beat him above these with
many stripes,] then thy brother should seem vile unto thee'-Once
he has submitted to the stripes, he is 'thy brother.'"26
The 'Ibrah's unambiguous insistence on punishing offenders
seems to position it at odds with the ideals of Restorative Justice
as described by some of its proponents from whose writings we
would suppose that restorative and retributive approaches stand in
polar opposition, and that the Western judicial tradition has been
・セ ャオウゥカセャケ
retributive. Indeed, if we portray the institution ofjudiCIal pumshment as some sort of barbaric act of vengeance that
seeks sadistically and futilely to erase past wrongs by inflicting
them on the perpetrators, then the entire process is discredited.
The ancient rabbis were well aware of the law's obligation to
impose suffering on criminals, both for their moral discipline and in
order to discourage other potential offenders. From this perspective,
any stance that entirely rejects judicial punishment seems seriously
flawed with respect to its understanding both of prevailing legal
ideologies, and of the role of punishment in a Restorative Justice
paradigm. As can be seen from Conrad Brunk's contribution to this
Eliezer Segal
Jewish Perspectives on Restorative Justice
volume, many modern ethicists have followed a utilitarian interpretation ofjudicial punishment, for which punishment serves chiefly
to deter offenders from future crime. 27 Admittedly, there is nothing
in the model of Restorative Justice that would contradict the need
for the fair and impartial imposing of punishments on wrongdoers.
The following quotation illustrates the view that shortsighted
compassion can be the cause of a long-term societal catastrophe:
The Jewish teachers were aware of the interdependence and
apparent overlap of the variegated biblical ordinances related to
restoration, punishment, and spiritual cleansing of a criminal. The
general rule is that intentional sins must be atoned for by subjecting oneself to the prescribed penalties, whereas the sacrifices (usually accompanied by a confession) are required for sins of negligence
or ignorance. There is considerable interpretative diversity with
regards to the specific roles of other elements, such as repentance,
the Day of Atonement, and its special rites. The following passage
from the Mishnah (end of Tractate Yoma) provides a powerful illustration of the intricacy of the system. Among other things, it sheds
light on two types of guilt, 'certain' and 'doubtful.' The certain guilt
offering is made when the offender is aware of his or her deed
whereas the doubtful guilt offering is made on behalf of ー・イウッョセ
who are uncertain whether they have committed a transgression.
190
Said Rabbi Joshua ben Levi: If a person acts compassionately in a situation where cruelty is required, in the end that
person will act cruelly when compassion is required. 28
An eminently balanced rationale for punishment was advanced eloquently by Maimonides:
The utility of this is clear and manifest, for if a criminal is
not punished, injurious acts will not be abolished in any way
and none of those who design aggression will be deterred. No
one is as weak-minded as those who deem that the abolition
of punishments would be merciful on men. On the contrary,
this would be cruelty itself on them as well as the ruin of
the order of the city. On the contrary, mercy is to be found
in His command, may he be exalted: Judges and officers
shalt thou make thee in thy gate (Deuteronomy 16:18)."29
Atonement
As perceived by the rabbis, the laws of robbery in the Torah
had in mind sinners or criminals who had already taken their first
hesitant steps towards restitution. Their interpretation of the
crime of "robbery" was such that in most instances the criminals
could have remained immune from judicial punishment had they
been willing to persist in their peIjury. The very fact that the issue
of restitution has arisen implies that they have a desire to repent.
Such persons are offered guidance with regards to correcting or
minimizing the specific damage that was inflicted upon their victims. However even after amends have been made on the human
plane, the sinner will remain troubled by a separation from God. 30
Talmudic sources focus especially on cases where the wrongdoer
has invoked the Lord's name in a false oath. The reconciliation with
God is accompanied by the bringing of a ram as 'guilt-offering.'
191
The sin-offering and the certain guilt-offering effect
atonement.
Death and the Day of Atonement effect atonement
when combined with repentance.
Repentance effects atonement for less serious transgressions: for the violation of positive or negative precepts. With
respect to grave transgressions, it suspends them until the
Day ofAtonement arrives and effects the full atonement ...
For transgressions between a person and the Almighty
the Day of Atonement effects atonement. For transgressions between persons the Day ofAtonement does not effect
atonement until the person has conciliated his/her fellow.
Rabbi Eleazar ben Azariah expounded: ". . . that ye
may be clean from all your sins before the Lord" (Leviticus
16:30)-fThis implies that] it is for transgressions between
a person and the Almighty that the Day of Atonement
effects atonement; however, for transgressions between
persons the Day of Atonement does not effect atonement
until the person conciliates his/her fellow.
Said Rabbi Akiva: How fortunate are you, Israel!,
Before whom are you cleansed, and who cleanses you? It is
your Father in heaven ... (Mishna Yoma 8:9)
Eliezer Segal
Jewish Perspectives on Restorative Justice
The process of forgiveness and atonement commences with reconciliation between the sinner and the wronged party, and when done
in sincerity, culminates in a cleansing by the Almighty himself.
The Jewish legal tradition is ambivalent when it comes to the
appropriateness of taking compassionate factors into account. Much
of the controversy revolves around the following case cited in the
Talmud. 31
moral persuasion that carried no legal sanctions. They felt that the
introduction of subjective considerations into legal decisions would
serve to undermine the law's authority.
Restorative Justice themes like compromise, conciliation and
arbitration prompt the question as to whether the judicial s;stem
should be bypassed in favour of compromise between the parties.
The Talmudic sources are not consistent in distinguishing between
conciliation (direct negotiation between the disputants) and arbitration (mutual agreement to abide by the decision of a third party).
on Jewish judicial autonomy during the
Owing セッ the セ・ウエイゥ」 ッョウ
TalmudIC era, It appears that arbitration courts did in fact become
エセ・N
ョッイュセエゥカ・N
カ・セオ
for ャゥエァセッョNSU
Although the topic of extrajudlClal arbItratIon IS more readIly applicable to civil disputes than to
cases ッセ criminal wrongdoing, the option can in principle be applied
to relations between criminal and victim. Talmudic tradition records
that the advisability of this course was debated in the early third
century:36
192
Some porters broke a barrel of wine belonging to Rabbah
son of Rav Huna. He seized their garments. They went and
told Rav. He said to them: "Give them back their garments."
He said: "Is that the law?"
He said: "[Yes.)32 'That thou mayest walk in the way of good
men.'"
He gave them their garments. They said to him, "We are
poor men, have worked all day, and are in need; are we to
get nothing?"
He said to him: "Go and pay them their salaries."
He said: "Is that the law?"
He said: [Yes] "and keep the path of the righteous (Proverbs
2:20)."
The ambiguities and textual variants of this story have provoked disagreements regarding its normative legal status. 33 The
classic commentators characterize Rav's decision as 'within the line
of the law,' that is, as based on compassionate, rather than legal,
motives, since the porters were clearly liable for the damage that
they occasioned. Nevertheless, in view of the fact that Rav was evidently acting in a judicial capacity, one may wonder whether the
case should be regarded as a legal precedent. Taking Rav's words
as a normative law, a number of medieval authorities, especially in
central and eastern Europe, upheld the courts' power to compel the
observance of standards that are technically 'beyond the letter of
the law.' Thus the sixteenth-century Polish Rabbi Joel Sirkes
writes: "And this is the custom of all Jewish courts, to compel the
wealthy to act according to what is right and fitting, even where
the law does not demand it."34 Authorities from Spain and north
Africa, on the other hand, were uneasy with such an apparent abrogation of the integrity of the law. They interpreted Rav's words as
193
Eliezer the son of Rabbi Yose the Galilean says:
. r。「セゥ
It IS forbIdden to effect a compromise, and anyone who does
effect a compromise is a sinner, and anyone who blesses the
one who effects a compromise is blaspheming ... Rather,
the law must pierce the mountain.
Moses also declared that the law must pierce the mountain, as it states "For judgment is God's" (Deuteronomy 1:17).
On the other hand, Aaron loved peace and pursued
peace and established peace between people.
Rabbi Joshua ben Qorhah says: We are commanded to
effect compromise, as it states "execute the judgment of truth
and peace in your gates" (Zechariah 8:16). But is it not the
case that in the place where there is judgment there is no
peace, and in the place where there is peace there is no judgment? Rather, what is judgment that includes peace? Necessarily, it is compromise ...
It would appear that the disputed issue was roughly as follows: Rabbi Eliezer felt that unless the verdict was issued unambiguously by the court, the parties would feel that it was lacking
'closure,' and resentments might continue to fester. Indeed, the
Talmud speaks of the cleansing feeling that results at the end of a
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Eliezer Segal
Jewish Perspectives on Restorative Justice
trial, when guilt and innocence have been clearly established, and
the guilty party is instructed how to remedy the situation. 37 Rabbi
Joshua, on the other hand, believed that a solution worked out
through a process of give-and-take between the two parties would
be more lasting than one imposed from without, in which justice
precluded the establishment of peace. This view was accepted as
normative. Judges are urged to encourage litigants to agree to conciliation before taking their cases to court. Post-Talmudic law has
generally favored the path of compromise.
In short, Jewish halakhah shares several of the features that
have been proposed by supporters of Restorative Justice, such as an
interest in the criminal's repentance, direct confrontation between
litigants, and avoidance of punitive incarceration. It is, however,
too diverse to be categorized unambiguously as a restorative system, especially since it has relatively little practical experience with
criminal law or violent offenses. It is crucial to keep in mind that
the judicial aspects of halakhah are inseparable parts of a religious
structure that integrates legal, moral, and spiritual matters. To
transplant individual features into a secular-liberal legal system
would alter their purpose in significant ways.
comparatae"; that is, reparative. Those that result in payments that are
greater than the original damage or misappropriation are "poenae"; that
is, punitive. See Moyle (1964),551-5; Moyle (1955),177-9; and Albeck (1965)
40-41.
'
195
7. This classification is roughly equivalent to our English distinctions between "the letter of the law" and ''beyond the letter of the law,"
though the difference in the wording is instructive. Commentators and
jurists have encountered considerable difficulty in formulating precise borders between the two realms, but in general they have noted two chief criteria: CO "The line of the law" is enforceable by the court, whereas "within
the line" is a voluntary moral stance. As we shall note below, this claim
was a disputed issue among the Jewish jurists; (ii) "Within the line" refers
to voluntarily foregoing a right or privilege to which the party has a legal
claim. See Berkovits HQYセSI[
Cohen (1966) 31-121; and Federbusch (1943).
8. Thus, Mishnah Avot 1:8 is traditionally rendered as: "Do not
behave like the lawyers" (but cf. [Kutscher 1965], 89-92).
9. For example, TB Shebu'ot 30a-31a.The concern there is chiefly
to prevent one litigant from gaining an advantage over the other.
10. Herring (1984),91-120; Rakover (1972),308-53.
11. Biblical instances such as Numbers 11:28 (cf. commentaries) or
15:34 refer always to temporary detention pending clarification of the law.
Regarding Mishnah Sanhedrin 9:5 see Lieberman (1970),10-13.
Notes
1. Following are some readable introductions to Judaism: Stein-
berg (1947); Epstein (1939); Schwarz and Baron, (1956); Seltzer (1980) and
Seltzer (1989).
2. For matters related to the commandments, the halakhah and
Jewish jurisprudence see: Elon (1975), Steinsaltz (1976), Berkovits (1983),
Urbach (1986), 286-292, 315-97, Urbach (1987), Elon (1994).
3. On decision making in the Jewish legal system see Roth (1986),
49-67.
4. On the classic texts of Jewish law see Strack, Sternberger, et
al. (1991), Part Two; Elon (1975), Chapters 25-40.
5. An extreme, but not untypical, example would be the "Holiness
Code" of Leviticus 19:3 ff.
6. The Hebrew "k'nas" apparently derives from the Latin "census"
in the sense of an extension of the Roman censor's authority over public
morals. Cf. Justinian's Code (Iv, vi, 16 ff.) which employs a classification
very similar to that of Talmudic law: In Roman law, those legal actions that
result in the restoration of property to its lawful owners are "rei gratia
12. This view also underlies Matthew 5:23: "First be reconciled to
thy brother and then come offer thy gift."
13. TB Ta'anit 16a.
14. This leniency is explained by the Talmud as intended to facilitate repentance. A central concern of the Bible and Oral Law traditions is
what to do in cases where restitution is impossible; e.g., where the crime
was committed on a collectivity, and we can no longer determine what was
taken from whom. The rabbis debate whether or not it is sufficient in such
cases to leave the object in front of the claimants and allow them to sort
the matter out. The sources also deal with situations where the victim has
since died. See Mishnah and TB Baba Qamma 110b.
15. This, at any rate, was the position of the House of Hillel which
became normative by the first century C.E. The view of the hセオウ・
of
Shammai (Tosefta Baba Qamma 10:5 and parallels) was that the structure
ought to be demolished in order to allow proper restitution.
16. Justinian, II i 29; Moyle (1964), 204 (text); 41 (translation). An
extensive bibliographical survey is found in Cohen, Jewish and Roman Law
19-20.
'
Eliezer Segal
Jewish Perspectives on Restorative Justice
17. This detail is not spelled out explicitly in the Talmudic text
that served as Maimonides' source. However several commentators understood the ruling similarly as referring only to cases where the court has
tangible reason to believe that the criminals are sincerely determined to
turn over a new leaf. As discussed in the Maggid Mishneh commentary by
Rabbi Vidal di Tolosa (Spain, fourteenth century), the authorities were
concerned that this well-intentioned enactment could easily be manipulated by criminals as a way in which to hold on to their ill-gotten gains.
Rabbi Jacob Tam (France, twelfth century) therefore interpreted the Talmud's statements such that the enactment had been in effect only during
the single generation of Rabbi Judah the Prince; he justified the thesis by
citing the Talmud's many anecdotal reports of robbers who were ordered to
return their stolen goods (see Tosafot to Talmud ad loc., and Schlesinger,
1959, #551). Advocates of the opposing view countered that those cases
involved uncooperative criminals who had not demonstrated any desire to
repent. See (Schlesinger, 1963),275.
Rab?i セィゥョ・。ウ
Ha-Kohen of Barcelona in his pop30. The セ・、ゥ カ。ャ
ular Sefer Ha-Hznnukh (begmmng of Leviticus). Wengrov Aaron et al.
an additional reason for ordaining the sacrifice: ゥヲエィセ
crime
(1978) ウセァエ
were セ、jオ ic。エ・、
purely as a property violation that can be remedied by
financIal payment, then potential criminals might perpetrate their crimes
that they could make amends after their economic situin.the ・クーセ」エ。 ゥッョ
ation had Improved.
196
18. Documentary sources suggest that by the close of the Biblical
era this institution was not actually practiced, and some rabbinic works
found Scriptural grounds for its abolition. Nevertheless, variants of this
practice are mentioned in anecdotal evidence from the Talmudic era. See
Urbach (1979), and Gulack (1939), 1:15-31.
19. Sifra Behar ch. 7; cf. TB Qiddushin 20a, 22a, etc.
20. The issue was a topic of debate among the ancient rabbis.
21. Actually, according to the accepted Talmudic ruling, it is onefifth of the value of the robbery plus the penalty; i.e., one quarter of the
value of the stolen item.
22. Note, for example, how the Jewish oral tradition developed its
laws of personal injury (as found chiefly in Talmudic sources related to
Mishnah Baba Qamma ch. 8).
23. A readable survey of the issue based on primary sources is
found in Herring's The Jewish Imagination (1989),149-173.
24. Urbach (1987), 432-36.
25. Hoffmann (1909), 164; cf. TB Shevu'ot 21a.
26. Finkelstein (1939).
27. See for example Rawls (1955) and literature cited therein; also
Rawls (1972), Ezorsky (1972), Barry (1973), Ewing (1970), Hospers (1996),
Baker, Stalker et al. (1987).
28. Ecclesiastes Rabbah 7:25.
29. Maimonides, Pines, et al.(1963), 536.
197
31. (TB Baba Mesi'a 83a).
.
32. This crucial word is absent from most texts here and in the
mstance below. This variant is, of course, related to the questions discussed below, namely whether Rav intended his statement as a bindin
legal precedent.
g
33. Urbach (1987), 330-5.
34. Rabbi Joel Joel Sistees, Bayit Hadash to Hoshen Mishpat, #12.
35. Gulack (1967), 4:178-9
36. TB Sanhedrin 6a and commentary of Tosafot.
37. Cf. Cohen (1966), 656-7.