EU Enlargement: Lessons
from, and Prospects for
Emmanuel Dalle Mulle
Gerben Wedekind
Inge Depoorter
Thomas Sattich
Tomas Maltby
IES WORKING PAPER 3/2013
1
2
EU Enlargement: Lessons from, and Prospects
for
Emmanuel Dalle Mulle, Gerben Wedekind, Inge
Depoorter, Thomas Sattich & Tomas Maltby
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ISSN Number: 2034-6697
© Emmanuel Dalle Mulle, Gerben Wedekind, Inge Depoorter, Thomas Sattich &
Tomas Maltby
Institute for European Studies, VUB
Pleinlaan 2, B-1050 Brussels, Belgium
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ABSTRACT
In 2009 the European Union (EU) reached a crucial moment in its history, in which
the terms Europe and crisis became conjoined: the European sovereign-debt crisis, or
Euro-crisis. Yet enlargement remains on the agenda, with the EU’s next enlargement
starting on 1st July 2013 with the accession of Croatia, Iceland and FYROM looking
set to follow in the near future, and probably other Western Balkan states and
possibly Turkey in the long term. Enlargement therefore will soon come back into
focus. Focusing on climate and energy security policy, this working paper first
reflects upon the impact of the 2004/2007 enlargement on the EU. A reflection on
the EU’s recent past with some of the lessons that can be learnt then follows, with a
consideration that predictions of decision- and policy-making gridlock were not
realised, that newer member states have proved influential, and that prospective
member states cannot be expected to be passive nor impotent. The latter part of this
paper evaluates the potential prospects and outcomes of these lessons with regard
to future enlargement from within (Scotland and Catalonia), and without (Turkey),
and the political factors which may dictate whether these possible enlargements are
realised.
ABOUT THE AUTHORS
Emmanuel Dalle Mulle is a PhD candidate and Teaching Assistant in International
History and Politics, Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies,
Geneva. He is working on a thesis entitled "Nationalism of the Rich: Discourses and
Strategies of Separatist Parties in Padania, Catalonia, Scotland and Flanders".
Gerben Wedekind is an expert in EU-enlargement and EU-Turkey affairs. He is
currently researching the integration of interest groups from EU Candidate States in
EU governance structures as part of his PhD at Ghent University. Moreover, he is a
full-time EU Advisor for the Brussels' office of Turkey's major research and business
organisations (TuR&Bo).
Inge Depoorter obtained a Master degree in Political Science, Vrije Universiteit
Brussel in 2007 (cum laude) and a Master degree in 'Comparative and International
Politics (European Politics)', Katholieke Universiteit Leuven in 2008. Currently, she is
writing a PhD thesis on the impact of the EU enlargement on the EU decision-making
process.
Thomas Sattich is Associate Researcher at the Institute for European Studies, Vrije
Universiteit Brussel and Visiting Researcher at the Brussels office of the Stiftung
Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP), German Institute for International and Security
Affairs. He is writing a PhD thesis on the impact of the EU's Eastern enlargement on
European climate and energy politics.
Tomas Maltby is a PhD candidate in the Politics department at the University of
Manchester, and a former Visiting Researcher at IES. His research focuses on energy
policy, EU enlargement and EU agenda-setting.
5
Table of Contents
1 Introduction: All Quiet on the (South) Eastern Front?
8
2 Still United in Diversity? The Impact of the EU’s 2004/2007 Enlargement on
Policy-making: The Case of European Climate Policy. From Politics to Policy 10
2.1. All quiet on the (South-) Eastern front?
10
2.2. Theory, model and case study design
10
2.3. The case of climate policy: renewable energy and emissions trading
11
2.4. Case study methods: network and cluster analysis
12
2.5. Data collection
12
2.6. Data analysis
12
2.7. Results
13
3 Enlargement and EU Policy-making: How Newer Member States can be, and
are, Influential as Agenda-Setters and Steerers in EU Energy Policy
3.1. Explaining Member State influence on EU policy-making: agenda-setting
and Europeanisation uploading: How influence is achieved
3.2. Agenda and policy-making influence in energy policy; hypotheses
3.3. Poland as a newer member state agenda-setter: Assertive, and becoming
effective.
3.4. Bulgaria: Passive, but becoming involved.
3.5. Conclusions
3.6. Implications for future enlargement
4 The Impact of ‘Widening’ on the Substantive Lourdeur of Decision-Making
4.1. Examining the impact of the EU enlargement on the quality of EU
legislation
4.2. Case study: Transport
4.3. Conclusions and discussion
15
15
16
17
17
18
18
20
20
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23
5 Forecasting the Implications of Turkish EU-Accession for Council of Ministers’
Decision-making
26
5.1. Turkey: a contested EU candidate
26
5.2. Determinants of decision-making: effectiveness and power
27
5.3. The influence of Turkish EU-membership on passage probability within the
Council
27
5.4. The influence of Turkish EU-membership on the power distribution within
the Council
29
5.5. Conclusion
31
6 Enlargement from Within? Secession and EU Membership
6.1. The Debate over Catalonia's and Scotland's EU Memberships
6.2. Some Legal Considerations
6.3. Conclusion
33
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35
7 Conclusion
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Dalle Mulle, Wedekind, Depoorter, Sattich & Maltby
Introduction: All Quiet on the (South) Eastern Front?
EMMANUEL DALLE MULLE, GERBEN WEDEKIND, INGE DEPOORTER, THOMAS SATTICH
& TOMAS MALTBY
In 2009 the European Union (EU) reached a crucial moment in its history, in which the
terms Europe and crisis became conjoined: the European sovereign-debt crisis, or Eurocrisis. All eyes since have been turned on the Eurozone, which saw a series of high-level
summits and a number of emergency measures with the aim of saving the common
currency. Another prominent feature of the history of the EU has been somewhat
forgotten in the course of these dramatic events: the EU’s 2004/2007 enlargement.
Expectations were that this enlargement round would have a profound impact on the EU
and was expected to be the starting point of its overall transformation. Yet during the
first years of their membership, the newer EU Member States rather became a stabilising
element in a troubled EU, being committed to the core of the European project, while
aspiring to eventual inclusion in the Eurozone and Schengen Agreement. Given Croatia’s
accession in July 2013, and the membership aspirations of the Balkan countries and
Turkey (and Iceland), from a Brussels perspective one could therefore ask: all quiet on
the (South) Eastern front?
Public opinion in the ‘old’ Member States was critical towards enlargement of the EU.
Whereas European and national policy-makers portrayed the prospects for the EU in a
positive light, the general public in the old Member States had a much gloomier
perception. Integration research was not unimpressed by these somewhat mixed
feelings, yet it reflected the ambiguous perception of the enlargement in a somewhat
delayed fashion: many scholars at first regarded the enlargement as a historical turning
point for European integration and expected that the expansion would change Europe
greatly. The only question seemed to be in which way enlargement would impact the EU
(Grabbe, 2004)? Various negative consequences were considered to be the likely result of
the enlargement: expectations of a blockade or gridlock of policy- and decision-making
processes were widespread (Wallace, 2007) as well as concerns regarding a potential race
to the bottom in several policy fields (Kvist, 2004), including the environment, consumer
protection, etc. Only a few scholars did not share these concerns (Wyplosz, 2005).
Since 2004, assessment of the enlargement surmised that many initial fears were
unrealised, concluding that it was a business as usual-scenario (Christiansen, Best and
Settembri, 2008) became mainstream (Sedelmeier and Young, 2006). In view of the
plethora of misgivings around 2004 this change is intriguing; if valid, it would undermine
the widespread assumption that the Eastern countries still differ from their WestEuropean counterparts, and many of the earlier concerns were based on a perception of
the new EU Member States en bloc. With Hungary, Cyprus and Slovenia heading towards
the centre of Europe’s current political and economic crisis, this judgment may have to
be revised (again). Secondly, since many scholars and others (e.g. Von Weizsäcker,
Dehaene and Simon, 1999; von Carlowitz, 2001) urged for institutional reform, it
undermines the assumption that the EU institutional structure and decision-making
process is not able to function efficiently with more Member States.
Hence, Political Science seems to reflect the mixed feelings present in the public debates
regarding the EU-enlargement. Yet, the course of the scholarly debate on the prospects
and dangers of the enlargement suggests that the pendulum of Political Science
mainstream thinking simply swung from one extreme to the other – from blockade/race
to the bottom to business as usual. It is therefore very likely that the actual outcomes of
the enlargement are to be found between the two poles of this debate, in the grey area of
daily European-level decision-making. This paper reflects upon the impact on, and
lessons from, EU enlargement on climate policy and energy security policy, and evaluates
the potential prospects and outcomes of future enlargement(s). This article presents a
few cases as lessons from the 2004/2007 EU enlargement alongside articles which reflect
upon prospects for future enlargement(s).
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References
Christiansen, Thomas. Best, Edward. and Settembri, Pierpaolo. 2008. Conclusion. In: Best,
Edward. Christiansen, Thomas. and Settembri, Pierpaolo. (eds.) The Institutions of the
Enlarged European Union: Continuity and Change. Cheltenham, Elgar, 243-252.
Kvist, Jon. 2004. Does EU Enlargement Start a Race to the Bottom? Strategic Interactions
among EU Member States in Social Policy. Journal of European Social Policy 14 (3): 301318.
Grabbe, Heather. 2004. The Constellations of Europe. How Enlargement will Transform
the EU. Center for European Reform, April 2004.
Sedelmeier, Ulrich. and Young, Alasdair R. 2006. Crisis, What Crisis? Continuity and
Normality in the European Union. In Sedelmeier, Ulrich. and Young, Alasdair R. (eds.) The
JCMS Annual Review of the European Union in 2005, Wiley-Blackwell, 1-5.
von Carlowitz, Philipp. 2001. Enlarging the EU: How Can the Costs be Minimised?.
Intereconomics, 36 (2): 77-86.
Von Weizsäcker, Richard. Dehaene, Jean-Luc. and Simon, David. 1999. The Institutional
Implications of Enlargement. Report to the European Commission, Brussels.
Wallace, Helen. 2007. Adapting to Enlargement of the European Union: Institutional
Practice since May 2004. Trans European Policy Studies Association, 16 November 2007,
doi:
http://www.tepsa.eu/download/publications/TEPSA%20%20Wallace%20Publication%20website.doc
Wyplosz, Charles. 2005 Has Europe Lost its Heart? Center for Social and Economic
Research Studies and Analyses 293/2005, Warsaw.
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Dalle Mulle, Wedekind, Depoorter, Sattich & Maltby
Still United in Diversity? The Impact of the EU’s 2004/2007
Enlargement on Policy-making: The Case of European Climate
Policy. From Politics to Policy
THOMAS SATTICH
2.1.
All quiet on the (South-) Eastern front?
The following sections briefly outline the preliminary results of (ongoing) research work
which has been conducted in the context of a doctoral thesis at the Research Centre for
East European Studies at the University of Bremen and the Institute for European Studies
at the Vrije Universiteit Brussel. The research work aims at a better understanding of the
consequences of the EU’s last two enlargement rounds on the policy-making process at
the European level. It is centred around the question, how the political system of the EU
reacted to the impact of the new Member States. In terms of the EU’s self chosen slogan
United in Diversity (European Union), the research work asks, in which direction the EU
gravitated after the enlargement was accomplished: Towards more unity or more
diversity?
In order to shed some light on this question, the following sections evolve around the
hypothesis that the accession of the new Member States to the EU resulted in a shift of
established policy-making procedures (or patterns). This approach follows the dominant
assessment of Political Science around 2004 (Nugent 2004, 7), which underlined the
gridlock/blockade scenario and the assumption of significant consequences for the EU
and its policy output (see introduction). The later assessment of Political Science (Wallace,
2007: 5), namely the business as usual scenario, which was much less alarmist and noted
a much less significant impact of the enlargement on EU policy-making, would have been
equally well suited as a starting point; yet given the widespread assumption of (mostly)
negative side effects for the EU resulting from the enlargement – namely a breakdown of
the policy-making process, a race to the bottom with regard to high standards, and a
historical turning point for the EU – it seems more relevant to start with the initial view.
At first sight, both scenarios – gridlock/blockade and business as usual – seem to be very
distinct, yet they both share one expectation with regard to the EU Member States:
similar behaviour of the entire group of countries after they acceded the EU. Whereas the
blockade scenario assumes the formation of a bloc (to exert influence on the policymaking process), the business as usual scenario assumes just the opposite, the traceless
absorption of the new group of countries in the given structures of European policymaking. The question therefore is, whether the accession of ten countries from Central
and Eastern Europe plus Malta and Cyprus indeed added a new line of conflict to
European politics, this time New vs. Old EU Member States, or not. According to the
above-mentioned discussions in Political Science the existence of such a divide serves as
a hypothesis to test. Given the enlargement indeed resulted in such a new cleavage in
European policy-making, the subsequent questions are: 1) whether this divide has an
impact on the EU’s output?; and, 2) whether it affects European policy in a comparable
manner in the various fields of EU policy-making? It is hypothesised that enlargement has
had a considerable impact on the EU’s policy output.
2.2.
Theory, model and case study design
In order to design a research framework which allows the isolation and measurement of
the variables, some theoretical groundwork is necessary. In this regard the study draws
upon several theories which are widely used for the definition of European policy-making:
1) Multi-level Governance (Marks et al., 1996; Börzel, 2008); 2) constructivist approaches
(Risse, 2004); 3) neo-institutionalism (March and Olsen, 1998; Pierson, 2004); and, 4) the
dimensionality of EU-level politics (Hix, 2008; Hooghe and Marks, 1999). In order to
combine these different theories, Paul A. Sabatiers’ Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF)
serves as model of the EU policy-making process (Sabatier, 1998; Sabatier and Weible,
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2007). The basic concept of this model is the Advocacy Coalition, a loose, informal
network of political actors from all levels of government (supranational, national,
subnational) and society (lobby, consultancy, science, journalism, etc.) on an issuespecific policy field.
The formation and collective action of these coalitions is based on shared world views or
political beliefs (Sabatier and Weible, 2007: 194-196), and on the desire to translate these
into legislation (Sabatier and Weible, 2007: 194-196). According to this model, several
advocacy coalitions – each based on a different set of political beliefs – compete with
each other for influence on the policy-making result. Which coalitions prevail depends on
personnel strength and the resources to dominate the policy field (Sabatier and Weible,
2007: 196). According to this model policy-making and its output is very stable over
time, as the different policy subsystems (e.g. clean air policy) normally feature one
coalition which reflects the zeitgeist and therefore is able to dominate the policy output.
Change therefore is measured in decades (Sabatier and Weible, 2007: 198-199). Only
external shocks may cause quicker changes. With regard to the high quantity of the
newcomers, the enlargement may have had enough weight to trigger quick change, by
altering the existing balance between the advocacy coalitions on a given policy field.
Following the blockade/business as usual framework, the enlargement could have
resulted in a whole spectrum of consequences for the policy-making process: at one
possible extreme the newcomers in the policy-making process formed their own
advocacy coalition(s), on the other extreme they merge into given structures.
2.3.
The case of climate policy: renewable energy and emissions trading
In order to allow broad generalisation, case selection faces several premises: 1) the
selected case has to be representative for a larger number of cases; 2) it has to fit with
the theoretical framework; 3) the chosen model of the policy process (Sabatier, 1998);
and, 4) the case study design. In the context of this study, only supranational, highly
Europeanised policy fields meet the premises of the set up, notably such with regulative
measures negotiated in a deliberative manner. Moreover, the selected cases should be
based on earlier cases before the enlargement in order to guarantee that the new actors
from the new Member States meet a policy subsystem, which has already been in place.
Climate policy is well suited in all the above-mentioned respects and therefore used as a
backdrop of the study. In order to isolate and measure the impact of the newcomers on
EU policy-making, two separate examples for EU climate policy are analysed in parallel:
subcase A) EU policy on greenhouse gas emission reductions and subcase B) the
promotion of renewable energies. The study aims to assess the integration of the actors
from the new EU Member States into the policy-making process for both subcases: the
negotiations of A) Directive 2009/28/EC on the promotion of the use of renewable
energy; and, B) Directive 2009/29/EC to improve and extend the greenhouse gas
emission allowance trading scheme.
A) Emissions Trading System (ETS): the hub of the discussions on the reduction of
CO2 emissions was the national vs. supranational dimension. Since support for a
market-based policy instrument was widespread already before the enlargement,
the policy-making process resulted in a revision of the ETS. Yet, whereas the
predecessor Directive 2003/87/EC established a decentralised policy instrument
which left Member States much leeway for the allocation of emission allowances,
the revision 2009/29/EC resulted in a centralised, pan-European scheme with
harmonised rules, which has been called a governance u-turn with regard to the
concept of hierarchy as a mode of governance.
B) Renewable energies (RES): the hub of the discussions on the promotion of
renewable energies was of a related, but slightly different nature: despite strong
initiatives to harmonise the promotion of renewables on the basis of tradable
certificates, Directive 2009/28/EC stayed – as its predecessor 2001/77/EC –
indifferent with regard to a particular instrument. Hence, no harmonisation took
place. This result clearly contradicts the internal market paradigm of the EU and
the trend to so called new policy instruments.
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2.4.
Dalle Mulle, Wedekind, Depoorter, Sattich & Maltby
Case study methods: network and cluster analysis
Methodologically, the case study follows a mixed methods approach; the triangulation of
network-, cluster- and content analysis as well as process tracing. This selection is based
on three core elements of the Advocacy Coalition Framework: 1) the ACF presumes the
cooperation of actors in the policy-making process; network analysis is applied in order
to visualise these interactions; 2) the ACF implies close ideological ties between the
cooperating actors as well as common policy ideas; based on a set of categories, cluster
analysis should identify such groups; 3) the ACF furthermore assumes that successful
policy-making is the translation of the policy ideas of individual groups into policy
output. Using the same set of categories as for the cluster analysis, this time to analyse
the policy output, should allow deductions which group of actors dominated the policymaking process and was able to translate its policy ideas into European legislation. As a
concluding step, process tracing is applied in order to close the causal chain between
hypotheses (changed Advocacy Coalitions, changed policy) with the policy output
(Directives 2009/29/EC and 2009/28/EC).
Since the Advocacy Coalition Framework underlines the importance of the micro level of
policy-making and the role of the individual actor’s behaviour for the policy output,
network and cluster analysis constitute the core of the study’s empirical part. Their
application serves two purposes: 1) the identification of existing Advocacy Coalitions;
and, 2) the role of the actors from the new EU Member States within them. Since the ACF
suggests the involvement of a large variety of actors (politics, lobby groups, civil society,
etc.), and hardly differentiates between the relevance of the individual stakeholder for the
policy result, data collection has to be extensive.
2.5.
Data collection
Most of the data is qualitative and is to be quantified for the analysis with statistics
programmes: whereas the network affiliations are collected as binary and undirected data
(contact = 1, non-contact/no data = 0), the policy ideas of the single actors are registered
as metric data which reflects the positions taken by the individual actors regarding a
defined system of categories (compliance with a category = 0, indifference/no data = 1,
non-compliance = 2). The categories thereby are based on EU typical dimensions of
policy-making: 1) the national-supranational; and, 2) the regulative dimension of
European policy-making. For each of the two cases 8 (2009/28/EC), respectively 7
(2009/29/EC) categories are designed to attribute the individual actors on these
dimensions. The attribution procedure thereby follows Sabatier’s (1993; 1998; 2007)
political belief systems and scientific assessment with regard to the discussions on the
European ETS and the promotion of renewable energies. The result is several data
matrices comprising the quantified data on network affiliations (subcase A: 237 actors; B:
157 actors) and policy ideas (subcase A: 161 actors; B: 123 actors). The two directives
2009/29/EC and 2009/28/EC provide the data for the content analysis, whereas media
coverage provides the data for process tracing.
2.6.
Data analysis
The computer programme GEPHI is utilised to calculate and visualise the networks. A
mathematical algorithm simulates repulsion and attraction forces between nodes (=
actors) in the network (0 = repulsion, like two magnetic fields; 1 = attraction,
nodes/actors linked by a spring). The result is an overview over the network and densely
interlinked regions ready for further analysis. One important aspect is the detection of
communities within the network, which is based on the ability of GEPHI to calculate path
distances. These communities are taken as one of two indicators for the presence of an
advocacy coalition. Based on the number of affiliations with other actors, GEPHI
furthermore is used to visualise central actors with an important position in the overall
network. With regard to the actors from the new EU Member States the methods allow
detailed insight in their network affiliations, their distribution and overall strength in the
network as well as their presence (and absence) in the different communities. The
computer programme moreover allows for a filtering of the results, and thus to
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Dalle Mulle, Wedekind, Depoorter, Sattich & Maltby
determine, whether the actors from the new EU Member States played a role among the
group of the most central stakeholders.
The statistics programme XLSTAT is used to calculate and visualise clusters of actors with
common policy ideas according to their placement in the system of categories. Using
Ward’s minimum variance method for a hierarchical agglomerative clustering (Euclidian
distance) the results show a dendrogram which visualises the various clusters. The
individual clusters thereby are the second indicator for the presence of an advocacy
coalition. Advocacy coalitions thus are expected, where communities in the network and
cluster overlap, that is to say, when the same actors are found in community and cluster.
2.7.
Results
The results at hand differ very much for the two cases: whereas the actors from the new
EU Member States did form an advocacy coalition in the case of the ETS (which also
includes a number of actors from the old EU Member States), this does not hold true for
RES policy; here the newcomers to the policy field played a negligible role. This
difference is striking, since the new EU Member States have been present in both
negotiations according to their demographic weight1 in the EU, that is to say, they started
negotiations from equal positions. However, only in the ETS case did the results of
network and cluster analysis overlap, allowing the inference that there was the presence
of an advocacy coalition, driven by actors from the new EU Member States. With regard to
the secondary aim of the research work, to determine what impact the enlargement had
on the policy-making output, the results also differ: consistent with the premises of the
Advocacy Coalition Framework there is no measurable impact on Directive 2009/28/EC
on renewable energy, yet the EU-12 were able to leave their mark on Directive
2009/29/EC on the ETS.
At this stage one can extrapolate some preliminary conclusions: the enlargement had an
effect on European politics as well as on European policy. In this regard it seems that the
EU gravitated towards more diversity. Yet given the case study selection, which singled
out two closely related and comparable examples of European politics/policy, the effect
is not evenly distributed over the different policy fields. Further research is required to
explain this disparity, yet with regard to the results at hand it can be assumed that the
impact of the enlargement is highly specific on the different policy fields. For detailed
results of the study please see http://newrospheres.wordpress.com/.
References
Börzel, Tanja. 2008. European Governance – Verhandlungen und Wettbewerb im Schatten
der Hierarchie. Politische Vierteljahresschrift Sonderheft 2008: 61-91.
Directive 2009/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 April 2009 on
the promotion of the use of energy from renewable sources and amending and
subsequently repealing Directives 2001/77/EC and 2003/30/EC OJ 140/16.
Directive 2009/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 April 2009
amending Directive 2003/87/EC as to improve and extend the greenhouse gas emission
allowance trading scheme of the Community OJ L140/63.
European
Union.
The
EU
motto.
http://www.europa.eu/about-eu/basicinformation/symbols/motto/index_en.htm. (Accessed 13 March 2013).
Hix, Simon. 2008. Towards a Partisan Theory of EU politics. Journal of European Public
Policy 15 (8): 1254-1265.
1
The “EU-12” account for 20 per cent of EU’s population, their weight in the policy-making
process should be accordingly.
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Hooghe, Liesbeth and Marks, Gary. 1999. The Making of a Polity. The Struggle Over
European Integration. In Continuity and Change in Contemporary Capitalism, edited by
Kitschelt, Herbert. et al., 70-98. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
March, James G. and Olsen, Johan P. 1998. The Institutional Dynamics of International
Political Orders. International Organization 52 (4): 943-969.
Marks, Gary. Hooghe, Liesbeth and Blank, Kermit. 1996. European Integration from the
1980s: State-Centric v. Multi-level Governance. Journal of Common Market Studies 34 (3):
341-377.
Nugent, Neill. 2004. The EU and the 10+2 Enlargement Round: Opportunities and
Challenges. In European Enlargement, edited by Nugent, Neill. 1-21. Basingstoke:
Palgrave Macmillan.
Pierson, Paul. 2004. Politics in Time: History, Institutions, and Social Analysis. Princeton:
Princeton University Press.
Risse, Thomas. 2004. Social Constructivism and European Integration. In European
Integration Theory, edited by Wiener, Antja. and Dietz, Thomas. 159-176.
Sabatier, Paul A. 1993. Advocacy-Koalitionen, Policy-Wandel und Policy-Lernen: Eine
Alternative zur Phasenheuristik. In Policy-Analyse. Kritik und Neuorientierung, edited by
Héritier, Adrienne. 116-148. Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag.
Sabatier, Paul A. 1998. The Advocacy Coalition Framework: Revisions and Relevance for
Europe. Journal of European Public Policy 5 (1): 98-130.
Sabatier, Paul A. and Weible, Christopher M. 2007. The Advocacy Coalition Framework.
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A. 189-220. Boulder: Perseus Running Press.
Wallace, Helen. 2007. Adapting to Enlargement of the European Union: Institutional
Practice since May 2004, Trans European Policy Studies Association TEPSA, 16 November
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doi:
http://www.tepsa.eu/download/publications/TEPSA%20%20Wallace%20Publication%20website.doc.
Wyplosz, Charles. 2005. Has Europe Lost its Heart?. Studies & Analyses 293/2005,
Warsaw, Center for Social and Economic Research.
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Dalle Mulle, Wedekind, Depoorter, Sattich & Maltby
Enlargement and EU Policy-making: How Newer Member States
can be, and are, Influential as Agenda-Setters and Steerers in EU
Energy Policy
TOMAS MALTBY
3.1.
Explaining Member State influence on EU policy-making: agendasetting and Europeanisation uploading: How influence is achieved
Early conceptions of Europeanisation tended to focus less on the opportunities to shape
EU policy that are conferred upon new members, and more on the impact of the EU on
domestic politics, policy and polity (Goetz and Hix, 2000; Buller and Gamble, 2002). Such
a conception assumes that ‘the imperatives, logic and norms of the EU become
intrinsically absorbed into domestic policy, to the extent that the distinction between
European and domestic policy requirements progressively ceases to exist’ (Featherstone,
1998: 24). However, as highlighted by Radaelli (2004: 190) a top down approach can be
problematic when restricted solely to a ‘logic in which the only aim is to find out the
domestic effects of independent variables defined at the EU level’. This necessarily
restricts scope to adaptation to, and implementation of, EU policy. Bulmer and Lequesne
(2002) commented that, ‘[t]he question of how successful a Member State is in
promoting or ‘uploading’ its policy preferences is one of the most relatively underresearched and under-theorised in the literature on EU governance’.
This article conceives of EU agenda setting and policy-making process as a holistic, bidirectional process, which takes account of the ‘second dimension’ of Europeanisation,
whereby Member States also seek to ‘externalise’ their national foreign policy positions
at the EU level, success of which results in ‘Europeanised’ policy’ (Tsardanidis and
Stavridis, 2005: 221-222; also Börzel, 2002). Once full membership is conferred upon a
state, opportunities are available to shape EU policy through uploading, or projecting
preferences, whilst simultaneously being shaped by EU-level pressures. The relationship
between structure and agency (and in this context between EU institutions and EU
Member State governments) conceived here is one that is mutually constitutive;
accounting for the potential reflexivity of the process. This framework allows for
consideration of the strategic behaviour of (newer) Member State actors, within the
constraints set by EU membership.
This research utilises a framework for evaluating both when, and how, EU Member States
can influence policy-making in the EU. Princen (2011: 930-931) pinpoints two challenges
for agenda-setters in the EU: 1) building credibility through capacity building and deriving
authority from this; and, 2) by gaining attention through mobilising supporters and
arousing interest (intensity and continuity of interest). Similarly, Copsey and Pamorksa
(2010: 309) assert that the influence capacity of Member States depends on relatively
fixed political power (size of a state's population and its economic weight), but also on
'variable' factors: ‘the intensity of its policy preference, its skill at coalition-building, its
administrative capacity, its persuasive advocacy, the receptiveness of other Member
States and its domestic political strength’. Also relevant is Kingdon’s work on (successful)
policy entrepreneurs, which posited three necessary criteria: 1) generating welldeveloped proposals supported by sustained advocacy; 2) consensus- and coalitionbuilding with other Member State and EU institutions; 3) taking advantage of policy
windows, which also requires policy coordination and administrative capacity (Kingdon,
2003: 204).
Uploading is then linked to five factors, which comprise the hypotheses tested in this
deductive research: motivation, expertise, coalition-building, learning how to act in the
EU policy-making environment and autonomy to act. The latter relates to energy
(in)dependence and diversification opportunities and trade relations with, in this case,
Russia.
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Europeanisation is conceptualised not as internalisation of rules and norms of behaviour,
but more as a compliance based on strategic calculation on the part of relevant Member
State actors both in Brussels and national capitals. This is assumed to occur through the
learning of appropriate norms, rules and strategies. Europeanisation then leads to
national decision-makers making decisions on a strategically calculated basis; altering
behaviour and strategies to take account of the context in which they are made, and the
accepted norms of appropriateness within environments, as Ladrech (1994: 17)
commented, ‘an incremental process reorienting the direction and shape of politics to
the degree that EC political and economic dynamics become part of the organisational
logic of national politics and policy-making’. It is hypothesised that ‘actor self- interest
effectively ‘maps on’ to ‘appropriate’ behaviour’, and varies over time and depending on
the issue (Goldmann, 2005: 43), rather than there being a clearly delineated distinction
between the logics of appropriateness and consequentiality (March and Olsen, 1998). It is
considered that strategies employed alter over time, but not necessarily values. Whilst
the latter shift posited by Sociological Institutional accounts, a transformation of values
and identity effected by Europeanisation, is not ruled out, it is largely precluded from this
analysis due to the difficulty of discerning between the two by the methodology
employed here, the examination of sources through triangulating explicit statements in
interviews2, policy documents and the interpretation of secondary sources.
3.2. Agenda and policy-making influence in energy policy; hypotheses
Since the Treaty establishing the European Coal and Steel Community, the structure (EU
institutions, rules, decision-making procedures, norms and informal ‘rules of the game’)
and agents (Member State actors) have been co-constituted. Even at the level of high
politics membership constrains autonomy by ensuring that strategic action of Member
State actors necessarily occurs within and is orientated towards the context of EU
membership, and at the same time impacts and affects the institutions (and other actors)
in which the interaction occurs (Hay, 2002: 127). The conception of Europeanisation
employed here is one which conceives of agents in line with Jessop’s strategic relational
approach, their ‘strategically calculating structural orientation’ occurs within ‘structurally
inscribed strategic selectivity’ (2001). Rules and informal norms can be contextually
dependent. The options of strategic actors are dependent upon a reflection on what
actions are considered to be appropriate in a particular context.
Here it is the extent to which, since their 2004 and 2007 enlargements, two newer
Member States (Poland and Bulgaria) have attempted to, and succeeded in, shaping
energy policy which is evaluated – selected as an example of a policy area that has been
high on the EU’s agenda in recent years, and has led to considerable decision, policy and
legislative outputs. In doing so through a bi-directional holistic Europeanisation lens, the
research allows for and tests (strategic), and norm advocacy and leadership (Björkdahl,
2008). It also considers the role of intersubjective understandings of energy security,
how these evolve, and how such perceptions can be affected by actors and events.
How newer, non-large, Member States can influence policy- and decision-making in the
EU:
• Utilising regional and strategic alliance-building;
• Diplomatic skill and learning over time of the ‘rules of the game’
(intensity of interest / government prioritisation);
• Relations with Russia as this factor can act to constrain or incentivise / an
active role in energy policy-making, depending on extent of energy
dependence and broader political and economic relations;
• Authority derived from demonstrable expertise, related to administrative
capacity;
2
Interviews conducted in Brussels, Warsaw and Sofia, with officials from the Commission,
national Ministries, energy attachés in Permanent Representatives, national energy companies,
academics, journalists and think tanks between 2010 and 2013.
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• Windows of opportunity for policy developments (the impact of supply
disruptions).
3.3. Poland as a newer member state agenda-setter: Assertive, and becoming
effective.
Polish influence has been significant. Successive governments have focused on energy
policy and EU-Russia relations. Since accession, Poland’s capacity to exert influence has
increased, determined by diplomatic learning resulting in a more consensus style of
negotiating, and the Polish government has increasingly adopted appropriate norms,
rules and strategies for the uploading of national preferences. The credibility of Polish
government energy policy proposals has been derived increasingly from demonstrable
expertise, and increased administrative capacity and a move towards a more ‘results
oriented not procedure orientated’ civil service culture. Through persuasive advocacy and
improved alliance-building (within the Visegrád Group) Polish governments have
capitalised on a policy window created by gas supply disruptions, that in turn affected
Member States receptiveness to Polish preferences.
Poland then had medium initial impact, then quite substantial within a few years of
accession. This was achieved through concentrating resources and diplomatic energy on
the issue, appealing to norms of ‘solidarity’, achieving EU recognition of importance of
regions in the Single Market, and achieving a ‘spirit of solidarity’ in energy relations in
the Lisbon Treaty. The Visegrád regional grouping has been useful for example
immediately prior to Council summits, as have bilateral coordination with Member States
such as Lithuania, and trilateral with France and Germany. In Poland, Russia has had a far
lesser constraining influence on policy-making, but has provided a focus of energy and
foreign policy efforts of the Polish government with regard to participating in EU policyand decision-making. The history of conflict with Russia and recent supply disruptions
have played into the Polish government’s objectives.
Capitalising on the context of two gas supply disruptions, the repeated appeal by Poland
for energy ‘solidarity’ mechanisms in regional groupings and in Council and Commission
interactions contributed to the inclusion of the energy chapter and ‘spirit of solidarity’ in
energy security reference in the Lisbon Treaty of June 2007, and subsequent EU policy
that has legislated for a limited communitarisation of energy policy.
3.4. Bulgaria: Passive, but becoming involved.
Political will to increase energy security in Bulgaria appeared to be lacking until 2009,
and since then characteristics of Bulgarian energy policy-making -weak administrative
capacity, weak regional coordination, and the influence of Russia- have been obstacles to
stated government policy of re-orientating away from dependence upon Russian energy
interests and towards a convergence with EU energy security objectives.
From 2009, a qualified shift of governmental perceptions of the energy security situation
(with a new coalition government), along with the pressures of EU membership led to a
rhetorical focus on diversification and the internal energy market. The disruptions also
contributed to a stronger EU energy policy and legislative response, greater (though far
from great) coherence and competence for the EU as an energy actor (Maltby, 2013). As a
consequence the EU is increasingly considered an alternative, or supplementary, energy
security guarantor, and EU accession and interaction between national and EU level actors
has begun to affect strategic calculations on realising national preferences. Yet the limits
of EU pressure were exposed by limited Bulgarian implementation of infrastructure
objectives or timely transposition of EU legislation until a change of government in 2009,
with a significant shift not apparent until 2012.
The Europeanisation of energy security policy in Bulgaria, and autonomy of the Bulgarian
government to act, has been inhibited by the historically derived economic and political
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Dalle Mulle, Wedekind, Depoorter, Sattich & Maltby
interests related to Bulgarian-Russian trade and energy imports. Preferences regarding
how to ensure national and energy security in Bulgaria have altered, but weak
administrative capacity has both undermined the capacity to transpose EU legislation,
and to develop and implement coherent energy policy that matches Europeanised
government objectives. There has been a distinct lack of focus on the regional level,
though the recent initiation of interconnection construction with neighbouring countries
demonstrates an improvement here. What remains is a lack of resources or inclination to
be involved at the EU level. The weakness of administrative capacity in Bulgaria has made
independent policy-making difficult, with strong influence from lobby groups. It has also
limited the ‘energy’ expended on coordinating policy responses and promoting the
Bulgarian government position (where known).
Overall Bulgaria has been a passive EU energy policy actor, with very limited
impact, which is increasing marginally, but the first 4-5 years of membership
were characterised by inertia, and unimplemented objectives.
3.5.
Conclusions
Figure 2) which strategies have Bulgaria and Poland used to influence energy policymaking? Table of preliminary results:
Strategies employed
The success of
Polish strategy
Medium
The
success
of
Bulgarian strategy
Low
Hypothesis 1 - Regional and strategic
alliance building
Hypothesis 2 – Diplomatic skill and Medium (even Low (improving)
learning over time of the ‘rules of the High)
game’ (Intensity of interest / government
prioritisation)
Hypothesis 3 – Relations with Russia Low
High
(constraining or enabling energy policymaking)
Hypothesis 4 – Authority derived from Medium to High Low
(Medium
demonstrable
expertise
related
to
potential)
administrative capacity
Hypothesis 5 – Windows of opportunity Low to medium
High
for policy developments (impact of supply
disruptions)
Source: Authors’ empirical research (methodology noted on page 2).
Pressure from the EU (Europeanisation) is mostly unilateral until the point at which
accession occurs. After this newer Member States are also able to participate in and
shape policy, though the capacity and inclination to do so varies between Member States
and across policy areas. For both the newer Member States examined, data gathered
through elite interviews and primary documentary evidence suggests it is clear that
administrative capacity has proven to be an important factor in accounting for activism
and policy/decision-making influence, though limitations can be overcome by focusing
limited resources on certain resources, and this is particularly applicable to smaller
Member States. Regional groupings can play a role in diplomatic learning, allowing an
awareness of other Member State preferences, and the development of common
positions and more convincing appeals for EU solidarity on energy issues. For Bulgaria at
least, the role of Russia and Russian interests in Bulgarian economics and politics has
constrained the development of an independent Bulgarian energy policy, one that would
otherwise likely be more in line with that of the European Commission.
3.6. Implications for future enlargement
Whilst the influence of Croatia and Iceland is likely to be negligible (though Iceland could
play a role in the formation of renewable energy policy – with its extensive geothermal
resources), Turkey would be a major energy actor with a key role as a transit state for gas
from Russia and the Caspian region that may facilitate strong regional group activity, and
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significant administrative capacity derived from its large size (it would be one of the
major EU Member States due to its population size).
References
Björkdahl, Annika. 2008. Norm advocacy: A small state strategy to influence the EU.
Journal of European Public Policy 15 (1): 135-154.
Börzel, Tanja. 2002. Member State Responses to Europeanization. Journal of Common
Market Studies 40 (2): 193-214.
Bulmer, Simon and Lequesne, Christian. 2002. New Perspectives on EU-Member State
Relationships. Centre d’etudes et de recherches internationales, 4 January 2002, doi:
http://www.ceri-sciences-po.org/publica/question/qdr4.pdf.
Copsey, Nathanial and Pomorska, Karolina. 2010. Poland's power and influence in the
European Union: The case of its eastern policy. Comparative European Politics 8: 304326.
Goetz, K.H. and Hix, Simon. (Eds.) 2000. Europeanised Politics? European Integration and
National Political Systems. London: Routledge.
Goldmann, Kjell. 2005. Appropriateness and Consequences: The Logic of Neoinstitutionalism. Governance 18 (1): 35–52.
Hay, Colin. 2002. Political Analysis: A critical introduction, Basingstoke: Palgrave.
Jessop, Bob. 2001. Institutional re(turns) and the strategic relational approach.
Environment and Planning 33: 1213-1235.
Kingdon, John. 1995. Agenda, Alternatives, and Public Policies, 2nd edition (Longman:
London).
Knill, Christoph and Lehmkuhl, Dirk. 2002. The national impact of European Union
regulatory policy: Three Europeanization mechanisms. European Journal of Political
Research 41: 255–280.
Ladrech, Robert. 1994. Europeanization of Domestic Politics and Institutions: The Case of
France. Journal of Common Market Studies 32 (1): 69-88.
March, James and Olsen, Johan. P. 1998. The Institutional Dynamics of International
Political Orders. International Organization 52 (4): 943-969.
Maltby, Tomas. 2013. European Union energy policy integration: A case of European
Commission policy entrepreneurship and increasing supranationalism. Energy Policy 55
(4): 435–444.
Princen, Sebastiaan. 2011. Agenda-setting strategies in EU policy processes. Journal of
European Public Policy 18 (7): 927-943.
Radaelli, Claudio. 2000. Whither Europeanization? Concept Stretching and Substantive
Change. European Integration Online Papers 4 (8): 1-25.
Radaelli, Claudio. 2004. Europeanisation: Solution or problem?. European Integration
online Papers 8 (16).
Tsardanidis, Charalambos and Stavridis, Stelios. 2005. The Europeanisation of Greek
Foreign Policy: A Critical Appraisal. Journal of European Integration 27 (2): 217-239.
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4
Dalle Mulle, Wedekind, Depoorter, Sattich & Maltby
The Impact of ‘Widening’ on the Substantive Lourdeur of EU
Decision-Making
INGE DEPOORTER
4.1.
Examining the impact of the EU enlargement on the quality of EU
legislation
The purpose here is to examine the impact of the fifth EU enlargement on what Krislov,
Ehlerman and Weiler (1986: 34) call the substantive lourdeur of EU decision-making. The
substantive lourdeur has a negative impact on the quality of legislation. This concept was
used to describe the decisional malaise after the Luxembourg Compromise (1966).
However, it is still relevant in the context of EU enlargement because sociological
theories on group size (e.g. Simmel, 1902) indicate that an increase of the group affects
the behaviour of the group, and, the outcome of what the group produces.
The conclusions of the research on the effects of the group size on group behaviour and
functioning are very uniform: the number of individual members in the group affects the
functioning and performance of the group. Small groups appear to be more efficient and
the members of small groups are more satisfied about their performance than the
members of the larger groups (Hackman and Vidmar, 1970: 43; Hare, 1952: 261 and
Olson, 1965). Larger groups have to deal more regularly with coordination problems,
conflicts among the members and they need more time to finalise their assigned task(s)
(Hackman and Vidmar, 1970: 49; Hare, 1952: 267 and Devine a.o., 2001: 670). In other
words, an increase in the number of members of a group has an impact on the efficiency
and quality of the group performance. Applying this to the recent EU enlargement, the
accession of new Member States would be expected to have a negative impact on the
quality of the adopted legislation.
Good legislation means that each legislative decision has to meet certain standards in
order to accomplish its functions. As such, the standards or requirements good
legislation has to meet, differs with the functions we assign to legislation. This article
examines the ability to produce clear and simple legislation, following the recent EU
enlargement.
Therefore, a number of technical standards and a number of other standards that are
also crucial to produce clear and simple legislation are selected (see table 1).3
Table 1: Quality of EU legislation standards
Quality category
1. Technical quality
Quality requirement
a. length/volume of the adopted decision
b. length of title
c. title reflects content of adopted decision
d. (comprehensible) external reference
e. no use of non-legal statements
2. Implementation and transposition
a. clear transposition deadlines for Directives
3. Consultation and due procedure
a. evidence based and duly motivated decisions
4. Subsidiarity and proportionality
a. necessity of Community action
b. informed and evidence-based decisionmaking
Source: Voermans, 2009 and European Communities, 2003
3
These standards are selected out of the literature on quality of legislation (e.g. Voermans,
2009 and Xanthaki, 2001) and EU documents on drafting good legislation (e.g. European
Communities, 2003).
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To examine the quality of legislation, a content-analysis should be conducted. Both a
quantitative and qualitative content analysis will be conducted because using both
research methods makes the research more complete (Holsti, 1969: 12). The main
purpose in using this research method is to examine trends and patterns in the material
under investigation.
4.2.
Case study: Transport
The research of Hagemann and De Clerck-Sachsse (2007) showed that some policy areas
were more affected by the accession of 10 new Member States than others in terms of
the amount of adopted legislation. One of these policy areas is the transport sector.
Therefore, and because transport was seen as an important element in the European
integration process (Greaves, 2000: 3), the transport sector is examined. Since the
research focuses on the recent EU enlargement, only the transport policy legislation
adopted by the European Parliament and the Council of the EU in the period 1999-2011
that was still in force at the time of the research (1/03/2012) is selected (see table 2).
Table 2: Research material for the quantitative content analysis
Adopted before
1/05/2004
Adopted after 1/05/2004
Regulations
17
4
Directives
17
11
Decisions
0
1
Total
34 (35%)
16 (16%)
Procedure started
Before 1/05/2004
After 1/05/2004
Regulations
19
Directives
27
Decisions
2
Total
Source: Eur-lex database, author’s calculations
48 (49%)
For the qualitative content analysis only three Directives and three regulations were
randomly selected across the three periods (see table 3).
Table 3: Research material for the qualitative content analysis
Period 1
Period 2
Period 3
Directive 2003/59/EC of 15 July 2003 on the initial qualification and
periodic training of drivers of certain road vehicles for the carriage of goods
or passengers, amending Council Regulation (EEC) No. 3820/85 and Council
Directive 91/439/EEC and repealing Council Directive 76.914.EEC
Regulation (EC) No. 847/2005 of 29 April 2004 on the negotiation and
implementation of air service agreements between Member States and third
countries
Directive 2006/22/EC of 15 March 2006 on minimum conditions for the
implementation of Council Regulation (EEC) No. 3820/85 and EEC No.
3821/85 concerning social legislation relating to road transport activities
and repealing Council Directive 88/599/EEC
Regulation (EC) No. 1370/2007 of 23 October 2007 on public passenger
transport services by rail and road and repealing Council Regulations (EEC)
Nos. 1191/69 and 1107/70
Directive 2011/82/EU of 25 October 2011 facilitating the cross-border
exchange of information on road safety related traffic offences
Regulation (EC) No. 391/2009 of 23 April 2009 on common rules and
standards for ship inspection and survey organisations
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Period 1: decision-making procedure started before 1/05/2004, decision was adopted
before 1/05/2004
Period 2: decision-making procedure started before 1/05/2004, decision was adopted
after 1/05/2004
Period 3: decision-making procedure started after 1/05/2004, decision was adopted after
1/05/2004
The legislative texts were examined on 4 quality requirements (the codebook for this
research can be found in annex A). Table 4 presents the average number for each of
these quality requirements.
Table 4: results of the quantitative content analysis
Average
Period 1
Period 2
Period 3
Regulations
7
10
10
Directives
7
5
7
Total
7
6
8
Regulations
7
10
6
Directives
7
30
17
Total
7
24
14
Regulations
14
20
15
Directives
13
36
24
Total
14
30
22
Regulations
13
10
16
Directives
14
11
11
Total
13
11
13
Regulations
4
11
7
Directives
6
9
9
Total
5
9
8
Regulations
2
6
5
Directives
3
5
6
Total
Source: Eur-lex database, author’s calculations
2
5
5
Number of pages decision
Number of pages annex
Number of pages total
Number of words
Number of external references
Number
of
references
precise
ext.
Period 1: decision-making procedure started before 1/05/2004, decision was adopted
before 1/05/2004
Period 2: decision-making procedure started before 1/05/2004, decision was adopted
after 1/05/2004
Period 3: decision-making procedure started after 1/05/2004, decision was adopted after
1/05/2004
The average number of pages of the decision does not show a trend in the quality of
legislation. However, the average number of pages of the annexes does tell something.
Comparing period 1 and period 3, table 4 shows that the average number of pages of the
annexes doubled. The research showed that this is mainly caused by an increase in the
number of pages of the annexes to the Directives, not to the regulations.4
4
The results of period 2 needs to be threated carefully because only 16 EU decision could be
included in the research material and there is one Directive with 252 pages of annexes.
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As a consequence, the same trend is seen for the average number of pages of the
decision and annexes taken together (total).
This should indicate that the decision-makers add more technical aspects to an EU
legislative text than before EU enlargement because the annexes should not contain new
rights and obligations.
Table 4 indicates that the average number of words of the title is more or less constant
in the period 1999-2011.
Table 4 shows that the average number of external references to other binding EU acts
did increase over the years. According to the literature on quality of legislation
(Voermans, 2009; Xanthaki, 2001) this means that the EU acts adopted after the
enlargement are less clear and less readable than the EU acts adopted before the
enlargement. The same trend is noticeable for the average number of comprehensible5
external references. This means that far from all external references in an EU act are
comprehensible, but there is no trend that the decision-makers add more references that
are not comprehensible. The average number of comprehensible external references
increased because more external references are included in the EU acts.
The analysis whether or not the Directives included in the research have clear
transposition deadlines showed that only a few had no clear transposition deadline or
that they exceeded two years.
The qualitative content analysis of the 6 EU legislative texts (see table 3) detected no
major problems regarding the title of the EU decision reflecting the content of the
legislative text. The subject matter and for whom the decision is of interest is clear.
Non-legal statements were not detected in the enacting terms. In the recitals of each
legislative texts under examination, at least one non-legal statement was found. Some of
them were expressed as desires. Others can be seen as political statements. However,
the analysis did not show that the decision-makers include more non-legal statements in
(the recitals of) the adopted legislation after the 2004 EU enlargement.
All of the examined legislative texts contain (a number of) reasons for adopting the
particular Directive or Regulation. In other words, the texts suggest that the decisionmakers agreed on the necessity to adopt the decision. The analysis did not detect any
shifts in the amount of reasons or in how motivated the adopted EU legislation is.
Lastly, in accordance with the quality requirement on subsidiarity and proportionality,
each of the examined EU texts made a clear statement regarding the subsidiarity and
proportionality principle and explained (briefly) why action is necessary on the level of
the EU.
4.3.
Conclusions and discussion
The EU enlargement only has had an impact on a few quality requirements with the
objective to produce clear and simple legislation. In other words, the 2004 EU
enlargement did not cause major problems among the decision-makers that could affect
the clarity and readability of the outcome of the decision-making process.
Another conclusion of this research is that there are still areas that need further
examination to capture all possible areas that can be influenced by the widening process
of the EU.
First, the research can be complemented with a content analysis on the quality of the
legislation adopted in other policy areas. Second, this research could not provide the
5
i.e. references made to other (legal) texts with a clear mentioning of the topic of the other
text. This makes it less necessary to examine the text to which the reference is made.
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elements that explain why the enlarged Union does not produce notable worse
legislation, in contrast with the hypothesis of the sociological theories on group size.
Third, other requirements capturing other functions of good legislation could present a
more thorough analysis of the impact of enlargement on the substantive lourdeur of EU
decision-making.
References
Devine, Dennis. 2001. Jury Decision Making. 45 Years of Empirical Research on
Deliberating Groups. Psychology, Public Policy and Law 7 (3): 622-727.
European Communities. 2003. Joint Practical Guide of the European Parliament, the
Council and the Commission for persons involved in the drafting of legislation within the
Community institutions. Luxembourg, Office for Official Publications of the European
Communities.
Greaves, Rosa. 2000. EC Transport Law. Harlow, Pearson.
Hackman, Richard J. and Vidmar, Neil. 1970. Effects of Size and Task Type on Group
Performance and Member Reactions. Sociometry 33 (1): 37-54.
Hagemann, Sara and De Clerck-Sachsse, Julia. 2007. ‘Old Rules, New Game. Decisionmaking in the Council of Ministers after the 2004 Enlargement’. CEPS Special Report
Hare, Paul A. 1952. A Study of Interaction and Consensus in Different Sized Groups.
American Sociological Review 17 (3): 261-267.
Holsti, Ole R. 1969. Content Analysis for the Social Sciences and Humanities. Reading,
Addison-Wesley.
Krislov, Samuel. Ehlerman, Claus-Dieter and Weiler, Joseph. 1986. The Political Organs
and the Decision-Making Process in the United States and the European Community. In:
Mauro Cappelletti, Monica Seccombe & Joseph Weiler (eds.) Methods, Tools and
Institutions. Political Organs, Integration Techniques and Judicial Process. Berlin, de
Gruyter.
Olson, Mancur. 1965. The Logic of Collective Action. Public Goods and the Theory of
Groups. Cambridge, Harvard University Press.
Simmel, Georg. 1902. The Number of Members as Determining the Sociological Form of
the Group. American Journal of Sociology 8 (1): 1-46.
Voermans, Wim. 2009. Concern about the quality of EU legislation: what kind of problem,
by what kind of standards?. Erasmus Law Review 2 (1): 59-95.
Xanthaki, Helen. 2001 The problem of quality in EU legislation: what on earth is really
wrong?. Common Market Law Review (38): 651-676.
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Annex A - Coding Unit
1. EU legislation in force (on 1/03/2012) and adopted in the period 1/01/199931/12/2011 and by the Eur-lex database filed under the Transport sector cover
the research material.
2. Only the EU legislative texts adopted by the ordinary legislative procedure (before
the Lisbon Treaty called the co-decision procedure) will be analysed.
Coding Directory
Variable
Name
Result
Explanation
1
# pages of decision
Number
i.e. the title,
enacting terms
2
# pages of annexes
Number
3
# pages of total
Number
i.e. variable 1 and 2
4
# words of the title
Number
Not the technical name (e.g. Directive
2003/59/EC) and not the reference(s) to
which EU decision(s) are amended or
repealed by the particular decision. Only
the words that (should) cover the
content/subject of the decision.
5
# external references
Number
Only in ‘enacting terms’; only references
to binding Community acts
6
#
comprehensible
external references
Number
Only in ‘enacting terms’; only references
to binding Community acts. According
to guideline 16 of the Joint Practical
Guideline
(European
Communities,
2003) for comprehensible references
7
Clear
deadline
Yes/no
Does not exceed 2 years (Inter
Institutional Agreement on betterlawmaking of 2003)
transposition
the
recitals
and
the
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Dalle Mulle, Wedekind, Depoorter, Sattich & Maltby
Forecasting the Implications of Turkish EU-Accession for Council
of Ministers’ Decision-making
GERBEN WEDEKIND
5.1.
Turkey: a contested EU candidate
Turkey’s EU-accession bid continues to stir debate among scholars and decision-makers.
The reason why Turkey’s EU-membership bid is contested bluntly lies in the fact that the
country is ‘[…] large, poor and Muslim. These three factors turn Turkey’s accession to the
EU into a major challenge, raising anxieties and resistance in many parts of Europe’
(Independent Commission on Turkey, 2004: 23).
Already in 2002 then Bundestag member Mattias Wissman feared that Turkey’s size
would render the EU ungovernable:
‘We have nothing against Turkey but we are of the opinion that the Union is at risk
of breaking if one stretches it too far. When one makes it so big that it is no longer
governable, can no longer be efficient. Turkey would soon be the largest country in
the Union and would completely change the architecture of the EU’ (Pahre and
Ucuray, 2006: 3).
Few studies (e.g. Baldwin and Widgren; Wedekind, 2011) actually assess the implications
of Turkish membership for decision-making practices in the EU. Since Turkey’s significant
population (and growth rates) could indeed alter EU decision-making in case of
membership, it is however an aspect which should not be overlooked when assessing the
country’s membership bid.
In 2011, Turkey’s population was 74 million, with an estimated annual growth rate of
1.2% (World Bank, 2013). If Turkey would enter the EU today, it would follow Germany as
its largest member. However, since Turkey is a candidate ‘whose accession could have
substantial financial consequences’, its accession can only be concluded after 2014,
when the EU’s next multi-annual programme enters into force. Conveniently ignoring
increasing scepticism on Turkey’s accession prospects and the slow pace of accession
negotiations, it was expected that Turkey ‘[...] will join the EU in a decade or so [...]’, thus
around 2020 (BBC, 2010).
It can be expected that by 2020, the EU will have expanded its membership-base. Besides
Croatia becoming the 28th EU Member State as of July 2013, Turkey, Iceland and
Montenegro are currently in the process of negotiating membership to the Union,
whereas Serbia, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM), Albania, BosniaHerzegovina and Kosovo have submitted a membership request or might do so in the
near future.
Besides an increase of the n beyond 28, the EU’s demography will change. On the one
hand, a large part of the ‘old’ EU members will experience the adverse effects of an
ageing population, while for instance Turkey’s populace will continue to grow during the
coming years and by 2020 it is expected that Turkey will match Germany in terms of
population.
Regarding decision-making processes, the 2009 Lisbon Treaty ascribes great importance
to the number of Member States as well and their demographic size. Only when certain
thresholds are met, can decision-making effectively take place in the Council of Ministers
- the EU’s main decision-making body.56
65
Lewis (2004: 149) states that ‘The Council is very much at the centre of EU decision-making
and plays a pivotal role in the making of European policy’. Although the Commission and the
EP have alike functions, their respective powers ‘[…] are not comparable to those of the
Council.’
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Dalle Mulle, Wedekind, Depoorter, Sattich & Maltby
In principle and as of 2014, proposals falling within exclusive competence areas - where
Qualified Majority Voting (QMV) applies - can be adopted by the Council of Ministers,
when:
1) at least 55% of the Member States votes in favour of the proposal, and;
2) these Member States comprise at least 65% of the EU’s population (Treaty on
European union, 2010: 24).67
Logically, it follows that change in the number of Member States and demographic size
will significantly influence decision-making dynamics and effectiveness.
5.2.
Determinants of decision-making: effectiveness and power
Turkey’s EU-membership can influence decision-making within the Council of Ministers in
two ways. First, it can influence the ‘effectiveness’ of Council decision-making.
‘Effectiveness’ within the Council - or its capacity to act - is captured by ‘passage
probability’, which is ‘[…] the likelihood that a random proposal would attract a winning
coalition, assuming that all coalitions are equally likely’ (Baldwin and Widgrén, 2005:
332).78 Specifically, it is the number of all possible winning coalitions divided by the
number of all possible coalitions’ (Baldwin and Wyplosz, 2009: 123).89 In the case of EU
decision-making, it means that only those Council of Ministers’ coalitions adhering to the
Lisbon Treaty’s provisions on QMV-voting would lead to a ‘win’. Logically, it follows that
changes in voting thresholds or in conditions relevant to the thresholds - such as Turkish
EU-accession - can influence the EU’s capacity to act.
Second, if the EU expands, its internal dynamics will most probably change. Baldwin and
Widgrén (2005) regard these changes in voting dynamics primarily in terms of 'power'
which is ‘[…] an actor’s marginal contribution to the equilibrium outcome, i.e. how big
the outcome shift would result from an actor’s marginal preference shift’ (Widgrén, 2008:
2). Power is measured through the Shapley-Shubik-Index (SSI) which gauges the likeliness
that a nation ‘finds itself in a position to ‘break’ a winning coalition on a randomly
selected issue’ (Baldwin and Widgrén, 2005: 332; Wedekind, 2011).
5.3.
The influence of Turkish EU-membership on passage probability
within the Council
In order to determine Turkey’s potential impact on the Council’s decision-making
process, one should ‘crystal gaze’ the future composition of the EU. However, as
exemplified by similar studies’ erroneous findings (Baldwin and Widgren, 2005;
Wedekind, 2011), forecasting is prone to errors. By taking into account various possible
scenarios however, the probability of incorrect forecasts decreases.
If Turkey becomes an EU Member, the Union will count more than 28 Member States.
Therefore, a number of different yet likely scenarios, or EU-compositions, can be
identified:
7 6
However, the TEU (2010: 322) indicates that the introduction of the Lisbon Treaty’s voting
thresholds can be postponed until 2017.
8 7
In games where only ‘yes’ or ‘no’ decisions can be taken, the total amount of coalitions is
2ⁿ, where n is the number of actors participating in the vote (Ade, 2005: 6). Subsequently,
index A is calculated by dividing the number of winning coalitions W by 2ⁿ. Thus passage
probability is captured by the formula A = W/(2ⁿ) (Holler and Owen, 2001: 300). Thus, in the
case of the EU-27 the total number of coalitions is thus 2²⁷= 134. 217.728.
9 8
This analysis uses Bräuninger and König’s (2001) Indices of Power 2.0 in order to calculate
passage probability and power indices.
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•
•
•
•
Dalle Mulle, Wedekind, Depoorter, Sattich & Maltby
EU-29: including Turkey as the only ‘new’ Member alongside the EU-28;
EU-31: including the countries currently negotiating EU Membership, i.e. Turkey,
Iceland and Montenegro;
EU-33: including all Candidate Countries, i.e. Turkey, Iceland, Montenegro,
FYROM, Serbia;
EU-35: including all Accession Countries, i.e. Turkey, Iceland, Montenegro,
FYROM, Serbia, Albania and Bosnia-Herzegovina.917
By contrasting these scenarios with similar ones although excluding Turkey (i.e.
comparing a EU-29 with the EU-28, EU-31 versus EU-30; EU-33 with EU-32 and EU-35 with
EU-34), one is subsequently able to find the intrinsic influence of Turkey on Council
decision-making processes.
Figure 1 outlines the passage probability in an enlarged EU inclusive of Turkey in 2020.
As a reference-point, the current decision-making efficiency is given (2.7%). Hence it
appears that the replacement of the Nice Treaty’s triple majority scheme with the double
majority scheme of the Lisbon Treaty would greatly increase decision-making efficiency
(i.e. to 11.3%).10 10
In an EU-29, passage probability would be 12.3%, thus marking a 1 percentage point
increase from the EU-28. Subsequent scenarios however would see a slight decrease in
effectiveness as passage probability would reduce to 9.6%, 9.5% and 9.4 for the
respective EU-31, EU-33 and EU-35 scenarios.
When abovementioned figures are compared with the plots of Figure 2 – which depicts
similar scenarios, yet excluding Turkey as an EU-member – it appears that Turkish EUmembership would generally lead to a marginal decrease in Council decision-making
efficiency. Only if the EU-28 would expand with Turkey passage probability would slightly
increase. In the remaining comparisons (i.e. EU-31 versus EU-30; EU-33/EU-32, and; EU35/EU-34) Turkey’s EU-membership would decrease Council passage probability with
respectively 1.5, 1.4 and 1.3 percentage points.
Figure 1: Overview Passage Probability in an Enlarged EU including Turkey (2020)
15
10
5
0
EU-28
Nice Treaty: 2013
2,7
Lisbon Treaty: 2020
11,3
EU-29
EU-31
EU-33
EU-35
12,3
9,6
9,5
9,4
10
9
In this study Kosovo is omitted because the United Nations (2011) - the principal source of
this study’s demographic data - does not possess demographic predictions for this country.
10
Although one needs to be careful as this Figure compares 2013 and 2020 data. `
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Dalle Mulle, Wedekind, Depoorter, Sattich & Maltby
Figure 2: Overview of Passage Probability in an Enlarged EU excluding Turkey
(2020)
15
10
5
0
EU-28
Nice Treaty: 2013
2,7
Lisbon Treaty: 2020
11,3
5.4.
EU-30
EU-32
EU-34
11,1
10,9
10,7
The influence of Turkish EU-membership on the power distribution
within the Council
Generally, it appears that Turkish EU-membership has limited negative effects on the
efficiency in an enlarged Council of Ministers. However, how would possible Turkish EU
membership affect its power distribution?
Figure 3 and Figure 4 depict the power distribution within an enlarged EU - including and
excluding Turkey. At a glance, both figures appear to be very similar. The Lisbon Treaty’s
voting provisions greatly decrease the collective power of the small1111and medium1212EU
Member States (i.e. -17.0% and -23.9%), whereas the largest Member States in contrast
would see their power values surge (e.g. 63.6% for Germany). The medium EU-members
collectively would remain the most powerful in the plotted enlargement scenarios
whereas Germany would remain the most powerful Member State, closely followed by
Turkey (in case of scenarios in Figure 3). Moreover, enlargement would generally result in
decreasing power values: as the EU’s membership-base expands, power needs to be
shared among more members thus logically leading to declining power values.
Figure 5 clearly shows the negative implications of Turkish EU-membership for other EU
Member States’ power values. Each Member State - or grouping – would see its power
decrease if Turkey would become a Member. However, the intensity of these implications
varies across enlargement scenarios and differs among Member States.
Figure 3: Power distribuBon in an Enlarged EU including Turkey (2020)
0,35
EU-27 Small
0,3
EU-27 Medium
0,25
Poland
Spain
0,2
France
0,15
Germany
0,1
Italy
0,05
United Kingdom
Enlargement
0
EU‐28 Nice EU‐28 Lisbon
2013
2020
EU‐29
EU‐31
EU‐33
EU‐35
Turkey
11 11
i.e. EU Member States having less than 8 votes in the Council of Ministers: Croatia, Cyprus,
Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Ireland, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta and Slovakia and
Slovenia.
12 12
i.e. EU Member States having between 10 and 14 in the Council: Austria, Belgium,
Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Greece, Hungary, Netherlands, Portugal, Romania and Sweden.
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For instance, whereas small Member States would see their power decrease greatly if the
EU-28 would expand with Turkey (-22%), this would not be the case for expansion to a
EU-31 (-1.0%), EU-33 (-1.7%) and EU-35 (-2.0%). A somewhat similar trend is visible for the
medium EU-Member States which would see their power decrease with respectively 16.7% (EU-29 versus 28), -12.4% (EU-31/30), -11.8% (EU-33/32) and 12.2% (EU-35/34) in
case of Turkish EU-membership.
Overall, it appears that in EU-constellations exceeding 30 Members, the large Member
States would endure greater power losses following Turkish Membership. If the EU-28
would expand with Turkey, Germany would lose 11.5% of its power, ranking it behind the
small and medium Member States in terms of losses. However, if Turkey would join a EU30, EU-32 or EU-34, Germany would endure the largest power losses, respectively, 17.3%,
16.9% and 16.7%. A similar pattern can be discerned for the other large Member States.
Figure 4: Power distribution in an Enlarged EU excluding Turkey (2020)
0,35
0,3
0,25
EU-27 Small
EU-27 Medium
Poland
Spain
France
Germany
Italy
United Kingdom
Enlargement
0,2
0,15
0,1
0,05
0
EU-28 Nice
2013
EU-28 Lisbon
2020
EU-30
EU-32
EU-34
Figure 5: Difference in power distribution in an Enlarged EU including and excluding
Turkey in 2020 (%)
70%
60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%
-10%
EU-28 Nice/
EU-28 Lisbon
EU-29/ EU-28
EU-31/ EU-30
EU-33/ EU-32
EU-35/EU-34
-20%
-30%
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IES Working Paper 3/2013
5.5.
Dalle Mulle, Wedekind, Depoorter, Sattich & Maltby
Conclusion
So will Turkey’s EU-membership render the Union ungovernable? This analysis has shown
that – at least quantitatively - Turkey’s inclusion would not significantly decrease Council
decision-making efficiency.
In this regard, possible Turkish EU-membership would only marginally influence Council
decision-making effectiveness. Negative differences between scenarios including and
excluding Turkey are limited and are increasingly so as the number of candidate
countries entering the EU alongside Turkey grows. Instead, the analysis showed that
changes in voting regimes (i.e. from the Nice Treaty’s triple majority to double majority
provisions of the Lisbon Treaty) appear to affect decision-making efficiency more
profoundly than expansion of the EU’s membership-base.
Turkish EU membership does however deeply impact the power distribution within the
Council. In case of membership in 2020, Turkey would be the second largest EU member
after Germany. All EU members would experience power losses as a result of Turkish
membership, although the intensity would differ among Member States and enlargement
scenarios. Small and medium-sized Member States would lose significant influence if the
EU would expand to a EU-29 and EU-31. Large Member States then again would see their
power decrease significantly if the EU would expand beyond 30 and with Turkey. In this
case, Germany – although remaining the most powerful EU Member– would experience
the most significant losses. This aspect could explain the resistance some of the Member
States have towards Turkish EU-membership.
Obviously, this study is subjected to limitations as it ignores EU institutions other than
the Council and disregards policy preferences. Moreover, the Council generally takes
decisions by consensus instead of QMV (Hayes-Renshaw et al., 2006: 162-163).
Moreover, the research uses the Shapley-Shubik Index which is not a flawless instrument
(see Paterson, 2005). Nevertheless, this analysis shows that Turkish EU-accession is not a
black and white case, something which should be noted by policy-makers and politicians
when assessing its Turkish bid.
Bibliography
Ade, Florian. 2005. Decision Making in Europe: Were Spain and Poland Right to Stop the
Constitution in December 2003?. Paper presented at the 9th Biennial Conference of the
European Union Studies Association, Austin, 31-March- 2 April 2005.
Baldwin, Richard and Widgrén, Mika. 2003. Decision-making and the Constitutional
Treaty: will the IGC Discard Giscard?. Policy Briefing 37. Brussels: Centre for European
Studies.
Baldwin, Richard and Widgrén, Mika. 2005. The Impact of Turkey's Membership on EU
Voting. In Turkey: economic reform & accession to the European Union, edited by
Hoekman, Bernard M. and Toğan, Sübidey. 333-441. Washington: World Bank.
Baldwin, Richard and Wyplosz, Charles. 2009. The economics of European integration.
Maidenhead: McGraw-Hill Education.
Bräuninger, Thomas and König, Thomas. 2001. Indices of Power IOP 2.0 (computer
programme). Konstanz: University of Konstanz.
British Broadcasting Cooperation (BBC). 2002. Turkey attacks EU 'double-standards'. BBC,
December 9. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/2558707.stm. (Accessed 5 April 2010).
Hayes-Renshaw, Fiona. van Aken, Wim and Wallace, Helen. 2006. When and Why the EU
Council of Ministers Votes Explicitly. Journal of Common Market Studies 44 (1): 161-194
Holler, Manfred Joseph and Owen, Guillermo. 2001. Power indices and coalition
formation. Dordrecht: Kluwers Academic Publishers Group.
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Independent Commission on Turkey. 2004. Turkey in Europe: more than a promise?
http://www.independentcommissiononturkey.org/pdfs/2004_english.pdf. (Accessed 20
March 2010).
Lewis, Jeffrey. 2004. The Council of the European Union. In European Union Politics,
edited by Cini, Michelle. 148-165. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Pahre, Robert and Burcu Uçaray-Mangitli. 2006. The Myths of Turkish Influence in the
European Union. Journal of Common Market Studies. 47 (2). 357-384.
Paterson, Ian. 2005. A lesser Known Probalistic Approach to the Shapley-Shubik Index
and Useful Related Voting Measures. Paper presented at the European Public Choice
Society Annual Conference, Durham, 31 March -3 April 2005.
Treaty on the European Union (TEU). 2010. Official Journal of the European Union. C83,
Volume 53 (March 30 2010).
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Wedekind, Gerben Kristian. 2011. The relief of Vienna in Vain: Assessing the Implications
of Turkish EU-membership for Council of Ministers’ Decision-making. Working Paper 1.
Brussels: Institute for European Studies.
Widgrén, Mika. 2008. The Impact of Council’s Internal Decision-Making Rules on the
Future EU Working Paper No. 2195. Munich: CESifo.
World Bank. 2013. Turkey Data. http://data.worldbank.org/country/turkey. (Accessed 17
February 2013).
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Enlargement from Within? Secession and EU Membership
EMMANUEL DALLE MULLE
Recent events in Scotland and Catalonia have temporarily shifted the attention of the
European public and policy-makers interested in the future membership of the EU from
East to West. The success of secessionist parties in Scotland and Catalonia, along with
their pledge to hold referenda on self-determination, has broached in the political arena
the question of their status within the EU upon independence.
As seen in the previous sections, despite sceptical forecasts on the part of scholars and
politicians, enlargement has not per se encumbered the EU policy-making process. New
Member States have rather found their own way within existing networks or created their
own ones and played a constructive role in Brussels. This suggests that the possible
accession of Scotland and Catalonia to the EU as independent countries should not a
priori have a negative impact on the workings of the Union, all the more so as the two
regions have been within the Union for more than 20 years already.
This last section therefore focuses on rather different questions, that is, would an
independent Scotland/Catalonia be automatically expelled from the Union or would it
remain as a member? If the regions have to re-apply, what procedure will be followed?
Answering to these questions is of the primary importance since the parties that are
currently pushing for independence have based their own campaigns on the slogan
"Independence in Europe", which takes for granted the regions' automatic membership of
the EU upon independence. But is this true? The answer is likely to have an impact on the
success of their bid for self-determination and, therefore, on the prospects for EU
enlargement "from within" as well.
6.1.
The Debate over Catalonia's and Scotland's EU Memberships
The cases for and against independence have been widely debated by the actors
involved. In Scotland, the Scottish National Party (SNP) has been campaigning for
independence in Europe since the late 1980s. Its major argument since has pointed to
the absence of precise rules about secession within the Union, which would urge the
Commission and the Council to flexibly accommodate similar situations within the
existing treaties - as shown by the precedent of Greenland departure (Sillars, 1989: 2934). The reasoning has been recently nuanced on account of the fact that Scottish
citizens have been members of the EU and the EEC for 40 years. As the SNP suggests,
depriving the Scots of their rights as European citizens as a result of their right to selfdetermination would contradict the EU's basic principles. Scotland would therefore
renegotiate its position within the Union (Maddox, 2012a). Similar arguments have been
used in Catalonia by Convergencia y Unio (CiU) and Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya
(ERC), the two parties leading the campaign for the independence referendum (Traynor,
2012; ERC, 2012). Yet, Artur Mas has framed the region's right to leave Spain on a wider
reform of the EU into a federal state with Catalonia as a federated entity, which would
obviously entail automatic membership (Mas, 2012).
While the arguments made by the parties involved have been quite similar, the reactions
of the respective governments have been opposed. Despite arguing that Scotland should
have to re-apply upon independence, and that the process would be long and uncertain
(Maddox, 2012b; Thorp and Thompson, 2011; Secretary of State for Scotland, 2013), the
United Kingdom (UK) government has granted the Scottish Parliament the powers to hold
a referendum in 2014 and has never suggested it would veto a Scottish EU application.
The Spanish government, on the other hand, has vocally and consistently denied the
legality of any referendum (Moffet, 2012; Diez, 2012; El Periodico, 2012).
Finally, the European Commission has remained rather silent on the issue, and this is in
line with its tendency to avoid stating ‘its views on matters which, as things stand, are
purely hypothetical’ (European Commission, 2007). However, recent comments of some
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EU representatives seem to confirm that secessionist regions will most likely have to reapply, although there probably will be room for flexibility in choosing the precise
procedure. According to some, for instance, Catalonia and Scotland could retain a kind of
passive membership during the application process, thus minimising the disruption
generated by secession (Fontanella-Khan et al., 2012).
6.2.
Some Legal Considerations
In assessing the arguments made by the SNP, CiU and ERC, the question whether
Scotland's and Catalonia's independence would be cases of secession or something else
needs to be answered. This entails two dimensions: the domestic and international.
Most elements suggest that both will be considered seceding states. Concerning
Catalonia, from a domestic law perspective, there is not much of an alternative. The
Spanish constitution asserts ‘the indissoluble unity of the Spanish nation, the common
and indivisible homeland of all Spaniards’ (Cortes Generales, 1978: art. 2) and attributes
sovereignty to the Spanish people. The fact that the Catalans call themselves a nation has
no legal right (Delledonne, 2011: 8). As far as Scotland is concerned, the situation is a
little more complex. The SNP has suggested that Scotland's independence would entail
the dissolution of the UK - formed through the Acts of Union signed by the Kingdoms of
Scotland and England in 1707. Nevertheless, this is highly unlikely to happen, as the Irish
precedent shows.1313
As far as international law is concerned, it is useful to look at the practice of the United
Nations (UN) and to contrast it with the peculiar features of the EU. The UN was
confronted with many instances of state secession, including the breakup of IndiaPakistan, and the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the Federal Socialist Republic of
Yugoslavia (FSRY) and Czechoslovakia, which are the most similar to the Scottish and
Catalan cases. In the first two the UN accepted the claim to rightful succession made by
the state that exercised control over most of the territory, the population, the resources
and administrative apparatus of the previous state - i.e. India and Russia. In the third, the
UN turned down the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia's (FRY later Serbia and Montenegro)
claim of succession on account of the small coincidence between the FRY's and the
FSRY's territory, resources and population. Finally, the Czech Republic could probably
have made a reasonable demand for succession, but decided with the Slovak Republic to
re-apply on different terms (Scharf, 1995: 43-66).
Thus, the rump Spain and UK will, in all likelihood, be considered the rightful successor
states of Spain and the UK, as within their boundaries lie most of the territory,
population, resources and administration of the former state. Nevertheless the UN and
the EU work in very different ways and, in particular, accession to the UN does not
require any treaty revision. In the EU this would be, at least in principle, obligatory, in
order to adjust practical matters - such as the number of seats at the Parliament, the
number of weighted votes at the Council and so on - to the new membership. Some then
argue that secession from the EU is not possible without negotiation (MacCormick, 2000:
735; Schieren, 2000: 131-133).
A different legal perspective focusing on the moving treaty boundaries principle,
however, challenges such a view. Accordingly, treaties are personal and not territorial,
i.e., if a territory secedes from the Member State that signed the treaty, its clauses no
longer apply there. German reunification would be a case in point, as the European
treaties automatically extended to Eastern Germany without treaty revision as soon as the
Democratic Republic was absorbed by the Federal Republic (Happold, 2000: 32-33).14 14
Nevertheless, as Jacqué has pointed out, ‘treaty revision would have allowed the new
situation created by German unification to have been approached from an undisputable
legal basis’ (1991: 8). If this did not happen it is because, ‘for quite understandable
13 13
For more details on the secession of Ireland see Mair, 1978.
Happold also mentions a case of secession: Algeria. Upon its independence in 1962
nobody suggested it should remain within the EEC (Happold, 2000: 33). For a position against
Algeria being a precedent see (Schieren, 1995: 125).
14 14
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political reasons, Member States have preferred to do without treaty revision’ (Jacqué,
1991: 15).1515 Hence, the moving treaty boundaries principle was applied at the time, with
the tacit understanding of the other members, but there was nothing legally compelling
about that decision. It rather was the result of political expediency and the general
willingness to reduce the potential disruption generated by German reunification.
6.3.
Conclusion
Scotland and Catalonia will almost certainly have to re-apply for membership of the EU.
This seems the most logical conclusion stemming from the review of legal arguments for
and against automatic membership, as well as of the practice of the UN and the
peculiarities of the Union. However, the precise procedure that will be followed, as well
as the specific status that will be granted to the two regions during the process are still
open to question. Furthermore, two additional considerations should be borne in mind:
1) the specific features of the European Treaties seem to suggest that a minimum of
negotiations will be needed in order to settle the departure of the two regions; and, 2)
past practice has shown that the Union tends to act flexibly with a view to
accommodating the overriding interests of its members.
Three scenarios therefore seem likely. First, the two regions could be granted a kind of
passive membership while their application is under review. This could also be
accompanied by a substantial acceleration of the application process, although the
quickest procedure ever - Sweden - still took 4 years. Second, Scotland and Catalonia will
have to negotiate from outside the Union, with negative consequences for their economy
and the life of their citizens. Third, opposition to the process on the part of some
Member States could be so high as to urge the regions to apply for membership of the
European Fair Trade Association (EFTA) and the European Economic Area (EEA), a
scenario recently predicted by Scottish Cabinet Secretary for Culture and External Affairs,
Fiona Hyslop (Furby, 2011). This however would clearly be a setback, since it would entail
that lack of decision-making powers which the SNP, CiU and ERC have consistently
mentioned as one of the main reasons to seek independence.
It is difficult to foresee which scenario is the most likely. This will depend first on the
nature of the process leading up to secession and, then, on the configuration of interests
in Europe at the time of independence. Some have argued that a few European countries,
threatened with secessionist drives within their borders, might use the veto power on the
accession of new members bestowed upon them by article 49 of the Treaty on European
Union (James, 2008). This however does not seem underpinned by sufficient evidence. In
the wake of the joint UK-Scottish announcement that a referendum on independence will
be held by 2014, no European country has declared its willingness to use such a power.
Furthermore, the non-recognition of Kosovo's independence by five European
countries1616 is often mentioned as proof that the same will happen with Scotland and
Catalonia. Yet, the two examples are very different. The main reason why some countries
refuse to recognise Kosovo lies in the unilateral nature of Kosovo's independence. There
is no element to suggest that these countries will similarly oppose a process of
consensual secession (Ker-Lindsay, 2012).
Nevertheless, what some European countries, and Spain above all others,1717 will clearly
try to avoid is a precedent of automatic EU membership. This suggests that, as Scotland
appears set to concretely confront the question of European membership before
Catalonia, Madrid's flexibility will largely depend on the domestic situation in Spain.
Although it is certain that automatic membership will be ruled out, there are a number of
concessions that can be made or not during the application process, especially
15 15
Jacqué added that the decision not to change the treaties did not guarantee proper
representation to the population of the German Democratic Republic in the European
Parliament.
16 16
These countries are Spain, Romania, Greece, Cyprus and Slovakia.
17 17
In the debate on the Scottish independence referendum, Spain, along with Cyprus, has
been the only EU Member State that unambiguously declared its opposition to any simplified
procedure for Scottish accession (Peterkin 2012).
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Dalle Mulle, Wedekind, Depoorter, Sattich & Maltby
considering that, as a part of the UK, Scotland has so far benefitted from opt-out options
that will have to be re-discussed.
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7
Dalle Mulle, Wedekind, Depoorter, Sattich & Maltby
Conclusion
EMMANUEL DALLE MULLE, GERBEN WEDEKIND, INGE DEPOORTER, THOMAS SATTICH,
TOMAS MALTBY
At a time when the EU is going through what probably is the most serious crisis since its
foundation, enlargement still remains a lively force and a relevant topic of discussion in
the European political arena: with political frictions in Hungary, economic problems in
Cyprus and Slovenia, with Croatia formally becoming the 28th member of the EU on 1 July
2013, Turkey’s and Iceland’s accession still on the agenda, and several Western Balkan
states aspiring to membership, enlargement will soon come back into focus. Not only are
candidate countries from South-West Europe and Turkey pursuing their negotiations for
accession, but new unexpected members from within the Union itself might soon be
knocking at the door of the Brussels institutions. Looking back to the previous
enlargement rounds may help to draw some valuable lessons on how to successfully
process upcoming enlargements.
The case studies presented above point to a major general conclusion, that from the
observed variety of adaptation strategies pursued by the new Member States and results
obtained, it is difficult, if not impossible, to consider the members of the 2004/2007
enlargement rounds en bloc. This conclusion becomes apparent when looking at the
cases analysed in the energy sector, where administrative capacity –alongside with
Russian influence in the case of Bulgaria– has proven to be an important factor in
accounting for differences in activism and policy/decision-making influence. However,
this does not mean that generalisations are not possible, since Member States have
shown their capability to act collectively in order to shape policy, though the capacity and
inclination to do so largely varies. This variation is best illustrated by the European
energy and climate policy, where a group of actors from the new Member States
effectively formed an advocacy coalition in the case of ETS negotiations, but not in the
case of European policy on the promotion of renewable energy.
Nevertheless, a more general concern regarding the 2004-2007 enlargement impact
pertains not so much to the new members' capabilities to actively participate in and
influence policy-making, but rather to the possibility that the multiplication of actors
would paralyse the decision-making process. By looking at the outcome of decisionmaking, the third section of this paper argues that the enlargement did not have a
substantial negative impact on the quality of the EU legislation. Only a few criteria
showed a relative decline in the average standard of the post-enlargement legislation,
which runs counter to sociological theories of the size of groups on their functioning.
This conclusion is confirmed by the fourth section, which looks at the possible impact of
Turkey's accession on decision-making efficiency and dynamics in the EU’s Council of
Ministers. The analysis shows that - at least quantitatively - Turkey’s inclusion would not
significantly decrease Council decision-making efficiency. Indeed, negative differences
between scenarios including and excluding Turkey are limited, and increasingly so, as
the number of countries entering alongside Turkey grows. On the contrary, it is likely
that institutional mechanisms - such as changes in voting regimes and thresholds - affect
decision-making efficiency and dynamics more profoundly than the expansion of the EU’s
membership base.
Such an expansion, however, could also come in new and unexpected ways. That is, from
EU breakaway regions. Here the peculiarity of the accession process, along with the
absence of clear rules to guide it, have shifted the focus on the possible scenarios
concerning Catalonia's and Scotland's status relating to the EU upon independence,
rather than on their impact on policy-making. As suggested in this section, it is clear that
the independent states arising thereof will have to reapply for Union membership, but
the precise path to be followed will be largely influenced by political considerations.
Three scenarios seem likely: passive membership until the end of the application
process; temporary exclusion; and, in case of too high opposition, application for EFTA
membership. What is certain is that European countries threatened with minority issues
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will seek to avoid the setting of a precedent of automatic EU membership for a
secessionist region.
The findings in the sections above suggest that as regards the impact of enlargement
neither the gridlock nor the business as usual scenarios were realised. Therefore, the best
way to determine the impact of the accession of future candidate countries is to assess
each specific case in detail, without being distracted by theoretical considerations about
the optimal threshold beyond which decision-making would collapse.
39